

Organization of the Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement


The Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement (SWEIS) is divided into a Summary and two volumes.

The Summary provides an overview of material presented in the SWEIS, including background, purpose and need, alternatives, existing environment, and environmental impacts.

Volume I analyzes the three alternatives (including the No Action Alternative) as they relate to U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) missions assigned to Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico (SNL/NM): national security, energy resources, environmental quality, science and technology. Volume I contains 15 chapters. Chapter 1 provides introductory information on background, site missions, purpose and need, decisions to be made, related *National Environmental Policy Act* analyses, and public participation. Chapter 2 describes programs and facility operations at SNL/NM (including selected facilities). Chapter 3 describes the alternatives. Chapter 4 provides a discussion of the affected environment, and Chapter 5 presents an analysis of environmental consequences of each of the proposed alternatives. Chapter 6 describes potential cumulative effects (including effects from other DOE-funded operations and other activities on Kirtland Air Force Base). Chapter 7 contains applicable laws, regulations, and other requirements. Chapters 8 through 15 include references; a list of preparers; conflict of interest statements; list of agencies, organizations, and individuals who received copies of the Draft SWEIS; list of agencies and people contacted; glossary; notice of intent; and index.

Volume II contains appendixes of technical details in support of the environmental analyses presented in Volume I. These appendixes contain information on the following issues: material inventory, water quality analysis, cultural resources, air quality analysis, human health analysis, accidents analysis, transportation analysis, and waste generation.

The SWEIS Process



COVER SHEET

RESPONSIBLE AGENCY: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE)

COOPERATING AGENCY: U.S. AIR FORCE

TITLE: Draft Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement for Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico (DOE/EIS-0281)

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Abstract: The DOE proposes to continue operating the Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico (SNL/NM) located in central New Mexico. The DOE has identified and assessed three alternatives for the operation of SNL/NM: (1) No Action, (2) Expanded Operations, and (3) Reduced Operations. In the No Action Alternative, the DOE would continue the historical mission support activities SNL/NM has conducted at planned operational levels. In the Expanded Operations Alternative, the DOE would operate SNL/NM at the highest reasonable levels of activity currently foreseeable. Under the Reduced Operations Alternative, the DOE would operate SNL/NM at the minimum levels of activity necessary to maintain the capabilities to support the DOE mission in the near term. Under all of the alternatives, the affected environment is primarily within 50 miles (80 kilometers) of SNL/NM. Analyses indicate little difference in the environmental impacts among alternatives.

Public Comments: Comments on the Draft SWEIS may be submitted through the end of the 60-day comment period (expected to be June 15, 1999), which will commence with the publication of the Environmental Protection Agency's *Federal Register* Notice of Availability for this document. Comments may be submitted in writing, orally, or by electronic mail to the DOE at the addresses and phone number indicated above. Oral or written comments may also be submitted at public meetings to be held during the comment period on dates and locations to be announced in the *Federal Register* and via other public media shortly after issuance of the Draft SWEIS. Comments submitted will be considered in preparation of the Final SWEIS.

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Summary Acronyms, Abbreviations, and Units of Measure

ac	acre
BLM	Bureau of Land Management
CFR	<i>Code of Federal Regulations</i>
CWL	Chemical Waste Landfill
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
DU	depleted uranium
ER	Environmental Restoration (Project)
FR	<i>Federal Register</i>
ft ³	cubic feet
FY	fiscal year
gal	gallon
IRP	Installation Restoration Program
KAFB	Kirtland Air Force Base
kg	kilogram
kw	kilowatt
M	million
MEI	maximally exposed individual
mi	mile
mrem	millirem
mrem/yr	millirems per year
MWh	megawatt hour
NEPA	<i>National Environmental Policy Act</i>
NESHAP	<i>National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants</i>
NOI	Notice of Intent
OEL	occupational exposure limits
PCB	polychlorinated biphenyl
R&D	research & development
rem	Roentgen equivalent, man
SNL/NM	Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico
SWEIS	Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement
TA	technical area
TCP	traditional cultural property
U.S.C.	<i>United States Code</i>
USAF	U.S. Air Force
USFS	U.S. Forest Service

Note: Italics are used to denote formal names or titles of acts, published documents, or computer models.

Metric Conversion Chart					
TO CONVERT FROM U.S. CUSTOMARY INTO METRIC			TO CONVERT FROM METRIC INTO U.S. CUSTOMARY		
If you know	Multiply by	To get	If you know	Multiply by	To get
Length					
inches	2.540	centimeters	centimeters	0.3937	inches
feet	30.48	centimeters	centimeters	0.03281	feet
feet	0.3048	meters	meters	3.281	feet
yards	0.9144	meters	meters	1.094	yards
miles	1.609	kilometers	kilometers	0.6214	miles
Area					
square inches	6.452	square centimeters	square centimeters	0.1550	square inches
square feet	0.09290	square meters	square meters	10.76	square feet
square yards	0.8361	square meters	square meters	1.196	square yards
acres	0.4047	hectares	hectares	2.471	acres
square miles	2.590	square kilometers	square kilometers	0.3861	square miles
Volume					
fluid ounces	29.57	milliliters	milliliters	0.03381	fluid ounces
gallons	3.785	liters	liters	0.2642	gallons
cubic feet	0.02832	cubic meters	cubic meters	35.31	cubic feet
cubic yards	0.7646	cubic meters	cubic meters	1.308	cubic yards
Weight					
ounces	28.35	grams	grams	0.03527	ounces
pounds	0.4536	kilograms	kilograms	2.205	pounds
short tons	0.9072	metric tons	metric tons	1.102	short tons
Temperature					
Fahrenheit (°F)	subtract 32, then multiply by 5/9	Celsius (°C)	Celsius (°C)	multiply by 9/5, then add 32	Fahrenheit (°F)
kelvin (°k)	subtract 273.15	Celsius (°C)	kelvin (°k)	Multiply by 9/5, then add 306.15	Fahrenheit (°F)

Metric Prefixes			
PREFIX	EXPONENT CONVERTED TO WHOLE NUMBERS	PREFIX	EXPONENT CONVERTED TO WHOLE NUMBERS
atto-	$10^{-18} = 0.000,000,000,000,000,001$	deka-	$10^1 = 10$
femto-	$10^{-15} = 0.000,000,000,000,001$	hecto-	$10^2 = 100$
pico	$10^{-12} = 0.000,000,000,001$	kilo-	$10^3 = 1,000$
nano-	$10^{-9} = 0.000,000,001$	mega-	$10^6 = 1,000,000$
micro-	$10^{-6} = 0.000,001$	giga-	$10^9 = 1,000,000,000$
milli	$10^{-3} = 0.001$	tetra-	$10^{12} = 1,000,000,000,000$
centi	$10^{-2} = 0.01$	peta-	$10^{15} = 1,000,000,000,000,000$
deci-	$10^{-1} = 0.1$	exa-	$10^{18} = 1,000,000,000,000,000,000$
Note: $10^0 = 1$			

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SUMMARY

PURPOSE AND NEED

As directed by the President and Congress, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) provides stewardship and management of our country's nuclear weapons stockpile. In addition, the DOE has national security, energy resources, environmental quality, and science and technology mission lines, which it performs at a number of facilities across the United States (Table S-1). The DOE directs and funds Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico (SNL/NM) activities in support of its programs and missions (Figure S-1). In turn, SNL/NM's facilities and operations are designed to meet the requirements of the programs, projects, and activities assigned to the laboratory.

The DOE will need to continue to meet its responsibilities for national security, energy resources, environmental quality, and science and technology. These needs are met, in part, by national laboratories. The primary purpose for SNL/NM is to serve as a national resource for scientific, technical, and engineering expertise, with a special focus on national security. The DOE needs to continue to fulfill its responsibilities as mandated by statute, Presidential Decision Directive, and congressional authorization and appropriation. The DOE goal in meeting this need is to do so in a manner that protects human health and the environment. This Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement (SWEIS) evaluates the environmental impacts associated with alternative levels of operation at SNL/NM that will meet these responsibilities.

As part of the DOE's strategy for implementing the *National Environmental Policy Act* (NEPA) (42 United States Code [U.S.C.] §4321), the Department prepares a SWEIS to examine environmental impacts of operations at multi-program sites (10 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] §1021.330). In May 1977, the DOE (formerly Energy Research & Development Administration) prepared the *Environmental Impact Assessment, Sandia Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico* for the operation of SNL/NM. Since that time, site programs and activity levels have changed. Based on these changes and SNL/NM's status as a multi-program site, the DOE has performed a thorough environmental analysis of ongoing SNL/NM operations and proposed operations to 2008. This SWEIS is the result of that analysis.

SCOPING PROCESS

Figure S-2 shows a timeline for the preparation of the SNL/NM SWEIS. A public scoping period began after the publication of the Notice of Intent (NOI) on May 30, 1997 (62 Federal Register [FR] 29332), and continued until July 14, 1997. The NOI informed the public that the DOE intended to prepare a SWEIS on SNL/NM operations and invited other Federal agencies, Native American tribes, state and local governments, and the public to participate in the scoping process.

The DOE presented information on its SWEIS proposal at public scoping meetings on June 23, 1997, in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The public was invited to present oral and/or written comments at the meetings or by mail, facsimile, electronic mail, or telephone. Twenty-nine individuals and organizations submitted requests for information or presented oral or written comments. These comments covered a range of issues, including the following:

- impacts of SNL/NM operations on natural and cultural resources, including air, groundwater, surface water, biological and ecological resources, and Native American cultural and religious sites;
- SNL/NM mission, policy, management, and alternatives for future operations;
- methods to be used for analyzing impacts and impartiality of the SWEIS;
- socioeconomic impacts including those affecting minority, low-income, and Native American populations (environmental justice);
- cleanup of known contamination or waste discharge and compliance with environmental regulations;
- potential seismic effects;
- health and safety of onsite workers and the surrounding community;
- impacts from SNL/NM operations on land use;
- level of public involvement in SWEIS preparation; and
- relationship of SNL/NM operations to city and county transportation planning policies.


These comments were distributed to experts for each resource or issue area to ensure that they were considered during the preparation of the SWEIS.

Table S–1. DOE Mission Lines and DOE Office Mission Statements

DOE MISSION LINE	DOE OFFICE	MISSION STATEMENT
<i>National Security</i>	Defense Programs	To ensure the safety, reliability, and performance of nuclear weapons without underground testing
	Nonproliferation & National Security	To support DOE activities related to nonproliferation, nuclear safeguards and security, classification and declassification, and emergency management
	Fissile Materials Disposition	To reduce the global nuclear danger associated with inventories of surplus weapons usable fissile materials
<i>Energy Resources</i>	Nuclear Energy	To support the successful decontamination and decommissioning of nuclear reactor sites; certify next-generation nuclear power plants; ensure the availability of industrial and medical isotopes and radioisotope power systems for space exploration
	Fossil Energy	To enhance U.S. economic and energy security
	Energy Efficiency	To lead the nation to a stronger economy, a cleaner environment, and more secure future through development and deployment of sustainable energy technologies
<i>Environmental Quality</i>	Environmental Management	To develop a clear national cleanup strategy with a strong commitment to results that will gain the trust and confidence of Congress, the states, Native American tribes, and the public
	Civilian Radioactive Waste Management	To develop, construct, and operate a system for spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste disposal, including a permanent geologic repository, interim storage capability, and transportation system
	Environment, Safety, & Health	To protect the environment and the health and safety of workers at DOE facilities and the public
<i>Science & Technology</i>	Science & Technology	To manage and direct targeted basic research and focused, solution-oriented technology development
	Science	To improve and advance the science and technology foundations and effective use and management of DOE laboratories
	Basic Energy Science	To advance the scientific and technical knowledge and skills needed to develop and use new and existing energy resources in an economically viable and environmentally sound manner

Source: DOE 1997c

Figure S-1. DOE Funding of SNL/NM
The DOE's funding flows through various DOE offices to SNL/NM.






Figure S-2. Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement Preparation Timeline
SWEIS preparation will follow the typical NEPA timeline.

ALTERNATIVES

The DOE identified the following three alternatives that would meet its purpose and need, as well as support existing and potential future programs at SNL/NM: No Action, Expanded Operations, and Reduced Operations.

The NOI proposed that the SWEIS consider the No Action and Expanded Operations Alternatives. However, the DOE added the Reduced Operations Alternative to show a broader range of alternatives and respond to comments received from the public during the scoping process. These alternatives were chosen for analysis because they cover the range of potential operations at SNL/NM. The SWEIS analyzes the environmental impacts of activities associated with these three alternatives at SNL/NM over a 10-year period of operations from 1998 to 2008. The DOE has not selected a preferred alternative.

Alternatives Evaluated in the SNL/NM SWEIS

No Action Ongoing DOE and interagency programs and activities at SNL/NM would continue the status quo, that is, operating at planned levels as reflected in current DOE management plans. In some cases, these planned levels include increases over today's operating levels. This would also include any recent activities that have already been approved by DOE and have existing NEPA documentation.

Expanded Operations DOE and interagency programs and activities at SNL/NM would increase to the highest reasonable activity levels that could be supported by current facilities and the potential expansion and construction of new facilities for future actions specifically identified in the SWEIS.

Reduced Operations DOE and interagency programs and activities at SNL/NM would be reduced to the minimum level of operations needed to maintain SNL/NM facilities and equipment in an operational readiness mode.

SNL/NM FACILITIES

SNL/NM provides a diverse set of capabilities that support DOE's mission lines through various programs. The major consideration in deciding to analyze impacts by facility rather than by program was the complexity of the analysis. Any given program may use operations in more than one facility, and many facilities serve multiple programs. An analysis of environmental impacts requires knowledge of particular activities in a particular place over a known span of time in order to project the effect those activities will have on the surrounding environment. A presentation of impacts by program would require that impacts from operations at each facility be subdivided into the contribution from each program using the facility. The resulting impacts would then have to be reassembled by program. The complexity of analysis would greatly increase, and the clarity of the presentation would suffer. Therefore, the DOE chose to group the operations to be analyzed by facility.

To accomplish this objective, the DOE used the results of a detailed questionnaire distributed throughout SNL/NM to develop a database containing pertinent information about the approximately 670 buildings and outdoor test facilities where SNL/NM operations are conducted.

This database was then assessed and refined by qualitatively evaluating the types of operations performed, identifying those with the highest potential for environmental impacts or concerns, and then grouping them according to function and location.

Finally, a set of facilities was selected for detailed analysis. To be selected, a facility had to meet one or more of the following criteria:

- be known to have generated an important public concern;
- conduct operations that have the potential to affect the environment, safety, and health;
- be a critical element of one of SNL/NM's principal missions; and/or
- be anticipated to expand over the next 10 years, likely resulting in the need for additional NEPA documentation.

Based on these criteria, the DOE selected 10 facilities or facility groups for in-depth analysis.

- *Neutron Generator Facility*—Manufactures neutron generators, which provide a controlled source of neutrons.

- *Microelectronics Development Laboratory*—Performs research and development (R&D) and fabricates custom and radiation-hardened microelectronics.
- *Advanced Manufacturing Processes Laboratory*—Performs R&D of technologies, practices, and unique equipment and fabricates prototype hardware for advanced manufacturing processes.
- *Integrated Materials Research Laboratory*—Performs R&D of semiconducting and other specialized materials, including silicon processing and equipment development and materials synthesis, growth, processing, and diagnostics.
- *Explosive Components Facility*—Performs R&D and testing of explosives components, neutron generators, batteries, and explosives.
- *Physical testing and simulation facilities group*—Performs physical testing and simulation of a variety of natural and induced environments at four facilities consisting of numerous principal buildings and structures. These facilities include extensive environmental test facilities, such as sled tracks, centrifuges, and a radiant heat facility.
- *Accelerator facilities group*—Performs inertial-confinement fusion research and pulsed-power research at 10 facilities. The accelerators are also used to conduct research on inertial-confinement fusion and particle-beam weapons.
- *Reactor facilities group*—Performs R&D and testing at five experimental and engineering nuclear reactors and electron-beam accelerators in a highly secure, remote research area. Some of these facilities are being converted to production facilities for medical radioactive isotopes.
- *Outdoor test facilities group*—Conducts physics, explosives, and burn testing at five facilities located in remote areas of Kirtland Air Force Base (KAFB).
- *Selected infrastructure facilities group*—Supports steam generation, waste management, and waste disposal activities at four facilities.

The operations within these facilities or facility groups are the basis for differentiating among the three alternatives analyzed in the SWEIS and for any associated environmental impacts between alternatives.

Taken together, these facilities and facility groups represent the majority of exposure risks associated with continuing operations at SNL/NM. They represent

- over 99 percent of all radiation doses to SNL/NM personnel.

- over 99 percent of all radiation doses to the public.
- from 81 to 99 percent of stationary source criteria pollutants (nitrogen dioxide, carbon monoxide, particulate matter less than 10 microns in diameter [PM₁₀], sulfur dioxide), depending on the alternative. This does not include hazardous air pollutants or toxic air pollutants, which instead are analyzed on a facility-wide basis in the SWEIS. The remaining stationary source criteria pollutants would be associated with backup generators.
- all radioactive waste volumes, including medical isotopes production, Environmental Restoration (ER) Project wastes, and hazardous waste, which are accounted for in analyses of infrastructure, radiological air quality, transportation, and waste generation.

Some activities at SNL/NM are not likely to change regardless of which alternative the DOE selects for continued operations. Although included within the analysis of all alternatives, these activities were projected to remain at currently planned levels over the 10-year period analyzed. Examples of these activities are maintenance support, material management and operations, waste management and operations, natural resource management, environmental restoration, and science and engineering work at nonselected (balance of operations) facilities.

AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT


Location

SNL/NM is located on KAFB, approximately 7 mi southeast of downtown Albuquerque, New Mexico (Figure S-3). SNL/NM comprises approximately 8,800 ac of Federal land on KAFB. Albuquerque is in Bernalillo county, in north-central New Mexico, and is the state's largest city, with a population of approximately 420,000. The Sandia Mountains are immediately north and east of the city, with the Manzanita Mountains extending to the southeast. The Rio Grande runs southward through Albuquerque and is the primary river traversing central New Mexico. Nearby communities include Rio Rancho and Corrales to the northwest, the Pueblo of Sandia and town of Bernalillo to the north, and the Pueblo of Isleta and towns of Los Lunas and Belen to the south.

Land Use and Visual Resources

Areas Surrounding KAFB

Areas immediately surrounding KAFB on the north and northwest consist of single- and multi-family residential neighborhoods, mixed/minor commercial



Source: SNL/NM 1997j

Figure S-3. General Location of KAFB
KAFB is located southeast of the city of Albuquerque in Bernalillo county.

establishments, and light industrial/wholesale operations. The eastern boundary of KAFB almost entirely abuts Cibola National Forest. Some private land, scattered residential dwellings, and industrial operations are present northeast of KAFB. Single-family residences are present just beyond the national forest, approximately 1 mi east of the KAFB eastern boundary. The southern portion of KAFB borders a wide expanse of open rangeland owned by the Pueblo of Isleta. To the west, adjacent land consists of the Albuquerque International Sunport (the city's major airport), some city and county open space, and a large parcel of open space for an extensive future planned community known as Mesa del Sol. Under agreements with the Pueblo of Isleta and the state of New Mexico, two areas, encompassing over 9,000 ac adjacent to the southwestern boundary of KAFB, are designated as buffer zones for SNL/NM testing activities.

KAFB Land Ownership

KAFB land is owned primarily by the U.S. Air Force (USAF), DOE, Bureau of Land Management (BLM), and U.S. Forest Service (USFS). The USAF owns the majority of acreage comprising the western half of KAFB. The DOE also owns land in this area, which is occupied almost entirely by SNL/NM facilities. Some land owned by the BLM, also in the southwestern half, has been withdrawn from public access by the USAF. The eastern portion of KAFB, commonly referred to as the Withdrawn Area, consists of more than 20,480 ac of USFS land within the Cibola National Forest that has been withdrawn from public use by the USAF and the DOE in separate actions.

USAF Activities on KAFB

KAFB land occupied by the USAF is used for a wide variety of purposes, including equipment maintenance, research, munitions storage, residential housing, recreational facilities, medical activities, and administration. In addition, large areas of land on KAFB, particularly in the Withdrawn Area, do not support specific facilities or programs, but are used as safety zones for USAF training activities.

SNL/NM Activities on KAFB


SNL/NM facilities and activities are located primarily in five technical areas (TAs) (Figure S-4). TAs-I, -II, and -IV encompass approximately 645 ac. TAs-III and -V encompass approximately 1,900 ac.

- TA-I is located in the northeast part of KAFB. It is the most densely developed and populated of the TAs, with over 6,600 employees and 370 structures. The structures within TA-I consist of laboratories, shops, offices, warehouses, and other storage buildings used for administration, site support, technical support, basic research, defense programs, component development, microelectronics, energy programs, exploratory systems, technology transfer, and business outreach.
- TA-II is immediately south of TA-I. Like TA-I, the area is urbanized but less densely developed, with approximately 440 employees in over 30 structures that consist of several laboratories, limited office space, and numerous storage buildings.
- TA-III is approximately 5 mi south of TA-I in the southwest portion of KAFB. Approximately 224 people work in the area, which is composed of 20 test facilities devoted to large-scale physical testing and simulating a variety of natural and induced environments. Over 150 structures are located within TA-III, most of which are grouped in small units separated by extensive open spaces.
- TA-IV is immediately south of TA-II. TA-IV is urbanized but less densely developed than TA-I with 546 employees occupying about 70 structures. The area is primarily an R&D site for pulsed-power sciences and particle-beam fusion accelerators.
- TA-V is adjacent to the northeast corner of TA-III. TA-V consists of about 35 closely grouped structures where experimental and engineering nuclear reactors are located. Approximately 160 personnel work in the area.

In addition to the TAs, SNL/NM conducts activities in the Coyote Test Field (Figure S-4), a large undeveloped area on KAFB that contains a variety of remote testing sites and facilities. Approximately 173 structures consisting of laboratories, mobile offices, and storage areas are widely dispersed throughout the area.

Infrastructure

Infrastructure consists of buildings, services, maintenance, utilities, material storage, and transportation systems and corridors that support the operations of a facility. Specifically, SNL/NM's infrastructure consists of water, sanitary sewer, storm drain, steam, fossil fuels, chilled water, electrical transmission, electrical distribution, communications, roads, and parking that support the TAs and other DOE facilities at KAFB. From 28 to 36 percent of system



Source: SNL/NM 1997j

Figure S-4. Locations of SNL/NM Technical Areas
SNL/NM conducts most operations in five technical areas and the Coyote Test Field.

capacity was used to supply water, wastewater, electricity, and natural gas in 1996.

Geology and Soils

Seismic activity, slope stability, and soil contamination were evaluated in the geology and soils resource area. Albuquerque is in a region expected to experience moderate earthquakes that could result in damage to buildings. The largest magnitude earthquake in Albuquerque this century measured 4.7 on the Richter scale.

Most SNL/NM facilities are constructed on level ground or gentle slopes. Slope stability has not been an issue at SNL/NM facilities.

SNL/NM identified 182 locations of potential soil contamination at KAFB resulting from past activities. Of these, 122 have been proposed to the New Mexico Environment Department as requiring no further action because no contamination was found, contaminants were below risk- or regulatory-based criteria, or cleanup has been completed. Investigation or cleanup continues at the other sites.

Water Resources

Groundwater beneath KAFB is in the Albuquerque-Belen Basin aquifer, the sole source of drinking water for Albuquerque and surrounding communities. At SNL/NM TAs, depth to groundwater is 400 to 500 ft. Basinwide groundwater levels have been decreasing for more than 30 years, the result of groundwater withdrawal by municipal and private wells exceeding the rate of groundwater recharge. In 1996, SNL/NM used 440 million gal of water. Concentrations of contaminants above Federal drinking water standards have been detected in groundwater near several SNL/NM facilities. Of these contaminants, concentrations of trichloroethene (TCE) at one site are attributed to past SNL/NM waste disposal practices. This site is 4 mi from the nearest water supply well.

Surface water at KAFB is almost exclusively ephemeral, that is, present in onsite drainages only during periods of heavy rainfall in the summer “monsoon” season (July through September). Surface water flowing through KAFB could discharge to the Rio Grande, 6 mi downstream from the KAFB boundary.

Biological and Ecological Resources

At least 267 plant species and 195 animal species occur on KAFB. This diversity is due in part to the variety of habitats, which include cliff faces, caves, abandoned mines, and drainages, as well as the four major vegetation associations (grassland, woodland, riparian, and altered habitat). Only one Federally listed threatened or endangered species has been observed on KAFB. This was a single sighting of a Peregrine Falcon (Federally endangered), probably a migrant. Sixteen other animal and two plant species present or observed on KAFB are listed by the Federal government as species of concern or sensitive species, or by the state of New Mexico as threatened or sensitive.

Cultural Resources

Cultural resources at KAFB include prehistoric archaeological sites, which in the Albuquerque area date to before A.D. 1540 (the initiation of Spanish exploration of the area), historic archaeological sites (sites, buildings, and structures from A.D. 1540 to 1948). Within the boundaries of KAFB and DOE buffer zones are 284 recorded prehistoric and historic archaeological sites. No traditional cultural properties (TCPs) have been identified at KAFB.

Air Quality

Major sources of air emissions in the Albuquerque area are motor vehicles, wood burning stoves and fireplaces, and open burning. The SNL/NM steam plant, which provides heat to a large number of SNL/NM facilities, accounts for more than 90 percent of the total SNL/NM emission of pollutants from fixed facilities regulated by the *Clean Air Act*. All emissions are within permitted levels and result in concentrations of these pollutants that are below standards set to protect health with an ample margin of safety. Actual emissions are only a fraction of permitted levels. Hazardous chemical air emissions are small and are not required to be individually monitored. Vehicle carbon monoxide emissions are the dominant source of this pollutant from SNL/NM and are of concern because the Albuquerque/Bernalillo county area is a U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)-designated “maintenance” area for carbon monoxide. All other sources of carbon monoxide at SNL/NM are small, and the total carbon monoxide emissions are about 3 percent of the total carbon monoxide emissions in the county.

Currently, 16 SNL/NM facilities emit radionuclides. The maximum calculated total dose of radiation from

Exposure to Radiation

All people are constantly exposed to some form of radiation. This radiation can be from different sources: cosmic from space, medical from X-rays, internal from food, and external from rocks and soil (such as radon in homes). The "Roentgen equivalent, man" (rem) unit is a measurement of the dose from radiation and its physical effects and is used to predict the biological effects of radiation on the human body. Therefore, one rem of one type of radiation is presumed to have the same biological effects as one rem of any other type of radiation. This allows comparison of the biological effects of radiological materials that emit different types of radiation. A commonly used dose unit of measure is millirem (mrem), which is equal to 0.001 rem.

atmospheric emissions at all SNL/NM facilities to an individual is 0.007 mrem/yr, which is much lower than the regulatory limit of 10 mrem/yr. This dose is also small compared to an individual background radiation dose from all sources of 360 mrem/yr received by residents of the Albuquerque area.

Human Health and Worker Safety

SNL/NM has the potential of affecting human health from radiological or hazardous materials that could reach either workers or the public. Of the average background radiation dose of 360 mrem/yr, more than 80 percent is from natural sources such as radon. The major nonnatural source of radiation is medical testing, which accounts for 15 percent of the total dose. The maximum 1996 dose estimate from air emissions at SNL/NM facilities for an individual in a publicly accessible area is 0.007 mrem/yr, which is 0.002 percent of the background radiation dose. This dose is associated with an increased lifetime cancer risk of 1 in 285 million. The 1996 collective dose to the population within 50 mi is 0.14 person-rem. Based on current environmental monitoring data, radiation exposures would not be expected through media such as surface water, soil, groundwater, and natural vegetation.

Nonradiological chemical air pollutants are released from SNL/NM facilities that house chemistry laboratories or chemical operations. Concentrations of these pollutants are below safety levels established for workers in industrial areas and are known to diminish with increasing distance from the sources. Environmental

monitoring data indicate that the public is not in contact with chemical contamination through surface water, soil, or groundwater.

Workers in some SNL/NM facilities receive an additional dose of radiation, measured by personal radiation monitoring devices (dosimetry badges). The average annual collective radiation dose to the entire group of radiation workers is 12 person-rem per year, based on 1992 through 1996 data. This dose is associated with a latent cancer fatality risk to the radiation worker population of 1 in 200. At this risk level, no additional fatal cancers would be likely to occur within the radiation worker population.

SNL/NM's nonfatal injury/illness rate has ranged between 2.3 and 4.1 per 100 workers per year from 1992 through 1996. This is significantly less than national (7.4 to 8.9) or New Mexico (7.3 to 8.5) private industry rates. SNL/NM had no fatal occupational injuries from 1992 through 1996.

Transportation

Normal transportation activities can affect air quality and cause noise, vibration, and traffic congestion.

Transportation activities at SNL/NM involve the receipt, shipment, and transfer of hazardous and nonhazardous materials and waste. The most frequently received hazardous materials are chemicals. In 1997, SNL/NM received more than 25,000 chemical containers in approximately 2,800 shipments.

From 1994 through 1997, SNL/NM had 10 transportation-related incidents involving onsite transfer or offsite shipment or receipt of hazardous material. None resulted in the release of a hazardous cargo to the environment or exposure of the workforce or the public to hazardous materials.

Waste Generation

Waste generation activities consist of managing, storing, and preparing waste for offsite disposal in accordance with applicable Federal and state regulations, permits, and DOE Orders. Waste generated onsite under current operations include radioactive waste, hazardous waste, biohazardous (medical) waste, asbestos, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), nonhazardous solid waste, and process wastewater. Waste generated in 1996 included 25,600 ft³ of radioactive waste, 48,000 kg of hazardous waste, 52,000 kg of PCBs, and 77,000 kg of asbestos. Additional waste will be generated by the ER Project. Several waste transfer and storage facilities exist at

SNL/NM to handle this waste for onsite or offsite disposal.

Noise and Vibration

SNL/NM produces sounds from the detonation of explosives or sonic booms from sled track activities. The distance at which these so-called “impulse” sounds can be heard varies depending on the intensity of the initial blast, meteorological conditions, terrain, and background noise levels. These sounds are sometimes heard beyond the KAFB boundary. In 1996, SNL/NM produced 1,059 impulse noise events, only a small fraction of which were of sufficient magnitude to be heard beyond the KAFB boundary. Offsite damage from vibrations associated with these noise events would be unlikely.

Socioeconomics

SNL/NM is the fifth-largest private employer in New Mexico. For Fiscal Year (FY) 1997, the SNL/NM payroll in the local four-county region was \$417 million for 6,824 full-time personnel. During the same year, SNL/NM spent approximately \$309 million in procurements in the region. The total operating and capital budget for SNL/NM for FY 1996 was approximately \$1.4 billion, of which an estimated \$877 million was spent in central New Mexico.

Environmental Justice

Presidential Executive Order 12898, *Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations*, requires identifying and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of Federal programs, policies, and activities on minority and low-income populations. According to a 1990 report, *Poverty Thresholds*, from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, 49 percent of New Mexico’s population was minority, and 21 percent was listed as in poverty or designated as having low income. Areas with greater than the state average of minority population border KAFB to the northeast, west, and south. Areas with greater than the state average of low-income populations border KAFB to the west and south.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES

This section summarizes, by resource area, the environmental consequences of operating SNL/NM facilities according to the levels of activity specified in the

three alternatives. Table S–2 also provides a comparison of impacts across alternatives for each resource area. Table S–3 provides this comparison for accidents.

Land Use and Visual Resources

No adverse impacts to land resources are expected as a result of the No Action, Expanded Operations, or Reduced Operations Alternatives. The extent of DOE land and USAF-permitted acreage currently available for use by SNL/NM facilities on KAFB would remain approximately the same. Operations would remain consistent with industrial and research park uses and would have no foreseeable effects on established land use patterns or requirements. Buffer zones would continue to remain at their current size and location. New SNL/NM facilities, expansions, and upgrades would be limited and would not require changes to current land ownership or classification status because these activities would be planned in or near existing facilities, within already disturbed or developed areas, or on land already under DOE control. There would be no adverse impacts to visual resources that change the overall appearance of the existing landscape, obscure views, or alter the visibility of SNL/NM structures. New facilities, expansions, and upgrades would be planned in or near existing facilities in areas with common scenic quality. Efforts initiated by SNL/NM to incorporate a campus-style design would continue.

Infrastructure

Annual projected utility demands for all alternatives would be well within system capacities. Electrical consumption would range from 185,000 MWh (Reduced Operations Alternative) to 198,000 MWh. Projected water usage would range from 416 million gal to 495 million gal per year. Actual water usage probably would be lower because SNL/NM has implemented a conservation program to reduce usage by 30 percent by 2004. For comparison purposes, a conservation scenario is provided under the No Action Alternative. Other infrastructure-related factors, including maintenance, roads, communications, steam, natural gas, and facility decommissioning, would be similar for each alternative and would not be adversely affected by the projected levels of SNL/NM operations. The Expanded Operations Alternative considered a 10-percent margin, which shows that utility systems supporting SNL/NM maintain adequate capacities.

Geology and Soils

No activities planned for any of the alternatives would present a potential for slope destabilization. Slope instability has not been an issue in past SNL/NM operations and would likely not be a concern in the future. Existing soil contamination is being cleaned up through SNL/NM's ER Project, which is scheduled for completion by 2004. Under the Expanded Operations Alternative, there would be the potential for increased deposition of soil contaminants in outdoor testing areas. Potential contaminants would include depleted uranium (DU) fragments, explosive residue, and metals contained in weapons that are used in the tests. SNL/NM performs periodic sampling and radiation surveys in these testing areas. DU fragments are collected after tests. Potential contaminants have not been detected at concentrations above background at current testing levels. These areas are not accessible to the general public.

Water Resources and Hydrology

Groundwater contamination attributable to known SNL/NM activities is present at one site, the Chemical Waste Landfill (CWL) in TA-III. Investigation and cleanup planning are ongoing at this site, and any final plans must be approved by the New Mexico Environment Department. Under a no-cleanup scenario, the only contaminant exceeding EPA concentration limits in groundwater would be TCE, which occurs in a plume extending 410 ft from the CWL. This would not impact drinking water supplies because the nearest water supply well is approximately 4 mi from the CWL. Although the resulting impact is due to past waste management practices rather than current operations, it is considered to be adverse. Groundwater investigation would continue at several additional locations where the source of potential contamination has not been identified. Investigation and cleanup at locations with groundwater contamination would continue at the same rate under any of the three alternatives.

The estimated SNL/NM portion of local (in the immediate vicinity of KAFB) aquifer drawdown from 1998 to 2008 would range from 11 to 12 percent for all alternatives. Local drawdown would range from less than 1 to 28 ft across KAFB during this period. The impact resulting from SNL/NM's contribution to drawdown in the aquifer derives from both past and present water usage and is considered to be adverse. This drawdown would not have an immediate effect on other water users, spring flow, or land subsidence. Long-term effects would be greatly mitigated by the city of Albuquerque's

conversion to surface water use, scheduled to begin in 2004. Water demand under each alternative would be within existing KAFB water rights.

Potential sources of surface water contamination at SNL/NM would be storm water runoff from ER Project sites (including active testing areas) and runoff from developed areas. However, no contaminants attributable to SNL/NM activities have been detected in surface water samples collected onsite. The elevated levels of naturally occurring metals detected in the storm water samples have not been attributed to SNL/NM. No SNL/NM activities are projected under any of the alternatives that would contribute contaminants to surface water.

SNL/NM has little effect on the quantity of surface water in arroyos or the Rio Grande. The combined excess storm water runoff from SNL/NM facilities and discharge to Albuquerque's Southside Water Reclamation Plant would contribute from 0.06 to 0.07 percent to the annual Rio Grande flow under all alternatives, with no measurable impacts to the Rio Grande.

Biological and Ecological Resources

Beneficial impacts to biological and ecological resources would occur under all alternatives. Restricted access and limited development and use have benefited biological resources at KAFB. For example, the absence of livestock grazing has improved the quality of the grasslands in relation to the region.

SNL/NM operations in TAs-I, -II, and -V would continue to occur primarily inside buildings. Under all alternatives, small areas of vegetation would be removed (see Section 2.3.5), but this removal would not affect the viability of the plant communities. Proposed activities could result in the local displacement of wildlife. There would be slightly increased levels of noise and activity under the Expanded Operations Alternative. However, data from raptor surveys of KAFB indicate that they have become accustomed to the noise and activities that currently exist, as raptor species at KAFB return to the same nest sites each year. Outdoor activities at TA-III and the Coyote Test Field would continue to affect small localized areas.

Limited site access and management of the biological resources by SNL/NM, KAFB, and the USFS would continue to benefit the animals and plants, including sensitive species on KAFB.

Cultural Resources

Restricted access in association with activities at certain facilities would continue to have a beneficial effect on prehistoric and historic archaeological resources because it would protect the resources from vandalism, theft, or unintentional damage. For all three SWEIS alternatives, there would continue to be a potential for impacts to prehistoric and historic archaeological resources. These impacts would derive from explosive testing debris and shrapnel produced as a result of outdoor explosions, off-road vehicle traffic, and unintended fires and fire suppression. However, the potential for impacts due to these factors would be minimal under all three alternatives.

As a result of the ongoing consultation with 15 Native American tribes; no TCPs have been identified at SNL/NM; however, several tribes have requested that they be consulted under the *Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act* (NAGPRA) if human remains are discovered within the region of influence. These consultations will continue. If specific TCPs are identified, any impacts of SNL/NM activities on the TCP and any impacts of restricting access to the TCP would be determined in consultation with Native American tribes, and further NEPA review would be conducted, if appropriate.

Air Quality

Concentrations of criteria and chemical pollutants in air would be below regulatory standards and human health guidelines. Maximum concentrations of criteria pollutants from operation of the steam plant, electric power generator plant, boiler and emergency generator in Building 701, and 600-kw-capacity generator in Building 870b would represent a maximum of 96 percent of the allowable regulatory limits of several criteria pollutants (nitrogen dioxide, total suspended particulates, and particulate matter less than 10 microns in diameter) at a public access area.

These standards, in general, are set to provide an ample margin of safety below any pollutant concentration that might be of concern. The methodology used in the criteria pollutant analysis also produces projections that are conservative maximum concentrations.

Based on the analysis of stationary and mobile source emissions, carbon monoxide emissions from SNL/NM would be less than 1996 emissions under any alternative. Emissions would remain below the 10-percent threshold

that denotes a regionally significant action in a nonattainment area. As a result, the DOE has determined that a conformity determination under 40 CFR Part 93 Subpart B is not required.

With the exception of one chemical (chromium trioxide), concentrations of noncarcinogenic chemicals emitted from 12 facilities on SNL/NM were projected to be below screening levels based on occupational exposure limit (OEL) guidelines generally referenced to determine human health impacts. Concentrations of carcinogenic chemical emissions would pose little cancer risk (less than 1 in 1 million) to onsite workers or the general public. Chemical emissions would be highest for the Expanded Operations Alternative, although they would still be below levels that would affect public health.

The impact from emissions of criteria pollutants for the No Action and Expanded Operations Alternatives would be essentially the same. The major source of criteria pollutants (other than mobile sources) would be the steam plant, which supplies steam to the facilities for heating. No increase in floor space is anticipated under the Expanded Operations Alternative; therefore, no increase in steam production would be required. The Reduced Operations Alternative would require less steam, resulting in lower emissions from the steam plant.

The radiological dose impacts due to the annual air emissions from SNL/NM facilities during normal operations under each of the alternatives would be much lower than the regulatory National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) limit of 10 mrem/yr to a maximally exposed individual (MEI). The calculated radiological dose to an MEI would be 0.15 mrem/yr under the No Action Alternative; 0.51 mrem/yr under the Expanded Operations Alternative; and 0.02 mrem/yr under the Reduced Operations Alternative. The dose to an MEI under each alternative would be small in comparison to the average individual background radiation dose of 360 mrem/yr.

The calculated collective dose to the population within 50 mi of SNL/NM from the annual radiological air emissions due to the SNL/NM operations under each alternative would be 5.0 person-rem per year under the No Action Alternative; 15.8 person-rem per year under the Expanded Operations Alternative; and 0.80 person-rem per year under the Reduced Operations Alternative. The collective dose would be much lower than the collective dose of 263,700 person-rem to the same population from background radiation.

Human Health

Routine releases of hazardous radiological and chemical materials would occur during SNL/NM operations. These releases would have the potential to reach receptors (workers and members of the public) by way of different environmental pathways. The levels of exposure to chemicals and radionuclides were assessed for each environmental medium determined to be a pathway for these releases.

The SWEIS impact analyses identified air as the primary environmental pathway having the potential to transport hazardous material from SNL/NM facilities to receptors in the SNL/NM vicinity. In the assessment of human health risk from air emissions, a number of receptor locations and possible exposure scenarios were analyzed. The total composite cancer health risk is the sum of potential chemical and radiation exposures, calculated from the radiation cancer health risk to the MEI, plus the upper bound chemical cancer health risk from a hypothetical worst-case exposure scenario. This very conservative estimate of maximum health risk is greater than any of the individual health risks based on more likely exposure estimates at specific receptor locations.

Both the composite cancer health risk estimate of 1 in 385,000, and the cancer health risk estimates for specific receptor locations are below levels that regulators consider protective of public health. No adverse health effects would be expected from any of the three alternatives for SNL/NM. The small amounts of chemical carcinogens and radiation released from SNL/NM facilities would increase the MEI lifetime risk of cancer by less than 1 chance in 434,000 under the No Action Alternative and by less than a possible 1 chance in 126,000 under the Expanded Operations Alternative. Noncancer health effects would not be expected based on hazard index values of less than 1. No additional nonfatal cancers, genetic disorders, or latent cancer fatalities (LCFs) would be expected in the population living within a 50-mi radius.

Transportation

The SNL/NM material and waste truck traffic offsite would be projected to increase from 14.5 shipments per day (1996) to 34.4 shipments per day under the Expanded Operations Alternative. However, the SNL/NM truck traffic would comprise less than 0.03 percent of the total traffic, including all types of vehicles entering and leaving the Albuquerque area by way of interstate highways. Therefore, the impact under the Expanded Operations Alternative would be minimal. The total local traffic on roadways would be expected to

increase by a maximum of 3.6 percent overall under the Expanded Operations Alternative.

The overall maximum lifetime fatalities from SNL/NM annual shipments of all types of materials and wastes due to SNL/NM operations were estimated to be 1.7 fatalities under the Expanded Operations Alternative. Of these estimates, 1.3 fatalities would be due to traffic accidents; 0.33 fatalities would be due to incident-free transport of radiological materials and wastes; and 0.06 fatalities would be due to air pollution from truck emissions.

The maximum lifetime LCFs in the population within a 50-mi radius were estimated, based on a population dose of 4.93 person-rem, to be 0.0025 from the annual transport of radiological materials and wastes.

Waste Generation

Generation of radioactive waste, hazardous waste, process wastewater, and nonhazardous solid waste was reviewed. The goal of the review was to determine the adequacy of existing onsite and offsite storage and treatment and disposal capabilities. Storage capacity for all anticipated waste types would be adequate. Limited onsite hazardous and mixed waste treatment capacity would be within current permit limits. Most hazardous waste would be treated and disposed of offsite within the commercial sector. Commercial offsite capacity is currently adequate and would exceed anticipated future demand.

Recycling of wastes was not included in the modeling to bound actual projected waste quantities. Radioactive

Radioactive Waste Categories

Low-Level Waste—Waste that contains radioactivity and is not classified as high-level waste, transuranic waste, or spent nuclear fuel or byproduct tailings containing uranium or thorium from processed ore (as defined in Section 11[e][2] of the *Atomic Energy Act* [42 U.S.C. §2011]). Test specimens of fissionable material, irradiated for research and development only and not for the production of power or plutonium, may be classified as LLW, provided that the concentration of transuranic is less than 100 nanocuries per gram.

Low-Level Mixed Waste—Waste that contains both hazardous waste regulated under the *Resource Conservation and Recovery Act* (42 U.S.C. §6901) and low-level waste.

material management practices would be required to reduce quantities of material that could inadvertently become contaminated. Low-level waste (LLW) and low-level mixed waste (LLMW) (see text box) would increase by a maximum of 198 and 69 percent, respectively, under the Expanded Operations Alternative. One new operation, the Medical Isotopes Production Project, would be the major contributor to this increase. Capacity currently exists to manage the waste generated from all operations at the Expanded Operations Alternative level.

Trends for all hazardous waste clearly show a significant reduction due to the implementation of pollution prevention protocols at SNL/NM. New procedures and recycling for the solid waste and process wastewater would have similar impacts on the nonhazardous waste volumes being generated.

Noise and Vibration

The No Action Alternative would enable SNL/NM to operate at current planned levels, which include baseline background noise levels and short-term noise impacts from SNL/NM test activities. Impulse noise-producing test activities would increase an estimated 35 percent over the 1996 number of test activities by 2008.

Projections under the Expanded Operations Alternative indicate a 250 percent increase in the number of impulse noise tests over 1996 levels. This would result in an average of approximately 1 impulse noise event per hour for an 8-hour work day, based on a 261-day work year.

The projected frequency of impulse noise events for the Reduced Operations Alternative would be 65 percent less than the 1996 levels, resulting in an average of 1.5 impulse noise tests per day.

Only a small fraction of these tests would be loud enough to be heard or felt beyond the site boundary. The vast majority of tests would be below background noise levels for locations beyond the KAFB boundary and would be unnoticed in neighborhoods bounding the site. Ground vibrations would remain confined to the immediate test area.

Socioeconomics

Direct SNL/NM employment projections range from 7,422 (Reduced Operations Alternative) to 8,417 (Expanded Operations Alternative), in comparison to 7,652 full-time SNL/NM employees in the base year. These employment changes would change regional population, employment, personal income, and other

socioeconomic measures in the region by less than 1 percent.

Environmental Justice

Based on the analyses of other impact areas, the DOE would not expect any environmental justice-related impacts from the continued operation of SNL/NM under any of the alternatives. Resource areas of potential concern were evaluated on an individual basis with respect to minority populations and low-income populations, as appropriate.

No TCPs have been identified at SNL/NM. If specific TCPs are identified, Native American tribes will be consulted.

Accidents

At SNL/NM, accidents could occur that would affect workers and the public. Potential accidents with the largest impacts would involve radioactive materials in TA-V facilities and hazardous chemicals in TA-I facilities. In most instances, involved workers (those individuals located in the immediate vicinity of an accident) would incur the largest risk of serious injury or fatality. This is because, for most accidents, the magnitude of the damaging effects are highest at the point of the accident and diminish with increasing distance. This would apply, for example, to releases of radioactive and chemical materials, explosions, fires, airplane crashes, earthquakes, and similar events. In some situations, however, the mitigating effects of structural barriers, personal protection equipment, and engineered safety features may offer greater protection for close-in workers than others in the general vicinity of the accident.

In TA-I, under all three alternatives, there could be numerous situations in laboratory rooms where workers could be accidentally exposed to small amounts of dangerous chemicals. The potential also exists in TA-I for a catastrophic accident, such as an airplane crash into a facility or an earthquake, in which multiple dangerous chemicals could be released and expose onsite individuals to harmful or fatal chemical concentrations. Large quantities of hydrogen stored in outside areas of TA-I could also explode as a result of a catastrophic event and cause serious injury or fatality to involved workers and other nearby onsite individuals. The probability of a catastrophic chemical or explosive accident with serious consequences is low (less than once in a thousand years). Should such an accident occur, emergency procedures, mitigating features, and administrative controls would minimize its adverse impacts.

The potential for accidents would exist in TA-V that would cause the release of radioactive materials, causing injury to workers, onsite individuals, and the public. The magnitudes of impacts for the worst-case accident, an earthquake, would be minimal for all alternatives. If an earthquake occurred, the impacts would range from a 1 in 33 increase in probability of an LCF for a noninvolved worker on the site to 1 in 120,000 for a maximally exposed member of the public. For the entire population residing within 50 mi of SNL/NM, one or two additional LCFs would be expected. Involved workers, as in the case of chemical accidents, would incur the largest risk of injury or fatality in the event of almost any accident because of their close proximity to the hazardous conditions.

Cumulative Effects

Cumulative effects result from the incremental impacts of an action added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions. To conduct this analysis, the DOE examined the effects associated with the continued and expanded operation of SNL/NM, and then added the effects of other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions to assess the cumulative effects to various resource areas. These additional effects are primarily because of the presence of USAF and other DOE facilities at KAFB and the environmental effects caused by residents and businesses in the city of Albuquerque.

Other DOE Facilities

There are seven other DOE facilities at KAFB: the DOE Albuquerque Operations Office, Energy Training Complex, Transportation Safeguards Division, Nonproliferation and National Security Institute (formerly the Central Training Academy), Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute (formerly the Inhalation Toxicology Research Institute), Federal Manufacturing & Technology/New Mexico (also known as AlliedSignal), and Ross Aviation, Inc. The potential for environmental impacts from these facilities would be low. These facilities do not have stationary sources of air pollutants designated as "major" by Federal or local air quality regulations. Criteria pollutant air emissions from these facilities were modeled in combination with those for SNL/NM in the 1996 operating permit application required by 20 NMAC 11.42, and potential concentrations of pollutants from these emissions were found to be below levels designed to protect human health with an ample margin of safety. Emissions from

these facilities are expected to be below these maximum potential levels. Hazardous air pollutant emissions are minimal, and only small quantities of chemicals are purchased. Emissions of carbon monoxide from vehicles were included with the analysis for vehicles associated with SNL/NM.

None of the activities at these facilities would pose any significant adverse threat to the environment.

USAF Operations

USAF installations typically generate waste solvents, oils, paints, paint sludges, and some R&D chemical wastes that are regulated as hazardous waste. The KAFB Hazardous Waste Management Plan sets local management procedures for managing hazardous waste and preventing pollution. The plan incorporates Federal, state, and local requirements regarding hazardous waste, and applies to all host and associate organizations that generate hazardous waste on KAFB.

USAF installations typically have numerous sources of air pollutant emissions that are regulated and might require permits for construction and operation. Primary emission sources are steam plants, paint shops, air craft and ground vehicles, and processes and test activities. KAFB currently has two air permits in effect. The Title V permit application was submitted in December 1995. KAFB also conducts environmental restoration under the USAF's Installation Restoration Program (IRP). There are currently 70 IRP sites and 12 areas of concern.

NonDOE or USAF Operations

A number of other activities in the area surrounding KAFB are not DOE- or USAF-related. The city of Albuquerque and its suburbs form the state's largest metropolitan area with a population over 500,000. Over 400 local manufacturers produce a wide range of products including electronic components, baked goods, computers, construction materials, and heavy trailers. The counties surrounding SNL/NM have numerous existing and planned industrial facilities and residences with permitted air emissions and discharges to surface waters. These facilities comprise electric generating stations (including Cobisa Power Station), computer chip manufacturers, construction materials industries, and other manufacturing facilities. KAFB has residential and commercial centers onsite, as well as to the north, south, west, and northeast. There are many local and regional influences as well as private and public activities.

Analysis Results

The analysis found that cumulative effects to the environment resulting from SNL/NM activities would be small.

No adverse cumulative impacts to land use would occur. Land in the area surrounding KAFB would continue to be developed at its present rate of growth regardless of the presence of the DOE and SNL/NM. In addition, no adverse impacts to infrastructure would occur.

Consumption of natural gas, fuel oil, and electricity at KAFB would decline slightly or remain at recent historic levels. Adequate capacities exist for all utilities.

No adverse cumulative effects to transportation routes would be expected. However, traffic congestion and transportation construction projects would continue to affect local transportation.

Cumulative effects to water resources would be small. Total SNL/NM withdrawal of groundwater would be approximately 1 percent of basin-wide withdrawal and 12 percent of local withdrawal.

Cultural resources would not be adversely affected by SNL/NM or DOE activities. The restricted public access at KAFB would result in the protection of cultural resources.

Cumulative effects to air quality would be small. A comprehensive analysis of air emissions from SNL/NM show no individual or aggregate emissions of concern to human health. Emissions from KAFB are also unlikely to be of concern to human health because, like SNL/NM, hazardous chemical air emissions are below levels requiring monitoring by the *Clean Air Act* or local air quality regulations. Carbon monoxide emissions from vehicles are the primary air pollutant of concern. Carbon monoxide emissions from SNL/NM and KAFB show decreasing trends and, combined, are less than 10 percent of the total carbon monoxide emissions in the county. There would be no adverse cumulative impacts due to radiological air emissions. In addition, there would be no adverse impacts to human health or safety.

Slight increases in ambient noise levels would occur due to intermittent testing at KAFB; however, no long-term increases in noise or vibration levels would occur.

Beneficial cumulative impacts would result from direct and indirect socioeconomic effects. The DOE expects that overall expenditures and employment at SNL/NM would expand gradually at a steady rate over the next 10 years, which would tend to maintain demographic patterns in the region.

MITIGATION MEASURES

The regulations promulgated by the Council on Environmental Quality to implement the procedural provisions of NEPA require that an environmental impact statement include a discussion of appropriate mitigation measures. Mitigation includes the following (40 CFR Part 1508.20):

- avoiding an impact by not taking an action or parts of an action;
- minimizing impacts by limiting the degree of magnitude of an action and its implementation;
- rectifying an impact by repairing, rehabilitating, or restoring the affected environment;
- reducing or eliminating the impact by preservation and maintenance operations during the life of the action; and
- compensating for the impact by replacing or providing substitute resources or environments.

The mitigation measures in this SWEIS are built into the alternatives. These measures address the range of potential impacts of continuing to operate SNL/NM. Based on the results of the analyses, the DOE does not anticipate implementing additional mitigation measures. The following list contains examples of SNL/NM programs, plans, and projects that are integral to the SWEIS alternatives:

- Environmental Surveillance and Compliance Program (monitors SNL/NM for permit and environmental management requirements)
- Threatened and Endangered Species Habitat Management Plan
- Natural Resource Management Plan (in development)
- Public and worker health studies in and around SNL/NM
- Groundwater Protection Management Program Plan
- Safeguards and Security Program
- Emergency management and response capability enhancement
- Fire Protection Program
- Pollution Prevention and Waste Minimization Programs
- Water and Energy Conservation Programs
- ER Project plans

Table S–2. Comparison of Potential Consequences of Continued Operations at SNL/NM

RESOURCE AREA		NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE	EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE	REDUCED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE
<i>Land Use</i>		No changes projected in classification or ownership	Same as No Action Alternative	Same as No Action Alternative
<i>Visual Resources</i>		Changes would be minor and transitory. Projected new construction in already developed areas	Same as No Action Alternative	Same as No Action Alternative
<i>Infrastructure</i>		All projected activities within capacities of existing road, waste management, and utility systems	Same as No Action Alternative	Same as No Action Alternative
<i>Water Use</i>		440-463 M gal/yr	495 M gal/yr	416 M gal/yr
<i>Geology and Soils</i>	Slope Stability	SNL/NM activities are not anticipated to destabilize slopes.	Same as No Action Alternative	Same as No Action Alternative
	Soil Contamination	Minimal deposition of contaminants to soils and continued removal of existing contaminants under the ER Project	Same as No Action Alternative	Same as No Action Alternative
<i>Water Resources and Hydrology</i>	Groundwater Quality	TCE above MCL from SNL/NM disposal activities is present in groundwater near the Chemical Waste Landfill (TA-III). No future activities are anticipated to cause further groundwater contamination.	Same as No Action Alternative	Same as No Action Alternative
	Groundwater Quantity	SNL/NM groundwater use is projected to account for 11% of local aquifer drawdown and 1% of basin-wide use. The potential consequence is considered adverse.	SNL/NM groundwater use is projected to account for 12% of local aquifer drawdown and 1% of basin-wide use.	Same as No Action Alternative
	Surface Water Quality	No contaminants attributable to SNL/NM activities have been detected in water samples collected onsite. No future activities are anticipated to cause surface water contamination.	Same as No Action Alternative	Same as No Action Alternative
	Surface Water Quantity	SNL/NM's projected portion of Rio Grande flow is 0.07%.	Same as No Action Alternative	Projected portion of Rio Grande flow is 0.06%

Table S–2. Comparison of Potential Consequences of Continued Operations at SNL/NM (continued)

RESOURCE AREA	NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE	EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE	REDUCED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE
Biological and Ecological Resources	Impacts projected for biological or ecological resources are low to negligible.	Same as No Action Alternative	Same as No Action Alternative
Cultural Resources^a	Potential for impacts to cultural resources is low to negligible. Explosive testing debris and shrapnel, off-road vehicle traffic, and unintended fires present a low to negligible potential for impacts. SNL/NM security would likely result in continued protection of archaeological sites.	Same as No Action Alternative	Same as No Action Alternative
Air Quality	Concentrations would be below the most stringent standards, which define the pollutant concentrations below which there are no adverse impacts to human health and the environment.	Same as No Action Alternative	Same as No Action Alternative
Stationary Source Criteria Pollutants	Modeling results (summary)		
	Carbon Monoxide (8 hours) 57% of standard		
	Lead (quarterly) 0.07% of standard		
	Nitrogen dioxide (annually) 30% of standard		
	Total suspended particulates (annually) 69% of standard		
Nonradiological Air Quality	Sulfur dioxide (annually) 4% of standard		
Chemical Pollutants	Concentrations are below regulatory standards and human health guidelines.	Same as No Action Alternative	Same as No Action Alternative
Mobile sources (percent of Bernalillo county mobile-source carbon monoxide emissions)	4.6	5.1	4.5
Fire testing facilities	Chemical concentrations are below OEL/100 guideline.	Same as No Action Alternative	Same as No Action Alternative

Table S–2. Comparison of Potential Consequences of Continued Operations at SNL/NM (continued)

RESOURCE AREA		NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE	EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE	REDUCED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE
<i>Air Quality (continued)</i>				
Radiological Air Quality	MEI dose	0.15 mrem/yr	0.51 mrem/yr	0.02 mrem/yr
	Collective ROI dose	5.0 person-rem/yr	15.8 person-rem/yr	0.80 person-rem/yr
	Average individual dose within ROI	6.8×10^{-3} mrem/yr	2.16×10^{-2} mrem/yr	1.1×10^{-3} mrem/yr
<i>Human Health and Worker Safety</i>	MEI public risk (from radiation)	7.5×10^{-8} LCF/yr	2.6×10^{-7} LCF/yr	8.0×10^{-9} LCF/yr
	ROI population risk to public (from radiation)	2.5×10^{-3} LCF/yr	7.9×10^{-3} LCF/yr	4.0×10^{-4} LCF/yr
	Fatal SNL/NM worker occupational injuries	none	Same as No Action Alternative	Same as No Action Alternative
	Average radiation-badged SNL/NM worker dose (risk)	47 mrem/yr (1.9×10^{-5} LCF/yr)	Same as No Action Alternative	Same as No Action Alternative
	Nonfatal SNL/NM worker occupational injuries/illnesses	311/yr	326/yr	287/yr
	Occupational SNL/NM worker chemical exposures	1-2/yr	Same as No Action Alternative	Same as No Action Alternative
	Environmental risk to public (from chemical exposures)	$<1 \times 10^{-6}$ ELCR	Same as No Action Alternative	Same as No Action Alternative

Table S–2. Comparison of Potential Consequences of Continued Operations at SNL/NM (continued)

RESOURCE AREA		NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE	EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE	REDUCED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE
Transportation	Transportation population risk within ROI (from radiation)	8.3x10 ⁻⁴ LCF/yr (1.7 person-rem)	2.5x10 ⁻³ LCF/yr (4.9 person-rem)	2.0x10 ⁻⁴ LCF/yr (0.4 person-rem)
	Total transportation population risk (from radiation)	0.1 LCF/yr	0.33 LCF/yr	4.5 x10 ⁻² LCF/yr
	Traffic accident fatalities	0.49/yr	1.3/yr	0.18/yr
	Total transportation population risk (from truck emissions)	0.03 LCF/yr	0.06 LCF/yr	0.01 LCF/yr
Waste Generation (Annual)	Management capability (infrastructure)	All projected activities are within capacities of existing facilities and systems.	Same as No Action Alternative	Same as No Action Alternative
	Total radioactive waste	Up to 176 m ³	Up to 289 m ³	Up to 106 m ³
	Total chemical waste	Up to approximately 379,000 kg	Up to approximately 441,000 kg	Up to approximately 306,000 kg

Table S–2. Comparison of Potential Consequences of Continued Operations at SNL/NM (concluded)

RESOURCE AREA	NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE	EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE	REDUCED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE	
Noise and Vibration	Impulse noise-producing test activities projected to increase 35% over 1996 level to 1,435 tests by 2008. Effects would be limited to windows rattling or startle reaction. Background noise levels would continue at current levels from generators, air conditioners, and ventilation systems, but increase due to additional vehicular traffic, aircraft noise, and temporary construction projects (range from 50 to 70 dB).	There would be a 250% increase in test activities over 1996 levels, to 2,638 per year, approximately one impulse noise event per hr for an 8-hr work day and a 261-day work year. Only a small fraction of these tests would be of sufficient magnitude to be heard or felt beyond the site boundary. The vast majority of tests expected to be below background noise levels for receptor locations beyond the KAFB boundary and would, therefore, be unnoticed in neighborhoods bounding the site.	Test activities would be 65% less than the 1996 level, 371 tests per year, an average of approximately 1.5 impulse noise tests per day. Only a small fraction of these tests would be of sufficient magnitude to be heard or felt beyond the site boundary. The vast majority of tests expected to be below background noise levels for receptor locations beyond the KAFB boundary and would, therefore be unnoticed in neighborhoods bounding the site.	
Socioeconomics^b	SNL/NM employment ^c	8,035	8,417	7,422
	SNL/NM total economic activity within the ROI	\$4.13 B/yr	\$4.33 B/yr	\$3.81 B/yr
	Percent of ROI total economic activity	9.7	10.1	9.0
Environmental Justice^a	No disproportionately high and adverse impacts to minority or low-income communities are anticipated.	Same as No Action Alternative	Same as No Action Alternative	

Source: TtNUS 1998l

B: billion

dB: decibel

ELCR: excess lifetime cancer risk

gal: gallon

hr: hour

kg: kilogram

LCF: latent cancer fatality

M: million

m³: cubic meter

MCL: maximum contaminant level

MEI: maximally exposed individual

mrem: millirem

ROI: region of influence

TA: technical area

TCE: trichloroethene

TCP: traditional cultural property

yr: year

^aNo TCPs have been identified at SNL/NM. If specific TCPs are identified, Native American tribes will be consulted.

^bBounding analysis is based on parameters presented in DOE 1997j.

^cSection 4.12, Affected Environment, differs slightly, using 6,824 full-time employees. Base year in Section 5.3.12, Environmental Consequences (also see Table 3.6–2), used 7,652 full-time employees.

**Table S–3. Comparison of Potential Consequences
for Accident Scenarios at SNL/NM**

RESOURCE AREA	NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE	EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE	REDUCED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE
SITE-WIDE EARTHQUAKE			
RADIOLOGICAL IMPACTS			
50-Mile Population (Additional Latent Cancer Fatalities)	8.1x10 ⁻²	7.5x10 ⁻²	7.5x10 ⁻²
Maximally Exposed Individual (Increased Probability of Latent Cancer Fatality)	8.6x10 ⁻⁶	7.7x10 ⁻⁶	7.7x10 ⁻⁶
Noninvolved Worker (Increased Probability of Latent Cancer Fatality)	3.1x10 ⁻²	3.0 x10 ⁻²	3.0x10 ⁻²
CHEMICAL IMPACTS			
Distance (feet) to reach ERPG-2 Levels	3,800	3,800	3,800
CATASTROPHIC ACCIDENT SINGLE FACILITY			
RADIOLOGICAL IMPACTS			
ACRR Medical Isotopes Production			
50-mile population (additional latent cancer fatalities)	1.6x10 ⁻⁶ to 4.9x10 ⁻³	1.6x10 ⁻⁶ to 4.9x10 ⁻³	1.6x10 ⁻⁶ to 4.9x10 ⁻³
Maximally Exposed Individual (increased probability of latent cancer fatality)	1.0x10 ⁻¹⁰ to 6.1x10 ⁻⁷	1.0x10 ⁻¹⁰ to 6.1x10 ⁻⁷	1.0x10 ⁻¹⁰ to 6.1x10 ⁻⁷
Noninvolved Worker (increased probability of latent cancer fatality)	4.9x10 ⁻⁸ to 7.6x10 ⁻⁵	4.9x10 ⁻⁸ to 7.6x10 ⁻⁵	4.9x10 ⁻⁸ to 7.6x10 ⁻⁵
Hot Cell Facility			
50-mile population (additional latent cancer fatalities)	1.6x10 ⁻⁶ to 7.9x10 ⁻²	1.6x10 ⁻⁶ to 7.9x10 ⁻²	1.6x10 ⁻⁶ to 7.9x10 ⁻²
Maximally Exposed Individual (increased probability of latent cancer fatality)	1.0x10 ⁻¹⁰ to 6.6x10 ⁻⁶	1.0x10 ⁻¹⁰ to 6.6x10 ⁻⁶	1.0x10 ⁻¹⁰ to 6.6x10 ⁻⁶
Noninvolved Worker (increased probability of latent cancer fatality)	4.2x10 ⁻⁹ to 7.4x10 ⁻⁶	4.2x10 ⁻⁹ to 7.4x10 ⁻⁶	4.2x10 ⁻⁹ to 7.4x10 ⁻⁶
Sandia Pulsed Reactor			
50-mile population (additional latent cancer fatalities)	1.2x10 ⁻³ to 9.2x10 ⁻³	1.2x10 ⁻³ to 9.2x10 ⁻³	1.2x10 ⁻³ to 9.2x10 ⁻³
Maximally Exposed Individual (increased probability of latent cancer fatality)	1.5x10 ⁻⁷ to 8.4x10 ⁻⁷	1.5x10 ⁻⁷ to 8.4x10 ⁻⁷	1.5x10 ⁻⁷ to 8.4x10 ⁻⁷
Noninvolved Worker (increased probability of latent cancer fatality)	2.5x10 ⁻⁴ to 3.8x10 ⁻³	2.5x10 ⁻⁴ to 3.8x10 ⁻³	2.5x10 ⁻⁴ to 3.8x10 ⁻³

Table S–3. Comparison of Potential Consequences for Accident Scenarios at SNL/NM (concluded)

RESOURCE AREA	NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE	EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE	REDUCED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE
ACRR-Defense Programs Configuration			
50-mile population (additional latent cancer fatalities)	1.3x10 ⁻³ to 9.0x10 ⁻³	1.3 x10 ⁻³ to 9.0x10 ⁻³	Not operational
Maximally Exposed Individual (increased probability of latent cancer fatality)	1.7x10 ⁻⁷ to 1.0x10 ⁻⁶	1.7x10 ⁻⁷ to 1.0x10 ⁻⁶	Not operational
Noninvolved Worker (increased probability of latent cancer fatality)	1.2x10 ⁻⁵ to 2.2x10 ⁻⁴	1.2x10 ⁻⁵ to 2.2x10 ⁻⁴	Not operational
CHEMICAL IMPACTS			
Technical Area-I			
Distance (feet) to reach ERPG-2 Levels ^a	1,440 - 4,884	1,440 - 4,884	1,440 - 4,884
EXPLOSIVE IMPACTS			
Technical Area-I			
Distance (feet) to reach 2 psi (Damage to cinder block walls)	370	370	370
Distance (feet) to reach 10 psi (rupture of 50% of eardrums)	126	126	126
Distance (feet) to reach 50 psi (50% fatalities)	61	61	61

Source: Original

ERPG: emergency response planning guideline

ACRR: Annular Core Research Reactor

psi: pounds per square inch

^a For the three largest worker (people) densities within ERPG-2 levels related to Buildings 858, 883, and 893

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COVER SHEET

RESPONSIBLE AGENCY: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE)

COOPERATING AGENCY: U.S. AIR FORCE

TITLE: Draft Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement for Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico (DOE/EIS-0281)

CONTACT: For further information or to submit comments concerning the Draft Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement (SWEIS), contact

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Abstract: The DOE proposes to continue operating the Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico (SNL/NM) located in central New Mexico. The DOE has identified and assessed three alternatives for the operation of SNL/NM: (1) No Action, (2) Expanded Operations, and (3) Reduced Operations. In the No Action Alternative, the DOE would continue the historical mission support activities SNL/NM has conducted at planned operational levels. In the Expanded Operations Alternative, the DOE would operate SNL/NM at the highest reasonable levels of activity currently foreseeable. Under the Reduced Operations Alternative, the DOE would operate SNL/NM at the minimum levels of activity necessary to maintain the capabilities to support the DOE mission in the near term. Under all of the alternatives, the affected environment is primarily within 50 miles (80 kilometers) of SNL/NM. Analyses indicate little difference in the environmental impacts among alternatives.

Public Comments: Comments on the Draft SWEIS may be submitted through the end of the 60-day comment period (expected to be June 15, 1999), which will commence with the publication of the Environmental Protection Agency's *Federal Register* Notice of Availability for this document. Comments may be submitted in writing, orally, or by electronic mail to the DOE at the addresses and phone number indicated above. Oral or written comments may also be submitted at public meetings to be held during the comment period on dates and locations to be announced in the *Federal Register* and via other public media shortly after issuance of the Draft SWEIS. Comments submitted will be considered in preparation of the Final SWEIS.

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Acronyms

58 th SOW	58 th Special Operations Wing
A/BC AQCB	Albuquerque/Bernalillo County Air Quality Control Board
ACGIH	American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists
ACPR II	Annular Core Pulsed Reactor II
ACRR	Annular Core Research Reactor
ACS	American Cancer Society
AEA	<i>Atomic Energy Act</i>
AEHD	Albuquerque Environmental Health Department
AEI	average exposed individual
AFRL	Air Force Research Laboratory
AFSC	Air Force Safety Center
AL	Albuquerque Operations Office
ALARA	as low as reasonably achievable
ALOHA	<i>Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres</i>
AMPL	Advanced Manufacturing Processes Laboratory
ANSI	American National Standards Institute
APCD	Air Pollution Control Division
APPRM	Advanced Pulsed Power Research Module
AQCR	Air Quality Control Region
ARF	airborne release fraction
AT&T	American Telephone and Telegraph
BEA	Bureau of Economic Analysis
BIA	Bureau of Indian Affairs
BLM	Bureau of Land Management
BLS	Bureau of Labor Statistics
CAA	<i>Clean Air Act</i>
CAB	Citizens Advisory Board
CAMP	Capital Assets Management Process
CAMU	Corrective Action Management Unit
CAP88-PC	<i>Clean Air Assessment Package</i>
CAS	Chemical Abstract Service
CDG	Campus Design Guideline

Note: Italics are used to denote formal names or titles of acts, published documents, or computer models.

CDI	chronic daily intake
CEQ	Council on Environmental Quality
CERCLA	<i>Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act</i>
CFR	<i>Code of Federal Regulations</i>
CHEST	Conventional High Explosives and Simulation Test
CIS	Chemical Information System
CPMS	Criteria Pollutant Monitoring Station
CRMP	Cultural Resource Management Plan
CSRL	Compound Semiconductor Research Laboratory
CTA	Central Training Academy
CTTF	Containment Technology Test Facility
CWA	<i>Clean Water Act</i>
CWL	Chemical Waste Landfil
CY	calendar year
D&D	decontamination and decommissioning
DARHT	dual-axis radiographic hydrotest
DEAR	Department of Energy Acquisitions Regulations
DF	decontamination factor, dispersion factor
DFG	Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
DNL	day-night average noise level
DoD	U.S. Department of Defense
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
DOI	U.S. Department of the Interior
DOL	U.S. Department of Labor
DOT	U.S. Department of Transportation
DP	Defense Programs
DR	damage ratio
DU	depleted uranium
EA	environmental assessment
EAL	Explosives Applications Laboratory
ECF	Explosive Components Facility
EDE	effective dose equivalent
EF	emission factor
EID	environmental information document

EIS	environmental impact statement
ELCR	excess lifetime cancer risk
EM	Office of Environmental Management
EMP	electromagnetic pulse
EO	<i>Executive Order</i>
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
EPCRA	<i>Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act</i>
ER	Environmental Restoration (Project)
ERPG	emergency response planning guideline
ES&H	Environment, Safety, and Health
ETC	Energy Training Center
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FCDSWA	Field Command, Defense Special Weapons Agency
FFCA	<i>Federal Facilities Compliance Act</i>
FM&T/NM	Federal Manufacturing & Technology/New Mexico
FONSI	Finding of No Significant Impact
FR	<i>Federal Register</i>
FSID	<i>Facilities and Safety Information Document</i>
FY	fiscal year
GHA	ground hazard area
GIF	Gamma Irradiation Facility
GIS	geographic information system
GRABS	Giant Reusable Air Blast Simulator
GWPMPP	<i>Groundwater Protection Management Program Plan</i>
HA	hazards assessment
HAP	hazardous air pollutants
HBWSF	High Bay Waste Storage Facility
HCF	Hot Cell Facility
HEAST	Health Effects Assessment Summary Tables
HEPA	high efficiency particulate arrestance
HERMES	High-Energy Radiation Megavolt Electron Source
HERTF	High-Energy Research Test Facility
HI	hazard index

HLW	high-level radioactive waste
HPML	High Power Microwave Laboratory
HQ	headquarters
HR	hydrogeologic region
HSWA	<i>Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments</i>
HVAR	high velocity aircraft rocket
HWMF	Hazardous Waste Management Facility
IBMRL	Ion Beam Materials Research Laboratories
ICF	inertial confinement fusion
ICRP	International Commission on Radiological Protection
IDLH	immediately dangerous to life and health
IH	industrial hygiene
IHE	insensitive high explosives
IHIL	Industrial Hygiene Instrumentation Laboratory
IHIR	Industrial Hygiene Investigation Report
IMRL	Integrated Materials Research Laboratory
IPS	Integrated Procurement System
IRIS	Integrated Risk Information System
IRP	Installation Restoration Program
ISC	industrial source complex
ISCST3	<i>Industrial Source Complex Short-Term Model, Version 3</i>
ISS	interim storage site
JIT	just-in-time
JP	jet propulsion
KAFB	Kirtland Air Force Base
KAO	Kirtland Area Office
KUMMSC	Kirtland Underground Munitions and Maintenance Storage Complex
L90	the A-weighted background sound pressure level that is exceeded 90 percent of the time, based on a maximum of a 1-hour period
LADD	lifetime average daily dose
LANL	Los Alamos National Laboratory
LANMAS	Local Area Network Nuclear Material Accountability System
LBERI	Lovelace Biomedical and Environmental Research Institute, Inc.
LCF	latent cancer fatality

LLMW	low-level mixed waste
LLNL	Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLW	low-level waste
LPF	leak path factor
LSA	low specific activity
LSF	Lightning Simulation Facility
LWDS	Liquid Waste Disposal System
M&O	management and operations
M.W.	molecular weight (in grams)
MAC	maximum allowable concentration
MACCS2	<i>MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System, Version 2</i>
MAR	material-at-risk
MBTA	<i>Migratory Bird Treaty Act</i>
MCL	maximum contaminant level
MDL	Microelectronics Development Laboratory
MEI	maximally exposed individual
MEMF	Mobile Electronic Maintenance Facility
MEPAS	Multimedia Environmental Pollutant Assessment System
MIPP	Medical Isotopes Production Project
MOBILE 5a	<i>Mobile Source Emission Factor (model)</i>
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSDS	material safety data sheet
MTRU	mixed transuranic waste
MWL	Mixed Waste Landfill
NAAQS	<i>National Ambient Air Quality Standards</i>
NAGPRA	<i>Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act</i>
NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NCA	<i>Noise Control Act</i>
NCEA	National Center for Environment Assessment
NCRP	National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements
ND	not detected
NEPA	<i>National Environmental Policy Act</i>
NESHAP	<i>National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants</i>
NEW	net explosive weight

NF	not found
NGF	Neutron Generator Facility
NGIF	New Gamma Irradiation Facility
NHPA	<i>National Historic Preservation Act</i>
NRHP	National Register of Historic Places
NIOSH	National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health
NMAAQs	<i>New Mexico Ambient Air Quality Standards</i>
NMAC	<i>New Mexico Administrative Code</i>
NMED	New Mexico Environment Department
NMEIB	New Mexico Environmental Improvement Board
NMFRCD	New Mexico Forestry and Resource Conservation Division
NMDGF	New Mexico Department of Game and Fish
NMSA	<i>New Mexico Statutes Annotated</i>
NMSU	New Mexico State University
NMWQCC	New Mexico Water Quality Control Commission
NNSI	Nonproliferation and National Security Institute
NOI	Notice of Intent
NOVA	North Vault
NPDES	National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
NPS	National Park Service
NRC	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRHP	National Register of Historic Places
NTS	Nevada Test Site
OBODM	<i>Open Burn/Open Detonation Model</i>
OEL	occupational exposure limits
OLM	ozone limiting method
ORPD	Occupational Radiation Protection Division
ORPS	Occurrence Reporting and Processing System
OSHA	Occupational Safety and Health Administration
PBCA	Particle Bed Critical Assembly
PBFA	Particle Beam Fusion Accelerator
PCB	polychlorinated biphenyl
PDFL	Photovoltaic Device Fabrication Laboratory
PDL	Power Development Laboratory

PEIS	Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement
PEL	permissible exposure limit
PL	<i>Public Law</i>
PM _{2.5}	particulate matter smaller than 2.5 microns in diameter
PM ₁₀	particulate matter smaller than 10 microns in diameter
PNM	Public Service Company of New Mexico
PPE	personal protective equipment
PSD	prevention of significant deterioration
PSL	Production Primary Standards Laboratory
PT	product tester
R&D	research & development
RCRA	<i>Resource Conservation and Recovery Act</i>
REL	recommended exposure limit
REMS	Radiation Exposure Monitoring System
RF	respirable fraction
RHEPP	Repetitive High Energy Pulsed Power
RHI	risk hazard index
RITS	Radiographic Integrated Test Stand
RME	reasonable maximum exposure
RMMA	Radioactive Materials Management Area
RMP	Risk Management Plan
RMSEL	Robotic Manufacturing Science Engineering Laboratory
RMWMF	Radioactive and Mixed Waste Management Facility
ROD	Record of Decision
ROI	region of influence
RV	reentry vehicle
SA	safety assessment
SABRE	Sandia Accelerator & Beam Research Experiment
SAR	Safety Analysis Report
SARA	<i>Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act</i>
SDWA	<i>Safe Drinking Water Act</i>
SECOM	Secure Communication Center
SHPO	State Historic Preservation Officer (NM)
SIP	State Implementation Plan

SMERF	Smoke Emission Reduction Facility
SMS	Scenery Management System
SNAP	Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power
SNL/CA	Sandia National Laboratories/California
SNL/HI	Sandia National Laboratories/Hawaii
SNL/NM	Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico
SNL/NV	Sandia National Laboratories/Nevada
SNM	special nuclear material
SPA	sawdust-propellant-acetone
SPHINX	Short-Pulse High Intensity Nanosecond X-Radiator
SPR	Sandia Pulsed Reactor
SSM	stockpile stewardship and management
SST	safe, secure transport
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
STEL	short-term exposure limit
STL	Simulation Technology Laboratory
STP	standard temperature and pressure
SVOC	semivolatile organic compound
SWEIS	Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement
SWISH	Small Wind Shielded Facility
SWMU	solid waste management unit
SWTF	Solid Waste Transfer Facility
TA	technical area
TAP	toxic air pollutants
TBF	Terminal Ballistics Facility
TCP	traditional cultural property
TEDE	total effective dose equivalent
TESLA	Tera-Electron Volt Semiconducting Linear Accelerator
TEV	threshold emission value
TLV	threshold limit value
TRU	transuranic
TSCA	<i>Toxic Substances Control Act</i>
TSD	Transportation Safety Division
TSP	total suspended particulates

TTF	Thermal Treatment Facility
TWA	time weighted average
U.S.	United States
U.S.C.	<i>United States Code</i>
UBC	Uniform Building Code
UNM	University of New Mexico
UPS	United Parcel Service
USAF	U.S. Air Force
USFS	U.S. Forest Service
USFWS	U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
USGS	U.S. Geological Survey
UST	underground storage tan
VDL	vacuum diode load
VHI	vapor hazard index
VHR	vapor hazard ratio
VMF	vehicle maintenance facility
VOC	volatile organic compound
WARE	Worksite Accident Reduction Expert
WFO	work for others
WIPP	Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
WM	Waste Management

UNIT OF MEASURE	ABBREVIATION
acre	ac
billion gallons per year	BGY
centimeters	cm
cubic feet	ft ³
cubic feet per second	ft ³ /s
cubic meters	m ³
cubic yards	yd ³
Curie	Ci
decibel	dB
degrees Celsius	°C
degrees Fahrenheit	°F
feet	ft
gallon	gal
gallons per day	gpd
gram	g
grams per second	g/sec
gravity	<i>g</i>
hectare	ha
Hertz	Hz
hour	hr
kelvin	K
kilogram	kg
kilojoule	kJ
kilometer	km
kilometer per hour	km/hr
kilovolt	kV
kilovoltampere	kVA
kilowatt	kW
kilowatt hour	kWh
liter	L
megajoule	MJ
megavolt-ampere	MVA

UNIT OF MEASURE	ABBREVIATION
megawatt	MW
megawatt hour	MWh
megawatt-electric	MWe
megawatt-thermal	MWt
meter	m
meters per second	m/sec
microcurie	μCi
microcuries per gram	$\mu\text{Ci/g}$
microgram	μg
micrograms per cubic meter	$\mu\text{g/m}^3$
micrograms per kilogram	$\mu\text{g/kg}$
micrograms per liter	$\mu\text{g/L}$
micron or micrometer	μm
microohms per centimeter	$\mu\text{ohms/cm}$
micropascal	mPa
mile	mi
miles per hour	mph
millicurie	mCi
millicurie per gram	mCi/g
millicurie per millimeter	mCi/ml
milligram	mg
milligram per liter	mg/L
milliliter	ml
millimeters of mercury	mmHg
million	M
million electron volts	MeV
million gallons per day	MGD
million gallons per year	MGY
millirem	mrem
millirem per year	mrem/yr
nanocurie	nCi
nanocuries per gram	nCi/g

UNIT OF MEASURE	ABBREVIATION
part per billion	ppb
part per billion by volume	ppbv
part per million	ppm
particulate matter of aerodynamic diameter less than 10 micrometers	PM ₁₀
particulate matter of aerodynamic diameter less than 25 micrometers	PM ₂₅
pascal	Pa
picocurie	pCi
picocuries per gram	pCi/g
picocuries per liter	pCi/L
pound	lb
pounds mass	lbm
pounds per square inch	psi
pounds per year	lb/yr
quart	qt
Roentgen equivalent, man	rem
second	sec
square feet	ft ²
square kilometers	km ²
square meters	m ²

Metric Conversion Chart					
TO CONVERT FROM U.S. CUSTOMARY INTO METRIC			TO CONVERT FROM METRIC INTO U.S. CUSTOMARY		
If you know	Multiply by	To get	If you know	Multiply by	To get
Length					
inches	2.540	centimeters	centimeters	0.3937	inches
feet	30.48	centimeters	centimeters	0.03281	feet
feet	0.3048	meters	meters	3.281	feet
yards	0.9144	meters	meters	1.094	yards
miles	1.609	kilometers	kilometers	0.6214	miles
Area					
square inches	6.452	square centimeters	square centimeters	0.1550	square inches
square feet	0.09290	square meters	square meters	10.76	square feet
square yards	0.8361	square meters	square meters	1.196	square yards
acres	0.4047	hectares	hectares	2.471	acres
square miles	2.590	square kilometers	square kilometers	0.3861	square miles
Volume					
fluid ounces	29.57	milliliters	milliliters	0.03381	fluid ounces
gallons	3.785	liters	liters	0.2642	gallons
cubic feet	0.02832	cubic meters	cubic meters	35.31	cubic feet
cubic yards	0.7646	cubic meters	cubic meters	1.308	cubic yards
Weight					
ounces	28.35	grams	grams	0.03527	ounces
pounds	0.4536	kilograms	kilograms	2.205	pounds
short tons	0.9072	metric tons	metric tons	1.102	short tons
Temperature					
Fahrenheit (°F)	subtract 32, then multiply by 5/9	Celsius (°C)	Celsius (°C)	multiply by 9/5, then add 32	Fahrenheit (°F)
kelvin (°k)	subtract 273.15	Celsius (°C)	kelvin (°k)	Multiply by 9/5, then add 306.15	Fahrenheit (°F)

Metric Prefixes			
PREFIX	EXPONENT CONVERTED TO WHOLE NUMBERS	PREFIX	EXPONENT CONVERTED TO WHOLE NUMBERS
atto-	$10^{-18} = 0.000,000,000,000,000,001$	deka-	$10^1 = 10$
femto-	$10^{-15} = 0.000,000,000,000,001$	hecto-	$10^2 = 100$
pico	$10^{-12} = 0.000,000,000,001$	kilo-	$10^3 = 1,000$
nano-	$10^{-9} = 0.000,000,001$	mega-	$10^6 = 1,000,000$
micro-	$10^{-6} = 0.000,001$	giga-	$10^9 = 1,000,000,000$
milli	$10^{-3} = 0.001$	tetra-	$10^{12} = 1,000,000,000,000$
centi	$10^{-2} = 0.01$	peta-	$10^{15} = 1,000,000,000,000,000$
deci-	$10^{-1} = 0.1$	exa-	$10^{18} = 1,000,000,000,000,000,000$
Note: $10^0 = 1$			

CHAPTER 1

Introduction and Purpose and Need for Agency Action

This chapter introduces Sandia National Laboratories' (SNL's) role in supporting the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) statutory missions and operations, a statement of the purpose and need for the Department's action, a description of DOE missions for SNL, an overview of the alternatives to be considered, and a review of the decisions that the DOE will make based in part on the findings in this Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement (SWEIS) in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (42 United States Code [U.S.C.] Section 4321). In addition, it discusses the public participation process, related NEPA documents, and the organization and contents of the remaining chapters in the SWEIS.

1.1 INTRODUCTION

SNL is one of several national laboratories that support the DOE's statutory responsibilities for nuclear weapons research and design, development of other energy technologies, and basic scientific research. SNL is one of the largest laboratories in the world, with an annual budget of approximately \$1.4 billion and a workforce of approximately 7,500 (DOE 1998j). SNL is composed of four geographically separated facilities: Albuquerque, New Mexico (SNL/NM); Tonopah, Nevada; Kauai, Hawaii; and Livermore, California (SNL/CA). This SWEIS focuses on SNL/NM. (A SWEIS was completed in 1992 for SNL/CA and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (DOE/EIS-0157) (DOE 1992f).) SNL/NM comprises approximately 8,800 ac of Federal land (owned by the DOE, U.S. Department of Defense [DoD], and U.S. Forest Service [USFS]) on Kirtland Air Force Base (KAFB) southeast of the city of Albuquerque (Figure 1.1–1) (SNL/NM 1997a). SNL/NM shares KAFB with other Federal agencies, primarily the U.S. Air Force (USAF) and the USFS. The USAF is a cooperating agency in the preparation of the SWEIS.

The DOE has prepared the SWEIS to examine the environmental impacts associated with three alternatives for SNL/NM's continued operation (see Section 1.2 and Chapter 3 for additional information regarding the alternatives). In the SWEIS, the DOE describes the consequences, both onsite and offsite, of ongoing and proposed SNL/NM operations and compares the potential consequences to three alternative levels of future operations.

DOE activities at the national laboratories and production facilities are known as mission lines. In the DOE *Strategic Plan*, mission lines are also known as business lines. Descriptions of DOE mission/business lines follow (DOE 1997c):


The Importance of SNL's National Security Role

The continuing need for SNL to support the DOE's national security mission line was confirmed by President Clinton, who stated, **"...to meet the challenge of ensuring confidence in the safety and reliability of our stockpile, I have concluded that the continued vitality of all three DOE nuclear weapons laboratories will be essential."** Statement by the President: Future of Major Federal Laboratories (The White House 1995).

- *National Security*—effectively support and maintain a safe, secure, and reliable enduring stockpile of nuclear weapons without nuclear testing; safely dismantle and dispose of excess nuclear weapons; and provide technical leadership for national and global nonproliferation and nuclear safety activities.
- *Energy Resources*—ensure adequate supplies of clean energy; reduce U.S. vulnerability to supply disruptions; encourage efficiency and advance alternative and renewable energy technologies; and increase energy choices for all consumers.

The DOE Mission Statement

To foster a secure and reliable energy system that is environmentally and economically sustainable, to be a responsible steward of the nation's nuclear weapons, to clean up our own facilities, and to support continued United States leadership in science and technology. (DOE 1996e)



Source: SNL/NM 1997j

Figure 1.1–1. SNL/NM, KAFB, and Surrounding Region

SNL/NM is located within the boundaries of KAFB, southeast of Albuquerque in Bernalillo county.

- *Environmental Quality*—reduce the environment, safety, and health risks and threats from DOE facilities and materials; safely and permanently dispose of civilian spent nuclear fuel and defense-related radioactive waste; and develop the technologies and institutions required for solving domestic and international environmental problems.
- *Science and Technology*—combine the unique resources of the Department’s laboratories and the nation’s universities to maintain leadership in basic research and to advance scientific knowledge; focus applied research and technology development in support of the Department’s mission lines; contribute to the nation’s science and mathematics education; and deliver relevant scientific and technical information.

1.2 PURPOSE AND NEED FOR AGENCY ACTION

The DOE needs to continue to meet its responsibilities for national security, energy resources, environmental quality, and science and technology. These responsibilities are met, in part, by national laboratories, of which SNL is one. The primary purpose for SNL is to serve as a national resource for scientific, technical, and engineering expertise, with a special focus on national security. The DOE needs to continue to fulfill its responsibilities as mandated by statute, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD), and congressional authorization and appropriation. The DOE goal in meeting these responsibilities is to do so in a manner that protects human health and the environment.

DOE missions for SNL have evolved over time in response to national needs. When assigning missions to SNL, the DOE considers many factors, including PDDs; the *National Defense Authorization Act of 1994* (Public Law 103-160); the DoD Nuclear Posture Review; and treaties, both implemented and proposed, including the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I, proposed START II, and the proposed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Following are specialized capabilities SNL/NM provides in support of the Department’s mission lines:

- science-based performance and reliability testing and computer-based modeling of nuclear components;
- production of nonnuclear components;
- production of neutron generators;

SWEIS Terminology

Mission	DOE’s mission is to foster a secure and reliable energy system that is environmentally and economically sustainable, to be a responsible steward of the nation’s nuclear weapons, to clean up its facilities, and to support continued United States leadership in science and technology.
Mission Lines	The DOE accomplishes its major responsibilities by assigning groups or types of activities (National Security, Energy Resources, Environmental Quality, Science and Technology) to its system of national laboratories and production facilities.
Programs	The DOE is organized into Program Offices. Each has a primary responsibility within one of the four DOE mission lines. The Program Offices provide funding and direction for activities at DOE facilities. Similar, coordinated sets of activities that meet Program Office responsibilities are referred to as programs. Programs are usually long-term efforts with broad goals or requirements.
Capabilities	The combination of equipment, facilities, infrastructure, and expertise required to implement mission assignments.

- materials science, including studying behavior of materials under high temperature and pressure;
- engineering and high-energy physics;
- high explosives research and development (R&D) and testing;
- microelectronics and photonics research;
- medical isotopes production; and
- radiation effects experimentation and accelerator operations.

For additional discussion of SNL/NM’s support of DOE mission lines, see Section 2.1.

Description of Alternatives

No Action Ongoing DOE and interagency programs and activities at SNL/NM would continue the status quo, that is, operating at planned levels as reflected in current DOE management plans. In some cases, these planned levels include increases over today's operating levels. This would also include any recent activities that have already been approved by DOE and have existing NEPA documentation.

Expanded Operations DOE and interagency programs and activities at SNL/NM would increase to the highest reasonable activity levels that could be supported by current facilities and the potential expansion and construction of new facilities for specifically identified future actions.

Reduced Operations DOE and interagency programs and activities at SNL/NM would be reduced to the minimum level of operations needed to maintain SNL/NM facilities and equipment in an operational readiness mode.

1.3 PROPOSED ACTION AND ALTERNATIVES

The DOE proposes to continue operating SNL and managing its resources in a manner that meets evolving DOE mission lines and that responds to the concerns of affected and interested individuals and agencies.

The DOE identified three alternatives—No Action, Expanded Operations, and Reduced Operations—that would meet its purpose and need for agency action and support existing and potential future program-related activities at SNL/NM. The Notice of Intent (NOI) (62 Federal Register [FR] 29332) proposed that the first two alternatives be considered in the SWEIS (see Chapter 14); however, a third alternative, the Reduced Operations Alternative, was added to show a broader range of alternatives and respond to comments received from the public during the scoping process (Section 1.7). The SWEIS analyzes the environmental impacts of activities at SNL/NM associated with these three alternatives, as well as activities common to all alternatives including maintenance support and material

management. The alternatives are more fully described in Chapter 3.

1.4 OBJECTIVE OF THE SWEIS

In the SWEIS, the DOE is examining the environmental impacts of the three alternatives for the continued operation of the laboratory. The objective of the SWEIS is to provide the DOE, other agencies, and the public with the following:

- descriptions of the affected environment, current operation, and potential impacts associated with the continued operation of SNL/NM;
- sufficient information to facilitate routine decisions by DOE regarding verification of operational status;
- a document that can be used for tiering (linking) NEPA analyses for future proposed actions, to eliminate repetitive discussions of similar issues and focus on the actual issues ready for decisions at each level of environmental review; and
- an understanding of SNL/NM's contribution to cumulative environmental impacts in the context of KAFB, other DOE activities at the site, and other activities in the Albuquerque area.

The last site-wide NEPA document for SNL/NM was prepared in 1977 (ERDA 1977). Since that time, site programs and activity levels have changed. Recently, the DOE has made programmatic decisions on the *Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Stockpile Stewardship and Management* (DOE 1996a), the *Final Waste Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement* (DOE 1997i), the *Medical Isotopes Production Project: Molybdenum-99 and Related Isotopes Environmental Impact Statement* (DOE 1996b), and the *Nonnuclear Consolidation Environmental Assessment* (DOE/EA-0792) (DOE 1993c). Based on these changes and programmatic decisions, the DOE decided that a thorough environmental analysis was needed to describe impacts of ongoing SNL/NM operations.

1.5 DECISIONS TO BE SUPPORTED BY THE SWEIS

The SWEIS will be used to support DOE decisions on the levels of operations at SNL/NM, as well as serving as a basis for tiering future NEPA analyses and decisions regarding specific activities, as needed.

No sooner than 30 days after the final SWEIS is issued, the DOE will consider preparing a Record of Decision

(ROD). The ROD will contain the DOE's decisions on future operating levels for SNL/NM. In the ROD, the DOE will explain all factors, including environmental impacts, that the Department considered in reaching its decision and identify the environmentally preferable alternative or alternatives. The DOE may select one of the three alternatives or a combination of the alternatives analyzed in the SWEIS. If mitigation measures, monitoring, or other conditions are adopted as part of the DOE decision, these, too, will be summarized in the ROD.

1.6 PROJECTS UNDER CONSIDERATION

The following five projects are under consideration, but have not been included in this NEPA process because they are not ripe for decision-making. Separate NEPA review of each would be conducted before implementation of these projects.

- *X-1 Advanced Radiation Source*—an accelerator envisioned to generate X-ray outputs far greater than those that can be generated on the SNL/NM Z-machine or the ZX machine. The X-1 would enable a comprehensive range of weapon research activities, made possible by achievement of high fusion yield. Four potential alternate locations for this facility, including SNL/NM, were outlined in the Final PEIS for Stockpile Stewardship and Management. However, pre-conceptual design on this project is stopped at this time, and the DOE does not know whether it will propose to pursue the project.
- *ZX*—a concept for a ZX experimental facility is under discussion that would provide a new X-ray source for high-energy density R&D and weapon effects testing. This facility would entail modifications to facilities in Technical Area (TA)-IV. The ZX would provide an increase in SNL/NM capabilities for stockpile stewardship studies. In concept, this facility would use existing facilities and infrastructure in TA-IV, but would require an additional building to house the pulsed-power accelerator and experimental area. The ZX would produce a significant increase in soft X-ray energy output (up to 7 MJ) per shot. Target materials would be similar to those used or planned for the Z facility.
- *Annular Core Pulse Reactor-II*—a proposed reactor that would use the same fundamental design as the existing Annular Core Research Reactor (ACRR) facility. This reactor could be used for defense

program-related testing using the uranium oxide-beryllium oxide fuel from the existing ACRR. This facility could be constructed in TA-V. A potential scenario for operation of such a reactor is analyzed under the Expanded Operations Alternative, but would require separate NEPA review if the DOE proposes pursuing the project.

- *ACRR-medical isotopes production privatization*—The DOE could decide to privatize its medical isotopes production in the future.
- *DOE-owned portion of a local research park*—86 ac of undeveloped DOE land adjacent to the Sandia Science and Technology Park may be developed in the future. The entire research park comprises approximately 200 ac, and various public and private entities are involved in the development activities. This project has not been analyzed in this SWEIS, but is described in Section 6.4.1.

1.7 PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

Public participation is integral to the preparation of the SWEIS. This section summarizes the issues and concerns that were identified during the public scoping process.

1.7.1 Scoping Process

Scoping is a process for determining the range of issues to be addressed in an environmental impact statement (EIS) and for identifying significant issues associated with the alternatives (40 Code of Federal Regulations §1501.7). The objectives of the scoping process are to notify interested persons, agencies, and other groups about the proposed action and the alternatives being considered; solicit comments about environmental issues, alternatives for the proposed action, and other items of interest; and consider those comments in the preparation of the SWEIS.

Scoping for the SWEIS consisted of both internal DOE scoping and external public scoping processes. The internal DOE scoping process began with working groups comprised of DOE managers and SNL/NM laboratory managers. The external scoping process period began after the publication of the NOI (62 FR 29332) on May 30, 1997, and continued until July 14, 1997. The purpose of the NOI was to notify the public that the DOE was intending to prepare a SWEIS on SNL/NM operations and invite other Federal agencies, Native American tribes, state and local governments, and the general public to participate in the scoping process. The NOI also presented background information on

SNL/NM and preliminary alternatives and issues identified through the internal scoping process.

Two scoping meetings for the SWEIS were held for the general public on June 23, 1997, at the University of New Mexico Continuing Education Center in Albuquerque, New Mexico. At these meetings, the DOE presented information on its proposal to prepare the SWEIS and the alternatives that were to be analyzed. The public was invited to present oral and/or written comments at the scoping meetings or by telephone by way of a toll-free number. Written comments could also be submitted by mail, facsimile, or electronic mail.

1.7.2 Summary of Scoping Issues and Concerns

During the public scoping process, 29 individuals and organizations either submitted requests for information or made oral or written comments. These comments, summarized in Table 1.7–1, were sorted based on the organization of the SWEIS. All of these comments have been reviewed and considered at various stages during the preparation of the SWEIS. Many are explicitly addressed in the pertinent sections of the first seven chapters of the SWEIS.

1.8 RELATED NEPA DOCUMENTS

The following NEPA documents analyzed ongoing programs and activities at SNL/NM:

- *Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Stockpile Stewardship and Management* (DOE/EIS 0236-F) (DOE 1996a).
- *Final Waste Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Managing Treatment, Storage, and Disposal of Radioactive and Hazardous Waste* (DOE/EIS-0200-F) (DOE 1997i).
- *Medical Isotopes Production Project: Molybdenum-99 and Related Isotopes Environmental Impact Statement* (DOE/EIS-0249-F) (DOE 1996b).
- *Nonnuclear Consolidation Environmental Assessment* (DOE/EA-0792) (DOE 1993c).
- *Environmental Assessment of the Environmental Restoration Project at Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico* (DOE/EA-1140) (DOE 1996c).
- *Final Rapid Reactivation Project Environmental Assessment* (DOE/EA-1264) (DOE 1999a).

- *Environmental Assessment of the Radioactive and Mixed Waste Management Facility* (DOE/EA-0466) (DOE 1993a).
- *Environmental Assessment for Operations, Upgrades, and Modifications in SNL/NM Technical Area-IV* (DOE/EA-1153) (DOE 1996g).
- *Environmental Assessment for the Processing and Environmental Technology Laboratory (PETL)* (DOE/EA-0945) (DOE 1995d).
- *Neutron Generator/Switch Tube Prototyping Relocation Environmental Assessment* (DOE/EA-0879) (DOE 1994a).

1.8.1 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (DOE/EIS-0236-F)

The DOE prepared the Stockpile Stewardship and Management (SSM) Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) and evaluated stockpile stewardship activities required to maintain a high level of confidence in the safety, reliability, and performance of nuclear weapons in the absence of underground testing and to be prepared to test weapons if directed by the President (DOE 1996a). Stockpile management activities include maintenance, evaluation, repair, or replacement of weapons in existing stockpiles.

The SSM PEIS examined the existing basic capabilities of the DOE laboratory and industrial complex, including SNL. The ROD for the PEIS determined SNL would continue as one of three weapons laboratories possessing most of the core intellectual and technical competencies of the U.S. in nuclear weapons.

1.8.2 Final Waste Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Managing Treatment, Storage, and Disposal of Radioactive and Hazardous Waste (DOE/EIS-0200-F)

In the Waste Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (WM PEIS), the DOE evaluated the environmental impacts of alternatives for managing five types of radioactive and/or hazardous waste generated by defense and research activities at a variety of DOE sites around the U.S. SNL/NM manages four of the five waste types: low-level waste (LLW), low-level mixed waste (LLMW), transuranic (TRU) waste, and hazardous waste. The DOE decided on January 23, 1998, that

Table 1.7–1. Summary Public Scoping Comments

COMMENT CATEGORY/ RESOURCE AREA	COMMENT
General	Discuss the effects of Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico (SNL/NM) on the environment.
	Examine current and future energy requirements and conservation potential.
	What are your proposed activities now and 10 years from now?
Alternatives	Return all or part of the withdrawn U.S. Forest Service lands to public use.
	Consider zero production.
	Evaluate neutron generator production if manufactured at a higher level than indicated in the Nonnuclear Consolidation Environmental Assessment (EA).
	Consider reduced operations.
	Consider relocating and/or outsourcing of some current activities.
	Consider closure of SNL/NM.
	Continue some operations and increase/decrease others.
	Concern was expressed about the DOE's objectivity in defining minimum operations.
	Expand renewable energy, energy efficiency, and waste management research facilities.
	Dedicate vast unused lands owned by SNL as an Environmental Research Park.
Land Use	Give full consideration of the use and impacts to U.S. Forest Service land.
	Consider impacts from testing/operations on land use, including tribal lands.
Geology	The potential for seismic activity along earthquake faults in the Manzanos makes the Manzano facility unsuited for nuclear storage.
Water Resources	Discuss water use, conservation, and cleanup.
	Consider the effects of testing on water in the East Mountain area.
	SNL should expand its research on wastewater treatment and water reuse technologies.
	Studies must include effects of an accident on groundwater quality.
	What impact will waste discharges to groundwater have on Isleta, and what impact will current and future surface water discharge have on the Rio Grande?
	Determine the extent of groundwater contamination.
	Is there a groundwater monitoring program in place?

Table 1.7–1. Summary Public Scoping Comments (continued)

COMMENT CATEGORY/ RESOURCE AREA	COMMENT
Water Resources (continued)	What is the current and future water use, and what is its impact on the Albuquerque Basin?
	How many acre feet of water rights do you currently have? Do you anticipate purchasing more in the future?
	Provide data on the present number of wells, including depth, water quantity, and water quality. Will more wells be needed?
	Is surface water currently used, including from the Rio Grande? Will it be used in the future?
	Is there any surface water contamination?
	Is there a surface water monitoring program in place?
Biological Resources	Consider implication of traffic associated with Sandia and Kirtland Air Force Base (KAFB) on water resources.
	Consider impacts on migratory birds such as the burrowing owl and gray vireo.
	Evaluate any research involving the capture and rendering of animals on KAFB for chemical or other analysis.
	What are the types of wildlife on your lands and how will they be impacted by future activities? If they migrate, where would they go?
Cultural and Religious	Have there been any tissue studies performed on any of the wildlife to determine if they have chemical concentrations that might be harmful to humans?
	Consider impacts to Native American archaeological sites and artifacts.
	Evaluate how impacts to cultural resources and properties, which may be historically significant, will be minimized.
	Full consideration must be given to Native American cultural and religious sites.
	Address cumulative impacts to traditional cultural properties.
	Consideration should be given to loss of access for Pueblo of Isleta to traditional cultural properties.
Air Quality	A full ethnographic survey of impacted lands should be conducted.
	Air quality must be addressed openly, otherwise public suspicion is fostered.
	Impacts of the open burn facility on the adjacent public use areas and the East Mountain area, including black smoke and forest fires, must be considered.
	Air conformity issues related to onsite transportation must be considered.
	Air conformity issues related to offsite transportation must be considered.
Consider the cumulative impacts to Pueblo of Isleta due to discharges of hazardous air pollutants, including radionuclides.	

Table 1.7–1. Summary Public Scoping Comments (continued)

COMMENT CATEGORY/ RESOURCE AREA	COMMENT
<i>Air Quality</i> <i>(continued)</i>	How many air pollutants are currently emitted and how will they be increased if activities are expanded?
<i>Health and Safety</i>	Could there be an increased incidence of thyroid cancer in the nearby community due to operation on KAFB?
	Have SNL/NM operations increased the incidence of child deformities?
	What is the current physical condition of the laboratories?
	How does the current condition of these laboratories compare with industry standards?
	What kind of environmental risk is posed by operating laboratories in their current physical condition?
	Are there criteria to ensure that a lab operation is appropriate to the condition of the lab?
	Is there a real option for a researcher or lab manager to stop work in a lab because it is unsafe?
	How has the maintenance or replacement budget for the individual labs fared and what is its future?
	The integrity of radioactive waste storage areas has to be examined to prevent environmental health hazards.
	Risks to surrounding neighborhoods in the case of an accident need to be studied.
	Cleanup standards for U.S. Forest Service land must consider ecological risks, not just the industrial human health cleanup standard.
	What types and quantities of nuclear materials and chemicals are used at SNL/NM?
	Does SNL/NM have an emergency response plan in place in the event of an emergency, and is the lab prepared for an evacuation if necessary?
Are employees trained to handle a nuclear and/or chemical emergency?	
What are the potential public and worker exposures to radiological and/or hazardous materials?	
<i>Transportation</i>	How can SNL/NM assist in developing more efficient, less intrusive transportation corridors?
	In what ways can SNL/NM assist in implementing a Southeast Corridor bypass?
	Discuss the effects of onsite transportation of radioactive and hazardous materials and wastes on the site workforce and the general public.
	Discuss impacts related to offsite transportation of radioactive and hazardous materials and wastes.
	Address the impact of SNL operations in relation to city and county policies regarding transportation planning.
	Is it in the best interest of the community to transport mixed waste to SNL/NM for treatment?

Table 1.7–1. Summary Public Scoping Comments (continued)

COMMENT CATEGORY/ RESOURCE AREA	COMMENT
<i>Transportation (continued)</i>	Will nuclear materials and chemicals be transported via Interstate 25 and the railroad?
<i>Noise</i>	Concerns were expressed about noise from explosions that can be felt and cause structural damage.
<i>Socioeconomics</i>	How can SNL/NM assist local communities in improving housing and services in the neighboring areas?
	Consider more employment opportunities for people whose lives and legacies are invested in New Mexico.
	Recognize the East Mountain area as an impacted community from SNL/NM activities.
	SNL/NM has had beneficial socioeconomic impacts on the Albuquerque area including contributions to the economy, establishment of businesses, as well as research, development, and technical support.
	Consider the economic effects of SNL/NM on the surrounding community and Isleta Pueblo.
	Address the impact of SNL operations in relation to city and county policies regarding growth management.
	How many Native Americans are employed at the laboratories?
<i>Environmental Justice</i>	Consider offsite transportation impacts to any disadvantaged groups.
	Consider impacts to disadvantaged populations or Native American interests.
<i>Analysis of Impacts</i>	Analyze direct impacts, as well as cumulative impacts.
	Consider impacts to U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities not located in Technical Areas-I, -II, -III, -IV, and -V and Coyote Canyon.
	Consider the contribution of the Corrective Action Management Unit (CAMU) when evaluating cumulative impacts.
	To properly evaluate cumulative impacts, analyze remaining activities (other than CAMU) of the Environmental Restoration Project.
	Document all environmental impacts, as well as cumulative impacts, of SNL, KAFB, and associated facilities using Federal government lands, including U.S. Forest Service lands.
	The Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement (SWEIS) cannot depend on the analyses in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) and the Waste Management PEIS.
	Consider cumulative impacts to Pueblo of Isleta lands.
<i>Environmental Restoration/Waste and Waste Management</i>	Confirm the existence of unexploded ordinance previously reported by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD).
	How has waste handling been improved?
	What is being done to detect hazardous plastic hardeners that have been buried near the Manzano facility?

Table 1.7–1. Summary Public Scoping Comments (continued)

COMMENT CATEGORY/ RESOURCE AREA	COMMENT
Environmental Restoration/Waste and Waste Management (continued)	The DOE needs to include thorough studies of potential cleanup sites and develop implementation strategies for cleanup of waste storage facilities.
	Studies must include effects of contamination on soils.
	If Mesa del Sol is contaminated from any SNL/NM sources, SNL/NM has a duty to clean it up.
	When considering returning U.S. Forest Service land to public access, the necessary decontamination and decommissioning must be carried out.
	Concerns relating to the Medical Isotope Production project need to be addressed including the life of the project, where and how spent fuel rods will be stored, how many spent fuel rods will be generated, has the disposal cost been considered, and which DOE program would pay for it.
	Consider impacts to Isleta property from soil contamination due to waste discharges.
	Consider heavy metal and depleted uranium contamination from overshoot and explosives debris.
Regulatory Compliance	What are current waste management practices, and are hazardous materials currently stored or disposed of onsite?
	Consider SNL/NM s and KAFB s compliance with environmental laws, including the <i>Clean Air Act</i> and <i>Clean Water Act</i> . A study of Native American traditional cultural properties on KAFB and the U.S. Forest Service withdrawn land must consider not only the <i>National Historic Preservation Act</i> , but also the relevant aspects of the <i>American Indian Religious Freedoms Act</i> .
Public Involvement	Make technical data more available, including by computer access.
	Public involvement and input must be considered.
	There should be total public disclosure of activities.
	Information should be disseminated to the local Hispanic community and be available in Spanish.
	Copies of <i>National Environmental Policy Act</i> (NEPA) documents and supporting analyses should be available to the public for independent review.
	All comments, DOE responses, and other documents should be available on the Internet.
	Will there be public participation meetings?
	A work plan or some other similar document should be made available for public comment by the Fall of 1997 that would identify schedules, alternatives, facilities to be analyzed, contractors preparing the SWEIS, roles of other Federal agencies, and other NEPA documents the DOE intends to prepare during preparation of the SWEIS.
	The DOE should actively cooperate with and involve the Pueblo of Isleta in the preparation of the draft SWEIS.

Table 1.7–1. Summary Public Scoping Comments (concluded)

COMMENT CATEGORY/ RESOURCE AREA	COMMENT
Public Involvement (continued)	The DOE should provide for ongoing public input during the SWEIS process and keep the public informed on SWEIS progress.
	The Open House format of the June 23, 1997, public meeting permitted good communication and should be continued.
	The DOE should demonstrate during the NEPA process a respectful, continuing government-to-government relationship with the Pueblo of Isleta.
Mission, Policy and Management	Technology transfer between SNL/NM and Bernalillo county and local governments should continue to be encouraged.
	SNL/NM should stop open burn tests and any and all reclamation of plutonium pits from warheads.
	The DOE should set time limits for each constituent part of the SWEIS with the total time not to exceed 15 months.
	SNL/NM is a good place to work.
	Concern was expressed over ethics of experiments such as human radiation experiments on people living around SNL/NM.
	The DOE should reassign SNL/NM s mission statement and make it concentrate on energy and material efficiency, renewable resource research, waste management and recycling, and development of biodegradable and reusable materials.
	SNL/NM should make a commitment to engage in an arms control program, work on weapons disarmament, and seek improvements to the recent test-ban agreement.
Document Preparation	The SWEIS should be extended to cover business incubator activities.
	In the event of a war, would SNL/NM be a target?
	It should be explained in the SWEIS how the DOE will ensure that all proposed actions will receive the appropriate level of NEPA review after the document is completed.
	A description of how the DOE intends to condition funding for mitigation, if proposed, and a progress report on mitigation should be included in the SWEIS or a mitigation action plan.
	The many other project-specific NEPA documents that SNL/NM has prepared, other than the two called out in the Notice of Intent, should be considered.
	Any relationship between SNL/NM and contractors selected to prepare the SWEIS should be described in the disclosure statement.
	A classified appendix is not warranted.

Source: HNUS 1997

SNL/NM TRU waste would be sent to Los Alamos National Laboratory for storage pending disposal (63 FR 3629), and on August 5, 1998, that SNL/NM would continue to ship its hazardous waste offsite for treatment (DOE 1998m). The DOE has not yet decided

on a national strategy for treatment and disposal of LLW and LLMW; but under the preferred alternatives for both waste types, SNL/NM would treat its own waste onsite, then ship it offsite for disposal.

1.8.3 Medical Isotopes Production Project Environmental Impact Statement (DOE/EIS-0249-F)

The DOE prepared the Medical Isotopes Production Project (MIPP) Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and evaluated the domestic production of molybdenum-99 and related medical isotopes (DOE 1996b). The MIPP EIS's five alternatives regarding the production of a reliable domestic supply of molybdenum-99 included a baseline production level of 10 to 30 percent of the current U.S. demand and the capability to increase production to supply 100 percent of the U.S. demand.

The MIPP EIS evaluated the ACRR capabilities, target fabrication, target processing at the Hot Cell Facility, and waste management capabilities at SNL/NM. The ROD for the MIPP EIS determined SNL/NM would become a domestic producer and supplier of molybdenum-99 (61 FR 48921).

1.8.4 Nonnuclear Consolidation Environmental Assessment (DOE/EA-0792)

The DOE prepared the *Nonnuclear Consolidation Environmental Assessment* (EA) and evaluated the consolidation of nonnuclear component manufacturing, storage, and surveillance functions (DOE 1993c). The EA discussed six categories of capabilities: electrical/mechanical; tritium handling; detonation; beryllium technology and pit support; neutron generators, cap assemblies, and batteries; and special products.

The Finding of No Significant Impact for the EA determined the significance of impacts for the continuation of SNL/NM's existing research, development, testing, and prototyping capability, which would be augmented to provide the necessary fabrication capability for future neutron generators, cap assemblies, and other nonnuclear components (DOE 1993c).

1.8.5 Environmental Assessment of the Environmental Restoration Project at SNL/NM (DOE/EA-1140)

The DOE prepared the Environmental Restoration (ER) Project EA and Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI). The EA evaluated the environmental impacts

of site restoration characterization and waste cleanup activities (corrective actions) at SNL/NM (DOE 1996c). The corrective actions included a range of waste treatment options at a currently estimated 182 ER Project sites. The corrective measures implement treatment technologies that are reasonable, feasible, and capable of being implemented to achieve regulatory compliance.

1.8.6 Rapid Reactivation Project Environmental Assessment (DOE/EA-1264)

The Rapid Reactivation Project EA analyzed alternatives for continued neutron generator production. The DOE's FONSI covers the proposed alternative that increases the annual neutron generator production capacity from its current level of 600 to 2,000. Existing buildings and infrastructure would be used to the maximum extent possible to meet the additional production needs. The addition of approximately 26,290 gross square feet of facility space and other facility modifications would be necessary to achieve the proposed production capacity.

1.8.7 Environmental Assessment of the Radioactive and Mixed Waste Management Facility (DOE/EA-0466)

The DOE prepared the Radioactive and Mixed Waste Management Facility EA and FONSI for the proposed completion of construction and subsequent operation of the RMWMF in TA-III. The RMWMF was designed to receive, store, characterize, conduct limited bench-scale treatment of, repackage, and certify LLW and LLMW for shipment to an offsite disposal or treatment facility.

1.8.8 Environmental Assessment for Operations, Upgrades, and Modifications in SNL/NM Technical Area-IV (DOE/EA-1153)

The EA for Operations, Upgrades, and Modifications in SNL/NM Technical Area-IV and FONSI were prepared by the DOE for continuing existing operations, modifying an existing accelerator (Particle Beam Fusion Accelerator II) to support defense-related Z-pinch experiments, and constructing two transformer oil storage tanks to support the expansion of the Advanced Pulsed Power Research Module.

1.8.9 Environmental Assessment for the Processing and Environmental Technology Laboratory (PETL) (DOE/EA-0945)

In the EA for the PETL at SNL/NM, the DOE analyzed alternatives for the building and operation of the PETL. The DOE proposed constructing the PETL on KAFB and relocating operations from existing facilities to the new building in TA-I. The DOE issued a FONSI associated with the proposed alternative.

1.8.10 Neutron Generator/Switch Tube Prototyping Relocation Environmental Assessment (DOE/EA-0879)

The Neutron Generator/Switch Tube Prototyping Relocation EA analyzed two alternatives for expanded prototyping of neutron tubes, neutron generators, and switch tubes. The DOE's proposed action would relocate neutron tube, neutron generator, and switch tube prototyping operations from Buildings 891 and 878 to a Building 870 annex. A prototyping capability for electronic neutron generators would be established in Building 878. The DOE prepared a FONSI for this action.

1.9 COOPERATING AGENCIES

On May 30, 1997, the NOI announced the USAF as a cooperating agency because of the interdependence of KAFB and the DOE planning for SNL/NM. The USAF has participated in planning meetings, developing analytical methodologies and data projections, and reviewing analyses for and predecisional drafts of the SWEIS.

1.10 OTHER DOE OPERATIONS AT KAFB

In addition to SNL/NM, the following DOE-funded facilities are located on KAFB. The impacts from these facilities are not analyzed in Chapter 5 because they are not under the management of SNL. They are analyzed as part of cumulative effects in Chapter 6.

- The Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute, formerly the Inhalation Toxicology Research Institute, is a private business that leases space from the DOE. The Institute began operations in the 1960s as a research team for determining the long-term health impacts of inhaling radioactive particles. It has since become a recognized center for inhalation toxicology and related fields.
- The Nonproliferation and National Security Institute ensures the efficient and effective training of Safeguards and Security Division personnel from throughout the DOE who are, or might become, involved in the protection of materials and facilities vital to the nation's defense.
- The Transportation Safeguards Division (TSD) coordinates, implements, and operates the DOE Safeguards Program that transports special nuclear materials (SNM). The TSD coordinates and plans weapons distribution with the DoD and coordinates SNM shipments for all DOE field offices.
- Federal Manufacturing & Technology/ New Mexico, a division of AlliedSignal, is an applied science and engineering organization engaged in research, analysis, testing, and field operations. A major portion of this work is in the design, fabrication, and testing of electro-optic and recording systems for capturing fast transient signals.
- Ross Aviation is the DOE's support contractor providing air cargo and passenger service. Ross transports cargo between production plants, national laboratories, test sites, and military facilities and provides special passenger and cargo flights on request.
- The DOE's Albuquerque Operations Office complex houses DOE and contractor staff.
- The Energy Training Complex consists of classrooms for DOE training.

Figure 1.10–1 shows the approximate locations of these facilities. The above operations, along with KAFB activities, are discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.




Figure 1.10-1. Seven Additional DOE Facilities at KAFB
Other DOE-funded operations not related to SNL/NM are located within the boundaries of KAFB.

Source: SNL/NM 1997i

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CHAPTER 2

Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico Operations

Chapter 2 provides an overview of Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico (SNL/NM) operations, programs, and facilities. It begins with a description of the history of the laboratory and site-wide operations, followed by a discussion of SNL/NM support for U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) mission lines, programs, and projects. Descriptions of selected facilities and their operations are located at the end of the chapter.

During World War II, nuclear weapons were designed, developed, and tested entirely at Los Alamos Laboratory. In late 1945, Los Alamos Laboratory began transferring its field-testing and engineering organization, known as Z-Division, to Sandia Base, near Albuquerque. This organization was the nucleus of what became Sandia Laboratory in 1949. The initial focus of the newly formed Sandia Laboratory was on nuclear weapons engineering and production coordination, with a growing emphasis on research and development (R&D) to improve weapons design.

By 1952, the Sandia Laboratory focused on weapons development. The laboratory undertook extensive field testing of components, supported the atmospheric tests by its partner laboratories, and established an advanced development group to anticipate future projects regarding nuclear weapons proliferation, weapons development, and treaty monitoring technologies.

In the 1960s and early 1970s, the growing emphasis on strengthening engineering applications resulted in new missions lines and programs. These new areas, energy research and safeguards and security, addressed international concerns such as the energy crisis and international terrorism. They remain as current programs in the areas of nuclear, fossil, and renewable energy.

As international arms control efforts increased in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, the U.S. emphasized treaty monitoring, safety, security, and control of the national nuclear weapons stockpile. With the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, the role of SNL/NM (formerly known as Sandia Laboratory), to act as stockpile steward ensuring nonproliferation and continued safety, security, and reliability, took on greater importance.

The DOE uses management and operating (M&O) contractors to manage its facilities, including SNL/NM. SNL/NM was managed and operated by American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T) from 1949 to 1993. In

1993, the M&O contract was awarded to Sandia Corporation, a subsidiary of Martin Marietta Corporation, now known as Lockheed Martin Corporation.

2.1 SNL/NM SUPPORT FOR DOE MISSION LINES


As discussed in Chapter 1, the DOE is responsible for ensuring the safety, reliability, and effectiveness of the nation's nuclear deterrent; fostering a secure and reliable energy system that is environmentally and economically sustainable; reducing the environment, safety, and health risks and impacts from DOE facilities and materials; maintaining leadership in basic research; and advancing scientific knowledge.

SNL/NM has unique capabilities that support the DOE Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense Programs (DP) and other DOE programs. DP provides approximately 47 percent of SNL/NM's budget (Figure 2.1–1).

SNL/NM conducts R&D activities involving over 90 percent of the individual nonnuclear parts of a typical nuclear weapon.

SNL/NM's primary capabilities, as listed in Chapter 1, are as follows:

- Supporting stockpile surveillance activities of hardened weapons systems and components to ensure these systems function properly when exposed to radiation from hostile sources, whether encountered by satellites and reentry vehicles in space or by the conditions created by nuclear detonations. SNL/NM integrates experimentation and computational simulation in support of radiation effects testing, radiation transport, diagnostics, and analyses to certify that electrical, mechanical, energetic, and other nonnuclear components will operate as designed in such hostile radiation environments.



Source: SNL/NM 1997i

Figure 2.1–1. SNL Funding Sources by Major Program

SNL funding is provided by a variety of major programs.

- Developing specific, limited “piece parts” required to repair deterioration or defects in existing weapons components or to make modifications essential to maintaining deterrent credibility as the existing stockpile continues to shrink and age.
- Characterizing and demonstrating the utility of pulsed-power-generated soft X-ray sources for weapons physics and inertial confinement fusion experiments. SNL/NM combines diagnostics, modeling, and simulation codes in designing and qualifying pulsed-power components and target R&D.
- Developing fundamental capabilities required to take advantage of computational engines ranging from clusters of components to massively parallel units to large state-of-the-art platforms. Expertise ranges from fundamental, broadly applicable efforts to those of a developmental nature, all of which support both high-end computing and specific stockpile systems simulations.
- Conducting computer science research that addresses computational methods and technologies such as numerical methods for designing and processing new stockpile materials, new massively parallel numerical algorithms, and new strategies for code reusability, portability, and debugging. SNL/NM develops codes for simulating shock, high-velocity impact, penetration, or blast, and develops computational techniques that can represent fundamental circumstances and processes with the capability to provide predictive solutions.
- Developing radiation transport models that address three-dimensional radiation deposition for heat-based structure response and heat-based mechanical shock of systems in hostile environments.
- Manufacturing neutron generators, switches, and tubes. SNL/NM provides technical analysis, engineering design, and manufacturing support for nonnuclear components, as well as nonnuclear component dismantlement support.
- Providing sensor development, technical analysis, and export license support for the control and prevention of nuclear and nonnuclear (chemical, biological, explosive, and missiles) proliferation. Detection technology capabilities include airborne, satellite, seismic, and chemical-based monitoring systems.

- Producing a number of medical radioisotopes including iodine-131 and molybdenum-99, the primary isotope used in nuclear medicine in the U.S. SNL/NM supports the development of optimized production and processing, cooperation with private industry, and technology transfer.
- Conducting fundamental energy research in a wide variety of energy resources including electrical energy, energy storage, hydrogen storage (fuel cells), fossil fuels, geothermal technology (wireless telemetry), solar energy technology, photovoltaics (silicon cell), applied wind power technology, and light-water reactor technology.
- Conducting numerous projects that contribute to DOE's science and technology mission. These include activities in scientific computing, basic energy sciences, and magnetic fusion energy; developing methods using computational science research for solving scientific and engineering problems and a software infrastructure for parallel computing; using the performance and cost advantages of massive parallelism to meet critical DOE mission requirements in advanced computing; conducting scientific research, development, and applied engineering on materials and systems in areas of chemistry, physics, material science, biology, and environmental sciences; and designing components for fusion plasma environments.
- Managing, storing, and treating a variety of wastes. SNL/NM also develops technology to improve waste processing and reduce impacts to the environment, including long-term waste disposal facilities such as Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP).
- Restoring, monitoring, and treating a variety of environmental cleanup sites. SNL/NM develops technology (including remote robotics) to improve environmental restoration processes to reduce impacts to the environment.

The DOE directs SNL/NM activities in support of its programs and missions. In turn, SNL/NM's facilities and operations are designed to meet the requirements of the programs, projects, and activities assigned to the laboratory. Figure 2.1–2 illustrates the DOE's funding, by mission, to SNL/NM facilities. Table 2.1–1 lists DOE mission lines by DOE mission and office. Following are brief descriptions of DOE mission assignments to SNL/NM.

2.1.1 SNL/NM Support for DOE's National Security Mission Line


SNL/NM's principal DOE assignments under this mission line focus on the nuclear stockpile and reducing the vulnerability of a reduced stockpile; managing nonnuclear components of every weapon in the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile; and reducing the vulnerability of the U.S. to threats of proliferation and to the use of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear incidents, and environmental damage. Following are the major DOE programs under this mission line:

- *Stockpile Stewardship*—Tasks involve stockpile upgrades, material and component tests involving hostile environmental exposures, computer-simulated testing, performance assessments, systems component engineering, chemistry and material science activities, stockpile computations, and new technology development.
- *Stockpile Management*—SNL/NM provides capabilities in onsite and offsite manufacturing; design of nonnuclear components, systems, and materials; production support; quality assurance; stockpile surveillance; component dismantlement; and accident response support. SNL/NM supplies, certifies, and tests shipping containers including nuclear component and tritium containers.
- *Nonproliferation*—Material control includes support in the following areas: verification R&D; nuclear safeguards and security; arms control; material protection, control, and accounting; proliferation prevention; and intelligence.

In 1997, SNL/NM undertook 218 R&D projects using DOE-focused technologies and unique SNL/NM science and engineering capabilities (SNL 1998a). Nearly 46 percent of the projects had applications that were national security-related.

2.1.2 SNL/NM Support for DOE's Energy Resources Mission Line

SNL/NM supports DOE assignments under this mission line to enhance the safety, security, and reliability of energy, focusing on implications for our nation's security related to the increasing interdependencies among domestic elements and global resources. SNL/NM helps develop strategies to protect the supply of the nation's energy resources. SNL/NM applies science and technology capabilities to develop various technologies. Following are the major DOE programs under this mission line:



Source: Original

Figure 2.1-2. Flow of DOE Funding by Mission Line to SNL/NM
The DOE's funding flows through various DOE offices to SNL/NM.

Table 2.1–1. DOE Mission Lines and DOE Office Mission Statements

DOE MISSION LINE	DOE OFFICE	MISSION STATEMENT
<i>National Security</i>	Defense Programs	To ensure the safety, reliability, and performance of nuclear weapons without underground testing
	Nonproliferation & National Security	To support DOE activities related to nonproliferation, nuclear safeguards and security, classification and declassification, and emergency management
	Fissile Materials Disposition	To reduce the global nuclear danger associated with inventories of surplus weapons usable fissile materials
<i>Energy Resources</i>	Nuclear Energy	To support the successful decontamination and decommissioning of nuclear reactor sites; certify next-generation nuclear power plants; ensure the availability of industrial and medical isotopes and radioisotope power systems for space exploration
	Fossil Energy	To enhance U.S. economic and energy security
	Energy Efficiency	To lead the nation to a stronger economy, a cleaner environment, and more secure future through development and deployment of sustainable energy technologies
<i>Environmental Quality</i>	Environmental Management	To develop a clear national cleanup strategy with a strong commitment to results that will gain the trust and confidence of Congress, the states, Native American tribes, and the public
	Civilian Radioactive Waste Management	To develop, construct, and operate a system for spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste disposal, including a permanent geologic repository, interim storage capability, and transportation system
	Environment, Safety, & Health	To protect the environment and the health and safety of workers at DOE facilities and the public
<i>Science & Technology</i>	Science & Technology	To manage and direct targeted basic research and focused, solution-oriented technology development
	Science	To improve and advance the science and technology foundations and effective use and management of DOE laboratories
	Basic Energy Science	To advance the scientific and technical knowledge and skills needed to develop and use new and existing energy resources in an economically viable and environmentally sound manner

Source: DOE 1997c

- *Medical Isotopes Production*—Tasks include developing a U.S. source for the molybdenum-99 isotope and other isotopes that have widespread medical applications. The project uses the Annular Core Research Reactor (ACRR) and the Hot Cell Facility (HCF). Detailed information is provided in the *Medical Isotopes Production Project: Molybdenum-99 and Related Isotopes Environmental Impact Statement* (DOE 1996b).
- *Utility Technologies*—Utility technologies support includes developing clean, renewable, and more economical sources of electricity. SNL/NM supports aggressive R&D in photovoltaic, solar thermal, wind, geothermal, hydropower, and biomass power technologies and systems.
- *Pulsed-Power*—Pulsed-power tasks include developing fusion capabilities and experimenting with X-ray sources for understanding harsh electromagnetic, shock, and debris environments. SNL/NM supports R&D in radiography and accelerator technology.

Of the previously mentioned R&D projects in 1997, about 16 percent had applications that were energy resource-related.

2.1.3 SNL/NM Support for DOE's Environmental Quality Mission Line

SNL/NM supports DOE assignments under this mission line with onsite operations and developing technology for national environmental problems. Activities include some treatment, temporary storage, and offsite disposal of hazardous waste, low-level waste (LLW), low-level mixed waste (LLMW), transuranic waste (TRU), mixed transuranic waste (MTRU), and solid wastes generated by ongoing mission-related activities. Environmental restoration activities are ongoing at SNL/NM, with most remedial actions scheduled for completion by the end of 2004. Following are the major DOE programs under this mission line:

- *Waste Management*—Tasks include some treatment, storage, and offsite disposal of wastes in a manner that is safe to humans and the environment. The Hazardous Waste Management Facility (HWMF) and Radioactive and Mixed Waste Management Facility (RMWMF) manage a variety of wastes in accordance with applicable laws, permits, and regulations.

- *Environmental Restoration*—Environmental restoration activities include the assessing and cleaning up of inactive sites contaminated from previous defense and nondefense-related programs. SNL/NM activities are conducted in accordance with applicable Federal, state, and local laws and regulations.
- *National TRU Waste Program*—activities include site assessments, performance assessments, regulatory compliance support, and science research in support of the WIPP.

Of the previously mentioned R&D projects in 1997, about 24 percent had applications that were environmental quality-related.

2.1.4 SNL/NM Support for DOE's Science and Technology Mission Line

SNL/NM's facilities and expertise are used in support of this mission line through R&D in modeling and simulation testing, physical sciences, and advanced chemical and materials sciences. SNL/NM activities include developing radiation-hardened microelectronic components; computer-based testing, modeling, and simulation; and pulsed-power technology. Following are the major DOE programs under this mission line:

- *Magnetic Fusion*—R&D activities involving studying materials, components, and development processes.
- *Scientific Computing*—Advanced mathematical modeling, computational R&D, communication sciences, and information technologies.
- *Basic Energy Sciences*—R&D in material sciences, chemical sciences, energy biosciences, and engineering.

Of the previously mentioned R&D projects in 1997, about 15 percent had applications that were science and technology-related.

2.2 REIMBURSABLE WORK FOR OTHERS

SNL/NM performs reimbursable work for other Federal agencies and sponsors, including the private sector. This work, also known as work for others (WFO), must be compatible with the DOE mission work conducted at SNL/NM and must be work that cannot reasonably be performed by the public sector. Approximately 25 percent of SNL's funding is reimbursable work for

agencies and organizations other than the DOE (Figure 2.1–1). SNL/NM activities support other Federal departments and agencies. The major agencies include the U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Department of State, and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Details regarding WFO support activities and projects are provided in SNL/NM's *Facilities and Safety Information Document* (FSID) (SNL/NM 1997b), and the *SNL Institutional Plan FY 1998–2003* (SNL 1997b).

Universities and others can use SNL/NM facilities to conduct research. SNL/NM collaborates with the University of New Mexico in the materials science area.

2.3 SNL/NM FACILITIES: A FRAMEWORK FOR IMPACTS ANALYSIS

As discussed above, SNL/NM provides a diverse set of capabilities that support DOE's mission lines through various programs. The major consideration in deciding to analyze impacts by facility rather than by program was the complexity of the analysis. Any given program may use operations in more than one facility, and many facilities serve multiple programs. An analysis of environmental impacts requires knowledge of particular activities in a particular place over a known span of time in order to project the effect those activities will have on the surrounding environment. A presentation of impacts by program would require that impacts from operations at each facility be subdivided into the contribution from each program using the facility. The resulting impacts would then have to be reassembled by program. The complexity of analysis would greatly increase, and the clarity of the presentation would suffer. Therefore, the DOE chose to group the operations to be analyzed by facility.

To accomplish this objective, the DOE used the results of a detailed questionnaire distributed throughout SNL/NM to develop a database containing pertinent information about the approximately 670 buildings in the 5 technical areas (TAs) and structures in the Coyote Test Field. An initial screen of these facilities, along with the details of how the screen was performed, is described and the facilities are listed in the FSID (SNL/NM 1997b).

This list was then further assessed and refined by qualitatively evaluating the types of operations performed, identifying those with the highest potential

for environmental impacts or concerns, and then grouping them according to function and location. Key qualitative criteria used in the final screen identified facilities or facility groups with operations that have generated important public concern in the past or have a relatively greater impact to the environment, safety, and health. The criteria used in this final screening process are described in Section 2.3.1 and illustrated in Figure 2.3–1.

The operations within these facilities or facility groups are the basis for differentiating between the three alternatives analyzed in the SWEIS and any associated environmental impacts. Taken together, these facilities and facility groups represent the majority of exposure risks associated with continuing operations at SNL/NM. They represent

- over 99 percent of all radiation doses to SNL/NM personnel.
- over 99 percent of all radiation doses to the public.
- from 81 to 99 percent of stationary source criteria pollutants (nitrogen dioxide, carbon monoxide, PM₁₀, sulfur dioxide), depending on the alternative. This does not include hazardous air pollutants or toxic air pollutants, which instead are analyzed on a facility-wide basis in the SWEIS. The remaining stationary source criteria pollutants would be associated with backup generators.
- all radioactive waste volumes, including medical isotopes production, Environmental Restoration (ER) Project wastes, and hazardous wastes, which are accounted for in analyses of infrastructure, radiological air quality, transportation, and waste generation.

2.3.1 Facility Screening Process

To be selected for detailed analysis, a facility or facility group had to meet one or more of the following criteria:

- be known to have generated an important public concern;
- conduct operations that have the potential to affect the environment, safety, and health;
- be a critical element of one of SNL/NM's principal missions; and/or
- be anticipated to expand over the next 10 years, likely resulting in the need for additional *National Environmental Policy Act* (NEPA) documentation.




Figure 2.3-1. SWEIS Analysis of SNL/NM Facilities
An SNL/NM facility screening process was used during SWEIS analysis of potential impacts.

Source: Original

2.3.2 Framework for Analysis

The SWEIS evaluates SNL/NM facilities and operations and their effects on environmental conditions under the three alternatives. Because of their importance, potential environmental impacts from the selected facilities are described and evaluated in greater detail than other SNL/NM facilities. This in-depth look at selected facilities provides the framework for analyzing impacts.

For completeness of analysis, the DOE also gathered information on the balance of operations at SNL/NM. Information regarding other facilities, site support services, water and utility use, waste generation, hazardous chemicals purchased for use, process wastewater, and radioactive dose data were incorporated into the analysis. The DOE examined all nuclear/radiological facilities and hazardous nonradiological facilities and associated DOE-approved safety documents (for example, safety analysis reports, safety assessments, and hazard assessments) for SNL/NM facilities. In addition, facility walk-throughs and interviews were performed to ensure that all hazards and safety concerns were properly captured in the accident analysis. This information is included in the current environmental consequences (Chapter 5) and Appendix F. In addition, some aspects of the impact analysis considered individual facility operations, regardless of whether the entirety of the facility met the criteria for detailed analysis. These aspects included evaluating chemical air emissions and radiological air emissions. This type of specific information, as well the contribution to impacts in all resource areas from the balance of operations at SNL/NM, including ongoing R&D activities, is included in the analysis of each alternative.

The following sections provide an overview of the TAs at SNL/NM and describe the facilities the DOE identified for detailed analysis.

2.3.3 Technical Areas

DOE mission lines are executed at SNL/NM through program funding at multiple facilities. Facility operations are conducted within five TAs and many additional outdoor test areas, including an area of test facilities known as the Coyote Test Field. These TAs comprise the basic geographic configuration of SNL/NM. Figure 2.3–2 illustrates the five TAs. TA-I is the main administration and site support area and also contains several laboratories. TA-II consists primarily of support service facilities along with the new Explosive Components Facility (ECF), several active and inactive waste management facilities, and vacated facilities replaced by the ECF. TA-III is

devoted primarily to physical testing, TA-IV is primarily accelerator operations, and TA-V is primarily reactor facilities. The Coyote Test Field and the Withdrawn Area are used primarily for outdoor testing. A complete listing of all the facilities in each TA is presented in the FSID (SNL/NM 1997b).

2.3.4 Selected SWEIS Facilities

Table 2.3–1 identifies the 10 facilities or facility groups selected for in-depth analysis. Taken together, these facilities represent the main activities at SNL/NM that have the potential to affect the environment, have generated public concern, are critical to SNL/NM’s missions, or are anticipated to expand over the next 10 years. TA-I and TA-II contain five selected facilities that fall into the categories of manufacturing, R&D laboratories, and testing described in Section 2.3.4.1, below. The five other selected facility groups include the following:

- physical testing and simulation facilities (TA-III) (Section 2.3.4.2),
- accelerator facilities (TA-IV) (Section 2.3.4.3),
- reactor facilities (TA-V) (Section 2.3.4.4),

Table 2.3–1. Facilities/Facility Groups Selected for Analyzing SNL/NM Operations

SELECTED FACILITIES/FACILITY GROUPS	LOCATION
1. <i>Neutron Generator Facility</i>	TA-I
2. <i>Microelectronics Development Laboratory</i>	TA-I
3. <i>Advanced Manufacturing Processes Laboratory</i>	TA-I
4. <i>Integrated Materials Research Laboratory</i>	TA-I
5. <i>Explosive Components Facility</i>	TA-II
6. <i>Physical Testing and Simulation Facilities</i>	TA-III
7. <i>Accelerator Facilities</i>	TA-IV
8. <i>Reactor Facilities</i>	TA-V
9. <i>Outdoor Test Facilities</i>	Coyote Test Field and Withdrawn Area
10. <i>Selected Infrastructure</i>	TA-I and TA-III

Source: SNL/NM 1997b
TA: technical area




Figure 2.3-2. Locations of Technical Areas and Outdoor Test Facilities on Kirtland Air Force Base

SNL/NM conducts operations within five technical areas and several outdoor test areas, including the Coyote Test Field.

- outdoor test facilities (including Coyote Test Field and the Withdrawn Area) (Section 2.3.4.5), and
- selected infrastructure facilities (Section 2.3.4.6).

2.3.4.1 Manufacturing, R&D Laboratories, and Testing Facilities

The five selected facilities located in TA-I and TA-II are described below (SNL/NM 1997b).

- *Neutron Generator Facility (NGF)*—Manufactures neutron generators, which provide a controlled source of neutrons.
- *Microelectronics Development Laboratory (MDL)*—Performs R&D and fabricates custom and radiation-hardened microelectronics.
- *Advanced Manufacturing Processes Laboratory (AMPL)*—Performs R&D of technologies, practices, and unique equipment and fabricates prototype hardware for advanced manufacturing processes.
- *Integrated Materials Research Laboratory (IMRL)*—Performs R&D of semiconducting and other specialized materials, including silicon processing and equipment development and materials synthesis, growth, processing, and diagnostics.
- *Explosive Components Facility (ECF)*—Performs R&D and testing of explosives components, neutron generators, batteries, and explosives.

2.3.4.2 Physical Testing and Simulation Facilities

TA-III is composed of numerous principal buildings and structures devoted to the physical testing and simulation of a variety of natural and induced environments. The facilities include extensive environmental test facilities, such as sled tracks, centrifuges, and a radiant heat facility. Other facilities include an inactive paper incinerator; a large melt facility; and the formerly used Chemical Waste, LLW, and LLMW landfills. Major outdoor operations located in TA-III include the following (SNL/NM 1997b):

- *Terminal Ballistics Complex*—Provides a test environment for ballistics studies and terminal effects.
- *Drop/Impact Complex*—Provides a controlled environment for high velocity impact testing on hard surfaces, water impact testing, and underwater testing.
- *Sled Track Complex*—Simulates high speed impacts of weapons shapes, substructures, and components to verify design integrity, performance, and fuzing functions; tests parachute systems to aerodynamic loads.

- *Centrifuge Complex*—Simulates the forces of acceleration produced by missiles and aircraft for test packages that include satellite systems, re-entry vehicles, rocket propellants, sensing devices of weapons, and weapons system components.

2.3.4.3 Accelerator Facilities

TA-IV contains several inertial-confinement fusion research and pulsed-power research facilities. Facilities include a large “Z-pinch” accelerator known as the Z-Machine, and the Simulation Technology Laboratory (STL), which houses seven pulsed-power accelerators that are used to simulate the effects of nuclear detonations and various atmospheric conditions on nonnuclear components and subsystems. The accelerators are also used to conduct research on inertial-confinement fusion and particle-beam weapons. Another accelerator facility, SATURN, and a research facility are also located in TA-IV. Accelerator operations located in TA-IV are described below (SNL/NM 1997b).

- *SATURN Accelerator*—Simulates the radiation effects of nuclear countermeasures on electronic and material components.
- *High-Energy Radiation Megavolt Electron Source III (HERMES III) Accelerator*—Provides gamma-ray effects testing for component and weapon systems development, which helps ensure operational reliability of weapon systems in radiation environments caused by nuclear explosions.
- *Sandia Accelerator & Beam Research Experiment (SABRE)*—Supports the inertial confinement fusion program for advanced extraction ion diode research and for target and focusing studies.
- *Short-Pulse High Intensity Nanosecond X-Radiator (SPHINX) Accelerator*—Measures X-ray-induced photocurrents from short pulses in integrated circuits and thermostructural response in materials.
- *Repetitive High Energy Pulsed-Power Unit I (RHEPP I) Accelerator*—Supports the development of technology for continuous operation of pulsed-power systems.
- *Repetitive High Energy Pulsed-Power Unit II (RHEPP II) Accelerator*—Supports the development of technology for continuous operation of pulsed-power systems for very high power outputs.
- *Z-Machine Accelerator (formerly the Particle Beam Fusion Accelerator)*—Generates high intensity light-ion beams for the inertial confinement fusion program and the high energy/density weapons physics program for stockpile stewardship.

Accelerators

Accelerators are devices that accelerate (speed up) the movement of atomic-sized particles such as electrons, protons, and ions. Examples of these devices range from huge cyclotrons to television sets. The accelerators in TA-IV use pulsed-power technology and are called pulsed-power accelerators. Accelerators can produce radiation by accelerating protons that strike target atoms, thereby producing radioisotopes.

Pulsed-power accelerators are single-shot devices that accelerate large numbers of particles (energy) in a very short period. These accelerators are considered high power. The HERMES III accelerator, for example, can generate a 350-kJ pulse of electrons in 20 nsec, or 17 TW (17×10^{12} W) of power. However, because of the low shot rate of these machines (sometimes only one per day), the average power generated is typically very low. One of the areas of research being conducted in TA-IV is to increase the shot rate, or repetition rate, of these accelerators for applications that require high average power.

The TA-IV pulsed-power accelerators are designed to compress (in time) the electrical pulse. This generates high power by transferring a high percentage of the energy while shortening the pulse.

The desire to create controlled fusion for commercial power generation initially motivated the development of pulsed-power technology. Later, it was determined that the same technology could be used to generate X-rays and gamma rays for weapons testing. New uses for pulsed-power technology are continually being explored. Usually, a particular application will require some modification to existing devices, which adds knowledge to the pulsed-power technology base. Many applications, such as materials hardening and sterilization, have resulted in the development of high-power, high-repetition-rate accelerators.

- *Tera-Electron Volt Energy Superconductor Linear Accelerator (TESLA)*—Tests plasma opening switches for pulsed-power drivers.
- *Advanced Pulsed-Power Research Module Accelerator (APPRM)*—Tests the performance and reliability of components for use in a much larger accelerator still in the conceptual stage.

- *Radiographic Integrated Test Stand (RITS) Accelerator*—Simulates nuclear weapons effects on nonnuclear components and subsystems.

2.3.4.4 Reactor Facilities

TA-V is a highly secure, remote research area housing experimental and engineering nuclear reactors. Certain facilities in this area are being converted to production facilities for medical radioactive isotopes. Reactor operations located in TA-V are discussed below (SNL/NM 1997b).

- *New Gamma Irradiation Facility (NGIF)*—Produces a gamma radiation field, simulating weapons effects on nuclear weapons components.
- *Gamma Irradiation Facility (GIF)*—Provides high intensity gamma radiation for radiation environment testing of materials, components, and systems.
- *Sandia Pulsed Reactor (SPR)*—Simulates nuclear weapons effects on nuclear weapons components. The SPR houses two fast-burst reactors, SPR II and SPR III.
- *ACRR*—Formerly used for pulsed-power research; under conversion for the production of molybdenum-99 for use in nuclear medicine.
- *HCF*—Formerly used to support pulsed-power research; under conversion for processing irradiated targets from the ACRR and the production of molybdenum-99.

2.3.4.5 Outdoor Test Facilities

Selected outdoor test facilities are located in the Coyote Test Field and the Lurance Canyon Burn Site. The Coyote Test Field is a remote area containing physics testing facilities. Lurance Canyon was used for explosives testing. Although no explosives tests are currently being conducted at Lurance Canyon, burn tests are currently conducted there. Outdoor operations in the Coyote Test Field and several canyons are discussed below (SNL/NM 1997b).

- *Containment Technology Test Facility - West*—Provides nuclear power reactor containment model testing.
- *Explosives Applications Laboratory (EAL)*—Supports the design, assembly, and testing of explosive experiments in support of site-wide programs.

Reactors

Typically, reactors are devices that provide neutron and sustained gamma-pulsed environments. The reactors in TA-V conduct a variety of experiments, including those for DP system component electronics testing and reactor safety research. The primary purpose for the ACRR is the production of medical isotopes.

Normally, the SNL/NM reactors operate at steady-state power. These reactors are considered low power. The SPR III reactor, for example, is limited to 10 kW.

TA-V reactors are designed as research reactors, small low-power reactors providing specialized near-fission ranges of radiation environments. SPR reactors, SPR II and SPR III, are small air-cooled reactors less than 8 ft tall. The ACRR would operate approximately 1,000 hours per year at a maximum power level of 4 MW (approximately 4,000 MWh per year). Commercial reactors operate at 1,000 MW of power (approximately 5,000,000 MWh per year).

The desire to produce medical isotopes can include expanding the range of isotopes to cover the broad field of medical isotopes and various research isotopes. The long-term, steady-state operation of the reactor for isotope production would allow experiments in areas of neutron irradiation, radiography, and other activities related to isotope production.

- *Aerial Cable Facility*—Provides a controlled environment for high velocity impact testing on hard surfaces and precision testing of full-scale, ground-to-air missile operations; air-to-ground ordnance testing; and nuclear material shipping container testing for certification.
- *Lurance Canyon Burn Site*—Provides safety testing of various hazardous material shipping containers, weapons components, and weapons mockups in aviation fuel fires, propellant fires, and wood fires.
- *Thunder Range Complex*—Provides inspection facility capabilities and assembly and disassembly of special explosive-containing items. In the past, the facility was used for environmental, safety, and survivability testing for nuclear weapons applications.

2.3.4.6 Selected Infrastructure Facilities

All SNL/NM structures were evaluated to identify representative infrastructure facilities. Most SNL/NM infrastructure facilities are used for office space, storage, or support. Other infrastructure support related to roads and utilities is described in Section 4.4. Following are the major infrastructure facilities at SNL/NM that have environmental permits and that have been selected for evaluation:

- *Steam Plant in TA-I*—Provides heat and hot and chilled water to buildings in TA-I and the eastern portion of Kirtland Air Force Base (KAFB).
- *HWMF in TA-I*—Provides temporary storage for hazardous SNL/NM wastes prior to offsite treatment and/or disposal.
- *RMWMF in TA-III*—Processes LLW and LLMW generated at SNL/NM to meet waste acceptance criteria at designated DOE disposal sites.
- *Thermal Treatment Facility (TTF) in TA-III*—Thermally treats (burns) small quantities of waste explosive substances, waste liquids, and items contaminated with explosive substances.

2.3.5 Activities Common to All Alternatives

Some activities at SNL/NM are not expected to change significantly, regardless of which alternative the DOE selects for continued operations. In general, these balance of operations activities involve little or no toxic materials, are of low hazard, and are usually categories of actions excluded from analysis by DOE's NEPA regulations. Balance of operations activities were included for the appropriate resource areas. These are evaluated along with the more detailed analyses of the selected facilities for each alternative in order to provide the total impacts from SNL/NM operations. They include many R&D activities and routine operations; infrastructure, administrative, and central services for SNL/NM; traffic flow adjustments to existing onsite roads in predisturbed areas, including road realignment and widening; facility maintenance and refurbishment activities; and environmental, ecological, and natural resource management activities. Some routine refurbishment, renovation, and small-scale removal of specific surplus facilities and closures will also continue at SNL/NM. Examples include office buildings, trailers, storage facilities, and infrastructure. A detailed description of these routine activities is available in the FSID (SNL/NM 1997b).

2.3.5.1 Research & Development Activities

R&D activities at SNL/NM are focused in the following areas: materials and process science, computational and information sciences, microelectronics and photonics sciences, engineering sciences, and pulsed-power sciences. Many aspects of the programs described in Section 2.1 fall into these areas of R&D, which are not analyzed in detail.

SNL/NM's research foundation in materials and process science develops the scientific basis for current and future mission needs. New and replacement materials are created for refurbished weapons components, enhanced safety subsystems, and advanced energy storage devices.

SNL/NM's research foundation in computational and information sciences develops technology to transition from model- and simulation-based life-cycle engineering. Increases in supercomputing capabilities are needed to analyze complicated accident scenarios, to design weapons components and systems, and to predict the aging of key stockpile materials.

SNL/NM's research foundation in microelectronics and photonics provides the science and technology to ensure implementation of its electronics systems. This research foundation conducts activities ranging from fundamental solid-state physics to design and fabrication of radiation-hardened integrated circuits.

SNL/NM's research foundation in engineering sciences focuses on model- and simulation-based, life-cycle engineering. Life-cycle engineering at SNL/NM occurs within a comprehensive validated modeling and simulation environment required for validation and verification of simulations.

SNL/NM's research foundation in fast pulsed-power technology applies technological advances in conjunction with other DOE laboratories, U.S. industry, and universities. SNL/NM supports science-based stockpile stewardship by providing radiation experiments to certify the survivability of strategic systems in the stockpile and to support DOE initiatives such as the Stockpile Life Extension Program. The large-volume, high-temperature, high-energy-density environments uniquely generated with pulsed power have produced a unique opportunity to collaborate with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in weapons physics and experimentation. These capabilities are especially critical in the absence of underground nuclear testing for certification of weapons survivability and performance (SNL/NM 1997b).

2.3.5.2 Maintenance Support Activities

These activities comprise frequently and routinely requested maintenance services for operational support of SNL/NM facilities and associated DOE properties. Activities range from ongoing custodial services to corrective, preventive, predictive, and training actions required to maintain and preserve buildings, structures, roadways (including widening in disturbed areas), and equipment in a condition suitable for fulfilling their designated purposes. While these activities are intended to maintain current operations, they would not substantially extend the life of a facility or allow for substantial upgrades or improvements.

2.3.5.3 Material Management and Operations

Routine operations at SNL/NM require the management of hazardous, industrial, commercial, and recyclable materials. Appendix A contains information regarding the responsible organizations, regulatory requirements, and types and quantities of material at SNL/NM. SNL/NM standards, which were developed in accordance with DOE, DOT, and U.S. Air Force policies, determine if a material constitutes an onsite hazard.

Four types of hazardous material regulated by the DOT are tracked by SNL/NM. These include radioactive materials, chemicals, explosive materials, and fuels.

2.3.5.4 Chemical Materials Management and Control

The primary goal for managing and controlling chemicals at SNL/NM is to protect the health and safety of workers, the public, and the environment.

Chemical Materials

SNL/NM handles more than 25,000 chemical containers annually. Chemicals are designated as hazardous if they present either a physical or a health hazard as defined by the DOT and listed in 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) §172.101. Chemicals are managed using

Hazardous Material

A material, including a hazardous substance, as defined by 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) §171.8, that poses an unreasonable risk to health, safety, and property when transported or handled.

administrative and physical controls that are designed to minimize exposure to an identified hazard. Facilities that use and store chemicals are evaluated using SNL/NM's Integrated Safety, Environmental, and Emergency Management System for determining appropriate approaches to managing and controlling hazards.

Historic Chemical Materials Use

SNL/NM previously maintained inventories of hazardous chemicals at levels sufficient to meet immediate needs that could arise at any time. This involved economical bulk chemical purchases; however, this also led to the shelf life of some containers expiring before they could be used. These chemical procurement practices created legacy chemicals that had to be disposed of properly. Now, SNL/NM orders needed chemicals on a "just-in-time" basis.

Baseline Hazardous Chemical Materials Use

From 1990 through 1996, SNL/NM primarily tracked chemical inventories using the *CheMaster* System. This system was designed primarily to enable SNL/NM to meet the requirements of the *Emergency Planning Community Right-to-Know Act* (EPCRA), also known as *Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, Title III* (SARA) (42 United States Code [U.S.C.] Section [§]11001). EPCRA requires a facility to generate an annual list documenting the presence of certain hazardous chemicals in quantities exceeding federally prescribed safety thresholds and providing the list to health officials in the state and local community.

SNL/NM is currently changing to a new chemical inventory tracking program known as the *Chemical Information System* (CIS). This system, a commercial program developed by AT&T, provides features not available with the former system that allow the tracking of individual containers and access to online chemical inventory data at any time. This system also interfaces more readily with other environment, safety, and health programs, including industrial hygiene, hazardous waste management, radioactive and mixed waste management, waste minimization, emergency preparedness, fire protection, and NEPA. For NEPA, the CIS provides essential information on the chemical inventory and is a necessary element for calculating potential health effects.

2.3.5.5 Explosive Material Management and Control

SNL/NM manages explosive material through the *Explosive Inventory System*, a comprehensive database that tracks explosives and explosive-containing devices and assemblies from acquisition through use, storage, reapplication, and transfer or disposal. It provides information on material composition, characteristics, shipping requirements, life-cycle cost, plan of use, and duration of ownership. This system includes an inventory of explosive material owned or controlled by SNL/NM line organizations.

2.3.5.6 Radioactive Material Management and Control

SNL/NM uses a two-fold approach to radioactive material management: reduce surplus legacy radioactive material inventories and manage current nuclear material inventories at mission-essential levels. Nuclear material is a subclass of radioactive material as defined by the *Atomic Energy Act of 1954* (AEA) (42 U.S.C. §2011). SNL/NM manages the three types of accountable nuclear material—special nuclear material, source material, and other nuclear material—through an inventory database known as the *Local Area Network Nuclear Material Accountability System* (LANMAS). Other radioactive material (less than 1 percent by mass) located at SNL/NM is not tracked through this tracking system.

2.3.5.7 Waste Management and Operations

Waste Operations

This section generally describes waste operations that are not analyzed in detail, as noted in Section 2.3.5.

SNL/NM manages all wastes in accordance with applicable Federal, state, and local laws and regulations and DOE Orders. These wastes are primarily regulated by the EPA, the DOE, and the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED). All current waste operations are being implemented following SNL/NM policies established to ensure worker and public safety and compliant management of regulated waste. These policies clearly define waste acceptance and disposal criteria, limit the number of workers who handle wastes, provide appropriate waste-specific training, and centralize waste handling areas.

Hazardous Waste

Hazardous wastes managed at the HWMF include wastes regulated under *Resource Conservation and Recovery Act* (RCRA) (42 U.S.C. §6901) and wastes regulated under the *Toxic Substances Control Act* (TSCA) (15 U.S.C. §2601); other wastes managed at the HWMF including wastes not regulated by RCRA or TSCA, but still hazardous; certain other solid wastes; and some other wastes not accepted by the Solid Waste Transfer Facility (SWTF). The hazardous waste generated at SNL/NM is predominantly from experiments, testing, other R&D activities, and infrastructure fabrication and maintenance.

Environmental restoration and D&D also generate hazardous waste. Hazardous waste generated at each facility is usually coordinated by that facility's waste management department, with the exception of waste from large projects focused on asbestos abatement, which is managed separately through subcontracts.

SNL/NM also manages small amounts of waste from other SNL or DOE operations, such as SNL's Advanced Materials Laboratory on the University of New Mexico campus in Albuquerque or the DOE's Albuquerque Operations Office.

Radioactive Waste

The RMWMF staff manages LLW, LLMW, TRU waste, and MTRU waste for SNL/NM. In general, LLW and LLMW are generated during laboratory experiments and component tests. TRU and MTRU wastes are generated from the use of small quantities of plutonium and other TRU isotopes in R&D or from experiments involving nuclear reactor operations, including cleanup of residuals during reactor tests. Additional small quantities of LLW can be received periodically from remote test facilities including Kauai, Hawaii; White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico; and Tonopah Test Range, Nevada. LLMW generated at Sandia National Laboratories/California has also been shipped to SNL/NM for management in accordance with an NMED compliance order issued under the *Federal Facility Compliance Act* (42 U.S.C. §6961). SNL/NM has also received TRU waste from the Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute, which is DOE-funded and located on KAFB (Section 6.2.6).

2.3.5.8 Environmental Restoration

The ER Project is a phased project designed to identify, assess, and remediate contaminated DOE-owned or

Radioactive Waste Categories

Low-Level Waste (LLW)—Waste that contains radioactivity and is not classified as high-level waste, TRU waste, spent nuclear fuel, or byproduct tailings containing uranium or thorium from processed ore (as defined in Section 11[e][2] of the AEA [42 U.S.C. §2011]). Test specimens of fissionable material irradiated for research and development only, and not for the production of power or plutonium, may be classified as LLW, provided that the concentration of TRU is less than 100 nCi/g.

Low-Level Mixed Waste (LLMW)—Waste that contains both hazardous waste under the RCRA (42 U.S.C. §6901) and source, special nuclear, or byproduct material subject to the AEA (42 U.S.C. §2011).

Transuranic Waste (TRU)—Waste that contains more than 100 nCi of alpha-emitting TRU isotopes per gram of waste, with a half-life greater than 20 years, except for (a) high-level radioactive waste; (b) waste that the Secretary has determined, with concurrence of the Administrator, does not need the degree of isolation required by the disposal regulations; or (c) waste that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has approved for disposal on a case-by-case basis in accordance with 10 CFR Part 61.

Mixed Transuranic Waste (MTRU)—TRU waste that contains hazardous waste, as defined and regulated under the RCRA (42 U.S.C. §6901).

-operated facilities that have contamination from disposal sites, releases, or spills. The initial remedial assessment of SNL/NM sites was conducted under the Comprehensive Environmental Assessment and Response Program beginning in 1984 and ending in 1987. The assessment identified 117 potential release sites. By 1993, the number had increased to 219 potential release sites (including offsite locations). A Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments (HSWA) module of the RCRA permit was issued in August 1993. As co-permittees, both SNL/NM and the DOE are responsible for compliance under the terms of the HSWA permit. The EPA Region 6 (Dallas, Texas) was the authorized permitting agency at the time of issuance, but beginning in January 1996, authority was transferred to the NMED. The terms, conditions, and schedule contained

Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments (HWSA)

The HSWA were proposed in 1984 by the EPA as amendments to the RCRA (42 U.S.C. §6901). A very important aspect of HSWA requires that release of hazardous wastes or hazardous constituents from any solid waste management unit that is located on the site of a RCRA-permitted facility be cleaned up. The cleanup is required regardless of when the waste was placed in the unit or whether the unit was originally intended as a waste disposal unit. SNL/NM's HWSA module to the RCRA Part B permit includes provisions for corrective actions for all releases. It also contains a compliance schedule that governs the corrective action process.

in the original HSWA Part B permit are, and continue to be, the primary legal drivers for the ER Project. The remediation field activities under the ER Project are scheduled for completion in fiscal year (FY) 2002, with permit modification by FY 2004 to remove remediated sites from further action. Subsequent monitoring activities are scheduled for an additional 30 years. As of 1996, 153 sites remained for restoration or additional assessment. SNL/NM has proposed no further action for 100 of the 153 sites to the appropriate regulatory authority. The ER Project is currently the largest generator of regulated waste at SNL/NM. The project can potentially generate wastes of varying types due to the many kinds of material that have historically been handled at SNL/NM. For example, these wastes may consist of contaminated soils, debris, wastewater, and used personal protective equipment. The waste categories include LLW, LLMW, RCRA hazardous waste, TSCA waste, biohazardous waste (such as septic tank sludge), and nonhazardous waste. ER Project generated waste is processed through the HWMF, the RMWMF, or the SWTF. Once accumulated, sampled, and fully characterized, environmental restoration-generated waste is transferred to the appropriate SNL/NM waste management department for treatment, storage, and offsite disposal. The time frame for disposal of waste, once removed from a release site, can be months or years, depending on the time required for characterization and scheduling for shipment to disposal facilities.

In June 1996, SNL/NM submitted a request for a permit modification for a Corrective Action Management

Unit (CAMU) designed to be a storage, treatment, and containment unit dedicated to ER Project-generated hazardous waste (SNL/NM 1997a). This unit will be located near the former Chemical Waste Landfill (a site scheduled for remediation and closure under a RCRA Closure Plan). SNL/NM security personnel will provide controlled access. The SNL/NM waste management departments will continue to manage waste generated by the ER Project, excluding hazardous waste designated for containment in the CAMU. The CAMU was approved in September 1997 by EPA Region 6. An environmental assessment was prepared for the ER Project at SNL/NM. It analyzes potential environmental effects of the characterization and waste cleanup or corrective action of environmental restoration sites (DOE 1996c). The impacts of the ER Project are incorporated into the analysis of the SWEIS.

2.3.5.9 Pollution Prevention and Waste Minimization

SNL/NM has implemented a Pollution Prevention Program to comply with DOE requirements. SNL/NM's Pollution Prevention Program applies to all pollutants generated by routine and nonroutine operations. It consists of activities that encourage pollution prevention or waste source reduction, recycling, resource and energy conservation, and procurement of EPA-designated recycled products.

2.3.5.10 Recycling

SNL/NM currently has recycling processes for plain paper, cardboard, used oil, scrap metal, batteries, fluorescent light bulbs, solvents, mercury, landscaping waste, aluminum cans, tires, and used toner cartridges. At present, all paper and corrugated paper recycled at SNL/NM are processed through the SWTF. In 1996, SNL/NM initiated a joint effort with LANL to collect, process, and market LANL-generated recyclable paper. After creating the process, the program was expanded to include the DOE/Kirtland Area Office. Over the next few years, efforts will continue to expand cooperation with other Federal and state facilities.

2.3.6 Selected Facilities

Following Chapter 2 are a series of facility descriptions that provide additional detail for all of the facilities that are named in Sections 2.3.4.1 through 2.3.4.6. They consist of a brief description of the location, hazard class (low-hazard nonnuclear), primary purpose, and the major types of activities performed at the facility. Also

Low-Hazard Nonnuclear

“Low-hazard nonnuclear” are facilities or project activities that have the potential for minor onsite impacts (within the boundaries of SNL/NM-controlled areas) and negligible offsite impacts (outside the boundaries of SNL/NM-controlled areas) to people or the environment. SNL/NM uses primary hazards screening (PHS) to identify hazards, hazard classifications, training requirements, and required safety documents. A “low-hazard nonnuclear” facility does not require additional safety documentation. Accelerators and reactors do not meet this definition and require additional safety documentation including safety assessments and safety analysis reports.

identified are the basic processes performed at the facility, the programs and activities currently being supported, the major categories of radioactive and hazardous materials used by the processes, and the types or radioactive and hazardous emissions or wastes generated by activities at the facility. For all of the facilities described here and for each of the three alternatives described in Chapter 3, the FSID (SNL/NM 1997b) contains more detail including the estimated quantities for the specific radioactive and hazardous chemicals used and emissions or waste generated by a facility’s operations. All of these details were considered in completing the consequence analysis in Chapter 5.

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Advanced Manufacturing Processes Laboratory (AMPL)	FD-8
Integrated Materials Research Laboratory (IMRL)	FD-10
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PHYSICAL TESTING AND SIMULATION FACILITIES

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Drop/Impact Complex	FD-16
Sled Track Complex	FD-18
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ACCELERATOR FACILITIES

SATURN Accelerator	FD-22
High-Energy Radiation Megavolt Electron Source III (HERMES III)	FD-24
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Tera-Electron Volt Energy Superconducting Linear Accelerator (TESLA)	FD-36
Advanced Pulsed-Power Research Module Accelerator (APPRM)	FD-38
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Explosives Applications Laboratory (EAL) FD-56
Aerial Cable Facility FD-58
Lurance Canyon Burn Site FD-60
Thunder Range Complex FD-62

SELECTED INFRASTRUCTURE FACILITIES

Steam Plant FD-64
Hazardous Waste Management Facility (HWMF) FD-65
Radioactive and Mixed Waste Management Facility (RMWMF) FD-66
Thermal Treatment Facility (TTF) FD-68

FACILITY DESCRIPTIONS

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Hot Cell Facility (HCF)	FD-52
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Lurance Canyon Burn Site	FD-60
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Sandia Pulsed Reactor (SPR)	FD-46
SATURN Accelerator	FD-22
Short-Pulse High Intensity Nanosecond X-Radiator (SPHINX)	FD-28
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Thunder Range Complex	FD-62
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NEUTRON GENERATOR FACILITY (NGF)

Function and Description:

The mission of the NGF, located in Technical Area-I, is to support the U.S. nuclear weapons program by fabricating neutron generators (external initiators for nuclear weapons), neutron tubes, and prototype switch tubes. This is a low-hazard, nonnuclear facility located in Building 870, a two-story structure with a basement, where most processing and assembly operations take place. The facility includes a special air handling system that captures tritium from operations that have the potential to release this material. The NGF is primarily an assembly facility that receives components, including the tritium-loaded target materials, from various sources. Final neutron generator assembly is conducted and devices are tested.

Specific Processes, Activities, and Capabilities:

A variety of techniques are used and highly specialized metal work is done to accomplish the following categories of processes:


- preparing and coating the surfaces of components,
- joining and welding,
- encapsulating,
- fabricating and assembling, and
- inspecting and testing.

The NGF operations are allocated, but not limited, to the following programs and activities:

- Direct Stockpile Activities and Weapon Programs involve development of neutron generators.
- Technology Transfer develops processes with part and process suppliers.
- Production Support and Capability Assurance activities involve production of neutron generators including components.
- Other programs, include research and development, process development, and certification testing of neutron generators and components.

The production of neutron generators involves fabricating and assembling major components, including a neutron tube, miniature accelerator, power supply, and timer.

Potential tritium emissions are associated with various aspects of equipment calibration, destructive testing, outgassing of components, prototype development, manufacturing, and material handling. A variety of chemicals (corrosives, solvents, organics, and inorganics) in gaseous (including hydrogen), liquid, and solid forms in relatively small quantities are used in many of these specific processes. Chemical emissions, including corrosives, alcohols, ketones, and other solvents, are associated with various aspects of surface preparation, cleaning, material processing, manufacturing, testing, and quality control. Small sealed radioactive sources, nondestructive testing (X-rays), and lasers are used in the facility.



Source: SNL/NM 1998a

Figure FD-1. Neutron Generator Facility (NGF)

The NGF is used for fabricating neutron generators and prototype switch tabs. The neutron generator consists of a neutron tube and a power supply to operate it. The generation of neutrons is accomplished by the fusion of isotopes of hydrogen (deuterium and tritium) by ion acceleration.

MICROELECTRONICS DEVELOPMENT LABORATORY (MDL)

Function and Description:

The mission of the MDL, located in Building 858 in Technical Area-I, is to provide the microelectronics research and engineering capabilities to support industry, government, and other programs of national interest. The MDL contains 30,000 ft² of clean room, consisting of 22 independent bays separated by 8-ft-wide utility chases. Laboratory space outside the clean room area is used for wafer test equipment, die packaging, scanning electron microscopy, device radioactive source exposure, and device inspection. The basement of the facility contains acid waste neutralization equipment used in the neutralization of process wastewater. The MDL includes the Emergency Response Center, which has the equipment necessary to respond to facility emergencies.

Specific Processes, Activities, and Capabilities:

A variety of processes are used to produce microelectronic and micromechanical devices that may vary according to the needs of a particular project. These processes, however, can be grouped within the following four broad categories of iterative processes:

- Film deposition—processes that prepare the surface of a silicon chip with conductive and nonconductive layers and polymers.
- Photolithography—processes that transfer a larger master pattern of components onto the film layers, similar to photographic processes in concept.
- Etching—processes that carve out the image created on the films and that can expose selected portions of the surface of the silicon chip.
- Ion implantation—processes that place electrically active chemicals of various types into the exposed portions of the silicon chip surface.

MDL operations support the following types of programs and activities:

- Direct stockpile activities conduct research and development in microelectronics devices for nuclear weapon applications.
- Enhanced Surveillance Programs examine corrosion in select components.
- Technology Transfer and Education Programs develop microelectronic systems and processes.
- Advanced Manufacturing, Design and Production Technologies develop new processes and building prototypes.
- Weapons Programs activities develop microelectronic devices for weapon components.

Large quantities of acids and caustics and a wide variety of toxic and corrosive gases are used in clean rooms to clean, develop, and etch wafer surfaces and to create the films and chemical ions for implantation. While chemical quantities are less than those of a commercial manufacturing operation, the types of materials and chemicals used in these processes are generic to the semiconductor industry. Chemical air emissions occur during various points of the processes identified above, including the use or application of chemical developers and reactant liquids. Small sealed sources are also contained in equipment used in radiation hardening testing.



Source: SNL/NM 1998a

Figure FD–2. Microelectronics Development Laboratory (MDL)

The MDL was built in 1988 as a world-class facility dedicated to the advancement of microelectronic research, development, and application initiatives of strategic interest. Advanced manufacturing technologies can be tested at the MDL. Here, this worker wears a special uniform to protect microcircuits from lint and dust.

ADVANCED MANUFACTURING PROCESSES LABORATORY (AMPL)

Function and Description:

The mission of the AMPL, located in Technical Area-I, is to develop and apply advanced manufacturing technology to produce products in support of Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico's national security missions. The AMPL, comprised of 11 laboratories or divisions, can prototype and do limited manufacture of many of the specialized components of nuclear weapons. The advanced manufacturing technology development in the AMPL is focused on enhancing capabilities in four broad areas: manufacture of engineering hardware, emergency and specialized production of weapon hardware, development of robust manufacturing processes, and design and fabrication of unique production equipment.

Specific Processes, Activities, and Capabilities:

The activities conducted in the AMPL are typically laboratory and small-scale manufacturing operations involving materials and process research. The equipment used is commercial or custom-built laboratory and small-scale instrumentation. Operations range from standard wet chemistry to high-tech chemical techniques. Operations include, but are not limited to, development of processes and applications using plastics and organics, nonexplosive powders, adhesives, potting compounds, ceramics, laminates, microcircuits, lasers, machine shop equipment, electronic fabrication, multichip modules, thin-film brazing and deposition, and plating and glass technology.

AMPL operations support the following types of programs and activities:

- Direct stockpile activities program develops and applies advanced processes for nuclear weapon applications.
- System Components Science and Technology Program supports materials processing needs of Defense Programs (metals, polymers, ceramics, and glasses).
- Technology Transfer and Education Programs develop advanced manufacturing processes through coordination with industrial partners.
- Production Support and Capability Assurance Program activities develop and produce active ceramic components for neutron generators.
- Advanced Manufacturing, Design, and Production Technologies develop and improve processes for weapon production.
- Work for other Federal Agencies, Private Corporations, and Institutions develop advanced manufacturing techniques and processes, electronics, materials, and systems.

These activities involve the use of a variety of chemicals (including corrosives, solvents, organics, inorganics, and gases) in relatively small amounts. All activities are performed in well-ventilated areas or fume hoods to prevent employee exposure. Most of the wastes generated in these activities are spent solvents, corrosives, and inert purge gases (such as nitrogen and helium). Neutron generators and other related components containing tritium are handled at the AMPL; however, the tritium contained in these components is completely sealed within a welded tube. No radioactive air emissions are produced at this facility.



Source: SNL/NM 1998a

Figure FD-3. Advanced Manufacturing Processes Laboratory (AMPL)

Activities at the AMPL include development of weapons hardware and design of production equipment.

INTEGRATED MATERIALS RESEARCH LABORATORY (IMRL)

Function and Description:

The mission of the IMRL, located in Technical Area-I, is to conduct materials and advanced components research. The IMRL facility is a 140,000-ft² multiple-story facility, which develops new and superior materials to meet the needs of government and private industry. This low-hazard, nonnuclear facility houses most of the advanced materials research and development functions at Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico (SNL/NM). These research activities include laboratory studies in chemistry, physics, and alternative energy technologies. Experimental work is augmented by advanced computer modeling and simulation techniques, another SNL/NM area of expertise.

Specific Processes, Activities, and Capabilities:

IMRL research and development efforts are focused on meeting multiple program management objectives through manufacturing process development and integration of new and advanced products with advanced process development. In process development, IMRL concentrates on materials and processes to support long-term stockpile needs for limited-life components. In material sciences, work includes scientifically tailoring materials, studying defects, and researching impurities in materials.

Numerous techniques and highly specialized processes are developed to improve light gas membranes, improve fuel and chemical production, and develop thin films (each a few angstroms thick). These thin films include mixtures of semiconductors to enhance electronic and optical properties not exhibited in purer form. Thin-film techniques include depositing chemicals (in vapor form) to surfaces to reduce friction, corrosion, and wear and enhance performance of materials like superconductors and optical materials.

To accomplish these tasks, IMRL uses electron microscopy for analytical and high resolution imaging and an electron microprobe to analyze very small structures. Also IMRL uses X-ray diffraction, X-ray fluorescence, and vibrational spectroscopy for surface and material analysis especially for material defects along with computer-aided design, synthesis, characterization, and testing. A variety of operations are carried out involving laser, electron beam, pulsed, and inertial welding equipment designed to join different types of metals. Small-lot fabrication of foams and membranes are also made. Synthesis of novel polymers, experimental and theoretical studies on polymer degradation, and catalysis development and improved material separation to reduce impurities and defects are accomplished using numerous analytical techniques including dielectric and ferroelectric testing, electrooptic characterization, and ultra-fast optical spectroscopy.

IMRL operations support the following types of programs and activities:

- Advanced Industrial Materials Research Program conducts materials research and development.
- Catalysis and Separations Science and Engineering chemistry and materials research and development.
- Materials Processing by Design.
- Materials Sciences uses advanced characterization instrumentation for research into relationships between materials properties and structure, and development of new and favorable material properties through advanced synthesis and nanoscale structuring of materials.
- Advanced Design and Production Technologies develops and characterizes advanced materials and production processes.

- Direct Stockpile Activities conducts research and development of engineered materials for nuclear weapon applications.
- Technology Transfer and Education Activities conduct materials development and testing in conjunction with industry partners in technology development.

A variety of chemicals (corrosives, solvents, organics, and inorganics) in gaseous (including hydrogen), liquid, and solid forms in relatively small quantities are used in many of these specific processes. Chemical air emissions, including corrosives, alcohols, ketones, and other solvents, are associated with various aspects of surface preparation, cleaning, material processing, manufacturing, testing, and quality control. Small sealed radioactive sources, nondestructive testing (X-rays), and lasers are used in the facility.



Source: SNL/NM 1998a

Figure FD-4. Integrated Materials Research Laboratory (IMRL)

Various weapons materials are tested at the IMRL.

EXPLOSIVE COMPONENTS FACILITY (ECF)

Function and Description:

The mission of the ECF, located just outside and to the south of Technical Area (TA)-I, is to conduct research and development on a variety of energetic components. The facility comprises a main building (Building 905) and six explosives storage magazines (Buildings 905A through F). The ECF consolidates a number of activities formerly conducted in TA-II related to energetic component research, testing, and development. The ECF is a low-hazard, nonnuclear, state-of-the-art facility.

Specific Processes, Activities, and Capabilities:

The ECF is primarily a test facility performing the following activities:

- physical and chemical testing of explosives, pyrotechnics, and propellants;
- development of advanced explosive components;
- research, development, and testing of neutron-generating devices;
- research, development, and testing of batteries; and
- stockpile surveillance of explosives, pyrotechnics, and propellants.

The ECF operations are allocated, but not limited, to the following programs and activities:

- Direct Stockpile Activities involve research and development (R&D), energetic materials, and other components.
- Special projects, conducted with the U.S. Department of Defense, include projects for the purpose of reducing operational hazards associated with energetic materials, advanced initiation and fuse development, and material studies along with computer simulation.
- Other projects involve a wide variety of experimental testing, R&D, analyses, technology transfer, and technology development related to explosives, explosive materials, explosive components, and other materials.

A broad range of energetic-material R&D and application activities are conducted at the ECF. Advanced diagnostic equipment is used during experiments ranging from 1 kg tests to sophisticated spectroscopic studies on milligram-size samples that probe fundamental processes of detonation.

A variety of chemicals (corrosives, solvents, organics, and inorganics) in gaseous, liquid, and solid forms in relatively small quantities are used in many different processes. Air emissions result from the use of corrosives, alcohols, ketones, and other solvents. Sealed radioactive sources, X-rays, and lasers are used in the facility. Low-level tritium emissions are associated with various aspects of neutron generator development and testing.



Source: SNL/NM 1998a

Figure FD-5. Explosive Components Facility (ECF)

SNL/NM's new 91,000-ft² ECF is a U.S. Department of Energy-designated user facility and makes state-of-the-art testing and evaluation capabilities available to industry.

TERMINAL BALLISTICS COMPLEX

Function and Description:

The mission of the Terminal Ballistics Complex, located in Technical Area-III, is to conduct environmental, safety, and survivability testing for nuclear weapon applications. The Terminal Ballistics Complex is a low-hazard facility that includes a main building (Building 6750), two smaller buildings (Buildings 6752 and 6753), and four explosive storage magazines. Building 6750 houses a small machine shop, office space, a control area, and an indoor firing range. Building 6753 is used for large propellant charge assembly and temperature conditioning of propellants. Building 6752 is an unoccupied storage shed for nonhazardous materials. The storage magazines are used for long-term storage of propellants and explosives.

Specific Processes, Activities, and Capabilities:


Processes at the Terminal Ballistics Complex are centered on the evaluation of test materials, primarily the physical examination, cleaning, and general quality assurance of munitions and components. In addition, the Terminal Ballistics Complex provides unique test environments and capabilities including the following:

- an outdoor, large-caliber gun range with a 155-mm "Long Tom" artillery gun permanently mounted in a revetment;
- static-fire rocket stands used to measure the thrust force of small rockets;
- test environments for ballistic studies and solid-fuel rocket motor tests; and
- secure, remote indoor and outdoor test facilities.

The Terminal Ballistics Complex operations are allocated, but not limited, to the following programs and activities:

- Direct Stockpile Activities, include development and survivability testing of nuclear weapon subsystems and components by using firearms and projectiles to determine material effects and responses.
- Special projects reduce operational hazards associated with explosives, explosive initiators, hard target penetration, computer simulation.
- Science and Technology include material response evaluations.
- Other projects include experiments on shipping containers and storage facilities.

The Terminal Ballistics Complex maintains a small chemical inventory and no radioactive material inventory. Various aspects of the preparation and evaluation of test materials can result in emissions from a variety of solvents including alcohols and ketones. Radioactive air emissions are not produced at this facility.



Source: SNL/NM 1998a

Figure FD-6. Terminal Ballistics Complex

At the Terminal Ballistic Complex's outdoor firing range, a 155-mm "Long Tom" gun fires a projectile.

DROP/IMPACT COMPLEX

Function and Description:

The mission of the Drop/Impact Complex, located in Technical Area-III, is to conduct hard-surface impacts, water impacts, and underwater tests of weapon shapes, substructures, and components. This work is performed to verify design integrity and performance and fuzing functions performance. Such tests help ensure that the nation's nuclear weapons systems meet the highest standards of safety and reliability. This is a low-hazard, nonnuclear facility consisting of two towers: a 185-ft drop tower next to a hard surface and a 300-ft drop tower next to a water-filled pool, 120 ft wide, 188 ft long, and 50 ft deep. A 600-ft-long rocket sled track is located at the end of the pool opposite the tower for testing rocket pull-down accelerated impacts into the water pool.

Specific Processes, Activities, and Capabilities:

The Drop/Impact Complex is primarily a test facility with operations that include conducting drop tests, rocket pull-down tests, submersion tests, and underwater explosive effects tests. Testing involves the following processes and support activities:

- receiving, storing, and handling explosives; pyrotechnics; propellants; nuclear radioactive, and chemical materials;
- setting up explosive tests, explosive arming and firing, explosives ordnance disposal;
- testing electronic instrumentation and data recording, photometrics, and telemetry;
- conducting hazard area control and checking fire-control system support;
- transporting test assemblies to test sites, rocket arming and launching, post-launch and firing procedures, diving operations; and
- recovering radioactive and chemical material.

The Drop/Impact Complex operations are allocated, but not limited, to the following programs and activities.

- Direct Stockpile Activities conduct environmental, safety, and survivability testing for nuclear weapon systems and components.
- Science and Technology activities involve testing of materials, components, and weapon systems.
- Model Validation efforts involve high-velocity impact testing on hard surfaces, water impact tests, and underwater tests to validate models.
- Other projects include testing prototype nuclear materials packaging, and other projects not associated with the U.S. Department of Energy.

During a drop test, a test object is dropped from the top of the tower for gravity acceleration to a hard impact surface. In a water test, objects are dropped from the top of the tower by gravity or rockets are used to boost acceleration.

The Drop/Impact Complex contains a small chemical inventory and no radioactive material inventory. Cleaners, lubricants, solvents, paints, and agents are used in small quantities. Compressed gases are used in the assembly areas, including acetylene and oxygen (for welding), argon, and helium. Chemical emissions, including alcohols, ketones, and other solvents, are possible and are associated with various aspects of surface preparation, cleaning, and material processing including quality control. Small amounts of airborne emissions, including carbon monoxide and lead, are released during explosives tests. Although the most common radioactive material used is depleted uranium, other nuclear and radioactive materials associated with test objects may include uranium alloys, thorium alloys and compounds, and tritium. Radioactive air emissions are not produced at this facility.



Source: SNL/NM 1998a

Figure FD-7. Drop/Impact Complex

The Drop/Impact Complex is used to conduct hard-surface and water impact tests.

SLED TRACK COMPLEX

Function and Description:

The Sled Track Complex, located in Technical Area-III, supports the verification of design integrity, performance, and fuzing functions of weapon systems through the simulation of high-speed impacts of weapon shapes, substructures, and components. Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico (SNL/NM) test facilities such as the Sled Track Complex have been specifically designed for the validation of analytical modeling and the functional certification of weapons systems. The facility is also used to subject weapon parachute systems to aerodynamic loads to verify parachute design integrity and performance. In addition, SNL/NM Energy & Environment Programs use the Sled Track Complex to verify designs in transportation technology, reactor safety, and Defense Programs transportation systems.

Specific Processes, Activities, and Capabilities:

Operations at the Sled Track Complex include a variety of tests and test article preparation such as conducting rocket sled and rocket launcher tests, free-flight testing, and explosive testing. Each rocket sled test involves the acceleration of a rocket down a sled track. A test may involve impacting an object onto a target, or launching a parachute from an ejector accelerated along the track. Each explosive detonation is used to subject test articles to shock waves and propel missiles into test articles. Rocket launches are used to accelerate test objects along a beam on a carriage that is stopped at the end of the beam, releasing test objects into free flight at specific targets. In free-flight launches, test objects are launched directly into free flight from portable launch rails.

These operations also include:

- receiving, storing, and handling explosives; pyrotechnics; propellants; and nuclear, radioactive, and chemical materials;
- fabricating and assembling rocket sleds including payloads and rockets;
- setting up explosive tests, electronic instrumentation, and data recording and special equipment including lasers, tracking equipment, and X-ray;
- reducing hazards through area, systems, and personnel control;
- disposing of explosives ordnance; and
- recovering radioactive and chemical materials.

Specific programs and activities supported by the Sled Track Complex include, but are not limited to, the following:

- Direct Stockpile Activities and Performance Assessment and Technology Programs conduct environmental, safety, and survivability testing for nuclear weapon applications.
- Energy Programs certify designs in transportation technology and reactor programs.
- Work for Other Federal Agencies in impact, functional, and explosives effects testing.

Small amounts of chemicals are maintained for use in assembling rocket sleds and test payloads in Buildings 6741, 6743, and 6736. For example, various adhesives and epoxies are used to fasten transducers and similar items. Cleaners, lubricants, solvents, paints, and other such agents may also be used in small quantities. Compressed gases are used in the assembly areas, including acetylene and oxygen (for welding), argon, and helium; and dry nitrogen and carbon dioxide are used for pneumatic actuators.



Source: SNL/NM 1998a

FD-8. Sled Track Complex

One of the more unique testing sites available for use at SNL/NM is a high-speed sled track used for rocket sled and launcher testing, free-flight testing, and explosive testing.

CENTRIFUGE COMPLEX

Function and Description:

The Centrifuge Complex, located in Technical Area-III, is used to validate analytical models and to certify the functioning of large test objects under high acceleration conditions. The complex is also used to certify designs in transportation technology. The Centrifuge Complex has been classified a low-hazard, nonnuclear facility. Typical test objects in the Centrifuge Complex include weapons systems, satellite systems, reentry vehicles, geotectonic loads, rocket components, and sensing devices.

Specific Processes, Activities, and Capabilities:

Test preparation processes include machine shop welding operations, surface treatments, welding, and other means to attach parts. Test objects are attached to one end of a boom that rotates around a central shaft. Counterweights are attached to the other end of the boom to counterbalance the test objects. Hydraulic drive motors rotate the central shaft and boom to the revolutions per minute required to achieve the test acceleration. Other tests involve combining vibration and acceleration of oversized or hazardous test objects, including explosive payloads. Sometimes a centrifuge is used to accelerate small objects to high velocity with subsequent release to impact on targets. The Centrifuge Complex has two centrifuge units.

- The 29-ft indoor centrifuge, located inside Building 6526, can subject test objects weighing up to 16,000 lb to 100 times the acceleration of gravity (100 *g*). An acceleration of 300 *g* can be achieved with proportionally lighter test objects.
- The 35-ft outdoor centrifuge, located adjacent to Building 6526, can subject test objects weighing up to 10,000 lb to an acceleration of 45 *g*. An acceleration of 240 *g* can be achieved with proportionally lighter test objects.

Each centrifuge test involves subjecting a test object to a specified level of acceleration for a specified duration. In each impact test, a small object is accelerated and released from the arm of the 35-ft centrifuge on a tangential trajectory to impact targets.

The Centrifuge Complex operation are allocated, but not limited, to the following programs and activities:

- Direct stockpile activities include survivability testing of nuclear weapon systems and components.
- Energy Programs conduct certification testing of transportation systems through impact tests.
- Other programs test satellite systems.

The Centrifuge Complex contains a small chemical inventory but no radioactive materials. Cleaners, lubricants, solvents, paints, and agents are used in small quantities. Compressed gases used in the assembly areas include acetylene and oxygen (for welding), argon, and helium. Chemical emissions, including alcohols, ketones, and other solvents, are associated with various aspects of surface preparation, cleaning, and material processing including quality control. Small amounts of airborne emissions, including carbon monoxide and lead, are released during explosives tests. Radioactive air emissions are not produced at this facility. Noise from centrifuge operation, collision impacts, and explosive testing does occur. Fragments resulting from centrifuge-launched explosives are recovered shortly after test events.



Source: SNL/NM 1998a

FD-9. Centrifuge Complex

This 35-ft outdoor centrifuge can test objects weighing up to 10,000 lb to an acceleration of 45 g.

SATURN ACCELERATOR

Function and Description:

The mission of the SATURN accelerator, located in Building 981 in Technical Area-IV, is to conduct development and survivability testing of nuclear weapon subsystems and components. SATURN was designed and built to provide X-ray radiation environments with enhanced simulation fidelity as well as providing improved test exposure levels and test areas. SATURN can also operate in a plasma radiation source configuration, generating ultra-high intensity soft X-ray environments. The SATURN facility consists of a laboratory building (including a high bay, office space, shop areas, light laboratories, a mechanical room, a radiation exposure cell, and a basement) and storage tanks and transfer systems for large quantities of transformer oil and deionized water.

The accelerator is a symmetric, parallel-current driver consisting of 36 identical pulse-compression and power-flow modules arranged like the spokes of a wheel. It can easily be configured to drive either annular electron beam or Z-pinch loads. The pulsed-power components are housed in an open-air tank that is 96 ft in diameter and 14 ft high. The tank is divided into energy storage, pulse compression, power flow, and power combination sections. The concrete- and earth-shielded exposure cell is located in a basement room beneath the accelerator.

Specific Processes, Activities, and Capabilities:

Activities in the SATURN involve testing the survivability of nuclear weapon systems by simulating the X-rays produced by a nuclear weapon detonation. SATURN is used to simulate the effects of nuclear countermeasures on electronic and material components, as a pulsed-power and radiation source, and as a diagnostic test bed for accelerator component development. This work would include, but not be limited to, improvements or changes to energy storage systems, pulse-forming systems, voltage conditioning networks, and other accelerator components. The SATURN accelerator is designed as a modular, high-power, variable-spectrum, X-ray simulation source that can be operated with two different X-ray controllers or any one of several plasma radiation sources.

Areas of application include the following:

- satellite systems;
- electronic and materials devices, components, and subsystems; and
- reentry vehicle and missile subsystems.


SATURN facility operations are allocated, but not limited, to the following programs and activities:

- Direct Stockpile Activities conduct development and survivability testing of nuclear weapons subsystems and components by simulating the X-ray radiation effects of nuclear weapons on nonnuclear components of U.S. Strategic Systems.
- Testing of satellite systems.
- Strategic Defense Initiative tests space assets, reentry vehicles, and missile subsystems.
- Inertial Confinement Fusion Programs involves Z-pinch plasma tests and weapons physics research.

The SATURN facility contains a small chemical inventory and a small radioactive material inventory. Chemical emissions, including alcohols, ketones, and other solvents, are possible and are associated with various aspects of surface preparation, cleaning, and material processing including quality control. Sulfur hexafluoride is used as the insulator gas in switching components. Sulfur hexafluoride gas is passed through switches under continuous pressure. It is hazardous in enclosed areas because it does not support respiration. Some tests involve the installation of beryllium filters or shields that can be damaged during a shot, causing release of beryllium particulates. Radioactive air emissions are not produced at this facility. Small sealed radioactive sources (calibration and monitoring), nondestructive testing (X-rays), and lasers are used in the facility.

Accelerator Hazards:

All areas of the facility have access control maintained by fences and gates with locking mechanisms, physical inspection, and clearing processes. In addition, confinement barriers are provided to protect personnel and equipment from the effects of any generalized radiation or electromagnetic fields produced by the operation of the accelerator.



Source: SNL/NM 1998a

FD-10. SATURN Accelerator

The SATURN accelerator is a modular, high-power, variable-spectrum, X-ray simulation source. SATURN is used to simulate the radiation effects of nuclear countermeasures on electronic and material components, as a pulsed-power and radiation source, and as a diagnostic test bed.

HIGH-ENERGY RADIATION MEGAVOLT ELECTRON SOURCE UNIT III (HERMES III)

Function and Description:

HERMES III, a major facility in the Simulation Technology Laboratory (STL), Building 970, is a short-pulse (20- to 30-nsec), high-energy (20-MeV) accelerator that was designed and built to provide intense gamma ray fields over very large areas. This testing provides very realistic conditions associated with some aspects of a nuclear explosion radiation environment. The radiation can be used to test the response of electronics, weapon system components, and entire systems. The accelerator can also be reconfigured to accelerate light ions.

The 55,000-ft² (5,110-m²) HERMES III facility includes the accelerator, indoor and outdoor test cells, and ancillary support systems, including oil storage tanks. The heavily shielded indoor test cell, which is used for most tests, has a usable test area 25 ft deep by 37 ft wide, and can support a load of 100 lb/ft², which makes it suitable for testing of most parts and components. The unique shielded outdoor test cell allows testing of large assemblies and entire weapon systems or a variety of other large systems such as tanks.

Specific Processes, Activities, and Capabilities:

Gamma rays are created by discharging the energy storage systems in a manner that increases their voltage. Then, intermediate storage systems and transmission lines add voltage and form a pulse, and a diode section generates an electron beam and converts the beam into gamma rays. The diode section can also be configured to generate a variety of light ion beams and associated ionizing and nonionizing radiation depending on the type of ion accelerated, the target material, and radioactive decay mode. Objects to be irradiated are placed in either the indoor or outdoor test cells and the radiation environment created by operating the accelerator is tailored to the needs of the test.

HERMES III operations support the following types of programs and activities:

- Direct Stockpile Activities conduct the development and survivability testing of nuclear weapon subsystems and components.
- Experimental Activities in radiation testing and associated diagnostics determine the deleterious or beneficial effects of radiation on electronic, material, and biological systems.
- Inertial Confinement Fusion Program activities validate advanced hydrodynamic radiography techniques and applications to address stockpile stewardship issues on the compact, cost-effective, multi-axis Advanced Hydrotest Facility expected to be located at Los Alamos National Laboratory.
- Performance Assessment Science and Technology Program supports hostile (radiation) environmental testing of weapon components.
- Pulsed-Power Technology Program activities support new pulsed-power components and designs involving modifications to the HERMES III machine for pulsed-power research, development, testing, and evaluation.

A large amount of transformer oil is used as an insulator in the energy storage sections of the facility, but only small amounts of hazardous chemicals, such as solvents, are used. Inert gases are used in switching devices and stored in the facility in sufficient quantities to warrant controls for asphyxiant hazards. Lasers are used to align accelerator components and in switching mechanisms. Radioactive air emissions

may be generated by activation of oxygen or nitrogen in air while operating in the gamma ray production mode, particularly with outdoor shots; however, these emissions are at very low levels and decay within seconds.

Accelerator Hazards:

All areas of the facility have access control maintained by fences and gates with locking mechanisms, physical inspection, and clearing processes. In addition, confinement barriers are provided to protect personnel and equipment from the effects of any generalized radiation or electromagnetic fields produced by the operation of the accelerator.



Source: SNL/NM 1998a

FD-11. High-Energy Radiation Megavolt Electron Source Unit III (HERMES III)

The HERMES III accelerator is the world's most powerful gamma simulator. It is used primarily for simulating the effects of prompt radiation for a nuclear burst on electronics and complete military systems.

SANDIA ACCELERATOR & BEAM RESEARCH EXPERIMENT (SABRE)

Function and Description:

The mission of the SABRE pulsed accelerator, located in Building 970 in Technical Area-IV, is to support the Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) Program for advanced extraction ion controller research and for target and focusing studies. The accelerator can also be configured for radiography experiments and used as the driver that provides a flash radiography source. SABRE is a pulsed accelerator located within the Simulation Technology Laboratory (STL), along with the High-Energy Radiation Megavolt Electron Source Unit III (HERMES III) accelerator and, soon to be constructed, the Radiographic Integrated Test Stand (RITS) accelerator. The SABRE is comprised of the accelerator itself, a lead- and concrete-shielded test cell, a basement trench where the diode capacitor banks are located, and several screen rooms and work areas located nearby.

Specific Processes, Activities, and Capabilities:

For the ICF Program, the SABRE is the workhorse of the light ion program for investigating extraction diodes and magnetically insulated transmission line coupling; for testing surface and subsurface cleaning, improved vacuum conditions, and advanced ion sources; and for studying lithium ion transport. It uses the inductive voltage adder technology also used on the HERMES III. New high-magnetic-field capability was tested in fiscal year 1996 as part of the Advanced Hydrodynamic Radiography Program in the Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico Pulsed-Power Sciences. For Stockpile Support activities in testing weapons components, test objects are placed within the accelerator test cell and irradiated by the accelerator-produced radiation. Afterwards, the test objects are examined to determine their survivability from exposure to radiation.

Areas of application include

- computer science,
- simulation of X-rays and gamma rays produced by a nuclear weapon detonation,
- flight dynamics,
- satellite processing, and
- robotics.


SABRE operations are allocated, but not limited, to the following programs and activities:

- Direct Stockpile Activities, include survivability testing of nuclear weapon subsystems and components.
- Performance Assessment Science and Technology Program supports developing pulsed-power technology to provide advanced radiographic characterization techniques useful to applications such as Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrotesting.
- Inertial Confinement Fusion Program involves light-ion program activities, lithium ion transport, and high-magnetic field testing.

The SABRE facility contains a small chemical inventory and a small radioactive material inventory. Chemical emissions, including alcohols, ketones, and other solvents, are possible and are associated with various aspects of surface preparation, cleaning, and material processing, including quality control. Radioactive air emissions are not produced at this facility. Small, sealed radioactive sources (calibration and monitoring), nondestructive testing (X-rays), and lasers are used in the facility.

Accelerator Hazards:

All areas of the facility have access control maintained by fences and gates with locking mechanisms, physical inspection, and clearing processes. In addition, confinement barriers are provided to protect personnel and equipment from the effects of any generalized radiation or electromagnetic fields produced by the operation of the accelerator.



Source: SNL/NM 1998a

FD-12. Sandia Accelerator & Beam Research Experiment (SABRE)

The SABRE is located in TA-IV and is used to support the ICF Program.

SHORT-PULSE HIGH INTENSITY NANOSECOND X-RADIATOR (SPHINX)

Function and Description:

The mission of the SPHINX facility, located in Building 981 in Technical Area-IV, is to provide radiation environments for testing components of nuclear weapons and for confirming codes used in the certification of nuclear weapons components. Because of the moratorium on underground nuclear testing, the nuclear stockpile integrity must be assured by various simulation testing including computer modeling. The SABRE creates a radiation environment used to validate computer simulations and verify stockpile integrity. The SPHINX accelerator is a high-voltage, high-shot-rate X-ray and electron beam accelerator that is used primarily to measure X-ray-induced photo currents from short, fast-rise-time pulses in integrated circuits and associated heat handling response in materials. The facility, including a concrete-shielded enclosure adjacent to the SATURN accelerator in Building 981, consists of an 18-stage, low-inductance generator; several pulse conduits; and radiation barriers.

Specific Processes, Activities, and Capabilities:

The SPHINX is used primarily as a research facility. The operations and activities taking place in the SPHINX are diverse, although the dominant activity is related to pulsed-power technology. SPHINX is applied as a high-shot-rate, hot-X-ray-effects simulator capable of testing piece parts or components that require small-area exposure. The SPHINX can operate in two distinct modes: as an X-ray source and as an electron beam source. In the X-ray source mode, researchers study the response of electronics to pulsed high-energy X-ray environments. The electron beam mode is used to study the heat handling response of materials to pulsed radiation. It has high usage to support development work in tactical, strategic satellite systems.

Areas of application include

- computer science,
- simulation of X-rays and gamma rays produced by a nuclear weapon detonation,
- flight dynamics,
- satellite processing, and
- robotics.

SPHINX operations are allocated, but not limited, to support to the following programs and activities:


- Experimental activities involve testing with high-shot-rate (accelerator firings) and simulating hot X-ray effects for testing of parts and components.
- Performance Assessment Science and Technology Program applications provide high intensity X-ray and electron beam sources for weapons effects studies.
- Studies on the thermostructural response of materials to pulsed radiation.

- Tactical and strategic satellite systems development work.
- Various research and development work for other Federal agencies using SPHINX facility capabilities.

The SPHINX facility contains a small chemical inventory and no radioactive material inventory. Chemical emissions, including alcohols, ketones, and other solvents, are possible and are associated with various aspects of surface preparation, cleaning, and material processing, including quality control. Radioactive air emissions are not produced at this facility.

Accelerator Hazards:

All areas of the facility have access control maintained by fences and gates with locking mechanisms, physical inspection, and clearing processes. In addition, confinement barriers are provided to protect personnel and equipment from the effects of any generalized radiation or electromagnetic fields produced by the operation of the accelerator.



Source: SNL/NM 1998a

FD-13. Short-Pulse High Intensity Nanosecond X-Radiator (SPHINX)

The SPHINX is a new addition to SNL/NM radiation facilities and was placed in operation in 1992. SPHINX is primarily used to measure the X-ray-induced photocurrents from short, fast-rise-time pulses in integrated circuits.

REPETITIVE HIGH ENERGY PULSED-POWER UNIT I (RHEPP I)

Function and Description:

The mission of the RHEPP I accelerator, located in Building 986 in Technical Area-IV, is to serve as a tool for the technology development of continuous-operation, pulsed-power systems to demonstrate high-energy ion beams and industrial pulsed-power applications. The RHEPP I facility includes a high-energy generator; computer-controlled, pulsed-power equipment; specialized voltage enhancement equipment; specialized electrical current control and storage equipment; and a material test chamber for ion source testing and development. The electrical current control equipment and materials test chamber are located in a below-grade, radiation-shielded test cell under the voltage-enhancement equipment.

Specific Processes, Activities, and Capabilities:

The RHEPP I is primarily a research facility. Its operations and activities are diverse, although the dominant activity is related to pulsed-power technology. During normal operation, the RHEPP systems produces pulses of electrons that may be stopped, converted to ions, or extracted, depending upon the configuration of the accelerator. The RHEPP I was the first Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico (SNL/NM) accelerator used for the basic technology development of the RHEPP technical concept. It is now used for applications at lower energies and for technology development and some experimental work with materials and organic sterilization processes. Testing in RHEPP I includes exposing test materials (metals and plastics) located in the test cell to shots of proton energy generated by the accelerator. Test objects are then evaluated to determine the effects of the low-level radiation. A new activity for the RHEPP I would be to use ion beams to melt and resolidify near-surface material on small amounts of depleted uranium.

Areas of application include

- computer science,
- simulation of the X-rays and gamma rays produced by a nuclear weapon detonation,
- flight dynamics,
- satellite processing, and
- robotics.

RHEPP I operations support the following types of programs and activities:

- Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development Program design of advanced accelerators for applications related to the defeat of biological (nonpathogenic) and chemical agents.
- Performance Assessment Science and Technology Program develops unique pulsed-power materials-processing techniques for weapons applications.
- Pulsed-Power Technology Program technology development and related experimental activities.

The RHEPP I facility contains a small chemical inventory and a small radioactive material inventory. Chemical emissions, including alcohols, ketones, and other solvents, are possible and are associated with various aspects of surface preparation, cleaning, and material processing, including quality control. Radioactive air emissions are not produced at this facility.

Accelerator Hazards:

All areas of the facility have access control maintained by fences and gates with locking mechanisms, physical inspection, and clearing processes. In addition, confinement barriers are provided to protect personnel and equipment from the effects of any generalized radiation or electromagnetic fields produced by the operation of the accelerator.



Source: SNL/NM 1998a

FD-14. Repetitive High Energy Pulsed-Power Unit I (RHEPP I)

The RHEPP I facility is an operational test bed for the development of technology used to melt and resolidify metals and ceramics for a variety of potential industrial applications.

REPETITIVE HIGH ENERGY PULSED-POWER UNIT II (RHEPP II)

Function and Description:

The mission of the RHEPP II accelerator, located in Building 963 in Technical Area-IV, is the development of radiation processing applications using high-dose-rate electron or X-ray beams. The RHEPP II accelerator is also a test center for the continued development of high-power magnetic switches and repetitive magnetically insulated transmission lines.

The RHEPP II facility contains the RHEPP II accelerator and the additional components of the microsecond pulse compressor, water-insulated pulse equipment, voltage enhancement equipment, and a high-power electron beam controller.

Specific Processes, Activities, and Capabilities:

The RHEPP II is primarily a research facility in the area of pulsed-power technology. It is used for basic magnetic switching technology development and as a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) user facility for high-energy-per-pulse applications. RHEPP technology has been used for ion beam surface treatment to harden material surfaces and for advanced research supporting sterilization projects for organic materials (for example, food products and lumber). Testing in RHEPP II includes exposing test materials in the test cell to high doses of X-rays to both simulate the conditions of nuclear weapon detonation as well as the effects of outer space on satellite components. While RHEPP I testing is confined largely to the surface of materials, RHEPP II produces an X-ray environment used to irradiate the entire test material.

Areas of application include

- computer science,
- simulation of the X-rays and gamma rays produced by a nuclear weapon detonation,
- flight dynamics,
- satellite processing,
- commercial application and technology transfer, and
- robotics.


RHEPP II operations support the following types of programs and activities:

- Performance Assessment Science and Technology Program develops pulsed-power technologies and applications for DOE Defense Programs and work for other Federal agencies.
- Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention Program and Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development Program activities involve developing advanced accelerators for biosterilization of such items as food and lumber, mentioned earlier.
- Pulsed-Power Technology Program activities involve basic switching technology development, high-energy pulse applications, ion-beam surface treatment for hardened materials, advanced research in support of the programs mentioned above, and the sterilization of organic materials.

The RHEPP II facility contains a small chemical inventory and no radioactive material inventory. Chemical emissions, including alcohols, ketones, and other solvents, are possible and are associated with various aspects of surface preparation, cleaning, and material processing, including quality control. Radioactive air emissions are not produced at this facility.

Accelerator Hazards:

All areas of the facility have access control maintained by fences and gates with locking mechanisms, physical inspection, and clearing processes. In addition, confinement barriers are provided to protect personnel and equipment from the effects of any generalized radiation or electromagnetic fields produced by the operation of the accelerator.



Source: SNL/NM 1998a

FD-15. Repetitive High Energy Pulsed-Power Unit II (RHEPP II)

RHEPP II, which began operation in July 1994, is a modular accelerator capable of operation up to 300 kW. Scheduled experiments include food pasteurization studies and direct bonding of ceramics.

Z-MACHINE

Function and Description:

The mission of the Z-Machine facility, formerly known as the Particle Beam Fusion Accelerator II (PBFA II) and located in Building 983 in Technical Area-IV, primarily provides weapons systems survivability testing by simulating the X-rays produced by nuclear weapon detonation.

The Z-Machine facility includes the accelerator high bay, support area high bays, laser and facility support systems including water and oil tank farms, low bay light laboratories, and the control room. The Z-Machine consists of 36 modules arranged radially around a central experiment vacuum chamber. The accelerator is located in a tank approximately 108 ft in diameter and 20 ft high, divided into 3 annular regions.

Specific Processes, Activities, and Capabilities:


Operating on the principle of pulsed-power, the Z-Machine stores electrical energy over a period of minutes then releases that energy in a concentrated burst. The accelerator produces a single, extremely short, extremely powerful pulse of energy that can be focused on a target. The primary operating mode of the Z-Machine produces a pulse that lasts 100 nsec with approximately 5 MJ of electrical energy and a peak power of 50 TW. Materials are not irradiated within the Z-Machine, but rather the accelerator provides a radiation environment used to validate computer modeling of the effects of certain X-rays on weapons components. Experiments at the facility are primarily research and development in nature.

Z-Machine operations are allocated, but not limited, to accelerator shots, or firings, in support of the following types of programs and activities:

- Performance Assessment Science and Technology Program develops advanced pulsed-power sources for weapons effects testing and weapons physics experiments.
- Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) Program studies involve pulse-shaping, radiation flow, equation of state and opacity measurements, hydrodynamic instabilities, capsule implosion physics, and the production of thermonuclear neutrons using deuterium.
- Continued Advanced Pulsed-Power Technology Program tests provide high-temperature, large-volume hohlraums and cold X-ray environments for weapons physics and ICF applications.

Accelerator Hazards:

All areas of the facility have access control maintained by fences and gates with locking mechanisms, physical inspection, and clearing processes. In addition, confinement barriers are provided to protect personnel and equipment from the effects of any generalized radiation or electromagnetic fields produced by the operation of the accelerator.



Source: SNL/NM 1998a

FD-16. Z-Machine

Raw Power: Time exposure photography of electrical discharges illuminating the surface of the Z-Machine, the world's most powerful X-ray source, during a recent accelerator shot.

TERA-ELECTRON VOLT ENERGY SUPERCONDUCTING LINEAR ACCELERATOR (TESLA)

Function and Description:

The mission of the TESLA facility, located in Building 961 in Technical Area-IV, is to test plasma-opening switches for pulsed-power drivers. The TESLA accelerator facility includes the accelerator high bay, light laboratories, offices, and the screen room. The facility is contained in a rectangular tank, 25 ft wide by 14 ft long by 10 ft high, with a vacuum chamber extension represented by two coaxial cylinders. The TESLA test cell includes electrical charge storage, a magnetically controlled plasma-opening switch, and electron beam storage. The oil tank contains 10,000 gals of transformer oil and a generator, which can store a maximum of 740 kJ in 48 capacitors and is equipped with a mechanical shorting system. The water tank contains 15,000 gals of deionized water and a 150-kilojoule intermediate storage capacitor. Two-foot-thick concrete block walls surround the test cell.

Specific Processes, Activities, and Capabilities:

The electron beam storage consists of an electron diode with a graphite converter. Testing at TESLA is primarily focused on evaluating improvements to pulsed-power technology and not on irradiating materials. The maximum possible voltage is 5 MV into a very high impedance load.

TESLA operations support, but are not limited to, the following types of programs and activities:

- Pulsed-Power Technology Program activities including radiation-producing shots (electron-beam into carbon load) and pulsed-power shots into dummy loads (shots that do not produce radiation).
- Performance Assessment Science and Technology Program activities dedicated to advanced pulsed-power development.

The TESLA facility contains a small chemical inventory and no radioactive material inventory. Chemical emissions, including alcohols, ketones, and other solvents, are possible and are associated with various aspects of surface preparation, cleaning, and material processing, including quality control. Radioactive air emissions are not produced at this facility.

Accelerator Hazards:

All areas of the facility have access control maintained by fences and gates with locking mechanisms, physical inspection, and clearing processes. In addition, confinement barriers are provided to protect personnel and equipment from the effects of any generalized radiation or electromagnetic fields produced by the operation of the accelerator.



Source: SNL/NM 1998a

FD-17. Tera-Electron Volt Energy Superconducting Linear Accelerator (TESLA)

The TESLA facility is used to test switches for pulsed-power drivers.

TESLA

ADVANCED PULSED-POWER RESEARCH MODULE (APPRM)

Function and Description:

The mission of the APPRM, located in the Building 963 in Technical Area-IV, is to evaluate the performance of new pulsed-power components and component alignments to improve the performance of future accelerators. The APPRM is a relatively small, single-pulse accelerator that serves as a test center for other scientific projects and can be used for conducting general pulsed-power research. Pulsed-power technology being tested at the APPRM is a potential candidate technology for future accelerator development beyond Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico's (SNL/NM's) Z-Machine.

Specific Processes, Activities, and Capabilities:

The operations and activities taking place in the APPRM are diverse, although the dominant activity is related to pulsed-power technology. APPRM is primarily used as a test bed for investigating physical design and pulsed-power issues associated with future accelerator design. None of the research involves the use of radioactive materials. Even in the "full system" configuration of the accelerator, the activation of materials from firing the accelerator is negligible.

Areas of application include

- computer science,
- simulation of X-rays and gamma rays produced by a nuclear weapon detonation,
- flight dynamics,
- satellite processing, and
- robotics.

APPRM operations support the following types of programs and activities:

- Experimental programs develop pulsed-power modules designed to study power storage, high-voltage switching, power flow for advanced applications, and advanced technologies in support of new designs.
- Performance Assessment Science and Technology Program develops pulsed-power sources for future incorporation into pulsed-power machines designed for weapons effects and weapons physics experiments.
- Inertial Confinement Fusion Program activities are similar to a gas switch design that eliminates the shock generated in the module and is useful to designs of future pulsed-power facilities such as the X-1 accelerator, for which the APPRM is the design prototype.

The APPRM facility contains a small chemical inventory and no radioactive material inventory. Chemical emissions, including alcohols, ketones, and other solvents, are possible and are associated with various aspects of surface preparation, cleaning, and material processing including quality control. Radioactive air emissions are not produced at this facility.

Accelerator Hazards:

All areas of the facility have access control maintained by fences and gates with locking mechanisms, physical inspection, and clearing processes. In addition, confinement barriers are provided to protect personnel and equipment from the effects of any generalized radiation or electromagnetic fields produced by the operation of the accelerator.



Source: SNL/NM 1998a

FD-18. Advanced Pulsed-Power Research Module (APPRM)

Pulsed-power components are evaluated at the APPRM.

RADIOGRAPHIC INTEGRATED TEST STAND (RITS)

Function and Description:

The RITS is a proposed new accelerator that would be installed in the Technical Area (TA)-IV, Building 970, high bay. The purpose of this new accelerator, planned for fiscal year 1999, would be to demonstrate voltage enhancement technology utility for advanced water influenced radiography. The RITS would be an intense electron beam test center bed and would be used to develop and demonstrate the capabilities required for the national Advanced Hydrotest Facility (AHF). The AHF would provide experimental benchmarking for advanced full-physics, three-dimensional numerical models of nuclear weapon primaries. The resulting confidence in the codes would form the basis for confidence in the nuclear performance and safety of the enduring stockpile and provide critical data to qualify remanufacture technologies and lifecycle engineering.

Specific Processes, Activities, and Capabilities:

The operations and activities of the RITS would be diverse, although the dominant activity would be related to pulsed-power technology. Other research that the RITS would support includes validation of pulse-power architecture (power flow), equipment physics studies, weapons code validation, diagnostic development, and possible long-range research involving explosive component testing. The X-rays would be used to radiograph both static and dynamic (explosively driven) objects within the Building 970 high bay. Under future programs, explosive testing could be conducted within the accelerator test cell. Such explosive tests would be conducted using an approved explosive containment system that could handle explosive charges up to 30 lb of trinitrotoluene (TNT) equivalent.

Areas of application include

- computer science,
- simulation of the X-rays and gamma rays produced by a nuclear weapon detonation,
- flight dynamics,
- satellite processing,
- commercial application and technology transfer, and
- robotics.

As planned, RITS operations would initially support the following Assistant Secretary for Defense Program activities:


- Radiography of both static and dynamic objects, including explosives tests in containment systems.
- Research into validating pulse-power architecture (power flow), diode physics studies, weapons code validation, and system diagnostic development.

The RITS facility would contain a small chemical inventory and a small radioactive hardware inventory. This hardware would become radioactive through high-energy activation during tests. Chemical emissions, including alcohols, ketones, and other solvents, would be possible and would be associated with various

aspects of surface preparation, cleaning, and material processing including quality control. Radioactive air emissions would be produced when the energy releases during a test.

Accelerator Hazards:

All areas of the facility would have access control maintained by fences and gates with locking mechanisms, physical inspection, and clearing processes. In addition, confinement barriers would be provided to protect personnel and equipment from the effects of any generalized radiation or electromagnetic fields produced by the operation of the accelerator.



Source: SNL/NM 1998a

FD-19. Radiographic Integrated Test Stand (RITS)

The RITS is a proposed accelerator to replace the existing Proto II accelerator.

NEW GAMMA IRRADIATION FACILITY (NGIF)

Function and Description:

The mission of the NGIF, located in Technical Area (TA)-V, is to provide test cells for the irradiation of experiments with high-intensity gamma ray sources. Currently under construction, the NGIF will be a single-story structure located in the northeast area of TA-V. The main features of the NGIF will be the deep water pool and two dry irradiation cells. The facility will include a special air handling system, water recirculation system, and water makeup subsystem to maintain optimal operational conditions and to prevent the potential release of materials. The pool will be able to store up to 2.4 MCi of cobalt-60 or an equivalent source (40 kw) of other gamma-ray sources. The sources will be in the form of pins and could be shared between in-cell irradiation facilities and in-pool irradiation facilities. Ancillary spaces in the high bay will include offices, setup/light laboratories, and restrooms.

The NGIF consolidates several existing Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico (SNL/NM) gamma sources into a single facility. The planned facility could include sources relocated from the existing Gamma Irradiation Facility, which is a two-cell dry irradiator located in the Annular Core Research Reactor (ACRR) high bay in TA-V. The NGIF would also include gamma sources relocated from the low-intensity cobalt array, which is located in SNL/NM's TA-I. This would consolidate gamma irradiation sources in a single dedicated facility in a remote area, reducing the potential for radiation exposure of nonoperations personnel. The main hazard associated with the facility would be the potential for inadvertent exposure of operations personnel to the high-intensity radioactive sources.

Specific Processes, Activities, and Capabilities:

Testing in the NGIF facility would include irradiation of test packages in one of the available test cells for 13,000 test hours per year (approximately 26 weeks continuous irradiation in each of 3 cells). The key consumable resources in the NGIF facility would be the radioisotope sources that provide the gamma radiation necessary to conduct the tests. The radioactivity of these radioisotope sources would diminish over time regardless of whether or not tests were being conducted. The NGIF has been designed for highly specialized high-intensity gamma ray source experiment work.

Areas of application include

- thermal and radiation effects studies,
- degradation testing of weapon components,
- material and component testing for nuclear reactor accident tests,
- electronic component certification and testing
- survivability and certification tests for military and commercial applications,
- radiation effects on material properties,
- radiation effects on organic materials (such as food or sludge),
- hazardous waste destruction, and
- mixed environment testing (such as steam and radiation or heat and radiation).

The NGIF facility would contain a small chemical inventory and no radioactive material inventory. Chemical emissions, including alcohols, ketones, and other solvents, would be possible and would be associated with various aspects of surface preparation, cleaning, and material processing, including quality control. Radioactive air emissions would not be produced at this facility.



Source: SNL/NM 1998a

FD-20. New Gamma Irradiation Facility (NGIF)

The three new cells being developed at the NGIF would allow complete systems to be tested during irradiating experiments.

GAMMA IRRADIATION FACILITY (GIF)

Function and Description:

The mission of the GIF, located in Technical Area-V, is to provide test cells for the irradiation of experiments with high-intensity gamma ray sources. The GIF facility shares the high bay with the Annular Core Research Reactor (ACRR) in Building 6588 and includes a deep water pool and two dry irradiation cells. The pool is a rectangular, reinforced concrete structure with a stainless steel liner, approximately 8 ft wide by 14.5 ft long by 16 ft deep. The facility also includes a special air handling system, water recirculation system, and water makeup subsystem to maintain optimal operational conditions and to prevent the potential release of materials. The main hazard associated with the facility is the potential for inadvertent exposure of operations personnel to the high-intensity radioactive sources.

Specific Processes, Activities, and Capabilities:


Testing in the GIF facility includes irradiation of test packages in one of the two available test cells for 1,000 test-hours (approximately 40 days of continuous irradiation in each of the two cells) per year. Current plans call for test hours to reach zero by 2003 as the New Gamma Irradiation Facility begins operation. The key consumable resource in the GIF is the radioisotope sources that provide the gamma radiation necessary to conduct the tests. The radioactivity of the radioisotope sources diminishes over time regardless of whether or not tests are being conducted. The GIF is designed for highly specialized high-intensity gamma ray source experiment work.

Areas of application include

- radiation testing of electronic components in satellite and weapon systems,
- dosimetry calibration,
- studies of radiation damage to materials,
- hostile (gamma radiation) environmental testing,
- underwater transfer of material from the reactor to transfer casks, and
- reactor fuel and other radioactive components storage.

The radioactive sources that the GIF uses are pins of cobalt-60, which are sealed in stainless steel cladding with welded end caps. Stainless steel is used as cladding because of its high strength and resistance to corrosion in water. The GIF inventory of sources includes 107 pins of cobalt-60 with a total strength of 109,100 Ci.

The GIF facility contains a small chemical inventory and no radioactive material inventory. Chemical emissions, including alcohols, ketones, and other solvents are possible and are associated with various aspects of surface preparation, cleaning, and material processing, including quality control. Radioactive air emissions are not produced at this facility.



Source: SNL/NM 1998a

FD-25. Gamma Irradiation Facility (GIF)

The GIF provides two cobalt cells for total dose irradiation environments and is used mainly for radiation certification of satellite and weapons systems electronic components, dosimetry calibration, and radiation damage to materials studies.

SANDIA PULSED REACTOR (SPR)

Function and Description:

The mission of the SPR, which includes the fast-burst reactors SPR II and SPR III, is to provide unique near-fission spectrum radiation environments for testing a wide variety of technologies that support both defense and nondefense activities. The facility, located in Technical Area-V, produces high-neutron fluence or pulsed high-neutron doses for the testing of electronic subsystems and components.


The SPR facility is located in the reactor building, a large, thick-walled, steel-reinforced concrete structure referred to as the Kiva. It is cylindrical, with an outside diameter of about 39 ft, covered with a hemispherical shell. Access to the reactor building is provided by a concrete and steel door, which remains closed for most operations. Experiment support facilities, including the reactor maintenance building and the instrument rooms, are adjacent to the reactor building. Also, several storage vaults, which are integral units in adjacent buildings, are available for the storage of the reactor and fissionable and radioactive materials.

Specific Processes, Activities, and Capabilities:

SPR III uses an unmoderated cylindrical assembly of solid uranium metal, enriched to 93 percent uranium-235 with 10 weight-percent molybdenum. SPR III can be operated at steady-state power levels; however, the capability of the nitrogen cooling system and administrative restrictions effectively limit power and total energy generated in a given period. Normally, steady-state power operations are limited to a maximum of 10 kw, although higher power levels can be achieved.

The SPR facility currently houses the SPR-II and SPR-III and is used for reactor critical experiments. Also, SPR provides a source of pulsed high-energy radiation to simulate neutron and gamma radiation effects and provide data for certifying weapons and components for hostile environments. SPR-II and SPR-III are designed to produce a neutron spectrum very similar to the fission spectrum. The primary experiment chambers are central cavities that extend through the cores. Experiments may also be placed around the reactors. Beam ports are used to transport neutron flows outside the Kiva for other experimental needs.

The SPR facility contains a small chemical inventory and a radioactive nuclear material inventory. Chemical emissions, including alcohols, ketones, and other solvents, are possible and are associated with various aspects of surface preparation, cleaning, and material processing including quality control. Radioactive air emissions are produced at this facility when the energy releases during a test interact with air and produce argon-41. Small sealed radioactive sources are used for calibration and monitoring in the facility.



Source: SNL/NM 1998a

FD-24. Sandia Pulsed Reactor (SPR)

The Sandia Pulse Reactors II and III (SPR-II and SPR-III) are fast-burst core reactors capable of pulse and limited steady-state operation. SPR-II and SPR-III are used primarily for high-dose-rate testing of electronic devices.

ANNULAR CORE RESEARCH REACTOR (ACRR) – DEFENSE PROGRAMS (DP) CONFIGURATION

Function and Description:

The mission of the ACRR, operating in the DP configuration, is to provide neutron and sustained gamma pulsed environments to perform experiments, including those for DP system's components electronics testing. Part of a larger complex located in Technical Area-V, the ACRR is located in Building 6588 and is primarily a low-power research reactor facility. The facility is comprised of the reactor room, low bay, control room, building utilities, several small laboratories, and support staff offices.

The ownership of the ACRR was transferred to the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy, for application to radioisotope production. As a result, there are two options for providing an ACRR neutron effects test capability for DP if that should be required in the future: the current molybdenum-99 ACRR could be reconfigured to allow pulse testing for a "window" of time in the molybdenum-99 operation; or the DP configuration could be reconstituted using the existing fuel in a new tank in another location in TA-V (a detailed description is being developed).

Specific Processes, Activities, and Capabilities:

The ACRR in the DP configuration is a water-moderated and -reflected, low-power research reactor that uses enriched uranium oxide-beryllium oxide cylindrical fuel elements arranged in a close-packed hexagonal lattice around a central experiment cavity. The reactor has several features for conducting experiments, including a dry cavity in the central core region and a radiography tube, and is capable of producing a high yield of high-energy neutrons in the central dry cavity over a very short period of time. The reactor is operated by means of the reactor instrumentation and control system in either the short-duration, steady-state power mode at 2 megawatts or less, or the fast-pulse mode. Specific research activities involve neutron effects on fissile components, radiation effects on various types of electronics, radiography, and testing of materials and systems.

The DOE has identified a recent short-term need to conduct a single test series related to certification of some weapons components (Weigand 1999a). This test would be conducted in the existing ACRR facility, which would have to be temporarily reconfigured to restore DP testing capability (for 12 to 18 months following the Record of Decision) (Weigand 1999b). During this time, medical isotopes preparation and validation testing would be integrated with the weapons certification testing schedule. The reconfiguration to ACRR-DP would be done so that conversion back to ACRR-medical isotope production would be more efficient.

The reconfiguration activities to restore the ACRR to the DP test configuration would mainly consist of replacing the central cavity, enabling the pulse mode of operation, reconfiguring the core fuel, reinstalling the appropriate fuel-ringed external cavity (if required), and executing the necessary battery of tests, documentation, and reviews to certify that the reconfigured reactor is operational. Tests conducted for DP could include weapons systems and components or other DP hardware. After irradiation, test packages could be stored in the ACRR storage holes or similar storage and handling space in the Sandia Pulsed Reactor facility while awaiting shipment, disposal, or examination. Following the test, these changes would be reversed to restore the reactor for isotopes production. Each reconfiguration (isotopes production-to-DP or DP-to-isotopes production) would likely take several months to complete. If a DP test is needed after a new isotopes production core (fuel elements with no pulse test capability) has been installed, the total reconfiguration time would be increased to allow for a complete core refueling to switch back to the uranium oxide-beryllium oxide fuel.

The ACRR facility contains a small chemical inventory and a radioactive nuclear material inventory. Chemical emissions, including alcohols, ketones, and other solvents, are possible and are associated with various aspects of surface preparation, cleaning, and material processing including quality control. Radioactive air emissions are produced at this facility when the energy released during a test interacts with air and produces argon-41. The nuclear material inventory includes enriched uranium fuel, plutonium-239, and cobalt-60.



Source: SNL/NM 1998a

FD-21. Annular Core Research Reactor (ACRR)—Defense Programs (DP) Configuration

The ACRR is a pool-type research reactor capable of steady-state, pulse, and tailored-transient operation.

ANNULAR CORE RESEARCH REACTOR (ACRR) – MEDICAL ISOTOPES PRODUCTION CONFIGURATION

Function and Description:

The mission of the ACRR, operating in the medical and research isotopes production configuration, is the production of medical and research isotopes, primarily molybdenum-99, whose daughter, technetium-99m, is used in nuclear medicine applications. The potential exists for expanding the range of isotopes produced to cover the broad field of medical isotopes and various research isotopes. Located in Building 6588 in Technical Area-V, the ACRR is part of a larger complex that includes two other major structures, Buildings 6580 and 6581. Building 6588 comprises the reactor room, low bay, control room, building utilities, several small laboratories, and support staff offices. Operating in the medical isotopes production configuration, the facility is primarily a low-power medical isotopes production reactor facility.

Specific Processes, Activities, and Capabilities:

In the medical isotopes production configuration, the ACRR would operate for 52 weeks to irradiate targets to produce approximately 30 percent of the U.S. demand (on average) for molybdenum-99 and other isotopes such as iodine-131, xenon-133, and iodine-125. The estimates for the years 2003 and 2008 assume that the Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico medical isotopes production program operates primarily as a backup to Nordion, Inc., the current supplier for the U.S. market, producing a nominal 30 percent of U.S. demand level. This would require the irradiation of about 375 highly enriched uranium targets per year.

The isotopes production needs may require varying scenarios that would range from periods of shutdown to periods of operation at 100 percent of the U.S. demand level (approximately 25 targets per week). However, it is anticipated that the annual total would not exceed approximately 1,300 targets irradiated in a particular year (100 percent production level). The irradiation schedule could require reactor operations that vary from as little as a single worker shift (typically an 8-hour shift) for only a few days per week to 24-hour-per-day, 7-day-per-week operation. The U.S. Department of Energy has evaluated this program in an environmental impact statement (DOE/EIS-0249F) and has issued a record of decision that addresses operations and production levels to meet the entire U.S. demand continuously at this facility.

The long-term, steady-state operation of the reactor for isotopes production allows the associated use of the reactor for neutron irradiation, radiography experiments, and other activities that are suitable for concurrent use of the ACRR while it is in operation for the production of isotopes.

The ACRR in the medical isotopes production configuration contains a small chemical inventory and a radioactive nuclear material inventory. Chemical emissions, including alcohols, ketones, and other solvents, are possible and are associated with various aspects of surface preparation, cleaning, and material processing including quality control. Radioactive air emissions are produced at this facility when the energy released during operation interacts with air and produces argon-41. The nuclear material inventory includes enriched uranium fuel and cobalt-60.



Source: SNL/NM 1998a

FD-22. Annular Core Research Reactor (ACRR)– Medical Isotopes Production Configuration

Production Site–Jeff Wemple of Isotopes Project and Compliance Initiatives Dept. 9361 peers toward the center of the ACRR where targets are placed for irradiation.

HOT CELL FACILITY (HCF)

Function and Description:

The mission of the HCF, located in Technical Area-V, is to operate primarily as a medical isotopes production facility that supports the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Isotopes Production and Distribution Program (IPDP). Among other activities, the IPDP has responsibility for ensuring that the U.S. health care community has access to a reliable supply of molybdenum-99. The IPDP activities at Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico (SNL/NM) would provide the only domestic capability to produce a continuous supply of molybdenum-99 and related medical isotopes and is currently under modification for enhanced production capability. Targets produced at Los Alamos National Laboratory are irradiated in the Annular Core Research Reactor (ACRR) and then transferred to the HCF for processing. Besides molybdenum-99, other isotopes produced in the process include iodine-131, xenon-133, and iodine-125.

Specific Processes, Activities, and Capabilities:

A few days after its production, molybdenum-99 decays to form metastable technetium-99m, the most widely used medical radioisotope in the U.S. The primary operations and capabilities of the HCF are geared to support efficient isotopes production. Experiments and chemical and material science analysis activities with radioactive and other hazardous materials can be accommodated, but would impact isotopes production. If isotopes production is low during a period, it may be possible to accommodate some limited experiments in support of other programs.

Isotopes production operations and associated capabilities of the HCF include receipt, extraction, and separation processing of molybdenum-99 from the irradiated targets. In addition, isotopes product packaging and quality sample extraction is also performed. Quality control analysis samples are produced in the ventilation hoods, using small quantities of prepared chemicals. Isotopes product final packaging is performed in the product packaging and shipping area. Finally, radioactive waste neutralization and solidification is done at the HCF prior to offsite disposal.

The HCF would process approximately 30 percent of the U.S. demand for molybdenum-99 and other isotopes, such as iodine-131, xenon-133, and iodine-125. This would require the processing of about 375 irradiated highly-enriched uranium targets per year. The production needs may require varying scenarios that would range from periods of shutdown to periods of operation at 100 percent of the U.S. demand level (approximately 25 targets per week). However, it is anticipated that the annual total would not exceed approximately 1,300 targets processed in a particular year. The HCF associated facilities would be in use continuously for activities that fall within their operating parameters.

The predominant HCF radiological air emissions result from the chemical separation of molybdenum-99 from irradiated fission targets including isotopes of iodine, krypton, and xenon. A variety of chemicals (corrosives, solvents, organics, and inorganics) in gaseous (including hydrogen), liquid, and solid forms, in relatively small quantities, are used in many of these specific processes. Chemical emissions, including corrosives, alcohols, ketones, and other solvents, are associated with various aspects of surface preparation, cleaning, material processing, manufacturing, testing, and quality control.



Source: SNL/NM 1998a

FD-23. Hot Cell Facility (HCF)

The HCF at SNL/NM is a highly shielded area for the remote handling, processing, storage, and analysis of radioactive materials.

CONTAINMENT TECHNOLOGY TEST FACILITY - WEST

Function and Description:

The Containment Technology Test Facility - West conducts containment model testing for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Nuclear Power Engineering Test Center, Tokyo, Japan. The facility is located in the Coyote Test Field and includes two scale-model containment buildings. One model is a 1:4 to 1:6 scale representation of a two-buttress, prestressed concrete containment structure with a flat concrete base, cylindrical sides, and hemispheric dome. The other model is a 1:8 to 1:10 scale steel containment structure that will be fabricated in Japan and shipped to Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico for testing. All support facilities will be temporary and portable.

Both the prestressed concrete containment structure and the steel containment structure will be tested to failure by pneumatic over-pressurization with nitrogen gas. Following the test program, the sites will be restored (SNL/NM 1997b).

Specific Processes, Activities, and Capabilities:

The Containment Technology Test Facility-West operations are allocated, but not limited, to the following:

- Nuclear Regulatory Commission activities involve testing the reactor containment building.
- Other projects not associated with the U.S. Department of Energy include work for the Nuclear Power Engineering Corporation, Tokyo, Japan, and consist of activities needed to support reactor containment research and development.

Both the prestressed concrete containment structure and steel containment were constructed to be tested to failure by pneumatic overpressurization with nitrogen gas. Operations include planning, analysis, instrumentation, pressure testing, and data acquisition.

A variety of chemicals (adhesives, corrosives, solvents, organics, and inorganics) in gaseous, liquid, and solid forms in relatively small quantities will be used in material handling and maintenance. Small quantities of air emissions result during operations. Radioactive air emissions are not produced at this facility. Noise generation during construction should be moderate, and the sound pressure wave from catastrophic failure testing of the models will dissipate to below 145 dB at the boundary of the exclusion zones.



Source: SNL/NM 1998a

FD-26. Containment Technology Test Facility - West

EXPLOSIVES APPLICATIONS LABORATORY (EAL)

Function and Description:

The mission of the EAL, located in Building 9930 in the Coyote Test Field, is to support the design, assembly, and testing of explosive experiments. The facility is essentially a laboratory used to design, assemble, and test explosives. The EAL is a low-hazard, nonnuclear facility.

Specific Processes, Activities, and Capabilities:

The EAL is used to test the performance of explosive or energetic materials together with materials and components as part of various systems or subsystems. Other activities include fabrication and assembly of explosion test packages and operation of a small machine shop.

Operations at the EAL support the following programs and initiatives:

- U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Direct Stockpile Activities in support of research, development, application, and surveillance of energetic materials and components.
- Experimental activities support the development and testing of a full range of explosive devices, components, subsystems, and complete systems. The site is also used for activities that support Nuclear Safety testing requirements, Nuclear Emergency Search Team activities and other similar programs
- Work for other agencies not associated with the DOE in the development and testing of explosive devices, components, subsystems, and complete systems in support of nuclear safety testing requirements.

A variety of chemicals (corrosives, solvents, organics, and inorganics) in gaseous (acetylene for welding), liquid, and solid forms, in relatively small quantities, are used for surface preparation, cleaning, material processing, fabrication of test parts, pre-explosive testing, and quality control. Associated emissions include corrosives, alcohols, ketones, and other solvents. Additional emissions are associated with the conduct of outdoor explosive tests. Nondestructive tests, using X-rays and lasers, are conducted within the facility.



Source: SNL/NM 1998a

FD-26. Explosives Applications Laboratory

The EAL is used to design, assemble, and test explosives.

AERIAL CABLE FACILITY

Function and Description:

The primary mission of the Aerial Cable Facility, located in the Coyote Test Field, is to help ensure that the nation's nuclear weapons systems meet the highest standards of safety and reliability. The Aerial Cable Facility is a restricted-access field test facility consisting of several cables spanning Sol Se Mete canyon. The Aerial Cable Facility comprises a control building, explosives assembly building, instrument bunker, and several explosive storage facilities (magazines and igloos). The complex conducts precision testing of full-scale, air-deliverable weapon systems using realistic target engagement scenarios for verification of design integrity and performance. Activities at the facility include explosives storage and assembly, rocket motor staging and assembly, and test data collection.

Specific Processes, Activities, and Capabilities:

Testing activities at the Aerial Cable Facility include gravitational accelerated (drop) tests and rocket sled pull-down tests. The rocket pull-down technique uses towing cables to accelerate rocket sleds carrying the test items. The test items are released from the overhead cable as the rockets are ignited and directed toward a target. Multiple types of targets can be simulated for worst-case scenarios involving weapons systems, defensive systems, shipping containers, and transportation systems.

Operations at the Aerial Cable Facility support the following programs and initiatives:

- U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) programs in support of Direct Stockpile Activities involving environmental, safety, and survivability testing for nuclear weapons applications.
- Joint-funded Research and Development Special Projects between the DOE and the U.S. Department of Defense to exploit and transfer the technology base resident at the DOE national laboratories for the development of advanced, cost-effective, nonnuclear munitions.
- Performance Assessment, Science, and Technology support to the DOE to provide full-scale, highly instrumented impact environments, aircraft crash environments, captive flight, and missile intercept simulation, as well as providing elevated hoisting capability for advanced sensor development and parachute testing.
- Support to Major Program Initiatives such as sustaining Critical Progress in Model Validation designed to provide controlled environments for high-velocity experiments in code validation, such as penetrator performance in frozen soil.
- Work for other entities that are not associated with the DOE, including aerial targets tests and drop/pull-down tests.

Operations require the use of a variety of chemicals (corrosives, solvents, organics, and inorganics) in gaseous, liquid, and solid forms, in relatively small quantities. No radioactive emissions are produced at this facility. Compressed gases used in the assembly areas include acetylene and oxygen (for welding), argon, and helium. There are some chemical emissions, including alcohols, ketones, and other solvents. Small amounts of airborne emissions, including carbon monoxide and lead, are released during explosives tests. Operations associated with preparation of test payloads, fixtures, and rocket sleds involve machining that generates residues, bonding of parts with epoxies, cleaning of parts, and wiping of excess materials.



Source: SNL/NM 1998a

FD-27. Aerial Cable Facility

The Aerial Cable Facility is used for drop tests and rocket sled pull-down tests.

LURANCE CANYON BURN SITE

Function and Description:

The mission of the Lurance Canyon Burn Site, located in the Coyote Test Field, is to help ensure that the nation's nuclear weapons systems meet the highest standards of safety and reliability. The facility is specifically designed for the validation of analytical modeling and the functional certification of weapons systems. The Lurance Canyon Burn Site is also used to test and evaluate the design integrity and performance of weapon components and shipping containers in the event of their accidental exposure to various fires. In addition, the Lurance Canyon Burn Site is used extensively for transportation package certification and to verify designs in transportation technology.

Specific Processes:


Aviation fuel fire tests are conducted at a combination of outdoor and indoor test facilities. There are four outdoor test areas with water pools to simulate the burning of fuels spilled on open water surfaces. Various test objects may be placed on pool surfaces during test events. Duration of test fires vary from 60 to 150 minutes. The principal emission products from aviation fuel fires are carbon dioxide, carbon soot, and very small amounts of carbon monoxide.

There are three indoor test facilities used for conducting tests similar to those performed outdoors (that is, on the surface of water), but under more controlled conditions (that is, no wind), per test specifications and to provide emission controls when required. Operations at the Lurance Canyon Burn Site support the following programs and initiatives:

- U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Direct Stockpile Activities in support of Environmental, Safety, and Survivability testing for nuclear weapon applications.
- DOE Performance Assessment Science and Technology Programs to simulate fuel fire environments for testing and certification of weapon systems and components.
- DOE Programs in support of Environmental Technology Management.
- Support to Major Program Initiatives such as sustaining Critical Progress in Model Validation to verify models for fire characterization such as air and fuel mixing, vortices, soot production and destruction, soil and fuel interactions, and enclosure fires driving a hot-gas layer as a function of ventilation; and model validation of component and system response, such as fire-induced response of polyurethane foam, devolatilization processes, and burn front movement.
- Work for other entities not associated with the DOE for research and development activities in the national interest. Major Program Initiatives such as Energy Programs including support to Transportation Package Certification Programs to verify designs in Transportation Technology.

There is also an outdoor test facility that uses wood fires or crib fires for certifying U.S. Department of Transportation explosive component shipping containers.

To support test preparations, the Lurance Canyon Burn Site contains a small chemical inventory but no radioactive material. Chemical emissions, including alcohols, ketones, and other solvents, are associated with various aspects of surface preparation, cleaning, and material processing including quality control of test packages. The Lurance Canyon Burn Site has been classified a low-hazard, nonnuclear facility.



Source: SNL/NM 1998a

FD-28. Lurance Canyon Burn Site

The Lurance Canyon Burn Site is used to test shipping containers and weapons components.

THUNDER RANGE COMPLEX

Function and Description:

Historically, the mission of the Thunder Range Complex, located southeast of Technical Area-III, has been environmental, safety, and survivability testing of nuclear weapon components. Current activities at the site are primarily associated with the disassembly, inspection, and documentation of special items, such as nonnuclear munitions. The complex includes other capabilities, such as outdoor explosives or shock-tube testing, although none is scheduled or planned in the foreseeable future.

Specific Processes, Activities, and Capabilities:

The specific processes at the Thunder Range Complex are focused on the evaluation of test materials. Evaluation activities involve physical examination, cleaning, mechanical disassembly, physical measurement, sampling, and photography of test materials.

The Thunder Range Complex also has a combination of essential characteristics not available at any other single Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico location. These include

- conductive floors and grounding provisions for handling explosives;
- explosive storage bunkers;
- alarms and security provisions for "vault classification," allowing for classified work;
- established explosive quantity distance boundaries; and
- a 4,000-lb explosive materials handling rating.

Thunder Range projections are provided for two primary activities: equipment disassembly and evaluation and ground truthing tests.

Examination of objects in support of Equipment Disassembly and Evaluation activities is done on an as-needed basis. The site may be used continuously for 30- to 60-days once a year for this activity, or used only 1 to 2 days per month throughout the year. Operations and activities occurring at the Thunder Range Complex support the following programs and initiatives:

- Direct Stockpile Activities conduct survivability testing of nuclear weapon systems and components.
- Arms Control and nonproliferation activities include conventional weapon disassembly and inspection work.
- Special Projects include projects not associated with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) involving disassembly, inspection, and evaluation.
- Work for other agencies not associated with the DOE for the disassembly, inspection, and documentation of special items, including special nonnuclear munitions, and joint work with the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory (formerly called Phillips Laboratory or Air Force Weapons Laboratory). Use of Thunder Range for the placement of targets for testing airborne sensors may also be performed in support of various U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) agencies.

- DOE Programs in Arms Control and Nonproliferation for disassembly and inspection.
- DOE and DoD support to Nonproliferation Verification Research and Development, including aerial observation activities.

The Thunder Range Complex maintains a small inventory of chemicals, but no radioactive material inventory. Various aspects of the preparation and evaluation of test materials can result in emissions from a variety of solvents, including alcohols and ketones. Although sealed sources are not part of any permanent inventory at the Thunder Range Complex, they may also be present at the complex as part of a test sponsor's radiation monitoring device. Radioactive air emissions are not produced at this facility.



Source: SNL/NM 1998a

FD-29. Thunder Range Complex

The Thunder Range Complex is used for testing explosives.

STEAM PLANT

Function and Description:

The mission of the steam plant is to provide uninterrupted steam supply through a steam distribution system to all of Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico Technical Area (TA)-I and Kirtland East. The steam is used for heating domestic hot water and for building heat and freeze protection. The steam is also essential to various other programmatic missions, such as those conducted at the Standards Laboratory and the Microelectronics Development Laboratory.

Specific Processes, Activities, and Capabilities:

The steam plant consists of five operational boilers with supporting systems that supply steam to TA-I buildings, U.S. Department of Energy buildings, and U.S. Air Force buildings from Eubank to Pennsylvania Boulevards and from O Street to the Wyoming Boulevard base gate. For the majority of buildings in TA-I, steam is the only heating medium used; therefore, during winter months, the plant is a critical operation because it could have a direct impact on the mission of the laboratories.

The five boilers in the plant are all dual-fired (dual-fuel capability) and collectively have the capacity to provide 370,000 lb per hour of steam to the distribution system. This capacity is much greater than the current or anticipated supply requirements. The boilers are primarily fired on natural gas and use #2 diesel fuel as an emergency backup during natural gas pressure interruptions.

The steam plant contains a chemical inventory and no radioactive material inventory. Chemicals include phosphate, sulfite, amine, and salt to maintain water and steam quality. Chemical emissions include alcohols, ketones, and other solvents. Emissions from other cleaning agents are possible and are associated with various aspects of boiler preparation, cleaning, and steam production quality control. Criteria pollutants are produced from the burning of an estimated 779 million standard cubic feet of natural gas to supply 544 million pounds of steam annually. Radioactive air emissions are not produced at this facility. For backup fuel, 1.5 million gallons of diesel fuel are stored in reserve.



Source: SNL/NM 1998a

FD-30. Steam Plant

The steam plant provides steam to TA-I and Kirtland East.

HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT FACILITY (HWMF)

Function and Description:

The HWMF, located in Technical Area-II, performs safe handling, packaging, short-term storing, and shipping (for recycling, treatment, or disposal) of all nonradioactive *Resource Conservation and Recovery Act* (RCRA)-regulated and other hazardous and toxic waste categories (except explosives). The HWMF is a low-hazard facility that consists of two permanent buildings: the Waste Packaging Building (Building 959) and the Waste Storage Building (Building 958). Both buildings are located within an 8-ft-high single fence enclosure. Additionally, the following structures are located at the facility within the fenced area:

- six supply sheds,
- two self-contained prefabricated storage structures,
- a waste oil storage area,
- a catchment pond, and
- three office trailers.

Specific Processes, Activities, and Capabilities:

Hazardous, nonradioactive chemical waste (excluding explosive waste), which is generated by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) operations described in the RCRA Part B Permit, is collected and transported to the HWMF for packaging and short-term (less than 1 year) storage prior to offsite transportation for recycling, treatment, or disposal at a licensed facility. The waste is managed in accordance with the RCRA Part B Permit. The HWMF also manages small amounts of waste from other SNL or U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) operations, such as SNL's Advanced Materials Laboratory on the University of New Mexico campus in Albuquerque or the DOE's Albuquerque Operations Office.

In the normal conduct of business, contract personnel use a variety of power equipment such as hydraulic drum handlers and empty drum compactors, forklifts, lift trucks, flatbed trucks, and hauling trucks. Personnel routinely handle containers of various nonradioactive hazardous waste, including oxidizers, flammable waste, and irritants. Personnel typically handle waste on a day-to-day basis.

No radioactive materials and no explosive materials are managed at the HWMF. Chemical emissions are small and related to the waste handled in the HWMF.



Source: SNL/NM 1998a

FD-31. Hazardous Waste Management Facility (HWMF)

The HWMF is used for handling, packaging, short-term storing, and shipping of nonradioactive RCRA waste and other hazardous and toxic waste.

RADIOACTIVE AND MIXED WASTE MANAGEMENT FACILITY (RMWMF)

Function and Description:

The RMWMF at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL)/New Mexico serves as a centralized facility for receipt, characterization, compaction, treatment, repackaging, certification, and storage of low-level waste (LLW), transuranic (TRU) waste (including mixed TRU), and low-level mixed (LLMW) waste. The RMWMF is used for extended storage until disposal (or treatment) sites are identified that could accept these materials. The RMWMF is located in the southeastern portion of Technical Area-III and includes Buildings 6920, 6921, and 6925, and the land, structures, and systems on the paved area within the compound fence. Building 6920 is known as the Waste Management Facility; Building 6921 is the Waste Assay Facility; and Building 6925 is the Waste Storage Facility. Other structures include prefabricated, skid-mounted storage buildings (used for storage of reactive waste, flammable waste, and compressed gas cylinders); a paved outdoor LLW and LLMW storage area; an unpaved (gravel) outdoor storage area for LLW; a lined retention pond designed to hold site surface water runoff, the sprinkler discharge from a design fire, and fire-hose streams; and office trailers.

Building 6920 is designed to manage classified and unclassified waste and includes waste storage and staging areas, drum compactor rooms, and areas for *Resource Conservation and Recovery Act* (RCRA)-regulated hazardous waste treatment. Buildings 6921 and 6925 are used for limited RCRA-regulated hazardous waste storage and treatment activities. Building 6921 provides waste characterization capabilities. The maximum storage capacity at the RMWMF is approximately 285,000 ft³.

Specific Processes, Activities, and Capabilities:

Activities at the RMWMF include unpacking, sorting, repackaging, sampling, storing, staging, treating (dewatering, separating, neutralizing, solidifying, stabilizing, amalgamating, cutting, decontaminating, and compacting), and preparing waste for offsite shipment to a permitted disposal site. Most of this waste is generated by SNL. Small amounts may be generated by other SNL or U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) activities such as DOE funded research at the Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute at Kirtland Air Force Base.

Most LLMW stored in Buildings 6920 and 6921 exhibits the characteristic of toxicity (for example, from heavy metals), or contains RCRA F-listed constituents (such as paper products contaminated with trace quantities of solvents). Negligible quantities of corrosive, ignitable, or reactive waste are stored in Buildings 6920 and 6921. Reactive, ignitable, and flammable waste and combustible liquid waste are stored in skid-mounted storage sheds that are located at a safe distance from the buildings. Liquid waste is stored with secondary containment.

Hazard control at the RMWMF is maintained by using the following engineered features, as needed: waste containers, secondary containment, glove boxes, fume hood, air supply and exhaust systems, high-efficiency particulate air filters, air monitoring systems, radiation area monitor system, breathing air supply, fire detection and notification system, fire suppression system, and backup electrical power generator.

Operations that generate radioactive air emissions include preparation of tritium waste for shipment in Building 6920. Radioactive air emissions are monitored through the use of stack monitors. All detectable releases are from tritium, based on sampling the stack effluent. Small sealed radioactive sources are stored at the RMWMF. Some sealed radioactive sources are used for calibrating equipment, such as emission stack monitors. Chemical emissions are small and related to the waste handled in the RMWMF.



Source: SNL/NM 1998a

FD-32. Radioactive And Mixed Waste Management Facility (RMWMF)

The RMWMF is used for characterization, repackaging, and certification of radioactive waste.

THERMAL TREATMENT FACILITY (TTF)

Function and Description:

The TTF, located in the northeast corner of Technical Area-III, is used to thermally treat (burn) small quantities of waste explosive substances, waste liquids (for example, water and solvents) contaminated with explosive substances, and waste items (for example, rags, wipes, and swabs) contaminated with explosive substances. No radioactive waste is treated at the Thermal Treatment Facility.

The TTF consists of a square burn pan of 3/8-inch steel, 29.25 inches on each side and 5-5/8 inches deep. A remotely operated metal lid can be raised to open or lowered to cover the burn pan. A grated metal cage, which is open to the air and is approximately 4 ft on each side and 8 ft tall, encloses the burn pan. The burn cage sits in the center of a steel-lined concrete pad approximately 13 ft on each side with a 4-inch-high curb at the perimeter. The concrete pad is surrounded on the west, south, and east sides by an 8-ft-tall earthen berm. An 8-ft-high chain link security fence surrounds the entire TTF. Three gates, located on the north side of the fence, provide access to the facility. A door on the north side of the burn cage provides access to the burn pan.

Specific Processes, Activities, and Capabilities:

The TTF conducts thermal treatment of CHNO (comprised entirely of elemental carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, and oxygen) explosives; waste propellants and pyrotechnics; waste items that are contaminated with CHNO high explosives, waste propellants, and pyrotechnics; and liquids that are contaminated with CHNO high explosives, waste propellants, and pyrotechnics.

Emissions include carbon monoxide, nitrogen compounds, sulfur compounds, and other compounds associated with the specific type of explosive material treated.



Source: SNL/NM 1998a

FD-33. Thermal Treatment Facility (TTF)

CHAPTER 3

Alternatives for Continuing Operations at SNL/NM

This chapter describes the three alternatives the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has analyzed in detail regarding continuing operations at Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico (SNL/NM). It describes the activities and the level of activities, which will vary depending on the alternative analyzed, at SNL/NM's selected facilities. In addition, the chapter identifies the alternatives the DOE has considered, but not analyzed in detail because they were not reasonable. It concludes by summarizing the comparison of the environmental consequences of the three alternatives.

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations (40 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] Parts 1500-1508) require that the DOE and other Federal agencies use the review process established by the *National Environmental Policy Act* (NEPA) of 1969, as amended (42 United States Code [U.S.C.] 4321 *et seq.*) and the DOE regulations implementing NEPA (10 CFR Part 1021) to evaluate not only the proposed action, but also to identify and review reasonable alternatives to the proposed action, as well as a “no action” alternative. This comprehensive review ensures that environmental information is available to public officials and citizens before decisions are made and before actions are taken. The alternatives are central to an environmental impact statement (EIS).

The proposed action for the Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement (SWEIS) is to continue to operate SNL/NM as a DOE national laboratory. The DOE, with public input, developed three alternatives to accomplish this proposed action and assess environmental impacts of activities at SNL/NM. This chapter examines and compares the three alternatives. For clarity and brevity, the descriptions of the alternatives in the text (Sections 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4) and in the tables (Section 3.6) focus on significant distinguishing features that characterize the variation of activities across alternatives. More complete descriptions of the activities at SNL/NM are provided by facility in Chapter 2. All of the activities discussed in Chapter 2 were used in evaluating the impacts of each alternative. The alternatives are defined below.

- *No Action Alternative (Section 3.2)*
- *Expanded Operations Alternative (Section 3.3)*
- *Reduced Operations Alternative (Section 3.4)*

These three alternatives represent the range of levels of operation necessary to carry out DOE mission lines,

from the minimum levels of activity that maintain core capabilities (Reduced Operations Alternative) to the highest reasonable activity levels that could be supported by current facilities, and the potential expansion and construction of new facilities for specifically identified future actions (Expanded Operations Alternative).

DOE work assignments to SNL/NM are based on using existing personnel and facility capabilities, as described in Chapters 1 and 2. The DOE has examined the various activity levels typical of past SNL/NM operations (generally within the past few years), and assumes that future work descriptions will resemble current and recent activities.

The three alternatives represent the range of operating levels that could be reasonably implemented in the 10-year time frame of the SWEIS analysis (1998-2008). Many of SNL/NM's ongoing and planned activities do not vary by alternative. The No Action Alternative reflects currently planned activities or projects, some of which may already have NEPA documentation and analysis (Section 2.3.3).

[Table 3.1–1](#) provides a brief summary of the facilities evaluated in this SWEIS. [Table 3.6–1](#) (see Section 3.6) provides an expanded look at the materials used and wastes generated at each facility.

In order to provide comprehensive baseline data from which operational levels could be projected, the DOE gathered the best-available data representing the facilities' normal levels of operation. In most cases, the base year for data was 1996. For some facilities, several years of data were gathered in order to determine normal trends. Facilities that have base years other than 1996 are noted in the tables in Section 3.6. Also, note that projected activity levels under the Reduced Operations Alternative could be above the base years' because some facilities were operating below the minimum levels of activity necessary to maintain core capabilities or facilities were not yet in full operation (Section 3.4).

Table 3.1–1 Summary of Facility Activity Levels Used as the Basis of Alternatives Analysis

FACILITY	CATEGORY	ACTIVITY TYPE OR MATERIAL	UNITS (per year)	NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE			EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE (2008)	REDUCED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE (2008)
				BASE YEAR ^a	FIVE-YEAR	TEN-YEAR		
Neutron Generator Facility	Development or production of devices, processes, and systems	Neutron generators	Neutron generators	600	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000
Microelectronics Development Laboratory	Development or production of devices, processes, and systems	Microelectronic devices and systems	wafers	4,000	5,000	7,000	7,500	2,666
Advanced Manufacturing Processes Laboratory	Development or production of devices, processes, and systems	Materials, ceramics/glass, electronics, processes, and systems	operational hours	248,000	310,000	310,000	347,000	248,000
Integrated Materials Research Laboratory	Other	Research and development of materials	operational hours	395,454	395,454	395,454	395,454	363,817
Explosive Components Facility	Test activities	Neutron generator tests	tests	200 (FY 1998)	500	500	500	500
		Explosive testing	tests	600	750	850	900	300
		Chemical analysis	analyses	900	950	1,000	1,250	500
		Battery tests	tests	50	60	60	100	10

Table 3.1–1 Summary of Facility Activity Levels Used as the Basis of Alternatives Analysis (continued)

FACILITY	CATEGORY	ACTIVITY TYPE OR MATERIAL	UNITS (per year)	NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE			EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE (2008)	REDUCED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE (2008)
				BASE YEAR ^a	FIVE-YEAR	TEN-YEAR		
PHYSICAL TESTING AND SIMULATION FACILITIES								
Terminal Ballistics Complex	Test activities	Projectile impact testing	tests	50	80	100	350	10
		Propellant testing	tests	25	40	50	100	4
Drop/Impact Complex	Test activities	Drop test	tests	18	20	20	50	0
		Water impact	tests	1	1	1	20	1
		Submersion	tests	1	1	1	5	0
		Underwater blast	tests	0	2	2	10	0
Sled Track Complex	Test activities	Rocket sled test	tests	10	10	15	80	2
		Explosive testing	tests	12	12	12	239	0
		Rocket launcher	tests	3	4	4	24	0
		Free-flight launch	tests	40	40	40	150	0
Centrifuge Complex	Test activities	Centrifuge	tests	32	46	46	120	2
		Impact	tests	0	10	10	100	0

Table 3.1–1 Summary of Facility Activity Levels Used as the Basis of Alternatives Analysis (continued)

FACILITY	CATEGORY	ACTIVITY TYPE OR MATERIAL	UNITS (per year)	NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE			EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE (2008)	REDUCED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE (2008)
				BASE YEAR ^a	FIVE-YEAR	TEN-YEAR		
ACCELERATOR FACILITIES								
SATURN	Test activities	Irradiation of components or materials	shots	65	200	200	500	40
HERMES III	Test activities	Irradiation of components or materials	shots	262	500	500	1,450	40
Sandia Accelerator & Beam Research Experiment	Test activities	Irradiation of components or materials	shots	187	225	225	400	0
Short-Pulse High Intensity Nanosecond X-Radiator	Test activities	Irradiation of components or materials	shots	1,185	2,500	2,500	6,000	200
Repetitive High Energy Pulsed Power Unit I	Test activities	Accelerator tests	tests	500	5,000	5,000	10,000	100
Repetitive High Energy Pulsed Power Unit II	Test activities	Radiation production	tests	80	160	160	800	40
Z-Machine	Test activities	Accelerator shots	shots	150	300	300	350	84
Tera-Electron Volt Semiconducting Linear Accelerator	Test activities	Accelerator shots	shots	40	1,000	1,000	1,300	40

Table 3.1–1 Summary of Facility Activity Levels Used as the Basis of Alternatives Analysis (continued)

FACILITY	CATEGORY	ACTIVITY TYPE OR MATERIAL	UNITS (per year)	NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE			EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE (2008)	REDUCED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE (2008)
				BASE YEAR ^a	FIVE-YEAR	TEN-YEAR		
<i>Advanced Pulsed Power Research Module</i>	Test activities	Accelerator shots	shots	500	1,000	1,000	2,000	40
<i>Radiographic Integrated Test Stand</i>	Test activities	Accelerator shots	shots	0	400	600	800	100
REACTOR FACILITIES								
<i>New Gamma Irradiation Facility</i>	Test activities	Tests	hours	0	13,000	13,000	24,000	0
<i>Gamma Irradiation Facility</i>	Test activities	Tests	hours	1,000	0	0	8,000	0
<i>Sandia Pulsed Reactor</i>	Test activities	Irradiation tests	tests	100	100	100	200	30
<i>Annular Core Research Reactor (DP for No Action and Reduced Operations Alternatives, ACPR-II for Expanded Operations Alternative)</i>	Test activities	Irradiation tests	test series	0	1	0	2 to 3	0
		Fissile component tests	tests	0	0	0	2	0
		Materials/electronics tests	tests	0	0	0	6	0

Table 3.1–1 Summary of Facility Activity Levels Used as the Basis of Alternatives Analysis (continued)

FACILITY	CATEGORY	ACTIVITY TYPE OR MATERIAL	UNITS (per year)	NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE			EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE (2008)	REDUCED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE (2008)
				BASE YEAR ^a	FIVE-YEAR	TEN-YEAR		
<i>Annular Core Research Reactor (medical isotopes production configuration)</i>	Test activities	Irradiation of production targets	targets	8	375	375	1,300	40
<i>Hot Cell Facility</i>	Development or production of devices, processes, and systems	Processing of production targets	targets	8	375	375	1,300	40
OUTDOOR TEST FACILITIES								
<i>Aerial Cable Facility</i>	Test activities	Drop/pull-down	tests	21	32	38	100	2
		Aerial target	tests	6	6	6	30	0
		Scoring system tests	series	0	1	1	2	0
<i>Lurance Canyon Burn Site</i>	Test activities	Certification testing	tests	12	12	12	55	1
		Model validation	tests	56	56	56	100	0
		User testing	tests	37	37	37	50	0
<i>Containment Technology Test Facility - West</i>	Test activities	Survivability testing	tests	1	1	0	2	1
<i>Explosives Applications Laboratory</i>	Test activities	Explosive testing	tests	240	240	240	275 to 360	50

Table 3.1–1 Summary of Facility Activity Levels Used as the Basis of Alternatives Analysis (continued)

FACILITY	CATEGORY	ACTIVITY TYPE OR MATERIAL	UNITS (per year)	NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE			EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE (2008)	REDUCED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE (2008)
				BASE YEAR ^a	FIVE-YEAR	TEN-YEAR		
<i>Thunder Range Complex</i>	Other	Equipment disassembly and evaluation	days	60	82	82	144	42
	Test activities	Ground truthing tests	test series	1	5	8	10	1
INFRASTRUCTURE FACILITIES								
<i>Steam Plant</i>	Infrastructure	Generate and distribute steam to DOE, TA-I, KAFB East, Coronado Club	lb	544 M	544 M	544 M	544 M	362 M
<i>Hazardous Waste Management Facility</i>	Infrastructure	Collection, packaging, handling, and short-term storage of hazardous and other toxic waste ^b	kg	203,000	192,000	196,000	214,000	175,000
	Waste managed ^c	RCRA hazardous waste	kg	55,852	70,469	74,358	92,314	53,123
<i>Radioactive and Mixed Waste Management Facility</i>	Infrastructure	Receipt, packaging, and shipping of radioactive waste ^d	lb	1.6 M	2.1 M	2.1 M	2.7 M	0.8 M
	Waste managed ^c	Low-level waste	ft ³ (m ³)	11,874 (337)	15,436 (438)	15,436 (438)	19,592 (556)	5,937 (168)

Table 3.1–1 Summary of Facility Activity Levels Used as the Basis of Alternatives Analysis (concluded)

FACILITY	CATEGORY	ACTIVITY TYPE OR MATERIAL	UNITS (per year)	NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE			EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE (2008)	REDUCED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE (2008)
				BASE YEAR ^a	FIVE-YEAR	TEN-YEAR		
Thermal Treatment Facility	Infrastructure	Treatment of waste	lb	Minimal	336	336	1,200	Minimal

Source: SNL/NM 1998a

ACPR: Annular Core Pulsed Reactor

DOE: U.S. Department of Energy

DP: Defense Programs

FTE: full-time equivalent

FY: fiscal year

HERMES: High Energy Radiation Megavolt Electron Source

KAFB: Kirtland Air Force Base

lb: pound

RCRA: *Resource Conservation and Recovery Act*

TA: technical area

TSCA: *Toxic Substances Control Act*

^a Base year is the year selected as most representative of normal operations (SNL/NM 1998ee).

^b Larger number is a total including TSCA waste, other solid waste, recyclable materials, and inventory (non-RCRA).

^c Numbers do not represent totals (generation), only quantities to be managed by the specific facility.

^d Includes inventory.

The DOE is not revisiting any programmatic decisions previously made in other NEPA documents, such as those addressing weapons complex consolidation and reconfiguration, materials disposition, or waste management. The SWEIS includes these programmatic activities in order to provide the DOE and the public with an overall understanding of the activities at SNL/NM.

Many of the selected facilities are primarily engaged in activities supporting the DOE's national security mission. Other facilities are engaged in neutron science and research and development (R&D) efforts, such as materials research, radiochemistry, and health research. The DOE examined specific activities performed at SNL/NM facilities that relate to issues identified from public input, the DOE mission lines, and the potential for environmental impacts.

The DOE has not selected a preferred alternative, but will identify the preferred alternative in the Final SWEIS. The preferred alternative could be a hybrid or combination of the three alternatives presented in the Draft SWEIS. At this time, the DOE does not know what this combination might be.

3.2 NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE

Summary Description

Under the No Action Alternative, ongoing DOE and interagency programs and activities at SNL/NM would continue the status quo, that is, operating at planned levels as reflected in current DOE management plans. In some cases, these planned levels include increases over today's operating levels. This would also include any recent activities that have already been approved by DOE and have existing NEPA documentation.

The CEQ's NEPA implementing regulations (40 CFR Parts 1500-1508) require analyzing the No Action Alternative to provide a benchmark against which the impacts of the activities presented in the other alternatives can be compared. The No Action Alternative analysis includes current operations and ongoing and planned environmental restoration activities. Some of these activities have already had NEPA review. It also includes any approved and interim actions and facility expansion or construction, where detailed design and associated NEPA documentation were completed by the end of March 1998. The analysis also includes facilities, including new construction and upgrades, for which NEPA documents have been prepared, decisions made,

Organization of Chapter 3

Sections 3.2 through 3.4 describe the activities that would occur at selected facilities under each of the three alternatives.

Section 3.5 describes alternatives that were considered but eliminated from detailed analysis.

Section 3.6 compares the environmental consequences of the three alternatives.

and funds allocated in the fiscal year 2000 planning year budget (submitted in 1998).

3.2.1 Basis for Current Planned Operations

DOE management plans include continued support of major DOE programs, such as Defense Programs (DP), Nuclear Energy, Fissile Material Disposition, Environmental Management, and Science. They also include projects to maintain existing facilities and capabilities and projects for which a NEPA determination has been made (for example, the Medical Isotopes Production Project).

Other plans used to prepare the description of the No Action Alternative include the site development plans for SNL/NM, interagency agreements between the DOE and the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), programmatic environmental impact statements (PEISs), Presidential Decision Directives, and DOE Work for Others (WFO) proposals and guidance. Some documents have future projects included for planning purposes; others have been deleted due to lack of funding or other reasons. The activities reflected in this alternative include planned increases in some SNL/NM operations and activities over previous years' levels (for example, medical isotopes production). There may also be decreases in some SNL/NM activities (for example, a decrease in certain outdoor testing activities).

The *Facilities and Safety Information Document* (SNL/NM 1997b, SNL/NM 1998ee) and facility source documents (SNL/NM 1998a) provide in-depth information concerning the activities, operations, and hazards of selected facilities. These documents have been used extensively to describe the following facility activities in this chapter. The facilities discussed below are also described in detail in the Facility Descriptions following Chapter 2. For most facilities, the base year considered is 1996. The base year for the Neutron

Generator Facility (NGF) is 1998, the first year in which the facility will have achieved its initially planned level of production.

3.2.2 Selected Facilities in Technical Areas-I and -II

Under the No Action Alternative, the following activities would take place at the facilities in Technical Areas (TAs)-I and -II.

3.2.2.1 Neutron Generator Facility

Under all alternatives, the NGF, TA-I, would continue to be used to fabricate neutron generators and neutron tubes. Support activities would include a wide variety of manufacturing, testing, and product development techniques and processes. An addition to an existing building would be constructed to meet production projections. Additionally, Building 870 would undergo extensive renovations. Approximately 2,000 neutron generators and associated neutron and switch tubes would be manufactured per year by 2008.

3.2.2.2 Microelectronics Development Laboratory

The Microelectronics Development Laboratory (MDL), TA-I, would continue to be used to conduct R&D activities on microelectronic devices for nuclear weapons. A broad range of microtechnology development and engineering activities, including integrated circuit and wafer production, would occur. Approximately 4,000 wafers would be produced in the base year, increasing to 5,000 wafers by 2003 and 7,000 wafers by 2008.

3.2.2.3 Advanced Manufacturing Process Laboratory

Advanced manufacturing technologies are developed and applied at the Advanced Manufacturing Process Laboratory (AMPL), TA-I. Under this alternative, AMPL activities would include hardware manufacturing, emergency and prototype manufacturing, development of manufacturing processes, and design and fabrication of production equipment. The activities conducted in the AMPL would be typical of other laboratories and small-scale manufacturing plants working with ceramics, glass, plastics, electronics, and other materials. There would also be a slight increase in WFO. Operational hours under the No Action Alternative would be 248,000 hours per year in the base year (1996-1997), increasing to 310,000 hours per year in 2003 and 2008. Personnel would increase from 150 in the base year to 184 in 2003 and 2008.

3.2.2.4 Integrated Materials Research Laboratory

Research on materials and advanced components would continue to be conducted at the Integrated Materials Research Laboratory (IMRL), TA-I. A wide variety of materials would be investigated, including metallic alloys, semiconductors, superconductors, ceramics, opticals, and dielectric materials. Basic research activities would continue in chemistry, physics, and energy technologies. The 1998 number for operational hours was derived by multiplying the number of workers in the IMRL by the number of hours worked by one employee during a year. This totals approximately 395,000 hours per year for 1998, 2003, and 2008.

3.2.2.5 Explosive Components Facility

The Explosive Components Facility (ECF), TA-II, would continue to be used to support the work performed at the NGF and the R&D performed on a variety of energetic components. Energetic component research, testing, development, and quality control activities focus in four areas: neutron generators, explosives, chemicals, and batteries. Expected operating levels at the ECF would include 200 neutron generator tests in the base year, increasing to approximately 500 neutron generator tests per year through 2008. Other tests would involve 600 explosive tests in the base year, growing to 750 tests in 2003 and 850 tests in 2008. Chemical analyses would increase from 900 analyses in the base year to 1,000 in 2008. Battery tests would range from 50 tests in the base year to 60 tests in 2003 and 2008.

3.2.3 Physical Testing and Simulation Facilities

TA-III incorporates four principal testing facilities: the Terminal Ballistics Complex, Drop/Impact Complex, Sled Track Complex, and Centrifuge Complex, described below.

3.2.3.1 Terminal Ballistics Complex

Ballistic studies and solid-fuel rocket motor tests would continue to be conducted at the Terminal Ballistics Complex. Testing capabilities would include research in areas of armor penetration, vulnerability, acceleration, flight dynamics, and accuracy. Projectile impact tests would include all calibers of projectiles, from small arms to the 155-mm gun. For projectile impact testing, 50 tests would occur in the base year, increasing to approximately 80 tests each year by 2003 and 100 tests annually by 2008. Approximately 25 propellant tests

would occur in the base year, increasing to 40 tests annually by 2003 and 50 tests annually by 2008.

3.2.3.2 Drop/Impact Complex

Tests designed for the validation of analytical modeling and weapons system certification would continue to be conducted at the Drop/Impact Complex. Test activities would focus on water and underwater tests, design verification, and performance assessments. After the base year activity level of 18 tests, up to 20 tests would be conducted each year through 2008. One water impact test, one submersion test, and as many as two underwater blast tests would be planned annually through 2008.

3.2.3.3 Sled Track Complex

The Sled Track Complex is a test facility that simulates high-speed impacts of weapon shapes, substructures, and components to verify design integrity, performance, and fuzing functions. Sled Track Complex capabilities would continue to include testing parachute systems, transportation equipment, and reactor safety. Tests would include rocket sleds; short-duration, free-flight launches; rocket launches; and explosives using SNL/NM instrumentation capabilities in lasers, photometrics, telemetry, and other data collection techniques. Current plans would number 10 to 15 rocket sled tests per year through 2008. Other tests would number 40 short-duration, free-flight launches, up to 4 rocket launches, and 12 explosive detonations per year through 2008.

3.2.3.4 Centrifuge Complex

The Centrifuge Complex would continue to be used to test objects weighing up to 5 tons or more with over 100 *g* of force. Following 32 tests in 1998, this would increase to an estimated 46 tests annually in 2003 and 2008 on a variety of test objects. Although no impact tests have occurred, 10 tests per year are planned for 2003 through 2008.

3.2.4 Accelerator Facilities

3.2.4.1 SATURN

Under the No Action Alternative, the SATURN accelerator would continue to be used to produce X-rays to simulate the radiation effects of nuclear bursts on electronic and material components. SATURN capabilities would be used to test satellite systems, weapons materials and components, and re-entry vehicle and missile subsystems. Accelerator activities would include an estimated activity of 65 shots in 1998,

increasing to 200 shots per year by 2003. Accelerator activity would remain at this level (200 shots) through 2008.

3.2.4.2 High-Energy Radiation Megavolt Electron Source III

High-Energy Radiation Megavolt Electron Source III (HERMES III) would continue to be used to provide gamma ray effects testing capabilities. HERMES III would test electronic components and weapon systems and would include high-fidelity simulation over large areas in near nuclear-explosion radiation environments. Activity levels would be approximately 262 shots per year in 1998, increasing to approximately 500 shots per year through 2003 and 2008.

3.2.4.3 Sandia Accelerator & Beam Research Experiment

The Sandia Accelerator & Beam Research Experiment (SABRE) would continue to be used to provide X-ray and gamma ray effects testing capabilities. SABRE capabilities would allow testing of pulsed-power technologies, fusion systems, and weapons systems. Other activities would include computer science, flight dynamics, satellite systems, and robotics testing. Approximately 187 shots would occur in 1998, increasing to approximately 225 shots per year in 2003 and 2008.

3.2.4.4 Short-Pulse High Intensity Nanosecond X-Radiator

The Short-Pulse High Intensity Nanosecond X-Radiator (SPHINX) accelerator would continue to be used to produce high-voltage accelerations to measure X-ray-induced currents in integrated circuits and heat response in materials. The SPHINX would provide testing capabilities in radiation environments for a variety of weapons components. Approximately 1,185 shots would occur in 1998, increasing to approximately 2,500 shots per year in 2003 through 2008.

3.2.4.5 Repetitive High Energy Pulsed Power I

The Repetitive High Energy Pulsed Power (RHEPP) I would continue to be used for the development of pulsed-power technology, including high-power energy tests. Activities would include basic scientific research, development, and testing. The RHEPP I averaged approximately 500 tests per year over 1996 and 1997. This would increase to approximately 5,000 tests per year by 2003 through 2008.

3.2.4.6 Repetitive High Energy Pulsed Power II

The RHEPP II would continue to be used to develop radiation processing applications using powerful electron or X-ray beams. Activities would include testing of high power magnetic switches and specialty transmission lines. Operations in 1996 included 80 tests per year. As many as 4 tests per week for 40 weeks (160 tests per year) would be completed at the RHEPP II by 2003 through 2008.

3.2.4.7 Z-Machine

The Z-Machine would continue to be used to produce extremely short, extremely powerful energy pulses at various targets. The Z-Machine capabilities simulate special atmospheric conditions and fusion reaction conditions. The average activity in 1996 and 1997 was approximately 150 shots per year. A projected 165 accelerator firings would occur per year using tritium, deuterium, plutonium, and depleted uranium (DU). An additional 135 accelerator firings would support performance assessment and development of advanced pulsed-power sources, for a total of 300 shots per year by 2003 through 2008.

3.2.4.8 Tera-Electron Volt Energy Superconducting Linear Accelerator (TESLA)

The Tera-Electron Volt Energy Superconducting Linear Accelerator (TESLA) facility would continue to be used to test plasma opening switches for pulsed-power drivers. Other activities would include basic research science, material development, and material testing. TESLA activities in 1998 increased to 40 shots. Following a base year of 40 test shots, as many as 1,000 test shots per year would be completed for pulsed-power technology development in 2003 through 2008.

3.2.4.9 Advanced Pulsed Power Research Module

The Advanced Pulsed Power Research Module (APPRM) would be used to evaluate the performance and reliability of components including next-generation accelerators. Activities would include research and development in pulsed-power technologies such as power storage, high-voltage switching, and power flow. Following base year operations of 500 shots, the APPRM would fire approximately 1,000 shots per year in 2003 and 2008.

3.2.4.10 Radiographic Integrated Test Stand

The Radiographic Integrated Test Stand (RITS) accelerator is anticipated to start operations in 1999. It would be used to develop and demonstrate capabilities for future accelerator facility design. The DOE categorically excluded the project. The proposed accelerator would replace the existing Proto II accelerator. Capabilities would focus on demonstrating inductive voltage technology. It is estimated that there will be 200 shots in the startup year (1999). Approximately 400 shots would occur per year in 2003, increasing to 600 shots per year in 2008.

3.2.5 Reactor Facilities

3.2.5.1 New Gamma Irradiation Facility

Under the No Action Alternative, the New Gamma Irradiation Facility (NGIF) would be used to perform a wide variety of gamma irradiation experiments under both dry and water-pool conditions. The NGIF would replace the Gamma Irradiation Facility (GIF) prior to 2003. The NGIF would provide capabilities for studies in thermal and radiation effects, weapons component degradation, nuclear reactor material and components, and other nonweapon applications. The NGIF was not operational in 1998. This facility would be constructed after the No Action baseline time frame; hence, there are no activities planned prior to 2003. Operations would begin in 2000 or 2001, depending on operational approval. By 2003, a wide variety of test packages would be conducted each year. Approximately 13,000 test hours per year would be expected from 2003 through 2008.

3.2.5.2 Gamma Irradiation Facility

The GIF would continue to be used to perform gamma irradiation experiments until the NGIF begins operation. The facility would irradiate test packages for approximately 1,000 test hours per year. Operating levels by 2003 would decrease to zero, coinciding with the startup and operation of the NGIF. The decision to reuse, modify, or demolish the GIF will be addressed in future NEPA documentation.

3.2.5.3 Sandia Pulsed Reactor

The Sandia Pulsed Reactor (SPR) would continue to provide multiple fast-burst reactor, near-fission spectrum radiation environments. Testing activities would include a wide variety of technologies that support both defense and nondefense projects. Approximately 100 tests per year would be expected through 2008.

3.2.5.4 Annular Core Research Reactor— Medical Isotopes Production or Defense Programs (DP) Testing Configuration

The ACRR may be operated in either of two ways: to produce medical isotopes or to support Defense Programs. Descriptions of these two operating configurations follow. The impacts for each of these configurations are presented separately in Table 3.6–1 and Chapter 5.

Annular Core Research Reactor (ACRR)—medical isotopes production configuration activities would produce medical and research radioactive isotopes. Research activities that are compatible and capable of being conducted concurrently with production would continue. Under the No Action Alternative, the ACRR would operate for 52 weeks to irradiate targets to produce approximately 30 percent of the U.S. demand (on average, not necessarily a “fixed” amount each week) for molybdenum-99 and other medical and research isotopes, such as iodine-131, xenon-133, and iodine-125. The 2003 and 2008 estimates assume that the SNL/NM medical isotopes production program would operate primarily as a backup to Nordion, Inc. At the 30 percent of U.S. demand production level expected for the 2003 and 2008 scenarios, it is assumed that the reactor would be operated for 16 hours per day, 5 days per week (4,160 hours per year) at a maximum power level of 4 MW (approximately 16,640 MWh per year).

The production needs could require varying scenarios that would range from periods of shutdown to periods of operation at 100 percent of the U.S. demand level (approximately 25 targets per week). Under the No Action Alternative, irradiation of eight targets is planned in the base year, increasing to 375 targets in 2003 through 2008.

ACRR – Defense Programs (DP) testing configuration capabilities would be maintained. The DOE also has identified a recent, short-term need to conduct a single test series related to the certification of some weapons components (Weigand 1999a). The ACRR would be reconfigured to pulse-mode operation for a limited-duration test period (12 to 18 months following the Record of Decision) (Weigand 1999b). This test campaign would be conducted in the existing ACRR facility, which would have to be temporarily reconfigured to restore DP testing capability. The reconfiguration activities required to change the reactor to the DP test configuration would mainly consist of replacing the central cavity, enabling the pulse mode of operation,

reconfiguring the core fuel, reinstalling the appropriate fuel-ringed external cavity (if required), executing the necessary battery of tests, preparing documentation, and conducting reviews to certify that the reconfigured reactor is operational. The reconfiguration to ACRR-DP would be done so that conversion back to ACRR-medical isotope production would be more efficient. The DOE is evaluating the potential need for long-term DP test requirements for ACRR, but currently the DOE has no plans for such tests. Any future long-term test campaigns would undergo the appropriate NEPA reviews. The readiness capability to maintain the DP-testing configuration is described in detail in the April 1996, *Medical Isotopes Production Project: Molybdenum-99 and Related Isotopes Environmental Impact Statement* (DOE 1996b).

The DOE considered the possibility of conducting this short-term test series at other DOE sites. Only Transient Reactor Test Facility (TREAT), Idaho National Engineering & Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), was a possible alternate, but was dismissed because of the limited timeframe needed to complete the test campaign (Minnema 1999). The DOE is also evaluating the possibility of using nondestructive simulations (computer modeling) to accomplish certification.

3.2.5.5 Hot Cell Facility

The Hot Cell Facility (HCF) would primarily support medical isotopes production. Isotopes production operations and associated capabilities include isotope extraction and separation, isotope product purification, product packaging, and quality control. The base year level of activity would include 8 targets per year and would increase to 375 by 2003, continuing at the same rate until 2008.

3.2.6 Outdoor Test Facilities

3.2.6.1 Aerial Cable Facility

The Aerial Cable Facility would be used to conduct a variety of impact tests involving weapon systems and aircraft components. Capabilities include free-fall drop, rocket pull-down, and captive flight tests with state-of-the-art instrumentation, data recording, and simulation technologies. Under this alternative, approximately 21 drop/pull-down tests would be completed in the base year, increasing to 32 tests in 2003 and 38 tests in 2008. Approximately one-half dozen other tests would be completed each year.

3.2.6.2 Lurance Canyon Burn Site

The Lurance Canyon Burn Site is a group of facilities that would be used to test, certify, and validate material and system tolerances. Test objects would be burned for short periods of time under controlled conditions. Approximately 12 certification tests would be conducted each year through the year 2008, with 56 model validation tests and 37 user tests.

3.2.6.3 Containment Technology Test Facility - West

Planning for the two tests at the Containment Technology Test Facility-West began in 1991. Each test would involve a series of successive events leading up to ultimate failure of the two test vessels. The first test was completed in 1997, and the second test is scheduled for completion in 2000. After the second test, there are no further plans for additional testing.

3.2.6.4 Explosives Applications Laboratory

The Explosives Applications Laboratory (EAL) would continue to design, assemble, and test explosive materials, components, and equipment for multiple programs. Work at the facility would involve arming, fuzing, and firing of explosives and testing of components. The EAL would use X-ray analysis, fabrication technology, photographic analysis, and machine shop techniques to complete energetic material research and development. Approximately 240 tests would be completed each year through 2008.

3.2.6.5 Thunder Range Complex

The Thunder Range Complex capabilities would range from disassembly and evaluation to calibration and verification testing of special nuclear and nonnuclear systems. Examination and testing of objects would involve cleaning, physical examination, disassembly, measurement, sampling, photography, and data collection. Equipment disassembly would take place during 60 days per year in the base year, increasing to 82 days per year in 2003 through 2008. Ground-truthing tests consist of one test series in the base year, increasing to five test series in 2003 and eight test series in 2008.

3.2.7 Infrastructure Facilities

3.2.7.1 Steam Plant

The steam plant would continue to produce and distribute steam to SNL/NM and Kirtland Air Force Base (KAFB) facilities. The steam would be primarily

used for domestic hot water and building heat. Approximately 544 M lb would be produced each year.

3.2.7.2 Hazardous Waste Management Facility

The Hazardous Waste Management Facility (HWMF) would handle, package, short-term store, and ship hazardous, toxic, and nonhazardous chemical wastes. The HWMF is a *Resource Conservation and Recovery Act* (RCRA), Part B-permitted facility that would support waste generators throughout SNL/NM. The HWMF would prepare wastes for offsite transportation for recycling, treatment, or disposal at licensed facilities. The facility would operate one shift. Quantities of RCRA hazardous waste managed (see Section 3.6, Table 3.6–1) would range from 55,852 kg in the base year to 74,358 kg through 2008. Infrastructure-related activities are rated at approximately 200,000 kg per year (see Section 3.6, Table 3.6–1).

3.2.7.3 Radioactive and Mixed Waste Management Facility

The Radioactive and Mixed Waste Management Facility (RMWMF) would continue to serve as a centralized facility for receipt, characterization, compaction, treatment, repackaging, certification, and storage of low-level waste (LLW), transuranic (TRU) waste, low-level mixed waste (LLMW), and mixed transuranic (MTRU) waste. A new prefabricated storage building would be constructed to replace an existing building to improve flexibility and operational efficiencies. The replacement of the existing facility is covered by Categorical Exclusion B6.10 (10 CFR Part 1021). Like the HWMF, the RMWMF would support waste generators throughout SNL/NM. The RMWMF would prepare waste for offsite treatment and disposal at permitted and licensed facilities. The facility would operate one shift. Total wastes by waste type are presented in Section 3.6, Table 3.6–1. Annual quantities of radioactive waste managed (see Section 3.6, Table 3.6–1) would range from 11,874 ft³ (337 m³) for LLW (only 3,322 ft³ [94 m³] are generated; the remainder is legacy waste [see Section 3.6, Table 3.6–2]) in the base year to 15,436 ft³ (438 m³) for LLW (only 5,993 ft³ [170 m³] are generated; the difference is legacy waste [see Section 3.6, Table 3.6–2]) through 2008. Annually, for LLMW, TRU, and MTRU, the quantities to be managed (see Section 3.6, Table 3.6–1) through the RMWMF, including legacy waste and the expected quantities to be generated (see Section 3.6, Table 3.6–2), are as follow: 5,353 ft³ (152 m³) to 6,959 ft³ (197 m³) LLMW managed; 153 ft³ (4.33 m³) to 258 ft³ (7.31 m³)

LLMW generated; 214 ft³ (6.1 m³) to 278 ft³ (7.9 m³) TRU managed; zero ft³ (zero m³) to 26 ft³ (0.74 m³) TRU generated; and 16 ft³ (0.45 m³) to 23 ft³ (0.65 m³) MTRU managed; 16 ft³ (0.45 m³) to 23 ft³ (0.65 m³) MTRU generated. Infrastructure-related activities are rated at 2.1 M lb per year (see Section 3.6, Table 3.6–1).

3.2.7.4 Thermal Treatment Facility

The Thermal Treatment Facility (TTF) would thermally treat (burn) small quantities of explosive materials and explosives-contaminated waste. Quantities would range from minimal in the base year to 336 lb of waste through 2008. This assumes that the RCRA permit is reissued.

3.3 EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE

The Expanded Operations Alternative assumes implementation of assignments that would result in the highest reasonable activity levels that could be supported by current facilities and the potential expansion and construction of new facilities. Appropriate NEPA documentation would be prepared prior to any new construction. This alternative addresses the same selected existing facilities described under the No Action Alternative. Under this alternative, operations could increase to the highest reasonably foreseeable levels over the next 10 years. The following sections describe the activities that would occur at specific facilities as a result of implementing assignments under the Expanded Operations Alternative.

3.3.1 Selected Facilities in Technical Areas-I and -II

3.3.1.1 Neutron Generator Facility

Under all alternatives, the NGF, TA-I, would continue to be used to fabricate neutron generators and neutron tubes. Support activities would include a wide variety of manufacturing, testing, and product development techniques and processes. An addition to an existing building would be constructed to meet production projections. Additionally, Building 870 would undergo extensive renovations. Approximately 2,000 neutron generators and associated neutron and switch tubes would be manufactured per year by 2008.

3.3.1.2 Microelectronic Development Laboratory

Under this alternative, the MDL would continue present activities, but would increase production to 7,500 wafers

per year, using 3 shifts. Use of new technologies and manufacturing processes would be expected to meet expanded activities.

3.3.1.3 Advanced Manufacturing Processes Laboratory

Activities at the AMPL would be similar to those under the No Action Alternative. Operations would increase beyond a single shift, adding 54 employees. Operations would increase to 347,000 hours per year.

3.3.1.4 Integrated Materials Research Laboratory

Activities at the IMRL would be the same as under the No Action Alternative (approximately 395,000 hours per year). Currently, the IMRL is operating at maximum capacity. No expansion would be anticipated.

3.3.1.5 Explosive Components Facility

Activities at the ECF would be similar to those under the No Action Alternative. Operations would be maximized to complete 500 neutron generator tests, 900 explosive tests, 1,250 chemical analyses, and 100 battery tests annually.

3.3.2 Physical Testing and Simulation Facilities

3.3.2.1 Terminal Ballistics Complex

Activities would be the same as under the No Action Alternative. No additional capabilities or new activities would be undertaken. The operating level would be increased to 350 projectile impact tests and 100 propellant tests per year.

3.3.2.2 Drop/Impact Complex

The Drop/Impact Complex tests would be expanded for all four capabilities: drop test, water impact, submersion, and underwater blasting. The projected increase would be beyond historic use but within the complex capabilities. Approximately 50 drop tests, 20 water impact tests, 5 submersion tests, and 10 underwater blast tests would occur each year.

3.3.2.3 Sled Track Complex

Activities would be the same as those described under the No Action Alternative. Operating levels would be increased to approximately 80 rocket sled tests, 239 explosive tests, 24 rocket launches, and 150 free-flight launches per year.

3.3.2.4 Centrifuge Complex

The Centrifuge Complex activities would be the same as those described under the No Action Alternative. However, the number of tests per year would increase to 120 centrifuge tests and 100 impact tests.

3.3.3 Accelerator Facilities

3.3.3.1 SATURN

Under the Expanded Operations Alternative, the accelerator output would increase by 3 shots or firings every other day for a maximum of 500 shots annually. Activities would be the same as those described under the No Action Alternative.

3.3.3.2 High-Energy Radiation Megavolt Electron Source III

The HERMES III capabilities would remain the same under the Expanded Operations Alternative. The maximum number of shots per year would be 1,450. This level of activity would be achieved through the addition of multiple shifts.

3.3.3.3 Sandia Accelerator & Beam Research Experiment

Testing at the SABRE would increase to 400 shots per year. Activities would be the same as those described in the No Action Alternative.

3.3.3.4 Short-Pulse High Intensity Nanosecond X-Radiator

The SPHINX would operate at a maximum of 6,000 shots per year. Activities would be the same as those described under the No Action Alternative. This would be an increase from 1,185 shots in the 1997 base year. This increase would be achieved through multiple shifts.

3.3.3.5 Repetitive High Energy Pulsed Power I

The tests projected for the RHEPP I would be in both the single and repetitive pulse modes. The RHEPP I would provide support for approximately 10,000 tests per year. No new capabilities or activities would be expected.

3.3.3.6 Repetitive High Energy Pulsed Power II

The RHEPP II capacity would be maximized at 20 tests per week for 40 weeks per year (800 tests). Activities

would be similar to those described under the No Action Alternative.

3.3.3.7 Z-Machine

The Z-Machine capability would be maximized to 350 firings per year. Approximately 78 percent would involve nuclear materials identified under the No Action Alternative. Upgrades would be planned to maximize the Z-Machine's operations.

3.3.3.8 Tera-Electron Volt Energy Superconductor Linear Accelerator (TESLA)

The operating levels at the TESLA would be increased to 1,300 shots per year.

3.3.3.9 Advanced Pulsed Power Research Module

The APPRM activity would increase to 2,000 shots per year.

3.3.3.10 Radiographic Integrated Test Stand

The RITS would operate at a maximum of approximately 800 tests per year. Capabilities would remain the same as those described under the No Action Alternative.

3.3.4 Reactor Facilities

3.3.4.1 New Gamma Irradiation Facility

The NGIF would irradiate test packages for approximately 24,000 test hours per year. Capabilities would remain the same as those described under the No Action Alternative.

3.3.4.2 Gamma Irradiation Facility

GIF operations would continue under the Expanded Operations Alternative. Actual operations would expand to complete tests in two available cells. The GIF would supplement the capabilities of the NGIF. Approximately 8,000 test hours would be expected.

3.3.4.3 Sandia Pulsed Reactor

Several new, yet-to-be-designed reactors would be added to the SPR facility. Modifications would be completed to enhance and expand current capabilities. Operating levels would increase to 200 tests per year.

3.3.4.4 Annular Core Pulse Reactor II

The Annular Core Pulse Reactor (ACPR-II) would be an additional pulse-power reactor similar to the ACRR. The ACPR-II would operate in pulse mode using the same fundamental design as the ACRR prior to its conversion to the medical isotopes production configuration. The Expanded Operations Alternative assumes that there would be an ongoing need for DP testing in a pulsed-power reactor facility. Approximately two major fissile component tests and approximately six material irradiation, electronics effects tests would be performed each year. These tests would involve setup, calibration, and operation sequences that could require from 1 to 2 days to several weeks, depending on the conditions of the test. To meet this need, an additional ACPR facility would be reconstituted using the same fundamental design as the ACRR facility. If this additional ACPR facility is proposed at some time in the future, the DOE would prepare a separate project-specific NEPA review.

The specially designed uranium oxide-beryllium oxide fuel from the existing ACRR medical isotopes production configuration would be used for the reconstituted ACPR-II to support DP test requirements. New fuel of a more standard design would be purchased for the original ACRR medical isotopes production configuration to support ongoing isotope production activities.

Under the Expanded Operations Alternative for DP testing in the ACPR-II, approximately two or three test campaigns (consisting of several individual tests) would be conducted each year. A test campaign would consist of a test setup period of a few days to 2 weeks and a test duration (time in reactor) of 1 day to 2 weeks. These tests would typically use the ACPR-II in its pulse mode or steady-state operations that would not exceed a few days in duration. Hence, a minimal amount of resources such as uranium fuel and water would be expended for these tests for high-use, steady-state operation.

3.3.4.5 Annular Core Research Reactor–Medical Isotopes Production Configuration

The ACRR medical isotopes production configuration would be operated for 24 hours per day, 7 days per week, at a maximum power level of 4 MW (approximately 35,000 MWh per year) to meet the entire U.S. demand for molybdenum-99 and other isotopes such as iodine-131, xenon-133, and iodine-125. This would require the irradiation of about 25 highly enriched uranium targets per week (1,300 per year).

3.3.4.6 Hot Cell Facility

Under the Expanded Operations Alternative, the HCF would continuously process 100 percent of the U.S. demand for molybdenum-99 and other isotopes such as iodine-131, xenon-133, and iodine-125. This would require the processing of about 25 irradiated, highly enriched uranium targets per week (1,300 per year).

3.3.5 Outdoor Test Facilities

3.3.5.1 Aerial Cable Facility

The Aerial Cable Facility drop, pull-down, aerial target, and system testing capabilities would remain the same as under the No Action Alternative. Drop tests of joint test assemblies that contain DU, enriched uranium, and insensitive high explosives would represent a new test activity at the complex. These test articles would contain less than 45 lb of DU, less than 120 lb of enriched uranium, and less than 104 lb of insensitive high explosives (plastic-bonded explosive [PBX]-9502 or press-moldable explosive [LX]-17). Test articles would be designed using insensitive high explosives because of the low probability of detonation under test conditions. In addition, the nuclear material contained in the test article would be configured in a manner that prevents a criticality event from occurring. The number of tests using this kind of test article (containing DU, enriched uranium, and insensitive high explosives) could range from one to five per year depending upon programmatic requirements. The total number of drop/pull-down tests would increase to an estimated 100 experiments per year. Aerial target tests would increase to 30 tests per year. Two series of scoring system tests would be conducted each year.

3.3.5.2 Lurance Canyon Burn Site

The Lurance Canyon Burn Site activities in certification, model validation, and user testing would remain similar to those described under the No Action Alternative. The number of certification tests would increase to an estimated 55 tests per year under the Expanded Operations Alternative. Model validation tests and user tests would increase to 100 and 50 per year, respectively.

3.3.5.3 Containment Technology Test Facility - West

The Containment Technology Test Facility - West would perform two survivability tests per year under the Expanded Operations Alternative. No new programs would be anticipated.

3.3.5.4 Explosives Applications Laboratory

Activities at the EAL would increase slightly under the Expanded Operations Alternative. The number of explosive tests would range from 275 to a maximum of 360 tests per year.

3.3.5.5 Thunder Range Complex

Activities at the Thunder Range Complex would increase slightly to 10 test series per year in 2008. Equipment disassembly would increase to 144 days per year. A moderate increase in workload would occur and the number of facility personnel would increase slightly.

3.3.6 Infrastructure Facilities

3.3.6.1 Steam Plant

The steam plant would require upgrades of several boilers, steam distributors, and natural gas supply systems. The actual boiler upgrade would potentially include a technology change to co-generation units. Steam production, however, would remain similar (544 M lb per year) to that under the No Action Alternative.

3.3.6.2 Hazardous Waste Management Facility

The HWMF activities would remain the same as under the No Action Alternative. Operating conditions would include increasing from one to three shifts. Quantities of RCRA hazardous waste managed (see Section 3.6, Table 3.6–1) would be 92,314 kg each year. Infrastructure-related activities are rated at 214,000 kg per year (see Section 3.6, Table 3.6–1).

3.3.6.3 Radioactive Mixed Waste Management Facility

The RMWMF capabilities would remain the same as under the No Action Alternative. A new prefabricated building would be constructed to replace an existing building to improve flexibility and operational efficiencies. The facility would be increased from one to two shifts. Annual quantities of radioactive waste managed (see Section 3.6, Table 3.6–1) would be 19,592 ft³ (556 m³) for LLW (only 9,897 ft³ [280 m³] are generated; the remainder is legacy waste [see Section 3.6, Table 3.6–2]). Annually, for LLMW, TRU, and MTRU, the quantities to be managed (see Section 3.6, Table 3.6–1) through the RMWMF, including legacy waste and the expected quantities to be generated (see Section 3.6, Table 3.6–2), are as follow: 8,833 ft³

(251 m³) LLMW managed; 258 ft³ (7.31 m³) LLMW generated; 353 ft³ (10 m³) TRU managed; 26 ft³ (0.74 m³) TRU generated; and 37 ft³ (1.05 m³) MTRU managed; 37 ft³ (1.05 m³) MTRU generated. Infrastructure-related activities are rated at 2.7 M lb per year (see Section 3.6, Table 3.6–1).

3.3.6.4 Thermal Treatment Facility

Activities at the TTF would remain the same as under the No Action Alternative; quantities of wastes treated, however, would increase. Approximately 1,200 lb of waste per year would be thermally treated. This rate assumes that 60 burns are performed at 20 lb of waste per burn. This rate also assumes that the RCRA permit is reissued.

3.4 REDUCED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE

The Reduced Operations Alternative reflects minimum levels of activity required to maintain a facility's assigned capability. In some specific facilities, the Reduced Operations Alternative includes activity levels that represent an increase over the base period activity levels (typically 1996). The facilities are those that, during the base period, have not been operated at a level sufficient to maintain capability or to satisfy DOE-assigned theoretical or experimental R&D product requirements.

This alternative does not eliminate assigned missions or programs, but could entail not meeting technical program requirements or could increase program or technological risk (for example, not meeting program deliverables, reduced technology demonstration activities, or a decline in technological capability). However, under this alternative, SNL/NM operations would not be reduced beyond those required to maintain safety and security activities, such as maintaining nuclear materials, high explosives, or other hazardous materials in storage or use.

The following sections describe the activities that would occur at specific facilities as a result of implementing the Reduced Operations Alternative.

3.4.1 Selected Facilities in Technical Areas-I and -II

3.4.1.1 Neutron Generator Facility

Under all alternatives, the NGE, TA-I, would continue to be used to fabricate neutron generators and neutron tubes. Support activities would include a wide variety of

manufacturing, testing, and product development techniques and processes. An addition to an existing building would be constructed to meet production projections. Additionally, Building 870 would undergo extensive renovations. Approximately 2,000 neutron generators and associated neutron and switch tubes would be manufactured per year by 2008.

3.4.1.2 Microelectronics Development Laboratory

All existing capabilities would remain to produce a reduced number of wafers. Operations would be single-shift only. Approximately 2,700 wafers would be manufactured each year.

3.4.1.3 Advanced Manufacturing Processes Laboratory

The level of effort projected for the Reduced Operations Alternative would be similar to that under the No Action Alternative because the facility would be operating with the minimum number of personnel (minus administrative staff) required to maintain operational capability in each of the various areas of expertise. Approximately 248,000 operational hours would be expected.

3.4.1.4 Integrated Materials Research Laboratory

The level of effort projected under the Reduced Operations Alternative would be slightly lower than that under the No Action Alternative. A reduction in capabilities would not occur; however, there could be a slight reduction in the number of personnel and operational hours (approximately 364,000 per year).

3.4.1.5 Explosive Components Facility

Existing activities would continue at reduced levels. Activities at the ECF would include 500 neutron generator tests, 300 explosive tests, 500 chemical analyses, and 10 battery tests per year.

3.4.2 Physical Testing and Simulation Facilities

3.4.2.1 Terminal Ballistics Complex

All existing capabilities would remain under the Reduced Operations Alternative. Operating levels would be reduced to a minimum to support those capabilities. An estimated 10 projectile impact tests and 4 propellant tests would be conducted each year.

3.4.2.2 Drop/Impact Complex

All existing capabilities would remain under the Reduced Operations Alternative. No drop tests would be conducted, but one water impact test would be conducted annually to maintain operational capability. No submersion or underwater blasts would occur.

3.4.2.3 Sled Track Complex

All existing activities would remain viable under the Reduced Operations Alternative. Approximately two rocket sled tests would occur each year. While other types of tests would not be conducted, the capability would be maintained.

3.4.2.4 Centrifuge Complex

Existing activities would be reduced to a minimum level of testing required to maintain operational capability. Testing would cease for certification of weapon modifications and special items. At least two annual centrifuge tests would be conducted. No impact testing would be done under the Reduced Operations Alternative.

3.4.3 Accelerator Facilities

3.4.3.1 SATURN

The SATURN capabilities would remain at a sufficient level to maintain operational readiness. The number of shots would decrease to 40 each year.

3.4.3.2 High-Energy Radiation Megavolt Electron Source III

Existing capabilities would be maintained at the HERMES III facility. Annual tests would be reduced to an estimated 40 shots per year.

3.4.3.3 Sandia Accelerator & Beam Research Experiment

Under the Reduced Operations Alternative, the SABRE would be placed in standby mode. No test shots would be required to keep the facility operational. With minimal testing and general maintenance, operational capabilities would remain in place.

3.4.3.4 Short-Pulse High Intensity Nanosecond X-Radiator

Under the Reduced Operations Alternative, approximately 200 test shots would be completed each

year. All existing capabilities would remain in a state of operational readiness.

3.4.3.5 Repetitive High Energy Pulsed Power I

All existing capabilities would be maintained. The number of tests would be reduced to 100 per year.

3.4.3.6 Repetitive High Energy Pulsed Power II

Activities would continue at the RHEPP II facility; however, the number of tests would decrease to 40 tests per year.

3.4.3.7 Z-Machine

Under the Reduced Operations Alternative, an estimated 84 tests per year would be required to maintain existing capabilities.

3.4.3.8 Tera-Electron Volt Energy Superconductor Linear Accelerator (TESLA)

All existing capabilities would be maintained under the Reduced Operations Alternative. To maintain operational readiness, an estimated 40 shots would be completed each year.

3.4.3.9 Advanced Pulsed Power Research Module

The level of activity necessary to maintain the operational capabilities would be 40 shots per year.

3.4.3.10 Radiographic Integrated Test Stand

Under the Reduced Operations Alternative, the minimum level of shots required to ensure operational capability in both the pulse-power and explosive modes would be an estimated 1 to 3 per week over the 40-week operational year. A total of 100 shots per year would be necessary to maintain operational capacity.

3.4.4 Reactor Facilities

3.4.4.1 New Gamma Irradiation Facility

Under the Reduced Operations Alternative, the NGIF would not conduct any irradiation tests.

3.4.4.2 Gamma Irradiation Facility

Under the Reduced Operations Alternative, the GIF would not conduct irradiation tests.

3.4.4.3 Sandia Pulsed Reactor

Under the Reduced Operations Alternative, the SPR facility would conduct 30 tests to maintain existing capabilities. No new reactors would be added to the facility.

3.4.4.4 Annular Core Research Reactor–Medical Isotopes Production Configuration

Under the Reduced Operations Alternative, the ACRR medical isotopes production configuration would irradiate the minimum number of targets required to maintain the facility, staff, processes, and material inventories needed to restart production activities on short notice. This would consist of the irradiation of approximately 40 targets per year. Although the ACRR would not be used in the DP configuration, the readiness capability to operate would be maintained.

3.4.4.5 Hot Cell Facility

Under the Reduced Operations Alternative, the HCF would process the minimum number of targets required to maintain the facility, staff, processes, and material inventories needed to restart production activities on short notice. This would consist of the processing of approximately 1 target per week over 40 weeks, or 40 targets per year. The HCF-associated facilities would be maintained at the minimum operational level. Occasional activities would be performed to support those programs that require the capabilities of these facilities. Total wastes by waste type are presented in Section 3.6, Table 3.6–1.

3.4.5 Outdoor Test Facilities

3.4.5.1 Aerial Cable Facility

All existing capabilities would remain as described under the No Action Alternative. Some activities would be reduced to zero tests per year. Two drop/pull-down tests would be conducted annually.

3.4.5.2 Lurance Canyon Burn Site

All existing capabilities would be maintained with minimal testing (one certification test per year).

3.4.5.3 Containment Technology Test Facility - West

To maintain the existing capability, at least one test would be required over a period of several years. A typical test cycle would be 6 years.

3.4.5.4 Explosives Applications Laboratory

Maintaining the site capability and qualifications would require approximately 50 tests per year to ensure minimum qualifications for arming, fuzing, and firing of explosives and explosives components.

3.4.5.5 Thunder Range Complex

All existing capabilities would be maintained. One test, ranging in duration from 1 to 30 days, would be completed each year. Equipment disassembly would be reduced to 42 days per year.

3.4.6 Infrastructure Facilities

3.4.6.1 Steam Plant

Steam plant production would decline to 362 M lb per year.

3.4.6.2 Hazardous Waste Management Facility

The HWMF capability would be maintained through the life of the current permit. The facility would be operated with one shift. Quantities of RCRA hazardous waste managed (see Section 3.6, Table 3.6–1) would be 53,123 kg each year. Infrastructure-related activities are rated at 175,000 kg per year.

3.4.6.3 Radioactive Mixed Waste Management Facility

The RMWMF capability would be maintained consistent with the applicable permit requirements. The facility would be operated with one shift. Annual quantities of radioactive waste managed (see Section 3.6, Table 3.6–1) would be 5,937 ft³ (168 m³) for LLW (only 3,616 ft³ [102.4 m³] are generated; the remainder is legacy waste [see Section 3.6, Table 3.6–2]). Annually, for LLMW, TRU, and MTRU, the quantities to be managed (see Section 3.6, Table 3.6–1) through the RMWMF, including legacy waste and the expected quantities to be generated (see Section 3.6, Table 3.6–2), are as follow: 2,677 ft³ (76 m³) LLMW managed; 134 ft³ (3.79 m³) LLMW generated; 107 ft³ (3 m³) TRU managed; no TRU generated; and 8 ft³ (0.23 m³) MTRU managed; 8 ft³ (0.23 m³) MTRU generated. Infrastructure-related activities are rated at approximately 0.8 M lb per year.

3.4.6.4 Thermal Treatment Facility

The TTF capability would be maintained at minimal operational levels without treating waste.

3.5 ALTERNATIVES THAT WERE CONSIDERED BUT ELIMINATED FROM DETAILED ANALYSIS

The CEQ regulations implementing NEPA require that all reasonable alternatives be evaluated in an EIS (40 CFR §1502.14[a]). The term *reasonable* has been interpreted by CEQ to include those alternatives that are practical or feasible from a common sense, technical, and economic standpoint. The range of reasonable alternatives is, therefore, limited to continued SNL/NM operations. DOE mission line assignments to SNL/NM define the agency's purpose and need for action, as discussed in Chapter 1.

The DOE carefully considered public input and comments received during the pre-scoping and scoping processes. Some alternatives suggested for SNL/NM's future operations were not considered in detail in the SWEIS because they were deemed unreasonable within the next 10 years. These alternatives are defined and the reasons why they were eliminated from detailed analysis are presented in the following sections.

3.5.1 Shutdown of Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico

Under this alternative, SNL/NM operations would shut down and all facilities would be subject to decontamination and decommissioning (D&D). All DOE property would be transferred following D&D.

PL 103-160, the *National Defense Authorization Act of 1994*, and Presidential policy statements on the future of the laboratories (The White House 1995) require maintaining a safe and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile as a cornerstone of the nation's nuclear deterrent for the near future. The continued viability of all three DOE weapons laboratories, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and SNL, is essential to ensuring national security. Unique competencies and facilities at SNL/NM provide for R&D, surveillance, testing, reliability and safety assessment, certification, and manufacturing associated with nuclear weapons.

Because continuing operations at SNL/NM are essential to DOE's implementation of Public Law (PL) 103-160, Presidential Decision Directives, U.S. compliance with treaties, as well as Congressional guidance and national security policy, the shutdown of SNL/NM is not a reasonable alternative and is not analyzed in the SWEIS.

SNL/NM's continued operations fulfill national security requirements for stockpile stewardship and management (based on PL 103-160, the DoD Nuclear Posture Review, Presidential Decision Directives, and the Nuclear Weapon Stockpile Memorandum), and it is not economically feasible to reassign certain SNL/NM activities to other DOE laboratories (see PL 103-160 and the Stockpile Stewardship and Management (SSM) PEIS, Volume I, Sections 2.2 and 2.3 [DOE 1996a]).

3.5.2 Expansion of Nonweapons Environmental and Renewable Energy Research

During the public scoping process, the DOE received a suggestion that it consider changing the focus of SNL/NM's mission statement from ensuring the safety, reliability, and security of the nuclear weapons stockpile to expanding SNL/NM's capabilities in the areas of improving energy and material efficiency; renewable resources, waste management and recycling research; and biodegradable and reusable material development.

The DOE's mission lines and funding come from Congress and the President. In the course of the implementation process, the DOE assigns aspects of its mission lines to its laboratory and plant facilities across the country, based on the unique skills and capabilities of each facility. SNL/NM is one of only three national laboratories whose primary mission from DOE is to contribute its specialized capabilities to the assurance of a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile. The 1996 SSM PEIS reaffirmed the continuation of SNL/NM's role in DOE's nuclear weapons program. To fulfill its primary mission, SNL/NM has developed and perfected unique capabilities, such as high explosives R&D and testing, radiation effects experimentation through the use of accelerators and research reactors, neutron generator production, engineering and production of nonnuclear components, and microelectronics and photonics research.

Notwithstanding SNL/NM's primary mission, the energy crisis in the 1970s and other events caused the DOE to request that SNL/NM apply its knowledge and expertise to support its other mission lines (Section 2.1). SNL/NM accomplished this task by expanding its research, developed primarily as an offshoot of weapons research, into a number of environmental and energy fields. Areas where SNL/NM has been active include waste management, environmental restoration, energy efficiency, renewable energy, magnetic fusion, and nuclear, fossil, and solar energy.

This alternative was not analyzed in detail because the three alternatives analyzed in detail evaluate and bound levels of *activity* (Section 3.1) for facilities where ongoing environmental and energy research activities are conducted. If, during the next 10 years, the DOE wants to consider increasing or reallocating existing weapons resources to any of the environmental or energy fields, the increased activities are already encompassed in the evaluation of the three alternatives described in Sections 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4.

3.6 COMPARISON OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES AMONG ALTERNATIVES

The SWEIS combines the results of several studies to address consequences to the environment and risks associated with the DOE's operations at SNL/NM. The affected environment evaluated in the SWEIS includes the following 13 resource areas: land use and visual resources, infrastructure, geology and soils, water resources and hydrology, biological and ecological resources, cultural resources, air quality, human health and worker safety, transportation, waste generation, noise and vibration, socioeconomics, and environmental justice (see Chapter 4).

The following subsections summarize the environmental consequences and risks by resource area under each alternative. Tables 3.6-1 through 3.6-4 (located at the end of Chapter 3) present the comparison of environmental consequences in tabular form. Table 3.6-1 summarizes operational data from the selected facilities for each alternative. The facilities are arranged by selected facility/facility group, including the infrastructure facilities. Table 3.6-2 compares important parameters used in performing impact analyses described in Chapter 5. Table 3.6-3 compares impacts determined from these analyses for each alternative. Table 3.6-4 presents a condensed list of high-consequence impacts determined from the accidents analyses for each alternative. A complete list may be found in Appendix F.

3.6.1 Land Use and Visual Resources

No adverse impacts to land resources are expected as a result of the No Action, Expanded Operations, or Reduced Operations Alternatives. The extent of DOE land and U.S. Air Force (USAF)-permitted acreage currently available for use by SNL/NM facilities on KAFB would remain approximately the same.

Operations would remain consistent with industrial and research park uses and would have no foreseeable effects on established land use patterns or requirements. Buffer zones would continue to remain at their current size and location. New SNL/NM facilities, expansions, and upgrades would be limited and would not require changes to current land ownership or classification status because these activities would be planned in or near existing facilities, within already disturbed or developed areas, or on land already under DOE control. There would be no adverse impacts to visual resources that change the overall appearance of the existing landscape, obscure views, or alter the visibility of SNL/NM structures. New facilities, expansions, and upgrades would be planned in or near existing facilities in areas with common scenic quality. Efforts initiated by SNL/NM to incorporate a campus-style design would continue.

3.6.2 Infrastructure

Annual projected utility demands for all alternatives would be well within system capacities. Electrical consumption would range from 185,000 MWh (Reduced Operations Alternative) to 198,000 MWh per year. Projected water usage would range from 416 M gal to 495 M gal per year. Actual water usage probably would be lower because SNL/NM has implemented a conservation program to reduce usage by 30 percent by 2004. For comparison purposes, a conservation scenario is provided under the No Action Alternative. Other infrastructure-related factors, including maintenance, roads, communications, steam, natural gas, and facility decommissioning, would be similar for each alternative and would not be adversely affected by the projected levels of SNL/NM operations. Although not shown in Table 3.6–2, Expanded Operations Alternative, infrastructure analysis included a 10-percent margin to illustrate that the utility systems supporting SNL/NM have adequate capacity.

3.6.3 Geology and Soils

No activities planned for any of the alternatives would present a potential for slope destabilization. Slope instability has not been an issue in past SNL/NM operations and would likely not be a concern in the future. Existing soil contamination is being cleaned up through SNL/NM's Environmental Restoration (ER) Project, which is scheduled for completion by 2004. Under the Expanded Operations Alternative, there would be the potential for increased deposition of soil

contaminants in outdoor testing areas. Potential contaminants would include DU fragments, explosive residue, and metals contained in weapons that are used in the tests. SNL/NM performs periodic sampling and radiation surveys in these testing areas. DU fragments are collected after tests. Potential contaminants have not been detected at concentrations above background at current testing levels. These areas are not accessible to the general public.

3.6.4 Water Resources and Hydrology

Groundwater contamination attributable to known SNL/NM activities is present at one site, the Chemical Waste Landfill (CWL) in TA-III. Investigation and cleanup planning are ongoing at this site, and any final plans must be approved by the New Mexico Environment Department. Under a no-cleanup scenario, the only contaminant exceeding U.S. Environmental Protection Agency concentration limits in groundwater would be trichloroethene (TCE), which occurs in a plume extending 410 ft from the CWL. It is important to note the contamination was a result of past activities and is not expected to be adversely affected by the alternatives. The TCE would not impact drinking water supplies because the nearest water supply well is approximately 4 mi from the CWL. Groundwater investigation would continue at several additional locations where the source of potential contamination has not been identified. Investigation and cleanup at locations with groundwater contamination would continue at the same rate under each of the three alternatives.

The estimated SNL/NM portion of local (in the immediate vicinity of KAFB) aquifer drawdown from 1998 to 2008 would range from 11 to 12 percent for all alternatives. Local drawdown would range from less than 1 to 28 ft across KAFB during this period. The potential consequence is considered adverse. This drawdown would not have an immediate effect on other water users, spring flow, or land subsidence. Long-term effects would be greatly mitigated by the city of Albuquerque's conversion to surface water use, scheduled to begin in 2004. Water demand under each alternative would be within existing KAFB water rights.

No contaminants attributable to SNL/NM activities have been detected in surface water samples collected onsite.

SNL/NM has little effect on the quantity of surface water in arroyos or the Rio Grande. The combined excess storm water runoff from SNL/NM facilities and

Maximally Exposed Individual

A hypothetical person who could potentially receive the maximum dose of radiation or hazardous chemicals.

discharge to Albuquerque's Southside Water Reclamation Plant would contribute from 0.06 to 0.07 percent to the annual Rio Grande flow under all alternatives, with no measurable impacts to the Rio Grande.

3.6.5 Biological and Ecological Resources

Beneficial impacts to biological and ecological resources would occur under all alternatives. Restricted access and limited development and use have benefited biological resources at the KAFB. For example, the absence of livestock grazing has improved the quality of the grasslands in relation to the region.

SNL/NM operations in TAs-I, -II, and -V would continue to occur primarily inside buildings. Under all alternatives, proposed construction (analyzed and approved in separate NEPA documents) would remove small areas of vegetation, but would not affect the viability of the plant communities. Proposed activities could result in the local displacement of wildlife. There would be slightly increased levels of noise and activity under the Expanded Operations Alternative. Observations indicate that wildlife has become accustomed to the noise and activities that currently exist. Data from raptor surveys of KAFB support this conclusion, as raptor species at KAFB return to the same nest sites each year. Outdoor activities at TA-III and the Coyote Test Field would continue to affect small localized areas.

Limited site access and management of the biological resources by SNL/NM, KAFB, and the U.S. Forest Service would continue to benefit the animals and plants, including sensitive species on KAFB.

3.6.6 Cultural Resources

Restricted access in association with activities at certain facilities would continue to have a beneficial effect on prehistoric and historic archaeological resources because it would protect the resources from vandalism, theft, or unintentional damage. For all three SWEIS alternatives, there would continue to be a potential for impacts to prehistoric and historic archaeological resources. These

impacts would derive from explosive testing debris and shrapnel produced as a result of outdoor explosions, off-road vehicle traffic, and unintended fires and fire suppression. However, the potential for impacts due to these factors would be minimal under all three alternatives.

As a result of the ongoing consultation with 15 Native American tribes; no traditional cultural properties (TCPs) have been identified with SNL/NM; however, several tribes have requested that they be consulted under the *Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act* (NAGPRA) if human remains are discovered within the region of influence. These consultations will continue. If specific TCPs are identified, any impacts of SNL/NM activities on the TCP and any impacts of restricting access to the TCP would be determined in consultation with Native American tribes, and further NEPA review would be conducted, if appropriate.

3.6.7 Air Quality

Concentrations of criteria and chemical pollutants in air would be below regulatory standards and human health guidelines. Under a worst-case, 24-hour scenario, the maximum concentrations of criteria pollutants from operation of the steam plant, electric power generator plant, boiler and emergency generator in Building 701, and 600-kw-capacity generator in Building 870b would represent a maximum of 96 percent of the allowable regulatory limit for several criteria pollutants (nitrogen dioxide, total suspended particulates (TSP), and particulate matter smaller than 10 microns in diameter [PM₁₀]) at a public access area (See Table 5.3.7-1).

The Federal and state regulatory standards, in general, are set to provide for an ample margin of safety below any pollutant concentration that might be of concern.

The methodology used in the criteria pollutant analysis also produces maximum concentration projections that are very conservative. For example, 100 percent of the maximum concentration of air pollutants projected for Cobisa Power Station (located 5 mi west of the National Atomic Museum) was added to the background concentration calculated for the Steam Plant location (near the museum). Also, the maximum concentrations of air pollutants, from a monitoring station measuring contributions from the surrounding community that are dominated by traffic emissions, were added to the worst-case contribution of pollutants from operating SNL/NM's diesel fuel-powered backup generators and fuel oil-powered Steam Plant boilers. Consequently, though close to the thresholds, these calculated

concentrations for nitrogen dioxide, TSP, and PM₁₀ are considered to be very conservative.

Based on the analysis of stationary and mobile source emissions, carbon monoxide emissions from SNL/NM would be less than 1996 emissions under any alternative.

With the exception of one chemical (chromium trioxide), concentrations of noncarcinogenic chemicals emitted from 12 facilities on SNL/NM were projected to be below screening levels based on occupational exposure limit (OEL) guidelines generally referenced to determine human health impacts. Concentrations of carcinogenic chemical emissions would pose little cancer risk (less than 1 in 1 million) to onsite workers or the general public. Chemical emissions would be highest for the Expanded Operations Alternative, although they would still be below levels that would affect public health.

The impact from emissions of criteria pollutants for the No Action and Expanded Operations Alternatives would be essentially the same. The major source of criteria pollutants (other than mobile sources) would be the steam plant that supplies steam to the facilities for heating. No increase in floor space is anticipated under the Expanded Operations Alternative; therefore, no increase in steam production would be required. The Reduced Operations Alternative would require less steam, resulting in lower emissions from the steam plant.

The radiological dose impacts due to the annual air emissions from SNL/NM facilities during normal operations under each of the alternatives would be much lower than the regulatory National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) limit of 10 mrem/yr to a maximally exposed individual (MEI). The calculated radiological dose to an MEI would be 0.15 mrem/yr under the No Action Alternative; 0.51 mrem/yr under the Expanded Operations Alternative; and 0.02 mrem/yr under the Reduced Operations Alternative. The dose to an MEI under each alternative would be small in comparison to the average individual background radiation dose of 360 mrem/yr.

The calculated collective dose to the population within 50 mi of SNL/NM from the annual radiological air emissions due to the SNL/NM operations under each alternative would be 5.0 person-rem per year under the No Action Alternative; 15.8 person-rem per year under the Expanded Operations Alternative; and 0.80 person-rem per year under the Reduced Operations Alternative. The collective dose would be much lower than the collective dose of 263,700 person-rem to the same population from background radiation.

3.6.8 Human Health

Routine releases of hazardous radiological and chemical materials would occur during SNL/NM operations. These releases would have the potential to reach receptors (workers and members of the public) by way of different environmental pathways. The levels of exposure to chemicals and radionuclides were assessed for each environmental medium determined to be a pathway for these releases.

The SWEIS impact analyses identified air as the primary environmental pathway having the potential to transport hazardous material from SNL/NM facilities to receptors in the SNL/NM vicinity. In the assessment of human health risk from air emissions, a number of receptor locations and possible exposure scenarios were analyzed. The total composite cancer health risk is the sum of potential chemical and radiation exposures, calculated from the radiation cancer health risk to the MEI, plus the upper bound chemical cancer health risk from a hypothetical worst-case exposure scenario. This very conservative estimate of maximum health risk is greater than any of the individual health risks based on more likely exposure estimates at specific receptor locations.

Both the composite cancer health risk estimate of 1 in 385,000 and the cancer health risk estimates for specific receptor locations are below levels that regulators consider protective of public health. No adverse health effects would be expected from any of the three alternatives for SNL/NM. The small amounts of chemical carcinogens and radiation released from SNL/NM facilities would increase the maximally exposed individual lifetime risk of cancer for the hypothetical MEI by less than 1 chance in 434,000 under the No Action Alternative and by less than a possible 1 chance in 126,000 under the Expanded Operations Alternative. Noncancer health effects would not be expected based on hazard index values of less than 1. No additional nonfatal cancers, genetic disorders, or latent cancer fatalities (LCFs) would be expected in the population living within a 50-mi radius.

3.6.9 Transportation

The SNL/NM material and waste truck traffic offsite would be projected to increase from 14.5 shipments per day (1996) to 34.4 shipments per day under the Expanded Operations Alternative. However, the SNL/NM truck traffic would comprise less than 0.03 percent of the total traffic, including all types of vehicles entering and leaving the Albuquerque area by way of interstate highways. Therefore, the impact under

the Expanded Operations Alternative would be minimal. The total local traffic on roadways would be expected to increase by a maximum of 3.6 percent overall under the Expanded Operations Alternative.

The overall maximum lifetime fatalities from SNL/NM annual shipments of all types of materials and wastes due to SNL/NM operations were estimated to be 1.7 fatalities under the Expanded Operations Alternative. Of these estimates, 1.2 fatalities would be due to traffic accidents; 0.33 fatalities would be due to incident-free transport of radiological materials and wastes; and 0.06 fatalities would be due to air pollution from truck emissions.

The maximum lifetime LCFs in the population within a 50-mi radius were estimated, based on a population dose of 4.93 person-rem, to be 0.0025 from the annual transport of radiological materials and wastes.

3.6.10 Waste Generation

Generation of radioactive waste, hazardous waste, process wastewater, and nonhazardous solid wastes was reviewed. The goal of the review was to determine the adequacy of existing onsite and offsite storage, treatment, and disposal capabilities. Storage capacity for all anticipated waste types would be adequate. Limited onsite hazardous and mixed waste treatment capacity would be within current permit limits. Most hazardous waste would be treated and disposed of offsite within the commercial sector. Commercial offsite capacity is currently adequate and would exceed anticipated future demand.

Recycling of wastes was not included in the modeling to bound actual projected waste quantities. Radioactive material management practices would be required to reduce quantities of material that could inadvertently become contaminated. LLW and LLMW would increase by a maximum of 198 percent (from 3,322 ft³ to 9,897 ft³ per year, Table 3.6–2) and 69 percent (from 153 ft³ to 258 ft³ per year, Table 3.6–2), respectively, under the Expanded Operations Alternative. One new operation, the Medical Isotopes Production Project, would be the major contributor to this increase. Capacity currently exists to manage the waste generated from all operations at the Expanded Operations Alternative level.

Trends for all hazardous waste clearly show a significant reduction due to the implementation of pollution prevention protocols at SNL/NM. New procedures and recycling for the solid waste and process wastewater

would have similar impacts on the nonhazardous waste volumes being generated.

3.6.11 Noise and Vibration

The No Action Alternative would enable SNL/NM to operate at current planned levels, which include baseline background noise levels and short-term noise impacts from SNL/NM test activities. Impulse noise-producing test activities would increase an estimated 35 percent over the 1996 number of test activities by 2008.

Projections under the Expanded Operations Alternative indicate a 250 percent increase in the number of impulse noise tests over 1996 levels. This would result in an average of approximately 1 impulse noise event per hour for an 8-hour work day, based on a 261-day work year.

The projected frequency of impulse noise events for the Reduced Operations Alternative would be 65 percent less than the 1996 levels, resulting in an average of 1.5 impulse noise tests per day.

Only a small fraction of these tests would be loud enough to be heard or felt beyond the site boundary. The vast majority of tests would be below background noise levels for locations beyond the KAFB boundary and would be unnoticed in neighborhoods bounding the site. Ground vibrations would remain confined to the immediate test area.

3.6.12 Socioeconomics

Direct SNL/NM employment projections range from 7,422 (Reduced Operations Alternative) to 8,417 (Expanded Operations Alternative), in comparison to 7,652 full-time SNL/NM employees in the base year. These employment changes would change regional population, employment, personal income, and other socioeconomic measures in the region by less than 1 percent.

3.6.13 Environmental Justice

Based on the analyses of other impact areas, the DOE would not expect any environmental justice-related impacts from the continued operation of SNL/NM under any of the alternatives. Resource areas of potential concern were evaluated on an individual basis with respect to minority populations and low-income populations. Three resource areas evaluated individually were water resources, cultural resources, and transportation.

3.6.14 Accidents

At SNL/NM, accidents could occur that would affect workers and the public. Potential accidents with the largest impacts would involve radioactive materials in TA-V facilities and hazardous chemicals in TA-I facilities. In most instances, involved workers (those individuals located in the immediate vicinity of an accident) would incur the largest risk of serious injury or fatality. This is because, for most accidents, the magnitude of the damaging effects are highest at the point of the accident and diminish with increasing distance. This would apply, for example, to releases of radioactive and chemical materials, explosions, fires, airplane crashes, earthquakes, and similar events. In some situations, however, the mitigating effects of structural barriers, personal protection equipment, and engineered safety features may offer greater protection for close-in workers than others in the general vicinity of the accident.

In TA-I, under all three alternatives, there could be numerous situations in laboratory rooms where workers could be accidentally exposed to small amounts of dangerous chemicals. The potential also exists in TA-I for a catastrophic accident, such as an airplane crash into a facility or an earthquake, in which multiple dangerous chemicals could be released and expose onsite individuals

to harmful or fatal chemical concentrations. Large quantities of hydrogen stored in outside areas of TA-I could also explode as a result of a catastrophic event and cause serious injury or fatality to involved workers and other nearby onsite individuals. The probability of a catastrophic chemical or explosive accident with serious consequences is low (less than once in a thousand years). Should such an accident occur, emergency procedures, mitigating features, and administrative controls would minimize its adverse impacts.

The potential for accidents would exist in TA-V that would cause the release of radioactive materials, causing injury to workers, onsite individuals, and the public. The magnitudes of impacts for the worst-case accident, an earthquake, would be minimal for all alternatives. If an earthquake occurred, the impacts would range from an approximate 1 in 33 increase in probability of an LCF for a noninvolved worker on the site to 1 in 120,000 for a maximally exposed member of the public. For the entire population residing within 50 mi of SNL/NM, less than one additional LCF would be expected. Involved workers, as in the case of chemical accidents, would incur the largest risk of injury or fatality in the event of almost any accident because of their close proximity to the hazardous conditions.

Table 3.6–1. Comparison of Activity Levels at 10 Selected Facilities/Facility Groups Under the No Action, Expanded Operations, and Reduced Operations Alternatives

FACILITY	CATEGORY	ACTIVITY TYPE OR MATERIAL	UNITS (PER YEAR)	NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE			EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE	REDUCED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE
				BASE YEAR ^a	FIVE-YEAR	TEN-YEAR		
Neutron Generator Facility	Development or production of devices, processes, and systems	Neutron generators	Neutron generators	600	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000
	Expenditures		dollars	2.6 M	5.2 M	5.2 M	5.2 M	5.2 M
	Hazardous waste		kg	2,760	3,680	3,680	3,680	3,680
	Low-level waste		kg	3,000	4,000	4,000	4,000	4,000
	Low-level mixed waste		kg	150	300	300	300	300
	Nuclear consumption	Tritium	Ci	386	652	652	652	652
	Nuclear inventory	Tritium	Ci	682	836	836	836	836
	Radioactive air emissions	Tritium	Ci	94	156	156	156	156
	Personnel		FTEs	160	320	320	320	320
	Process water		gal	4.5 M	5 M	5 M	5 M	5 M
Wastewater		gal	4.5 M	5 M	5 M	5 M	5 M	
Microelectronics Development Laboratory	Development or production of devices, processes, and systems	Microelectronic devices and systems	wafers	4,000	5,000	7,000	7,500	2,666
	Boiler energy consumption	Natural gas	ft ³	34.3 M	34.3 M	34.3 M	34.3 M	34.3 M
	Hazardous waste		kg	2,520	3,150	4,410	4,738	1,688
	Low-level waste		ft ³	4	5	7	8	3
	Process electricity		kWh	28.6 M	28.6 M	28.6 M	28.6 M	28.6 M
	Process water		gal	44.1 M	55.1 M	77.2 M	77.2 M	44.1 M
	Process wastewater		gal	44 M	55 M	77 M	77 M	44 M

Table 3.6–1. Comparison of Activity Levels at 10 Selected Facilities/Facility Groups Under the No Action, Expanded Operations, and Reduced Operations Alternatives (continued)

FACILITY	CATEGORY	ACTIVITY TYPE OR MATERIAL	UNITS (PER YEAR)	NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE			EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE	REDUCED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE
				BASE YEAR*	FIVE-YEAR	TEN-YEAR		
<i>Advanced Manufacturing Processes Laboratory</i>	Development or production of devices, processes, and systems	Materials, ceramics/glass, electronics, processes, and systems	operational hours	248,000	310,000	310,000	347,000	248,000
	Expenditures		dollars	32 M	40 M	40 M	45 M	32 M
	Hazardous waste		kg	4,732	5,915	5,915	6,625	4,732
	Personnel		FTEs	150	184	184	204	150
<i>Integrated Materials Research Laboratory</i>	Other	Research and development of materials	operational hours	395,454	395,454	395,454	395,454	363,817
	Expenditures		dollars	45 M	55 M	60 M	62 M	48 M
	Hazardous waste		kg	2,400	2,100	1,850	2,000	2,000
	Nuclear inventory	Depleted uranium	mCi	0.93	1.0	1.0	1.0	0
	Personnel		FTEs	250	250	250	250	230
<i>Explosive Components Facility</i>	Test activities	Neutron generator tests	tests	200 (FY 1998)	500	500	500	500
		Explosive testing	tests	600	750	850	900	300
		Chemical analysis	analyses	900	950	1,000	1,250	500
		Battery tests	tests	50	60	60	100	10
	Boiler energy consumption	Natural gas	ft ³	24 M	27 M	27 M	29 M	16 M
	Expenditures		dollars	1.7 M	2.1 M	2.1 M	2.5 M	1.4 M

Table 3.6–1. Comparison of Activity Levels at 10 Selected Facilities/Facility Groups Under the No Action, Expanded Operations, and Reduced Operations Alternatives (continued)

FACILITY	CATEGORY	ACTIVITY TYPE OR MATERIAL	UNITS (PER YEAR)	NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE			EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE	REDUCED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE
				BASE YEAR ^a	FIVE-YEAR	TEN-YEAR		
<i>Explosive Components Facility (continued)</i>	Hazardous waste		kg	360	400	500	500	200
	Low-level waste		ft ³	95	190	190	190	190
	Low-level mixed waste		kg	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
	Nuclear inventory	Tritium	Ci	49	49	49	49	49
	Radioactive air emissions	Tritium	Ci	1x10 ⁻³	2x10 ⁻³	2x10 ⁻³	2x10 ⁻³	2x10 ⁻³
	Personnel		FTEs	81	94	94	102	94
	Process electricity		kWh	2.9 M	3.1 M	3.1 M	3.4 M	2.5 M
	Process water		gal	6 M	6.5 M	6.5 M	7 M	4 M
Process wastewater		gal	4.8 M	5 M	5 M	6.4 M	3.2 M	
PHYSICAL TESTING AND SIMULATION FACILITIES								
<i>Terminal Ballistics Complex</i>	Test activities	Projectile impact testing	tests	50	80	100	350	10
		Propellant testing	tests	25	40	50	100	4
	Expenditures		dollars	8,500	9,500	11,000	12,000	3,000
	Hazardous waste		kg	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.75	0
	Personnel		FTEs	0.3	0.4	0.6	2	0.05
<i>Drop/Impact Complex</i>	Test activities	Drop test	tests	18	20	20	50	0
		Water impact	tests	1	1	1	20	1
		Submersion	tests	1	1	1	5	0
		Underwater blast	tests	0	2	2	10	0

Table 3.6–1. Comparison of Activity Levels at 10 Selected Facilities/Facility Groups Under the No Action, Expanded Operations, and Reduced Operations Alternatives (continued)

FACILITY	CATEGORY	ACTIVITY TYPE OR MATERIAL	UNITS (PER YEAR)	NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE			EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE	REDUCED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE
				BASE YEAR ^a	FIVE-YEAR	TEN-YEAR		
<i>Drop/Impact Complex (continued)</i>	Expenditures		dollars	50,000	55,000	60,000	146,000	31,000
	Personnel		FTEs	2.5	2.5	2.5	8	2.5
<i>Sled Track Complex</i>	Test activities	Rocket sled test	tests	10	10	15	80	2
		Explosive testing	tests	12	12	12	239	0
		Rocket launcher	tests	3	4	4	24	0
		Free-flight launch	tests	40	40	40	150	0
	Expenditures		dollars	334,000	376,000	451,000	2.0 M	190,000
	Hazardous waste		kg	15	15	15	50	3
	Personnel		FTEs	8	8	8	40	8
<i>Centrifuge Complex</i>	Test activities	Centrifuge	tests	32	46	46	120	2
		Impact	tests	0	10	10	100	0
	Expenditures		dollars	400,000	450,000	480,000	750,000	250,000
	Hazardous waste		kg	10	12	12	15	12
	Personnel		FTEs	3.5	4.5	4.5	10	3.5
ACCELERATOR FACILITIES								
<i>SATURN</i>	Test activities	Irradiation of components or materials	shots	65	200	200	500	40
	Expenditures		dollars	1.5 M	3 M	3 M	5.4 M	1.2 M
	Hazardous waste		kg	167	501	501	1,286	100
	Personnel		FTEs	5	10	10	18	4

Table 3.6–1. Comparison of Activity Levels at 10 Selected Facilities/Facility Groups Under the No Action, Expanded Operations, and Reduced Operations Alternatives (continued)

FACILITY	CATEGORY	ACTIVITY TYPE OR MATERIAL	UNITS (PER YEAR)	NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE			EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE	REDUCED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE
				BASE YEAR*	FIVE-YEAR	TEN-YEAR		
HERMES III	Test activities	Irradiation of components or materials	shots	262	500	500	1,450	40
	Expenditures		dollars	2.4 M	3.0 M	3.0 M	4.4 M	1.98 M
	Hazardous waste		kg	167	316	316	915	25
	Low-level waste		ft ³	0.25	0.48	0.48	1.38	0.04
	Radioactive air emissions	Nitrogen-13	Ci	6.55×10^{-4}	12.45×10^{-4}	12.45×10^{-4}	36.03×10^{-4}	1×10^{-4}
		Oxygen-15	Ci	6.55×10^{-5}	12.45×10^{-5}	12.45×10^{-5}	36.03×10^{-5}	1×10^{-5}
Personnel		FTEs	12	15	15	22	10	
Sandia Accelerator & Beam Research Experiment	Test activities	Irradiation of components or materials	shots	187	225	225	400	0
	Expenditures		dollars	640,000	800,000	800,000	960,000	80,000
	Hazardous waste		kg	63	76	76	132	0
	Low-level waste		ft ³	4.0	4.8	4.8	8.4	0.0
	Personnel		FTEs	4.0	5.0	5.0	6.0	0.5
Short-Pulse High Intensity Nanosecond X-Radiator	Test activities	Irradiation of components or materials	shots	1,185	2,500	2,500	6,000	200
	Expenditures		dollars	300,000	500,000	500,000	710,000	70,000
	Hazardous waste		kg	21	45	45	107	3.6
	Personnel		FTEs	2.7	3.5	3.5	5	0.5
Repetitive High Energy Pulsed Power Unit I	Test activities	Accelerator tests	tests	500	5,000	5,000	10,000	100

Table 3.6–1. Comparison of Activity Levels at 10 Selected Facilities/Facility Groups Under the No Action, Expanded Operations, and Reduced Operations Alternatives (continued)

FACILITY	CATEGORY	ACTIVITY TYPE OR MATERIAL	UNITS (PER YEAR)	NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE			EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE	REDUCED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE	
				BASE YEAR ^a	FIVE-YEAR	TEN-YEAR			
<i>Repetitive High Energy Pulsed Power Unit I (continued)</i>	Expenditures		dollars	1.5 M	2.5 M	2.5 M	5.5 M	750,000	
	Hazardous waste		kg	0	5	5	10	0	
	Nuclear consumption	Depleted uranium	μg	0	10	10	100	0	
	Nuclear inventory	Depleted uranium	μg	0	10	10	100	0	
	Personnel		FTEs	5	8	8	10	2	
<i>Repetitive High Energy Pulsed Power Unit II</i>	Test activities	Radiation production	tests	80	160	160	800	40	
	Expenditures		dollars	252,000	353,000	353,000	754,000	126,000	
	Hazardous waste		kg	0	1	1	1	0	
	Personnel		FTEs	0.9	1.4	1.4	3	0.45	
<i>Z-Machine</i>	Test activities	Accelerator shots	shots	150	300	300	350	84	
	Expenditures		dollars	1.2 M	3 M	3 M	40 M	800,000	
	Hazardous waste		kg	750	1,000	1,000	1,250	400	
	Low-level waste		ft ³	44	20	20	28	12	
	Nuclear consumption	Tritium		Ci	0	2,500	2,500	7,500	0
		Deuterium ^b		L	0	3,750	3,750	5,000	0
		Plutonium-239		mg	0	800	800	2,000	0
		Depleted uranium		mg	0	800	800	2,000	0
	Nuclear inventory	Tritium		Ci	0	1,000	1,000	50,000	0
		Deuterium ^b		L	0	1,000	1,000	5,000	0

Table 3.6–1. Comparison of Activity Levels at 10 Selected Facilities/Facility Groups Under the No Action, Expanded Operations, and Reduced Operations Alternatives (continued)

FACILITY	CATEGORY	ACTIVITY TYPE OR MATERIAL	UNITS (PER YEAR)	NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE			EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE	REDUCED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE
				BASE YEAR ^a	FIVE-YEAR	TEN-YEAR		
Z-Machine (continued)	Nuclear inventory (continued)	Plutonium-239	mg	0	200	200	200	0
		Depleted uranium	mg	0	200	200	200	0
	Radioactive air emissions	Nitrogen-13	Ci	0.042	0	0	0	0
		Oxygen-15	Ci	0.005	0	0	0	0
	Personnel		FTEs	50	85	85	115	50
TESLA	Test activities	Accelerator shots	shots	40	1,000	1,000	1,300	40
	Expenditures		dollars	500,000	1 M	1 M	1.6 M	500,000
	Hazardous waste		kg	2	50	50	65	2
	Personnel		FTEs	1	3	3	5	1
Advanced Pulsed Power Research Module	Test activities	Accelerator shots	shots	500	1,000	1,000	2,000	40
	Expenditures		dollars	3.5 M	5 M	5 M	5.5 M	1.5 M
	Hazardous waste		kg	50	100	100	200	5
	Personnel		FTEs	5	7	7	7	5
Radiographic Integrated Test Stand	Test activities	Accelerator shots	shots	0 ^c	400	600	800	100
	Expenditures		dollars	0	2.25 M	2.25 M	4 M	1.75 M
	Hazardous inventories	Insulator oil	gal	0	40,000	40,000	40,000	40,000
	Hazardous waste		kg	0	136	204	272	34
	Low-level waste		kg	0	60	90	120	15
	Radioactive air emissions	Nitrogen-13	Ci	0	0.08	0.12	0.16	0.02

Table 3.6–1. Comparison of Activity Levels at 10 Selected Facilities/Facility Groups Under the No Action, Expanded Operations, and Reduced Operations Alternatives (continued)

FACILITY	CATEGORY	ACTIVITY TYPE OR MATERIAL	UNITS (PER YEAR)	NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE			EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE	REDUCED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE
				BASE YEAR ^a	FIVE-YEAR	TEN-YEAR		
<i>Radiographic Integrated Test Stand (continued)</i>	Radioactive materials inventory	Activated hardware	kg	0	500	500	500	500
	Personnel		FTEs	0	6	6	10	4
REACTOR FACILITIES								
<i>New Gamma Irradiation Facility</i>	Test activities	Tests	hours	0 ^c	13,000	13,000	24,000	0
	Expenditures		dollars	0	6 M	500,000	1 M	0
	Hazardous waste		ft ³	0	14	14	14	7
	Low-level waste		ft ³	0	92	92	126	56
	Personnel		FTEs	0	3	3	4	2
	Process water		gal	0	166,000	166,000	255,000	0
	Radioactive consumption	Cobalt-60	Ci	0	142,000	142,000	246,000	0
<i>Gamma Irradiation Facility</i>	Test activities	Tests	hours	1,000	0	0	8,000	0
	Hazardous waste		ft ³	7	0	0	14	7
	Low-level waste		ft ³	56	0	0	126	56
	Nuclear inventory	Depleted uranium	kg	13,600	13,600	13,600	13,600	13,600
	Personnel		FTEs	2	0	0	3	2
	Process water		gal	17,000	0	0	17,000	17,000
<i>Sandia Pulsed Reactor</i>	Test activities	Irradiation tests	tests	100	100	100	200	30
	Expenditures		dollars	0	5 M	0	6 M	0
	Hazardous waste		ft ³	7	14	14	30	7
	Low-level waste		kg	440	440	440	900	440

Table 3.6–1. Comparison of Activity Levels at 10 Selected Facilities/Facility Groups Under the No Action, Expanded Operations, and Reduced Operations Alternatives (continued)

FACILITY	CATEGORY	ACTIVITY TYPE OR MATERIAL	UNITS (PER YEAR)	NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE			EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE	REDUCED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE
				BASE YEAR ^a	FIVE-YEAR	TEN-YEAR		
Sandia Pulsed Reactor (continued)	Low-level mixed waste		ft ³	4	4	4	14	4
	Nuclear inventory	Plutonium-239	g	53	10,000	10,000	10,000	53
		Enriched uranium	kg	550	900	550	1,000	550
		Radioactive air emissions	Argon-41	Ci	9.5	9.5	9.5	30.0
	Personnel		FTEs	10	12	10	17	8
Annular Core Research Reactor (DP for No Action and Reduced Operations Alternatives, ACPR-II for Expanded Operations Alternative)	Test activities	Irradiation tests	test series	0	1	0	2 to 3	0
	Expenditures		dollars	200,000	5 M	200,000	12 M	200,000
	Explosives inventory	Bare UNO 1.2 ^d	g	0	500	500	500	0
	Hazardous waste		ft ³	0	2	0	14	0
	Low-level mixed waste		ft ³	0	35	0	170	0
	Low-level waste		ft ³	0	0	0	5	0
	Nuclear consumption	Enriched uranium	g	0	0	0	2	0
	Nuclear material inventory	Cobalt-60	Ci	33.6	19	10	33.6	33.6
		Enriched uranium	kg	12	37	37	85	12
		Plutonium-239	g	148	148	148	8,800	148
	Personnel		FTEs	1	1	1	8	1
	Process wastewater		gal	0	10,000	0	50,000	0
Process water		gal	0	10,000	0	100,000	0	
Radioactive air emissions	Argon-41	Ci	2.6	2.6	2.6	7.8	0	

Table 3.6–1. Comparison of Activity Levels at 10 Selected Facilities/Facility Groups Under the No Action, Expanded Operations, and Reduced Operations Alternatives (continued)

FACILITY	CATEGORY	ACTIVITY TYPE OR MATERIAL	UNITS (PER YEAR)	NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE			EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE	REDUCED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE
				BASE YEAR ^a	FIVE-YEAR	TEN-YEAR		
<i>Annular Core Research Reactor DP (continued)</i>	Transuranic mixed waste		ft ³	0	0	0	5	0
	Transuranic waste		ft ³	0	0	0	5	0
<i>Annular Core Research Reactor (medical isotopes production configuration)</i>	Test activities	Irradiation of production targets	targets	8 ^e	375	375	1,300	40
	Expenditures		dollars	200,000	4.5 M	4 M	0	0
	Explosives inventory	Bare UNO 1.2 ^d	g	0	500	500	500	0
	Hazardous waste		ft ³	7	14	14	30	7
	Low-level waste		ft ³	56	370	370	1,090	56
	Nuclear consumption	Enriched uranium	kg	0	0.38	10.6	16	0
	Nuclear inventory	Enriched uranium	kg	25.8	56.7	56.7	56.7	18.3
	Radioactive air emissions	Tritium	Ci	0	1.1	1.1	2.2	0.24
		Argon-41	Ci	35.4	1.1	1.1	2.2	0.24
	Personnel		FTEs	9	14	14	22	7
	Process water		gal	600,000	5 M	5 M	11 M	1.2 M
	Process wastewater		gal	125,000	1M	1 M	2.2 M	240,000
	Spent fuel	Spent fuel from fuel elements	kg	0	0	189	399	42

Table 3.6–1. Comparison of Activity Levels at 10 Selected Facilities/Facility Groups Under the No Action, Expanded Operations, and Reduced Operations Alternatives (continued)

FACILITY	CATEGORY	ACTIVITY TYPE OR MATERIAL	UNITS (PER YEAR)	NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE			EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE	REDUCED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE
				BASE YEAR ^a	FIVE-YEAR	TEN-YEAR		
<i>Hot Cell Facility</i>	Development or production of devices, processes, and systems	Processing of production targets	targets	8	375	375	1,300	40
	Expenditures		dollars	0	4 M	0	0	0
	Hazardous waste		ft ³	7	14	14	22	7
	Low-level waste		ft ³	100	2,200	2,200	5,000	270
	Low-level mixed waste		ft ³	7	17	17	40	5
	Nuclear consumption	Enriched uranium	kg	0.2	9.4	9.4	32.5	1.0
	Nuclear inventory	Enriched uranium	g	25	25	25	125	25
		Iodine-131	Ci	0.00196	1.17	1.17	3.9	0.117
		Iodine-132	Ci	0.000129	3.0	3.0	10.0	0.3
		Iodine-133	Ci	0.00951	5.4	5.4	18.0	0.54
		Iodine-135	Ci	0.00132	3.3	3.3	11	0.33
		Krypton-83m	Ci	0.0000957	198.0	198.0	660.0	19.8
		Krypton-85	Ci	0.00153	0.19	0.19	0.63	0.019
		Krypton-87	Ci	0.0294	57.0	57.0	190	5.7
		Krypton-88	Ci	0.527	480.0	480.0	1,600	48.0
		Xenon-133	Ci	17.5	2,160.0	2,160.0	7,200.0	216.0
		Xenon-133m	Ci	0.768	102.0	102.0	340.0	10.2
		Xenon-135	Ci	14.7	2,070.0	2,070.0	6,900.0	207.0
		Iodine-134	Ci	0	0.22	0.22	0.72	0.022
		Xenon-135m	Ci	0.976	360	360	1,200	36
	Krypton-85m	Ci	0.587	290.0	290.0	970.0	29.0	
	Xenon-131m	Ci	0.000345	1.8	1.8	5.9	0.18	
	Personnel		FTEs	12	32	32	55	12

Table 3.6–1. Comparison of Activity Levels at 10 Selected Facilities/Facility Groups Under the No Action, Expanded Operations, and Reduced Operations Alternatives (continued)

FACILITY	CATEGORY	ACTIVITY TYPE OR MATERIAL	UNITS (PER YEAR)	NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE			EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE	REDUCED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE	
				BASE YEAR ^a	FIVE-YEAR	TEN-YEAR			
OUTDOOR TEST FACILITIES									
Aerial Cable Facility	Test activities	Drop/pull-down	Tests	21	32	38	100	2	
	Test activities (continued)	Aerial target	tests	6	6	6	30	0	
		Scoring system tests	series	0	1	1	2	0	
	Expenditures		dollars	250,000	350,000	380,000	725,000	150,000	
	Explosives consumption	Bare UNO 1.4 ^d		g	410	625	741	2,314	71
		Bare UNO 1.1 ^d		kg	18.9	28.4	34.6	78.8	0
		Bare UNO 1.3 ^d		kg	1,514	3,268	3,814	22,930	480
	Hazardous waste		kg	5	5	5	9	5	
Personnel			FTEs	8	8	10	24	6	
Lurance Canyon Burn Site	Test activities	Certification testing	tests	12	12	12	55	1	
		Model validation	tests	56	56	56	100	0	
		User testing	tests	37	37	37	50	0	
	Expenditures		dollars	250,000	275,000	300,000	625,000	150,000	
	Hazardous waste		kg	900	900	900	900	900	
	Personnel			FTEs	4.5	4.5	4.5	11	3.5
	Process wastewater		gal	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	
Containment Technology Test Facility - West	Test activities	Survivability testing	tests	1	1	0	2	1	
	Expenditures		dollars	2 M	2 M	0	2 M	2 M	
	Hazardous waste		g	100	100	0	100	100	
	Personnel			FTEs	12	12	0	12	12

Table 3.6–1. Comparison of Activity Levels at 10 Selected Facilities/Facility Groups Under the No Action, Expanded Operations, and Reduced Operations Alternatives (continued)

FACILITY	CATEGORY	ACTIVITY TYPE OR MATERIAL	UNITS (PER YEAR)	NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE			EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE	REDUCED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE	
				BASE YEAR ^a	FIVE-YEAR	TEN-YEAR			
<i>Explosives Applications Laboratory</i>	Test activities	Explosive testing	tests	240	240	240	275 to 360	50	
	Expenditures		dollars	650,000	747,500	859,625	975,000	435,500	
	Hazardous waste		kg	1	1	1	1.5 to 2	0.5	
	Personnel		FTEs	3	3	3	6	2	
<i>Thunder Range Complex</i>	Other	Equipment disassembly and evaluation	days	60	82	82	144	42	
	Test activities	Ground truthing tests	test series	1	5	8	10	1	
	Nuclear inventory	Plutonium-239		Ci	≤ 0.52	≤ 0.52	≤ 0.52	0.52	0
		Plutonium-238		Ci	≤ 0.62	≤ 0.62	≤ 0.62	0.62	0
		Americium-241		Ci	≤ 0.52	≤ 0.52	≤ 0.52	0.52	0
		Americium-243		Ci	≤ 0.52	≤ 0.52	≤ 0.52	0.52	0
		Normal uranium		Ci	≤ 4.2	≤ 4.2	≤ 4.2	4.2	0
	Personnel		FTEs	1.1	1.5	1.5	2.6	0.8	
INFRASTRUCTURE FACILITIES									
<i>Steam Plant</i>	Infrastructure	Generate and distribute steam to DOE, TA-I, KAFB East, Coronado Club	lbs	544 M	544 M	544 M	544 M	362 M	
	Boiler energy consumption	Natural gas ^f	ft ³	779 M	779 M	779 M	779 M	519 M	
	Expenditures		dollars	2.8 M	2.83 M	2.83 M	2.87 M	2.4 M	

Table 3.6–1. Comparison of Activity Levels at 10 Selected Facilities/Facility Groups Under the No Action, Expanded Operations, and Reduced Operations Alternatives (continued)

FACILITY	CATEGORY	ACTIVITY TYPE OR MATERIAL	UNITS (PER YEAR)	NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE			EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE	REDUCED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE
				BASE YEAR ^a	FIVE-YEAR	TEN-YEAR		
Steam Plant (continued)	Personnel		FTEs	17	17	17	17	12
	Process electricity		kWh	1.2 M	1.2 M	1.2 M	1.2 M	0.8 M
	Process water		gal	14.3 M	17 M	17 M	20 M	9.5 M
Hazardous Waste Management Facility^d	Infrastructure	Collection, packaging, handling, and short-term storage of hazardous and other toxic waste	kg	203,000	192,000	196,000	214,000	175,000
	Expenditures		dollars	950,000	890,000	890,000	1.0 M	820,000
	Waste managed	RCRA hazardous waste	kg	55,852	70,469	74,358	92,314	53,123
	Personnel		FTEs	13	12	13	14	11
Radioactive and Mixed Waste Management Facility	Infrastructure	Receipt, packaging, and shipping of radioactive waste	lb	1.6 M	2.1 M	2.1 M	2.7 M	0.8 M
	Expenditures		dollars	320,000	416,000	416,000	528,000	160,000
	Waste managed	Low-level waste	ft ³ (m ³)	11,874 (337)	15,436 (438)	15,436 (438)	19,592 (556)	5,937 (168)
		Low-level mixed waste	ft ³ (m ³)	5,353 (152)	6,959 (197)	6,959 (197)	8,833 (251)	2,677 (76)
		Transuranic	ft ³ (m ³)	214 (6.1)	278 (7.9)	278 (7.9)	353 (10)	107 (3.0)

Table 3.6–1. Comparison of Activity Levels at 10 Selected Facilities/Facility Groups Under the No Action, Expanded Operations, and Reduced Operations Alternatives (concluded)

FACILITY	CATEGORY	ACTIVITY TYPE OR MATERIAL	UNITS (PER YEAR)	NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE			EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE	REDUCED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE
				BASE YEAR ^a	FIVE-YEAR	TEN-YEAR		
Radioactive and Mixed Waste Management Facility (continued)	Waste managed	Mixed transuranic	ft ³ (m ³)	16 (0.45)	21 (0.60)	23 (0.65)	37 (1.05)	8 (0.23)
	Radioactive air emissions	Tritium	Ci	2.203	2.203	2.203	2.203	2.203
	Personnel		FTEs	30	39	39	49	15
Thermal Treatment Facility	Infrastructure	Treatment of waste	lb	minimal	336	336	1,200	minimal
	Expenditures		dollars	10,000	20,000	20,000	100,000	10,000
	Hazardous waste		kg	minimal	76	76	272	minimal
	Personnel		FTEs	0.1	0.2	0.2	1	0.1

Source: SNL/NM 1998a

Ci: curie

DP: Defense Programs

ft³: cubic foot

FTE: full-time equivalent

FY: fiscal year

g: gram

gal: gallon

HWMF: Hazardous Waste Management Facility

kg: kilogram

kWh: kilowatt-hour

L: liter

lb: pound

M: million

mCi: millicurie

mg: milligram

RCRA: Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

RMWMF: Radioactive and Mixed Waste Management Facility

TA: technical area

TSCA: Toxic Substances Control Act

yr: year

µg: microgram

≤: less than or equal to

^aBase year is the year selected as most representative of normal operations (SNL/NM 1998ee).

^bDeuterium is not a radionuclide; however, it is considered as accountable nuclear material.

^cFacility not completed as of publication of this SWEIS

^dThe United Nations Organization (UNO) Classification System is used to identify hazard class for explosives.

^eEight tests are planned for the base year to test and evaluate Molybdenum-99 separation process

^fAt 14.7 pounds per square inch

^gInfrastructure and waste management quantities differ from waste generation quantities in Table 3.6–2, because the HWMF does not manage explosive (RCRA hazardous) waste, does not manage all TSCA wastes generated at SNL/NM, and does not manage all other types of wastes (nonRCRA hazardous) generated at SNL/NM.

^hInfrastructure and waste management quantities differ from waste generation quantities in Table 3.6–2 because the RMWMF manages legacy waste inventories that were previously generated by SNL/NM facilities and activities.

Table 3.6–2. Comparison of Parameters Used to Analyze Selected Facilities Under the No Action, Expanded Operations, and Reduced Operations Alternatives

RESOURCE AREA	UNITS	BASELINE	NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE (2008)	EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE	REDUCED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE
LAND USE					
<i>SNL/NM Land Use Within KAFB</i>	ac	8,824	8,824	8,824	8,824
<i>DOE Buffer Zones</i>	ac	9,093	9,093	9,093	9,093
INFRASTRUCTURE					
<i>Utilities (Annual Basis)</i>	Note: Expanded Operations Alternative quantities do not include 10% margin.				
Water Use/ Water Capacity	gal/yr	440 M 2.0 B	463 M 2.0 B	495 M 2.0 B	416 M 2.0 B
Sanitary Sewer Discharge/ Sanitary Sewer Capacity	gal/yr	280 M 850 M	304 M 850 M	322 M 850 M	268 M 850 M
Natural Gas Use/ Natural Gas Capacity	ft ³ /yr ^a	475 M 2.3 B ft ³	450 M 2.3 B ft ³	475 M 2.3 B ft ³	385 M 2.3 B ft ³
Electrical Use/ Electrical Capacity	MWh/yr	197,000 1.1 M	186,000 1.1 M	198,000 1.1 M	185,000 1.1 M
GEOLOGY AND SOILS					
<i>Potential Soil/Subsurface Contamination Sites Identified</i>	sites	182	182	182	182
<i>Active Sites^b</i>	sites	20	20	20	20
<i>SNL/NM Usage Areas Near 10% Or Greater Slopes</i>	areas	4	4	4	4
WATER RESOURCES AND HYDROLOGY					
<i>Total SNL/NM Projected Groundwater Use, through 2008^c</i>	ft ³ /10 yr	575 M	605 M	628 M	571 M
<i>Developed Area</i>	mi ²	0.72	0.72	0.72	0.72

Table 3.6–2. Comparison of Parameters Used to Analyze Selected Facilities Under the No Action, Expanded Operations, and Reduced Operations Alternatives (continued)

RESOURCE AREA	UNITS	BASELINE	NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE (2008)	EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE	REDUCED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE
BIOLOGICAL/ECOLOGICAL RESOURCES					
<i>Change in Habitat Area</i>		NA	No change	No change	No change
CULTURAL RESOURCES					
<i>Cultural Resources Located in all Areas of Potential Effect</i>	number	192	192	192	192
AIR QUALITY					
Nonradioactive Emissions					
Nitrogen Oxides	tons/yr	153.92	162.36	162.36	162.36
Carbon Monoxide					
Stationary Sources	tons/yr	15.21	18.36	18.36	18.36
Mobile Sources	tons/yr	4,087	3,489	3,837	3,385
Construction Activities	tons/yr	132	132	132	132
Lurance Canyon Burn Site	tons/yr	0.78	0.78	4.5	0.78
Particulate Matter	tons/yr	3.65	7.46	7.46	7.46
Sulfur Dioxide	tons/yr	0.32	1.10	1.10	1.10
Radioactive Emissions					
Argon-41	Ci/yr	44.9	13.2	40.0	3.1
Tritium	Ci/yr	4.52	159.6	161	158.7
Nitrogen-13	Ci/yr	4.2x10 ⁻²	0.12	0.16	0.02
Oxygen-15	Ci/yr	2.6x10 ⁻²	1.25x10 ⁻⁴	3.60.10 ⁻⁴	1.0x10 ⁻⁵
Iodine-131	Ci/yr	1.96x10 ⁻³	1.17	3.90	0.117
Iodine-132	Ci/yr	1.29x10 ⁻⁴	3.0	10.0	0.3
Iodine-133	Ci/yr	9.51x10 ⁻³	5.4	18.0	0.54

Table 3.6–2. Comparison of Parameters Used to Analyze Selected Facilities Under the No Action, Expanded Operations, and Reduced Operations Alternatives (continued)

RESOURCE AREA	UNITS	BASELINE	NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE (2008)	EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE	REDUCED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE
Iodine-134	Ci/yr		0.22	0.72	0.022
Iodine-135	Ci/yr	1.32x10 ⁻³	3.3	11.0	0.33
Krypton-83m	Ci/yr	9.57x10 ⁻⁵	198.0	660.0	19.8
Krypton-85	Ci/yr	1.53x10 ⁻³	0.19	0.63	0.019
Krypton-85m	Ci/yr	0.587	290	970	29.0
Krypton-87	Ci/yr	0.029	57	190	5.7
Krypton-88	Ci/yr	0.527	480	1,600	48.0
Xenon-131m	Ci/yr	3.45x10 ⁻⁴	1.8	5.9	0.18
Xenon-133	Ci/yr	17.5	2,160	7,200	216
Xenon-133m	Ci/yr	0.768	102	340	10.2
Xenon-135	Ci/yr	14.7	2,070	6,900	207
Xenon-135m	Ci/yr	0.976	360	1,200	36.0
TRANSPORTATION (Normal Operations)					
Material (Annual Shipments/Receipts Radioactive, Chemical, and Explosives)	trips	3,358	5,096	7,498	4,170
Radioactive Waste (LLW & LLMW)	shipments	5	16	24	11
Chemical Waste	shipments	102	122	150	95
Solid Waste (Includes Construction/Demolition)	shipments	51	650	650	650
Recyclable Waste (Excludes D&D)	shipments	86	231	233	8
Site Related Traffic - Total KAFB Daily traffic	vehicles	37,727	38,406	39,085	37,319
SNL/NM Daily Hazardous Materials Transports	shipments	14.5	24.6	34.4	20.7

Table 3.6–2. Comparison of Parameters Used to Analyze Selected Facilities Under the No Action, Expanded Operations, and Reduced Operations Alternatives (continued)

RESOURCE AREA		UNITS	BASELINE	NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE (2008)	EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE	REDUCED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE
WASTE GENERATION^d (Selected Facilities plus Balance of Operations)						
Radioactive Waste	Low-Level	ft ³ (m ³)	3,322 (94)	5,993 (170)	9,897 (280)	3,616 (102)
	Low-level Mixed	ft ³ (m ³)	153 (4.33)	189 (5.34)	258 (7.31)	134 (3.79)
	Transuranic Waste	ft ³ (m ³)	0 (0)	10 (0.28)	26 (0.74)	0 (0)
	Mixed Transuranic Waste	ft ³ (m ³)	16 (0.45)	23 (0.65)	37 (1.05)	8 (0.23)
	Total Radioactive Waste	ft ³ (m ³)	3,493 (98.9)	6,215 (176.0)	10,220 (289.4)	3,758 (106.4)
Chemical Waste	RCRA Hazardous Waste ^e	kg	55,852	74,358	92,314	53,123
	TSCA (PCBs and Asbestos) ^f	kg	147,055 ^c	122,000	122,000	122,000
	Non-RCRA Chemicals ^g	kg	69,321 ^c	92,290	114,576	65,934
	Biohazardous ^g	kg	2,463 ^c	3,279	4,071	2,343
	Recyclable Materials ^g	kg	60,768 ^c	80,903	100,439	57,799
Total Chemical Waste	kg	340,317	379,298	441,429	305,819	
Solid Waste		kg	0.6 M	0.6 M	0.6 M	0.6 M
		m ³	2,022	1,955	2,022	1,955
NOISE/VIBRATION						
SNL/NM Estimated Number of Noise/Vibration-Producing Tests		tests/day	4.1	5.5	15.6	1.5
SOCIOECONOMICS^h						
Employmentⁱ		FTEs	7,652 SNL/NM 18,826 (indirect)	8,035 SNL/NM 19,765 (indirect)	8,417 SNL/NM 20,706 (indirect)	7,422 SNL/NM 18,259 (indirect)
Payroll		dollars	480 M SNL/NM 580 M (indirect)	500 M SNL/NM 610 M (indirect)	530 M SNL/NM 640 M (indirect)	470 M SNL/NM 560 M (indirect)
Expenditures		dollars	1.43 B SNL/NM 2.50 B (indirect)	1.50 B SNL/NM 2.63 B (indirect)	1.57 B SNL/NM 2.75 B (indirect)	1.39 B SNL/NM 2.43 B (indirect)

Source: SNL/NM 1998a
ac: acre
B: billion
Ci: curies
D&D: decontamination and decommissioning
FTE: full-time equivalent
ft³: cubic feet
g: gram
gal: gallon
HSWA: *Hazardous Solid Waste Amendment*
HWMF: Hazardous Waste Management Facility
KAFB: Kirtland Air Force Base
kg: kilogram
M: million
m³: cubic meter
mi: mile
mi²: square mile

MWh: megawatt-hour
PCB: polychlorinated biphenyls
RCRA: *Resource Conservation and Recovery Act*
yr: year

^a 60 psi

^b Sites that cannot be removed from HSWA permit because of ongoing activities

^c Ten-year quantities are sums of annual interpolated quantities.

^d Quantities do not include special operations or legacy waste and differ from those in Table 3.6-1.

^e HWMF managed.

^f 1997 was used as the base year as 1996 was abnormal for PCBs and asbestos wastes.

^g Multipliers, based on the proportional increase/decrease of hazardous waste, were used for projection of other wastes and materials recycled.

^h Bounding analysis based on parameters presented in DOE 1997j.

ⁱ Section 4.12, Affected Environment, differs slightly, using 6,824 full-time employees.

Note: Waste totals bound SNL/NM, DOE, and other small DOE-funded activities.

Table 3.6–3. Comparison of Potential Consequences of Continued Operations at SNL/NM

RESOURCE AREA		NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE	EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE	REDUCED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE
Land Use		No changes projected in classification or ownership	Same as No Action Alternative	Same as No Action Alternative
Visual Resources		Changes would be minor and transitory. Projected new construction in already developed areas	Same as No Action Alternative	Same as No Action Alternative
Infrastructure		All projected activities within capacities of existing road, waste management, and utility systems	Same as No Action Alternative	Same as No Action Alternative
Water Use		440-463 M gal/yr	495 M gal/yr	416 M gal/yr
Geology and Soils	Slope Stability	SNL/NM activities are not anticipated to destabilize slopes.	Same as No Action Alternative	Same as No Action Alternative
	Soil Contamination	Minimal deposition of contaminants to soils and continued removal of existing contaminants under the ER Project	Same as No Action Alternative	Same as No Action Alternative
Water Resources and Hydrology	Groundwater Quality	TCE above MCL from SNL/NM disposal activities is present in groundwater near the Chemical Waste Landfill (TA-III). No future activities are anticipated to cause further groundwater contamination.	Same as No Action Alternative	Same as No Action Alternative
	Groundwater Quantity	SNL/NM groundwater use is projected to account for 11% of local aquifer drawdown and 1% of basin-wide use. The potential consequence is considered adverse.	SNL/NM groundwater use is projected to account for 12% of local aquifer drawdown and 1% of basin-wide use.	Same as No Action Alternative
	Surface Water Quality	No contaminants attributable to SNL/NM activities have been detected in water samples collected onsite. No future activities are anticipated to cause surface water contamination.	Same as No Action Alternative	Same as No Action Alternative
	Surface Water Quantity	SNL/NM's projected portion of Rio Grande flow is 0.07%.	Same as No Action Alternative	Projected portion of Rio Grande flow is 0.06%

Table 3.6–3. Comparison of Potential Consequences of Continued Operations at SNL/NM (continued)

RESOURCE AREA		NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE	EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE	REDUCED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE							
<i>Biological and Ecological Resources</i>		Impacts projected for biological or ecological resources are low to negligible.	Same as No Action Alternative	Same as No Action Alternative							
<i>Cultural Resources</i> ^a		Potential for impacts to cultural resources is low to negligible. Explosive testing debris and shrapnel, off-road vehicle traffic, and unintended fires present a low to negligible potential for impacts. SNL/NM security would likely result in continued protection of archaeological sites.	Same as No Action Alternative	Same as No Action Alternative							
<i>Air Quality</i>	Stationary Source Criteria Pollutants	Concentrations would be below the most stringent standards, which define the pollutant concentrations below which there are no adverse impacts to human health and the environment. Modeling results (summary)	Same as No Action Alternative	Same as No Action Alternative							
	Nonradiological Air Quality	<table border="0"> <tr> <td>Carbon Monoxide (8 hours)</td> <td>57% of standard</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Lead (quarterly)</td> <td>0.07% of standard</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Nitrogen dioxide (annually)</td> <td>30% of standard</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Total suspended particulates (annually)</td> <td>69% of standard</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Sulfur dioxide (annually)</td> <td>4% of standard</td> </tr> </table>			Carbon Monoxide (8 hours)	57% of standard	Lead (quarterly)	0.07% of standard	Nitrogen dioxide (annually)	30% of standard	Total suspended particulates (annually)
Carbon Monoxide (8 hours)	57% of standard										
Lead (quarterly)	0.07% of standard										
Nitrogen dioxide (annually)	30% of standard										
Total suspended particulates (annually)	69% of standard										
Sulfur dioxide (annually)	4% of standard										
	Chemical Pollutants	Concentrations are below regulatory standards and human health guidelines.	Same as No Action Alternative	Same as No Action Alternative							
	Mobile sources (percent of Bernalillo county mobile-source carbon monoxide emissions)	4.6	5.1	4.5							
	Fire testing facilities	Chemical concentrations are below OEL/100 guideline.	Same as No Action Alternative	Same as No Action Alternative							

Table 3.6–3. Comparison of Potential Consequences of Continued Operations at SNL/NM (continued)

RESOURCE AREA		NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE	EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE	REDUCED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE
<i>Air Quality (continued)</i>				
Radiological Air Quality	MEI dose	0.15 mrem/yr	0.51 mrem/yr	0.02 mrem/yr
	Collective ROI dose	5.0 person-rem/yr	15.8 person-rem/yr	0.80 person-rem/yr
	Average individual dose within ROI	6.8×10^{-3} mrem/yr	2.16×10^{-2} mrem/yr	1.1×10^{-3} mrem/yr
<i>Human Health and Worker Safety</i>	MEI public risk (from radiation)	7.5×10^{-8} LCF/yr	2.6×10^{-7} LCF/yr	8.0×10^{-9} LCF/yr
	ROI population risk to public (from radiation)	2.5×10^{-3} LCF/yr	7.9×10^{-3} LCF/yr	4.0×10^{-4} LCF/yr
	Fatal SNL/NM worker occupational injuries	none	Same as No Action Alternative	Same as No Action Alternative
	Average radiation-badged SNL/NM worker dose (risk)	47 mrem/yr (1.9×10^{-5} LCF/yr)	Same as No Action Alternative	Same as No Action Alternative
	Nonfatal SNL/NM worker occupational injuries/illnesses	311/yr	326/yr	287/yr
	Occupational SNL/NM worker chemical exposures	1-2/yr	Same as No Action Alternative	Same as No Action Alternative
	Environmental risk to public (from chemical exposures)	$<1 \times 10^{-6}$ ELCR	Same as No Action Alternative	Same as No Action Alternative

Table 3.6–3. Comparison of Potential Consequences of Continued Operations at SNL/NM (continued)

RESOURCE AREA		NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE	EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE	REDUCED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE
Transportation	Transportation population risk within ROI (from radiation)	8.3x10 ⁻⁴ LCF/yr (1.7 person-rem)	2.5x10 ⁻³ LCF/yr (4.9 person-rem)	2.0x10 ⁻⁴ LCF/yr (0.4 person-rem)
	Total transportation population risk (from radiation)	0.1 LCF/yr	0.33 LCF/yr	4.5 x10 ⁻² LCF/yr
	Traffic accident fatalities	0.49/yr	1.3/yr	0.18/yr
	Total transportation population risk (from truck emissions)	0.03 LCF/yr	0.06 LCF/yr	0.01 LCF/yr
Waste Generation (Annual)	Management capability (infrastructure)	All projected activities are within capacities of existing facilities and systems.	Same as No Action Alternative	Same as No Action Alternative
	Total radioactive waste	Up to 176 m ³	Up to 289 m ³	Up to 106 m ³
	Total chemical waste	Up to approximately 379,000 kg	Up to approximately 441,000 kg	Up to approximately 306,000 kg

Table 3.6–3. Comparison of Potential Consequences of Continued Operations at SNL/NM (concluded)

RESOURCE AREA	NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE	EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE	REDUCED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE	
Noise and Vibration	Impulse noise-producing test activities projected to increase 35% over 1996 level to 1,435 tests by 2008. Effects would be limited to windows rattling or startle reaction. Background noise levels would continue at current levels from generators, air conditioners, and ventilation systems, but increase due to additional vehicular traffic, aircraft noise, and temporary construction projects (range from 50 to 70 dB).	There would be a 250% increase in test activities over 1996 levels, to 2,638 per year, approximately one impulse noise event per hr for an 8-hr work day and a 261-day work year. Only a small fraction of these tests would be of sufficient magnitude to be heard or felt beyond the site boundary. The vast majority of tests expected to be below background noise levels for receptor locations beyond the KAFB boundary and would, therefore, be unnoticed in neighborhoods bounding the site.	Test activities would be 65% less than the 1996 level, 371 tests per year, an average of approximately 1.5 impulse noise tests per day. Only a small fraction of these tests would be of sufficient magnitude to be heard or felt beyond the site boundary. The vast majority of tests expected to be below background noise levels for receptor locations beyond the KAFB boundary and would, therefore be unnoticed in neighborhoods bounding the site.	
Socioeconomics^b	SNL/NM employment ^c	8,035	8,417	7,422
	SNL/NM total economic activity within the ROI	\$4.13 B/yr	\$4.33 B/yr	\$3.81 B/yr
	Percent of ROI total economic activity	9.7	10.1	9.0
Environmental Justice^d	No disproportionately high and adverse impacts to minority or low-income communities are anticipated.	Same as No Action Alternative	Same as No Action Alternative	

Source: TtNUS 1998l

B: billion

dB: decibel

ELCR: excess lifetime cancer risk

ER: environmental restoration

gal: gallon

hr: hour

kg: kilogram

LCF: latent cancer fatality

M: million

m³: cubic meter

MCL: maximum contaminant level

MEI: maximally exposed individual

mrem: millirem

OEL: occupational exposure limit

ROI: region of influence

TA: technical area

TCE: trichloroethene

TCP: traditional cultural property

yr: year

^aNo TCPs have been identified at SNL/NM. If specific TCPs are identified, Native American tribes will be consulted.^bBounding analysis is based on parameters presented in DOE 1997j.^cSection 4.12, Affected Environment, differs slightly, using 6,824 full-time employees. Base year in Section 5.3.12, Environmental Consequences (also see Table 3.6–2), used 7,652 full-time employees.

**Table 3.6–4. Comparison of Potential High Consequences
(condensed version) for Accident Scenarios at SNL/NM**

RESOURCE AREA	NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE	EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE	REDUCED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE
SITE-WIDE EARTHQUAKE			
RADIOLOGICAL IMPACTS			
50-Mile Population (Additional Latent Cancer Fatalities)	8.1x10 ⁻²	7.5x10 ⁻²	7.5x10 ⁻²
Maximally Exposed Individual (Increased Probability of Latent Cancer Fatality)	8.6x10 ⁻⁶	7.7x10 ⁻⁶	7.7x10 ⁻⁶
Noninvolved Worker (Increased Probability of Latent Cancer Fatality)	3.1x10 ⁻²	3.0 x10 ⁻²	3.0x10 ⁻²
CHEMICAL IMPACTS			
Distance (feet) to reach ERPG-2 Levels	3,800	3,800	3,800
CATASTROPHIC ACCIDENT SINGLE FACILITY			
RADIOLOGICAL IMPACTS			
ACRR Medical Isotopes Production			
50-mile population (additional latent cancer fatalities)	1.6x10 ⁻⁶ to 4.9x10 ⁻³	1.6x10 ⁻⁶ to 4.9x10 ⁻³	1.6x10 ⁻⁶ to 4.9x10 ⁻³
Maximally Exposed Individual (increased probability of latent cancer fatality)	1.0x10 ⁻¹⁰ to 6.1x10 ⁻⁷	1.0x10 ⁻¹⁰ to 6.1x10 ⁻⁷	1.0x10 ⁻¹⁰ to 6.1x10 ⁻⁷
Noninvolved Worker (increased probability of latent cancer fatality)	4.9x10 ⁻⁸ to 7.6x10 ⁻⁵	4.9x10 ⁻⁸ to 7.6x10 ⁻⁵	4.9x10 ⁻⁸ to 7.6x10 ⁻⁵
Hot Cell Facility			
50-mile population (additional latent cancer fatalities)	1.6x10 ⁻⁶ to 7.9x10 ⁻²	1.6x10 ⁻⁶ to 7.9x10 ⁻²	1.6x10 ⁻⁶ to 7.9x10 ⁻²
Maximally Exposed Individual (increased probability of latent cancer fatality)	1.0x10 ⁻¹⁰ to 6.6x10 ⁻⁶	1.0x10 ⁻¹⁰ to 6.6x10 ⁻⁶	1.0x10 ⁻¹⁰ to 6.6x10 ⁻⁶
Noninvolved Worker (increased probability of latent cancer fatality)	4.2x10 ⁻⁹ to 7.4x10 ⁻⁶	4.2x10 ⁻⁹ to 7.4x10 ⁻⁶	4.2x10 ⁻⁹ to 7.4x10 ⁻⁶
Sandia Pulsed Reactor			
50-mile population (additional latent cancer fatalities)	1.2x10 ⁻³ to 9.2x10 ⁻³	1.2x10 ⁻³ to 9.2x10 ⁻³	1.2x10 ⁻³ to 9.2x10 ⁻³
Maximally Exposed Individual (increased probability of latent cancer fatality)	1.5x10 ⁻⁷ to 8.4x10 ⁻⁷	1.5x10 ⁻⁷ to 8.4x10 ⁻⁷	1.5x10 ⁻⁷ to 8.4x10 ⁻⁷
Noninvolved Worker (increased probability of latent cancer fatality)	2.5x10 ⁻⁴ to 3.8x10 ⁻³	2.5x10 ⁻⁴ to 3.8x10 ⁻³	2.5x10 ⁻⁴ to 3.8x10 ⁻³

**Table 3.6–4. Comparison of Potential Consequences
for Accident Scenarios at SNL/NM (concluded)**

RESOURCE AREA	NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE	EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE	REDUCED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE
ACRR-Defense Programs Configuration			
50-mile population (additional latent cancer fatalities)	1.3x10 ⁻³ to 9.0x10 ⁻³	1.3 x10 ⁻³ to 9.0x10 ⁻³	Not operational
Maximally Exposed Individual (increased probability of latent cancer fatality)	1.7x10 ⁻⁷ to 1.0x10 ⁻⁶	1.7x10 ⁻⁷ to 1.0x10 ⁻⁶	Not operational
Noninvolved Worker (increased probability of latent cancer fatality)	1.2x10 ⁻⁵ to 2.2x10 ⁻⁴	1.2x10 ⁻⁵ to 2.2x10 ⁻⁴	Not operational
CHEMICAL IMPACTS			
Technical Area-I			
Distance (feet) to reach ERPG-2 Levels ^a	1,440 - 4,884	1,440 - 4,884	1,440 - 4,884
EXPLOSIVE IMPACTS			
Technical Area-I			
Distance (feet) to reach 2 psi (Damage to cinder block walls)	370	370	370
Distance (feet) to reach 10 psi (rupture of 50% of eardrums)	126	126	126
Distance (feet) to reach 50 psi (50% fatalities)	61	61	61

Source:

ERPG: emergency response planning guideline

ACRR: Annular Core Research Reactor

psi: pounds per square inch

^a For the three largest worker (people) densities within ERPG-2 levels related to Buildings 858, 883, and 893

CHAPTER 4

Affected Environment

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Understanding the affected environment is necessary for understanding potential impacts from operations at Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico (SNL/NM). This chapter describes the existing conditions that comprise the physical and natural environment within SNL/NM, the Regions of Influence (ROI), and the relationship of people with that environment. Descriptions of the affected environment provide a framework for understanding the direct, indirect, and cumulative effects of each of the three alternatives. The discussion is categorized by resource area to ensure that all relevant issues are included. This chapter is divided into the following 13 resource areas, and also includes other topic areas that support the impact assessment discussed in Chapter 5:

- Land Use and Visual Resources
- Infrastructure
- Geology and Soils
- Water Resources and Hydrology
- Biological and Ecological Resources
- Cultural Resources
- Air Quality
- Human Health and Worker Safety
- Transportation
- Waste Generation
- Noise and Vibration
- Socioeconomics
- Environmental Justice

The information in this chapter comes primarily from the SNL/NM *Environmental Information Document* (SNL/NM 1997a) and from the comprehensive environmental monitoring and surveillance programs that the United States (U.S.) Department of Energy (DOE) maintains at SNL/NM. Data for 1996 are presented where available; data for 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1995 are also included where necessary to present trends. Other relevant information is summarized and incorporated by reference.

Regions of Influence

Each ROI—the area that SNL/NM operations may reasonably affect—is delineated by its resource. The ROIs are determined based on characteristics of SNL/NM and the surrounding area. The ROI limits may be natural features (such as the extent of the Albuquerque-Belen Basin aquifer for groundwater) or political boundaries (such as the immediate four-county area for socioeconomics).

Other ROIs are delineated using industry-accepted norms for the resources (such as the 50-mi radius used in radiological air quality).

Each resource and topic area includes a discussion of the ROI—the area that may be affected by SNL/NM operations. The ROI establishes the scope of analysis and focuses the discussion on relevant information. Because resource and topic areas are often interrelated, one section may refer to another.

Materials (including chemicals and radioisotopes) released from SNL/NM can reach the environment and people in a number of ways. The routes that materials follow from SNL/NM to reach the environment and subsequently people are called transport and exposure pathways. SNL/NM conducts environmental monitoring to measure both radioactive and nonradioactive materials released into the environment.

Transport and Exposure Pathways

The routes that released materials follow to reach the environment and subsequently people involve both transport and exposure pathways. A transport pathway is the environmental media, such as groundwater, soil, or air, by which a contaminant is moved (for example, chemicals carried in the air or dissolved in groundwater and moved along by wind or groundwater). An exposure pathway is how a person or other organism comes in contact with the contaminant (for example, breathing, drinking water, or skin contact).

Environmental monitoring assesses the potential for people to come in contact with these materials by any route of exposure. Sampled media include groundwater, storm water runoff, wastewater discharge, vegetation, soil, and air. SNL/NM publishes an annual site environmental report that contains details on these sampling programs (SNL 1994b, 1995c).

4.2 GENERAL LOCATION

SNL/NM is located within Kirtland Air Force Base (KAFB), approximately 7 mi southeast of downtown Albuquerque, New Mexico (Figure 4.2–1). SNL/NM uses approximately 8,800 ac of Federal land on KAFB (SNL/NM 1997a). Albuquerque is located in Bernalillo county, in north-central New Mexico, and is the state's largest city, with a population of approximately 420,000 (Census 1997a). The Sandia Mountains rise steeply immediately north and east of the city, with the Manzanita Mountains extending to the southeast. The Rio Grande runs southward through Albuquerque and is the primary river traversing central New Mexico. Nearby communities include Rio Rancho and Corrales to the northwest, the Pueblo of Sandia and town of Bernalillo to the north, and the Pueblo of Isleta and towns of Los Lunas and Belen to the south.

4.3 LAND USE AND VISUAL RESOURCES

4.3.1 Land Use

4.3.1.1 Definition of Resource

Land use describes the activities that take place in a particular area. It is a critical element in site operations decision-making. It is especially important as a means to determine if there is sufficient area for site activities and required buffers and to identify conflicts between existing or projected onsite and offsite programs and operations. DOE P 430.1 governs DOE's management of its land and facilities as valuable natural resources, based on the principles of ecosystem management and sustainable development.

4.3.1.2 Region of Influence

The ROI consists of the land SNL/NM uses in and adjacent to KAFB. It represents probable impact areas differentiated by onsite or offsite land resources. Onsite resources are lands used for SNL/NM activities within KAFB. Offsite resources consist of land immediately adjacent to KAFB and include areas belonging to the

Pueblo of Isleta, city of Albuquerque, state of New Mexico, and the U.S. Forest Service (USFS).

4.3.1.3 Affected Environment

KAFB is an Air Force Materiel Command Base southeast of Albuquerque, New Mexico. KAFB shares facilities and infrastructure with several associates, including the DOE and its affiliates (for example, SNL/NM). It is comprised of approximately 51,560 ac of land, including portions of Cibola National Forest withdrawn in cooperation with the USFS. It is geographically bounded by the Pueblo of Isleta to the south, the Albuquerque International Sunport and lands held in trust by the state of New Mexico to the west, and the city of Albuquerque to the north. The eastern boundary lies within the Manzanita Mountains (Figure 4.3–1) (SNL/NM 1997a).

Historical Land Use Within KAFB


The earliest land use in the KAFB area is attributed to Native Americans and appears to have encompassed hunting, plant gathering, woodcutting, grazing, and possibly ritual activities (Holmes 1996a). No known Spanish land grants have been identified within KAFB. Farming and ranching were the principal activities during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Upon the arrival of the railroad in 1880, mining activity increased and new residents established homesteads. New Mexico became a territory in December 1850 and a state in January 1912.

KAFB's military and civilian history began with the establishment of the city's first airfield in 1928. Beginning in 1942 and throughout World War II, Los Alamos operations, associated with the Manhattan Engineering District, used the area to assist in transportation requirements for the nation's first atomic weapons program (SNL/NM 1997a).

In 1945, jurisdiction over the site that eventually became SNL/NM was transferred to the Manhattan Engineering District, which established the forerunner of SNL/NM. SNL/NM developed and expanded its facilities throughout the Cold War era and to the present. KAFB itself has also continued as a military base and multi-user industrial research and development complex (SNL/NM 1997a).

Land Ownership Within KAFB


Land ownership on KAFB is divided primarily among the U.S. Air Force (USAF), the DOE, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), and the USFS (Figure 4.3–1;



Source: SNL/NM 1997j

Figure 4.2–1. General Location of KAFB

KAFB is located southeast of the city of Albuquerque in Bernalillo county.



Source: SNL/NM 1997

Figure 4.3-1. KAFB Land Ownership

KAFB, occupying approximately 51,560 acres, is primarily owned by the U.S. Air Force, the DOE, the Bureau of Land Management, and the U.S. Forest Service.

Table 4.3–1). The majority of acreage comprising the western half of KAFB is owned by the USAF. The DOE also owns land in this area, which is occupied almost entirely by SNL/NM facilities. Some land in the southwestern half is owned by the BLM and has been withdrawn by the USAF. The eastern portion of KAFB, commonly referred to as the Withdrawn Area, consists of more than 20,480 ac of USFS land within the Cibola National Forest that has been withdrawn by the USAF and the DOE in separate actions.

Table 4.3–1. KAFB Land Ownership

OWNER	ACREAGE	PERCENT OF KAFB
USAF	25,586	49
USFS (Withdrawn by USAF)	15,891	31
USFS (Withdrawn by DOE)	4,595	9
DOE	2,938	6
BLM (Withdrawn by USAF)	2,549	5
TOTAL	51,559	100

Sources: SNL/NM 1997a, j
BLM: Bureau of Land Management
DOE: U.S. Department of Energy

KAFB: Kirtland Air Force Base
USAF: U.S. Air Force
USFS: U.S. Forest Service

Land Use Within the KAFB

The USAF and the DOE are the principal land users within the KAFB (SNL/NM 1997a) (Table 4.3–2). Land use is established through coordination and planning agreements between these agencies. On matters involving the Withdrawn Area, the USFS is also involved. The USAF operates on much of its own land, as well as on property within its portion of the Withdrawn Area. The DOE owns only a small portion of the land it needs, and is required to conduct many of its activities under permit on land owned or withdrawn by the USAF or within its section of the Withdrawn Area. The DOE also leases land adjacent to KAFB to support SNL/NM activities (see Land Use Adjacent to KAFB). SNL/NM facilities and operations encompass the majority of the DOE's land use requirements on KAFB. Other DOE-funded facilities make up the remainder. Figure 4.3–2 provides a general overview of land use on KAFB.

There is no single comprehensive land use plan for KAFB; however, existing land use designations and future planning scenarios are addressed in documents produced by the USAF, USFS, and SNL/NM. These documents include, for example, the *KAFB Comprehensive Plan* (USAF 1998a), *Cibola National*

Table 4.3–2. KAFB Land Use

USER	ACREAGE	PERCENT OF KAFB
USAF	33,338	65
DOE	<i>SNL/NM</i>	8,824
	<i>Other</i>	6,447
Joint USAF/DOE	2,950	6
TOTAL	51,559	100

Sources: SNL/NM 1997a, j
DOE: U.S. Department of Energy
KAFB: Kirtland Air Force Base
SNL/NM: Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico
USAF: U.S. Air Force


Forest Land and Resource Management Plan (USFS 1985), *SNL Sites Comprehensive Plan* (SNL 1997a), and *SNL Sites Integrated Master Plan* (SNL 1997c).

SNL/NM primary land use fits into a category of industrial/research park uses. This category coincides with the preliminary future use scenarios presented to the Citizens Advisory Board of the Future Use, Logistics, and Support Working Group (SNL 1997a, Keystone 1995) (see Future DOE Land Use on KAFB). Although not all facilities are industrial in nature (for example, administrative and office buildings), factors that contribute to the industrial designation include the following (SNL/NM 1997a):

- activities occurring in locations with limited area for development,
- testing activities occurring in areas near research and development facilities, and
- environmental restoration (ER) sites with associated remediation efforts resulting from research and testing activities.

In addition to SNL/NM, other DOE-funded facilities are located on land owned by the USAF and permitted to the DOE. These facilities include the Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute, Nonproliferation and National Security Institute (NNSI), Transportation Safeguards Division (TSD), Federal Manufacturing & Technology/New Mexico (FM&T/NM) (AlliedSignal), Ross Aviation, Inc., the Energy Training Center (ETC), and the DOE/Albuquerque Operations Office (AL).

KAFB land used by the USAF is also designated for industrial use, but includes a broader range of other uses such as residential, recreational, and medical activities that are associated with day-to-day base operations. Additionally, large areas of land within KAFB, particularly in the Withdrawn Area, do not support



Sources: SNL/NM 1997a, 1997f

Figure 4.3-2. KAFB Land Use
The U.S. Air Force and the DOE are the principal land users within KAFB.

specific facilities or programs, but are used as safety zones in association with USAF and DOE testing and training activities (SNL/NM 1997a).

SNL/NM Activities on KAFB

The five SNL/NM technical areas (TAs) cover approximately 2,560 ac (87 percent) of DOE-owned land. Table 4.3–3 lists DOE-owned land on and adjacent to KAFB, lists the total acreage of each SNL/NM Technical Area (TA), and provides a brief description of associated land use. TAs-I, -II, and -IV encompass approximately 645 ac. TAs-III and -V encompass approximately 1,915 ac. The DOE also owns approximately 10 ac that house the DOE/AL and 85 ac on the west side of Eubank Boulevard north of TA-I.

Technical Area I

TA-I comprises approximately 350 ac and is located in the northwest part of KAFB. TA-I is bordered by Wyoming Boulevard to the west and Eubank Boulevard to the east, while F and G Avenues form the northern

border and Hardin Boulevard defines the southern boundary (Figure 4.3–3). Approximately 110 ac of TA-I are enclosed behind a security fence. TA-I is the most densely developed and populated of the TAs, with over 6,600 employees and 370 structures (SNL/NM 1997a). The structures within TA-I consist of laboratories, shops, offices, warehouses, and other storage buildings used for administration, site support, technical support, basic research, Defense Programs (DP), component development, microelectronics, energy programs, exploratory systems, technology transfer, and business outreach (SNL/NM 1997b). Large parking lots are also prominent features. Future SNL/NM planning efforts are directed at developing the east side of TA-I along Eubank Boulevard, with additional expansion by private entities into the area outside of the KAFB Eubank Gate (SNL/NM 1996f).

Technical Area II

TA-II is located immediately south of TA-I (Figure 4.3–3). Approximately 440 people work in the 210-ac area. TA-II includes a diamond-shaped fenced area of approximately


Table 4.3–3. DOE-Owned Land on KAFB

AREA	APPROXIMATE ACREAGE	MAJOR LAND USES
<i>TA-I</i>	350	Administrative buildings, laboratories, and offices associated with commercial and light industrial activities
<i>TA-II</i>	210	Storage and warehouse areas, light testing facilities, and maintenance yards
<i>TA-III</i>	1,890	20 test facilities, widely separated by large tracts of open space; a limited number of buildings and mobile office trailers for administrative, office, and light laboratory uses
<i>TA-IV</i>	85	Several major laboratory/research facilities with accompanying office and administrative space
<i>TA-V</i>	25	A small, highly secured area of several primary research facilities, light laboratories, and office space
TOTAL TA ACREAGE	2,560	
<i>Tijeras Arroyo Drainage Area (Adjacent to TA-IV)</i>	280	Undeveloped open space
<i>DOE/AL and Coronado Club</i>	10	Administrative buildings and office space
<i>Eubank Boulevard Development Area</i>	85	Undeveloped open space
TOTAL DOE LAND	2,935	

Source: SNL/NM 1997a

DOE/AL: Department of Energy/Albuquerque Operations Office

TA: technical area



Source: SNL/NM 1997a

Figure 4.3–3. Technical Areas-I, -II, and -IV
Technical Areas-I, -II, and -IV are located in the northwest section of KAFB.

45 ac distinguished by a 10-ft-high chain link fence and security gate (SNL/NM 1997a, SNL 1997a). Like TA-I, the area is urbanized but less densely developed. Over 30 structures are within the area, consisting of several laboratories, limited office space, and numerous storage buildings (SNL/NM 1997b). The Explosive Components Facility (ECF), completed in 1995, is used by SNL/NM to perform low-hazard testing on small samples of explosive material. Additional facilities include the safeguards and security building, shipping and receiving, the waste transfer station, and maintenance yards. Other portions of the area have been vacated and are awaiting decommissioning and remediation activities (SNL 1997a). TA-II is fully developed; however, suitable facilities may be reassigned for use as warehouses or for other limited-occupancy uses (SNL/NM 1996f).

Technical Area III

TA-III consists of an area of about 1,890 ac located approximately 5 mi south of TA-I (Figure 4.3–4). Approximately 224 people work in the area, which is composed of 20 test facilities devoted to violent physical testing and simulating a variety of natural and induced environments (SNL/NM 1997a). Over 150 structures are located within TA-III. Most of these structures are grouped together in small units separated by extensive open spaces. These units are organized by testing facility (SNL/NM 1997b). An administrative building and mobile office trailers provide space for administrative, office, and light laboratory functions (SNL/NM 1997a). Although much of the area remains as open space characterized by flat to undulating grassland terrain, TA-III is considered fully developed due to the area required for hazard safety zones (SNL/NM 1997a). For example, testing activities associated with the 10,000-ft Sled Track Facility in the NW corner of TA-III require the leasing of a buffer zone west of the boundaries of KAFB (SNL/NM 1997a, SNL/NM 1997x). Buffer zones are discussed in more detail in the Land Use Adjacent to KAFB subsection.

Technical Area IV

TA-IV is located south of TA-II on approximately 85 ac, 19 of which are behind security fencing (Figure 4.3–3). Like TA-II, TA-IV is urbanized but less densely developed than TA-I. The area is primarily a research site for pulsed-power sciences and particle-beam fusion accelerators, as well as a research and development area. The working population of TA-IV is approximately 546, occupying about 70 structures consisting of main

laboratories, mobile offices, and storage (SNL/NM 1997a, 1997b). With the exception of the adjacent 280-ac Tijeras Arroyo drainage area, TA-IV has land available for construction of additional facilities.

Technical Area V


TA-V is located on approximately 25 ac adjacent to the northeast corner of TA-III (Figure 4.3–4). In addition to DOE-owned lands within the boundaries of TA-V, approximately six ac are permitted to the DOE by the USAF to provide additional security (SNL/NM 1997a). TA-V is a relatively small research area consisting of about 35 closely grouped structures where experimental and engineering nuclear reactors are located. Approximately 159 personnel work in the area.

Coyote Test Field

The Coyote Test Field (Figure 4.3–5) is a large area within KAFB that contains a variety of remote testing sites and facilities. The area is comprised of mostly open, flat to undulating, grassland terrain in the west, to more mountainous topography in the east. Approximately 173 structures consisting of laboratory buildings, mobile offices, and numerous storage areas are found widely dispersed throughout the area (SNL/NM 1997b). A number of SNL/NM facilities, such as the Explosives Applications Laboratory (EAL), Containment Technology Test Facility-West, and Thunder Range Complex, operate in this area on land permitted to the DOE by the USAF.


Withdrawn Area

The Withdrawn Area consists of approximately 20,485 ac in the eastern portion of KAFB, including land within the Cibola National Forest that has been withdrawn from public use by the USAF (15,890 ac) and the DOE (4,595 ac) (Figure 4.3–5). SNL/NM operations at the Lurance Canyon Burn Site and the Aerial Cable Facility are conducted on land that has been withdrawn by the USAF and subsequently permitted to the DOE. There are additional SNL/NM activities on USAF-permitted land in the Withdrawn Area as well. Other DOE activities not associated with SNL/NM, such as those associated with the NNSI and the TSD, are also conducted on USAF-permitted land, as well as on that portion withdrawn specifically by the DOE (Figure 4.3–5). The terrain is predominantly mountainous with increasing elevation to the east. Development is limited and characterized by small structures and mobile offices. Large portions of land within the Withdrawn Area do not support specific



Source: SNL/NM 1997a

Figure 4.3–4. Technical Areas-III and -V
Technical Areas-III and -V are located in the southwest section of KAFB.



Source: SNL/NM 1997j

Figure 4.3-5. Coyote Test Field and the Withdrawn Area
The Coyote Test Field and the Withdrawn Area occupy over 20,000 acres in the eastern portion of KAFB.

facilities or programs, but are used as buffer areas for USAF and SNL/NM testing activities (SNL/NM 1997a).

Land Use Adjacent to KAFB

Generalized land use adjacent to KAFB is shown in Figure 4.3–6. The city of Albuquerque has the most influence on land use adjacent to the north-northwestern boundary of KAFB. The city has experienced steady growth in these areas characterized by single-family and multi-family residential dwellings, mixed/minor commercial establishments, and light industrial/wholesale operations. Trending east along the northern border of KAFB, limited residential use, as well as some vacant land, is found within the city and surrounding Bernalillo county. The northeast boundary of KAFB is surrounded almost entirely by Cibola National Forest, although some private land, scattered residential dwellings, and industrial operations are present north of the Withdrawn Area. Much residential development, consisting of single-family homes, has occurred just beyond the national forest approximately 1 mi east of the KAFB Withdrawn Area boundary. The southern portion of KAFB borders a wide expanse of open rangeland owned by the Pueblo of Isleta. To the west, adjacent land consists of the Albuquerque International Sunport, some city and county open space, and a large parcel of open space planned for a significant future development known as Mesa del Sol. Mesa del Sol and a number of other planned development projects affecting adjacent land use are discussed in Chapter 6, Cumulative Effects Analysis.

DOE Buffer Zones

The DOE leases approximately 9,100 ac of land adjacent to the western and southwestern boundaries of KAFB as a buffer zone for the operations at the 10,000-ft Sled Track Complex in TA-III (Figure 4.3–7). The Sled Track Complex is an SNL/NM test facility used for simulating high-speed impacts of weapon shapes, substructures, and components to verify design integrity, performance, and fuzing (mechanical or electrical means used to detonate an explosive charge) functions. The facility also subjects weapon parachute systems to aerodynamic loads to verify parachute design integrity and performance (SNL/NM 1998a). The buffer zone ensures that an adequate safety area exists for the physical protection of the public from impact of all sled and payload components. This includes explosive debris and/or shrapnel as well as the maximum range of fly-away rocket motors (SNL/NM 1997x).

The Mesa del Sol Area


The Mesa del Sol area is a 13,000-acre parcel of vacant land, virtually all of which is held in trust by the NMSLO for the benefit of the University of New Mexico and New Mexico Public Schools. The area was annexed by the city of Albuquerque in 1993 and represents a 20 percent increase in the city's incorporated area. It is anticipated that the area will be home to as many as 40,000 households and be a major impetus for economic development for the city and the region.

Plans for Mesa del Sol call for a mixed-use pedestrian-oriented planned community with a number of districts and activity centers surrounded by large areas of open space. The community will be linked by a regional transportation, open space, and trail network, providing access to the entire metropolitan area.

For additional information, consult the 1997 Mesa del Sol Level A Community Master Plan produced by the NMSLO, Santa Fe, New Mexico (NMSLO 1997).


The buffer zone is comprised of two distinct areas due to land ownership and the nature of the individual arrangements between the landowners and the DOE (SNL/NM 1997a). The first part of the buffer zone consists of approximately 2,750 ac west of KAFB boundary that the DOE leases from the state of New Mexico. This area is 1 mi wide and encompasses the eastern edge of the proposed Mesa del Sol (state of New Mexico, University of New Mexico [UNM] land trust) development. The lease expired in 1995 and the New Mexico State Land Office (NMSLO) and the DOE are currently discussing its continuation. The second part of the buffer zone consists of approximately 6,345 ac, extending south and west of the southern KAFB boundary. This land is currently used under agreement with the Pueblo of Isleta through the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) (SNL/NM 1997a, 1997j).

For 20 days in 1990, an agreement with the Pueblo of Isleta temporarily established an additional buffer zone of approximately 3,840 ac south of the KAFB boundary. This action was taken during special testing at the Aerial Cable Facility (DOE 1990).



Sources: DOE 1993c, 1996b; SNL/NM 1997a

Figure 4.3-6. Generalized Land Use Adjacent to KAFB
Land adjacent to KAFB has a wide variety of uses.



Sources: DOE 1993c, 1996b; SNL/NM 1997a

Figure 4.3-7. DOE Leased Buffer Zones
The DOE has leased buffer zones adjacent to the western and southern boundaries of KAFB.

Future DOE Land Use on KAFB

Land use on KAFB is controlled by a complicated series of agreements, permits, and leases among the DOE, the USAF, and the USFS. Since June 1994, a Future Use, Logistics, and Support Working Group has been instrumental in developing future land use recommendations. The working group comprises representatives from the DOE, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED), SNL/NM, the Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute, FM&T/NM, Ross Aviation, Inc., the TSD, the NNSI, the USAF, and the USFS.

The DOE and SNL/NM Citizens Advisory Board (CAB) was identified by the working group as the appropriate vehicle for public participation. The CAB receives information from the DOE and SNL/NM relevant to future land use issues. The CAB held its first future land use meeting in June 1995 and is currently in the process of reviewing site baseline data and preliminary future land use information. The Pueblo of Isleta and the Bernalillo County Commission have been apprised of future land use planning activities at SNL/NM and are provided with all pertinent communications and publications (SNL 1997a).

The Future Use, Logistics, and Support Working Group developed preliminary recommendations for KAFB and recognized the high probability of continued Federal use of the complex. Under these recommendations, the Federal government will maintain institutional control of the site and restrict access to it. Interim future land use recommendations by the working group include industrial/commercial and recreational uses as they relate to general cleanup levels. Refer to Section 4.5.3.3, for a discussion of the cleanup level designations. SNL/NM's primary land uses fit into a category of industrial/research park uses. These uses are consistent with the preliminary future land use scenarios presented to the CAB for DOE-owned properties (SNL 1997a, Keystone 1995).

Although SNL/NM land use will not change significantly in the foreseeable future, the DOE is negotiating two real estate transactions on behalf of SNL/NM. The first involves acquiring from the city of Albuquerque approximately 4 ac along Eubank Boulevard south of H Street in exchange for a right-of-way for the city to improve Eubank Boulevard south of Central Avenue (SNL 1997a). The other possible transaction involves renewing the lease arrangement with the NMSLO for the buffer zone west of TA-III and the

KAFB boundary. The DOE and the NMSLO are establishing an arrangement that supports their mutual concerns for public safety while maintaining current testing capabilities (SNL 1997a, NMSLO 1997).

For a discussion of general future land use projects and developments in and adjacent to KAFB, see Chapter 6, Cumulative Effects Analysis.

4.3.2 Visual Resources

4.3.2.1 Definition of Resource

Visual resources encompass those aspects of an area that pertain to its appearance and to the manner in which it is viewed by people. This resource area provides a means to review the aesthetic qualities of natural landscapes and their modifications, associated perceptions and concerns of people, and the physical or visual relationships that influence the visibility of any proposed landscape modifications.

4.3.2.2 Region of Influence

The ROI is similar to that for land use (4.3.1.2). It consists of the geographic areas in and adjacent to KAFB where SNL/NM operations may influence the surrounding landscape and associated visual characteristics.

4.3.2.3 Affected Environment


The surrounding visual characteristics of SNL/NM consist of mostly flat, gently sloping grassland to the west and mountainous terrain to the east. Key landforms that dominate views in the general area include the Four Hills formation, the Manzanita Mountains, and the Manzano Mountains further south. From areas of Albuquerque nearest KAFB, views to the east and southeast are limited by the Four Hills formation and surrounding foothills of the Manzano Area. Views to the south partially consist of KAFB facilities, the Albuquerque International Sunport, and open rangeland. In general, the terrain features associated with the western portion of KAFB are not particularly distinctive. The eastern half, however, exhibits greater visual variety due to its mountain and canyon topography (SNL/NM 1997a). Most SNL/NM facilities are well within the KAFB boundary and away from public view. Because of their location and the surrounding terrain characteristics, most facilities are not visible from roads and areas with public access. Distant views of TA-I are possible from eastbound Interstate 40, but they are brief and show limited detail. Views from Interstate 25 consist of background landscapes only (SNL/NM 1997a).

Development is the most apparent modern alteration of the natural environment on KAFB affecting visual resources. Much of this activity is striking in nature and characterized by an urban setting with large buildings, extensive roadways, utility structures, parking lots, and other developed areas. The northwestern portion of KAFB, which includes SNL/NM TAs-I, -II and -IV, is the most populated and densely developed area that exemplifies these conditions. TAs-III and -V have a more limited and scattered development pattern, but similarly exhibit a variety of man-made modifications that affect the visual environment. The Coyote Test Field and particularly the Withdrawn Area are more sparsely developed. While early construction efforts throughout KAFB may not have specifically considered surrounding visual aesthetics, resulting in discordant assemblies of buildings and associated structures, recent development by both the USAF and the DOE includes facilities with designs and materials that are more visually compatible with the natural environment. In support of goals established to improve visual resources, SNL/NM has initiated Campus Design Guidelines, which contain a set of principles and detailed design guidance that provide a framework for the physical development and redevelopment of SNL/NM sites. They include guidance for building massing, facades, color palettes, building orientation and entries, circulation corridors, standardized signage, and landscaping, including low-water-use plant selections. All new and modified facilities will be brought into compliance with these guidelines over time. These efforts have been endorsed by SNL/NM senior management and are administered through the Corporate Projects Department, the Sites Planning Department, and the Campus Development Committee (SNL 1997a).

Visual resource value ratings for aesthetics, called “scenic classes,” have been developed for KAFB using the USFS Scenery Management System (Figure 4.3–8)

(USFS 1995, SNL/NM 1997a). These scenic classes are based on evaluating landscape character and scenic attractiveness, as well as on the number of observers/users in the area. The latter generate concern levels that measure the degree of public importance on landscapes viewed from travelways and use areas. For the KAFB visual resource analysis, viewer input was obtained from SNL/NM personnel working throughout the area, as well as from public comments solicited during preparation of the Cibola National Forest environmental analysis (USFS 1996). The scenic classes are rated from 1 to 6, corresponding to a gradual range from highest public value (1) to lowest public value (6). The higher the public value, the more important it is to maintain the highest scenic value. This evaluation provides baseline information for assessing potential effects on scenery from proposed projects or other proposed landscape changes.

As shown in Figure 4.3–8, the majority of SNL/NM TAs and other facilities are in areas where the scenic class indicates high public value (scenic class 1 or 2). Although these locations represent areas where the landscape is not particularly distinctive and has been extensively modified by development, the scenic class is elevated by the large number of observers and users present who generate high levels of concern for scenery. On a practical level, this means that future development at SNL/NM should continue to include efforts, such as the Campus Design Guidelines described above, to improve visual resources. Remote facility locations, particularly in the southwestern corner of KAFB and most of TA-III, are in areas of lower scenic value due to a combination of reduced observer/user sensitivity levels, indistinct landscape features, and extensive development. Other areas of SNL/NM activity, such as the Coyote Test Field and the Withdrawn Area, are generally within scenic classes representing high-to-moderate public value due to the inherently distinctive, less developed, and attractive nature of the area.



Source: SNL/NM 1997a

Figure 4.3-8. KAFB Scenic Classes

The scenic classes on KAFB range from the highest public value (scenic class 1) to low public value (scenic class 6).

4.4 INFRASTRUCTURE

4.4.1 Definition of Resource

Infrastructure consists of buildings, services, maintenance, utilities, material storage, and transportation systems and corridors that support the operations of a facility. Specifically, SNL/NM's infrastructure consists of water, sanitary sewer, storm drain, steam, fossil fuels, chilled water, electrical transmission, electrical distribution, communications, roads, and parking that support TAs-I, -II, -III, -IV, and -V and other DOE facilities at KAFB (SNL 1997a). For a discussion of land use, see Section 4.3.

4.4.2 Region of Influence

The ROI for infrastructure mainly consists of assets used by SNL/NM within KAFB. KAFB includes the physical area that encompasses KAFB, lands owned by the DOE, lands owned by the USAF, and portions of the Cibola National Forest withdrawn from public entry by the USAF and the DOE.

SNL/NM relies primarily on KAFB for infrastructure support, including base security, roads, electrical distribution, water supply, and sewage. Table 4.4–1 presents information on the type of utilities and amounts used by SNL/NM and KAFB. Table 4.4–1 also identifies utility capacities.

4.4.3 Affected Environment

4.4.3.1 SNL/NM Buildings

Buildings within SNL/NM are listed by type and square footage in Table 4.4–2. Physical attributes such as construction type, gross square feet, and usage distinguish primary buildings.

4.4.3.2 SNL/NM Services and Maintenance

SNL/NM's management and operations (M&O) contractor is Lockheed Martin Corporation. Under the office of SNL/NM's President and Laboratory Director, the complex is organized into 11 divisions: Physical Sciences and Components; Weapon Systems; Human Resources; Laboratory Development; National Security Programs; Energy, Environment, and Information Technology; Laboratory Services; California Laboratory; Systems, Science, and Technology; Business, Management, and Chief Financial Officer; and Defense Programs Products and Services. Extensive descriptions of key programs and services are provided in the *SNL Sites Comprehensive Plan FY 1998-2007* (SNL 1997a).

SNL/NM has a maintenance program supported by appropriate *National Environmental Policy Act* (NEPA) review. Routine maintenance and upgrades currently underway or planned include the following:

Table 4.4–1. Utility Capacities and Quantities Used by SNL/NM and KAFB

UTILITY	USAGE				KAFB CAPACITY
	SNL/NM (1996)	% OF CAPACITY	OTHER KAFB (1996)	% OF CAPACITY	
<i>Water</i>	440 M gal	22.0	710 M gal	35.5	2 B gal
<i>Wastewater</i>	280 M gal	32.9	256 M gal	30.1	850 M gal
<i>Electricity</i>	197,000 MWh	18.0	307,000 MWh	28.0	1.1 M MWh ^a
<i>Natural Gas^b</i>	580 M ft ^{3c}	26.5	680 M ft ³	31.1	2.3 B ft ³
<i>Fuel Oil</i>	15,000 gal ^c	NA	Not reported	NA	Not limited by infrastructure
<i>Propane</i>	370,000 gal ^c	NA	Not reported	NA	Not limited by infrastructure

Sources: DOE 1997k, SNL 1997a, SNL/NM 1997b

B: billion

ft³: cubic foot

gal: gallon

KAFB: Kirtland Air Force Base

M: million

MWh: megawatt-hour

NA: not applicable

SNL/NM: Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico

^aBased on 125-megawatt (MW) rating

^bEstimate based on 60 pounds per square inch (psi)

^cQuantities were not typical due to several factors including weather and boiler tests at the steam plant, and were not used as baseline quantities in Chapter 3 on Table 3.6–2 and Chapter 5 on Table 5.3.2–1.

Table 4.4–2. Summary of SNL/NM Buildings and Their Square Footage

SNL/NM BUILDING TYPES	NUMBER OF BUILDINGS	GROSS SQUARE FT (GSF)	% OF GSF	PARAMETERS
<i>Primary Buildings</i>	125	4,441,636	88	Buildings > 3,000 GSF Permanent, semi-permanent, or wood/steel construction; not leased space
<i>Other Buildings</i>	304	268,319	6	Nonprimary buildings < 3,000 GSF
<i>Mobile Offices</i>	180	200,530	4	Mobile offices < 3,000 GSF
<i>Transportable Buildings</i>	65	109,529	2	Transportable buildings < 3,000 GSF
TOTAL	674	5,020,014	100	

Source: SNL 1997a

<: less than

>: greater than

SNL/NM: Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico

- cleaning, painting, repairing, renovating, and servicing buildings, equipment, vehicles, and utility infrastructure;
- maintaining and extending onsite roads, parking areas, and access control structures;
- replacing, upgrading, and maintaining equipment, tools, and components, such as computers, valves, pumps, filters, monitors, and equipment controls to preserve, improve, and extend the life of the infrastructure; and
- maintaining, replacing, and upgrading environment, safety, and health equipment, controls, and monitoring capabilities.

4.4.3.1 Roadways and Transportation Access

The general road network in KAFB is shown in Figure 4.4–1. Key roads include Interstates 25 and 40. Interstate 25 runs north-south and is approximately 1.5 mi west of the KAFB boundary at its nearest approach. Interstate 40 runs east-west through Albuquerque and is approximately 1 mi north of the KAFB boundary at its nearest approach.

Access to KAFB and SNL/NM consists of an urban road network maintained by the city of Albuquerque, the gates and roadways of KAFB, and SNL/NM-maintained roads. Traffic enters SNL/NM through three principal gates: Wyoming, Gibson, and Eubank. Most commercial traffic enters through the Eubank gate because it provides direct access to the SNL/NM shipping and receiving facilities located in TA-II. An additional entrance to KAFB, the

Truman gate, serves KAFB's western areas.


SNL/NM maintains approximately 20 mi of paved roads, 25 mi of unpaved roads, approximately 80 ac of paved service areas, and approximately 80 ac of paved parking (SNL 1997a). The roads near SNL/NM experience heavy traffic in the early morning and late afternoon. The principal contributors are SNL/NM staff and other civilian and military personnel commuting to and from KAFB. Survey estimates of employee-related traffic entering KAFB are between 10,000 to 13,500 SNL/NM and DOE commuters per day (SNL/NM 1997a). SNL/NM and DOE commuters represent approximately 36 percent of commuter traffic on KAFB (SNL 1997a). For a discussion of transportation-related issues such as traffic, see Section 4.11.

Rail facilities are not available on KAFB. The Burlington Northern & Santa Fe railroad discontinued its spur into KAFB in 1994. Land within KAFB, permitted to the DOE for the railroad right-of-way, has been returned to the USAF and demolition of the spur has begun.

Primary air service is provided for the entire region by the Albuquerque International Sunport, located immediately northwest of KAFB. Runways and other flight facilities are shared with KAFB.

4.4.3.2 Water

The water supply system consists of 85 mi of piping that, in 1996, provided 440 M gal of water (22 percent of KAFB capacity) for fire protection, industrial support of SNL/NM's research programs, and sanitary use



Source: SNL/NM 1997

Figure 4.4-1. General Area Road Network in KAFB
 Access to SNL/NM consists of key roads, Interstates 25 and 40, and an urban road network maintained by the city of Albuquerque.

(Table 4.4–1). The highest volume user is the Microelectronics Development Laboratory (MDL), which uses approximately 44 M gal of water per year for its activities. The second largest individual user (14.3 M gal per year) is the steam plant, supplying steam to SNL/NM and KAFB for space heating and laboratory processes (SNL 1998a).

KAFB owns and operates the water supply and distribution system, which includes the main booster pump station, storage reservoirs, and wells. Neither the existing water service from KAFB to SNL/NM, nor most major SNL/NM facilities are metered. The minimum pipeline size is dictated by the need for fire protection; sanitary and industrial use determine the size of service lines to specific facilities. For a discussion of water resources, see Section 4.6.

4.4.3.3 Sanitary Sewer

In 1996, the sewer system consisted of a 40-mi underground pipe network that discharged approximately 280 M gal per year (32.9 percent of KAFB capacity) of industrial and domestic wastewater (Table 4.4–1). Wastewater has leaked from underground sewer lines. Possible soil contamination associated with these leaks is being investigated and cleaned up as part of the SNL/NM Environmental Restoration (ER) Project. Sections 4.5 and 4.6 discuss ER Project activities.

4.4.3.4 Storm Drain

As part of its storm drain system, SNL/NM maintains approximately 15 mi of pipe and 2 mi of channel. KAFB experiences periodic thunderstorms accompanied by brief periods of intense rainfall. Approximately one-half of the system is designed to provide a means of storm water control to protect buildings, roads, and equipment from a 100-year storm event. The remaining half, which does not meet the current standard, has been assessed and upgrades, modifications, and repairs are currently underway in order to effectively control storm water throughout the facility and meet the 100-year storm event criteria. Existing drainage channels require continuous maintenance to correct erosion problems and remove weeds, sediment, and debris that inhibit proper flow (SNL 1997a).

4.4.3.5 Electrical Transmission and Distribution

SNL/NM maintains approximately 115 mi of electrical transmission/distribution lines. The electrical transmission system is a high-voltage (46-kV) overhead transmission system from the Public Service Company of New Mexico (PNM) to the various substations within SNL/NM.

SNL/NM maintains the 26 master unit substations that distribute all its electrical power. The estimated monthly electric bill for the DOE, KAFB, and SNL/NM is \$1.6 M. PNM provides power to SNL/NM through the Eubank substation, located east of SNL/NM. A second source of power from PNM is currently under construction south of TA-IV (SNL 1997a).

South of Tijeras Arroyo, KAFB owns and maintains the transmission lines that support SNL/NM facilities. The system has experienced outages to facilities in TAs-III, -IV, and -V and the Coyote Test Field. Improvements to the system are anticipated pending completion of an upgrade project (SNL 1997a). In 1996, SNL/NM used 197,000 MWh (18 percent of KAFB capacity) (Table 4.4–1).

4.4.3.6 Natural Gas

SNL/NM maintains 4.5 mi of gas line. Natural gas supplied by PNM is the primary heating fuel used at the steam plant. It is also supplied to self-contained boilers at facilities in TAs -I, -II, and -IV, which are not on the steam distribution system. Laboratories also use natural gas in many of the buildings for heating and experiments. SNL/NM uses approximately 580 M ft³ per year (26.5 percent of system capacity). Diesel fuel is used as an emergency backup during natural gas pressure interruptions. SNL/NM uses 370,000 gal of propane per year in TAs-III and -V and in other remote locations (SNL 1997a). Natural gas and propane use in 1996 was not considered typical due to several factors, including weather and tests associated with the steam plant. However, the recent completion of a natural gas line into the area is expected to significantly reduce the demand for propane, while increasing use of natural gas.

The source of natural gas to KAFB and the SNL/NM central steam plant is a high-pressure line that enters KAFB near the intersection of Pennsylvania Avenue and Gibson Boulevard. The reliability of the line may be questionable, since it has been damaged in the past. Two low-pressure gas isolation valves allow restoration of service if the primary distribution line becomes damaged. The internal low-pressure gas system is a dual loop throughout the TAs that provides a backup source if a portion of the line becomes temporarily disabled. This distribution system is made of steel pipe and requires protection to prevent corrosion. Recent projects have upgraded the steel pipelines, replaced building gas valves, and replaced many of the steel lines with polyethylene pipe, thus eliminating the need for previously required protection measures (SNL 1997a).

4.4.3.7 Steam/Chilled Water

The purpose of the steam system is to provide heat for buildings and hot water for sanitary use. It is also used to provide humidity in a limited number of buildings and chilled water through absorption chillers. The steam plant supplies an average of 1.5 M lbs per day of saturated steam for space heating in TA-I and the eastern portion of KAFB (SNL/NM 1997b). SNL/NM maintains 14 mi of piping for steam and 1 mi of piping for chilled water.

4.4.3.8 Communications

SNL/NM maintains 2,900 mi of communication lines. Surveys indicate that the system may be nearing capacity; however, system upgrades are meeting the current demand for data links (SNL 1997a).

4.4.3.9 Selected Infrastructure Facilities

The steam plant, Radioactive and Mixed Waste Management Facility (RMWMF), Thermal Treatment Facility (TTF), and Hazardous Waste Management Facility (HWMF) were identified as representative facilities that provide infrastructure support services. For a discussion of the facility screening process, see Section 2.3. Steam plant functions are discussed in the Facility Descriptions that follow Chapter 2.


The three remaining facilities are waste management facilities. The facilities vary in size, capacity, and scope of

operation, depending on the waste type for which they are designed. SNL/NM manages low-level waste (LLW), low-level mixed waste (LLMW), transuranic (TRU) waste, mixed transuranic (MTRU) waste, and hazardous waste. Descriptions of these wastes and associated management facilities are provided in Section 4.12. Figure 4.4–2 shows the locations of the three selected waste management facilities and four additional waste management facilities on SNL/NM.

4.4.3.10 Material Storage and Inventory

SNL/NM stores and manages a wide variety of hazardous and nonhazardous materials. Hazardous materials include radioactive materials; chemicals including solvents, acids, bases, and specialty gases; explosives and explosive containing materials; and fuels. Nonhazardous materials include plastics, metals, certain solvents, certain oils like mineral oil, and simple office materials like paper. For a detailed discussion of SNL/NM material management see *SNL/NM Environmental Information Document* (SNL/NM 1997a).


Figure 4.4–3 illustrates conceptually how materials move at SNL/NM. For details regarding material inventories used for analysis in the SWEIS, see Appendix A. The material inventories and SNL/NM databases were used to analyze potential air quality impacts, human health impacts including accidents, and transportation requirements (see Sections 4.9, 4.10, and 4.11, respectively).



Source: SNL/NM 1997]

Figure 4.4–2. Waste Management Facilities

SNL/NM manages a variety of waste through seven facilities located throughout SNL/NM.



Source: SNL/NM 1997]

Figure 4.4-3. Conceptual Illustration of Material Movement at SNL/NM

SNL/NM receives materials that are then distributed to testing, research and development, and other facilities.

4.5 GEOLOGY AND SOILS

4.5.1 Definition of Resource

The discussion of geology and soils includes seismology, slope stability, and soil contamination. Seismology refers to the geology below the soil layer that is relevant to the occurrence, frequency, and magnitude of earthquakes. Slope stability generally focuses on the stability of the soil layer. For the purpose of this SWEIS, soils include natural material at the ground surface extending to a depth that construction activities could reasonably disturb (20 to 30 ft).

4.5.2 Region of Influence

The main concern of seismic activity and slope stability is their effect on onsite facilities, specifically, whether damage from earthquakes or slope failures could result in a contaminant release. The ROI would, therefore, be the extent of environmental or human health effects from such a release. Offsite impacts from these and other accidental releases are addressed in Sections 5.3.8.2, 5.4.8.2, and 5.5.8.2.

Potential soil contamination effects would result from exposure at or near the contaminated area. Thus, the ROI is limited to KAFB. Potential migration of soil contaminants into groundwater or surface water is addressed in Sections 4.6.1.3 and 4.6.2.3.

4.5.3 Affected Environment

4.5.3.1 Seismology

SNL/NM is in the eastern portion of the 30-mi-wide Albuquerque-Belen Basin, about midway along its north-south trending length of about 90 mi (Figure 4.5–1). The city of Albuquerque is in a region expected to experience moderate earthquakes that could result in damage to buildings, depending on the quality of construction (SNL/NM 1997a). Since 1966, New Mexico has experienced four moderate earthquakes, all approximately 5.0 on the Richter scale. Two of these were in Dulce (near the Colorado border in north-central New Mexico), one was in Gallup (near the Arizona border in west-central New Mexico), and one was in Eunice (extreme southeast corner of New Mexico, near the Texas border). The Dulce and Gallup earthquakes were the closest to SNL/NM, all approximately 125 mi away. The largest shock predicted in New Mexico in a 100-year period would have a magnitude of 6.0 on the Richter scale (SNL/NM 1997a). The Richter scale does not measure damage. Damage is dependent upon several

factors, including duration of the event, type of movement, facility design, and construction materials and practices.

A number of regional faults (Sandia, West Sandia, Manzano, Hubbell Springs, Tijeras, and Coyote) intersect within KAFB (Figure 4.5–2). There is no evidence of movement along these faults over the last 10,000 years (SNL/NM 1997a).

In the Albuquerque area, the largest magnitude earthquake of the century, a recorded magnitude 4.7 on the Richter scale, occurred on January 4, 1971. SNL/NM buildings did not receive any appreciable damage. A survey after the event noted cracks in some SNL/NM buildings, but the cracks could have predated the earthquake (SNL/NM 1997a).


4.5.3.2 Slope Stability

Most SNL/NM facilities are constructed on level ground or gentle slopes. These areas are composed of alluvial fan sediments that slope westward toward the Rio Grande. Steeper slopes occur along the arroyos (particularly where channel erosion occurs during periods of storm runoff) and in the Manzanita Mountains. Facilities near slopes are those that border the Tijeras Arroyo at the southern edge of TA-IV, including Building 970 and parking areas, and the ECF, Building 905, in TA-II. Similarly, there are only two SNL/NM facilities in the Manzanita Mountains—the Lurance Canyon Burn Site and the Aerial Cable Facility. The Manzanita Mountains are predominantly Precambrian crystalline and Paleozoic marine carbonate bedrock and are not prone to landslides. To date, no SNL/NM facility has been affected by slope instability.

4.5.3.3 Soil Contamination


Soils at SNL/NM are derived primarily from eroded bedrock in the Manzanita Mountains that was transported downslope by water. Soil layers formed by these sediments tend to be discontinuous. The chemical composition of these soils reflect the composition of the source bedrock, and soils at SNL/NM frequently have high naturally occurring (background) concentrations of the metals arsenic, beryllium, and manganese (SNL/NM 1996e).

As a result of past SNL/NM activities, soil contamination exists or may exist at a number of locations at KAFB, although most sites are less than 1 ac in size (Figure 4.5–3). Cleanup of these contaminated sites is regulated under RCRA. SNL/NM investigates and




Sources: SNL/NM 1997j, USGS 1995

Figure 4.5–1. Location and Extent of the Albuquerque-Belen Basin
SNL/NM is located along the eastern edge of the Albuquerque-Belen Basin.



Sources: SNL/NM 1997a, 1997f

Figure 4.5-2. Regional Faults at KAFB
Six regional faults intersect KAFB.



Source: SNL/NM 1997

Figure 4.5-3. Locations of SNL/NM Environmental Restoration Sites
One hundred eighty-two sites have been identified for investigation and potential remediation under the SNL/NM Environmental Restoration Project.

remediates these sites through the ER Project. Under the ER Project, potentially contaminated sites go through an investigative process that includes identification, sampling, and, if necessary, remediation. SNL/NM proposes no further action at sites that do not have contamination or that have concentrations of contaminants that pose no appreciable risk to human health or the environment. The state of New Mexico has the authority to approve or reject “no further action” proposals. As of August 1998, 182 sites had been identified, with 122 proposed as “no further action” to the NMED

Further, of the 182 sites identified under the ER Project, 47 are within 0.5 mi of a major surface water drainage, either Tijeras Arroyo or Arroyo del Coyote (DOE 1996c). Of these, 39 were proposed by SNL/NM for no further action, either because confirmatory soil sampling failed to show the presence of contamination or contaminants in soil were present in low concentrations.

Sites that pose a potential risk to human health and the environment will undergo some type of remediation, often the removal of contaminated soil. Some residual contamination may remain at these sites, but at concentrations presenting little or no human-health risk. Immediate risks to human health are addressed through short-term measures, such as restricting site access or covering contaminated soil with tarps or commercially available dust suppression products that reduce the chance of airborne soil particles (DOE 1996c). Monitoring near ER sites indicates that exposure to dust particles is not a significant transport pathway for radioisotopes (Section 4.1) (SNL 1996a). The ER Project is scheduled for completion by 2004.

Soil contamination also exists at some active SNL/NM outdoor test facilities. In the past decade, environmental controls on testing have reduced the concentrations or extent of additional soil contamination. The ER Project addresses soil contamination resulting from past testing (DOE 1996c). Most of the soil contamination at these active sites is shallow surface contamination stemming from the explosion, destruction, or burning of tested devices containing hazardous material. The primary contaminants at these active sites are depleted uranium (DU) and lead.

SNL/NM actively performs environmental soil monitoring on and near KAFB to confirm the effectiveness of control systems in place at the various TAs. Soil samples are collected twice annually from 50 locations: 31 onsite, 13 at the site perimeter, and

6 offsite (SNL 1997d). Samples are analyzed for common radionuclides and metals, with analytical results compared to naturally occurring concentrations. For 1996, most soil monitoring results showed no difference from naturally occurring concentrations. However, three onsite locations had higher-than-background soil concentrations of tritium (averaging 20.13 pCi/ml versus 0.24 pCi/ml offsite), which were associated with identified ER Project sites in controlled areas (SNL 1996a, 1997d). Excluding these three locations, onsite tritium concentrations averaged 0.72 pCi/ml (SNL 1997d).

4.6 WATER RESOURCES AND HYDROLOGY

4.6.1 Groundwater

4.6.1.1 Definition of Resource

Groundwater in the KAFB area occurs within saturated unconsolidated geologic material and fractured and porous bedrock. Aquifers are subsurface layers of rock or unconsolidated material that are capable of yielding usable amounts of water to wells or springs.


4.6.1.2 Region of Influence

The groundwater beneath KAFB is part of an interconnected series of water-bearing geologic units within the Albuquerque Basin that form the Albuquerque-Belen Basin aquifer (Figure 4.5–1). This aquifer defines the ROI.

4.6.1.3 Affected Environment

The principal sedimentary fill of the Albuquerque-Belen Basin is the Santa Fe Group, consisting of gravels, sands, silts, and clays (Figure 4.6–1). The local (SNL/NM area) groundwater system has three hydrogeologic regions (HRs), which are delineated by their locations in relation to the geologic fault system that bisects KAFB (Figure 4.6–2).

HR-1, within which the SNL/NM TAs are located, is to the west of the fault system. It consists of thick unconsolidated sedimentary deposits overlying bedrock. The Albuquerque-Belen Basin aquifer occurs in this unit of unconsolidated sediments and is the source of Albuquerque’s municipal water. Groundwater flow is generally north to northwest in the northwestern portion of KAFB where TAs-I, -II, and -IV are located (Figure 4.6–2). Hydraulic conductivities range from less



Source: Original

Figure 4.6-1. Conceptual Diagram of Groundwater System Underlying KAFB
Santa Fe Group alluvial sediments and groundwater underlie KAFB.




Figure 4.6-2. Locations of Hydrogeologic Regions at KAFB
The SNL/NM area groundwater system has three hydrogeologic regions.

Source: SNL/NM 1997

than 0.1 ft to more than 100 ft per day. The depth of the unsaturated zone, from ground surface to the aquifer, increases toward the west and is approximately 500 ft at the western edge of KAFB.

HR-2 straddles the Sandia/Tijeras/Hubbell Springs fault system. This region is a transition between the unconsolidated sedimentary character of HR-1 and the bedrock-dominated character of HR-3. Hydraulic conductivities are highly variable, ranging from 0.003 ft per day in bedrock to near 150 ft per day in alluvial material. Depth to groundwater is also highly variable, ranging from 500 ft near the southeast corner of TA-III to near zero ft along the Arroyo del Coyote south of the Manzano Area (Figure 4.6–2). The eastern portion of KAFB, which includes the Coyote Test Field and the Withdrawn Area, is within HR-2 and HR-3.

HR-3 is characterized by its bedrock aquifers, although in some places a thin layer of groundwater-containing alluvial material overlies the bedrock. Depth to groundwater in HR-3 varies from 150 ft near the Hubbell Springs Fault to near zero ft along portions of Arroyo del Coyote (SNL/NM 1997a). The depth to groundwater may exceed 150 ft in mountainous areas, but data are limited.

Groundwater Quality

A network of monitoring wells is used to collect samples for characterizing baseline water chemistry and groundwater contamination (Figure 4.6–3). This network is part of an active environmental monitoring program covering groundwater, surface water, and air (SNL 1995c, 1996a).

The groundwater beneath SNL/NM and adjacent areas is the source of drinking water for SNL/NM, KAFB, and adjacent portions of the city of Albuquerque. The local groundwater is also used for irrigation and industry. Federal and state water quality standards are based on the type of water use (for example, drinking, irrigation, or recreation). Maximum contaminant levels (MCLs) are based on the National Primary Drinking Water Regulations. The New Mexico Water Quality Control Commission (NMWQCC) has established maximum allowable concentrations for some substances for which no Federal MCLs have been established (NMWQCC 1994).

Groundwater quality can be influenced by the presence of contaminants in the soil column above the groundwater, as well as in the groundwater itself. These influences are of major concern to the SNL/NM ER Project, which is investigating the nature and extent of

groundwater contamination from past activities at SNL/NM sites. All known groundwater contamination is the result of past waste management activities that occurred before the enactment of such laws as RCRA, the *Toxic Substances Control Act* (TSCA), and the *Clean Water Act* (CWA).

Locations of Potential or Known Groundwater Contamination

Sites with potential or known groundwater contamination at SNL/NM are Sandia North (an ER Project designation for groundwater investigations of sites in TA-I and TA-II), the Mixed Waste Landfill (MWL), locations in TA-V, Lurance Canyon Burn Site, and the CWL (SNL 1997d) (Figure 4.6–4). Measurements indicate that some contaminants at some of these sites exceed MCLs (40 CFR Part 141) (Table 4.6–1). Investigation or remediation of these sites is ongoing as part of the ER Project.


Sandia North

Sandia North is a 1.2-mi² area located in the northern part of KAFB. It encompasses TA-I and TA-II and includes approximately 40 ER sites. Underlying the Sandia North area are shallow water-bearing zones, with a gradient towards the southeast, and deep regional groundwater (approximately 500 ft deep) that flows generally to the northwest and north. Some city of Albuquerque and KAFB production wells are located within 1 mi of the Sandia North area. Trichloroethene (TCE) and nitrates have been detected in both the deep and shallow groundwater beneath the Sandia North area. Since 1993, six shallow and three deep wells have been used to monitor groundwater in the Sandia North area. TCE and nitrates have been detected repeatedly in some of these wells. In 1996, TCE was detected at just above the 0.005-mg/L MCL at a deep aquifer monitoring well; nitrate was detected at levels almost three times the MCL of 10 mg/L in another deep aquifer monitoring well (SNL 1997d).

An investigation plan is being implemented to characterize the sources and site hydrogeology (SNL/NM 1998bb). The sources of the TCE and nitrate have not been determined. Possible explanations include multiple sources among the SNL/NM ER sites located in this area or nearby private landfills not associated with SNL/NM.


Mixed Waste Landfill

The MWL was established in 1959 for the disposal of radioactive and mixed wastes. The landfill, inactive since



Source: SNL/NM 1997/

Figure 4.6-3. Locations of Groundwater Monitoring and Supply Wells
A network of monitoring wells is used to collect samples for environmental monitoring.



Sources: SNL 1997d; SNL/NM 1997f.

Figure 4.6-4. SNL/NM Known or Potential Groundwater Contamination Sites
Sites with potential for or that have known groundwater contamination are located at Tech Areas I, II, III, and V and the CTF.

Table 4.6–1. Maximum Recorded Levels of Suspected Groundwater Contamination at SNL/NM

SITE	CONTAMINANTS	MAX MEASURED CONCENTRATIONS	MCL
<i>Sandia North (TA-I and TA-II)</i>	TCE	0.0056 mg/L	0.005 mg/L
	Nitrate ^a	29 mg/L	10 mg/L
<i>TA-V</i>	TCE	0.019 mg/L	0.005 mg/L
	Nitrate ^a	12 mg/L	10 mg/L
<i>Chemical Waste Landfill</i>	TCE	0.026 mg/L	0.005 mg/L

Sources: 40 CFR Part 141, DOE 1996c, SNL 1997d
MCL: maximum contaminant level
mg/L: milligram per liter

TA: technical area
TCE: trichloroethene
^aAll nitrate concentrations are as nitrogen.

1988, is located in the north-central part of TA-III and encompasses approximately 2.6 ac. Uranium, thorium, transuranics, fission products, and tritium were disposed of in the landfill. Tritium has been detected in soils below and outside the perimeter of the MWL.

The regional water table at the MWL occurs at a depth of approximately 460 ft. No evidence of groundwater contamination has been detected at the landfill since September 1990 in 18 rounds of sampling. Nickel has been measured in one monitoring well at a concentration (0.145 mg/L) above the 0.1-mg/L MCL. The concentrations of nickel in groundwater samples at this well are attributed to dissolution of the stainless steel well screen (SNL 1997d). Such dissolution is a well-known phenomenon (Hewitt 1992, Oakley and Korte 1996), with these concentrations confined to water within or immediately surrounding the well (not characteristic of concentrations in the aquifer). Monitoring of nickel concentrations continues at this location. SNL/NM has removed broken and subsided concrete caps at the MWL to reduce the possibility of ponding water infiltrating into underlying wastes. The waste pits where the concrete caps were removed were backfilled with soil to ground surface to promote precipitation runoff. Site remediation is projected to be completed in 1999.

TA-V

The TA-V area contains seven monitoring wells, including those that monitor the Liquid Waste Disposal System (LWDS) site. During 1996, TCE was present at levels of about 3 to 4 times the 0.005-mg/L MCL at one LWDS well. TCE has been detected in several wells at concentrations below the MCL. The source of the TCE is unknown; however, it is believed that the TCE is reaching groundwater via aqueous phase transport. From

1963 to 1967, approximately 6.4 M gal of waste water were released to the LWDS drain field. Historical disposal of small amounts of TCE through the LWDS is a possible source. In 1996, nitrate concentrations as high as 12 mg/L (versus an MCL of 10 mg/L) were found in samples at two wells, including the LWDS well (SNL 1997d). The probable sources of the nitrates are septic tanks and leachfields; these systems have been closed and waste and contamination from these sites have been removed. Information about the hydrogeology and contamination at TA-V is presently being developed for a groundwater data report to be released by the SNL/NM ER Project in mid FY99.

Lurance Canyon Burn Site

The Lurance Canyon Burn Site is located in the eastern part of KAFB in a canyon in the Manzanita Mountains. This site was used in the 1970s for testing high explosives. Today it is used to test the effects of fire on weapons components and equipment. Nitrates have been consistently found in a production well used to supply fire-control water to the Burn Site, at concentrations ranging from 8 to 27 mg/L, near or above the 10-mg/L MCL (SNL 1997d). This well is upgradient from Burn Site activities, where it would not be expected to be affected by these activities. A recently completed downgradient well shows the presence of similar concentrations of nitrates. Isotopic analyses performed by SNL/NM indicate that these nitrates are not from septic systems or fertilizers and may be naturally occurring (SNL/NM 1997a). An ongoing investigation is intended to identify the source.

Chemical Waste Landfill

The CWL, located in TA-III, is currently managed in accordance with the *Chemical Waste Landfill Closure Plan*

(DOE 1992d) that was approved in 1993 by the NMED. Although cleanup is underway at the CWL, there is no plan to remove the entire source (DOE 1996c). The primary inorganic and organic contaminants of concern at the CWL are hexavalent chromium (disposed of as chromic acid) and TCE, respectively (DOE 1992d). Both contaminants have been discovered in the groundwater beneath the site at levels above the EPA's drinking water standards of 0.100 and 0.005 mg/L, respectively (SNL 1997d). The released chromium has not reached the water table, although chromium is found in groundwater samples as a result of stainless steel corrosion from the monitoring wells that were installed in 1988 (SNL/NM 1995d). Such dissolution is a well-known phenomenon (Hewitt 1992, Oakley and Korte 1996). Furthermore, if the chromium in the aquifer were a result of vertical transport of the CWL contamination, chromium contamination would be continuously seen in the vadose zone down to the water table. Chromium contamination is not found in the lower 410 ft of the vadose zone.

Groundwater Quantity

Little moisture is available for groundwater recharge from direct precipitation on the site. Recharge estimates range from 0.004 to 0.1 inch per year. Local groundwater recharge is associated primarily with infiltration of arroyo water during short-term storm events. Water supply wells (in the Santa Fe Group) for the city of Albuquerque and KAFB are near the northern boundary of KAFB (Figure 4.6–3). Pumping from these wells and others throughout the Albuquerque-Belen Basin results in groundwater withdrawal exceeding recharge. The 1996 KAFB withdrawal was 1.16 B gal; some of the nearby city well fields pump considerably more than this amount (SNL/NM 1997a).

An excess of withdrawal over recharge results in a continuing decline in groundwater levels beneath the site. In HR-1, groundwater levels have been declining at rates of 0.2 to 3.0 ft per year. During the 12-year period from 1985 through 1996, water levels declined by more than 35 ft in the extreme northwestern portion of KAFB (Figure 4.6–5). At KAFB, the rates of drawdown are greatest westward from the fault zone and northward near the water-supply wells. Water levels in HR-2 and HR-3 have not been affected by water supply production in HR-1 (SNL/NM 1997a).

A shallow groundwater system underlies TA-II and TA-IV at approximately 300 ft below the ground surface. Groundwater within this system perches on a relatively

impermeable layer of sediments above the Albuquerque-Belen Basin aquifer. Relatively shallow groundwater also underlies the Tijeras Arroyo Golf Course, about 1.5 mi east of TA-II. Water levels in this area are rising at a rate of 2 ft per year, most likely because of golf course watering. Existing information is insufficient to determine whether this shallow zone is connected to the regional Albuquerque-Belen Basin aquifer (SNL/NM 1997a).

Water level declines in the Albuquerque-Belen Basin as a whole mirror those in HR-1. Estimates of basin-wide declines range from 20 to 160 ft since the 1960s, when significant increases in groundwater withdrawal began (SNL/NM 1997a).

4.6.2 Surface Water

4.6.2.1 Definition of Resource

The surface water system on KAFB is a reflection of the dry high-desert climate of the area. Surface water flows through several major and many small unnamed arroyos, primarily during summer thunderstorms (July through September). With the exception of flow from one spring, there are no perennial streams or other surface water bodies at KAFB. As an example of how infrequently water flows in the arroyos, flow was detected at the lowermost Tijeras Arroyo monitoring station on only 28 days during the 4-year period from 1992 through 1995. Floodplains occur next to the major arroyos; however, their areas are small in comparison to the size of KAFB (Figure 4.6–6). Wetlands are present only in the immediate vicinity of several springs in the Manzanita Mountains.

4.6.2.2 Region of Influence

The ROI for surface water is onsite arroyos and the watershed downstream from KAFB, which consists of Tijeras Arroyo, extending from the western KAFB boundary to the Rio Grande, and the Rio Grande downstream from Tijeras Arroyo. Surface water flowing in arroyos and subject to SNL/NM influences can affect KAFB and downstream resources and users. Surface water in Tijeras Arroyo flows through public and private lands west of KAFB before discharging into the Rio Grande.

4.6.2.3 Affected Environment

Major Arroyos

The major surface drainages at SNL/NM are Tijeras Arroyo and Arroyo del Coyote (Figure 4.6–6). With the





Figure 4.6-5. Decline in Water Levels from 1985 through 1996

During the period from 1985 through 1996, groundwater levels in parts of KAFB declined by more than 35 ft.

Sources: SNL/NM 1997a, 1997f; MMSLO 1997



Source: SNL/NM 1997

Figure 4.6-6. Arroyos, Floodplains, and Springs at KAFB
 Surface water flows through several major and many small unnamed arroyos, primarily during summer thunderstorms.

exception of two short sections of channel with intermittent flow (fed by springs), these drainages flow only during storm events.

Tijeras Arroyo is the primary drainage feature on KAFB. Above the point where Tijeras Arroyo enters KAFB, it drains approximately 80 mi²; at the point where it exits, the drainage area encompasses approximately 122 mi². Tijeras Arroyo is the only substantial outlet for surface water exiting KAFB; this arroyo joins the Rio Grande approximately 6 mi downstream of the KAFB boundary.

Arroyo del Coyote joins Tijeras Arroyo approximately 2 mi upstream of where Tijeras Arroyo leaves KAFB, and drains approximately 39 mi².

Several unnamed arroyos and drainages to the south of Arroyo del Coyote dissipate as the topographic relief decreases to the west. Storm water in this area either evaporates or infiltrates into the soil; therefore, there is no hydrologic surface connection from these areas to Tijeras Arroyo or the Rio Grande.

Floodplains and Wetlands

Floods and runoff occur most commonly during the summer thunderstorm season (July through September) when approximately 50 percent of the average annual rainfall occurs. Snow in the Manzanita Mountains can produce local runoff that rarely reaches the lower portions of the arroyos or the Rio Grande. Figure 4.6–6 shows the 100- and 500-year floodplains. Note that 100-year floodplains identified in TA-I (DOE 1996c) are not shown on Figure 4.6–6. These are narrow floodplains confined to existing drainage channels and several low-lying streets and vacant areas.

Wetlands on KAFB are associated with several springs, all within the Arroyo del Coyote drainage (Figure 4.6–6). Two of these springs, Coyote Springs and Sol Se Mete Spring, flow year-round. G-Spring, Burn Site Spring, Cattail Spring, and Homestead Spring are intermittent (SNL 1997d). The water originating at springs on KAFB travels only a short distance before infiltrating the soil. Associated wetlands (if any) are smaller than 1 ac (Section 4.7.3.2). Only the Burn Site Spring is under SNL/NM control.

No floodplain/wetlands impacts were identified for the SWEIS for which a floodplain/wetlands assessment is required under 10 CFR Part 1022.

Surface Water Quality – Storm Water Runoff

Water flowing in arroyos is subject to the quality standards listed in 20 New Mexico Administrative Code (NMAC) 6.1, *State of New Mexico Standards for Interstate and Intrastate Streams* (NMWQCC 1994). This regulation includes a set of general standards, applicable to all surface water in the state (including ephemeral streams) and additional or more stringent standards for designated bodies of water. They include criteria within the KAFB boundary for stream bottom deposits; floating solids, oil, and grease; color; odor and taste of fish; plant nutrients; toxic substances; radioactivity; pathogens; temperature; turbidity; salinity; and dissolved gases. For “non-classified” waters, such as the arroyos on KAFB, livestock watering and wildlife habitat standards apply. Livestock watering standards are the most stringent, with numeric standards for 12 metals, radium-226/-228, tritium, and gross alpha.

New Mexico standards also apply to the Rio Grande from the Alameda Bridge (14 mi upstream of the Albuquerque sewage treatment plant) to the headwaters of Elephant Butte Reservoir (120 mi downstream of Tijeras Arroyo). The designated uses of this water are irrigation, limited warm water fishery, livestock watering, wildlife habitat, and secondary contact. Additional water quality criteria cover pH, temperature, fecal coliform bacteria, total dissolved solids, sulfate, and chloride.

The Rio Grande flows through the Pueblo of Isleta, beginning 6 mi downstream from the confluence with Tijeras Arroyo. The Pueblo of Isleta has designated surface water quality standards (Isleta Pueblo 1992) that parallel the New Mexico standards for many quality indicators. However, Pueblo of Isleta standards are generally more specific (quantitative measures rather than qualitative criteria for oil and grease, color, plant nutrients, and turbidity) and stricter (for example, a fecal coliform limit of 100 colonies/100 ml versus 1,000 colonies/100 ml). The stricter criteria stem from additional designated uses of the Rio Grande, which are “primary contact” and “primary contact-ceremonial.”

SNL/NM’s discharge to arroyos is limited to runoff during storm events. Storm water from TAs-I, -II, and -IV is collected in storm sewer systems that discharge to Tijeras Arroyo. There is no discharge from TAs-III and -V because of evaporation and infiltration of storm water into the air and ground.

Potential Sources of Runoff Contamination

Environmental Restoration Project Sites

A few ER sites are located adjacent to arroyos. In July 1997, a heavy storm washed DU into the soil outside the boundary of an ER site. (This event was documented in the Occurrence Reporting and Processing System [ORPS] Report number ALO-KO-SNL-6000-1997-0006 and reported to the state [SNL 1997a].) However, past sampling activities have not shown clear evidence of contamination in local surface runoff water. Samples taken from SNL/NM operational sites in the upper Arroyo del Coyote showed higher levels of aluminum, magnesium, and copper compared to samples taken upstream of the sites, but none of these constituents has been associated with SNL/NM activities or ER sites in the area (SNL 1995c).

Permitted Storm Water Discharge

SNL/NM monitors storm water runoff from TAs-I, -II, and -IV for compliance with National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits. Sampling conducted in 1995 and 1996 show four exceedances of the New Mexico Maximum Allowable Concentrations (MACs). Manganese was detected above the 0.2-mg/L MAC on three occasions (twice at 0.24 mg/L, and once at 0.57 mg/L). Barium was detected above the 1.0-mg/L MAC on one occasion (1.1 mg/L); this concentration may be naturally occurring. No exceedances of radionuclides, organics, or other metals were detected. The concentrations of manganese noted are likely the result of high natural concentrations in KAFB soils (SNL/NM 1996e).

Outdoor Testing Facilities

Radioactive materials could be released to the ground during outdoor testing activities conducted in TA-III and the Coyote Test Field (SNL/NM 1998a). Only facilities in the Coyote Test Field have a defined surface water drainage path to Tijeras Arroyo. SNL/NM sampling in Tijeras Arroyo has shown only trace amounts of the sampled radionuclides, uranium-233/234, -235, and -238; thorium-228, -230, and -232; and strontium-90 (Appendix B). These concentrations are consistent with estimates of background levels for surface water (SNL/NM 1996g).

Surface Water Monitoring Data

During storm events in 1994 and 1995, SNL/NM collected 32 surface water samples from onsite arroyos

(Figure 4.6–7, Table 4.6–2). Not all samples were analyzed for all constituents. Most constituents of concern, which include dissolved metals, explosives, and radionuclides, were found only at trace concentrations (SNL/NM 1996g). Only aluminum was detected above applicable standards in any of the samples (5 of 29 samples analyzed). Three of these samples, including the sample with the highest aluminum concentration (41.4 mg/L), were collected from tributaries of the Arroyo del Coyote in the Withdrawn Area. These sampling locations are upstream of SNL/NM facilities, indicating that aluminum at these concentrations is naturally occurring.

Surface Water Quality - Wastewater


SNL/NM discharges both sanitary and industrial effluents into the Albuquerque sanitary sewer system. Sanitary effluents include wastewater from restrooms and cafeterias and from other domestic activities. Industrial discharges originate from laboratory processes, general manufacturing, and experimental activities. SNL/NM actively monitors compliance with discharge permits (see Section 7.3.4.1) and policies that allow no direct disposal of hazardous chemicals or radioactive materials into the sewer system.

As part of the wastewater management program, SNL/NM also maintains a small number of septic systems (at remote facilities) that are periodically pumped and discharged by certified pumping contractors. Contents are sampled before pumping to ensure that the sewage meets regulatory criteria. SNL/NM submits wastewater permit applications, which detail potential pollutant sources and the raw materials used in industrial processes, to the city of Albuquerque. To ensure compliance with the discharge limits stated on each city permit, SNL/NM conducts monthly sampling at each general outfall monitoring station and continuous monitoring of pH and water flow at all permitted stations.

During 1996, SNL/NM reported two permit violations for all wastewater discharges (both pH exceedances lasted a total of 4.5 hrs). No violations were reported for 1995 (SNL 1996a).

Surface Water Quantity

The quantity of surface water flow depends on the nature of both the drainage area (soil characteristics, slope, and vegetation) and the storm event (intensity and duration). Flow data for the arroyos is limited; only one stream gauge was in place before 1994.



Sources: SNL 1995c; SNL/NM 1997f

Figure 4.6-7. Locations of Surface Water Samples Collected During 1994 and 1995
Thirty-two surface water samples were collected from nineteen locations at KAFB during 1994 and 1995.

Table 4.6–2. Summary of Surface Water Quality Data Collected by the Site-Wide Hydrogeologic Characterization Project (1994 and 1995)

ANALYTE	SAMPLES ANALYZED	NUMBER OF DETECTIONS	MINIMUM	MAXIMUM	MEAN DETECT	MEDIAN DETECT	STANDARD ^a
METALS (mg/L)							
<i>Silver</i>	29	2	ND	0.0061	0.00485	0.00485	NA
<i>Aluminum</i>	29	21	ND	41.4	4.93	1.7	5.0
<i>Arsenic</i>	29	1	ND	0.016	0.016	0.016	0.2
<i>Barium</i>	29	20	ND	3.9	0.53	0.22	NA
<i>Beryllium</i>	29	3	ND	0.0091	0.0062	0.0056	NA
<i>Calcium</i>	29	18	ND	1,690	205	51.65	NA
<i>Cadmium</i>	29	1	ND	0.0056	0.0056	0.0056	0.05
<i>Cobalt</i>	29	8	ND	0.021	0.0096	0.0084	1.0
<i>Chromium</i>	29	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	1.0
<i>Copper</i>	29	16	ND	0.096	0.022	0.0135	0.5
<i>Iron</i>	29	19	ND	23.2	2.21	0.82	NA
<i>Mercury</i>	29	3	ND	0.0003	0.00019	0.00016	0.01
<i>Potassium</i>	18	17	ND	14.9	4.94	4.3	NA
<i>Magnesium</i>	29	26	ND	20.4	4.44	3.5	NA
<i>Manganese</i>	29	18	ND	2.6	0.54	0.27	NA
<i>Sodium</i>	19	10	ND	11.3	3.28	2.6	NA
<i>Nickel</i>	29	10	ND	0.054	0.019	0.00965	NA
<i>Lead</i>	29	15	ND	0.04	0.015	0.011	0.1
<i>Antimony</i>	29	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
<i>Selenium</i>	29	3	ND	0.012	0.0076	0.0057	0.05
<i>Tin</i>	10	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
<i>Thallium</i>	29	3	ND	0.011	0.0086	0.011	NA
<i>Vanadium</i>	29	19	ND	0.081	0.024	0.016	0.1
<i>Zinc</i>	28	18	ND	0.24	0.087	0.059	25.0
EXPLOSIVES (µg/L)							
<i>1, 3-DNB</i>	16	0	ND	ND	NA	NA	NA
<i>HMX</i>	16	0	ND	ND	NA	NA	NA
<i>Nitrobenzene</i>	16	0	ND	ND	NA	NA	NA
<i>RDX</i>	16	0	ND	ND	NA	NA	NA

Table 4.6–2. Summary of Surface Water Quality Data Collected by the Site-Wide Hydrogeologic Characterization Project (1994 and 1995) (concluded)

ANALYTE	SAMPLES ANALYZED	NUMBER OF DETECTIONS	MINIMUM	MAXIMUM	MEAN DETECT	MEDIAN DETECT	STANDARD ^a
EXPLOSIVES (µg/L)							
<i>Tetryl</i>	16	2	ND	1.9	1.25	1.25	NA
<i>2,6-DNT</i>	16	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
<i>2,4-DNT</i>	15	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
<i>2,4,6-TNT</i>	16	2	ND	0.11	0.087	0.087	NA
<i>2-Amino-4,6-DNT</i>	16	5	ND	0.28	0.091	0.038	NA
<i>4-Amino-2,6-DNT</i>	16	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
<i>1,3,5-TNB</i>	16	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
RADIONUCLIDES (pCi/L)							
<i>Uranium-233/234</i>	26	26	0.17	22	4.38	1.415	NA
<i>Uranium-235</i>	26	19	ND	0.98	0.25	0.13	NA
<i>Uranium-238</i>	26	25	ND	42	4.77	1.1	NA
<i>Thorium-228</i>	10	6	ND	4.81	1.61	1.46	NA
<i>Thorium-230</i>	26	25	ND	27	5.04	1.2	NA
<i>Thorium-232</i>	26	18	ND	24	5.73	2.6	NA
<i>Strontium-90</i>	23	23	0.26	19	3.12	1.7	NA

Sources: SNL 1995c, SNL/NM 1996g

µg/L: micrograms per liter
 DNB: Dinitrobenzene
 DNT: Dinitrotoluene
 HMX: High Melt Explosive
 mg/L: milligrams per liter
 NA: not applicable

ND: not detected

pCi/L: picocuries per liter

RDX: Research Development Explosive

TNB: Trinitrobenzene

TNT: Trinitrotoluene

^aMost stringent standard for designated use from 20 NMAC 6.1 (NMWQCC 1994)

SNL/NM activities affect surface water quantity in two ways: storm water runoff from SNL/NM facilities and discharge of process and sanitary water to the Albuquerque sewage treatment plant.

Storm Water Runoff

Parking lots, buildings, and other activities that have altered the natural vegetation or topography have affected the quantity of storm water runoff. Increases in the amount of storm water runoff from SNL/NM activities are due to the replacement of natural surfaces (soil and desert vegetation) with more impervious surfaces (primarily buildings and parking lots). Runoff to arroyos is more likely to occur from impervious surfaces, either directly or through storm sewers. The greatest areal extent of paved surfaces and buildings is in TA-I, which contains the densest population of SNL/NM employees.

Discharge to Sanitary Sewer

SNL/NM discharges approximately 770,000 gal of water per day to the sanitary sewer, the result of manufacturing activities and sanitary water used in SNL/NM facilities (SNL/NM 1997a). This water flows to the Albuquerque sewage treatment plant, where it is treated along with other sewage from the city. The treated water is discharged to the Rio Grande, about 0.7 mi north of Tijeras Arroyo. The discharged water must meet Federal and state quality standards.

4.7 BIOLOGICAL AND ECOLOGICAL RESOURCES

4.7.1 Definition of Resource

Biological resources are the plants and animals that live on or otherwise rely on lands at KAFB and contiguous lands for their continued existence. Biological resources include the habitats where plant and animal species live, as well as the plants, animals, and ecosystems that the Federal and state governments and agencies specifically address as protected or deserving of special consideration in planning and management activities.

4.7.2 Region of Influence

The ROI consists of KAFB, the Withdrawn Area, and the DOE buffer zones adjacent to the southwest corner of KAFB. In addition, it includes the adjacent lands to which animals regularly travel.

4.7.3 Affected Environment

4.7.3.1 Overview

KAFB is located at the juncture of four major North American biological provinces: Great Basin, Rocky Mountains, Great Plains, and Chihuahuan Desert (Brown 1982). Each province influences the existing biological communities. KAFB contains a diversity of biological resources due, in part, to these influences and an elevation change from a low point of approximately 5,200 ft in Tijeras Arroyo to a high point of 7,715 ft at Mt. Washington in the Manzanita Mountains.

Biological data at KAFB have been collected primarily for specific projects (Biggs 1991; IT Corp. 1995; SNL 1994a). Broad-scale studies include sensitive species surveys on KAFB (New Mexico Natural Heritage Program [USAF 1995d]), wetland surveys (USACE 1995), and plant and vertebrate animal inventory of portions of KAFB (SNL/NM 1997a). More extensive information on the biological resources at KAFB is available in the *SNL/NM Environmental Information Document* (SNL/NM 1997a).

4.7.3.2 Biodiversity

At least 267 plant species and 195 animal species occur on KAFB (SNL/NM 1997a). This diversity is due, in part, to the variety of habitats, which include cliff faces, caves, abandoned mines, and drainages, as well as the four major vegetation associations, which are grassland, woodland, riparian, and altered. Restricted access and limited planned

development have benefited biological resources at KAFB. The grasslands appear to be of particularly good quality in relation to the region, due to the exclusion of livestock grazing for 50 years (Parmenter & Chavez 1995). The presence of grama grass cactus may be due to this lack of grazing. The state of New Mexico delisted grama grass cactus as endangered in 1995, partially as a result of the populations found during surveys on KAFB (SNL/NM 1997a).


Plants

The four major vegetation associations at KAFB, grassland, woodland, riparian, and altered, are distinct in the form and composition of their vegetation (USAF 1996). Figure 4.7–1 shows the areal extent and location of the major natural vegetation associations on KAFB.

The grassland association occupies the lower alluvial slopes and terrace surfaces of the Rio Grande valley near the city of Albuquerque. It is the dominant vegetation association on KAFB, west of the Withdrawn Area. Coyote Test Field and TAs-I, -II, -III, -IV, and -V are on grasslands. Selected plant species common in the grasslands are listed in Table 4.7–1.

Woodland vegetation occurs primarily on the upper alluvial slopes and mountainous areas of the Withdrawn Area. Species generally found in the 6,000- to 6,200-ft elevation range include one-seed juniper with a groundcover that includes blue grama. Pinyon pine-juniper woodland, at an elevation of 6,200 to 6,500 ft, is characterized by an even mix of pinyon pine and one-seed juniper. The numbers of ponderosa pine have declined since 1850 due to fire suppression practices and climate change (Baisan & Swetnam 1994). Many areas of the woodlands are becoming progressively choked with deadwood and dense thickets of young trees (Baisan & Swetnam 1994).

Isolated, narrow bands of riparian vegetation occur along the surface drainages of KAFB. These drainages are predominantly ephemeral and contain flow only after large rainfall events. Riparian vegetation constitutes less than 5 percent of the area of KAFB. The riparian woodland vegetation is limited primarily to the upper reaches of Arroyo del Coyote and associated drainages. Common riparian plant species are listed in Table 4.7–1. The sites contain dense stands of trees where the water table is close to land surface, such as at G Spring and Coyote Springs. The riparian woodland vegetation is dominated by exotic species, principally salt cedar, which is widespread in the arroyos on KAFB (SNL/NM 1997a). They form dense stands on Arroyo del Coyote at G Spring and near Coyote Springs. Large, mature native



Source: SNL/NM 1997

Figure 4.7-1. Major Vegetation Associations at KAFB
The diversity of plant and animal species on KAFB is due in part, to the presence of four major vegetation associations.

Table 4.7–1. Selected Plant Species Common in the Vegetation Associations Occurring on KAFB

COMMON NAME	SCIENTIFIC NAME	VEGETATION ASSOCIATION
<i>Black Grama</i>	<i>Bouteloua eriopoda</i>	Grasslands
<i>Blue Grama</i>	<i>Bouteloua gracilis</i>	Grasslands
<i>Fourwing Saltbush</i>	<i>Atriplex canescens</i>	Grasslands
<i>Galleta</i>	<i>Hilaria jamesii</i>	Grasslands
<i>Sand Sagebrush</i>	<i>Artemisia filifolia</i>	Grasslands
<i>Apache Plume</i>	<i>Fallugia paradoxa</i>	Riparian
<i>Fremont Cottonwood</i>	<i>Populus fremontii</i>	Riparian
<i>Salt-Cedar</i>	<i>Tamarix pentandra</i>	Riparian
<i>Siberian Elm</i>	<i>Ulmus pumila</i>	Riparian
<i>Tree-of-Heaven</i>	<i>Ailanthus altissima</i>	Riparian
<i>Gambel Oak</i>	<i>Quercus gambellii</i>	Woodlands
<i>Mountain Mahogany</i>	<i>Cercocarpus montanus</i>	Woodlands
<i>Pinyon Pine</i>	<i>Pinus edulis</i>	Woodlands
<i>Ponderosa Pine</i>	<i>Pinus ponderosa</i>	Woodlands
<i>One-Seed Juniper</i>	<i>Juniperus monosperma</i>	Woodlands
<i>Wavy-Leaf Oak</i>	<i>Quercus undulata</i>	Woodlands
<i>Cattail</i>	<i>Typha latifolia</i>	Wetlands
<i>Three-square</i>	<i>Scirpus americanus</i>	Wetlands
<i>Torrey Rush</i>	<i>Juncus torreyi</i>	Wetlands
<i>Wire Rush</i>	<i>Juncus balticus</i>	Wetlands
<i>Poplar</i>	<i>Populus spp.</i>	Altered
<i>Russian Thistle</i>	<i>Salsola kali</i>	Altered
<i>Summer Cypress</i>	<i>Cupressus arizonica</i>	Altered

Sources: Parmenter & Chavez 1995; SNL 1997a, 1994a; SNL/NM 1974; USACE 1995

Fremont cottonwood trees occur where there is a sufficient subsurface water supply.

Human development and activities have created altered vegetation associations at KAFB. This vegetation ranges from no vegetative cover to manicured landscapes, such as the golf course. Most of this vegetation consists of nonnative species. Common plant species in altered vegetation are listed in Table 4.7–1.

Aquatic Habitat

Natural spring-fed wetlands form a minor component of the riparian habitat on KAFB and are cumulatively less than 1 acre in size. KAFB has six wetlands, all associated with springs (USACE 1995) (Figure 4.6–6). These wetlands are designated as jurisdictional wetlands under Section 404 of the CWA, because they have the soils, hydrology, and vegetation that meet standard criteria (USACE 1995). The largest wetland is Coyote Springs in Arroyo del Coyote. Two of the wetlands, Sol se Mete and Burn Site Springs, are in the canyons of the Withdrawn Area. Species characteristic of these wetlands include wire

rush, three-square, Torrey rush, and cattail (USACE 1995). Only the Burn Site Spring is on land used by SNL/NM. The USFS manages a tank that collects water for wildlife at this spring and Sol se Mete Spring. The USAF administers constructed ponds on KAFB Tijeras Arroyo Golf Course and a constructed lake, Christian Lake, in the southern part of KAFB.

Animals

Each of KAFB’s vegetation associations support a distinct assemblage of animal species, which include amphibians, reptiles, birds, and mammals. Each species exhibits specific habitat requirements for food, water, and cover, as well as behaviorally controlled requirements, such as travel corridors (areas through which animals habitually move), breeding site preferences, and sensitivity to human activity. Because of their mobility, bird

communities are particularly dynamic. Although some bird species at KAFB are resident throughout the year, many are migratory. They are only present seasonally, breeding, wintering, or traveling between their breeding and wintering grounds.

The most important ecological factor that controls wildlife communities on KAFB is the limited availability of surface water (USAF 1996). Selected common animal species and habitats on KAFB are listed in Table 4.7–2.

Large predators in the woodlands include the mountain lion and the black bear. The mule deer is the only large herbivore known to use KAFB and is also the principal game animal. Grassland-juniper vegetation in the foothills surrounding Lurance Canyon and Sol se Mete Canyon is an important winter range for mule deer (Biggs 1991).

Table 4.7–2. Selected Common Animal Species and Habitats on KAFB

COMMON NAME	SCIENTIFIC NAME	HABITAT TYPE
<i>American Kestrel</i>	<i>Falco sparverius</i>	Grasslands
<i>Coyote</i>	<i>Canis latrans</i>	Grasslands
<i>Deer Mouse</i>	<i>Peromyscus maniculatus</i>	Grasslands
<i>Desert Cottontail</i>	<i>Sylvilagus auduboni</i>	Grasslands
<i>Red-Tailed Hawk</i>	<i>Buteo jamaicensis</i>	Grasslands
<i>Whiptail Lizard</i>	<i>Cnemidophorus spp.</i>	Grasslands
<i>Ash-Throated Flycatcher</i>	<i>Myiarchus cinerascens</i>	Woodlands
<i>Cooper’s Hawk</i>	<i>Accipiter cooperii</i>	Woodlands
<i>Mule Deer</i>	<i>Odocoileus hemionus</i>	Woodlands
<i>Northern Flicker</i>	<i>Colaptes auratus</i>	Woodlands
<i>Rock Squirrel</i>	<i>Spermophilus variegatus</i>	Woodlands
<i>Scrub Jay</i>	<i>Aphelocoma coerulescens</i>	Woodlands
<i>Lark Sparrow</i>	<i>Chondestes grammacus</i>	Riparian
<i>Gray Fox</i>	<i>Urocyon cinereoargenteus</i>	Riparian
<i>Red-Spotted Toad</i>	<i>Bufo punctatus</i>	Riparian
<i>Violet-Green Swallow</i>	<i>Tachycineta thalassina</i>	Riparian
<i>Barn Swallow</i>	<i>Hirundo rustica</i>	Altered
<i>European Starling</i>	<i>Sturnus vulgaris</i>	Altered
<i>House Sparrow</i>	<i>Passer domesticus</i>	Altered

Sources: Parmenter & Chavez 1995, SNL 1994a, SNL/NM 1997u, USAF 1995d

Drainages provide a focal point for animals due to greater availability of food, water, and cover generally found along their courses. Diversity is, therefore, generally higher in the riparian habitat, especially where surface water is available. Most large mammal species of the area inhabit the canyons and arroyos. Coyote Springs, for example, attracts mule deer and a large number of bird species.

Drainages and their associated riparian vegetation serve as important wildlife corridors. In the Withdrawn Area, the Madera and Bonita Canyons and ridgelines contain travel corridors. On a regional scale, the Manzanita Mountains are an important migratory bird corridor for neotropical migrants, including several raptor species (SNL/NM 1997a).

Many species favor habitats that are disturbed, altered, or close to human activities. Colonies of Gunnison's prairie dogs (a state sensitive species) occur in the margins of developed areas including roads, housing, runways, and the golf course. On DOE lands, the colonies are limited to TA-I. The burrows in these colonies provide nesting sites for the burrowing owl, a species protected under the *Migratory Bird Treaty Act* (16 U.S.C. §703). The grass, ponds, and variety of trees at KAFB golf course provide a particularly rich haven for animals, including waterfowl and shorebirds.

Exposed cliffs on the west side of the Manzano Mountains provide potential nesting or roosting sites for a wide variety of birds, including raptors such as the golden eagle and peregrine falcon. Both species have been observed in that area; however, no nesting activity for either of these species has been documented. Several abandoned mines in the Manzanita Mountains provide habitat for bats.

4.7.3.3 Threatened, Endangered, and Sensitive Species

There are four agencies that have the authority to designate threatened, endangered, and sensitive species occurring in New Mexico. The agencies are the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), the New Mexico Game and Fish Department (NMGFD), the New Mexico Forestry and Resource Conservation Division (NMFRCDD), and the USFS. The state of New Mexico separates the regulatory authority for plants and animals between the NMFRCDD and the NMGFD, respectively. The USFS lists species for special management consideration on USFS lands. The USFWS protects species under the authority of the *Endangered Species Act of 1973* and the *Migratory Bird Treaty*

Act, which contains a list of migratory nongame birds for which information exists indicating declining populations. The levels of protection afforded threatened, endangered, and sensitive species on KAFB are defined in Table 4.7–3.

The Pueblo of Isleta recognizes and applies all state and Federal designations of endangered, threatened, and sensitive species to populations that occur on pueblo lands (SNL/NM 1997a). In addition, the Pueblo of Isleta considers all species occurring on pueblo lands to be of cultural importance and, therefore, protected (SNL/NM 1997a).

Plants

Table 4.7–3 lists the threatened, endangered, and sensitive species and habitats on KAFB. One state-listed sensitive plant species, the Santa Fe milkvetch, occurs on the low hills in the southwestern part of KAFB (SNL 1994a). The Strong prickly pear, found near the northern boundary of KAFB, is on the state of New Mexico Rare Plant Review List (Ferguson 1998). One USFS-listed species, the grama grass cactus, is found in areas of the grasslands.

Animals

The peregrine falcon is the only Federally listed threatened or endangered species that may frequent KAFB. A probable sighting near Mt. Washington was likely a migrant (USAF 1995d). No nesting activity of this species has been observed and KAFB contains only marginal nesting habitat (USAF 1995d). No Federally proposed or candidate species occur on KAFB. In 1993, a colony of state-listed threatened gray vireos was discovered in the western foothills of the Withdrawn Area on land controlled by the USAF. This is the largest known concentration of gray vireos in the state of New Mexico (USAF 1995d).

Eight species of concern have been observed on KAFB, in addition to thirteen migratory nongame birds of management concern for the USFWS, Region 2 (Table 4.7–3). These species are protected under the *Migratory Bird Treaty Act* (16 U.S.C. §703).

Four state-listed threatened animal species occur on KAFB (Table 4.7–3). Eleven USFS-listed sensitive animal species have also been observed on KAFB (Table 4.7–3). One of the state-listed sensitive species, Pale Townsend's big-eared bat, has been observed hibernating in two caves (Altenbach 1997).

Table 4.7–3. Threatened, Endangered, and Sensitive Species and their Habitats on KAFB

COMMON NAME	SCIENTIFIC NAME	STATUS	HABITAT
ANIMALS			
<i>Baird's Sparrow</i>	<i>Ammodramus bairdii</i>	SC, ST, FSS	Grasslands and moist meadows
<i>Bell's Vireo</i>	<i>Vireo bellii arizonae</i>	ST, FSS	Canyons
<i>Black Swift</i>	<i>Cyseloides niger borealis</i>	SS	Higher elevations
<i>Desert Massasauga</i>	<i>Sistrurus catenatus edwardsii</i>	FSS	Grasslands and arroyos
<i>Ferruginous Hawk</i>	<i>Buteo regalis</i>	SC, FSS	Grasslands and open shrublands
<i>Gunnison's Prairie Dog</i>	<i>Cynomys gunnisoni</i>	SS	Grasslands
<i>Gray Vireo</i>	<i>Vireo vicinior</i>	ST, FSS	Juniper woodlands & shrublands
<i>Loggerhead Shrike</i>	<i>Lanius ludovicianus</i>	SC	Shrublands & shrubby grasslands
<i>Pale Townsend's Big-Eared Bat</i>	<i>Plecotus townsendii pallescens</i>	SC, SS, FSS	Caves, mines, and rock shelters
<i>Peregrine Falcon</i>	<i>Falco peregrinus</i>	FE, ST, FSS	Cliffs, woodlands, and streams
<i>Small-Footed Myotis</i>	<i>Myotis ciliolabrum</i>	SC, SS	Caves, rock crevices, and grasslands
<i>Swainson's Hawk</i>	<i>Buteo swainsonii</i>	FSS	Grasslands and lower slopes
<i>Texas Horned Lizard</i>	<i>Phrynosoma cornutum</i>	SC, FSS	Grasslands and open deserts
<i>Texas Longnose Snake</i>	<i>Rhinocheilus lecontei</i>	FSS	Grasslands and arroyos
<i>Western Spotted Skunk</i>	<i>Spilogale gracilis</i>	SS	Arroyos, canyons, and rocky slopes
<i>Western Burrowing Owl</i>	<i>Athene cunicularia hypugea</i>	SC	Grasslands and open shrublands
<i>White-Faced Ibis</i>	<i>Plegadis chihi</i>	SC, FSS	Marshes, ponds, & riparian areas
PLANTS			
<i>Grama Grass Cactus</i>	<i>Pediocactus papyracanthus</i>	FSS	Grasslands
<i>Santa Fe Milkvetch</i>	<i>Astragalus feenis</i>	NML2 FSS	Limestone hills in grasslands
<i>Strong Prickly Pear</i>	<i>Opuntia valida</i>	NML3	Lower elevation hills

Sources: NMDGF 1997; SNL 1994a, b; SNL/NM 1997a; USAF 1995d; USFS 1994; USFWS 1998

FE: Federal Endangered: "... Any species that is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range" (16 U.S.C. Chapter 35).

SC: Federal species of concern: Species for which further biological research and field study are needed to resolve their conservation status (USFS-listed species).

FSS: United States Forest Service Sensitive Species: Species for which population viability is a concern based on current or predicted numbers, density, distribution, or habitat capability.

NML2: New Mexico List 2: Official listing of plant species that are vulnerable to extinction or extirpation within the state due to rarity or restricted distribution, but are not protected under the *New Mexico Endangered Plant Species Act*.

NML3: New Mexico List 3: Official Listing of plant species that are on the New Mexico Rare Plant Review List as species for which more information is needed, but are not protected under the *New Mexico Endangered Plant Species Act*.

ST: State Threatened: New Mexico-listed species protected as threatened under the *Wildlife Conservation Act*.

SS: State Sensitive: New Mexico-listed species: Taxa that, in the opinion of a qualified New Mexico Game and Fish Department biologist, deserve special consideration in management and planning, and are not listed threatened or endangered by the state of New Mexico. These can include taxa that are listed as threatened, endangered, or sensitive by other agencies; taxa with limited protection; and taxa without legal protection. The intent of this category is to alert land managers of the need for management where these taxa could be affected.

4.7.3.4 Biomonitoring

Ecological monitoring of selected biota, including small mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians, and vegetation, is conducted annually by SNL/NM. Baseline measurements are collected on potential contaminant loads in species as well species density and composition. In 1997, data were collected at two sites: TA-II and a site at the southeastern end of the perimeter fence separating the Pueblo of Isleta and KAFB. Analysis of samples of seven small mammals from these sites did not show any significant radionuclide or metal contamination (SNL/NM 1997u).

4.7.3.5 Ecosystems Management

KAFB is bordered by Cibola National Forest and the Pueblo of Isleta. Sensitive species and other wildlife travel across the management boundaries of the Pueblo of Isleta and the national forest, where biological resources are valued and actively used for recreational, cultural, and aesthetic purposes. Many of the sensitive biological resources on KAFB are on the lands the DOE and the USAF have withdrawn from the USFS (Cibola National Forest). SNL/NM conducts activities on these DOE and USAF lands, but the USFS retains management responsibilities for their natural resources. Management measures are delineated in the *Ecosystem Management Plan for National Forest Lands in and Adjacent to the Military Withdrawal, Sandia Ranger District, Cibola National Forest, Bernalillo County, New Mexico* (USFS 1996) and the 1985 *Cibola National Forest Land and Resource Management Plan*, as amended (USFS 1985). The USFS's emphasis in the Withdrawn Area is to improve wildlife diversity and decrease the threat of an escaped wildfire. USFS fire management practices include thinning vegetation, constructing fuel breaks, and prescribed burning. The USFS has stated that the desired condition for the Withdrawn Area is one in which the public feels that the area is a "special wildlife haven" over which it has stewardship (USFS 1995).

On KAFB, the USAF manages wildlife resources, wetlands, land resources, and outdoor recreation through guidance outlined in the *Integrated Natural Resources Management Plan, Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico* (USAF 1995).

4.8 CULTURAL RESOURCES

4.8.1 Definition of Resource

Cultural resources are prehistoric or historic sites, buildings, structures, districts, or other places or objects considered to be important to a culture, subculture, or community for scientific, traditional, or religious purposes, or for any other reason. Cultural resources primarily addressed in the SWEIS are those that have been recommended as or determined to be eligible or potentially eligible for inclusion in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) and those that are Traditional Cultural Properties (TCPs). TCPs are places or objects that have religious, sacred, or cultural value for a particular cultural group. In order to be included in the NRHP, a resource must meet one or more of the following criteria (36 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] Part 60):

- Criterion A—Associated with events that have made a significant contribution to the broad patterns of our history.
- Criterion B—Associated with the lives of persons significant in our past.
- Criterion C—Embodies the distinctive characteristics of a type, period, or method of construction.
- Criterion D—Yielded or may be likely to yield information important in prehistory or history.

The resource must also retain most, if not all, of seven aspects of integrity: location, design, setting, workmanship, material, feeling, and association.

Cultural resources considered in the SWEIS are divided into three categories. The first is prehistoric archaeological sites, which in the Albuquerque area date to before A.D. 1540, when Francisco Vasquez de Coronado and his expedition arrived in the middle Rio Grande valley and initiated Spanish exploration of the area. The second category, historic sites, includes archaeological sites as well as buildings and structures dating from A.D. 1540 to 1948. Based on the standards of the National Park Service (NPS), the cutoff date for being categorized as a historic resource is 50 years in age, which provides the historical perspective necessary to evaluate significance. However, this category also includes younger resources (post-1948) that have been recommended as *exceptionally significant* within one of the criteria. The third category consists of TCPs. TCPs can include resources that fall within the previous two categories.

4.8.2 Region of Influence

The ROI includes KAFB and the DOE buffer zones adjacent to the southwest corner of KAFB. The resources include those already identified, as well as those that have not yet been identified, such as buried archeological sites, TCPs, and unassessed resources. The ROI is further refined into areas of potential effect to cultural resources for the various activities performed at SNL/NM use areas.

4.8.3 Affected Environment

4.8.3.1 Overview of Cultural Resource Inventories and Sites

SNL/NM is located along the middle Rio Grande valley. The valley has been consistently inhabited for thousands of years, and contains present-day Puebloan cultural groups who have ancestral ties to the area. Archaeological resources and TCPs hold important roles within the traditional cultures of these groups and of groups that are farther away. These resources are not just contained in the groups' traditions and oral histories, but play an active part in continuing a way of life that has been in existence since the groups' origins. Cultural resources are also important to the scientific community and to the general public as a key to understanding the vast prehistory and history of this region.

Since the first documented survey in 1936, well before the establishment of KAFB, both KAFB and the DOE buffer zones have been the subject of cultural resource studies (Figure 4.8–1). Over 160 cultural resource investigations, reports, and studies have been conducted, most in the last 10 years. While many of these studies are extremely limited in scope, others are broad and apply to the entire KAFB. Approximately 75 percent of the ROI has been studied for cultural resources (Trierweiler 1998, SNL/NM 1997a).

Within the boundaries of KAFB and the DOE buffer zone, 284 prehistoric and historic archaeological sites have been recorded, of which 192 have been recommended as eligible or potentially eligible for the NRHP. The resources range from prehistoric Native American campsites to historic Euro-American placer mining pits. Of the prehistoric archaeological sites, campsites are the most common, followed by sites of limited activity (such as stone tool production), then habitations. Of the historic sites, mining sites are the most common, followed by habitations, then sites related to agriculture and ranching, then small, isolated trash scatters (Trierweiler 1998).

Five hundred seventy-nine architectural properties have been recorded and assessed for NRHP eligibility within KAFB boundaries, of which nine individual properties have been recommended as eligible or potentially eligible for the NRHP (Trierweiler 1998; USAF 1998a; Tuttle 1998). Most of them were recorded by the 377th Air Base Wing of KAFB, under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Legacy Program, and are on KAFB lands. Few of these properties predate World War II, and most were constructed during the 1940s and 1950s (Trierweiler 1998). In addition, the architectural properties in TA-II, as a group, are eligible to the NRHP as a district. A more detailed discussion of the cultural resources at KAFB is provided in Appendix C.

Unidentified Sites


Despite the large number of cultural resource inventories conducted on KAFB, cultural resources probably exist that have not yet been identified or recorded. Even in areas that have been inventoried, data collected on resource locations could be incomplete due to human error or conditions such as heavy vegetation cover, which can seriously affect the ability to see sites on the ground. In addition, archaeological sites may be buried (Frederick 1992, Frederick & Williamson 1997, Larson et al. 1998, Abbott et al. 1997, Doleman 1989).

Settlement Patterns

Previous archaeological research on KAFB indicates definite patterns in the location and densities of cultural resources on KAFB (Figure 4.8–2). These patterns can be used to predict if sites are likely to exist in an area and, if so, their probable density. Known archaeological sites on KAFB are primarily concentrated in four areas. Two areas along Arroyo del Coyote contain the largest concentrations of sites: one in the area southeast of the Manzano Area and the other in the Withdrawn Area near the headwaters of Arroyo del Coyote, where tributaries from the mountains flow into Coyote Canyon. A third concentration of sites is in the southwest corner of the Withdrawn Area in the upper elevations. Finally, a smaller concentration of sites is found along Tijeras Arroyo in the northwest portion of KAFB.


4.8.3.2 Cultural Resource Protection in the ROI

Because activities within KAFB are conducted by Federal agencies, contractors to Federal agencies, and private entities under agreement with Federal agencies, there are a number of laws, regulations, and executive orders applicable to Federal agencies that protect cultural



Source: SNL/NM 1997f

Figure 4.8-1. Areas Inventoried for Cultural Resources in KAFB and the DOE Buffer Zones
Over 160 cultural resource studies have been conducted on KAFB and the DOE Buffer Zones.



Source: SNL/NM 1997.

Figure 4.8-2. Areas With a Concentration of Archaeological Sites on KAFB and the DOE Buffer Zone
Known archaeological sites on KAFB are primarily concentrated in four areas.

resources and access to resources that are sacred or ceremonial sites on KAFB (see Chapter 7). Each of the agencies in the ROI (DOE, USAF, and USFS) has implementing policies and procedures that follow these regulations. In addition, there are personnel assigned within each agency with responsibility for overseeing compliance with the policies and procedures implemented by their respective agencies. Proposed undertakings in the ROI undergo review by the responsible Federal agency to determine if eligible cultural resources could be effected by the undertaking. Consultations between the agencies and the New Mexico State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO) take place as required. Agencies and the SHPO consult on measures that can be implemented to mitigate or avoid any potential adverse effects.

4.8.3.3 Cultural Resources by Land Use Type

KAFB Lands Owned by the DOE and Used by SNL/NM

TAs-I through -V have been completely inventoried for archaeological sites (both prehistoric and historic) (Hoagland 1990 a,b,c,d,e; Lord 1990). Although TAs-II and -IV are in an area that likely contains sites (adjacent to Tijeras Arroyo), aside from isolated occurrences of artifacts, no prehistoric or historic archaeological sites have been identified there. The vast majority of buildings and structures used by SNL/NM are less than 50 years old, and thus have not been assessed for eligibility for inclusion in the NRHP. Assessments have not been conducted for buildings and structures in TAs-III, -IV, and -V; thus, their eligibility to the NRHP is unknown. Fifty-two buildings in TA-I were assessed and determined to be ineligible (Hoagland 1991, 1993; Sebastian 1993; Merlan 1993). The remaining buildings and structures in that area have not been assessed due to their young age. As the buildings in the four TAs attain the 50-year mark, the DOE will assess them for eligibility for inclusion in the NRHP (Merlan 1991). TA-II has been determined to be eligible to the NRHP as a district, with most of the larger buildings contributing to that status (DOE 1998o).

The DOE is responsible for the cultural resources contained in these TAs and has adopted implementing policies and guidelines that address the management of cultural resources. The DOE does not have a cultural resource management plan for the land it owns on KAFB due to the paucity of sites on these lands.

Other KAFB Lands Used by SNL/NM Through Land Use Agreements

A number of cultural resource inventories on KAFB have included areas used by SNL/NM through various land use agreements with the USAF and the USFS. These areas have been completely surveyed for cultural resources, except for the southeastern one-third of the Joint Operating Agreement Area (Starfire Optical Range) (Figure 4.8–1). In the areas that have been inventoried, archaeological sites are frequent only in the areas coinciding with the settlement patterns discussed previously, such as the Joint Use Agreement Area (uplands), the DOE Withdrawn Area used by SNL/NM as a buffer for the Lurance Canyon Burn Site (near a tributary to Arroyo del Coyote), and the DOE permit area along Arroyo del Coyote. The unsurveyed portion of the Joint Use Agreement Area is likely to contain sites based on the high density of sites located in the adjacent inventoried areas. No building or structure assessments have been conducted in these areas.

Responsibility for managing the cultural resources contained in these areas falls to the agency that owns the specific parcel of land, though the land use agreements usually stipulate that the DOE must conduct the necessary studies to determine if an area scheduled for DOE activities contains cultural resources. For KAFB areas permitted to the DOE, the guidelines and policies of the USAF direct managing cultural resources in concert with the KAFB cultural resource management plan (Trierweiler 1998). For the entire Withdrawn Area, the management of cultural resources follows the policies and procedures of the USFS, along with the guidelines presented in the *Cibola National Forest Land and Resource Management Plan* (USFS 1985). The DOE and the USFS have two separate memorandums of agreement (dated May 15, 1989, and January 22, 1987) that address agency responsibilities on portions of the Withdrawn Area.

The DOE Buffer Zones Used by SNL/NM

SNL/NM uses two areas outside and adjacent to the KAFB boundary. These areas, leased from the state of New Mexico and the Pueblo of Isleta, comprise the DOE buffer zones. The land leased from the state of New Mexico has undergone a 20-percent cultural resource sample inventory (Doleman 1989). This inventory identified three archaeological sites within the leased area, one of which is eligible to the NRHP and the other two are potentially eligible. The land leased from the Pueblo of Isleta has not undergone a cultural resource

inventory and no cultural resources are currently known in this area (Geister 1998). Based on the settlement patterns evident on adjacent KAFB areas, a low density of archaeological sites in both these areas is expected. No building or structure assessments have been conducted on either leased area. Responsibility for the cultural resources in these areas is retained by the land-owning agencies (state of New Mexico or Pueblo of Isleta/BIA).

KAFB Lands Not Used by SNL/NM

Cultural resource inventories conducted on KAFB have also included areas not used by SNL/NM. Locations of archaeological sites in these areas follow the settlement patterns discussed previously, such as along Tijeras Arroyo, Arroyo del Coyote, and in the uplands near the Joint Use Agreement Area. Some inventories assessed the eligibility of certain buildings and structures. Of these areas, the DOE is responsible only for those areas owned by the DOE (Table 4.3–1), which may be used by, permitted to, or out-granted to other agencies.

4.8.3.4 Traditional Cultural Properties

A TCP is a place or object that is significant to a particular living community. This significance is “derived from the role the TCP plays in the community’s historically rooted beliefs, customs, and practices” (NPS 1990). TCPs are associated with the cultural practices and beliefs that are rooted in a community’s history and important in maintaining the cultural identity of the community.

A TCP study is being conducted for the purposes of the SWEIS. Consultations are being held with 15 Native American tribes with a cultural interest in the area to determine the presence of cultural properties significant to them within the ROI (Appendix C). Consultations have been completed with 8 of the 15 tribes, and are ongoing with the remaining 7 tribes. No specific TCPs have yet been identified through these consultations and no TCPs are currently known to exist within the ROI. Although no specific locations have been identified during these consultations, some tribes have stated that they have concerns for cultural sites in the ROI that are important to them. A more detailed discussion of the TCP study methods and results can be found in Appendix C.

4.9 AIR QUALITY

4.9.1 Nonradiological Air Quality

4.9.1.1 Definition of Resource

Ambient air quality is determined by measuring or modeling ambient pollutant concentrations and comparing the concentrations to the corresponding standards. As directed by the *Clean Air Act* (CAA) of 1970 (42 U.S.C. §7401), the EPA has set the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for several criteria pollutants to protect human health and welfare (40 CFR Part 50). These pollutants include particulate matter less than 10 microns in diameter (PM₁₀), sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, lead, and ozone. As of September 16, 1997, a new NAAQS became effective for particulate matter with a size classification defined as less than or equal to 2.5 microns in diameter (PM_{2.5}). This new standard is in addition to the PM₁₀ NAAQS. It is estimated that the new PM_{2.5} standard will not require local area controls until about 2005 and that compliance determinations will not be required until around 2008.

On June 5, 1998, SNL became subject to a new 8-hour, 0.08-ppm ozone standard, replacing the previous 1-hour, 0.12-ppm ozone standard (63 FR 31034). In the year 2000, the EPA will designate areas that do not meet the 8-hour standard based on the most recently available 3 years of ozone data available at that time (that is, 1997 through 1999).

A primary NAAQS has been established for carbon monoxide, and both primary and secondary standards have been established for the remaining criteria pollutants. Primary NAAQS define levels of air quality judged necessary, with an adequate margin of safety, to protect public health. Secondary NAAQS define levels of air quality judged necessary to protect public welfare from any known or anticipated adverse effects of a pollutant.

Air quality for SNL/NM is governed by regulations promulgated locally by the Albuquerque/Bernalillo County Air Quality Control Board (A/BC AQCB) and Federally by the EPA. The EPA has delegated authority for regulating sources under the CAA to the state of New Mexico. In turn, the state of New Mexico has delegated authority for regulating sources to the A/BC AQCB, located in Bernalillo county.

The A/BC AQCB promulgates regulations in 20 NMAC 11 for compliance with the CAA, as well as applicable state and local air quality requirements. The Albuquerque Environmental Health Department (AEHD) Air Pollution Control Division (APCD) administers the regulations promulgated by the A/BC AQCB (SNL/NM 1997a). The New Mexico Environmental Improvement Board (NMEIB) has established ambient air quality standards (20 NMAC 2.3) that are generally more stringent than the Federal standards and that incorporate additional standards for hydrogen sulfide and total reduced sulfur. In addition to the criteria pollutants provisions, the EPA established in 40 CFR Part 62, the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) and Title III of the 1990 CAA Amendments, which define hazardous air pollutants (HAPs). The primary nonradiological pollutants considered in the SWEIS are criteria pollutants and chemical pollutants.

Chemical pollutants include the 188 HAPs defined by the EPA in Title III of the CAA. Also included are other potentially toxic chemical air pollutants for which occupational exposure limits (OELs) have been defined by various organizations, including those chemicals categorized as volatile organic compounds (VOCs) (any organic compound that participates in atmospheric photochemical reactions except those designated by the EPA administrator as having negligible photochemical reactivity). The OEL used for this analysis is a time-weighted average concentration for a conventional 8-hour workday and a 40-hour workweek, to which it is believed that nearly all workers may be repeatedly exposed, day after day, without adverse effect.

4.9.1.2 Region of Influence

The ROI is defined in the *New Mexico Air Pollution Control Bureau Dispersion Modeling Guidelines* (NMAPCB 1996) as the maximum extent of a source's significant impact. Significant impact is provided for each of the criteria pollutants as a specific concentration for a given averaging period (for example, 5.0 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ for nitrogen oxide for a 24-hour averaging period). The maximum extent of significant ambient concentrations for the primary stationary source at SNL/NM (the steam plant) is approximately 15 mi for nitrogen oxide. The ROI for nonradiological air quality is, therefore, an area approximately 15 mi in radius about the SNL/NM steam plant. The steam plant is the primary stationary source at SNL/NM and determines the maximum extent of significant ambient concentrations (Figure 4.9–1).

The area contained within a 15-mi radius around the steam plant falls largely within the Albuquerque air basin and within Bernalillo county, with a small portion extending into northern Valencia county.


4.9.1.3 Affected Environment

The 1996 baseline air quality at SNL/NM and the ambient air quality within the ROI represent the affected environment. SNL/NM's contribution to the ambient air quality of the affected environment is based on its sources of emissions. The primary stationary sources of criteria pollutants are the steam plant boilers (which represent more than 90 percent of the total emissions of criteria pollutants), Building 862 generators, and the fire testing facilities located at the Lurance Canyon Burn Site (SNL/NM 1997a). Other sources are spatially separated, thereby contributing minimal impacts. Emissions of chemical air pollutants include those from facilities that release chemicals to the atmosphere and from operations at the burn site.

Meteorology and Climatology

The climate at SNL/NM and in the surrounding region is semiarid. The ambient temperatures in the region are characteristic of high-altitude, dry continental climates. Winter daytime temperatures average approximately 50 °F, with nighttime temperatures often dropping into the low teens. Summer daytime temperatures generally do not exceed 90°F, except in July, when average maximum temperatures reach 93°F. The Albuquerque basin is characterized by low precipitation, averaging between 7.5 and 10 inches a year. Most of this precipitation falls from July through September and usually occurs from thunderstorm activities and the intrusion of warm, moist tropical air from the Pacific Ocean. The storms are accompanied by localized heavy wind gusts. Winter months are typically dry, with less than 2 inches of precipitation and limited snowfall. The average annual relative humidity is about 43 percent. New Mexico has one of the greatest frequencies of lightning in the U.S. Tornadoes are uncommon in the Albuquerque basin (SNL/NM 1997a).

Temperature, relative humidity, and precipitation do not vary dramatically across the region. Daily and seasonal wind patterns occur near the mountains and plateau. Daytime upslope flows are usually coupled with downslope flows during the night. Strong springtime, easterly winds occur near canyons, and light north-south flows occur in the Rio Grande valley.



Source: SNL/NM 1997a

Figure 4.9–1. Air Quality Region of Influence

The region of influence for nonradiological air quality extends 15 mi around the SNL/NM steam plant.

In general, areas closer to the mountains or canyons experience more frequent winds from an easterly direction at night. Daytime wind patterns are not as pronounced, but generally flow toward the mountains or along the Rio Grande valley. The Rio Grande valley experiences the most frequent calm conditions and the lowest average wind speed. In most areas, the nighttime wind direction frequency produces the most dominant average annual direction.

Ambient Air Quality

This section describes the existing ambient air quality, which includes regional and SNL/NM air quality. Existing air quality in the region and for SNL/NM is defined by air emissions and air quality monitoring data.

Regional Air Quality

From 1978 through 1996, the EPA classified the Albuquerque/Bernalillo county region as a nonattainment area for carbon monoxide. In 1983, the area experienced 74 violations of the NAAQS for carbon monoxide. Control measures, such as the vehicle emissions testing, oxygenated fuels programs, and the winter “No Burn” program, have helped decrease the amount of carbon monoxide pollution and reduce the number of NAAQS violations. The Federal Motor Vehicle Control Program, which requires improved emissions standards for new cars, has also been a major factor in reduced vehicle emissions. Since 1992, the region has not violated NAAQS standards (COA n.d. [no date] [d]). On July 15, 1996, the EPA redesignated the region from nonattainment to a maintenance level for carbon monoxide.

Few industrial emission sources exist in the region. However, more than one-third of New Mexico’s population lives in the Albuquerque metropolitan area and the population is projected to increase an average of 10,000 to 15,000 per year. With increased population comes more motor vehicles, new development and housing, new employment, and more (often longer) commutes to work. Major sources of air emissions result from using motor vehicles, the seasonal use of wood-burning stoves and fireplaces, and open burning activities (COA n.d.[d]).

The dry climate, unpaved roads and parking lots, and wood-burning activities are primary sources of dust particles (PM₁₀) that cause poor visibility. The dry conditions result in poor soil stabilization, thereby increasing dust from agriculture, construction activities, and roads. These all contribute to high levels of


particulate matter in the air. These conditions can also clog air filters in vehicles, reducing air flow to carburetors. The high elevation of this region results in incomplete and less efficient fuel burning and increased carbon monoxide emission. Wood and open burning activities also contribute to carbon monoxide pollution. However, motor vehicles have been, and continue to be, the major source of carbon monoxide (COA n.d.[d]).

SNL/NM is in the Albuquerque Middle Rio Grande Intrastate Air Quality Control Region (AQCR) 152 (40 CFR §81.83). The EPA has classified this AQCR as follows:

- Better than national standards – sulfur dioxides
- Unclassifiable/attainment – ozone
- Unclassifiable – PM₁₀
- Cannot be classified or better than national standards – nitrogen dioxide
- Maintenance – carbon monoxide
- Not designated – lead (40 CFR §81.332)

Wood burning has been an important contributor to the visible winter brown cloud. In 1985, a “No Burn” program, from October through February, began on a voluntary basis. This program, now mandatory, has become an important element of the A/BC AQCB’s program for carbon monoxide abatement. The program prohibits operating a solid fuel heating device within the woodsmoke-impacted area during a declared no-burn period unless the device is a wood heater that has been emission-certified by the EPA. In recent years, the “No Burn” program has resulted in improved visibility on calm winter nights and mornings, as well as reductions in monitored carbon monoxide levels.

The AEHD and the NMED monitor the ambient air in the Albuquerque basin to determine the air quality in neighborhoods, background locations, and expected maximum impact locations and to estimate impacts from mobile vehicles. Fourteen monitoring stations throughout the Albuquerque basin measure criteria pollutants, including carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, PM₁₀, and ozone. These monitoring stations do not measure lead or sulfur dioxide. An additional station, the Criteria Pollutant Monitoring Station (CPMS) located in TA-I, measures lead and sulfur dioxide. Figure 4.9–2 presents the locations of ambient air monitoring stations within the Albuquerque basin (except for station 3ZC, located at Bandelier National Monument, approximately 50 mi north-northeast of



Source: SNL/NM 1997j

Figure 4.9–2. Locations of Offsite Criteria Pollutant Monitoring Stations
Fourteen monitoring stations measure criteria pollutants throughout the Albuquerque Basin.

SNL/NM). Figure 4.9–3 presents the monitoring stations located within KAFB.

Table 4.9–1 compares maximum air concentrations monitored in the Albuquerque basin during 1996 to applicable Federal (40 CFR Part 50) and state (20 NMAC 2.3) standards for each pollutant. The annual standards are not to be exceeded. Short-term standards may be exceeded, generally once, before a violation must be reported. The preamble of the state regulation (Section 108) allows excesses over short periods of time due to unusual meteorological conditions. Air quality standards were not exceeded in 1996 or 1997 (SNL/NM 1997a).

SNL/NM Air Quality

The major stationary sources of criteria pollutant emissions at SNL/NM are the steam plant, electric power

generator plant, and Lurance Canyon Burn Site. Emissions from the steam plant, electric power generator plant, and Lurance Canyon Burn Site include carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxide, sulfur dioxide, and PM₁₀. The emissions factors for these facilities were developed specifically for the SNL/NM operating permit application. The emissions were calculated by using the fuel throughputs and emission factors obtained from the EPA's *Compilation of Air Pollutant Emission Factors-AP-42* (EPA 1995b). Table 4.9–2 summarizes the emissions associated with these facilities for 1992 through 1996, as well as VOC and HAP emissions from the entire site. SNL/NM annual emissions show a trend toward lower annual emissions from 1992 through 1996 for PM₁₀, sulfur dioxide, VOCs, and HAPs. The nitrogen oxide and carbon monoxide emissions fluctuate with the annual demand for steam.

Table 4.9–1. Comparison of 1996 Maximum Ambient Air Concentrations With Applicable National and New Mexico Ambient Air Quality Standards (ppm)

POLLUTANT	AVERAGING TIME	NAAQS	NMAAQS	MAXIMUM AMBIENT AIR CONCENTRATION	MONITORING LOCATION
<i>Carbon Monoxide</i>	8 hours	9	8.7	8.30	2ZK
	1 hour	35	13.1	12.0	2ZK
<i>Lead</i>	Quarterly	1.5 ^a	-	0.001 ^a	CPMS
<i>Nitrogen Dioxide</i>	Annual	0.053	0.05	0.022	2ZM
	24 hours	-	0.10	0.045	2ZM
<i>Total Suspended Particulates</i>	Annual	-	60 ^a	NA	-
	30 days	-	90 ^a	NA	-
	7 days	-	110 ^a	NA	-
	24 hours	-	150 ^a	NA	-
<i>Particulate Matter</i>	Annual	50 ^a	-	37 ^a	2R
	24 hours	150 ^a	-	96 ^a	2R
	Annual	0.03	0.02	0.0001	CPMS
<i>Sulfur Dioxide</i>	24 hours	0.14 ^a	0.10 ^a	0.003 ^a	CPMS
	3 hours	0.50 ^a	-	0.009 ^a	CPMS
<i>Ozone^b</i>	1 hour	0.12	-	0.111	2ZF
<i>Hydrogen Sulfide</i>	1 hour	-	0.01	NA	-
<i>Total Reduced Sulfur</i>	0.5 hour	-	0.03	NA	-

Sources: 20 NMAC 2.3, 40 CFR Part 50, SNL/NM 1997a

CPMS: Criteria Pollutant Monitoring Station

NA: not available


NAAQS: National Ambient Air Quality Standard

NMAAQS: New Mexico Ambient Air Quality Standard

ppm: parts per million

^a micrograms per cubic meter

^b New 8-hour, 0.08-ppm ozone standard, applicable to SNL/NM, will apply in year 2000 (see Section 4.9.1.1).



Source: SNL/NM (1997)

Figure 4.9-3. Locations of Onsite Criteria Pollutant Monitoring Stations
Ten ambient air monitoring stations are located within the boundaries of KAFB.

Table 4.9–2. Estimated Air Emissions from Stationary Sources at SNL/NM, 1992 through 1996 (tons/year)

POLLUTANT	SOURCE	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Nitrogen Oxide	Lurance Canyon Burn Site ^c	0.07	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
	Steam plant	47.78 ^a	155.08 ^b	148.06 ^b	126.00 ^b	153.00 ^b
	Building 862 generators	0.03	5.55	0.61	1.11	0.90
	TOTAL	47.88	160.65	148.69	127.13	153.92
Carbon Monoxide	Lurance Canyon Burn Site ^c	2.87	0.77	0.79	0.75	0.78
	Steam plant	4.44 ^a	16.25 ^b	15.60 ^b	13.80 ^b	14.20 ^b
	Building 862 generators	0.00	0.28	0.02	0.29	0.23
	TOTAL	7.31	17.3	16.41	14.84	15.21
PM₁₀	Lurance Canyon Burn Site ^c	2.60	0.70	0.71	0.69	0.71
	Steam plant	1.76 ^a	3.90 ^b	3.75 ^b	3.45 ^b	2.93 ^b
	Building 862 generators	0.00	0.93	0.02	0.02	0.01
	TOTAL	4.36	5.53	4.48	4.16	3.65
Sulfur Dioxide	Lurance Canyon Burn Site ^c	0.14	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
	Steam plant	2.12 ^a	0.33 ^b	0.26 ^b	0.22 ^b	0.22 ^b
	Building 862 generators	0.00	0.87	0.13	0.08	0.06
	TOTAL	2.26	1.24	0.43	0.34	0.32
VOCs	All facilities	NA	63.32	24.00	9.8	4.07
HAPs	All facilities	NA	50.75	17.79	5.52	2.4

Source: SNL/NM 1997a

HAPs: hazardous air pollutants

NA: not available

PM₁₀: particulate matter less than 10 microns in diameter

SMERF: Smoke Emission Reduction Facility

SNL/NM: Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico

SWISH: Small Wind-Shielded Facility

VOCs: volatile organic compounds

^aBased on actual stack emission measurements^bBased on published, theoretical emission factors in EPA AP-42^cFire testing facilities include a number of open pools, the SMERF, and the SWISH located in Lurance Canyon

VOC and HAP emissions come from laboratories, miscellaneous chemical operations, and the fire testing facilities. Chemical uses and the corresponding emissions occur in each TA and in the outlying test areas. In 1996, HAP emissions associated with chemical users were 2.4 tons (SNL/NM 1997a). VOC emissions for 1996 were approximately 4.07 tons (SNL/NM 1997a).

In addition to regional ambient air quality monitoring for criteria pollutants, SNL/NM operates six onsite monitoring stations for PM₁₀. Monitoring results indicate that sampling locations closer to the most populated areas of SNL/NM generally reveal higher PM₁₀ concentrations. In addition, PM₁₀ concentrations generally increase during the windy season due to blowing soil particles. Dry weather conditions enhance this trend of increased concentration during windy periods. Table 4.9–3 presents the criteria pollutant concentrations at monitoring stations

in TA-I. These stations measure concentrations of criteria pollutants nearest SNL/NM emission sources.

In 1996, VOC samples were collected at four onsite monitoring stations. These locations were selected for their proximity to known VOC emission sources. Table 4.9–4 presents the estimated 8-hour concentrations of VOCs calculated from onsite monitoring data for 1996 and the respective 8-hour OELs. These data are presented for comparison and indicate that the concentrations of VOCs measured at the onsite monitors are well below the respective OEL concentrations for an 8-hour workday.

The monitored VOCs represent a portion of the total chemical emissions from SNL/NM facilities. Monitoring data are not available for additional chemical compounds.

Table 4.9–3. 1996 Criteria Pollutant Concentrations from the Criteria Pollutant Monitoring Station with Applicable National and New Mexico Ambient Air Quality Standards

POLLUTANT	AVERAGING TIME	NAAQS (ppm/μg/m ³)	NMAAQS (ppm/μg/m ³)	BASELINE CONCENTRATION (ppm/μg/m ³)	PERCENT OF STANDARD
Carbon Monoxide	8 hours	9/8,564	8.7/8,279	2.86/2,722	33
	1 hour	35/33,305	13.1/12,466	8.30/7,898	63
	Annual	-	-	0.78/742	NA
Lead	30 days	-	-	0.0021 ^a	NA
	Quarterly	1.5 ^a	-	0.001 ^a	0.07
Nitrogen Dioxide	Annual	0.053/83	0.05/78	0.012/19	24
	24 hours	-	0.10/156	0.035/55	35
Particulates (TSP)	Annual	-	60 ^a	14.76 ^a	30
	30 days	-	90 ^a	NA	NA
	7 days	-	110 ^a	NA	NA
	24 hours	-	150 ^a	49 ^a	33
Particulate Matter (PM₁₀)	Annual	50 ^a	-	14.76 ^{a,b}	30
	24 hours	150 ^a	-	49 ^{a,b}	33
Sulfur Dioxide	Annual	0.03/65	0.02/44	0.0003/0.7	1.5
	24 hours	0.14/305	0.10/218	0.003/6.5	3
	3 hours	0.50/1,088	-	0.009/20	2
Ozone	Annual	-	-	0.033/54	NA
	1 hour	0.12/196	-	0.103/168	85.8
Hydrogen Sulfide	1 hour	-	0.01/12	NA	NA
Total Reduced Sulfur	0.5 hour	-	0.03/33	NA	NA

Sources: 20 NMAC 2.3, 40 CFR Part 50, SNL/NM 1997a

- indicates no standard for listed averaging time

°R: degrees Rankin

CPMS: Criteria Pollutant Monitoring Station

ft: feet

NA: not available

NAAQS: National Ambient Air Quality Standard

NMAAQS: New Mexico Ambient Air Quality Standard

ppm: parts per million

TSP: total suspended particulates

^a micrograms per cubic meter^b highest quarterly lead monitoring data measured at the CPMS site in 1996^c highest one hour ozone monitoring data measured at the CPMS in 1996^d PM₁₀ is assumed equal TSPNote: Some of the pollutants are stated in parts per million (ppm). These values were converted to micrograms per cubic meter (μg/m³) with appropriate corrections for temperature (530°R) and pressure (elevation 5,400 ft) following New Mexico dispersion modeling guidelines (revised 1996).

Steam Plant

The steam plant produces heat for buildings in TA-I and the eastern portion of KAFB. During 1996, all five boilers at the plant used a total of 740 M standard ft³ of natural gas. These boilers can also run on diesel oil and used approximately 15,000 gal of oil during 1996 for system testing. Criteria pollutant emissions for 1992 through 1996

for the steam plant are presented in Table 4.9–2. The annual emissions for each pollutant vary from year to year based upon the heating degree days, fuel mix (natural gas versus fuel oil), and plant boiler loading, which have different efficiencies at different loadings.

Table 4.9–4. Maximum Ambient Concentrations of Volatile Organic Compounds from Onsite Monitors for 1996

VOCS	ESTIMATED 8-HOUR CONCENTRATION^a (ppb)	8-HOUR OEL^b (ppb)
<i>1,1,1-trichloroethane</i>	134.235	348,000
<i>1,4-dioxane+2,2,4-trimethylpentane</i>	1.35	25,000
<i>1-butene</i>	0.741	NA
<i>2,2,4-trimethylpentane</i>	0.426	NA
<i>3-methylpentane</i>	0.765	NA
<i>Acetone</i>	20.025	250,000
<i>Benzene</i>	1.674	100
<i>Bromodichloromethane</i>	0.096	NA
<i>Carbon Tetrachloride</i>	0.357	5,000
<i>Chloromethane</i>	1.371	5,000
<i>Dichlorodifluoromethane</i>	1.887	1,000,000
<i>Ethylbenzene</i>	0.411	100,000
<i>Halocarbon 113</i>	0.291	NA
<i>Isobutene</i>	0.648	NA
<i>Isobutene + 1-butene</i>	1.2	NA
<i>Isohexane</i>	1.425	NA
<i>Isopentane</i>	5.526	120,000
<i>m/p-xylene</i>	0.897	100,000
<i>Methylene Chloride</i>	0.258	50,000
<i>n-Butane</i>	5.466	800,000
<i>n-Hexane</i>	0.831	50,000
<i>n-Pentane</i>	2.496	120,000
<i>n-Undecane</i>	0.219	NA
<i>o-Xylene</i>	0.435	100,000
<i>Tetrachloroethene</i>	0.126	NA
<i>Toluene</i>	3.117	50,000
<i>Trichloroethene</i>	0.366	NA
<i>Trichloroethene+Bromodichloromethane</i>	0.195	NA
<i>Trichlorofluoromethane</i>	0.831	1,000,000
Total Nonmethane Hydrocarbons	259.191	NA

Source: SNL/NM 1997a

NA: not available

OEL: occupational exposure limit

ppb: parts per billion

VOC: volatile organic compound

^a Estimated value calculated by multiplying the 24-hour measured concentration by 3.^b OELs are the minimum time-weighted exposure concentration for an 8- or 10-hour

workday and a 40-hour work week to which it is believed that nearly all workers may be repeatedly exposed, day after day, without adverse effect based upon the following sources:

American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists
U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), Federal Republic of Germany, Commission for the Investigation of Health Hazards of Chemical Compounds in the Work Area

Electric Power Generator Plant

SNL/NM has four standby generators, each with a 600-kW capacity. These diesel-fired generators are in TA-I, Building 862. The generators have a local air quality permit limiting operation to 500 hours per year per generator. They are started monthly for maintenance and testing, as well as during electrical power outages in TA-I.

Fire Testing Facilities (Lurance Canyon Burn Site)

The fire testing facilities (Lurance Canyon Burn Site) include a number of open pools, the Smoke Emission Reduction Facility (SMERF), and the Small Wind-Shielded (SWISH) Facility. The open pools emit directly to the atmosphere, while SMERF and SWISH are closed and emit through exhaust stacks. The fire testing facilities are used to test the response of shipping containers, aerospace components, and other items to high-temperature conditions. These facilities use a variety of fuels including jet fuel (JP-8), sawdust, a sawdust-propellant-acetone (SPA) mixture, explosives, and urethane foam.

These facilities typically average 42 tests per year; each test lasts about 30 minutes, although some can last as long as 4 hours. During 1996, the fire testing facilities used 10,400 gal of JP-8 and approximately 8 tons of sawdust (or wood). Based on process knowledge, emissions from these tests are known to include carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxide, sulfur dioxide, PM₁₀, and chemical pollutants (SNL/NM 1997a).

Mobile (Vehicular) Sources

Mobile sources (motor vehicles) are a major source of criteria pollutant emissions in and around SNL/NM. Carbon monoxide levels are the highest from November through January (MRGCOG 1997c). The EPA's *Mobile Source Emission Factor* computer model, *MOBILE5a* (EPA 1994), showed an estimated 920 tons of carbon monoxide emissions from SNL/NM commuter traffic for November through January (SNL 1996c), which is approximately 3.7 percent of the estimated carbon monoxide emissions for Bernalillo county vehicular emissions during the same period. Total SNL/NM mobile source carbon monoxide emissions for 1996 are 4,087 tons.

4.9.2 Radiological Air Quality

4.9.2.1 Definition of Resource

Specific SNL/NM facilities discharge low quantities of radionuclides to the air. These releases can be evaluated according to the individual and population dose created

from the combined releases of all facilities at SNL/NM. The degree of hazard to the public is directly related to the type and quantity of the radioactive materials released. How long a person is exposed to the released material is also a factor in assessing potential health effects. Dose estimates are modeled from emissions determined at each facility and compared to regulatory dose limits for the protection of public health.

4.9.2.2 Region of Influence


The ROI is the 50-mi radius of SNL/NM, which is consistent with the recommended DOE 5400.5 guidance. The ROI includes the counties of Bernalillo, McKinley, Cibola, San Miguel, Santa Fe, Sandoval, Valencia, Socorro, and Torrance, and the major cities of Albuquerque and Rio Rancho.

4.9.2.3 Affected Environment

Data from 1992 through 1996 were reviewed to characterize the baseline operational radiological emissions and corresponding dose estimates for specific SNL/NM facilities. The sources of this data were annual NESHAP reports, annual surveillance/monitoring reports, existing site environmental descriptions, radioactive emissions, and dose evaluations.

SNL/NM facilities that release radionuclides are shown in Figure 4.9–4. Table 4.9–5 identifies the types and quantities of radionuclides released from these facilities from 1993 through 1996. The 1992 estimated radiological emissions data and doses were not included in this baseline due to large variations in the data. These releases were used to calculate the doses at various receptors, thereby identifying a maximally exposed individual (MEI) member of the public and also the dose to the total population (732,823) within 50 mi of SNL/NM.

Because the general public (such as visitors to the golf course or National Atomic Museum) and Air Force personnel (such as families at base housing) have access to SNL/NM, both onsite and site boundary locations are considered as potential locations for an MEI. Table 4.9–6 presents the total dose to the MEI, along with the dose contributions from each facility for each year's radionuclide emissions, which are calculated using the *Clean Air Assessment Package (CAP88-PC)* computer model (DOE 1997e). These calculated doses are less than the regulatory limit of 10 mrem/yr of exposure to an individual of the public from airborne releases of radiological materials (40 CFR Part 61). These doses also are small compared to an individual background radiation dose of 360 mrem/yr (Section 4.10.3).



Source: SNL/NM 1997d

Figure 4.9-4. SNL/NM Radionuclide-Releasing Facilities
Radionuclide-releasing facilities are located in all five technical areas.

Table 4.9–5. Summary of Radionuclides Released from SNL/NM Operations from 1993 through 1996

SOURCE LOCATION	TA	TYPE	RADIONUCLIDE RELEASED ^a	CURIES/YR			
				1993	1994	1995	1996
<i>Sandia Pulsed Reactor, Building 6590</i>	TA-V	Point	Argon-41	0.48	0.55	1.7	9.51
<i>Annular Core Research Reactor, Building 6588</i>	TA-V	Point	Argon-41	2.70	2.1	3.0	35.4
<i>Hot Cell Facility, Building 6580</i>	TA-V	Point	Tritium	0	1.1x10 ⁻⁵	2.0x10 ⁻⁵	0
			Iodine-131	0	0	0	1.96x10 ⁻³
			Iodine-132	0	0	0	1.29x10 ⁻⁴
			Iodine-133	0	0	0	9.51x10 ⁻³
			Iodine-135	0	0	0	1.32x10 ⁻³
			Krypton-83m	0.068	0.017	0.016	9.57x10 ⁻⁵
			Krypton-85	3.7x10 ⁻⁶	5.7x10 ⁻⁶	3.3x10 ⁻⁵	1.53x10 ⁻³
			Krypton-85m	0.14	0.063	0.12	0.587
			Krypton-87	0.17	0.032	0.0014	0.0294
			Krypton-88	0.36	0.11	0.10	0.527
			Rubidium-86	1.1x10 ⁻⁷	1.5x10 ⁻⁷	8.0x10 ⁻⁷	0
			Rubidium-87	1.0x10 ⁻¹⁴	1.4x10 ⁻¹⁴	8.1x10 ⁻¹⁴	0
			Rubidium-88	0.41	0.019	4.1x10 ⁻⁴	0
			Rubidium-89	0.0011	4.8x10 ⁻⁵	0	0
			Xenon-131m	5.7x10 ⁻⁶	5.8x10 ⁻⁴	5.7x10 ⁻⁵	3.45x10 ⁻⁴
			Xenon-133	0.026	0.034	0.24	17.5
			Xenon-133m	0.0013	0.0017	0.011	0.768
			Xenon-135	0.40	0.41	1.4	14.7
Xenon-135m	0.18	0.0051	2.7x10 ⁻⁴	0.976			
Xenon-137	0	2.2x10 ⁻²⁷	0	0			
Xenon-138	0.0019	1.4x10 ⁻⁴	1.4x10 ⁻¹⁴	0			
<i>High-Energy Radiation Megavolt Electron Source, Building 970</i>	TA-IV	Point	Nitrogen-13	0.58	2.32	5.5x10 ⁻⁴	2.85x10 ⁻⁴
			Oxygen-15	0.0050	0.030	5.5x10 ⁻⁵	2.85x10 ⁻⁵
<i>Particle Beam Fusion Accelerator Building</i>	TA-IV	Point	Nitrogen-13	0.042	0.042	0.042	0.042
			Oxygen-15	0.0050	0.0050	0.005	0.005
<i>Mixed Waste Landfill</i>	TA-III	Diffuse	Tritium	1.9	0.29	0.29	0.29

**Table 4.9–5. Summary of Radionuclides Released from SNL/NM Operations from 1993 through 1996
(continued)**

SOURCE LOCATION	TA	TYPE	RADIONUCLIDE RELEASED ^a	CURIES/YR			
				1993	1994	1995	1996
<i>Chemical Processing Laboratory, Building 6600</i>	TA-III	Point	Na-22	0	2.4×10^{-12}	2.4×10^{-12}	2.4×10^{-12}
			Gadolinium-153	0	1.0×10^{-13}	0	0
			Americium-241	0	1.0×10^{-13}	1.0×10^{-13}	1.0×10^{-13}
			Uranium-232	0	0	1.0×10^{-13}	1.0×10^{-13}
			Plutonium-241	0	0	1.0×10^{-13}	1.0×10^{-13}
<i>Radioactive and Mixed Waste Management Facility, Building 6920</i>	TA-III	Point	Tritium	0	0	0	4.12
<i>Radioactive Waste Landfill</i>	TA-II	Diffuse	Americium-241	0	0	0	4.7×10^{-13}
			Plutonium-239/240	0	0	0	3.9×10^{-15}
			Plutonium-238	0	0	0	7.9×10^{-15}
<i>Explosive Components Facility, Building 905</i>	TA-II	Point	Tritium	0	0	0	7.0×10^{-4}
<i>Integrated Materials Research Laboratory, Building 897</i>	TA-I	Point	Carbon-14	0	0	0	2.21×10^{-5}
<i>Neutron Generator Facility, Building 870</i>	TA-I	Point	Tritium	0	0	0	0.11
<i>TANDEM Accelerator, Building 884</i>	TA-I	Point	Tritium	0	0	0	1.0×10^{-6}
			Carbon-11	4.2×10^{-5}	5.2×10^{-5}	8.8×10^{-6}	5.3×10^{-3}
			Nitrogen-13	9.9×10^{-5}	1.2×10^{-4}	2.1×10^{-5}	9.3×10^{-8}
			Oxygen-14	0	3.2×10^{-7}	5.3×10^{-8}	0
			Oxygen-15	0.0017	0.0021	0.00035	0.021
			Fluorine-17	0	8.0×10^{-6}	1.3×10^{-6}	8.0×10^{-4}
			Fluorine-18	9.4×10^{-6}	1.2×10^{-5}	2.0×10^{-6}	4.4×10^{-5}

Table 4.9–5. Summary of Radionuclides Released from SNL/NM Operations from 1993 through 1996 (concluded)

SOURCE LOCATION	TA	TYPE	RADIONUCLIDE RELEASED ^a	CURIES/YR			
				1993	1994	1995	1996
<i>Radiation Laboratory, Building 827 & Building 805</i>	TA-I	Point	Tritium	1.0x10 ⁻⁵	1.0x10 ⁻⁵	2.0x10 ⁻⁵	1.00x10 ⁻⁵
			Nitrogen-16	0	2.0x10 ⁻⁷	2.0x10 ⁻⁷	2.00x10 ⁻⁷
			Nitrogen-17	0	0	1.0x10 ⁻⁸	0
			Nitrogen-13	1.0x10 ⁻⁸	1.0x10 ⁻⁸	0	1.0x10 ⁻⁸
			Nitrogen-15	0	0.10	0	0
			Argon-41	1.0x10 ⁻⁹	1.0x10 ⁻⁹	1.0x10 ⁻⁹	1.00x10 ⁻⁹
			Carbon-13	0	0.20	0	0
			Carbon-14	2.0x10 ⁻¹²	2.0x10 ⁻¹²	2.0x10 ⁻¹²	0
			Curium-244	7.0x10 ⁻¹¹	7.0x10 ⁻¹¹	0	0
			Lead-210	4.0x10 ⁻¹³	4.0x10 ⁻¹³	0	0
			Uranium-238	4.0x10 ⁻¹²	4.0x10 ⁻¹²	0	0
Plutonium-239	6.0x10 ⁻¹²	6.0x10 ⁻¹²	0	0			
Americium-241	1.0x10 ⁻¹¹	1.0x10 ⁻¹¹	0	0			
<i>Metal Tritide Shelf-Life Laboratory, Building 891</i>	TA-I	Point	Tritium	6.0x10 ⁻⁵	6.0x10 ⁻⁵	5.0x10 ⁻⁹	5.0x10 ⁻⁹
<i>Calibration Laboratory, Building 869</i>	TA-I	Point	Tritium	0	1.5x10 ⁻⁶	3.7x10 ⁻⁵	2.51x10 ⁻⁴
<i>Neutron Generator Testing Facility, Building 935</i>	TA-I	Point	Tritium	0	0	2.8x10 ⁻⁵	0

Sources: SNL 1994b, 1995c, 1996a, 1997d

- concentration not measured or facility inactive

SNL/NM: Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico

TA: technical area

yr: year

^a Historical releases do not necessarily equate to projected releases presented in Sections 5.3.7.2, 5.4.7.2, and Appendix D.2. This is due in part to DOE project and program changes expected through 2008.

Table 4.9–6. Summary of Dose Estimates to SNL/NM Public from Radioactive Air Emissions (1993 to 1996) Modeled Effective Dose Equivalent (mrem/yr) to SNL/NM MEI and (person-rem) to Population

SOURCE	YEAR			
	1993	1994	1995	1996
<i>MEI (mrem/yr)</i>				
<i>Sandia Pulsed Reactor, Building 6590</i>	5.9×10^{-5}	[5.0×10^{-4}] ^a	2.5×10^{-4}	1.2×10^{-3}
<i>Annular Core Research Reactor, Building 6588</i>	1.6×10^{-3}		6.0×10^{-4}	5.4×10^{-3}
<i>Hot Cell Facility, Building 6580</i>	-	-	-	3.9×10^{-4}
<i>High-Energy Radioactive Megavolt Electron Source</i>	1.7×10^{-5}	2.9×10^{-5}	5.8×10^{-9}	2.0×10^{-9}
<i>Particle Beam Fusion Accelerator, Building 983</i>	1.2×10^{-6}	0	4.0×10^{-7}	3.3×10^{-7}
<i>Mixed Waste Landfill</i>	8.5×10^{-6}	5.0×10^{-6}	4.0×10^{-6}	4.0×10^{-6}
<i>Chemical Processing Laboratory, Building 6600</i>	-	1.3×10^{-11}	3.7×10^{-11}	3.2×10^{-11}
<i>Radioactive and Mixed Waste Management Facility, Building 6920</i>	-	-	-	1.4×10^{-5}
<i>Radioactive Waste Landfill</i>	-	-	-	7.6×10^{-12}
<i>Explosive Components Facility, Building 905</i>	-	-	-	3.1×10^{-9}
<i>Integrated Materials Research Laboratory, Building 897</i>	-	-	-	4.8×10^{-12}
<i>Neutron Generator Facility, Building 870</i>	-	-	-	4.7×10^{-8}
<i>TANDEM Accelerator, Building 884</i>	2.7×10^{-9}	1.2×10^{-9}	3.0×10^{-10}	4.5×10^{-8}
<i>Radiation Laboratory, Building 827 & Building 805</i>	2.8×10^{-9}	8.8×10^{-10}	2.9×10^{-10}	4.6×10^{-11}
<i>Metal Tritide Shelf-Life Laboratory, Building 891</i>	1.0×10^{-9}	1.9×10^{-10}	3.0×10^{-14}	1.8×10^{-14}
<i>Calibration Laboratory, Building 869</i>	-	7.7×10^{-12}	5.7×10^{-10}	1.2×10^{-9}
<i>Neutron Generator Test Facility, Building 935</i>	-	-	2.1×10^{-9}	-
TOTAL	1.6×10^{-3}	5.3×10^{-4}	8.5×10^{-4}	7.0×10^{-3}
Collective Dose (person-rem) for Population Within 50 Miles Population Dose, person-rem	0.026	0.012	0.016	0.14

Sources: SNL 1994b, 1995c, 1996a, 1997d
 - concentration not measured or facility inactive
 MEI: maximally exposed individual

mrem/yr: millirems per year
 SNL/NM: Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico
^a Dose total for Sandia Pulsed Reactor and Annular Core Research Reactor

Both the dose to the MEI and the collective dose to the entire population within 50 mi of SNL/NM were assessed. Although releases from separate facilities contribute to the collective population dose, the computer model evaluated emissions out to a 50-mi radius, based on a single common release point centered at TA-V. The distances between buildings are relatively small compared to 50 mi, therefore, dose estimate results were only minimally affected. The calculated collective doses for SNL/NM operations from 1993 through 1996 are presented in Table 4.9–6.

Looking at the trend in SNL/NM radiological air emissions, higher releases occurred in 1996 than in the years 1993 through 1995 (Table 4.9–5). This has been attributed to converting and refurbishing the Annular Core Research Reactor (ACRR) for medical isotope production. Also, NESHAP “confirmatory measurements” requirements for radioactive air emissions were instituted at the Sandia Pulsed Reactor (SPR) and ACRR; these measurements were higher than calculated emissions. Since the SWEIS is addressing potential impacts for projected and planned future operations, the 1996 operations are considered representative of radiological air emissions for characterizing future SNL/NM operations. It can be seen from Table 4.9–5, that MEI dose is dominated by SPR, ACRR, and HCF source emissions.

4.10 HUMAN HEALTH AND WORKER SAFETY

4.10.1 Definition of Resource

This section on human health and worker safety describes how existing physical and environmental conditions affect public health and worker health and safety. It includes all individuals who could be affected by radioactive and nonradioactive hazardous materials released from SNL/NM operations. These individuals are referred to as receptors.

This section compares SNL/NM worker health and safety performance records from 1992 to 1996 to equivalent national, regional, or local health statistics. The current relationship of people to the SNL/NM environment is assessed by resource area. These assessments constitute the framework for understanding the impacts from the alternatives presented in Chapter 5.

4.10.2 Region of Influence

For a human to be exposed to a released material, there must be both complete transport and exposure pathways (Figure 4.10–1). Since pathways differ, the ROI for assessing health impacts to people in and around SNL/NM is specific to each exposure pathway. The ROIs for impacts to public health from radiological and nonradiological air emissions are the population living and working within 50 mi and 15 mi of SNL/NM, respectively. The ROIs for impacts to public health from pathways associated with groundwater, soils, and surface water relate more to the physical extent of that resource (such as the extent of groundwater used for drinking by the city of Albuquerque, discussed in Section 4.6.2).

4.10.3 Affected Environment

The environment within the ROI includes environmental resources such as air, groundwater, and soil, which, if affected, could subsequently affect public health and worker health and safety. See the specific resource sections for descriptions of existing conditions for these resources.

Any environmental releases due to activities described in the SWEIS have the potential to affect the health of people who live around and work at SNL/NM. Specifically, the SWEIS addresses the effects of radiation from radiological materials and the effects of hazardous materials on human health, as well as occupational safety issues common to laboratory and industrial work sites.

4.10.3.1 National and Regional Health Information

The general health of the population within the U.S., based on the types and rates of cancer, is assessed

Transport and Exposure Pathways

The pathways that release materials to the environment and subsequently reach people are known as transport and exposure pathways. A *transport pathway* is the environmental medium, such as groundwater, soils, or air, by which a contaminant is moved (for example, chemicals carried in the air or dissolved in groundwater and moved along by wind or groundwater flow). An *exposure pathway* is how a person comes into contact with the contaminant, for example, breathing (inhalation), drinking water (ingestion), or skin contact (dermal).

IN



Source: Original

Figure 4.10–1. Transport and Exposure Pathways

For a human to be exposed to a released material, there must be both complete transport and complete exposure pathways.

annually by the American Cancer Society (ACS). In the U.S., men have a 1 in 2 lifetime risk of developing cancer; for women, the risk is 1 in 3. The National Cancer Institute estimates that approximately 7.4 M Americans alive today have a history of cancer and that one out of every four deaths in the U.S. is from cancer (ACS 1997a).

The ACS annually estimates the number of cancer deaths and the number of new cancer cases nationally and by state. Nationally, the estimated 1997 cancer mortality rate was 173 deaths per 100,000 persons; for New Mexico, the rate was 146 per 100,000 persons. The estimated 1997 number of new cancer cases likely to occur in the U.S. was 1.4 M, with 7,000 occurring in New Mexico (excluding skin cancer cases). Estimates were based on 1997 population growth estimates.

The DOE has developed various programs and data collection/tracking systems that can be analyzed for epidemiological trends or for epidemiological studies by independent agencies or individuals. The DOE Office of Epidemiological Surveillance Program tracks the illnesses and injuries (incidence rates) of more than 65,000 DOE workers. SNL/NM has electronically coded and archived over 10 years of employee health information through this program. The database gives epidemiologists the opportunity to analyze health events that have affected the SNL/NM workforce over an extended time. The archived information has been categorized and summarized in the DOE 1993 *Epidemiologic Surveillance Report* (DOE n.d. [b]).

These studies document health conditions of the worker population in general, but do not assess the effects of specific chemicals or radiation doses from SNL/NM operations on human health. Therefore, the health effects data are not associated with specific SNL/NM operations, environmental releases, or worker or public exposures to hazardous or radioactive materials.

4.10.3.2 Public Health

Radiological and nonradiological hazardous materials released from SNL/NM facilities reach the environment and people through different transport pathways. The SWEIS focuses on transport media associated with inhalation, ingestion, or direct contact exposure pathways, such as air and drinking water, because they are the ways in which the greatest amount of a pollutant can reach people. The SWEIS evaluates the possibility of collective effects due to multiple pathways and indirect pathways for any impact contribution.

Radiological

Figure 4.10–2 presents major sources and levels of background radiation exposure to individuals in the vicinity of SNL/NM (SNL 1997d). All annual doses to individuals from background radiation are practically constant over time. The collective dose to the population varies as a result of increases or decreases in population size. The background radiation dose of 360 mrem/yr is unrelated to SNL/NM operations.


Air releases of radionuclides from the operation of a specific facility at SNL/NM result in radiation exposures to people in its vicinity. The radiation dose is calculated annually based on actual facility emissions monitoring data. Table 4.9–6 shows radiation doses from 1993 through 1996 for maximally exposed individual members of the public at SNL/NM. Based on the risk estimator of 500 fatal cancers per 1 M person-rem (ICRP 1991) to the public, a person exposed to the greatest amount of these SNL/NM radiological air releases would have an annual increased risk of dying from cancer of 3.5×10^{-9} . In other words, the likelihood of this person dying of cancer because of the maximum 1-year dose from SNL/NM operations is less than 4 chances in 1 B. This annual release has the potential to increase the number of latent cancer fatalities in the entire population within 50 mi of SNL/NM by 7.0×10^{-5} .

Radiological contamination contained in other environmental resources affected by SNL/NM has the potential to reach the public by different transport pathways. Environmental sampling programs involving resources such as groundwater, soils, and surface water are designed to monitor and assess the potential for public exposures to these pollutants through these different media.

Radiation exposures are not expected through surface water, soils, groundwater, and natural vegetation, based on information in the SNL/NM 1996 *Site Environmental Report* (SNL 1997d). Data collected from environmental sampling show that these media do not present complete exposure pathways that connect SNL/NM to the general population. The public, therefore, is not in contact with radiological pollutants from these media.

Maximally Exposed Individual

A hypothetical person at a location who could potentially receive the maximum dose of radiation or hazardous chemicals.



Sources: NCRP 1987, SNL 1997d
mrem/yr: millirems per year

Figure 4.10–2. Major Sources and Levels of Background Radiation Exposure in the SNL/NM Vicinity

The total annual background dose of radiation to an individual in the vicinity of SNL/NM is 360 millirem.

Nonradiological

Nonradiological chemical air pollutants are released from SNL/NM facilities that house chemistry laboratories or chemical operations. Air samples collected near known chemical emission sources are presented as the highest expected chemical air pollutant levels from current SNL/NM operations. Due to dilution and dispersion, lower levels of these air pollutants would occur at locations offsite and further away from the sources.

The maximum ambient concentrations of VOCs measured by monitoring stations onsite at SNL/NM in 1996 are identified in Table 4.9–4 (SNL/NM 1997a). These concentrations are below safety levels established for workers in industrial areas. Although there are no SNL/NM-operated monitoring stations offsite, it is possible to make the assessment that concentrations decrease with distance from the source and, therefore, are also below health-risk levels for impacts to public health.

Small amounts of nonradiological chemical contamination, which have been caused by past SNL/NM operations, have been identified in other

environmental resources (such as groundwater and soils-subsurface [Sections 4.5 and 4.6]). Chemicals existing in the environment have the potential to reach members of the public through these different transport pathways. Environmental sampling programs involving resources such as groundwater, soils, and surface water, are designed to monitor and assess the potential for public exposure to these pollutants through these different media. Evaluations of groundwater, soils, and surface water information indicate that the public is not in contact with these areas of contamination within SNL/NM site boundaries and that the contamination is not being transported offsite (Sections 4.5.3, 4.6.3, and 4.6.6).

4.10.3.3 Worker Health and Safety

SNL/NM operations are required to be in compliance with the DOE and Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) requirements for worker health and safety. DOE ES&H programs regulate the work environment and seek to minimize the likelihood of work-related exposures, illnesses, and injuries.

Calculating Radiological Effects

Estimating potential human health effects involves a series of calculations that indicate the potential health consequence of a particular action or accident. Effects can be calculated both for individuals and for a population. The health effect of concern is a person dying from cancer caused by being exposed to low levels of radiation. To quantify the radiological impact, the radiation dose must be calculated.

The dose is a function of the exposure pathway (external, inhalation, or ingestion) and the type and quantity of radionuclides involved. The calculated concentrations of radionuclides in the air from emissions are used in conjunction with uptake parameters, usage rates, duration times, and radionuclide-specific dose factors in determining internal dose. The total dose is the sum of external and internal doses from all pathways.

After the dose is estimated, the health impacts (number of additional latent cancer fatalities in a population or probability of additional latent cancer fatalities for an individual) are calculated from current internationally recognized risk factors (Section 4.10.3). These health impacts are further explained in Section 4.10.

Exposure to Radiation

All people are constantly exposed to some form of radiation. This radiation can be from different sources: cosmic from space, medical from X-rays, internal from food, and external from rocks and soil (such as radon in homes) (Figure 4.10–2). The “roentgen equivalent, man” (rem) unit is a measurement of the dose from radiation and its physical effects and is used to predict the biological effects of radiation on the human body. Therefore, one rem of one type of radiation is presumed to have the same biological effects as one rem of any other type of radiation. This allows comparison of the biological effects of radiological materials that emit different types of radiation. A commonly used dose unit of measure is millirem (mrem), which is equal to 0.001 rem.

Radiological

SNL/NM’s Occupational Radiation Protection Program complies with the Federal requirements in 10 CFR Part 835, *Occupational Radiation Protection*, and DOE N 441.1, *Radiological Protection for DOE Activities*. These requirements provide protection to onsite workers and visitors at SNL/NM.

Workers receive approximately the same background radiation dose as members of the general public. Some workers receive an additional dose from working in specific radiation facilities. The Radiation Exposure Monitoring System (REMS) database records worker radiation dose information as the total effective dose equivalent (TEDE), which is a sum of external and internal radiation doses. Radiation monitoring devices, known as dosimetry badges, report an individual’s external dose information. Bioassays provide internal dose information. Annually, information from dosimetry badges and bioassays is totaled as an individual TEDE and provided to each worker.

The REMS database also contains information on the number of badges issued. This is used to compile the annual average dose to workers at SNL/NM. Because the detection limit used to assess dosimetry badges is 10 mrem (external and internal radiation dose) above background, only exposures greater than 10 mrem above background are used in deriving the annual average collective TEDE to workers. For purposes of the SWEIS, this annual average collective TEDE is applied to this group of workers characterized as radiation-badged workers

Dosimetry Badges

All employees, contractors, and visitors entering or working in radiation areas are issued radiation monitoring devices known as dosimetry badges. The Radiation Exposure Monitoring System (REMS) database records individual worker radiation dose information as the total effective dose equivalent (TEDE), which is a sum of external and internal radiation doses. The detection limit for dosimetry badges used is 10 mrem above background, and therefore only exposures greater than 10 mrem are recorded, compiled, and used in deriving the annual average collective TEDE for the radiation-badged worker population (workers receiving 10 mrem or more above background).

(badges with greater than 10 mrem). The actual annual average worker dose for the entire SNL/NM workforce is much lower than the annual average radiation-badged worker dose.

Table 4.10–1 lists the annual average, maximum, and collective radiation-badged worker doses, based on data for 1992 through 1996. Based on the International Commission on Radiation Protection (ICRP 1991)-recommended risk estimator of 400 fatal cancers per 1 M person-rem among workers (ICRP 1991), the annual average collective dose increases the number of additional fatal cancers by 4.8×10^{-3} in the radiation-badged worker population from routine SNL/NM operations. The annual average radiation-badged worker dose (based on the 5-year average) increases the radiation-badged worker’s lifetime risk of fatal cancer from a one-year exposure by 1.68×10^{-5} . The radiological limit for an individual worker is 5,000 mrem/year (10 CFR Part 835). The maximum annual dose of 2,000 mrem/yr for an individual worker is set as an administrative guideline limit at SNL/NM.

Nonradiological

Occupational Injuries/Illnesses

OSHA has identified the most important risks to the health of workers as common industrial accidents that normally involve falls, slips, trips, contact with objects, and so on, and that result in sprains, cuts, abrasions, fractures, and other injuries. Monitoring and using personal protective equipment minimize or prevent overexposures to hazardous chemicals.

SNL/NM must comply with Federal requirements to track and report occupational illnesses and injuries as required by 29 CFR Part 1904, DOE O 231.1, DOE O 232.1, and the associated *OSHA Record Keeping Guidelines for Occupational Injuries and Illness, 1986* (29 CFR Part 1904). DOE contractors must report to DOE/Headquarters (HQ) the same type of information on occupational injuries and illnesses that private industry provides to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). SNL/NM and its contractors annually report all illnesses and injuries as required by OSHA. Table 4.10–2 and Figure 4.10–3 compare the

Table 4.10–1. Radiation-Badged Worker Doses (TEDE) at SNL/NM (1992-1996)

RADIATION-BADGED WORKER ^a	YEAR	RADIATION DOSES	FEDERAL STANDARD/DOE GUIDELINE
Annual Average Dose^b (millirem/year)	1992	35	ALARA
	1993	40	ALARA
	1994	52	ALARA
	1995	34	ALARA
	1996	47	ALARA
AVERAGE	--	42	ALARA
Annual Maximum Dose (millirem/year)	1992	920	5,000
	1993	520	5,000
	1994	830	5,000
	1995	500	5,000
	1996	845	5,000
AVERAGE	--	723	5,000
Annual Collective Dose (person-rem)	1992	16	ALARA
	1993	12	ALARA
	1994	10	ALARA
	1995	10	ALARA
	1996	12	ALARA
AVERAGE	--	12	ALARA


Source: SNL/NM 1997k
 ALARA: as low as reasonably achievable
 mrem: millirem
 TEDE: total effective dose equivalent

^a Radiation-badged workers are those having badges measuring greater than 10 mrem.
^b Annual average dose equals the collective TEDE divided by the number of badges with a measured dose greater than 10 mrem above background, which is the detection limit of the dosimetry used.

Table 4.10–2. Comparison of Nonfatal Occupational Injury/Illness Rates^a (1992 through 1996)

WORKFORCE SEGMENT	YEAR				
	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
<i>SNL/NM</i>	2.3	4.1	3.8	3.5	3.8
<i>DOE & Contractors</i>	3.8	3.7	3.6	3.6	3.5
<i>New Mexico Private Industry</i>	8.1	8.5	7.9	7.3	7.3
<i>National Private Industry</i>	8.9	8.5	8.4	8.1	7.4

Sources: DOE 1997b, n.d.(h); DOL 1996, 1997b-f, j, i, n, 1998, n.d. (a) through (d); SNL/NM 1997b, 1998l
^a Rates are per 100 workers per year.



Sources: DOE 1997b, n.d. (n); DOL 1996, 1997b-f, i, j, n, 1998, n.d. (a) through (d); SNL/NM 1997b, 1998l

Figure 4.10–3. Comparison of Nonfatal Occupational Injury/Illness Rates (1992 through 1996).

SNL/NM's nonfatal occupational injury/illness rates compared favorably with local and national private industry rates.

1992 through 1996 nonfatal injury/illness case rates per 100 workers (or 200,000 hours equivalent) for SNL/NM, the DOE, private industry in New Mexico, and private industry nationally. SNL/NM injury/illness rates are much lower than those of private industry (national or local) and are similar to the DOE as a whole.

The numbers of lost workdays resulting from nonfatal injuries and illnesses are also recorded annually. Table 4.10–3 and Figure 4.10–4 compare the lost workday case rates (number of lost workdays per 100 workers or 200,000 hours equivalent) for SNL/NM, the DOE and contractors, private industry in New Mexico, and private industry nationally. Both the DOE and SNL/NM show lower lost workdays than those of private industry (national and local).

Occupational Fatalities

As shown in Table 4.10–4, approximately 6,000 occupational fatalities occur each year nationwide (SNL/NM 1997b). Private industry accounts for approximately 5,500 of that total. Based on 5 years of data listed in Table 4.10–4, New Mexico has an average of 57 occupational fatalities per year. Ninety percent of occupational fatalities occur in private industry, while government, including Federal, state, and local, account for 10 percent (DOL 1997j). SNL/NM has never experienced a fatal occupational injury (SNL/NM 1997b).

Occurrences

DOE O 231.1, *Environment, Safety and Health Reporting* (see Chapter 7), and its predecessors specify criteria for reporting specific conditions, incidences, or situations related to the safety and security of operations of DOE and its contractors in formal occurrence reports. Occurrence reporting increases sensitivity to potentially unsafe conditions, requires analyses to determine the causes of events, provides a vehicle for formal corrective actions, and fosters lessons-learned programs. The *ORPS* database tracks occurrences (DOE 1998h).

Table 4.10–5 lists, by reporting category, the SNL/NM occurrence reports between 1993 and 1996. The number of reportable occurrences in categories “personnel safety” and “personnel radiation protection” have remained relatively constant at SNL/NM (SNL/NM 1997b). The personnel safety category, which includes any reportable injury, illness, or overexposure to hazardous chemicals or radiation, accounts for less than 10 percent of reportable occurrences. Not all reported occurrences in Table 4.10–5 result in adverse effects on human health; they also report

on other categories, such as security violations and observations that are potentially hazardous conditions.

Industrial Hygiene Reports

The industrial hygiene (IH) program monitors airborne chemicals and hazards in the workplace. A wide variety of workplace chemicals are monitored, such as heavy metals, VOCs, solvents, acids, as well as other potentially harmful health hazards, including noise and radio frequency.

The IH program investigates a wide variety of conditions and situations potentially involving health impacts to workers. An Industrial Hygiene Investigation Report (IHIR) is completed when formal investigations are conducted. IHIRs are performed or initiated through various avenues such as a worker complaint, scheduled monitoring, use assessments, worker risk assessments, change of building use (for example, changing laboratory to office space), and for other health and safety-related reasons.


Table 4.10–6 identifies the total number of IHIRs performed by IH program staff from 1992 through 1996. Less than 25 percent of these investigations involved air monitoring for worker exposures to hazardous materials, including chemicals in the workplace. Very few of these investigations ever revealed an environment where an overexposure to a chemical (above a health control limit) might occur. Reportable/recordable chemical exposures to an individual are reported in the *ORPS* database (DOE 1998h). The SNL/NM *Worksite Accident Reduction Expert (WARE)* database captures personal chemical exposure incidents (both OSHA/DOE recordable/reportable) (SNL/NM 1998d, 1998k). These incidents are investigated by either safety or industrial hygiene representatives, depending upon the type of accident, illness, or injury. Investigation report results are entered by safety representatives into the SNL/NM *WARE* database, which ultimately feeds recordable incidents into the DOE’s *Computerized Accident/Incident Reporting System (CAIRS)* database, or directly by industrial hygiene personnel into the *CAIRS* database through completed IHIR reports. These databases identify personal chemical exposures exceeding a health control limit and are investigated or reported in the *ORPS* database.

A search was performed in the DOE’s *ORPS* and *CAIRS* databases and SNL/NM’s *WARE* database for personal chemical overexposures exceeding a health control limit. Data showing SNL/NM personal chemical exposures for 1992 through 1996 are listed in the bottom row of Table 4.10–6. Within SNL/NM facilities, one or two

Table 4.10–3. Comparison of Lost Workday Case Rates^a (1992 through 1996)

WORKFORCE SEGMENT	YEAR				
	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
<i>SNL/NM</i>	1.44	2.05	1.77	1.63	1.73
<i>DOE & Contractors</i>	1.8	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.6
<i>New Mexico Private Industry</i>	3.8	3.5	3.4	3.2	3.2
<i>National Private Industry</i>	3.9	3.8	3.8	3.6	3.4

Sources: DOE 1997b; DOL 1996, 1997b-f, i, j, 1998, n.d. (a) through (d); SNL/NM 1997b, 1998l;
^a Rates are per 100 workers per year.



Sources: DOE 1997b; DOL 1996, 1997b-f, i, j, 1998, n.d. (a) through (d); SNL/NM 1997b, 1998l

Figure 4.10–4. Comparison of Lost Workday Case Rates (1992 through 1996)

SNL/NM's lost workday case rates compared favorably with local and national private industry rates.

Table 4.10–4. Comparison of Total Fatal Occupational Injuries (1992-1996)

WORKFORCE SEGMENT	YEAR				
	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
<i>SNL/NM</i>	0	0	0	0	0
<i>New Mexico Private Industry</i>	35 ^a	55	54	58	60
<i>National Private Industry</i>	5,497	5,590	5,923	5,495	5,521
<i>National Total (Government & Private Industry)</i>	6,217	6,331	6,632	6,275	6,112

Sources: DOL 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1997a, g, h, k-m; SNL/NM 1997b
^a Reflects startup of collection program; number is considered low/conservative.

Table 4.10–5. SNL/NM Safety and Security Occurrences by Reporting Category (1993-1996)^a

CATEGORY	YEAR			
	1993	1994	1995	1996
<i>Facility Condition</i>	48	25	27	33
<i>Environmental</i>	11	16	6	2
<i>Personnel Safety</i>	1	5	2	4
<i>Personnel Radiological Protection</i>	2	2	4	3
<i>Safeguards & Security</i>	7	1	5	3
<i>Transportation</i>	1	2	2	1
<i>Value Basis Reporting</i>	2	4	4	3
<i>Facility Status</i>	0	0	0	0
<i>Nuclear Explosive Safety</i>	0	0	0	0
<i>Cross Category Items</i>	5	4	4	12
GRAND TOTAL	77	59	54	61

Source: SNL/NM 1997b

^aSome occurrences received more than one classification, so the total differs slightly from the total number of occurrences.**Table 4.10–6. SNL/NM Industrial Hygiene Investigation Reports Summary (1992-1996)**

IHIRs	YEAR				
	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
<i>Total Number of IHIRs</i>	436	702	933	799	411
<i>Number With Hazardous Material Air Monitoring Data</i>	151	210	207	113	65
<i>Number With Data Showing Personal Chemical Exposures</i>	1	1	2	0	2

Sources: SNL/NM 1997e, 1998d, 1998k

IHIR: Industrial Hygiene Investigation Report

reportable chemical exposures occurred each year during the past 5 years. None of these were monitored overexposures. SNL/NM has an extensive safety and health program, compliance policies, and personal protective procedures in place to reduce or minimize the potential for work-related chemical exposures to hazardous or toxic chemicals.

4.11 TRANSPORTATION

4.11.1 Definition of Resource

This section describes current regional and local transportation activities, including descriptions of any highway, rail, air, or marine transportation infrastructure that the DOE uses to support hazardous material and waste movements at SNL/NM. Transportation activities at SNL/NM involve the receipt, shipment, and transfer of hazardous and nonhazardous materials and waste. Receipt refers to material received from an offsite location; shipment refers to material sent to an offsite location; and transfer refers to material moved from one onsite location to another.

4.11.2 Region of Influence

The transportation ROI consists of three areas: within KAFB, the major transportation corridors in Albuquerque, and the routes to and from DOE facilities and waste disposal sites.

4.11.3 Affected Environment

Moving or transporting hazardous material and waste under any conditions can pose inherent risks and impacts to workers and the public. However, SNL/NM has standard operating procedures in place to minimize these risks, and to ensure worker and public safety. Normal transportation activities affect air quality, noise and vibration, and traffic congestion. Some degree of external radiation exposure to workers and the public, which is known as incident-free exposure, also occurs during routine operations.

4.11.3.1 Responsible Organizations and Materials Tracking

SNL/NM organizations share responsibility for ensuring the safe receipt, shipment, and transfer of hazardous material and waste. These organizations perform the administrative and logistical operations involved in inspecting, packaging, handling, loading, transferring, shipping, and receiving these materials.

Accountable radioactive material receipts, shipments, and onsite transfers are tracked through the *Local Area Network Nuclear Material Accountability System (LANMAS)*, a database that tracks the location of nuclear materials inventory. Explosive material shipments are tracked through the Explosive Inventory System, which records all receipts, onsite transfers, and shipments of explosive materials by tracking the movement of each

individual unit. It is common for several trackable units to be moved simultaneously on the same conveyance.

Chemical purchases are tracked through the Chemical Inventory System (CIS) maintained by SNL/NM. The majority of chemical purchases, received in small quantity containers, are made through the just-in-time (JIT) procurement procedures, which are designed to limit any excess chemical inventory in storage onsite. Other purchases, delivered in bulk loads, include compressed gasses such as hydrogen and liquid nitrogen, large quantity acids and bases, and bulk fuels. JIT chemical vendors are required to issue a 10-digit barcode to each chemical container and to compile the following delivery information: vendor catalog number, quantity, unit of measure, delivery location (building, room, and quad), organization number, delivery date and time, person delivered to, price, and the material requisition number. The vendor is also responsible for providing the following chemical-specific data for inclusion in the CIS files: chemical name, physical state, manufacturer/supplier name, standard industry barcode number, Chemical Abstract Service (CAS) numbers of ingredients, *Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA)* storage code, SARA temperature code, SARA pressure code, and National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) codes. The vendors are required to transfer the accumulated data and catalog updates to the SNL/NM CIS every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday, or as otherwise agreed upon by the vendor and the CIS department. Each vendor is responsible for the accuracy of the data they submit to the CIS. In addition, vendors also provide Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDSs) for all chemicals not having an MSDS on record.

4.11.3.2 Types and Quantities of Material and Waste Transported

The affected environment considered under this analysis includes all transportation activities related to normal operations at SNL/NM. Normal operations encompass all operations required in order to maintain production at SNL/NM facilities. However, special operations, those operations outside the scope of normal facility production, sometimes occur and can have a substantial effect on the overall transportation activities at SNL/NM. Special operations and new programs routinely undergo program-specific assessments to consider any impacts that may result from their inception. These are also included in the site-wide analysis. One special program, the ER Project, is discussed separately because, within its limited duration, this project will be the single largest waste generator at SNL/NM through 1999, based on current projections.

Table 4.11–1 lists the number of hazardous material and waste shipments, receipts, and transfers made by SNL/NM during 1996. U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) definitions and standards (49 CFR Part 173) establish the means to determine if a material constitutes a hazard for offsite transportation. SNL/NM standards, which were developed in accordance with DOE, DOT, and USAF policies, determine if a material constitutes a hazard for onsite transportation. A *hazardous material*, as defined in 49 CFR Part 173, is one that, because of its quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics, can, without proper management, significantly contribute or pose a potential hazard to human health or the environment. The types of SNL/NM hazardous materials regulated by the DOT include radioactive materials, chemicals, explosive materials, and fuels. There are also three types of waste transported by SNL/NM: radioactive waste; hazardous waste (which includes RCRA chemical and explosives waste, medical waste, and TSCA waste, primarily asbestos and polychlorinated biphenyls [PCBs]); and nonhazardous solid waste.

In 1997, SNL/NM received more than 25,000 chemical containers in approximately 2,750 shipments. The majority of these receipts were small quantity purchases made through the JIT vendors. The remainder of the receipts were large quantity purchases received as bulk loads, including compressed hydrogen tube trailers, and acids received from tanker trucks. Typically, JIT chemicals are provided through local vendors and are usually shipped from locations within 40 km of SNL/NM.

In 1997, the JIT materials received from Fisher Scientific (representing 25 percent of all JIT chemicals received from vendors) were primarily flammable, approximately 46 percent (DOT Hazard Class [HC] 3); corrosive, approximately 35 percent (HC 8); and toxic substances, approximately 2 percent (HC 6.1) (FWENC 1998a). Flammables include materials such as acetone, isopropyl alcohol, methanol, propyl alcohol, and toluene. Corrosives include materials such as nitric acid, acetic acid, sulfuric acid, hydrogen chloride, and sodium hydroxide. Toxic chemicals include materials such as methylene chloride, trichloroethene, and chloroform.

Chemicals are the most frequently received hazardous materials at SNL/NM. The second most frequently received hazardous material is radioactive material. Radioactive and explosive materials shipments are often delivered through government carriers, unless the quantities and activities being transported are low

enough to meet Federal guidelines and restrictions in place for authorized commercial transporters.

SNL/NM ships radioactive material in both excepted and DOT-specific packaging. The most common type of shipments is excepted packaging shipments. Packaging includes containers and all accompanying components or materials required to adequately contain the material. Radioactive material that is shipped in excepted packaging has a radioactive level below the limit established in specific regulations contained within 49 CFR Part 173. Generally, in order to be shipped as excepted packaging, the radiation level at any point along the surface of the package cannot exceed 0.5 mrem per hour. The package type used must meet the standards set by the carrier and a statement must be included with the package that cites the specific regulation within 49 CFR Part 173 allowing the material to be shipped without shipping papers. Typical materials that fall under the excepted material criteria are low-level radioactive source material, instruments, and empty packaging.

Material with radioactive levels in excess of the excepted packaging regulations must be shipped in either a Type A or Type B container. Type A containers are designed to undergo the routine stresses of transport and can be drums, metal boxes, or wooden boxes. For a container to be considered Type A, it must be constructed and identified as following specific guidelines found within 49 CFR Part 173. Radioactive material requiring Type A containers consists of two categories, A1 and A2. A1 material is “special form” radioactive material, and A2 material is radioactive material in forms other than special form and low-specific-activity (LSA) radioactive material. Maximum activities of isotopes for A1/A2 are found in both 10 CFR Part 71 and 49 CFR Part 173. Radioactive material exceeding the activities posted in the A1/A2 table must be shipped in a Type B container. Type B containers are designed and tested to undergo stresses that exceed those usually associated with routine shipping, such as wrecks, fires, and so on. LSA radioactive material is shipped in industrial packing containers. Specifications for these containers are also found in 49 CFR Part 173. Chapter 7 provides detailed information regarding the specific regulations cited above.

SNL/NM also purchases propane to provide space heating to TAs-III and -V and other remote areas. Propane purchases should diminish significantly in the near future as remote facilities convert to natural gas heating. Offsite sources deliver other fuels, such as gasoline, diesel, and jet fuels, directly to KAFB. Then SNL/NM

Table 4.11–1. Annual Receipts, Shipments, and Transfers of Hazardous Material at SNL/NM

TYPE OF MOVEMENT	HAZARDOUS MATERIAL/WASTE	NUMBER OF MOVEMENTS ^a	
Receipt	Materials	Radioactive material ^b	109 (1997)
		Chemical material	2,750 (1997)
		Explosives	123 (1997)
		Fuels:	
		Diesel/unleaded	0
		Jet	0
		Propane	136
	Waste	TRU	0
		MTRU	0
		LLW	0
		LLMW	1
Hazardous waste ^c		12 (1997)	
Solid waste		0	
Shipment	Materials	Radioactive material ^b	196 (1997)
		Chemical material	164
		Explosives	180 (1997)
	Waste^d	TRU	0
		MTRU	0
		LLW	4
		LLMW	1
		Hazardous waste ^c	64 (1997)
		Recycled	8 (1997)
		Solid waste	51 (1997)
	ER Waste^e	TRU	0
		MTRU	0
		LLW	22
		LLMW	0
		Hazardous waste ^c	27 (1997)
Transfer	Materials	Radioactive material ^b	10 (1997)
		Chemicals ^h	0
		Explosives	1,453 (1997)
		Fuels:	
		Diesel/unleaded	72
		Jet	1
		Propane	0
	Waste	TRU ^g	0 (1997)
		MTRU ^g	4 (1997)
		LLW ^g	761 (1997)
		LLMW ^g	35 (1997)
		Hazardous waste ^c	Daily
Solid waste		Daily	

Source: SNL/NM 1997a

ER: Environmental Restoration

LLMW: low-level mixed waste

LLW: low-level waste

MTRU: mixed transuranic

RCRA: Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

SNL/NM: Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico

TRU: transuranic

TSCA: Toxic Substance Control Act

^a 1996 figures unless otherwise noted^b Data are restricted to accountable nuclear material^c Hazardous waste includes RCRA, TSCA, and medical waste.^d Waste shipments due to normal operations^e The Hazardous and Solid Waste Department records the quantity of waste shipped offsite. This assumes that the quantity of waste collected on the site in any year is approximately equal to the quantity shipped offsite for disposal.^f Waste shipments due to the ER Project, a limited duration special project^g Data are in terms of the estimated maximum collection trips per year by the Radioactive and Mixed Waste Department. Actual onsite conveyances of radioactive and mixed wastes are not included in the table.^h Chemical transfers are included within the chemical waste shipments.

purchases these fuels from KAFB as needed; thus, most fuel shipments are considered transfers rather than receipts.

4.11.3.3 Destinations and Origins of Shipments, Receipts, and Transfers

SNL/NM receives radioactive material and explosives from a number of locations across the U.S. and, since 1994, has shipped radioactive material to 96 locations. The common and recently used destinations are listed in Table 4.11–2. At present, SNL/NM ships hazardous waste offsite to several facilities for treatment and disposal. Most of these sites are located in the southwestern U.S. (Table 4.11–2).

4.11.3.4 Historic Records of Hazardous Material Transportation Incidents

Since 1994, SNL/NM has had six transportation-related incidents involving the onsite transfer of hazardous material. One incident occurred in 1997, two in 1996, and three in 1994 (Table 4.11–3). None resulted in the release of a hazardous cargo to the environment. No member of the workforce or the public was exposed to or harmed by hazardous material related to the incidents. Only one incident, on April 12, 1994, involved injuries to occupants of the vehicle involved.

Since 1994, SNL/NM has had seven transportation-related incidents involving the offsite shipment or receipt of hazardous material. Two incidents occurred in 1998, two in 1996, two in 1995, and one in 1994 (Table 4.11–3). None resulted in the release of a hazardous cargo to the environment and no member of the workforce or the public was exposed to or harmed by hazardous material related to the incidents.

4.11.3.5 Emergency Response and Training

The *Emergency Preparedness Plan* describes the process SNL/NM uses to prepare for and respond to emergencies (SNL/NM 1997a). The plan is reviewed annually and revised as necessary. Emergency planning is required under the *Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1996* (42 U.S.C. §11001).

4.11.3.6 SNL/NM Site-Related Traffic

Road Network

Albuquerque is intersected by Interstate 40, which runs east-west, and Interstate 25, which runs north-south (Figure 4.2–1). Figure 4.11–1 shows the road network for the city of Albuquerque. Figure 4.11–2 shows the road

network for SNL/NM and KAFB and the onsite routes specified for transporting hazardous material.

In 1995, approximately 7,868 trucks were estimated to have entered Albuquerque by way of interstates on any given work day; however, only 1,514 were placarded, and only 383 of these were indicated to be carrying hazardous materials. SNL/NM made an estimated 15 offsite truck shipments per day in 1996.

Traffic enters SNL/NM through three principal KAFB gates; Wyoming, Gibson, and Eubank. These gates handle 26 percent, 30 percent, and 20 percent of the total traffic entering KAFB, respectively. An additional entrance to KAFB, the Truman gate, serves KAFB's western area, and exclusively handles KAFB-related traffic. The principal mode of transportation for moving hazardous material shipments to or from SNL/NM is by truck. Most commercial truck traffic to SNL/NM uses the Eubank gate because it provides easy access to SNL/NM shipping and receiving in Building 957 (TA-II).

Other SNL/NM Modes of Transportation

SNL/NM uses the Albuquerque International Sunport for passenger and airfreight services. Commercial airfreight services, such as Emery Air Freight or Federal Express, are available at the Sunport. Ross Aviation, Inc., also located at the Sunport, is available to support DOE programs and operations. Access to Ross Aviation is at the east end of KAFB.

Occasionally, SNL/NM may ship materials to or from Kauai, Hawaii, either by way of air or marine transport, based on regulatory requirements and restrictions. Such shipments occur as needed and could be hazardous in nature. However, since 1994, no identified shipments have used marine transport.

Since the Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railroad, located in Albuquerque, discontinued its spur to KAFB in 1994, SNL/NM has not had an active rail spur. Any current or future rail shipments would have to travel by truck to the Santa Fe railway yard in downtown Albuquerque.

Employee-Related Traffic Volume

SNL/NM staff coming to and leaving KAFB and traffic from maintenance and contractor vehicles are significant contributors to KAFB traffic. A recent estimate of the employee-related traffic volume describes the traffic from SNL/NM commuters and SNL/NM and DOE-owned vehicles (SNL 1996c). The Sandia Vehicle Decal Office issued 22,940 decals in a 3-year period for SNL/NM

Table 4.11–2. Most Common Origins/Destinations of SNL/NM Materials and Waste Receipts and Shipments

TYPE OF MOVEMENT	TYPE OF MATERIAL/WASTE	MOST COMMON ORIGIN/DESTINATION	MOVEMENTS ^a
RECEIPTS			
Materials	Radioactive	Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM	30
		Pantex Plant, Amarillo, TX	31
		Martin Marrietta, Largo, FL	17
	Chemical	Various local vendors, Albuquerque, NM (1997)	2,750
		Pantex Plant, Amarillo, TX (1997)	22
		SNL/CA, Livermore, CA (1997)	18
		Explosive ^b	Strategic Weapons Facility Pacific, Silverdale, WA
	Tonopah Test Range, Tonopah, NV (1997)		19
	New explosive material (1997)		423
	Waste	Hazardous	SNL/NM, Albuquerque offsite laboratories
LLMW		SNL/CA, Livermore, CA	2
TRU		Lovelace, Albuquerque, NM	0
SHIPMENTS			
Materials	Radioactive	Harris Semiconductor, Mountaintop, PA	65
		El Segundo, CA	33
		Pantex Plant, Amarillo, TX	13
	Chemical	Burnet, TX	12
		Carlsbad, CA	16
		Livermore, CA	9
		Explosive (1997)	Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM
	SWFLANT, Kings Bay, GA		26
	Vandenberg AFB, CA		25
	Waste	LLW	Strategic Weapons Facility Pacific, Silverdale, WA
Tonopah Test Range, Tonopah, NV			20
LLMW		Envirocare, Clive, UT	0 (22 ER)
		Nevada Test Site, Mercury, NV	4
		Permafix, Gainesville, FL	1
TRU/MTRU		DSSI, Oak Ridge, TN (from Permafix)	0
		Envirocare, Clive, UT	14
		Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM (1997)	0

Table 4.11–2. Most Common Origins/Destinations of SNL/NM Materials and Waste Receipts and Shipments (concluded)

TYPE OF MOVEMENT	TYPE OF MATERIAL/WASTE	MOST COMMON ORIGIN/DESTINATION	MOVEMENTS ^a
Waste (continued)	Hazardous (1997)	Deer Park, TX	5
		ENSCO, El Dorado, AR	11
		Keers, Mountainair, NM	9
		Kirtland AFB, Albuquerque, NM	7
		Laidlaw Gray Back, UT	1
		Laidlaw Grassy Mountain, UT	8 (27 ER)
		Laidlaw Lone Mountain, Waynoka, OK	1
		Laidlaw Aptus, Aragonite, UT	12
		Laidlaw BDT, Clarence, UT	4
		NSSI Sources & Services, Inc, Houston, TX	1
		Salesco Systems, Inc, Phoenix, AZ	4
		Transformer Disposal Specialists, Tonkowa, OK	2
	Solid Waste	Rio Ranch Sanitary Landfill, Rio Rancho, NM (1997)	51
	Recyclable Hazardous (1997)	Kinsbursky Brothers, Anaheim, CA	2
		Safety-Kleen Corp, Albuquerque, NM	2
Tab Manufacturing, Albuquerque, NM		4	

Sources: FWENC 1998a; Rinchem 1998a; SNL/NM 1997a, 1998z, 1998aa

ER: Environmental Restoration

LLMW: low-level mixed waste

LLW: low-level waste

MTRU: mixed transuranic

SNL/CA: Sandia National Laboratories/California

SNL/NM: Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico

TRU: transuranic

^a Figures given for 1996 unless otherwise noted^b Many explosives received were new explosives. In 1997, 423 of 638 trackable units received were new with no tracking unit number. Because unit numbers were identified, actual numbers of these receipts is unknown.

employees, SNL/NM contractors, and DOE personnel. During the same period, 40,959 decals were issued for KAFB (exclusive of those associated with SNL/NM). Thus, SNL/NM accounted for 36 percent of the 63,899 decals issued.

An earlier traffic study by the Middle Rio Grande Council of Governments also determined that SNL/NM accounted for 36 percent (13,582 vehicles) of daily KAFB commuters (SNL 1996c).

4.11.3.7 Traffic Accident Injuries and Fatalities

Table 4.11–4 lists SNL/NM traffic accidents from 1994 through 1997. Some of the accidents caused minor injuries, but none caused fatalities.


Table 4.11–3. SNL/NM Transportation Incidents, 1994 to 1998

DATE	INCIDENT DESCRIPTION	INJURIES	DEATHS	HAZARDOUS MATERIAL	MATERIAL RELEASED
ONSITE INCIDENTS					
4/12/94	Truck rollover with minor injuries	Yes	No	Two compressed gas cylinders	No
4/12/94	Radioactive material being transported in improperly placarded vehicle	No	No	Radioactive material	No
6/10/94	Material being moved sustained a leak of nonPCB-bearing transformer oil.	No	No	Oil	No
2/13/96	Radioactive contamination found in container in a nonradioactive control area.	No	No	Radioactive contamination	No
8/1/97	Radioactive Class II item being transported was improperly shipped as a radioactive limited quantity material.	No	No	Radioactive material	No
8/12/96	Survey found radioactive material in items sent to property reapplication.	No	No	Radioactive material	No
OFFSITE INCIDENTS					
6/20/94	Sample material sent to contract laboratory was identified as radioactive.	No	No	Radioactive material	No
1/11/95	SNL/NM assessed two violations for hazardous materials that were not properly classified, marked, or labeled.	No	No	Hazardous material	No
3/21/95	Explosives shipped in shipping pipe labeled as empty	No	No	Explosives	No
1/23/96	Follow-up survey found a container with internal radioactive contamination.	No	No	Radioactive material	No
9/11/96	Hazardous material package incorrectly packaged and labeled	No	No	Hazardous material	No
2/19/98	Shipment from vendor of explosive components received with cap not attached to safety containment cylinder.	No	No	Explosives	No
3/18/98	Radioactive material contamination levels found to exceed DOT limits concerning receipt and subsequent shipment offsite. Follow-up surveys at destination indicated material to be below DOT limits.	No	No	Radioactive material	No

Source: SNL/NM 1998f


PCB: polychlorinated biphenyl

DOT: U.S. Department of Transportation



Source: SNL/NM 1997

Figure 4.11-1. Major Albuquerque Transportation Routes
Interstates 40 and 25 and a network of streets maintained by the city of Albuquerque serve KAFB.



Source: SNL/NM 1997J

Figure 4.11–2. KAFB Transportation Routes
A large network of roads is used to transport material and wastes from site to site on KAFB.

Table 4.11–4. Traffic Accidents Involving SNL/NM Vehicles

DATE	ACCIDENT	INJURIES	DEATHS
2/23/94	Pedestrian accident with minor injuries	Yes (minor)	No
4/12/94	Truck rollover with minor injuries	Yes	No
11/17/94	SNL/NM employee suffered broken arm during palletizing activity	Yes	No
12/17/94	Truck caught fire	Yes	No
2/2/94	Security vehicle backed into 2-ft post; gas tank punctured	No	No
7/17/96	Government van involved in collision in downtown Albuquerque	Yes (minor)	No
1/13/97	Pedestrian struck by motorized cart at SNL/NM	Yes	No

Source: SNL/NM 1997a

4.12 WASTE GENERATION

4.12.1 Definition of Resource

Waste generation activities consist of managing, storing, and preparing for offsite disposal of all wastes in accordance with applicable Federal and state regulations, permits obtained under these regulations, and DOE orders. The waste categories generated onsite under normal operations include radioactive waste (including LLW, LLMW, transuranic [TRU] waste and mixed transuranic [MTRU] waste); hazardous waste, which includes RCRA hazardous (chemical and explosives) waste and biohazardous (medical) waste; TSCA waste (primarily asbestos and PCBs); and nonhazardous solid waste and process wastewater.

4.12.2 Region of Influence

The ROI for waste generation involves SNL/NM and its facilities, including the HWMF, the TTF, the Solid Waste Transfer Facility (SWTF), the RMWMF, the High Bay Waste Storage Facility (HBWSF), the Interim Storage Site (ISS), and offsite SNL operations that generate and ship waste to SNL/NM (Table 4.11–2). The process design capacities for radioactive waste storage units covered under existing permits are shown in Table 4.12–1. The ROI does not include offsite waste disposal facilities because they involve the private sector or other Federal facilities. Waste management facility locations are shown in Figure 4.4–2.

4.12.3 Affected Environment

The generation of the many different waste streams at SNL/NM creates a continuous need for proper packaging, labeling, manifesting, transporting, storing, and disposing solutions.

Radioactive Waste Categories

Low-Level Waste (LLW)—Waste that contains radioactivity and is not classified as high-level waste, transuranic waste, or spent nuclear fuel or byproduct tailings containing uranium or thorium from processed ore (as defined in Section 11[e][2] of the *Atomic Energy Act* [42 U.S.C. §2011]). Test specimens of fissionable material, irradiated for research and development only and not for the production of power or plutonium, may be classified as LLW, provided that the concentration of transuranic is less than 100 nanocuries per gram.

Low-Level Mixed Waste (LLMW)—Waste that contains both hazardous waste regulated under the *Resource Conservation and Recovery Act* (42 U.S.C. §6901) and LLW.

Transuranic Waste (TRU)—TRU waste is waste containing more than 100 nanocuries of alpha-emitting TRU isotopes per gram of waste, with a half-life greater than 20 years, except for (a) high-level radioactive waste; (b) waste that the Secretary has determined, with concurrence of the Administrator, does not need the degree of isolation required by the disposal regulations; or (c) waste that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has approved for disposal on a case-by-case basis in accordance with 10 CFR Part 61.

Mixed Transuranic Waste (MTRU)—TRU waste that also contains hazardous waste, as defined and regulated under the *Resource Conservation and Recovery Act* (42 U.S.C. §6901).

Table 4.12–1. Process Design Capacity for Radioactive Waste Storage Units at SNL/NM

UNIT	CONTAINER STORAGE (m ³)
<i>RMWMF</i>	8,000
<i>HBWSF</i>	1,800
<i>Manzano Bunker 37034^a</i>	235
<i>Manzano Bunker 37045^a</i>	176
<i>Manzano Bunker 37055^a</i>	176
<i>Manzano Bunker 37057^a</i>	176
<i>Manzano Bunker 37063^a</i>	235
<i>Manzano Bunker 37078^a</i>	279
<i>Manzano Bunker 37118^a</i>	279
<i>ISS</i>	510
TOTAL	11,866

Source: DOE 1996c

HBWSF: High Bay Waste Storage Facility

ISS: Interim Storage Site

m³: cubic meters

RMWMF: Radioactive and Mixed Waste Management Facility

^a Bunkers are located within the Manzano Area (see Figure 4.4–2).

4.12.3.1 Normal Operations

The affected environment considered under this analysis is limited to those facilities that generate waste under normal operations at SNL/NM. Normal operations encompass all current operations that are required to maintain production at SNL/NM facilities. Other waste considered includes small amounts generated from SNL or DOE-funded operations at other DOE or Federal facilities that may also be managed at SNL/NM. For example, historically, TRU waste generated by the Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute has been managed at SNL/NM.

4.12.3.2 New Operations

Several new operations are currently in the planning stages at SNL/NM. However, they are considered outside of the scope of the current affected environment description for this analysis because they have not yet reached operational status. New operations are defined as programmatically planned projects with defined implementation schedules that will take place in the future. SNL/NM has identified operations at four facilities that fall under this category: Tera-Electron Volt Energy Superconducting Linear Accelerator (TESLA),

Radiographic Integrated Test Stand (RITS), Hot Cell Facility (HCF), and Annular Core Research Reactor (ACRR). The latter two are associated with the Molybdenum Isotopes Production Project (MIPP) (DOE 1996b). Due to the specific nature of waste material, it will be handled at the originating facilities until shipped offsite for disposal. Waste generated during the preparations for these operations has been omitted from assessments of existing operations in this SWEIS.

4.12.3.3 Special Projects

Special projects are limited-duration projects, such as corrective actions, that are considered separately from facility production. These projects can make a large contribution to the overall waste generation activities at SNL/NM. However, special projects and new programs routinely undergo program-specific assessments to consider any impacts that may result from their inception and are, therefore, not considered in-depth in the SWEIS.

One special project, the ER Project, within its limited duration, will actually be the single largest waste generator at SNL/NM, although it is not a component of normal operations. The Office of Environmental Management (EM) manages the ER Project, which is a phased program designed to identify, assess, and remediate DOE-owned or -operated facilities that have contamination from disposal sites, releases, or spills. SNL/NM has received a permit modification from EPA Region VI and the NMED for a Corrective Action Management Unit (CAMU) designed to be a treatment and disposal unit exclusively for ER Project-generated hazardous waste. The CAMU is near the former Chemical Waste Landfill (CWL), an ongoing ER Project remediation site near the southern boundary of TA-III. Authorization has been received from the EPA and NMED to treat metal-contaminated soil and organic compound-contaminated soil, respectively. Construction of the bulk waste staging area and temporary storage area components of the CAMU has been completed. Construction will be completed on the treatment area and disposal cell components of the CAMU as needed to accommodate contaminated soil from the CWL and other ER Projects. Excavation of the CWL was scheduled to begin in September 1998. The *Environmental Assessment of the Environmental Restoration Project at Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico* analyzes potential environmental effects of the characterization and waste cleanup or corrective action at ER sites (DOE 1996c).

Other facility maintenance and infrastructure support operations would continue (as outlined in Section 2.3.5) with refurbishment, renovation, and removal of outdated facilities such as small office buildings, temporary structures, and trailers. Appendix D of the SNL Sites Comprehensive Plan identifies the specific structures under consideration over the next 10 years (SNL 1997). This program will potentially generate large volumes of TSCA waste, primarily asbestos, and building debris that will increase SNL/NM's disposal needs. One hundred thirty-eight buildings, accounting for 179,204 gross ft², are scheduled for removal within FY 1998 and FY 1999. Building debris estimates associated with this special project are included in the assessments of the waste generated from existing operations. Separate NEPA review may be required in the future depending on the scale and extent of the work involved.

4.12.3.4 Radioactive Waste

Radioactive waste generated at SNL/NM includes LLW, TRU waste, LLMW, and MTRU waste. Radioactive waste is characterized as either TRU or LLW, according to its radiological characteristics. Either type is considered mixed waste (MTRU or LLMW) if it also contains a RCRA hazardous waste component. LLW and LLMW are produced primarily in laboratory experiments

and component tests. Other R&D activities that use radioactive materials may also generate LLW. TRU and MTRU wastes are produced in reactors and from the cleanup of reactor tests.

As part of the effort to minimize the total quantity of radioactive waste that is generated at SNL/NM, facilities that generate this type of waste are designated as Radioactive Materials Management Areas (RMMA). An RMMA is an area where the reasonable potential exists for contamination due to the presence of unconfined or unencapsulated radioactive material or an area that is exposed to beams or other sources of radioactive particles (such as neutrons and protons) capable of causing activation. Managers of facilities must document the location of all RMMAs. Procedures to minimize the generation of radioactive wastes are then developed with the Generator Interface and Pollution Prevention Department, Health Protection Department, and the Radiation Protection Operation Department.

SNL/NM has the capability to treat some mixed wastes onsite at the RMWMF and HBWSF. Treatment methods, quantity limits, and amounts treated in 1996 are shown in Table 4.12–2. Although treatment capacity appears to exceed demand, this is a permitted treatment quantity, based on the actual equipment, and often assumes conditions for operation not intended by the facility.

Table 4.12–2. Mixed Waste Treatments, Quantity Limits, and Amounts Treated Onsite in 1996

TREATMENT	PROCESS LIMIT		AMOUNT TREATED IN 1996
	RMWMF	HBWSF	
<i>Container Storage</i>	8,000,000 L	1,500,000 L	
<i>Thermal Treatment</i>	110 kg per hour	110 kg per hour	None
<i>Neutralization</i>	1,000 L per day	1,000 L per day	21 L
<i>Chemical Treatment</i>	537 kg per hour	537 kg per hour	<1 kg
<i>Centrifugation</i>	360 gal per hour	360 gal per hour	None
<i>Encapsulation</i>	0.3 L per hour	0.3 L per hour	None
<i>Flocculation</i>	360 gal per hour	360 gal per hour	None
<i>Physical Treatment</i>	6,500 L per day	6,500 L per day	None
<i>Reverse Osmosis</i>	100 L per day	100 L per day	None
<i>Mechanical Processing</i>	1,500 kg per hour	1,500 kg per hour	None
<i>Other Treatment</i>	30 kg per hour	30 kg per hour	None

Source: SNL/NM 1997a
gal: gallon
HBWSF: High Bay Waste Storage Facility

kg: kilogram
L: liter
RMWMF: Radioactive and Mixed Waste Management Facility

Limits are often rate-oriented (for example, kg per hour) even though the actual operations are of short duration.

Historic Radioactive Waste Generation

Radioactive waste has historically been generated from the use of plutonium and other TRU isotopes, experiments involving nuclear reactor fuels, or R&D activities that used radioactive materials. In addition, small quantities are periodically received from remote test facilities and the Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute on KAFB. Table 4.12–3 summarizes radioactive waste quantities generated onsite from 1992 through 1995.

Table 4.12–3. Radioactive Waste Generated from 1992 through 1995^a

RADIOACTIVE WASTE GENERATED ^b	LLW	TRU	LLMW	MTRU
1992	42	0	6	0
1993	40	0	7	0
1994	54	0	2	0
1995	45	0	18	0

Source: SNL/NM 1997a

LLMW: low-level mixed waste

LLW: low-level waste

MTRU: mixed transuranic

TRU: transuranic

^a Values are in cubic meters, rounded to two significant digits

^b It was assumed that the amount of waste placed into storage correlates to the amount of waste generated during a similar period of time.

Current Radioactive Waste Generation

Table 4.12–4 presents information on the generation of radioactive waste during 1996. It lists totals by waste type and major generators.

Legacy Waste

Legacy waste is considered to be waste material currently in storage pending disposal. SNL/NM is in the process of disposing of this waste as treatment and disposal capacity becomes available. For the most part, legacy waste is either radioactive or classified. Radioactive legacy waste, currently in storage pending treatment or disposal, is discussed in Appendixes G and H. ER Project-generated waste is considered a type of legacy waste; however, within the SWEIS, ER Project waste is addressed separately. Projections for elimination of radioactive legacy waste are shown in Figures 4.12–1, 4.12–2, and 4.12–3. All radioactive waste in storage at the end of FY 1998 is considered to be legacy waste. Figure 4.12–1 shows that LLW inventory will be reduced to zero by the end of FY 2005. Figure 4.12–2 shows that LLMW inventory will be reduced to zero by the end of FY 2002. Figure 4.12–3 shows that the TRU/MTRU inventory will be reduced to zero in FY 2004, with shipment of this waste to LANL for certification.

Table 4.12–4. 1996 Radioactive Waste Generation by Major Contributors and Special Projects^a

GENERATORS	LLW	LLMW	TRU	MTRU
<i>Environmental Restoration Project^b</i>	310	62	0	0
<i>Neutron Generator Facility, Building 870 and Related Production Activities</i>	11	<0.1	0	0
<i>Research Accelerator Facilities, TA-IV</i>	0.3	0	0	0
<i>Research Reactor Facilities, TA-V</i>	140	6	4	0
<i>Decontamination and Decommissioning</i>	31	4	0	0
<i>Waste Management of Legacy Waste</i>	11	71	0	0
<i>Other (Balance of Plant)^c</i>	74	0.3	0	0
TOTALS	577	143	4	0

Source: SNL/NM 1997a

LLMW: low-level mixed waste

LLW: low-level waste

MTRU: mixed transuranic waste


TA: technical area

TRU: transuranic waste

^a Values are in cubic meters, rounded to two significant digits.


^b Special program, not a component of normal operations

^c Balance of operations refers to generation of mission-related waste not otherwise accounted for under selected facilities or special projects.




Source: Losi 1998

Figure 4.12-1. Projected Low-Level Waste Inventory, Fiscal Years 1999 through 2007
Legacy low-level waste inventory levels are projected to decrease to zero by 2005.



Source: Losi 1998

Figure 4.12-2. Projected Low-Level Mixed Waste Inventory, Fiscal Years 1999 through 2005
Legacy mixed waste inventory levels are projected to decrease to zero by 2002.



Source: Losi 1998
^a Negative values for Transuranic and Mixed Transuranic indicate waste is placed into storage with no shipments occurring, resulting in an increase in inventory.

Figure 4.12-3. Projected Transuranic and Mixed Transuranic Waste Inventory, Fiscal Years 1999 through 2005
Transuranic waste volume is projected to increase through 2003 and then decrease by 2005.

4.12.3.5 Hazardous Waste

Hazardous waste refers specifically to nonradioactive waste, including RCRA chemical and explosives waste, biohazardous medical waste, and TSCA waste (primarily asbestos and PCBs). The hazardous waste generated at SNL/NM is predominantly chemical laboratory trash generated from experiments, testing, other research and development (R&D) activities, and infrastructure fabrication and maintenance.

Historic Hazardous Waste Generation

SNL/NM disposed of hazardous waste onsite from the start of operations until 1981. After 1981, waste was shipped offsite for disposal. Table 4.12–5 contains a summary of hazardous waste generated during normal operations from 1992 through 1995. Medical waste totals generated in these years are unavailable. Prior to 1996, ER and D&D wastes were included within the RCRA and TSCA waste categories.

Table 4.12–5. Hazardous Waste Generated During Normal Operations from 1992 through 1995^a

YEAR ACCEPTED AT HWMF	RCRA	TSCA
1992	147,000	5,000
1993	96,000	5,500
1994	86,000	24,000
1995	207,000	133,000

Source: SNL/NM 1997a

HWMF: Hazardous Waste Management Facility

RCRA: Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

TSCA: Toxic Substances Control Act

^a Quantities given in kilograms

Note: Large variations may be attributable to startup and closeout of projects and relocation of laboratories from one building to another.

Current Hazardous Waste Generation

Table 4.12–6 presents data on hazardous waste generated by major programs in 1996 and some subgroups of major waste-generating programs or facilities. The programs or facilities listed in the table are the highest contributors. The remainder of RCRA-regulated hazardous waste is generated by approximately 1,000 additional onsite hazardous waste generators. Figure 4.12–4 shows projected quantities of SNL/NM-generated RCRA hazardous waste declining through 2001.

The PCB waste generation for 1996 was unusually high due to transformer replacement activities. An additional 77,000 kg of other TSCA waste, primarily asbestos, were generated predominantly from D&D asbestos abatement projects. Finally, 1,400 kg of biohazardous waste were also generated by the Medical Department. Figures 4.12–5 and 4.12–6 show historic asbestos waste generation and PCB waste generation with projections through 2002 (see Section 4.12.3.3 for additional information).

Explosive Waste

Explosive waste is a specific class of hazardous waste, RCRA characteristic code D003, that, due to its inherent danger, is addressed separately. Only one facility at SNL/NM, the TTF, is permitted under RCRA to treat this class of waste onsite. The TTF was specifically designed to treat explosive-contaminated waste, which did not meet DOT requirements for offsite transportation, from the Light Initiated High Explosive Facility. The TTF RCRA permit allows for treatment of up to 300 lb of waste per year. In 1996, 5,634 kg of explosive wastes were also sent to the KAFB Explosives Ordinance Disposal Unit.

4.12.3.6 Solid Waste

Solid waste consists predominantly of office and nonhazardous laboratory trash. It does not include food waste from cafeteria operations, which is managed under a separate contract with the USAF. Nonhazardous building debris generated from D&D activities may also be considered solid waste; however, it is currently managed at KAFB. After nonhazardous trash is transferred to the SWTF, it is screened for improperly disposed of and potentially hazardous materials, which are removed from the trash and disposed of through appropriate processes. All solid waste is currently disposed of at the Rio Rancho Sanitary Landfill in Rio Rancho, New Mexico.

Historic Solid Waste Generation

Before August 1, 1994, solid waste was disposed of at the KAFB Solid Waste Landfill. From August 1, 1994, through May 13, 1996, the SNL/NM Solid Waste Management Program was in transition—the KAFB Landfill closed (except for nonhazardous construction and demolition waste and recyclable landscape debris) and SNL/NM built the SWTF.

During this transition, solid waste pickup and disposal was under contract to a commercial waste management company that transported from the pickup sites to the city of Albuquerque Cerro Colorado Landfill, initially,

Table 4.12–6. Major Hazardous Waste (RCRA and TSCA) Generators in Calendar Year 1996^a

GENERATOR	RCRA	TSCA ^b
<i>Environmental Restoration Project^c</i>	11,000	90
<i>Neutron Generator Facility</i>	220	680
<i>Research Accelerators Facilities, TA-IV</i>	1,100	41
<i>Research Reactors Facilities, TA-V</i>	110	460
<i>Integrated Materials Research Laboratories</i>	2,400	0
<i>Compound Semi-Conductor Research Laboratory</i>	2,000	0
<i>Advanced Material Processing Laboratory</i>	10,000	0
<i>Other Generators</i>	21,170	50,700
TOTALS	48,000	52,000 (PCBs)^d 77,000 (Asbestos)^e

Source: SNL/NM 1997a

D&D: decontamination and decommissioning

PCBs: polychlorinated biphenyls

RCRA: Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

TA: technical area

TSCA: Toxic Substance Control Act


^a Quantities given in kilograms

^b PCBs unless otherwise noted

^c The Environmental Restoration Project is a special program and not considered part of normal operations at SNL/NM.

^d PCB generation for 1996 was unusually high due to transformer changeout.


^e Asbestos generation predominantly was from D&D asbestos abatement projects.



Sources: Losi 1998, SNL/NM n.d. (d)

Figure 4.12–4. RCRA Hazardous Waste Generation


RCRA hazardous waste generated at SNL/NM would continue to decline through 2001.



Sources: Losi 1998, SNL/NM n.d. (d)

Figure 4.12–5. Asbestos Waste Generation

Volumes of asbestos waste generated at SNL/NM would remain constant through 2002.



Sources: Losi 1998, SNL/NM n.d. (d)

Figure 4.12–6. Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCB) Waste Generation

Volumes of PCB waste generated at SNL/NM would remain constant through 2002.

and then to the Rio Rancho Sanitary Landfill in Rio Rancho, approximately 28 mi from KAFB. On May 13, 1996, SWTF began screening waste. Since 1996, SNL/NM solid waste has been disposed of at local municipal landfills. Detailed records of disposal before August 1, 1994, are limited.

Current Solid Waste Generation

Table 4.12–7 presents information for solid waste generation from normal operations based on the period the SWTF operated from May through December 1996. In 1997, SNL/NM generated 51 solid waste shipments, totaling 1.1M kg or 2,100 m³ (2,700 yd³).

Table 4.12–7. 1996 Solid Waste Generation (Partial-Year Information)

DESCRIPTION	WEIGHT (kg)
<i>Dumpster waste generated from May 13, 1996, through December 31, 1996</i>	0.6 M
<i>Average monthly dumpster waste generation</i>	0.1 M
<i>Average annual dumpster waste generation, estimated</i>	1.1 M

Source: SNL/NM 1997a
 lb: pound
 M: million

4.12.3.7 Pollution Prevention and Waste Minimization

DOE 5400.1 and Executive Order (EO) 12856 implement a pollution prevention program to comply with DOE requirements (58 FR 41981). The SNL/NM Pollution Prevention Program applies to all pollutants generated by routine and nonroutine operations. The scope of the Pollution Prevention Program includes activities that encourage pollution or waste source reduction and recycling, resource and energy conservation, and affirmative procurement of EPA-designated recycled products.

Trends and Requirements

SNL/NM has reduced waste generation, water use, and air emissions and has increased recycling and procurement of recycled material. Figure 4.12–7 presents 1997 recycling information for SNL by material type.


Waste Minimization

Waste minimization activities are not included in the previous descriptions to bound maximum waste projections for any given year. Actual waste trends are

shown for RCRA hazardous, TSCA PCB, and TSCA asbestos wastes in Figures 4.12–4, 4.12–5, and 4.12–6. Actual figures for waste recycled are shown in Figures 4.12–7, 4.12–8, and 4.12–9. Prevention and minimization of waste generation and conservation of energy, water, and resources are the overall goals of this program.

The following wastes are tracked to determine SNL/NM’s effectiveness in reducing wastes: LLW and LLMW, RCRA, state-regulated, TSCA, and sanitary waste. In addition, reductions of resource, water, and energy use are tracked. Following are the goals to be completed in FY 1999.

- Limit the generation of routine LLW to 20 m³.
- Limit the generation of routine RCRA hazardous waste to 50 metric tons.
- Limit the generation of routine state-regulated chemical waste to 110 metric tons.
- Limit the generation of routine sanitary waste to 3,650 metric tons.
- Limit the generation of routine LLMW to 2.65 m³.
- Increase the recycling rate to 33 percent of total sanitary waste generated.
- Increase procurement of EPA-designated recycled products to 100 percent in 1999, except where they are not commercially available competitively at a reasonable price or do not meet performance standards.
- Reduce annual energy use per square foot in regular buildings by 30 percent from FY 1985 to FY 2005. Assume a linear step reduction per year (for example, a 21 percent reduction by FY 1999).
- Reduce annual energy use per square foot in energy-intensive buildings by 20 percent from FY 1990 to FY 2005. Assume a linear step reduction per year (for example, a 12 percent reduction by FY 1999).
- Reduce water use at SNL/NM by 30 percent from 1994 to 2004. Assume a linear step reduction per year (for example, a 15 percent reduction by FY 1999).




Source: SNL 1998d

Figure 4.12–7. SNL Recycling in 1997
SNL has reduced waste generation through recycling.

Recycling

Recycled paper and cardboard are processed through the SWTF. In 1996, SNL/NM initiated a joint effort with Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to cooperate in collecting, processing, and marketing LANL-generated recyclable paper. After creating a process, the program was expanded to include the Kirtland Area Office (KAO). Over the next few years, efforts to expand cooperation with other Federal and state facilities will continue.




Source: SNL/NM 1998x

^a Paper/cellulose quantities for 1996 and 1997 include amounts from LANL, the USAF, and other DOE activities at KAFB. For 1997, SNL/NM accounted for 51 percent of the recycled quantity, with LANL, the USAF, and other DOE accounting for 43, 3, and 3 percent, respectively.

Figure 4.12–8. Annual Recycling Trends, 1993 through 1997

SNL/NM annually recycles various material types.



Source: SNL/NM 1998x

Figure 4.12–9. Proportions of Recycled Materials, 1993 through 1997

Paper, cellulose, and metal comprise 95 percent of the material recycled at SNL/NM from 1993 through 1997.

4.13 NOISE AND VIBRATION

4.13.1 Definition of Resource

Noise is sound that is undesirable because it interferes with speech, communication, or hearing; is intense enough to damage hearing; or is otherwise annoying. Airblast noise from the detonation of explosives is impulsive in nature and generally lasts less than 3 seconds. The rapid onset of impulse noise or the vibration of buildings and other structures induced by a noise impulse can be annoying or discomforting to those around it.

Vibration is defined as a motion in which an object moves back and forth from its rest position when it is acted upon by an external force. The maximum ground-borne vibration level recommended by the U.S. Bureau of Mines to prevent threshold damage is 0.5 inches per second. The threshold level at which minor structural damage may begin to occur in 0.01 percent of structures is set at 2.0 inches per second. Noise from explosive detonations can cause buildings to vibrate, which is perceived by the occupants as shaking of the structure and rattling of the windows. These vibrations are

perceived by the residents as the cause of existing or potential structural damage. The probability of this shaking causing structural damage is minimal.

4.13.2 Region of Influence

The ROI associated with noise includes the area within the Albuquerque basin. Noise decreases with distance from the source. The sound heard outside KAFB from airblast noise, resulting from the detonation of explosives or sonic booms from sled track activities, resembles a dull thud or short burst of sound. The distance at which this sound can be heard depends on the intensity of the initial airblast, the meteorological conditions, terrain, and background noise levels.

4.13.3 Affected Environment

This section describes the sources of noise resulting from activities conducted at SNL/NM and those associated with activities at KAFB and Albuquerque International Sunport. Although noise from activities at KAFB and the Sunport is not related to SNL/NM activities, it could affect SNL/NM operations.

Quantifying the Effects of Sound

The process of quantifying the effects of sound begins with establishing a unit of measure that accurately compares sound levels. The physical unit most commonly used is the decibel (dB). The decibel represents a relative measure or ratio to a reference pressure. The reference pressure is a sound approximating the weakest sound that a person with very good hearing can hear in an extremely quiet room. The reference pressure is 20 micropascals, which is equal to 0 (zero) dB.

A-weighted sound levels (dBA) are typically used to account for the response of the human ear. A-weighted sound levels represent adjusted sound levels that are made according to the frequency content of the sound.

Baseline sounds at SNL/NM consist of manufactured noise generated in and around the surrounding area, mainly from transportation and stationary sources. Activities at and around SNL/NM affect ambient (background) sound. These include aircraft associated with Albuquerque International Sunport and KAFB, vehicular traffic at KAFB, and industrial sources. SNL/NM test programs, including tests of high explosives, rocket motors, and large-caliber weapons and tests producing sonic booms, contribute to the noise baseline.

Noise effects to the community depend on the loudness of the sound, the intensity of vibrations, the frequency of the events, and the atmospheric conditions transmitting sound during the event. In most cases, the impulse sound heard outside KAFB resembles a dull thud or a short burst (less than 3 seconds). The noise baseline (aircraft, traffic, and industrial sources) would mask the sounds produced by most SNL/NM activities.

Industrial and construction activities are another source of noise. Some of these activities could affect the occupational health of SNL/NM personnel, but measures are in effect through the SNL/NM Hearing Conservation Program to ensure that hearing damage to personnel does not occur.

The regulatory setting that applies to noise at SNL/NM includes the *Noise Control Act of 1972* (42 U.S.C. § 4901), *Contractor Industrial Hygiene Program* (DOE 5480.10), *Occupational Noise Exposure* (29 CFR §1910.95), and *City of Albuquerque Noise Control Ordinance* (Ord. 21-1975, § 9-9-1).

4.13.3.1 SNL/NM Ambient Noise Levels

The ambient noise level is the sound pressure level of the all-encompassing noise associated with a given environment,

usually a composite of sounds. Figure 4.13–1 shows a noise scale representing common noise events, the respective decibel (dB) level, and a subjective evaluation of the noise event.

SNL/NM's ambient background sounds will be relatively consistent. Background sounds produced by generators, air conditioning, ventilation systems, vehicles, and employee activities constitute a substantial sound source during the morning, midday, and evening. The range of background noise levels associated with these sources is from 50 to 70 dB (SNL/NM 1997a).

SNL/NM testing produces the most perceptible impulse sound levels at TA-III, Coyote Test Field, and other outdoor test facilities. The 1996 baseline frequency of impulse noise events is 1,059 events. Only a small fraction of these events are loud enough to be heard or felt beyond the site boundary.


No residential areas on KAFB or in the city of Albuquerque are affected by either the damaging vibration area of 2.0 inches per second or the annoyance vibration area of 0.2 inch per second. SNL/NM facilities within the damage radius for vibrations are designed to withstand the effects of testing; therefore, damage would be unlikely (SNL/NM 1997a).

4.13.3.2 Ambient Noise Levels at Other Locations

SNL/NM is subject to aircraft noise from the Albuquerque International Sunport and KAFB and from vehicular traffic on KAFB. Aircraft noise is the most prevalent sound because Runway 8-26 is the primary runway for the Albuquerque International Sunport. Aircraft take off and land in an easterly direction on this runway about 75 to 80 percent of the time. Aircraft using this runway fly directly over SNL/NM. Noise abatement procedures to decrease aircraft noise in nearby neighborhoods, such as Ridgecrest and Four Hills, affect SNL/NM (SNL/NM 1997a). These procedures direct pilots to avoid these neighborhoods by flying over SNL/NM.

Noise levels at SNL/NM associated with aircraft from the Albuquerque International Sunport are too low to be considered potentially damaging to hearing. The noise is primarily annoying, interrupting conversations, telephone communications, and possibly the ability to concentrate on difficult tasks. Personnel in temporary buildings, such as trailers, are more likely to be affected because of the poor sound absorption qualities of the building materials in comparison to permanent buildings.

Based on Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) land use compatibility guidelines, adverse effects on people are most likely to occur within the 75-dB(A) day-night average noise level (DNL) area.



Source: Original

Figure 4.13–1. Comparing Noise Levels to Events Within Range of Human Hearing
Decibel levels and subjective evaluations are compared for events within range of human hearing.

Day-Night Average Sound Level

The day-night average sound level (DNL) was developed to evaluate the total community noise environment. The DNL is the average A-weighted sound level during a 24-hr period, with 10 dB added to nighttime levels (between 10:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m.). This adjustment is added to account for the increased human sensitivity to nighttime noise events.

At the Albuquerque International Sunport, the 65-dB(A) and 70-dB(A) noise levels extend beyond the Sunport boundary with KAFB (SNL/NM 1997a), but not the 75-dB(A) noise level.

Motor vehicle noise is prevalent in the more congested areas of KAFB. The fluctuation of traffic noise over long periods is associated with peak traffic periods. In addition, noise levels are influenced by vehicle type, number of tires, road-surface conditions, and exhaust systems. The DNL in a 1995 KAFB traffic study in a 24-hr traffic count at the Gibson gate was 71 dB(A), averaged over a 24-hr period (SNL/NM 1997a).

The Air Force Research Laboratory, USAF/Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), and the Defense Special Weapons Agency detonate explosives on KAFB. Activities that are not SNL/NM's are performed at the Giant Reusable Air Blast Simulator (GRABS) Site, Chestnut Site, High Energy Research Test Facility (HERTF) Site, USAF/EOD areas, and the DOE Live Fire Range.

Harmful noise levels (above 140 dB) from these activities remain within the boundaries of KAFB, with the exception of an 1,800-lb high-explosive detonation at the Chestnut Site, for which the 140-dB noise level extends beyond the KAFB site boundary and into the buffer zone on the Pueblo of Isleta (SNL/NM 1997a). Explosive detonations of this magnitude are expected to be rare.

Future development in the buffer zones on the Pueblo of Isleta and Mesa del Sol will create potential conflicts with respect to land use. Noise levels are projected to affect the buffer zones during high-explosive detonations at the Chestnut Site. Ground vibration may be of sufficient magnitude to generate structural damage if development occurs in the buffer zones. Impulse noise may affect the area, producing annoyance to inhabitants of developed areas should the land-use status change from its current buffer zone designation.

4.14 SOCIOECONOMICS

4.14.1 Definition of Resource

This section describes the demographic and economic variables associated with community growth and development that have the potential to be directly or indirectly affected by changes in operations at SNL/NM. SNL/NM and the communities that support it can be described as a dynamic socioeconomic system. The communities provide the people, goods, and services required by SNL/NM operations. SNL/NM operations, in turn, create the demand and pay for the people, goods, and services in the form of wages, salaries, and benefits for jobs and dollar expenditures for goods and services. The measure of the communities' ability to support the demands of SNL/NM depends on their ability to respond to changing environmental, social, economic, and demographic conditions.

For a discussion of DOE operations and socioeconomic effects related to DOE operations at SNL/NM, see Section 6.2.


4.14.2 Region of Influence

The socioeconomic ROI is defined by the areas where SNL/NM employees and their families reside, spend their income, and use their benefits, thereby affecting the economic conditions of the region. The ROI consists of a four-county area (Bernalillo, Sandoval, Tarrant, and Valencia counties) and includes the city of Albuquerque, which is where approximately 97.5 percent of SNL/NM employees reside (Figure 4.14-1). The ROI is also defined in *The Economic Impact of Sandia National Laboratories on Central New Mexico and the State of New Mexico, Fiscal Year 1996*, prepared by New Mexico State University (NMSU) for the DOE Office of Technology and Site Programs, DOE/AL (DOE 1997j). The FY 1997 report was reviewed; however, FY 1996 remained the year most representative of past operations. FY 1997 data are presented for comparison.

4.14.3 Affected Environment

4.14.3.1 Demographic Characteristics

The estimated population in the four-county ROI in 1990 was approximately 599,416 people, of whom approximately 80 percent (480,577) reside in Bernalillo county. The predominant population in the ROI is white, although 37.1 percent of the total population have a Hispanic ethnic background (Table 4.14-1). Native Americans residing in the ROI account for 5 percent of the



Source: Census 1997a

Figure 4.14–1. Four-County ROI Population

The socioeconomic region of influence encompasses Bernalillo, Sandoval, Torrance, and Valencia counties.

**Table 4.14–1. Demographic Profile of the
Population in the Four-County Region of Influence**

PARAMETERS	BERNALILLO	SANDOVAL	TORRANCE	VALENCIA	ROI
POPULATION					
<i>1996 Population (Est.)</i>	526,614	83,264	13,584	60,214	683,676
<i>1990 Population</i>	480,577	63,319	10,285	45,235	599,416
<i>Population Change from 1990 to 1996</i>	46,037	19,945	3,299	14,979	84,260
RACE (1990)					
<i>Percent of Total Population</i>					
<i>White</i>	76.9	68.6	87.0	77.5	76.2
<i>Black</i>	2.7	1.5	0.4	1.1	2.4
<i>Native American</i>	3.4	19.7	1.2	2.9	5.0
<i>Asian/Pacific Islander</i>	1.5	0.8	0.2	0.4	1.4
<i>Other^a</i>	15.5	9.4	11.1	18.1	14.9
<i>Percent Minority (1990)</i>	44.2	48.8	39.5	54.3	45.4
Ethnicity (1990)					
<i>Hispanic</i>	178,310	17,372	3,892	22,733	222,262
<i>Percent of Total Population</i>	37.1	27.4	37.8	50.3	37.1
AGES (1990)					
<i>Percent Under 18</i>	26.1	32.0	32.1	30.8	27.2
<i>Percent 65 and Over</i>	10.5	10.1	11.4	10.1	10.4
<i>Percent Between 18 and 65</i>	63.4	57.9	56.5	59.1	62.4
EDUCATION (1990) PERSONS 25 YEARS AND OLDER					
<i>Percent High School Graduate or Higher</i>	82.1	79.3	72.6	73.3	81.0
<i>Percent Bachelor's Degree or Higher</i>	26.7	19.1	10.9	12.1	24.5
MONEY INCOME (1989)					
<i>Total Income (\$1,000)</i>	6,511,338	686,948	92,051	463,387	7,753,724
<i>Median Household Income (\$)</i>	27,382	28,950	19,619	24,312	27,392
<i>Per Capita Income (\$)</i>	13,594	10,849	8,950	10,244	12,935
<i>Percent of Persons Below Poverty Line (1989)</i>	14.6	15.6	21.1	19.0	15.1

Sources: Census 1995, 1997a; MRGCOG 1997a; UNM 1997a

ROI: region of influence

^a According to the Bureau of the Census, in the 1990 Census, the "Other" category included persons identifying themselves as multiracial, multiethnic, mixed, interracial, or a Spanish/Hispanic origin group (such as Mexican, Venezuelan, Latino, Cuban, or Puerto Rican).


general population. The Pueblos of Acoma, Cochiti, Isleta, Jemez, Laguna, San Felipe, Sandia, Santa Ana, Santo Domingo, Zia, and Zuni, and the Cañoncito Navajo Reservation are important centers of these Native American populations (Census 1995). In 1990, minorities made up 45.4 percent of the total ROI population and 49.6 percent (not shown in table) of the state population (based on revised 1990 census data). In April 1997, out of a total work force of 6,824 workers, minorities made up 27.4 percent of the SNL/NM work force, including 1,325 Hispanic, 203 Native American, 184 Black, and 155 Asian workers (SNL/NM 1997h).

According to the Bureau of the Census, the ROI population grew from 599,416 in 1990 to 683,676 by July 1, 1996, which is an increase of 83,260 people or 14.1 percent over the 1990 count (Census 1997a) (Table 4.14-1). Figure 4.14-2 shows population projections to 2010. Bernalillo county has attracted the highest population growth, a trend that is likely to continue. Sandoval and Valencia counties, however, have been increasing at faster rates than Bernalillo county, and probably will continue to grow at a faster percentage

increase than Bernalillo, with Sandoval doubling in population by 2020. The growth of the Albuquerque area is increasingly affecting a multi-county region. The social and economic activities of Sandoval, Torrance, and Valencia counties are becoming more intertwined with Bernalillo county as urbanization increases. The most concentrated development is expected to be in the Rio Grande valley, but northwest Torrance county will also become increasingly developed (MRGCOG 1997b).

Some 62.4 percent of the population in the ROI is between the ages of 18 and 65. Approximately 81 percent of this population has completed high school, and 24.5 percent has attained a 4-year or higher college degree (Census 1995) (Table 4.14-1).

The 1989 total, median, and per capita income levels of the population in the ROI were approximately \$7.8 B, \$27,392, and \$12,935, respectively (Table 4.14-1). While both the median and per capita income levels of the ROI were close to the respective state averages of \$24,087 and \$11,246, there are substantial differences in income levels among the counties, especially between Torrance county (at



Source: UNM 1997b

Figure 4.14-2. 1995 Population Estimates and Projections to 2010

Population increases are projected for each of the four counties from 1995 through 2010, with the total region of influence population increasing by 27 percent.

the low end) and Bernalillo county (at the upper end) (Table 4.14–1) (MRGCOG 1997b). At the time of the 1990 Census, an estimated 15.1 percent of the residents in the ROI were living below the official poverty thresholds. Poverty thresholds vary by size of family and number of related children under 18 years of age. In 1989, for example, the official poverty threshold for a family of four was \$12,674. In 1989, 21 percent of the state population was identified as in poverty or designated as having low income (Census 1996).

4.14.3.2 Economic Base

SNL/NM is the fifth-largest private employer in New Mexico and the third largest in the ROI. Its direct economic impact on the ROI is substantial even after deducting procurement and wage/salary payments made outside the ROI. For FY 1997, the SNL/NM payroll for the ROI was \$417 M for 6,824 full-time personnel (DOE 1997j). During the same year, SNL/NM spent approximately \$309 M in procurements (Figure 4.14–3) in the ROI (DOE 1997j). Therefore, \$726 M (\$417 M + \$309 M) in direct income was available for households and businesses to create jobs and make additional purchases of products and services inside or outside the ROI. Table 4.14–2 lists employment and income in the ROI.

The total number of employed civilian workers in the ROI in 1996 was 331,800 (363,192 in 1997 [DOE 1998j]). In 1996, Sandoval, Torrance, and Valencia counties had a combined overall average unemployment rate of 5.8 percent, which was higher than Bernalillo county (5.3 percent) and the ROI as a whole (5.4 percent) (Table 4.14–2) (UNM 1997c). Torrance county had the highest unemployment rate (8.9 percent). Employment changes at SNL/NM could have a greater socioeconomic effect on Bernalillo and Torrance counties (Figure 4.14–3), where members of the SNL/NM workforce comprise a higher percentage of the county population and civilian labor force in comparison to the other counties.

The pattern of employment and income are different from county to county. During 1996, employment and per capita income were highest in Bernalillo county, followed in descending order by Sandoval, Valencia, and Torrance counties (Table 4.14–2).

In 1995, service industries comprised the largest employment sector in Bernalillo county (108,172 employees or 40.6 percent), of which the health, engineering, management, and business sectors were the largest contributors. Retail trade accounted for another

21.9 percent, followed by manufacturing (8.9 percent) and construction (8.3 percent) (Figure 4.14–4). Manufacturing was the largest employment sector in Sandoval county in 1995 with 41.6 percent, followed by the retail trade and service industries sectors accounting for 21 percent and 17.2 percent, respectively. The retail trade sector provided the most employment in Torrance county (44.2 percent) and Valencia county (34.6 percent), followed by the service sector in both counties (22.6 percent and 33.2 percent, respectively) (Census 1997b).


The total operating and capital budget for SNL/NM for FY 1996 was approximately \$1.4 B (\$1.38 B in 1997), of which an estimated \$877 M (\$840.5 M in 1997) was spent in central New Mexico. SNL/NM expenditures by major sectors for FY 1996 were personnel, including benefits (\$525 M); services (\$158 M); trade (\$65 M); government (\$43 M); construction (\$43 M); other sectors (\$26 M); and manufacturing (\$17 M) (Figure 4.14–4). As Figure 4.14–3 illustrates, \$523 M of the \$1.4 B was spent outside of New Mexico and \$314 M was spent on salaries, wages, and benefits. In FY 1996, \$94 M of SNL/NM expenditures went for services, \$37 M for trade, \$26 M for government, \$26 M for construction, \$16 M for other sectors, and \$10 M for manufacturing (DOE 1997j).

The flow of income and expenditures (such as procurements) from SNL/NM also generates direct revenue to state and local governments in the form of taxes, fees, and government services. In 1996, SNL/NM paid \$43 M in revenue (mainly state and local taxes, fees, and government services) in New Mexico. An additional \$26 M was paid in taxes to other government entities (outside New Mexico).

NMSU prepares an annual analysis of SNL/NM's economic impact on the state of New Mexico and the four-county ROI. In their analysis, NMSU employs an economic model that incorporates buying and selling linkages among regional industries and measures the impact of SNL/NM's expenditure of money in the ROI.

The NMSU model produces three multipliers. The first multiplier is used to calculate overall economic activity, the second calculates income, and the third calculates employment. These multipliers provide information needed to estimate SNL/NM's economic impact. The overall economic activity multiplier identifies the extent to which SNL/NM relies directly and indirectly on the ROI economy to provide materials, services, and labor it requires to conduct its operations. It also identifies the extent to which responding by businesses and industries occurs in the ROI. Income and employment multipliers make

\$1.4 Billion Total SNL Expenditures



Source: Original

Figure 4.14–3. Total Operating and Capital Budget at SNL

Of the total operating and capital budget for SNL for FY 1996, \$877 M was spent in central New Mexico and \$523 M was spent outside of central New Mexico.

**Table 4.14–2. Employment and Income Profile
in the Four-County Region of Influence**

PARAMETERS	BERNALILLO	SANDOVAL	TORRANCE	VALENCIA	ROI
LABOR FORCE 1996					
<i>Number of Workers</i>	281,408	38,101	5,668	25,587	350,764
<i>Employed</i>	266,434	35,986	5,162	24,218	331,800
<i>Percent Unemployed</i>	5.3	5.6	8.9	5.4	5.4
SNL/NM WORK FORCE 1997					
<i>Number of Workers</i>	5,846	311	160	336	6,653 ^a
<i>Percent of Total SNL/NM Work Force^a</i>	85.7	4.6	2.3	4.9	97.5
<i>Percent of 1996 Population</i>	1.1	0.4	1.2	0.6	1.0
PERSONAL INCOME (BEA)					
<i>Total Personal Income 1995 (\$1,000)</i>	11,901,977	1,387,695	183,339	898,055	14,371,066
<i>Per Capita (\$)</i>	22,718	17,349	14,229	15,622	69,918
<i>SNL/NM Net Wages and Salaries (FY 1996) (\$1,000) (Not Including Benefits)</i>	366,712	19,509	10,037	21,077	417,335

Sources: SNL/NM 1997h; UNM 1997c, d
BEA: Bureau of Economic Analysis
FY: fiscal year

ROI: region of influence

SNL/NM: Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico

^aTotal SNL/NM workforce was 6,824 on April 13, 1997, of which 171 employees lived outside the ROI. Thus, only 6,653 workers are shown on this table.

possible the identification of not only the direct impacts of an activity on income and jobs but also the indirect (business) and induced (household) effects (DOE 1997j).

SNL/NM operations in the ROI have substantial influence on the economy. The total funding for SNL was approximately \$1.4 B in FY 1996. Using an overall economic activity multiplier of 2.75 (adjusted for central New Mexico) yields a total economic impact of \$3.9 B within the ROI. Assuming \$486 M net additional personal income (\$525 M gross personal income) and using the 2.21 income multiplier, the total personal income was slightly less than \$1.1 B in FY 1996, or approximately 8 percent of the personal income generated in the ROI. SNL/NM workers living in the ROI received approximately \$417.3 M in net wages and salaries in FY 1996. For every job at SNL/NM, an estimated additional 2.46 jobs were created in the ROI, which means that the 6,653 average employment level in FY 1996 resulted in an additional 16,366 jobs. In effect, nearly 1 out of every 14 jobs in the ROI was created or supported by SNL/NM, or 23,019 out of 331,800 (DOE 1997j).

4.14.3.1 Housing and Community Services


Table 4.14–3 lists the total number of occupied housing units and vacancy rates in the ROI. In 1990, the ROI contained 246,561 housing units, of which 225,289 were occupied. The median value of owner-occupied units was \$85,300 in Bernalillo county, which is higher than the other three counties and nearly twice the median value of units in Torrance county. Coincidentally, the vacancy rate was lowest in Bernalillo county (7.8 percent) and highest in Torrance county (24.8 percent). While both Bernalillo and Sandoval counties issued a high number of new housing permits between 1990 to 1992, Sandoval county had the highest percentage of permits in relation to the existing stock in 1990 (Census 1995).

Community services include public education and health care (hospitals, hospital beds, and doctors). In 1990, student enrollment totaled 165,719 in the ROI (Census 1995). Ninety-two percent of these students attended public schools. Community health services and facilities are concentrated in Bernalillo county.


SNL/NM is actively involved in the surrounding communities including the city of Albuquerque, Bernalillo

EMPLOYMENT


Bernalillo County




Sandoval County



Torrance County



Valencia County



Source: Census 1997b

Figure 4.14–4. 1995 Employment in Four-County Region of Influence
The largest employment sectors in the four-county region of influence are service (Bernalillo), manufacturing (Sandoval), and retail (Torrance and Valencia).

**Table 4.14–3. Housing and Community Services
in the Four-County Region of Influence**

PARAMETERS	BERNALILLO	SANDOVAL	TORRANCE	VALENCIA	ROI
HOUSING (1990)					
<i>Total Units</i>	201,235	23,667	4,878	16,781	246,561
<i>Occupied Housing Units</i>	185,582	20,867	3,670	15,170	225,289
<i>Median Value (\$)</i>	85,300	69,600	46,500	72,100	NA
<i>Vacant Units</i>	15,653	2,800	1,208	1,611	21,272
<i>Vacancy Rate</i>	7.8	11.8	24.8	9.6	8.6
<i>New Housing Building Permits (1990-1992)</i>	6,147	1,492	NA	490	NA
<i>Percent of 1990 Housing Stock</i>	3.1	6.3	NA	2.9	NA
PUBLIC EDUCATION (1990)					
<i>Total School Enrollment</i>	133,386	17,092	2,793	12,443	165,719
<i>Elementary or High School</i>	82,555	12,815	2,390	9,325	107,085
<i>Percent Public</i>	91.5	93.4	98.5	95.6	92.1
COMMUNITY HEALTH CARE (1991)					
<i>Hospitals</i>	10	0	0	0	10
<i>Hospital Beds</i>	1,726	0	0	0	1,726
<i>Physicians (1990)</i>	1,585	51	3	21	1,660

Source: Census 1995
NA: not available
ROI: region of influence

county, and neighboring pueblos. SNL/NM is active with the following committees, boards, and/or organizations: Albuquerque Economic Development; Citizens Advisory Board for SNL/DOE; Greater Albuquerque Chamber of Commerce; and the United Way (SNL/NM 1997a). Other activities include work with educational institutions, community associations, and government agencies.

Measuring SNL/NM's Economic Impact on the ROI

A multiplier is a factor used to calculate the incremental effect of changes, in dollars spent or jobs created or lost, at SNL/NM. For example, the overall economic activity multiplier is used to calculate the total economic activity generated in the ROI for each \$1 spent by SNL/NM. The income multiplier is used to calculate the total income generated in the ROI for each \$1 of income paid to workers at SNL/NM. The employment multiplier is used to calculate the total number of generated jobs in the ROI for each job created at SNL/NM.

NMSU identified the following multipliers in their FY 1996 analysis (FY 1997 is in parentheses):

Overall Economic Activity Multiplier

- \$1 spent by SNL/NM generates an additional \$1.75 (\$1.98), for a total overall economic impact of \$2.75 (\$2.98) in the ROI.

Income Multiplier

- \$1 income from SNL/NM for workers generates another \$1.21 (\$1.32), for a total impact on income of \$2.21 (\$2.32) in the ROI.

Employment Multiplier

- 100 jobs created at SNL/NM generates another 246 jobs (264), for a total impact of 346 (364) jobs in the ROI.

Sources: DOE 1997j, 1998j

4.15 ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

4.15.1 Definition of Resource

Presidential EO 12898, *Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations*, requires identifying and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of Federal programs, policies, and activities on minority and low-income populations. Identifying minority and low-income populations is based on demographic and economic census information presented in *Addressing Environmental Justice Under the National Environmental Policy Act at Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico* 59 FR 7629, (SNL 1997f). The following sections summarize the information presented in that report.

4.15.2 Region of Influence


The population within a 50-mi radius around SNL/NM was considered in this evaluation because most resource areas have an ROI with the 50-mi radius, and none of them (with the exception of the four-county region for socioeconomics) has an ROI that extends beyond 50 mi. Minority populations living up to a 50-mi radius of SNL/NM, which exceed 49 percent of the population according to census data (Figure 4.15–1), were evaluated regarding health and environmental effects from activities at SNL/NM. Similarly, where low-income population exceeded 21 percent of the general population (Figure 4.15–2), the effects from activities at SNL/NM were analyzed. Figure 4.15–3 shows areas of environmental justice concern located near KAFB main gates (SNL 1997f). The figure presents a composite assessment of both minority and low income populations as presented in *Addressing Environmental Justice Under the National Environmental Policy Act at Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico* (SNL 1997f).

4.15.3 Affected Environment

4.15.3.1 Identifying Minority and Low-Income Populations


For this SWEIS, minority populations are considered to be all *people of color*, except white people who are not Hispanic. In 1990, 49 percent (51 percent by 1996) of New Mexico's population was minority (Census 1998). Neighborhoods having minority population percentages exceeding the minority population percentage of 49 percent (slightly more conservative than 51 percent) are identified on a block-by-block basis, with clusters of blocks known as block groups.

The Bureau of the Census characterizes persons in poverty (low-income persons) as those whose incomes are less than a statistical poverty threshold. The threshold is a weighted average based on family size and age of family members. For instance, the 1990 census threshold for a family of four was based on a 1989 household income of \$12,674 (Census 1990). By 1996, the household income threshold rose to \$16,036 (Census 1997c). In 1989, 21 percent of New Mexico's population was listed in poverty or designated as having low income (Census 1996). By 1996, the estimated percentage stood at 24 percent (Census 1997c). In this analysis, low-income block groups (same as above) occur where the low-income population percentage in the block group exceeds the poverty percentage for the






Source: SNL/NM 1997j

Figure 4.15–1. Minority Population
Block groups with more than 49 percent minority population were identified within a 50-mi radius of SNL/NM.



Source: SNL/NM 1997j

Figure 4.15–2. Low-Income Population
Block groups with more than 21 percent low-income population were identified within a 50-mi radius of SNL/NM.



Source: SNL/NM 1997f

Figure 4.15–3. Environmental Justice Areas

Five block groups with potential environmental justice concern are located near KAFB.

state of New Mexico. Figures 4.15–1 and 4.15–2 show the percentages of minority populations and low-income individuals, respectively, living within a 50-mi radius of SNL/NM. This area is similar, but not identical to, the four-county socioeconomic ROI discussed in Section 4.14.

4.15.3.2 Minority Populations

Block groups containing fewer than 49 percent minority individuals were not considered minority block groups (SNL 1997f). According to 1990 census data, approximately 280,360 minority individuals from an approximate total population of 609,500 reside in the 50-mi ROI. This represents 46 percent of the total ROI population (SNL 1997f). Figure 4.15–1 shows the census block groups containing minority individuals.

Approximately 228,800 persons identified themselves as being of Hispanic origin, which represent approximately 37.5 percent of the ROI population (SNL 1997f). Areas of Hispanic population lie generally in historic settlement patterns west of Interstate 25, in areas called the North Valley and South Valley. In the North Valley, Los Ranchos de Albuquerque has a higher-than-state-average Hispanic concentration. Old Town, the original center of Albuquerque, also has a higher-than-state-average Hispanic concentration. The highest Hispanic concentration is in the South Valley (SNL 1997f).

Approximately 29,840 persons identified themselves as “American Indians,” which represent approximately 5 percent of the ROI population (SNL 1997f). The ROI contains 11 pueblos or reservations and 2 joint-use areas. The Pueblo of Isleta and Isleta Pueblo Trust Lands are adjacent to the southern boundary of KAFB. In addition, the Pueblo of Isleta represents the largest landholding of a minority population adjacent to KAFB (SNL 1997f).

Another 8,025 persons identified themselves as being “Asian or Pacific Islander,” and approximately 14,600 persons identified themselves as being “Black,” which represent approximately 1 and 2 percent, respectively, of the ROI population. The highest concentrations of both these groups reside in base housing on or near KAFB. Several smaller Black communities also exist west of KAFB, just beyond the city’s airport (SNL 1997f).

An estimated 91,600 persons identified themselves as “Other,” which represent approximately 15 percent of the ROI population. Statewide, 190,350 persons identified themselves as “Other.” Of those people, approximately 186,970 (98 percent) were of Hispanic origin (SNL 1997f). This phenomenon occurs because many Hispanics do not consider themselves to be “White,” a category they perceive as designated for European-Americans. According to the Bureau of the Census, the “Other” category includes persons identifying themselves as multiracial, multiethnic, mixed, interracial, or of a Spanish/Hispanic origin group (such as Mexican, Venezuelan, Latino, Cuban, or Puerto Rican). Concentrations of “Other” populations to the west of SNL/NM are in Hispanic neighborhoods. The distribution of “Other” minority individuals near SNL/NM mirrors the distribution of Hispanic individuals (SNL 1997f).

4.15.3.3 Low-Income Populations

Approximately 85,330 persons were identified as being low income, which represent approximately 14 percent of the ROI population (SNL 1997f). Figure 4.15–2 shows the census block groups containing more than 21 percent population below the poverty level.

This distribution of low-income population has a strong correlation to minority populations of Blacks, Native Americans, and Hispanics. For example, the high concentrations of low-income populations west of Albuquerque, shown in Figure 4.15–2 (near the 50-mi radius boundary), indicate the Pueblo of Laguna and its outlying Native American villages. Similarly, portions of the Pueblo of Isleta, south of the city, have high percentages of low-income individuals. To the southeast of SNL/NM, the rural Hispanic villages of Tajiique, Torreon, and Escobosa are also low-income. To the north of SNL/NM, high concentrations of low-income populations are located in the Pueblos of Jemez, San Felipe, Santo Domingo, and Cochiti, as well as in the rural Hispanic villages of La Cienega and Jemez Springs (SNL 1997f).

High concentrations of low-income populations occur west of SNL/NM, along the Rio Grande, in the predominantly Hispanic South Valley neighborhoods. In addition, small pockets of low-income populations reflect the locations of Black neighborhoods such as the Kirtland Addition and the South Broadway/East San Jose area (SNL 1997f).

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CHAPTER 5

Environmental Consequences

Chapter 5 provides information on the methods of analysis applied in the Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement (SWEIS) and the results of analyses for Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico (SNL/NM). The chapter begins with an introduction and a summary of the impact assessment methodologies that have been applied. It continues with descriptions of the impacts of the No Action, the Expanded Operations, and the Reduced Operations Alternatives. Within each alternative, impacts are presented by resource area (for example, infrastructure, land use, geology and soils) or topic area (for example, waste generation, transportation, environmental justice). Also addressed later in this chapter are mitigation measures, irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources, unavoidable adverse environmental impacts, and relationships between short-term uses of the environment and long-term productivity.

5.1 INTRODUCTION

Chapter 5 provides an analytical comparison of the environmental impacts associated with the alternatives. Section 5.2 contains a summary discussion of the

methodologies used to assess potential impacts to that aspect. Detailed methodologies, analyses, and supporting data are provided in resource-specific appendixes A through H. Section 5.3, No Action Alternative; Section 5.4, Expanded Operations Alternative; and Section 5.5, Reduced Operations Alternative are formatted so that, within each alternative, the discussion is divided into the following resource and topic areas:

- Land Use and Visual Resources
- Infrastructure
- Geology and Soils
- Water Resources and Hydrology
- Biological and Ecological Resources
- Cultural Resources
- Air Quality
- Human Health and Worker Safety (including Accidents)
- Transportation (including Accidents)
- Waste Generation
- Noise and Vibration
- Socioeconomics
- Environmental Justice

For comparison purposes, environmental emissions and other potential environmental effects are presented with regulatory standards or guidelines, as appropriate. However, for *National Environmental Policy Act 1969* (NEPA) purposes, compliance with regulatory standards is not necessarily an indication of the significance or severity of the environmental impact.

Types of Impacts

Direct Impacts

These are effects that are caused by the action and occur at the same time and place. Examples of these would be the elimination of original land use due to the erection of a building or change of land use. Direct impacts may cause indirect impacts, such as ground disturbance resulting in resuspension of dust and decreasing visibility.

Indirect Impacts


These are effects that are caused by the action or by direct impact, occur later in time or are farther removed in the distance, but are still reasonably foreseeable. Indirect effects may include growth-inducing effects and other effects related to induced changes in the pattern of land use (such as population density or growth rate and related effects on air and water and other natural systems, including ecosystems).

Cumulative Impacts

These are effects that result from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of which agency or person undertakes such other actions. Cumulative impacts can result from individually minor but collectively significant actions taking place over time.

Several resource-specific evaluations have also been performed that address the consequences and risks associated with the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) operations at SNL/NM. Each evaluation has a unique scope and purpose. Figure 5.1 illustrates how the facility-based assessments and SWEIS-specific evaluations and consultations flow into the SNL/NM SWEIS.

This chapter also provides a discussion of mitigation measures (Section 5.6), unavoidable adverse impacts (Section 5.7), the relationship between short-term uses and long-term productivity (Section 5.8), and the irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources (Section 5.9). A discussion of cumulative impacts is presented in Chapter 6.



Source: Original

Figure 5.1 1. Data and Analytical Contributions to the SNL/NM Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement

The SWEIS is related to many other DOE resource-specific studies.

5.2 METHODOLOGY

Following are brief descriptions of the impact assessment approaches used in the SWEIS for addressing potential impacts of SNL/NM operations under the No Action, Expanded Operations, and Reduced Operations Alternatives. The *Sandia National Laboratories Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement Final Methodologies for Impact Analysis* (TtNUS 1998e) provides in-depth information concerning the assessment methodologies used in the SWEIS.

5.2.1 Land Use and Visual Resources

A comparative methodology was used to determine impacts to SNL/NM land use. Facility operations and any construction or modification activities associated with each alternative were examined and compared to existing land use conditions. Impacts, if any, were identified as they relate to changes in land ownership and use classifications, extent and size figures, alternative or conflicting uses, and accessibility concerns.

The analysis of visual impacts was also comparative and consisted of a qualitative examination of potential changes in visual resources. The method of assessing a visual resource was based on the U.S. Forest Service (USFS) Scenery Management System (SMS). The SMS combines aspects of scenic attractiveness and landscape visibility to establish a series of six scenic classes. These classes indicate the degree of public value for a landscape area and serve as guidelines for future landscape changes. The higher the scenic class (on a scale where 1 is highest), the more important it is to maintain the highest scenic value. The scenic classes are 1-2, 3-4, and 5-6, corresponding to high public value, moderate public value, and low public value, respectively.

Aspects of visual modification examined included site development or modification activities that could alter the visibility of SNL/NM structures or obscure views of the surrounding landscape, changes in surrounding land cover that could make structures more or less visible, and air or light pollution associated with operations that could influence visibility factors in the area.

5.2.2 Infrastructure

Incremental changes to SNL/NM facilities and infrastructure were assessed by comparing the support requirements of the alternatives to current site infrastructure utility demands (water and electricity) based on projected facility square footage requirements and available capacities. Site-wide utility usage was

adjusted for contributions from the selected facilities. Impacts were considered on a wide variety of structures and systems used by SNL/NM, including infrastructure support provided by Kirtland Air Force Base (KAFB), and assessment was focused on infrastructure, facilities, services, and utility systems. Four infrastructure facilities (steam plant, Radioactive and Mixed Waste Management Facility [RMWMF], Hazardous Waste Management Facility [HWMF], and Thermal Treatment Facility [TTF]) were specifically evaluated for impacts as representative of SNL/NM (see Section 2.3).

5.2.3 Geology and Soils

Geology and soils analyses encompassed three distinct areas: seismic, soil contamination, and slope stability. The consequences of potential seismic activity at SNL/NM are addressed within the accident analysis sections (5.3.8.2, 5.4.8.2, and 5.5.8.2) and Appendix F.

The soil contamination analysis considered the potential for human contact of near-surface (the top 6 inches to 1 ft) contaminated soils and limitations on future land use of these areas. The analysis examined the types of sites where soil contamination could be present (environmental restoration and outdoor testing areas) and site characteristics. Soil contaminant concentrations were projected under each alternative and compared with criteria for future designated land use.

The slope stability analysis examined the location of SNL/NM facilities relative to areas with potentially unstable slopes. SNL/NM facilities near these slopes were identified using a map generated from a geographic information system (GIS) showing slopes of at least 10 percent. The 10 percent value was selected as a conservative screening criterion based on the dry site soil conditions and lack of previous slope stability problems at SNL/NM. For each SNL/NM facility identified, field observations were conducted to support a qualitative evaluation of the effects of SNL/NM activities on these slopes.

5.2.4 Water Resources and Hydrology

Water resources and hydrology analyses focused on four distinct areas: groundwater quality, groundwater quantity, surface water quality, and surface water quantity.

The groundwater quality analysis determined to what extent contamination from SNL/NM sites in the unsaturated and saturated zones would limit the potential use of groundwater, particularly as drinking

water. Unsaturated zone and groundwater contamination sites that have not been removed, are planned for removal, or are final or proposed no further action (NFA) sites were characterized in terms of their contaminants, concentrations, and extent. Where information was available, contaminant migration through the unsaturated zone beneath the contaminant source was characterized in terms of flow and transport parameters. A *MODFLOW/MODPATH* model maintained by the Environmental Restoration (ER) Project was used to simulate the path of contaminants from the water table beneath the source in the downgradient direction (DOE 1997a). This trajectory modeling was used with a one-dimensional (1-D)/three-dimensional (3-D) flow/transport model to determine the maximum portion of the aquifer (area and extent) that would exceed applicable water quality criteria.

The groundwater quantity analysis examined future SNL/NM water use projections, evaluating potential impacts of groundwater withdrawal. Using records of local groundwater withdrawals and water level measurements from 1985 through 1996, a simple linear relationship between withdrawal and drawdown was established. This linear relationship was used with projections of groundwater withdrawals from KAFB (includes SNL/NM), Ridgecrest, and Mesa del Sol wells under each alternative to estimate future aquifer drawdown. Impacts of drawdown were evaluated for existing water supply wells, springs, and land subsidence.

The surface water quality analysis examined the potential for future storm water runoff contamination in Tijeras Arroyo. Tijeras Arroyo water quality measurements at the point where the arroyo crosses the KAFB boundary were examined and compared with New Mexico Water Quality Control Commission (NMWQCC)-listed constituents and standards for designated use (general standards, livestock watering, and wildlife habitat) (NMWQCC 1994). The analysis examined changes in potential SNL/NM contributions to surface water contamination under the three alternatives and the likelihood of these changes affecting regulatory compliance at the downstream exit point of Tijeras Arroyo from KAFB.

Effects of SNL/NM facilities on surface water quantity were analyzed based on the incremental contribution of SNL/NM to Rio Grande flow from storm water runoff and wastewater discharge. The SNL/NM contribution to storm water runoff was determined by calculating the difference between estimated natural runoff (10 percent

of rainfall) and an assumed 100 percent runoff from the SNL/NM area covered by buildings and parking lots. Using flow measurements from the Montessa Park gaging station in Tijeras Arroyo, a portion of total Tijeras Arroyo flow was attributed to SNL/NM, based on the percentage of watershed area covered by SNL/NM facilities. This portion was added to the projected wastewater discharge quantities (wastewater is discharged to the Rio Grande after treatment at the Southside Water Reclamation Plant) for each alternative and compared with total Rio Grande flow. Potential impacts of this additional water quantity to the Rio Grande are discussed qualitatively.

5.2.5 Biological and Ecological Resources

A qualitative analysis addresses the impacts of the activities under each alternative to biological and ecological resources. The methodology focused on those biological resources with the potential to be appreciably affected, and for which analyses assessing alternative impacts were possible. Biological resources include biological communities, biodiversity, habitat, and ecological processes. Among these resources are the vegetation, wildlife, aquatic resources, and sensitive species that are present or use SNL/NM and contiguous areas. The potential sources of impacts to biological resources that were considered include noise, outdoor tests, hydrologic changes affecting availability of water to plants and animals, erosion, hazardous materials releases and radiological releases from normal operations, and security measures that restrict access to SNL/NM.

The biological data from earlier projects, wetlands surveys, and plant and animal inventories of portions of KAFB were reviewed to identify the locations of plant and animal species and wetlands. Lists of sensitive species potentially present on KAFB were obtained from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) (USFWS 1998), the New Mexico Department of Game and Fish (NMDGF 1997), the USFS (USFS 1990), and the New Mexico Energy, Minerals, and Natural Resources Department; Forestry and Resources Conservation Division (NMEM&NRD 1995).

Activities and potential releases identified under the three alternatives were reviewed for their potential to affect plants, animals, and the sensitive species under Federal and New Mexico laws and regulations. Potential beneficial and negative impacts to plants and animals were evaluated for gain, loss, disturbance, or displacement. Impacts to wetlands were evaluated to

determine if their areal extent would change. Monitoring data on selected small mammal, reptile, amphibian, bird, and plant species were reviewed for radionuclide and metal contamination (SNL/NM 1997u). Data from the ER Project were reviewed for impact to biological resources (DOE 1996c).

5.2.6 Cultural Resources

Potential impacts to cultural resources were assessed under the No Action, Expanded Operations, and Reduced Operations Alternatives. Cultural resources include prehistoric archaeological sites, historic sites, and traditional cultural properties (TCPs). Information used for impact assessment was derived from the results of systematic cultural resource inventories on KAFB, review of literature concerning TCPs and traditional uses of the area, and consultations with 15 Native American tribal governments and the New Mexico State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO).

Data on SNL/NM activities occurring under the three alternatives were used to analyze impacts to resources (SNL/NM 1998a). The results of consequence analyses for hydrology, transportation, infrastructure, and land use were used to determine the potential for other impacts to cultural resources. Human health, noise, and vibration analyses were used to assess impacts to human users of TCPs. The types of effects, or actions leading to effects, evaluated include the following:

- New construction
- Demolition
- Vibration
- Visual impact
- Radiation releases
- Hazardous material releases
- Maintenance
- Restricted access
- Explosive testing debris and shrapnel
- Hydrologic changes
- Erosion or soil movement
- Off-road vehicle traffic
- Unintended fires and fire suppression

Potential impacts to cultural resources can fall into four broad categories, called Criteria of Effect and Adverse Effect (36 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] §800.9),

as defined in the implementing regulations for the *National Historic Preservation Act* (NHPA), as amended (16 United States Code [U.S.C.] Section [§] 470). These categories consist of 1) destruction or alteration; 2) isolation and restriction of access; 3) introduction of visible, audible, or atmospheric elements out of character with the resource; and 4) neglect leading to deterioration and vandalism. The locations of known cultural resources were compared to the areas of potential effect from SNL/NM activities. The potential for impacts from these activities to cultural resources was then assessed.

5.2.7 Air Quality

5.2.7.1 Nonradiological Air Quality

Nonradiological air quality impacts were determined by modeling site emissions of criteria and chemical pollutants for the 1996 baseline conditions, plus those pollutant sources expected to become operational by 2008. The site-specific emissions were modeled in accordance with U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), state of New Mexico, and city of Albuquerque guidelines. The EPA-recommended *Industrial Source Complex Short-Term Model, Version 3 (ISCST3)* was selected as the most appropriate model to perform the air dispersion modeling analysis from stationary continuous emission sources. *ISCST3* and the available hourly meteorological data for 1994 through 1996 were used in the assessment of criteria pollutant air quality. The maximum concentrations of the seven criteria pollutants included in the primary and secondary National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) (40 CFR Part 50) and the New Mexico Ambient Air Quality Standards (NMAAQS) (20 New Mexico Administrative Code [NMAC] 2.3) were assessed, including carbon monoxide, lead, nitrogen dioxide, total suspended particulates (TSP), particulate matter smaller than 10 microns in diameter (PM₁₀), sulfur dioxide, and ozone. Ambient air monitoring data were used to supplement modeled pollutant concentrations for those pollutants for which no emission data were available.

The New Mexico Air Pollution Control Bureau approved the Ozone Limiting Method (OLM) to estimate nitrogen dioxide concentrations in modeled nitrogen oxides emissions. The OLM was employed to estimate nitrogen dioxide concentrations in cases where the modeled nitrogen oxides concentration is greater than the NMAAQS for nitrogen dioxide. The modeled 24-hour average nitrogen oxides concentration resulting from nitrogen oxides emissions from SNL/NM exceeds the NMAAQS for nitrogen dioxide. As a result, the OLM was implemented.

Evaluation of chemical pollutant air quality consisted of modeling chemical pollutant emissions derived from the Chemical Information System (CIS), CheMaster, and Hazardous Chemicals Purchased Inventory (HCPI) databases. The modeling was performed using the model *ISCST3*, the hourly meteorological data used for the criteria pollutant assessment, chemical purchase data, and chemical release assumptions.

Receptor locations for the criteria and chemical pollutant modeling included the maximum offsite concentration location, public access areas, hospitals, and schools. The maximum criteria pollutant concentrations at receptor locations were compared with the NAAQS and NMAAQs to determine compliance with standards, while the chemical pollutant concentrations were compared with health guidelines derived from occupational exposure limits (OEL) divided by 100 and unit cancer risk factors for 10^{-8} risk levels in lieu of established regulatory ambient air quality standards. Chemical pollutants of concern were identified through a progressive series of screening steps, each step involving fewer pollutants, which were screened by methods that involved more rigorous and realistic emission rates and modeling parameters than the step before. Chemicals that failed the screening process were referred to the Human Health risk assessment. This approach, consistent with EPA guidance, focused detailed analyses only on those chemicals of concern that have the potential to cause adverse health effects.

Analysis of the contribution of mobile sources (vehicular traffic) entering SNL/NM was performed using the *Mobile Source Emission Factor Model (MOBILE 5a)* to estimate mobile source emissions of carbon monoxide (EPA 1994). Assessment of air quality also included modeling the criteria and chemical emissions from fire testing facilities using the *Open Burn/Open Detonation Dispersion Model (OBODM)* developed by the U.S. Army and the EPA (Bjorklund et al. 1997).

5.2.7.2 Radiological Air Quality

Radiological emissions from routine SNL/NM facility operations were evaluated on the basis of dose to the maximally exposed individual (MEI) and collective dose to the general population within 50 mi of SNL/NM. This evaluation was compared to the standards in the National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) (40 CFR Part 61). NESHAP standards limit the radiation dose that a member of the public may receive from radiological material released to the atmosphere from normal operations to 10 mrem per

year. The emissions from all SNL/NM facilities were reviewed. Those facilities that did not contribute more than 0.01 mrem per year (0.1 percent of the NESHAP limit) to the MEI were excluded. Ten facilities exceeding the threshold were included in the dose impact evaluation: Annular Core Research Reactor (ACRR), Defense Programs (DP) configuration; ACRR, medical isotopes production configuration; Sandia Pulsed Reactor (SPR); Hot Cell Facility (HCF); RMWMF; Mixed Waste Landfill (MWL); High-Energy Radiation Megavolt Electron Source III (HERMES III); Radiographic Integrated Test Stand (RITS); Neutron Generator Facility (NGF); and Explosive Components Facility (ECF).

The radiological impacts of normal operations were based on estimated radionuclide emission rates and were calculated using the EPA-approved *Clean Air Assessment Package (CAP88-PC)* computer model (DOE 1997e). *CAP88-PC* conservatively calculates radiological impacts extending up to 50 mi.

Two dose quantities were calculated with the *CAP88-PC* model: the effective dose equivalent from external sources and the committed effective dose equivalent from internal sources. The external dose represents exposure from airborne radiation emissions or exposure from the ground, such as standing on ground that is contaminated with radioactive material. The pathways for internal exposure include ingesting food products contaminated by airborne radiation. Although the SNL/NM site does not contain any agricultural production, agricultural data beyond the site boundary to a 50-mi radius were considered in the impact evaluation.

Potential MEIs were identified as receptor locations. These receptor locations were selected based on distance, direction, and wind speed and direction from each modeled facility. The total dose was calculated at each of the receptor locations from each of the modeled facilities. The receptor with the highest combined dose from all facilities was identified as the MEI and compared with regulatory standards. The collective dose to the population within 50 mi of SNL/NM was also determined. The methodology for assessing MEI and collective population dose impacts is further discussed in Section 5.2.8, below.

5.2.8 Human Health and Worker Safety

5.2.8.1 Normal Operations

An analysis of environmental conditions related to SNL/NM routine operations under each alternative and

an assessment of the release of hazardous materials by way of different transport pathways were used to identify possible exposure pathways of concern to receptor locations within the SNL/NM vicinity. All environmental releases of chemicals and radionuclides with the potential to adversely impact public health or worker health and safety were evaluated for human health risk. The health risk assessment process is a series of steps associating environmental conditions with potential health effects resulting from contact with the contaminants in the environment, as illustrated in Figure 5.2.8 1.

An initial assessment identified potential sources at SNL/NM as emissions from stacks and open burning, radiological material transportation, and existing environmental contamination. Exposure pathways analyzed include inhaling affected ambient air, ingesting food products affected by radiological air releases, direct radiation exposure from radioactive air emissions and ground deposition, and direct radiation exposure from radioactive materials shipments. Human health risk calculations used exposure information derived from analysis of nonradiological air quality, radiological air quality, and transportation of hazardous material.

A receptor's exposure to a chemical contaminant was expressed in terms of chronic daily intake (CDI) or Lifetime Average Daily Dose (LADD). The numerical approach for CDI calculated potential chronic exposures averaged over a lifetime from noncarcinogenic chemicals and related them as a ratio to the EPA-derived health risk factors known as reference doses. The ratio estimates the increased risk that an individual exposed to that compound could develop an adverse health effect. The numerical approach for LADD estimated potential chronic exposures to carcinogenic chemicals and associated them with the EPA-derived health risk factor for carcinogens known as cancer slope factors (CSF). The daily intake was multiplied by the health risk CSF to estimate the increased likelihood of an individual getting cancer in his or her lifetime from that exposure.

The radiological dose assessment looked at appropriate health risk estimators for excess latent cancer fatalities (LCFs), nonfatal cancers, and excess genetic disorders. The risk estimators used are recommended by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP 1991) and are promulgated in Federal guidance. Dose to the individual was converted to the increase in lifetime risk of fatal cancer, nonfatal cancer, and genetic disorders. Population collective dose was converted to the additional number of LCFs, nonfatal cancers, and genetic disorders in the population assessed.

To account for multiple pathways, a composite cancer risk for an individual member of the public, due to both carcinogenic chemicals and radiological exposures, was derived by adding the radiological MEI cancer risk with the excess lifetime cancer risk (ELCR) due to chemical exposure. Two scenarios were developed expressing composite risk: the risk at the radiological MEI receptor location was evaluated for the contribution added by chemical exposures at the same location; and a worst-case composite risk was calculated, assuming the radiological MEI risk is hypothetically combined with the upper-bound value for cancer risk from chemicals, even though these concentrations occur at different locations.

Radiological doses to the radiation worker population were evaluated using the historic dosimetry data available for 1992 through 1996. Nonradiological impacts to workers were evaluated using occupational illness and injury data, occurrence reports, and industrial hygiene investigation reports available for the same period.


The SNL/NM illness/injury rate per year under each alternative is expected to remain consistent with the average illness/injury rate calculated for 1992 through 1996. Estimating the number of illnesses and injuries per year was based on projected changes in the total number of workers under each alternative multiplied by the 5-year average illness/injury rate.

The same approach was used to estimate radiation workers' annual workforce collective dose. Estimating the annual workforce collective dose was based on the projected changes in the number of radiation workers under each alternative multiplied by the 5-year average annual workforce collective dose. Annual workforce collective dose was converted to total number of fatal cancers in the radiation worker population from one year's dose.

Maximum worker dose and average worker dose under each alternative are expected to be consistent with data collected in base year 1996 (see Section 4.10).

5.2.9 Accident Analysis

The requirements for accident analysis are set forth by the DOE (DOE 1993b). DOE guidance for accident analysis allows a graded approach that analyzes accidents at a level of detail that is consistent with the magnitude of the potential impacts. The Department requires that potential hazards be considered if they can lead to accidents that are reasonably foreseeable; that is, there is a mechanism for their occurrence and their probability of occurrence is generally greater than one chance in a



Source: Original

Figure 5.2.8 1. The Health Risk Assessment Process

The health risk assessment process is a series of steps associating environmental conditions with potential health effects.

million per year (1×10^{-6}). Accidents that are less frequent may also be considered if they could result in high consequences and provide information important to decision-making. Although the impacts of all potential accidents are not required, the accident analysis is required to evaluate a sample of reasonably foreseeable accidents, to demonstrate the range of potential impacts. These accidents would include both low-frequency high-consequence and high-frequency-low consequence-events.

The accident impacts described in this section were developed as a result of detailed studies of selected SNL/NM facilities that included

- meetings with facility managers; environment, safety, and health coordinators; and/or safety personnel to identify major potential hazards and identify safety documentation applicable to the SWEIS;

- facility visits and tours to identify potential hazardous situations, gain an understanding of the mechanisms that could cause an accident, and obtain information for the development of accident scenarios; and

- reviews of facility safety documentation, including safety assessments (SAs), hazard assessment (HA) documents, process hazard surveys or studies, safety analysis reports (SARs), environmental impact statements (EISs), environmental assessments (EAs), hazardous material databases, environmental monitoring reports permits, and other source documents prepared by SNL/NM for the SWEIS.

The information and data obtained during these activities were used extensively for assessing hazards at SNL/NM facilities, developing accident scenarios, and estimating accident impacts (TtNUS 1998k).

Preliminary screenings of SNL/NM activities and operations were conducted to select facilities and operations to be evaluated. Because of the relatively large number of activities and operations at SNL/NM facilities and the large number of potential accident scenarios that could be postulated, further screening was performed to eliminate low-hazard activities and operations that would result in small consequences to receptors.

Facility SARs analyze accidents that have multiple conservative assumptions, resulting in the highest consequences. Radiological accidents generally represent accidents affecting the facility or the experiment being performed that contain radioactive materials. For accident scenarios involving stored materials, the

accidents represent the maximum quantities that could be involved. Similar conservative assumptions also hold for nonradiological accidents.

The impacts to humans that could result from potential radiological accident scenarios were evaluated in terms of dose units (such as rem or person-rem), and LCFs. For chemical releases, the impacts were evaluated in terms of chemical concentrations in relation to environmental response planning guideline (ERPG) levels for specified workers and the public (AIHA 1997). The potential for accidents whose impacts are measured in units other than LCF and chemical concentrations were also addressed.

The impacts of accidents were measured in terms of the effects for six types of human receptors:

- 1) 14 core receptors at various onsite and offsite locations;
- 2) receptor locations at the KAFB boundary at the 16 compass points;
- 3) the MEI, who has the highest reported dose of either core receptors or boundary receptors;
- 4) the offsite population within 50 mi;
- 5) a noninvolved worker at 100 m; and
- 6) involved workers (generally in the immediate vicinity of the accident).

The estimated impacts of accidents can be affected by unavoidable uncertainties in the analyses. These uncertainties can be attributed to modeling techniques, source-term estimates, release fractions, health effects estimators, accident scenario definitions, meteorological data, population estimates, and similar causes. Several actions were taken to minimize the effects of uncertainties. These included the use of approved methodologies, approved and verified models, formally documented data in approved reports, conservative data estimation practices, and formal quality assurance reviews. The effects of any remaining uncertainties were further minimized when accident impacts for alternatives were compared on a relative, rather than absolute, basis.

Many of the accident scenarios excluded the effects of mitigation measures such as filtration or scrubbing of the effluent prior to release to the environment. Some chemical storage containers are equipped with internal flow restrictors that would limit the uncontrolled release of their contents. Also, emergency procedures, sheltering, and evacuation would reduce the extent of human exposures.

5.2.10 Transportation

Transportation impacts were addressed by examining onsite and offsite transportation activities involving

radioactive, chemical, and explosive materials and wastes, including assessing existing transportation facilities and modes of transport. Both incident-free exposures and accident exposures to workers and the public were analyzed. Regional traffic impacts related to the alternatives were also addressed. The analysis presents a summary of the regulatory framework as it applies to transportation activities and considers current transportation procedures.

The analysis includes assessing impacts of local transportation; incident-free radiological dose to the crew and public; radiological dose (consequences) due to potential accidental release of radioactivity for a given accident (category VII); nonradiological impact due to traffic fatalities; and LCFs due to potential vehicle emissions of air pollutants from offsite transportation of materials and waste. The nonradiological traffic fatalities were calculated based on unit risk factors (fatalities per kilometer of travel for crew and public) developed from national statistics for highway accident-related deaths (SNL 1986). The radiological impacts were calculated using the *RADTRAN4* model developed at SNL/NM and documented by Neusher and Kanipe (SNL/NM 1992a). The LCFs due to vehicle emissions were calculated by using unit risk factors (fatalities per kilometer of urban travel) developed by SNL/NM (1982). The transportation impacts due to the movement of materials and wastes between SNL/NM and other sites would be bounding compared to the transportation impacts due to onsite transfers or movement of the materials and wastes (see Appendix G). Therefore, a detailed impact analysis was performed considering offsite transport of the materials and wastes. The details of this offsite transportation analysis are presented in Appendix G. Overall impact was evaluated in terms of total lifetime fatalities due to offsite transportation of materials and waste from SNL/NM operations.

Activity Multipliers

The activities proposed under the alternatives would potentially impact the types and quantities of material used and transported at SNL/NM. The activity scenarios from the SNL/NM Facility Information Manager were used to project inventories for facilities based on activities at the facilities. The selected existing facilities represent the types of operations that will occur at SNL/NM over the next 10 years. These activities primarily relate to test shots, production levels, and/or manpower estimates for these selected facilities. These activities have been converted to unit-less numbers that have been normalized so that a site-wide aggregate

multiplier for each alternative could be developed. In turn, these multipliers were used to develop projections for the waste management and transportation consequence analysis. The operations at new facilities were not considered for the multiplier because the start-up of these operations reaching their planned production levels would artificially inflate the multiplier and not truly reflect the anticipated activity levels at SNL/NM. The details of the activity multipliers are presented in Appendix A.

5.2.11 Waste Generation

The waste generation analysis examined potential impacts associated with waste generation activities of SNL/NM, including low-level waste (LLW), low-level mixed waste (LLMW), transuranic (TRU) waste, mixed transuranic (MTRU) waste, hazardous waste, and process wastewater. The ongoing waste management practices relating to generating, handling, treating, and storing wastes are described. The analysis also presents a summary of the regulatory framework as it applies to waste management and a summary of current and projected waste generation activities. Selected facilities or activities that generate waste were evaluated for changes in the baseline quantity of waste generated as a result of the proposed alternatives. SNL/NM treatment and storage facilities were evaluated for any impacts on their capabilities to manage wastes before transportation to offsite disposal. Potential impacts considered included physical safety, regulatory requirements, and security measures associated with storage capacity, personnel safety, and treatment capacity.

A quantity projected under the No Action Alternative for 2003 and 2008 represents the maximum quantity projected for any given year during the 1998-2003 and 2004-2008 5-year time frames. Waste volume estimates for 2003 and 2008 are considered to be conservative and bounding based on current annual projections.

For each selected facility, a waste quantity projected under the Expanded Operations Alternative represents the maximum possible waste generation level, and thus the bounding level of operation. This applies to all waste types (including LLW, LLMW, and *Resource Conservation and Recovery Act* (RCRA) hazardous waste).

A quantity projected under the Reduced Operations Alternative represents the projected quantity of waste generated during any given year as a result of maintaining programmatic capabilities across SNL/NM at minimum operational levels based on selected facilities.

5.2.12 Noise and Vibration

The noise and vibration analysis describes the noise sources at SNL/NM by activity and location and qualitatively discusses the impacts of these noise sources. Direct and indirect impacts of the alternatives and compliance with applicable regulations are addressed. The number of noise events projected for each alternative from tests of high explosives, tests using rocket motors, tests producing sonic booms, tests involving large-caliber weapons, as well as increased noise from aircraft, vehicular traffic, and industrial sources were compared with the available baseline data. A qualitative discussion of baseline noise at SNL/NM presents examples of dBA sound levels that are typical of short-term noise impacts from SNL/NM test activities. Estimated sound levels are presented for area locations as examples of the impacts from SNL/NM test activities.

5.2.13 Socioeconomics

The socioeconomic analysis measured the incremental effects from changes in expenditures, income, and employment associated with the three alternatives at SNL/NM and their overall effect on the region of influence (ROI). The ROI, as described in Chapter 4, is the four-county central New Mexico region around SNL/NM, including the city of Albuquerque, where 97.5 percent of SNL/NM employees and their families live, spend their wages and salaries, and use their benefits.

Spending by SNL directly affects the ROI in terms of dollars of expenditures gained or lost for individuals and businesses, dollars of income gained or lost to households, and the number of jobs created or lost. Changes in expenditures by SNL (that is, dollars spent for capital goods and services in the ROI) directly affect the number of jobs created and amount of income received by individuals and businesses who provide SNL with required goods and services. In addition, by spending their income in the ROI, SNL/NM employees and their families also directly affect the number of jobs created and amount of income received by individuals and businesses in the ROI who provide them with goods and services. Changes in employment at SNL/NM directly affect the overall economic and social activities of the communities and people living in the ROI. Additionally, businesses and households in the ROI spend SNL/NM money, which creates, in turn, indirect and induced socioeconomic effects from SNL/NM operations. Every subsequent re-spending of money by businesses and households in the ROI is

another tier of indirect and induced socioeconomic effects originating from SNL/NM operations.

Economic activity (expenditures), income, and employment multipliers are factors used in calculating the incremental effect of changes in socioeconomic conditions at SNL/NM. These multipliers were developed by New Mexico State University (NMSU) and are presented in *The Economic Impact of Sandia National Laboratories on Central New Mexico and the State of New Mexico, Fiscal Year 1996* (DOE 1997j). The 1997 report (update) was reviewed; however, 1996 remained the representative year for analyzing socioeconomic impacts because overall impacts remained stable.

Following are the selected socioeconomic impact areas examined:

Demographics evaluating the impact of the alternatives on the ROI's demographics;

Economic base evaluating the impact of the alternatives on the ROI economy; and

Housing and community services evaluating the impact of the alternatives on housing availability and services in the ROI

5.2.14 Environmental Justice

The potential for disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental impacts from the proposed alternatives on minority and low-income populations was examined in accordance with Executive Order (EO) 12898, *Federal Action to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations* (59 FR 7629). Both the *Environmental Justice Guidance Under the National Environmental Policy Act* (CEQ 1997) and the *Guidance for Incorporating Environmental Justice Concerns in EPA's NEPA Compliance Analyses* (EPA 1998d) provide guidance for identifying minority and low-income populations and determining whether the human health and environmental effects on these populations are disproportionately high and adverse.

The environmental justice analysis presents selected demographics and identifies the locations of minority and low-income populations living in the ROI of a 50-mi radius around SNL/NM (see Section 4.15.2). For the purposes of consistency and conservative analysis, data were extracted from *Addressing Environmental Justice Under the National Environmental Policy Act at Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico* (SNL 1997f). In this report, minority and low-income populations

within the ROI were identified at the U.S. Bureau of the Census block-group level, which allows for potential localized impact analysis.

In New Mexico, the minority population in 1990 was approximately 49 percent (51 percent by 1996) of the total state population (Census 1998). In accordance with the *Environmental Justice Guidance Under the National Environmental Policy Act* (CEQ 1997), all block groups with a percent minority population greater than 49 percent were identified as being minority.

Because ROIs vary by resource area, an environmental justice impact evaluation was conducted by individual resource area. The environmental justice analysis considered impacts to minority populations and low-income populations in the ROI. Resource areas having ROIs smaller than 50 mi and not having substantial impacts were assumed to have inconsequential impacts beyond the smaller ROI. Resource areas having substantial impacts (or of potential concern) were evaluated on an individual basis with respect to minority populations and low-income populations. Three resource areas evaluated individually were water resources, cultural resources, and transportation

Twenty-one percent of the state population in 1989 was considered to be living below the poverty level (Census 1996). Therefore, for analysis purposes, all block groups with a poverty percentage greater than 21 were identified as being low-income. Environmental justice impacts were assessed and compared to the analysis presented for the general population by resource area for each of the alternatives. Environmental justice-related impacts are only present if the impacts to minority or low-income populations are disproportionately high and adverse in comparison to the general population.

5.3 NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE

Under the No Action Alternative, ongoing DOE and interagency programs and activities at SNL/NM would continue at currently planned levels in support of assigned missions. This would include any activities that the DOE has approved and that have existing NEPA documentation. Sections 5.3.1 through 5.3.13 describe how this alternative would affect the resource or topic areas evaluated in the SWEIS.

5.3.1 Land Use and Visual Resources

The implementation of the No Action Alternative would not affect the existing land use patterns or visual resources

at SNL/NM facilities on KAFB. Sections 5.3.1.1 and 5.3.1.2 discuss these resource areas in relation to the No Action Alternative.

5.3.1.1 Land Use

The extent of DOE land and U.S. Air Force (USAF)-permitted acreage currently available for use by SNL/NM on KAFB would remain the same. Due to DOE-wide consolidation efforts and general guidance to return real estate that exceeds the Department's needs, the acquisition of additional land would be limited. One real estate transaction involving the acquisition of approximately 4 ac from the city of Albuquerque is ongoing (see Section 4.3.3.7). In general, the TAs, which encompass over 2,800 ac of DOE property, would not change. In addition, the SNL/NM use of more than 5,900 ac on KAFB, permitted by the USAF to the DOE, would continue with periodic modifications due to the expiration of permits and the initiation of new or modified requests. The continued operation of the 10,000-ft sled track in TA-III would require continuation of leases for land adjacent to KAFB as safety buffer zones. The lease with the Pueblo of Isleta for more than 6,300 ac would remain in effect. The renewal of the lease with the state of New Mexico for more than 2,700 ac is in negotiation. SNL/NM operations would remain consistent with industrial research park uses and would have no foreseeable effects on established land use patterns or requirements. Planned SNL/NM facilities, expansions, and upgrades referred to in the *1998 Sites Comprehensive Plan* (SNL 1997a) would not require changes to current land ownership or classification status because the DOE would place such facilities in or near existing facilities, in disturbed or developed areas, or on land under DOE control.

At locations on permitted land where operations would be declining or shut down by the owning organization, SNL/NM would continue to hold the sites to conduct periodic safety checks and complete any ER actions (Section 5.3.3.1). Before returning land, SNL/NM would be responsible for conducting any demolition work and restoring it to its condition when originally acquired from the USAF (SNL 1997a).

5.3.1.2 Visual Resources

As stated above, the No Action Alternative would not adversely change the overall appearance of the existing landscape, obscure views, increase the visibility of SNL/NM structures, or otherwise detract from the scenic perspectives of existing and planned residential

developments adjacent to KAFB. New SNL/NM facilities, expansions, and upgrades would be planned at or near existing facilities in areas with common scenic quality. Efforts initiated by SNL/NM to incorporate campus-style design are expected to continue. This style contains established principles and design guidance that provide a framework for the physical development and redevelopment of SNL/NM sites. The guidance covers building massing, facades, colors, building orientation and entries, traffic circulation corridors, standardized signage, and landscaping, including low-water-use plant selections. These efforts would be consistent with the generally high concern for scenery due to the number of observers and users in and around the area.

Limited operations at outdoor testing facilities in the Coyote Test Field and the Withdrawn Area would continue; however, no additional development is anticipated that would alter visual resources. Some testing activities would be conducted producing smoke and dust of variable quantity and duration, but these conditions would be periodic and short-term and would not change the visual characteristics of the area. Where decommissioning, demolition, or ER activities are planned, actions would be taken such as backfilling, reducing side slopes, applying topsoil, reseeded, and establishing plant growth to restore the area to its state when originally acquired by SNL/NM.

5.3.2 Infrastructure

Descriptions of important infrastructure-related services (such as maintenance), utilities (such as electricity), and facilities (such as the steam plant) are provided in the *SNL/NM Facilities and Safety Information Document* (SNL/NM 1998a), and the *SNL Sites Comprehensive Plan FY 1998-2007* (SNL 1997a). Potential incremental changes to SNL/NM services, utilities, and facilities were reviewed for each alternative. The analysis focused on incremental changes for site-wide utility demands and for the selected infrastructure facilities, the steam plant, RMWME, HWME, and TTE.

Regarding site-wide utility demands, most SNL/NM facilities do not meter utility use. However, annual site-wide utility demands are known and were used, in part, to make projections for this alternative (SNL/NM 1998c). These projections were made by identifying representative base years for each specific utility and calculating usage based on square footage presented in the *SNL Sites Comprehensive Plan FY 1998-2007* (SNL 1997a). These site-wide demand calculations were made independent of data collected on the selected facilities identified in

Chapter 2. Facility-specific utility demand estimates are presented in Chapter 3, Table 3.6-2. The assumptions used are detailed in the *SNL/NM Facilities and Safety Information Document* (SNL/NM 1998a). Any incremental changes from the base year in utility demands for the selected facilities were taken into account by adjusting site-wide demand accordingly, as presented in Table 5.3.2-1.

Analysis of four specific facilities in the selected infrastructure facility group (Section 2.3.4) was straightforward, relying on the information presented in the *SNL/NM Facilities and Safety Information Document* (SNL/NM 1998a). Projected throughput was compared to reported operational capacities as presented in Table 5.3.2-2. Air emissions from the steam plant are addressed in Section 5.3.7.1, radioactive air emissions are addressed in Section 5.3.7.2, and SNL/NM site-wide and specific facility waste generation is addressed in Section 5.3.10.

Implementation of the No Action Alternative would not affect current demands on infrastructure (described in Section 4.2). Water consumption would increase from 440 M gal per year to 463 M gal per year by 2008. However, SNL/NM has committed to a 30 percent reduction in water use by 2004. Table 5.3.2-1 shows the water use projections for the No Action Alternative and for a conservation-based scenario. The conservation-based scenario has water use decreasing from 440 M gal to 308 M gal per year before 2008. In Section 5.3.4, water use is conservatively analyzed at the 440 to 463 M gal per year projection. SNL/NM would generate approximately 280 to 304 M gal of wastewater per year. If the water use reduction effort is successful, a reduction in wastewater discharge would also occur (see Table 5.3.2-1). Annual electrical consumption would decrease from 197,000 to 186,000 MWh. Projections of annual consumption of natural gas, fuel oil, and propane are also presented in Table 5.3.2-1.

Table 5.3.2-1 shows water use and wastewater discharge increasing through fiscal year (FY) 2008, while electrical use and natural gas use decrease during the same period. This seemingly inconsistent effect is related to the fact that electricity and natural gas typically provide lighting and work environment control on a 24-hour basis regardless of activity level. This 24-hour support involves heating, steam distributing, air conditioning, and ventilating facilities, including maintaining clean room conditions and laboratory fume hoods. Thus, reducing square footage would drive a reduction in electrical and natural gas use. In contrast, water use and wastewater discharge are people-dependent and would potentially

Table 5.3.2 1. Annual SNL/NM Utility Usage and Capacities Under the No Action Alternative^a

RESOURCE/ DATA SOURCE	BASE YEAR USAGE	FY 2003 USAGE	FY 2008 USAGE	SYSTEM CAPACITY ^b	USAGE ^c AS PERCENT OF CAPACITY
WATER USE					
<i>Site-wide Demand^d</i>	440 M gal	430 M gal	417 M gal	2.0 B gal	21-22
<i>Selected Facilities/ Facility Groups^e</i>	0 M gal	23.6 M gal	45.6 M gal	NA	
TOTAL	440 M gal	454 M gal	463 M gal	2.0 B gal	22-23
<i>Conservation-Based Scenario^f</i>	440 M gal	352 M gal	308 M gal	2.0 B gal	15-22
WASTEWATER DISCHARGE					
<i>Site-wide Demand^d</i>	280 M gal	273 M gal	265 M gal	850 M gal	32-33
<i>Selected Facilities/ Facility Groups^e</i>	0 M gal	16.9 M gal	39.0 M gal	NA	
TOTAL	280 M gal	290 M gal	304 M gal	850 M gal	33-36
<i>Conservation-Based Scenario^f</i>	280 M gal	224 M gal	196 M gal	850 M gal	23-33
ELECTRICAL USE					
<i>Site-wide Demand^d</i>	197,000 MWh	192,000 MWh	186,000 MWh	1,095,000 MWh ^g	17-18
<i>Selected Facilities/ Facility Groups^e</i>	0 MWh	225 MWh	225 MWh	NA	
TOTAL	197,000 MWh	192,225 MWh	186,225 MWh	1,095,000 MWh^g	17-18
NATURAL GAS USE					
<i>Site-wide Demand^{d, h}</i>	475 M ft ³	464 M ft ³	450 M ft ³	2.3 B ft ³	21-22
<i>Selected Facilities/ Facility Groups^{e, i}</i>	0 M ft ³	0 M ft ³	0 M ft ³	NA	
TOTAL	475 M ft³	464 M ft³	450 M ft³	2.3 B ft³	21-22

Table 5.3.2 1. Annual SNL/NM Utility Usage and Capacities Under the No Action Alternative^a (concluded)

RESOURCE/ DATA SOURCE	BASE YEAR USAGE	FY 2003 USAGE	FY 2008 USAGE	SYSTEM CAPACITY ^b	USAGE ^c AS PERCENT OF CAPACITY
MISCELLANEOUS					
Fuel Oil^{i,j}	7,000 gal	7,000 gal	7,000 gal	Not limited by infrastructure	NA
Propane^{h,i}	383,000 gal	374,000 gal	362,000 gal	Not limited by infrastructure	NA

Sources: DOE 1997k; SNL 1997a; SNL/NM 1998a, c; USAF 1998a

B: billion

BY: base year

ft³: cubic feet

FY: fiscal year

gal: gallon

M: million

MW: megawatt

MWh: megawatt hour

NA: Not applicable

psi: pounds per square inch

^a Base Year is 1996 or 1997, the most representative of usage; not necessarily the same as in Chapter 4.

^b Capacity means the actual or calculated maximum amount of water, wastewater, or other resource that can be used, discharged, or consumed.

^c Usage means the actual or calculated annual amount of water, waste water, or other resource used, discharged, or consumed.

^d Prorated based on the following square footage: base year = 5.266 M; FY 2003 = 5.143 M; FY 2008 = 4.986 M

^e Base-year site-wide demand usage was assumed to include selected facilities/facility groups; however, any changes in selected facilities projected future usage were used to adjust site-wide demand for bounding purposes.

^f SNL/NM expects to reduce water use by 30% based on 1996 usage of 440 M gal. Thus, between 2004 and 2008, SNL/NM water use would be 308 M gal per year. Wastewater would be similarly reduced.

^g Based on 125-MW rating.

^h Estimated based on 60 psi.

ⁱ No adjustments were reported in SNL/NM 1998a.

^j Fuel oil is used in emergency situations at the steam plant and is not dependent upon square footage.

Table 5.3.2 2. Annual Throughput^a and Capacities Under the No Action Alternative for the Infrastructure Facility Group

FACILITY ^d	BASE YEAR 1997	FY 2003	FY 2008	SYSTEM CAPACITY	THROUGHPUT AS PERCENT OF CAPACITY
Steam Plant (steam produced)^e	544 M lb	544 M lb	544 M lb	3.33 B lb ^b	16
HWMF (waste handled)^e	203,000 kg	192,000 kg	196,000 kg	579,000 kg ^c	33-35
RMWMF (waste handled)^e	1.6 M lb	2.1 M lb	2.1 M lb	2.7 M lb	59-78
TTF (waste handled)^e	Minimal	336 lb	336 lb	7,300 lb ^b	5

Source: SNL/NM 1998b

B: billion

ft³: cubic feet

HWMF: Hazardous Waste Management Facility

kg: kilogram

lb: pound

M: million

RMWMF: Radioactive Mixed Waste Management Facility

TTF: Thermal Treatment Facility

FY: fiscal year

^a Throughput means the amount of steam produced or waste handled.

^b Permit capacity

^c This is the capacity for single shift work with current employment level, not permit capacity.

^d See Section 2.3 for discussion on how these facilities were selected.

^e See Table 3.6 1, Infrastructure category.

increase despite a reduction in square footage.

Projected utility consumption rates would likely fluctuate annually due to weather. The projected reduction in square footage is part of a facility strategic investment plan currently underway at SNL/NM (SNL 1997a). The minor changes in square footage are a result of removing substandard structures.

Under the No Action Alternative, current infrastructure resources are capable of accommodating SNL/NM facility requirements and no major additional infrastructure facilities are proposed to be built. Operational levels of SNL/NM buildings, services, communications, maintenance programs (including upgrades, repairs, and limited renovations), roads, material storage, and waste storage activities would remain compatible with system requirements. SNL/NM maintains an active decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) program that identifies and removes from active service outdated or substandard facilities. An overall reduction in the number of active facilities would reduce the overall impacts to SNL/NM infrastructure. Specific details on these systems and programs are presented in the *SNL Sites Comprehensive Plan FY 1998-2007* (SNL 1997a). Many of these activities are common to all alternatives and are discussed in Section 2.3.3. Additional details on land use and water resources are provided in Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.4, respectively. Traffic-related impacts are presented in Section 5.3.9. KAFB utility usage is specifically discussed in Section 6.2.

Four specific infrastructure facilities were analyzed for impacts (Figure 5.3.2 1), including the steam plant. Steam production would continue at 544 M lb per year, which represents 16 percent of capacity. While production capacity can expand, distribution capacity has some limitations. The steam distribution system in a portion of TA-I is 40 years old and is in poor condition. In addition, the main trunk steam line is in poor condition and operates at maximum capacity (SNL 1997a). Furthermore, three of the five boilers have reached or exceeded their design life. A study to upgrade or replace the steam plant was completed in 1998. The study recommended the upgrade begin in FY 2004; however, no decision has been made to upgrade the boilers (SNL/NM 1998b).

The other three infrastructure facilities are waste management facilities (Figure 5.3.2 1). The HWMF would manage approximately 195,000 kg of waste per year by 2008 (Table 5.3.2 2). Annual radioactive and mixed waste management would increase to 2.7 M lb per

year by 2008 at the RMWMF. The TTF would process small quantities of explosive wastes. Small fluctuations would occur during normal operations due to operational scheduling and shifts in priorities. ER project wastes are discussed in Section 5.3.10 by waste category.

5.3.3 Geology and Soils

Minimal impacts due to soil contamination would be possible, as discussed in Section 5.3.3.1. A brief summary is available at the end of Section 5.3.3.1. Similarly, it would be extremely unlikely to cause impacts on slope stability, as discussed in Section 5.3.3.2.


5.3.3.1 Soil Contamination

The term soil contamination, as used in the SWEIS, is the presence of any toxic, hazardous, or radioactive substance in the near-surface soil (nominally, the upper 6 inches to 1 ft) that is not naturally occurring. Determining whether concentrations of substances, particularly metals, are contamination and not naturally occurring, is often problematic (see text box).

Near-surface soils have the potential for direct contact with humans. Onsite workers could potentially contact these soils, although workers in contaminated areas (such as environmental restoration sites) would be subject to health and safety plans. However, there would be no direct effect on the public because affected sites are not available to public use (DOE 1996c).

Indirect pathway effects, such as soil contamination as an intermediary to groundwater or surface water contamination, are considered in Section 5.3.4.

Soil contamination at SNL/NM occurred as the result of past operations and may be occurring from ongoing operations in outdoor testing areas and radioactive material management areas. The cleanup of these soils is performed to a level that meets the health risk-based standards corresponding to the intended future uses of the site. Intended land uses are typically residential, recreational, or industrial. Soil cleanup levels are set so that the health risk to an individual using the site for its intended purpose is acceptable. Exposure levels used in the risk analysis are use-dependent. Such factors as typical time spent indoors and outdoors, amount of soil incidentally ingested, volume of air breathed while onsite, and ingestion of food grown onsite (for residential) affect the exposure and thus the residual concentrations the cleanup must meet. Remediation action levels and residual radiation site cleanup levels are based on these risk analyses.



Source: SNL/NM 1997

Figure 5.32 1. Selected Infrastructure Facilities/Facility Groups
Four selected SNL/NM infrastructure facilities/facility groups were analyzed for potential impacts.

ER Project Sites

As of August 1998, the ER Project at SNL/NM had identified 182 sites with soil contamination from past and continuing operations. Because contamination levels pose no threat to human health or the environment, the DOE has proposed no further action for 122 of 182 sites to the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED). Of these 122 sites, 48 have been approved. The remaining 74 sites are being evaluated by the NMED and may require additional characterization or some cleanup.

Inactive Sites

Of the 60 remaining sites (182 minus 122), approximately 40 are inactive sites that are undergoing further characterization or cleanup. These sites will be cleaned up to levels appropriate for future use, either as recreational or industrial sites. The Future Use, Logistics, and Support Working Group (consisting of SNL/NM, DOE, EPA, NMED, and members of the public) has agreed upon future use. Remediation of these sites was analyzed in the ER Project EA (DOE 1996c), which is described in Section 1.7 and incorporated by reference. All inactive sites, with the exception of subsurface contamination at the Chemical Waste Landfill (CWL), are scheduled for cleanup by 1999 (SNL 1997d). The ER Project is scheduled for completion in 2004.

Active Sites

Of the 60 remaining sites, 20 are active. These include outdoor testing facilities, several oil spills, and storage areas. Although many of these sites may have very low levels of contamination that would normally allow them to be proposed for no further action, ongoing and potential future activities at the sites may necessitate remediation. The NMED and SNL/NM are discussing how and when characterization and cleanup activities would be completed in the future when operations cease at the active sites.

Potential soil contamination from continuing operations has been identified at four test facilities in TA-III and the Coyote Test Field: the Terminal Ballistics Complex, Sled Track Complex, Aerial Cable Facility, and the Lurance Canyon Burn Site. All of these sites are listed as active ER Project sites.

The Terminal Ballistics Complex in TA-III (ER Project Site 84) has had projectile tests conducted using lead and depleted uranium (DU) as both projectile and target materials. A total of 50 point sources and 6 small area sources were cleaned up at this site during a

voluntary corrective measure of radioactive surface contamination (SNL 1997e). After the corrective measure, the maximum residual radionuclide activity at this site was 31.1 pCi of uranium-238 per g of soil (compared with an average background value of 1.4 pCi/g). A preliminary risk assessment using *Residual Radioactivity (RESRAD)*, a computer modeling program, indicated that potential effects on human health due to exposure to radionuclides would be within proposed standards for the industrial land use designation developed by the Future Use, Logistics, and Support Working Group (SNL 1997e).

The Sled Track Complex in TA-III (ER Project Sites 83 and 240) has had DU, beryllium, and lead fragments released from high velocity impact tests. A total of 1,601 point sources and 33 area sources were cleaned up during a voluntary corrective measure of radioactive surface contamination (SNL 1997e). After the corrective measure, the maximum residual radionuclide activity at this site was 28.3 pCi of uranium-238 per g of soil (compared with an average background value of 1.4 pCi/g). A preliminary risk assessment using *RESRAD* indicated that potential effects on human health due to exposure to radionuclides would be within proposed standards for the industrial land use designation developed by the Future Use, Logistics, and Support Working Group (SNL 1997e).

The Aerial Cable Facility at the Coyote Test Field (ER Project Site 81) could introduce small amounts of lead, beryllium, and DU into the soil from weapons test units that could break open on impact. This has occurred twice since operations began at this site in 1971. Each time, almost all of this material was collected and properly disposed of. A radiological survey of the site indicated no elevated radiation except for naturally occurring material in rock outcrops (SNL 1997e).

The Lurance Canyon Burn Site (ER Project Site 65) has the potential for test object rupture and subsequent release of DU. Pretest and posttest sampling of the test object and surrounding area is used to confirm the integrity of the test. It is estimated that once every 10 years, less than 25 kg of DU would be released over a 1,000-ft² area (that is, a 35-ft-diameter circle), resulting in a soil concentration of about 7,000 µg of DU per g of soil (SNL/NM 1998a). As with all of the above sites, a release of concern such as this one would be decontaminated and cleaned up on an interim basis by trained personnel in accordance with DOE policies. The area surrounding the Lurance Canyon Burn Site,

including ER Site 94, the explosive item burner within the Burn Site, was surveyed and remediated as part of a voluntary corrective measure (SNL 1997e). Fifty-four point sources and 14 area sources were cleaned up; the maximum residual activity at the site was 35.8 pCi of uranium-238 per g of soil (compared with an average background value of 2.3 pCi/g). A preliminary risk assessment using *RESRAD* indicated that potential effects on human health due to exposure to radionuclides would be within proposed standards for the recreational land use designation developed by the Future Use, Logistics, and Support Working Group (SNL 1997e).

Radioactive Material Management Areas

As of May 1998, there were 68 radioactive material management areas at SNL/NM. These are primarily indoor laboratories where radioactive materials are used in manufacturing processes or research. The Drop/Impact Complex is an outdoor radioactive material management area where sealed assemblies containing DU are tested. Impact velocities at this facility are much lower than those that would normally result in rupture and release of DU. There have been no recorded releases of DU to the environment at this facility.

Summary of Soil Contamination

In summary, known locations of soil contamination at inactive sites are planned for cleanup by 2004. Cleanup will be to levels appropriate for designated future uses. Soil contamination at active sites is monitored, and SNL/NM conducted periodic voluntary cleanups to ensure that potential human health effects are within proposed standards for the designated future land uses. The NMED and SNL/NM are discussing how and when future further characterization and cleanup activities would be completed when operations cease at the active sites.

5.3.3.2 Slope Stability

Slope stability depends on a variety of factors, including soil type, soil moisture, and load. With unloaded natural slopes that have reached a state of equilibrium over a period of years, slope failure almost invariably involves partial saturation of the sliding mass of soil by groundwater (Spangler & Handy 1973). Slope failure most commonly occurs in clay-rich soils, where platy minerals align to form a shear surface (Bromhead 1986). The arid desert climate, combined with the predominance of loamy (mixed clay, silt, sand, and

organic matter) rather than clayey soils, tends to reduce the likelihood of slope failure in the SNL/NM area (SNL/NM 1997a). There are no known instances of slope failure at SNL/NM.

An analysis of slope stability was conducted to determine whether SNL/NM activities could cause destabilization of slopes, thereby affecting other resources, such as cultural resource sites, if such resources were present. The types of slope destabilizing activities evaluated were vibrations, surface disturbances, and burning.

A GIS-generated slope map was combined with an overlay map of SNL/NM structures to determine which SNL/NM facilities are near 10 percent or greater slopes (Figure 5.3.3 1). The 10-percent slope map simply provides a tool to identify which SNL/NM facilities are closest to slopes, so they can be evaluated on an individual basis. Ten percent is not a threshold for whether a slope is stable or unstable. The stability of slopes is heavily dependent on additional factors such as soil type, soil thickness, moisture content, and vegetation. Ten percent or greater slopes are generally confined to the Manzanita Mountains and foothills, the Manzano Area, and along the banks of arroyos.


Four areas were identified for further analysis based on Figure 5.3.3 1: the southern boundary of TA-IV, the Aerial Cable Facility, the Lurance Canyon Burn Site, and the Electro-Explosive Research Facility. These areas were evaluated using field observations of facility configuration, vegetation, evidence of erosion, and any other factors that could contribute to slope destabilization.

Southern Boundary of TA-IV

Along the southern boundary of TA-IV, five SNL/NM facilities are housed in buildings within 100 ft of a graded-fill slope above the main Tijeras Arroyo escarpment. (More complete descriptions of these facilities are provided in Chapter 2.)

The SATURN and the Short-Pulse High Intensity Nanosecond X-Radiator (SPHINX) facilities are both located in Building 981. SATURN simulates the radiation effects of nuclear countermeasures on electronic and material components. SPHINX is used to measure X-ray-induced photocurrents from short pulses in integrated circuits and thermostructural response in materials.

The Repetitive High Energy Pulsed Power (RHEPP)-I facility in Building 986 supports the development of technology for continuous operation of pulsed-power systems.



Source: SNL/NM 1997I

Figure 5.3.3 1. SNL/NM Facilities Near 10 Percent or Greater Slopes

SNL/NM facilities that are near 10 percent or greater slopes are generally confined to the Manzanita Mountains and foothills, the Manzano Area, and along the banks of arroyos.

The Z-Machine facility in Building 983 generates high intensity light-ion beams for the inertial confinement fusion program and high energy/density weapons physics program for stockpile stewardship.

The HERMES III facility in Building 970 provides gamma-ray effects testing for component and weapons systems development, helping to ensure operational reliability of weapons systems in radiation environments caused by nuclear explosions.

The foundations of these buildings sit in natural ground (gravelly, fine, sandy loams of the Embudo and Tijeras Series [SNL/NM 1997a]), although a graded-fill slope of about 30 percent exists along the periphery of TA-IV leading into Tijeras Arroyo (Winowich 1998). This graded-fill slope is approximately 30 ft high and has light vegetation (primarily grass) cover. Minor erosional channels from storm water runoff are visible along the slope surface, but these are less than 6 inches wide or deep. The areas around the buildings and extending to the edge of the slope are paved, eliminating destabilization from significant water infiltration. At the base of the graded-fill slope, a gentler, natural slope (less than 10 percent) leads toward the main channel of Tijeras Arroyo, approximately 500 ft to the south and southeast. The base of the graded-fill slope is 20 ft higher than the current Tijeras Arroyo channel; there is no evidence of erosion at this point from water running through Tijeras Arroyo. The facilities are not in a floodplain.

Under the No Action Alternative, no new activities would be conducted in this portion of TA-IV. Based on the low potential for water infiltration, the lack of slope-destabilizing activities identified at these facilities (SNL/NM 1998a), and SNL/NM experience to date, the likelihood of slope failure at this location is remote.

Aerial Cable Facility

The Aerial Cable Facility provides a controlled environment for high velocity impact testing on hard surfaces and precision testing of full-scale ground-to-air missiles, air-to-ground ordnance, and nuclear material shipping containers for certification. (A more complete description of this facility is provided in Chapter 2.) The slopes surrounding the Aerial Cable Facility exhibit numerous bedrock outcrops. No soil classification has been assigned to this area (SNL/NM 1997a), because only a thin veneer of soil overlies the bedrock. Medium to heavy juniper-dominated vegetation is present in areas with this thin soil cover. Activities at the Aerial Cable Facility can result in hot missile debris causing brush fires

in the down-range impact area (SNL/NM 1998a). Evidence of one such burn (approximately 1 ac) was noted during the May 1998 reconnaissance. (Section 5.3.8 discusses other impacts associated with accidental burns.) However, there is no evidence of landslides or recent erosion in the burn area or other areas surrounding the facility.

Under the No Action Alternative, more tests would be conducted at the Aerial Cable Facility, with some types of tests doubling from their 1996 base-year frequency. However, based on the predominance of bedrock slopes and lack of evidence of slope instability (even in the burned area), the likelihood of slope failure at this location is remote.

Lurance Canyon Burn Site

Safety tests of various hazardous material shipping containers, weapon components, and weapon mockups in jet propulsion (JP)-8 aviation fuel fires, propellant fires, and wood fires are conducted at the Lurance Canyon Burn Site. (A more complete description of this facility is provided in Chapter 2.) The site is located in a canyon at the junction of two arroyos in the Manzanita Mountains. The facility sits on relatively level ground in the canyon bottom. Surrounding slopes have numerous bedrock outcrops. No soil classification has been assigned to this area (SNL/NM 1997a), as only a thin veneer of soil overlies the bedrock. Medium to heavy juniper-dominated vegetation is found in areas with soil cover. Adjacent arroyo channels are graded or have escarpments less than 3 ft high. The facility is graded with minor slopes and little vegetation. There is no visible evidence of landslides or erosion.

Under the No Action Alternative, testing at the Lurance Canyon Burn Site would continue at 1996 base-year levels. Based on the predominance of bedrock slopes and lack of evidence of slope instability, and because no slope-destabilizing activities have been identified at this facility (SNL/NM 1998a), the likelihood of slope failure at this location is remote.

Electro-Explosive Research Facility

The Electro-Explosive Research Facility has been used for the past five years for developing electromagnetic launch technology. The main building (Building 9990) is a concrete structure now used as a control, instrumentation, and shop facility. Two metal buildings house electromagnetic launchers and propulsion experiments. Although the main building was originally constructed for explosives testing, explosives are no longer stored or used at the site. Projectiles are launched at high velocity by

magnetic fields, not propellants, a distance of 600 to 800 yards eastward to the adjacent hillside for projectile diagnostics, study of exterior ballistics, and technology demonstration (SNL/NM 1994a).

The main building and bunkers of this facility are located in a canyon in foothills of the Manzanita Mountains. The main building abuts a hill. Surrounding slopes are covered with grass and minor juniper vegetation. Bedrock outcrops indicate that the soil cover is thin, although soils in this area are assigned to the Salas Series (typically very gravelly loam and stony soils). There is no visible evidence of landslides or erosion. Based on the predominance of bedrock slopes and lack of evidence of slope instability, the likelihood of slope failure at this location is remote. Summary of slope stability.

Summary of Soil Stability

In summary, the four areas identified for further analysis were unlikely to pose a slope failure problem.

5.3.4 Water Resources and Hydrology

5.3.4.1 Groundwater Quality

Sites with potential or known groundwater contamination at SNL/NM are Sandia North (an ER Project designation for groundwater investigations of sites in TA-I and TA-II), the MWL, locations in TA-V, the Lurance Canyon Burn Site, and the CWL (SNL 1997d) (Figure 5.3.4 1).

Information on the types and concentrations of potential contamination at these sites is presented in Section 4.6.1. Measurements (see Appendix B, Tables B.1 1 and B.1 2) indicate that some contaminants at some of these sites exceed the maximum contaminant levels (MCLs) contained in federal drinking water standards (40 CFR Part 141). MCLs are the levels of contaminants allowed in public drinking water systems, which are set by the EPA to provide protection from adverse health effects. MCLs are used in this analysis only as a frame of reference for evaluating groundwater quality. Existing institutional controls prevent access to this groundwater. Investigation or remediation of these sites is ongoing as part of the ER Project.

Sandia North

Current uncertainty regarding the nature of contamination sources and local hydrogeology at Sandia North precludes projections of future impacts at this time. As information is developed, SNL/NM will be projecting impacts and formulating mitigating measures to prevent such impacts. These formulations and, ultimately, site

remediation actions will be performed under SNL/NM ER Project and will be overseen by the NMED.

Mixed Waste Landfill

Tritium has been found in soil moisture to a depth of 120 ft below the MWL. The maximum tritium activity at this depth was 2.9 pCi/g, which, for 4.6 percent volumetric moisture content and a soil density of 1.8 g/cm³ (SNL/NM 1996h), corresponds to a soil moisture concentration of 1.135x10⁵ pCi/L. Assuming the tritium that has migrated the farthest is from the earliest release (1959), and using a linear time-distance relationship, this tritium will not reach the water table for 105 years from the time of the above measurement (1995). With a half-life of 12.3 years, the resulting tritium concentration in this soil moisture, when it reaches the aquifer (prior to dilution by aquifer water), would be 310 pCi/L, which is a factor of about 60 less than the MCL of 20,000 pCi/L. A similar calculation for the maximum measured soil concentration of 20,670 pCi/g, found at a depth of 26 ft, results in an estimated concentration upon reaching the aquifer (prior to dilution by aquifer water) of about 4,000 pCi/L, a factor of 5 less than the MCL. SNL/NM has removed broken and subsided concrete caps at the MWL to reduce the possibility of infiltration of precipitation into underlying wastes. The waste pits where the concrete caps were removed were backfilled with soil to ground surface. Site remediation is budgeted and planned to be completed in 1999.


TA-V

The probable sources of the nitrate contamination shown in Table 4.6 1 at TA-V are septic tanks and leachfields. These septic tanks and leach fields have been closed and waste and contamination from these sites have been removed. Disposal is now to the sanitary sewer. Information about the hydrogeology and contamination at TA-V is presently being developed for a groundwater data report to be released by the SNL/NM ER Project in mid FY 1999.

Lurance Canyon Burn Site

Isotopic analyses performed by SNL/NM indicate that nitrates (see Section 4.6.1.3) present in groundwater at the Lurance Canyon Burn Site are not from septic systems or fertilizers and may be naturally occurring (SNL/NM 1997a). The source is being investigated.

Groundwater in this vicinity is found within a thin layer of alluvium in the canyon bottom and underlying



Source: SNL 1997d, SNL/NM 1997j

Figure 5.3.4 1. Sites with Potential or Known Groundwater Contamination

Sites with potential or known groundwater contamination are located at TAs-I, -II, -III, and -V and the Lurance Canyon Burn Site.

fractured bedrock. Contaminants could potentially be transported downgradient within the alluvium layer and the fractured bedrock, although the regional aquifer is 7 mi distant. There is no impact to existing potable water supplies beyond the immediate area of the Burn Site.

Chemical Waste Landfill

A study was performed for the SWEIS to consider the ultimate fate of the primary CWL contaminants (see Appendix B, Tables B.1-1 and B.1-2). The study used the *Multimedia Environmental Pollutant Assessment System (MEPAS)* model (PNL 1989), described in Appendix B, to estimate the downgradient concentrations of chromium and trichloroethene (TCE) in the aquifer.

The site conditions used in the modeling are described in detail in Appendix B. The source and unsaturated zone parameters represent the site directly beneath the CWL, in the region of vertical contaminant transport. The saturated zone parameters represent the site along the projected groundwater flow path, from the CWL to the nearby municipal well field (Ridgecrest), located approximately 7 mi north of the CWL (DOE 1997a). The nearest downgradient drinking water supply well, KAFB-4, located approximately 4 mi north of the landfill, also lies along this flow path (Figure 5.3.4-2) (SNL/NM 1995d).

TCE presently in the groundwater is attributed to vapor phase transport of TCE volatilizing in the unsaturated zone (SNL/NM 1995d). Appendix B contains a discussion on the derivation of the vapor source term, which was calculated as 33 g per year into the uppermost saturated layer. This uppermost saturated layer is a silty clay layer, approximately 40 ft thick, through which the downward (vertical) movement occurs at a pore velocity of 0.03 ft per year and horizontal movement occurs at a pore velocity of 0.07 ft per year. Horizontal movement toward the drinking water wells would be predominantly through the underlying sandy aquifer. Appendix B describes the model's assumptions, inputs, and results.


The model results indicate that the maximum concentrations in the sandy aquifer (through which the potential contaminants would be transported from the landfill and from which the drinking water wells draw their water) would be an order of magnitude less than drinking water standards. The maximum downgradient distance from the source within which the 0.005 mg/L MCL would be exceeded is 410 ft, corresponding to an aquifer area of 1.7 ac (Figure 5.3.4-2). After remediation, planned for completion by 2001, downgradient

concentrations would be expected to decline quickly. The maximum downgradient distance within which the MCL would be exceeded would decrease to 190 ft after 50 percent remediation, to 3 ft after 90 percent remediation (Ardito 1998), and would not exceed the MCL for a remediation efficiency of 95 percent. Concentrations in the silty clay layer immediately below the TCE source would continue to exceed the MCL, at a level up to 0.05 mg/L, decreasing in response to source remediation. Table 5.3.4-1 summarizes the model results. The MCL concentration at its farthest downgradient extent will be reached approximately 5 years after introduction into the sandy layer and will begin to decrease approximately 10 years thereafter as a result of source remediation.

The liquid organic phase of the TCE currently resides totally in the unsaturated zone. This TCE is not presently affecting the saturated zone as a liquid product. Measurements have recently been taken that indicate degradation of this TCE to smaller chlorinated compounds including dichloroethane (Ardito 1998), which would result in undetectable concentrations of TCE in the water table (Appendix B).

Chromium was disposed of in the form of chromic acid, and presently resides totally in the unsaturated zone, to a depth of up to 75 ft below ground level. Although not presently affecting the saturated zone, this chromium may reach the saturated zone in the future. The EPA has conducted studies that show that hexavalent chromium is frequently reduced to trivalent chromium in the environment (Palmer & Puls 1994). Trivalent chromium has relatively low toxicity and very low mobility. The EPA has also indicated that hexavalent chromium can be expected to adsorb to soil, although not as strongly as trivalent chromium (EPA 1996b). This SWEIS conservatively assumes that the chromium would remain in its original hexavalent state and would not undergo soil adsorption (SNL/NM 1995d). Appendix B contains a description of the parameters used to conduct the analysis. The highest levels of chromium in the aquifer would be expected 7,900 years in the future, 1 m from the edge of the source, at a concentration of 0.005 mg/L. This concentration is a factor of 20 less than the MCL of 0.100 mg/L. Table 5.3.4-1 summarizes these modeling results.

The modeling of the CWL performed for this SWEIS is intended to provide a general estimate of future concentrations of TCE and chromium. It is not intended to substitute for SNL/NM ER Project modeling that may be performed to determine proper procedures for remediation.



Sources: SNL/NM 1997a, j

Figure 5.3.4 2. Projected Extent of Chemical Waste Landfill Trichloroethene Contamination Above Maximum Contaminant Level
The maximum calculated extent of TCE contamination above 0.005 mg/L is 410 ft from the CWL.

Table 5.3.4 1. Estimated Concentrations of Vapor-Phase Trichloroethene and Chromium in the Aquifer Beneath the Chemical Waste Landfill

CONTAMINANT	AMOUNT OF CONTAMINANT AVAILABLE FOR MOVEMENT (kg)	DRINKING WATER STANDARD (mg/L)	TIME OF MAXIMUM DOWNGRADIENT STANDARD EXCEEDANCE (YEARS FROM REACHING AQUIFER)	MAXIMUM DISTANCE FROM SOURCE AT WHICH STANDARD IS EXCEEDED (ft) ^a	MAXIMUM AREA OVER WHICH STANDARD IS EXCEEDED (ac) ^a
<i>Trichloroethene Prior to Remediation</i>	31,000	0.005	5 ^b	410	1.7
<i>Chromium^{a,c}</i>	9	0.100	-	0	0

Source: 40 CFR Part 141

ac: acres

ft: feet

kg: kilograms

MCL: maximum contaminant level

mg/L: milligrams per liter

^a Assumes no remediation^b Reduced below MCL at this distance due to remediation 5 years from first exceedance^c Not projected to reach water table

Note: See Appendix B for details regarding calculations

Summary of Groundwater Impacts

Although there appears to be no immediate or long-term threat to human health through contamination of the water supply, there is short-term, localized degradation of the aquifer beneath the CWL from vapor-transported TCE. The area of degradation will decrease once cleanup near the ground surface begins to remove the source of the contamination. The presence, concentration, and location of this contamination are independent of any of the alternatives analyzed in the SWEIS. The contamination is a result of past waste management practices. Appropriate cleanup measures, developed in cooperation with the NMED, will proceed regardless of the alternative selected. Because of its effect on the aquifer, groundwater contamination at the CWL is identified as an adverse impact in the SWEIS.

5.3.4.2 Groundwater Quantity

The effects of continued SNL/NM groundwater usage on the aquifer in the KAFB vicinity were investigated. Projected usage under the No Action Alternative was compared with recent (1985-1996) usage and the associated changes to groundwater levels were estimated from recent trends.

Appendix B contains information showing historical pumpage rates from onsite KAFB wells and from Ridgecrest, the nearby Albuquerque well field. Future groundwater levels in the vicinity of KAFB are expected to be most dependent on pumpage from these wells.

Table 5.3.4 2 shows the recent and projected groundwater withdrawals. The proposed Mesa del Sol development (NMSLO 1997) was included in the projections because it would be a potential major contributor to groundwater usage in the vicinity of KAFB for the analysis period. The projected groundwater withdrawals were compared with historical withdrawals in order to establish a linear relationship for projecting future aquifer drawdown, which is also included in Table 5.3.4 2. SNL/NM groundwater use would account for 3 ft (11 percent) of drawdown over the 1998 to 2008 period. The distribution of the projected groundwater level declines in the vicinity of KAFB is indicated on Figure 5.3.4 3. Appendix B describes the method of projection, which includes considerations of population growth and the city of Albuquerque's goal of 30-percent reduction in per capita water use. SNL/NM's influence on drawdown would decrease with distance from KAFB. A one-dimensional Theis equation, assuming a 500 ft-thick aquifer and a hydraulic conductivity of 40 ft/day (Appendix B), indicates that 1 ft per yr or less of water level decline would be expected beyond 3 mi of KAFB wells from combined KAFB and SNL/NM water pumpage.

The city of Albuquerque San Juan/Chama Project is projected to begin operation in 2004 (COA n.d. [a]). The project will allow the city of Albuquerque, including Mesa del Sol, to meet its normal water demands from Rio Grande water. Groundwater withdrawals will be used only to supplement these normal demands. All of the city wells will remain online and ready for operation.

Table 5.3.4 2. Projected Groundwater Use and Water Level Declines in the Vicinity of KAFB

KAFB AREA CONTRIBUTOR	QUANTITY OF WATER WITHDRAWN IN 10 YEARS (1998 to 2008) (M ft ³)	MAXIMUM DRAWDOWN OVER 10-YEAR PERIOD (1998 to 2008) (ft)	PERCENT OF TOTAL DRAWDOWN CONTRIBUTION NEAR KAFB ^a (%)
<i>Ridgecrest (city of Albuquerque)</i>	3,243	16.8	61
<i>KAFB (exclusive of SNL/NM)</i>	829	4.3	15
<i>SNL/NM</i>	605	3.1	11
<i>Mesa del Sol</i>	683	3.5	13
TOTAL	5,355	27.7	100%

Source: SNL/NM 1998c [see also Appendix B, Table B.2 3]

ft: feet

ft³: cubic feet

KAFB: Kirtland Air Force Base

M: million

SNL/NM: Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico

Note: See Appendix B for details regarding calculations.

^a Local effect (basin-wide effect is less than 1 percent.)

Which wells will be operated (and how often and how much) has not yet been determined. Therefore, the San/Juan Chama Project has not been included in this analysis. It is expected that the Ridgecrest and Mesa del Sol well withdrawals would be substantially less than quantities used in this analysis.

Potential impacts of continued aquifer drawdown were identified and evaluated for the SWEIS. These were: exceedance of water rights (owned by KAFB); effects on well operations; effects on Pueblo of Isleta wells; effects on springs; and potential for land subsidence.

The maximum recent KAFB annual withdrawal was 235.7 M ft³ (1992) (USGS 1995). KAFB withdrawals have been and are projected to remain significantly below the 278.7 M ft³ per yr allowed by KAFB water rights (Bloom 1972).


KAFB area wells are typically screened from the water table surface to about 500 ft below the water table (USAF 1975, USAF 1983). The wells are designed specifically for declining water levels with long screens and movable pumps. When groundwater levels drop below the pump, the pump can be lowered until it is submerged again. The pumps are typically installed about 80 ft beneath the water surface and are lowered when they are 20 ft below the water surface. Pumping wells located in areas projected to have 28 ft of decline over the 10-year period, 1998 to 2008 would require pump lowering in 22 years. If water was not being withdrawn for SNL/NM use, then the pumps would

need to be lowered every 24 years. KAFB has also recently installed two new wells, (early June 1998), KAFB-15 and -16, in the northwest portion of the site. These wells are screened over a 1,000-ft interval from the water table surface, (approximately 500 ft below ground surface) to 1,500 ft below ground surface.

SNL/NM operations would not be expected to have an impact on Pueblo of Isleta wells. The Pueblo of Isleta boundary is approximately 6 mi from the nearest KAFB water supply well. Of the 1-ft water level decline projected at this boundary, up to 1 inch per year (11 percent) would be attributed to SNL/NM operations.

The effect of local drawdown on spring flow was also considered. However, all local springs are east of the fault zone, an area in which groundwater levels are not affected by pumping in the vicinity of KAFB.

The possibility of subsidence due to excess withdrawal was also investigated. The threshold for subsidence has been estimated as 260 to 390 ft of aquifer drawdown (Haneberg 1995) and recently refined to 330 to 490 ft (Haneberg 1997). Adding the almost 28 ft of maximum projected drawdown in the vicinity of KAFB to the basin-wide maximum of 160 ft (USGS 1993), which is actually located about 1 mi north of KAFB (about 2 mi north-northeast of TA-I), suggests that the projected water withdrawal would not result in land subsidence. The potential impacts described above would tend to diminish at greater distances from KAFB.



Sources: NMSLO 1997; SNL/NM 1997a, j

Figure 5.3.4 3. Projected Decline in Albuquerque-Belen Basin Groundwater Levels

During the period from 1998 to 2008, groundwater levels at KAFB are projected to decline as much as 28 ft, 11 percent of which would be from SNI/NM water use.

Summary of Groundwater Quantity Impacts

Although this analysis indicates that no immediate effects of the projected water level decline over the 1998 to 2008 period would be expected, SNL/NM water use would continue to contribute to the depletion of the aquifer. Because the rate of basin-wide groundwater withdrawal significantly exceeds the recharge rate, all groundwater users contribute to this depletion to some degree. SNL/NM's local drawdown effect would be measurable (3 ft over the 1998 to 2008 period), accounting for 11 percent of groundwater decline in the northern portion of KAFB under the No Action Alternative. Because of the magnitude of the effect on local water level decline, SNL/NM's groundwater withdrawal is identified as an adverse impact in the SWEIS.

5.3.4.3 Surface Water Quality

During storm events in 1994 and 1995, SNL/NM collected 32 surface water samples from onsite arroyos (Figure 5.3.4-4). A summary of analytical results from these samples is presented in Section 4.6.2. Contaminants of concern, which include dissolved metals, explosives, and radionuclides, were found only at trace concentrations (SNL/NM 1996g). Of greatest importance to the SWEIS analysis are four surface water samples collected from Tijeras Arroyo within 1 mi of its exit point from KAFB (Figure 5.3.4-4). These samples, collected on July 20 and August 22, 1995, are downstream from all SNL/NM facilities and operations. They represent two different kinds of runoff events: Tijeras Arroyo runoff from the July 20th storm event did not reach the Rio Grande, whereas, the August 22nd storm event had the largest daily average flow measured in Tijeras Arroyo (14 ft³ per second at the farthest downstream gaging station) of the three days during 1995 when flow reached the Rio Grande (USGS 1998). Therefore, these samples are the best available indicators of what contaminants could reasonably be transported offsite to ultimately enter the Rio Grande approximately 7 mi farther downstream. These sample results show no contaminants above NMWQCC limits for the state-designated Tijeras Arroyo use (livestock watering) (Table 5.3.4-3) (NMWQCC 1994). Furthermore, the August 22nd flow was only 2 percent of the 712 ft³ per second measured at the nearest upstream gaging station on the Rio Grande for the same date; any contaminants in Tijeras Arroyo storm water runoff would likely be significantly diluted upon reaching the Rio Grande.

Potential Sources of Surface Water Contamination

Environmental Restoration Project Sites

Cleanup actions planned, underway, or completed at eight ER sites within 0.5 mi of Tijeras Arroyo or Arroyo del Coyote are intended to remove any potential source of surface water contamination, and the cleanup activities themselves are not expected to negatively affect surface water quality (DOE 1996c). The ER Project is scheduled for completion by 2004, with no projected variation in schedule under the No Action Alternative.

Permitted Storm Water Discharge

Surface water sampling results indicate storm water runoff from SNL/NM facilities in TAs-I, -II, and -IV does not contribute contaminants to Tijeras Arroyo. Under the No Action Alternative, no new activities are forecast in TAs-I, -II, or -IV that would cause contamination of storm water runoff (SNL/NM 1998a). The projected increase in SNL/NM staffing, 5 percent over current levels under the No Action Alternative (Section 5.3.12), could lead to runoff of additional organic compounds (primarily oil and grease) from vehicles in parking lots. The most recent storm water monitoring shows oil and grease concentrations ranging from 0.6 to 1.4 mg/L (SNL 1997d). Although there are no quantitative National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) or state limits for oil and grease, these concentrations are near detection limits. A 5-percent increase in these values would be of no environmental consequence, especially considering dilution that would occur in Tijeras Arroyo during periods of runoff.


Outdoor Testing Facilities

A slight increase in outdoor testing activities is projected under the No Action Alternative, and some types of tests may double (SNL/NM 1998a). However, controls are in place to minimize the amount of soil contamination that could occur during these tests, including post-test surveys and material removal (SNL 1997e). Because no surface water radionuclide concentrations have been detected above background under current test levels, contamination is not anticipated under test levels projected for the No Action Alternative.

5.3.4.4 Surface Water Quantity

Storm Water Runoff

By calculating the difference between runoff that would occur from a natural surface and an impervious surface,



Sources: SNL 1995c, SNL/NM 1997

Figure 5.3.4 4. Surface Water Sampling Locations at Tijeras Arroyo
Four surface water samples were collected from Tijeras Arroyo near the exit point from KAFB.

Table 5.3.4 3. Tijeras Arroyo Storm Water Sampling Results Near Downstream Boundary of KAFB (New Mexico Water Quality Control Commission-Listed Contaminants)

PARAMETER	UNITS	SAMPLING LOCATIONS ^a				NMWQCC LIMIT ^b
		25122	25123	25125	25126	
<i>Aluminum</i>	mg/L	0.67	0.048	ND	ND	5.0
<i>Arsenic</i>	mg/L	ND	ND	ND	ND	0.2
<i>Boron</i>	mg/L	NA	NA	NA	NA	5.0
<i>Cadmium</i>	mg/L	ND	ND	ND	ND	0.05
<i>Chromium</i>	mg/L	ND	ND	ND	ND	1.0
<i>Cobalt</i>	mg/L	ND	ND	ND	ND	1.0
<i>Copper</i>	mg/L	ND	0.01	ND	ND	0.5
<i>Lead</i>	mg/L	ND	ND	ND	ND	0.1
<i>Mercury (total)</i>	mg/L	ND	ND	ND	ND	0.01
<i>Selenium</i>	mg/L	ND	ND	ND	ND	0.05
<i>Vanadium</i>	mg/L	ND	0.006	ND	ND	0.1
<i>Zinc</i>	mg/L	0.16	0.003	ND	ND	25.0
<i>Radium-226, -228</i>	pCi/L	NA	NA	NA	NA	30.0
<i>Tritium</i>	pCi/L	NA	NA	NA	NA	20,000
<i>Gross alpha</i>	pCi/L	NA	NA	NA	NA	15

Sources: NMWQCC 1994, SNL/NM 1996g
 mg/L: milligrams per liter
 NA: not analyzed
 ND: not detected

NMWQCC: New Mexico Water Quality Control Commission
 pCi/L: picocuries per liter
^a Limit for livestock watering use
^b Locations shown in Figure 5.3.4 4

the net contribution of SNL/NM to runoff can be established. The percentage of rainfall that runs off natural surfaces at SNL/NM is estimated at 10 to 35 percent (SNL/NM 1997a), varying with factors such as slope, vegetation, and soil type. For this analysis, the increase in storm water runoff at SNL/NM was estimated by assuming that 100-percent of rainfall would run off areas with buildings and parking lots. Although the actual runoff percentage would be less because of pooling and evaporation of water on these surfaces, the 100 percent assumption provides a maximum estimate (greatest environmental effect) for the SNL/NM contribution to surface water quantity. The lower estimate of 10 percent was used for natural runoff, also to provide a maximum estimate of the SNL/NM contribution to storm water runoff. The calculations used in this analysis are shown in Appendix B.

The developed (impervious) area of SNL/NM is estimated to be 0.72 mi². This analysis indicates that SNL/NM

contributes no more than 5 percent of the flow in Tijeras Arroyo. The maximum increase in annual surface runoff due to the presence of SNL/NM is estimated to have ranged from approximately 100,000 to 700,000 ft³ from 1993 through 1995. These flows represent small fractions (0.0001 to 0.001 percent) of the annual Rio Grande flow above its confluence with Tijeras Arroyo.

Under the No Action Alternative, only minor net changes in building and parking lot areas would be anticipated. Annual variations in SNL/NM surface runoff would be likely; however, the overall impact would be minimal.

Discharge to Sanitary Sewer

During 1996, 37.4 M ft³ (280 M gal) of SNL/NM process and sanitary sewage water were discharged to the city of Albuquerque Southside Water Reclamation Plant (SNL/NM 1997a). This water, which is treated and then

discharged to the Rio Grande, 0.7 mi upstream of the river's confluence with Tijeras Arroyo, contributes approximately 0.06 percent to the 60.5-B-ft³ annual average flow (upstream of the water reclamation plant) measured from 1993 through 1995 (USGS 1998).

Under the No Action Alternative, annual discharge to the sanitary sewer would be expected to increase slightly from the 1996 level to 40.6 M ft³ (304 M gal). This would result in a contribution to Rio Grande flow of 0.07 percent. SNL/NM management has committed to a 30-percent reduction in water use by 2004 (SNL/NM 1997a). A decrease in the quantity of water discharged to the reclamation plant would be expected under this plan.

Based on this analysis, the total annual contribution of water to the Rio Grande from SNL/NM, including surface water runoff and discharge to the Southside Water Reclamation Plant, would be between 40.7 and 41.3 M ft³ under the No Action Alternative. The vast majority of this contribution (40.6 M ft³) would come from discharge to the water reclamation plant. The total SNL/NM contribution would be approximately 0.07 percent of the average annual Rio Grande flow. No discernible effects to the Rio Grande would be likely from the quantity of SNL/NM water discharged.

5.3.5 Biological and Ecological Resources

Implementation of the No Action Alternative would cause minimal impacts to biological and ecological resources. The ROI for biological resources consists of KAFB, the Withdrawn Area, buffer zones associated with operations in TA-III, and any adjacent lands that the No Action Alternative would affect.

Biological resources could be influenced by construction activities or outdoor operations that result in noise, projectiles, off-road vehicular traffic, unintended fires, and plumes of smoke. Radionuclides or chemicals could also be released from potential accidents or normal operations.

SNL/NM operations in TAs-I, -II, and -V would continue to occur primarily within buildings. Under the No Action Alternative, any proposed construction was analyzed and approved in separate NEPA documents (see Section 1.7): *Environmental Assessment for the Processing and Environmental Technology Laboratory* (DOE 1995d); *Environmental Assessment for Operations, Upgrades, and Modifications in SNL/NM Technical Area IV*,

(DOE 1996g); *Neutron Generator/Switch Tube (NG/ST) Prototyping Relocation Environmental Assessment*, (DOE 1994a); and the *Environmental Assessment for the Radioactive and Mixed Waste Management Facility*, (DOE 1993a). Small areas of vegetation would be removed as a result of some of these projects, but the viability of the plant communities would not be affected. Proposed activities would likely result in the local displacement of wildlife; however, the impact would be minimal and temporary.

Wildlife species at KAFB are representative of those present in the areas surrounding KAFB. From observation, wildlife appears to have become accustomed to the noise and activities that currently exist. Data from raptor surveys at KAFB support this observation, because some raptor species at KAFB return to the same nest sites each year. For example, the western burrowing owl and Swainson's hawk migrate to KAFB to breed in the same nests (USAF 1997b).

Outdoor activities at TA-III and the Coyote Test Facility would continue to affect small localized areas. At the Aerial Cable Facility, 2.2-lb antitank skeet warheads would continue to be detonated. Small fragments of explosive test debris and shrapnel would potentially be dispersed over a 1,200-ft radius (SNL/NM 1998a). Such debris would have a minimal impact on the mortality or distribution of plants and animals. At the Lurance Canyon Burn Site, tests using fire are conducted in outdoor pools, the largest of which is 1,800 ft² (SNL/NM 1998a). Normal operations at these sites would potentially result in unintended fires of limited areal extent. As a result, a temporary loss of vegetation would occur. A few one-seed junipers and grasses would potentially be lost in a fire. Desert shrubs are only marginally affected by fire (Dick-Peddie 1993). Perennial grasses appear to recover from fire less effectively than shrubs or forbs (Dick-Peddie 1993). However, the immediate effects on perennial grasses may last only 1 or 2 years (Cable 1967). Although relationships between fire and vegetation are complex, it is unlikely that fires or their suppression have had much effect on the scrublands or nonmontane grasslands of New Mexico (Dick-Peddie 1993). Individuals of the grama grass cactus, a USFS sensitive species, would possibly be destroyed in a fire, but seeds would survive (PSL 1992). The population would recover, and the temporary impact on this species would be minimal.

Normal operations at the Lurance Canyon Burn Site would result in large plumes of carbon particulates that would extend thousands of feet into the air

(SNL/NM 1998a). These smoke plumes would be of short duration and would temporarily displace birds.

Under the No Action Alternative, there would be no impact on springs or wetlands, including the Burn Site Spring, the only spring or wetland on land used by SNL/NM.

Under the No Action Alternative, the federally endangered peregrine falcon would not be affected. There would not be a loss, gain, or degradation to the habitat of peregrine falcons. While peregrine falcons are regular spring migrants along ridge lines of the Sandia and Mazano Mountains, only one probable sighting of a peregrine falcon, which was likely migrating, has been documented during surveys on the KAFB. No evidence of nesting has been found on KAFB, which has marginal nesting potential (USAF 1995d). Prey availability for any migrating falcons would also not be affected by continued and planned operations. Impacts to other protected or sensitive species, or both, would be negligible.

Ecological risks of the DOE's ongoing environmental restoration activities were analyzed in the *Environmental Assessment of the Environmental Restoration Project at SNL/NM* (DOE 1996c). Results indicate that removing soil that has been contaminated by radioactive or hazardous materials would reduce the potential for exposure of animals and plants to these contaminants and any associated ecological risk. Corrective actions could generate contaminated dust and subsequent exposure of small mammals and plants to radionuclides, cadmium, chromium, and lead. The predicted exposures were well below the benchmark levels, above which adverse effects are a potential concern. This indicates that biota would be at minimal risk for adverse effects from contaminated dust and radiation (DOE 1996c).

Annual ecological monitoring of small mammal, reptile, amphibian, bird, and plant species at selected sites does not show significant contaminant loads of radionuclides or metals in the individuals tested (SNL/NM 1997u). This indicates that no significant contaminant loadings of radionuclides or metals would likely be found in biota traveling across the boundaries between the KAFB and the Pueblo of Isleta. Ecological risks to plants and animals would continue to be further assessed using a phased approach outlined by the EPA (SNL/NM 1998w). The exposures of indicator plant and animal species to constituents of potential ecological concern would be modeled in order to calculate hazard quotients. For example, perennial grasses, small mammals, and insects would be collected at selected ER sites and

analyzed for the concentrations of selected metals, including uranium and lead (SNL/NM 1998w). No significant increases in contaminant loads of radionuclides or chemicals would be expected in plants or animals at KAFB under the No Action Alternative. Removal of contaminated soil would result in a short-term loss of vegetation and disturbance of wildlife.

Inventory and management of the biological resources by SNL/NM, KAFB, and the USFS would continue to protect the animals, plants, and sensitive species on KAFB.

5.3.6 Cultural Resources

The implementation of the No Action Alternative would have low to negligible impacts to cultural resources due to 1) the absence of prehistoric or historic archaeological sites on DOE-administered land, 2) the nature of the cultural resources found in the ROI (see Appendix C), 3) compliance with applicable regulations and established procedures for the protection and conservation of cultural resources located on lands administered by the DOE and on lands administered by other agencies and used by the DOE (see Section 4.8.3.2 and Chapter 7), and 4) the largely benign nature of SNL/NM activities near cultural resources. Implementation of the regulations and procedures would make unlikely any adverse impacts resulting from construction, demolition, decontamination, renovation, or ER Project activities.

No impacts would be anticipated to DOE buildings constructed during World War II or the Cold War era, some of which are eligible or potentially eligible for listing on the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP). Although some buildings on DOE-owned land have been assessed for eligibility, most have not because of their young age. Some of the buildings at SNL/NM have been proposed for decontamination, renovation, or demolition. Before any building is subjected to these activities, the DOE would assess the eligibility of the building for placement on the NRHP and, in consultation with the New Mexico SHPO, would determine if the activities would have an impact on an eligible building. This assessment would include determining measures to mitigate or avoid any potential impacts to eligible buildings.

Under the No Action Alternative, prehistoric and historic cultural resources could potentially be affected by activities performed at five SNL/NM facilities, although the potential for impact is low to negligible.

These facilities consist of the Aerial Cable Facility, Lurance Canyon Burn Site, Thunder Range, Sled Track Complex, and Terminal Ballistics Complex. The first three facilities are located on land not owned by the DOE. Impacts could potentially result from three activities at these facilities: production of explosive testing debris and shrapnel, off-road vehicle traffic, and unintended fires and fire suppression. Another source of potential impact derives from the restricted access present at KAFB and individual SNL/NM facilities. Discussions of potential impacts follow and are organized by impact source.

5.3.6.1 Explosive Testing Debris and Shrapnel

One source of potential impact to cultural resources would be explosive testing debris and shrapnel (referred to as debris) produced by outdoor explosions. Such explosions could cause the impact of airborne debris on cultural materials or the presence of debris on cultural resource sites. Activities at two SNL/NM facilities—the Aerial Cable Facility and the Lurance Canyon Burn Site would have the potential for impacts to cultural resources due to debris from outdoor explosions. The potential for impacts would be low for both facilities, as explained below.

Activities at the Aerial Cable Facility would include testing antitank skeet warheads weighing approximately 2.2 lb. During the tests, which would be conducted in target areas that have previously been disturbed, the warheads would explode, dispersing debris (SNL/NM 1998a). Studies conducted at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) for explosive tests measuring up to 500 lb have shown that debris primarily tend to fall within 800 ft of the firing site and no particles fall outside 1,200 ft (DOE 1998a).

No archaeological sites are located within an 800-ft radius of the Aerial Cable Facility. One eligible archaeological site is located within a 1,200-ft radius, where debris would be likely to fall less frequently. In addition, both the position of the site on a hill slope facing away from the facility and the surrounding vegetation would act to reduce both the velocity and amount of debris that could reach the site, thereby lowering the already low probability for impacts caused by debris. Dense pinyon and juniper trees and shrubs are present in the area, which would help protect the archaeological resource from airborne debris. Field observations conducted at this archaeological site in August 1998 by the SWEIS Cultural Resources Specialist did not reveal any visible effects that could be attributable to flying debris and no debris was identified on the site. Based on these studies, the probability of this one

archaeological site being affected by flying debris from the facility would be low.

Activities at the Lurance Canyon Burn Site could result in unintended explosions that could disperse debris. Four archaeological sites (all NRHP eligible) are located within 800 ft of the facility and three archaeological sites (two eligible and one potentially eligible) are within the 800- to 1,200-ft range. For the same reasons stated above for the Aerial Cable Facility, the potential for impacts to these sites from debris would be low. In addition, for some burn tests at the Lurance Canyon Burn Site, barriers are erected around test sites to contain fragments in the event of an unintended explosion, thereby reducing the already low potential for impacts to cultural resources. Field observations conducted at these seven archaeological sites in August 1998 by the SWEIS Cultural Resources Specialist did not reveal any visible effects that could be attributable to debris.

5.3.6.2 Off-Road Vehicle Traffic

Off-road vehicle traffic would be another possible source of impact to cultural resources. Activities at Thunder Range would sometimes require off-road vehicle travel to place objects for object detection activities, although most targets and reflectors would be placed along existing dirt roads and would usually not require off-road travel. There is one potentially eligible archaeological site on Thunder Range near a dirt road. Off-road vehicle travel could physically affect this site; however, personnel working in the area are aware of its location and the need to avoid it. Therefore, the potential for impacts to this site would be negligible. Field observations conducted at this site in August 1998 by the SWEIS Cultural Resources Specialist did not reveal any visible effects due to off-road vehicle travel.

5.3.6.3 Unintended Fires and Fire Suppression

Fires and fire suppression activities can cause physical damage to cultural resources. After a fire, the lack of vegetation can allow sheet-washing during rainstorms, thereby eroding exposed resources and causing further physical damage. Activities at four facilities—the Terminal Ballistics Complex, Sled Track Complex, Aerial Cable Facility, and Lurance Canyon Burn Site—would have the potential to ignite accidental outdoor brush fires. However, the potential for subsequent impacts to cultural resources would be low to negligible for a number of reasons. First, fires would be expected to occur close to the originating facility. Personnel would be aware of the potential for such fires and trained to spot and extinguish

them. Second, personnel would access the fire on foot and suppress it using portable chemical extinguishers or extinguishing blankets. Third, SNL/NM and the DOE would coordinate with KAFB and the USFS monthly to review scheduled activities with regard to the current fire hazard conditions and to determine if activities should be coordinated on a day-to-day basis (when the fire hazard is high). The Terminal Ballistics Complex and the Sled Track Complex are 1 mi or more away from any known cultural resources; thus, the probability for unintended fires and fire suppression activities from these facilities to affect these resources would be negligible. The other two facilities, the Aerial Cable Facility and the Lurance Canyon Burn Site, are in areas that contain many archaeological sites, with some sites located within 1,200 ft of the facilities. However, due to the training of personnel to identify and extinguish fires quickly, access them on foot, and use fire suppression methods that minimize ground disturbance, the probability for impacts to the archaeological sites at these two facilities would remain low.

5.3.6.4 Restricted Access

Restriction of access to areas within the ROI would have positive effects on cultural resources themselves. Under the No Action Alternative, current KAFB security levels that restrict access would remain. Additional access restrictions would be enforced at specific SNL/NM facilities during various activities. These restrictions would result in an increased level of protection for cultural resources in the ROI and particularly in the facility secure zones.

A TCP study is being conducted. Fifteen Native American tribes have been contacted to determine the presence of TCPs in the ROI. Of the 15 tribes contacted, 7 have responded and one tribe has declined consultation (see Appendix C). Consultations are continuing with the remaining seven tribes. Some tribes who traditionally used the area surrounding and including KAFB consider certain categories of features to be TCPs because of their sacred or religious association with the group or their use by the group in traditional lifeways. These features, which are present in the ROI, include archaeological sites, human burials, springs and other water sources, minerals, vegetation, and animals. However, no specific TCPs have been identified through these consultations and no TCPs are currently known to exist within the ROI.

5.3.7 Air Quality

The implementation of the No Action Alternative would continue the nonradiological and radiological emissions

(Sections 5.3.7.1 and 5.3.7.2, respectively) from SNL/NM facilities. These emissions would continue to be well within the applicable standards for public and worker health and safety.

5.3.7.1 Nonradiological Air Quality

Local, state, and Federal regulations require Federal agencies to assess the effect of their activities on ambient air quality. Under Section 176 (c) of the *Clean Air Act*, each Federal agency has an affirmative responsibility to ensure that the agency's activities conform to state implementation plans designed to achieve and maintain the NAAQS.

Air emissions were assessed for compliance with the NAAQS, and the NMAAQs, and the Albuquerque/Bernalillo County Air Quality Control Board (A/BC AQCB) regulations for criteria pollutants and guidelines for chemical concentrations. The A/BC AQCB enacted the General Conformity Regulation in November 1994 in the Air Quality Control Regulation (20 NMAC 11.04). A final Federal rule for Determining Conformity of General Federal Actions to State or Federal Implementation Plans was promulgated by the EPA on November 30, 1993 (58 FR 63214), and took effect on January 31, 1994 (40 CFR Parts 6, 51, and 93). This Federal rule established the conformity criteria and procedures necessary to ensure that Federal actions conform to the appropriate state implementation plan (SIP) and meet the provisions of the *Clean Air Act* (CAA) until the required conformity SIP revision by the state is approved by the EPA. In general, the final rule ensures that all criteria air pollutant emissions and volatile organic compounds (VOCs) are specifically identified and accounted for in the SIP's attainment or maintenance demonstration. This final rule establishes the criteria and procedures governing the determination of conformity for all Federal actions, except Federal highway and transit actions (transportation conformity). In addition, at the state level (under New Mexico Administrative Code, Title 20, 20 NMAC 2.98), are the provisions of Conformity of General Federal Actions to the State Implementation Plan passed on December 14, 1994, which echo the Federal conformity rule. These conformity regulations apply to nonattainment or maintenance areas for criteria pollutants. Bernalillo county is currently classified as a maintenance area for carbon monoxide and therefore these regulations apply to the current Federal actions at SNL/NM.

Criteria Pollutants

The nonradiological air quality for criteria pollutants at SNL/NM under the No Action Alternative is represented by 1996 baseline sources, plus those criteria pollutants sources expected to become operational by 2008. The criteria pollutants include PM₁₀, sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, lead, TSP, and ozone. The No Action Alternative provides for SNL/NM to operate at current planned levels, which would include emission sources that are planned or under construction. These planned sources include a boiler designated by the Albuquerque Environmental Health Department (AEHD) as insignificant, an emergency generator in Building 701 (currently under construction), and a 600-kw-capacity generator in Building 870b.

Insignificant Source

An insignificant source is a source that is listed by the Albuquerque Environmental Health Department (AEHD) or approved by the [EPA] Administrator as insignificant on the basis of size, emissions, or production rate.

Source: 20 NMAC 2.3

Following are the criteria pollutant sources included in the modeling analysis under the No Action Alternative:

- the steam plant,
- the electric power generator plant,
- a boiler and an emergency generator in Building 701, and
- the 600-kw-capacity generator in Building 870b.

The Lurance Canyon Burn Site is an additional source of criteria pollutants. This source is a noncontinuous source, spatially separated from those listed above, and is, therefore, addressed separately within the fire testing facilities section that follows.

The estimated emissions of criteria pollutants under the No Action Alternative were modeled using the EPA-recommended *ISCST3* (version 97363) model to estimate concentrations of criteria pollutants at or beyond the SNL/NM boundary, including receptor locations such as public access areas (for example, the National Atomic Museum, hospitals, and schools). Onsite hourly meteorological data from meteorological tower A15 for 1995 and 1996 and from meteorological


Receptor Location

A receptor location is a location at which any individual may be affected by SNL/NM activities.

tower A21 for 1994, 1995, and 1996, were used to perform the modeling. Figure 5.3.7 1 shows the locations of the two meteorological towers in the vicinity of TA-I.

Modeling results for nitrogen oxides using *ISCST3* for the 24-hour and annual averaging periods are 0.19 ppm (300 µg/m³) and 0.02 ppm (28 µg/m³), respectively. The NMAAQS standards for nitrogen dioxide for the 24-hour and annual averaging periods are 0.10 ppm (156 µg/m³) and 0.05 ppm (78 µg/m³), respectively. The modeling results indicate that the nitrogen oxides 24-hour concentrations exceed the NMAAQS standard for nitrogen dioxide. If the nitrogen oxides concentration is below the NMAAQS standard for nitrogen dioxide, then no further analysis is necessary to show compliance with the standard. Since the nitrogen oxides concentration is above the standard, a second step must be undertaken to show compliance. The second step implements the ozone-limiting method (OLM) to estimate nitrogen dioxide concentrations in modeled nitrogen oxides emissions.

The New Mexico Air Pollution Control Bureau has approved the OLM to estimate nitrogen dioxide concentrations in modeled nitrogen oxides emissions. A detailed description of the OLM is presented in Appendix D. The OLM results in a modeled annual average concentration of nitrogen dioxide of 0.006 ppm (10 µg/m³) and a 24-hour average concentration of 0.066 ppm (103.7 µg/m³). The OLM requires that background nitrogen dioxide concentrations be added to the model-calculated nitrogen dioxide concentrations to obtain a representative concentration of nitrogen dioxide. The maximum 24-hour average concentration of nitrogen dioxide at the chosen background station in 1996 was 0.029 ppm (46 µg/m³); the annual average concentration was 0.008 ppm (13 µg/m³). The future contribution from the Cobisa Power Station, located approximately 5 mi west of SNL/NM, will add to the annual average background concentration of nitrogen dioxide at the monitoring station. The calculated maximum incremental annual average nitrogen dioxide concentration from this facility will be 1.1 µg/m³. These values, added to the modeled values of nitrogen dioxide,



Source: SNL/NM 1997a

Figure 5.3.7 1. Locations of Meteorological Towers Used for Criteria Pollutant Modeling
Two meteorological towers (A15 and A21) in the TA-I vicinity were used to perform modeling for criteria pollutants.

are reported in Table 5.3.7-1. Potential increases in the background for other criteria pollutants, due to the Cobisa Power Station, are also included. The maximum criteria pollutant concentrations at a public access area outside of the SNL/NM fence occurred at the National Atomic Museum. Table 5.3.7-1 presents the criteria pollutant concentrations of carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, PM₁₀, TSP, and sulfur dioxide resulting from the

What is a Background Concentration?

Manufacturing processes may produce toxic, hazardous, and radioactive substances, either directly or as byproducts. However, many of these substances also occur naturally and can be found in air, water, and soils. Examples include: volatile chemicals produced by forests and phytoplankton; radioactive nuclides, such as uranium, radium, tritium, and beryllium, created by cosmic radiation; and all nonradioactive metals such as lead, chromium, nickel, and arsenic. In order to determine the amount of these substances in the environment resulting from human activity, it is necessary to subtract the naturally occurring or background concentrations from the concentrations measured in a finite number of environmental samples. Because background concentrations can vary substantially over an area and with depth, a difference between sample and background concentrations does not necessarily demonstrate that contaminants have been introduced into the environment.

Determining whether concentrations of metals or radionuclides are the result of contaminants introduced into the environment tends to be more problematic than situations involving volatile chemicals. Various metals and radionuclides occur naturally in measurable concentrations, and the amount of contamination introduced is often relatively small compared to the background values. To aid in the interpretation of metal and radionuclide concentrations in samples, SNL/NM conducted a study of background concentrations at KAFB (SNL/NM 1996e). Using more than 3,700 samples, SNL/NM demonstrated the variation in natural concentrations of 20 metals and 9 radionuclides in different regions of KAFB. This study was the basis for developing a set of agreed-upon maximum background concentrations with the NMED.

modeling analysis, and maximum measured monitoring data for lead and ozone. In addition, the table presents the applicable Federal (40 CFR Part 50) and New Mexico state (20 NMAC 2.3) standards for each pollutant.

As shown in Table 5.3.7-1, the maximum concentrations for three criteria pollutants (nitrogen dioxide, TSP, and PM₁₀) were calculated to be within 96 percent of (or 4 percent below) the Federal and state regulatory agency standards for a 24-hour period. These standards, in general, are set to provide for an ample margin of safety below any pollutant concentration that might be of concern.

The methodology used in the criteria pollutant analysis also produces maximum concentration projections that are very conservative. For example, 100 percent of the maximum concentration of air pollutants projected for Cobisa Power Station (located 5 mi west of the National Atomic Museum) was added to the background concentration calculated for the Steam Plant location (near the museum). Also, the maximum concentrations of air pollutants, from a monitoring station measuring contributions from the surrounding community that are dominated by traffic emissions, were added to the worst-case contribution of pollutants from operating SNL/NM's diesel fuel-powered backup generators and fuel oil-powered Steam Plant boilers. Consequently, though close to the thresholds, these calculated concentrations for nitrogen dioxide, TSP, and PM₁₀ are considered to be very conservative.

Table 5.3.7-2 presents the modeled incremental criteria pollutant concentrations representing only those new sources expected to become operational by 2008: an insignificant boiler and emergency generator in Building 701 and a 600-kw-capacity generator in Building 870b. These new sources are included in the concentrations presented in Table 5.3.7-1 and are presented separately in Table 5.3.7-2 to demonstrate the small incremental increase expected from these sources.

Table 5.3.7-1 presents carbon monoxide concentrations from stationary sources at SNL/NM, while carbon monoxide emissions from mobile (vehicular) sources are presented separately. Monitoring data best represent the combined impact of carbon monoxide emissions from these two sources, and the ambient concentrations of these pollutants are also provided in the table. On June 5, 1998, SNL/NM became subject to a new 8-hour, 0.08-ppm ozone standard, replacing the previous 1-hour, 0.12-ppm ozone standard (63 FR 31034). In the year 2000, the EPA will designate areas that do not meet the 8-hour standard based on the most recently available

Table 5.3.7-1. Criteria Pollutant Concentrations from SNL/NM Stationary Sources and Background with Applicable National and New Mexico Ambient Air Quality Standards Under the No Action Alternative

POLLUTANT (SNL/NM [Tons/yr])	AVERAGE TIME	NAAQS (ppm [$\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$])	NMAAQS (ppm [$\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$])	NO ACTION CONCENTRATION (ppm [$\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$])	BACKGROUND CONCENTRATION (ppm [$\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$])	TOTAL CONCENTRATION (ppm [$\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$])	PERCENT OF STANDARD ⁱ
Carbon Monoxide (18.36)	8 hours	9[8,564]	8.7[8,279]	0.08[78.4]	4.9[4,663] ^g	4.98[4,741]	57
	1 hour	35[33,305]	13.1[12,466]	0.13[119]	8.0[7,613] ^g	8.1[7,732]	62
Lead	Quarterly	1.5 ^a	-	0.001 ^{a,b}	-	0.001 ^{a,b}	0.07
Nitrogen Dioxide (162.36)	Annually	0.053[83]	0.05[78]	0.006[10.0]	0.009[14.1] ^{f,g}	0.015[24.1]	30
	24 hours	-	0.10[156]	0.066[103.7]	0.029[46] ^{f,g}	0.096[149.7]	96
TSP (7.46)	Annually	-	60 ^a	11.4 ^a	30 ^h	41.4 ^a	69
	30 days	-	90 ^a	NA	NA	NA	NA
	7 days	-	110 ^a	NA	NA	NA	NA
	24 hours	-	150 ^a	114.2 ^a	30 ^h	144.2 ^a	96
PM₁₀^d (7.46)	Annually	50 ^a	-	11.4 ^a	30 ^h	41.4 ^a	83
	24 hours	150 ^a	-	114.2 ^a	30 ^h	144.2 ^a	96
Sulfur Dioxide (1.10)	Annually	0.03[65]	0.02[44]	0.0008[1.7]	0.00005[0.12] ^f	0.00085[1.82]	4
	24 hours	0.14[305]	0.10[218]	0.006[12.2]	0.0008[1.7] ^f	0.006[13.9]	6
	3 hours	0.50[1,088]	-	0.01[21.1]	0.006[13.5] ^f	0.016[34.6]	3
Ozone^e	1 hour	0.12[196]	-	0.103[168] ^c	-	0.103[168] ^c	86
Hydrogen Sulfide	1 hour	-	0.01/12	NA	-	NA	NA
Total Reduced Sulfur	0.5 hour	-	0.03/33	NA	-	NA	NA

Sources: 20 NMAC 2.03, 40 CFR Part 50, NMAPCB 1996, SNL/NM 1997d
 mg/m³: micrograms per cubic meter

CPMS: criteria pollutant monitoring station

NA: Not Available

NAAQS: National Ambient Air Quality Standards

NMAAQS: New Mexico Ambient Air Quality Standards

PM₁₀: Particulate matter less than 10 microns in diameter

ppm: parts per million

TSP: total suspended particulates

^a mg/m³

^b Highest quarterly lead monitoring data measured at the CPMS site in 1996

^c Highest 1-hour ozone monitoring data measured at the CPMS site in 1996

^d PM₁₀ assumed equal to TSP

^e A new 8-hour, 0.08-ppm ozone standard is replacing the previous 1-hour, 0.12-ppm ozone standard based on the most recently available 3 years of ozone data. SNL/NM might not be in compliance with this standard in the year 2000 when the EPA will designate areas that do not meet the 8-hour standard.

Background concentrations resulting from operation of the Cobisa Power Station

^f 1996 maximum background concentrations from monitoring station 2R and/or 2ZR/2ZQ.

^g Background PM₁₀ values for 24-hour and annual PM₁₀ cumulative impacts (NMAPCB 1996).

ⁱ Represents SNL/NM contribution plus background as a percent of standard.

Note: The standards for some of the pollutants are stated in ppm. These values were converted to mg/m³ with appropriate corrections for temperature (530 degrees Rankin) and pressure (elevation 5,400 feet) following New Mexico Dispersion Modeling Guidelines (NMAPCB 1996).

Table 5.3.7 2. Incremental Criteria Pollutant Concentrations from SNL/NM Stationary Sources with Applicable National and New Mexico Ambient Air Quality Standards

POLLUTANT	AVERAGING TIME	NAAQS (ppm [$\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$])	NMAAQs (ppm [$\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$])	INCREMENTAL CONCENTRATION (ppm [$\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$])	PERCENT OF STANDARD
<i>Carbon Monoxide</i>	8 hours	9[8,564]	8.7[8,279]	0.03[29.7]	< 1
	1 hour	35[33,305]	13.1[12,466]	0.2[164.7]	1.3
<i>Lead</i>	Quarterly	1.5 ^a	-	NA	NA
<i>Nitrogen Dioxide^b</i>	Annual	0.053[83]	0.05[78]	0.001[1.1]	1.4
	24 hours	-	0.10[156]	0.02[12.2]	7.8
<i>TSP</i>	Annual	-	60 ^c	0.1 ^a	< 1
	24 hours	-	150 ^c	1.2 ^a	< 1
<i>PM₁₀^c</i>	Annual	50 ^a	-	0.1 ^a	< 1
	24 hours	150 ^a	-	1.2 ^a	< 1
<i>Sulfur Dioxide</i>	Annual	0.03[65]	0.02[44]	0.0001[0.23]	< 1
	24 hours	0.14[305]	0.10[218]	0.001[2.7]	1.2
	3 hours	0.50[1,088]	-	0.007[15.1]	1.4
<i>Ozone</i>	Annual	-	-	NA	NA
	1 hour	0.12[196]	-	NA	NA
<i>Hydrogen Sulfide</i>	1 hour	-	0.01[12]	NA	NA
<i>Total Reduced Sulfur</i>	0.5 hour	-	0.03[33]	NA	NA

Sources: 20 NMAC 2.03, 40 CFR Part 50, NMAPCB 1996, SNL/NM 1997d

- indicates no standard for listed averaging time

$\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$: micrograms per cubic meter

^aR: degrees Rankin

ft: feet

NA: Not Available

NAAQS: National Ambient Air Quality Standards

NMAAQs: New Mexico Ambient Air Quality Standards

OLM: ozone limiting method

PM₁₀: Particulate matter less than 10 microns in diameter

ppm: parts per million

TSP: total suspended particulates

^a $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$

^b The OLM was employed to calculate the nitrogen dioxide component of the nitrogen oxides concentration.

^c PM₁₀ assumed equal to TSP

Note: The standards for some of the pollutants are stated in ppm. These values were converted to $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ with appropriate corrections for temperature (53^oR) and pressure (elevation 5,400 ft) following New Mexico Dispersion Modeling Guidelines (NMAPCB 1996).

3 years of ozone data available at that time (such as 1997 through 1999).

The modeling results presented in Table 5.3.7 1 indicate that the No Action Alternative criteria pollutant concentrations would be below the most stringent standards, which define the pollutant concentrations below which few adverse impacts to human health and the environment are expected. Appendix D contains the assumptions and model input parameters used to calculate the criteria pollutant concentrations presented in Table 5.3.7 1.

Mobile Sources

The model projected carbon monoxide emissions from mobile sources (motor vehicles) from SNL/NM commuter traffic, including on-base vehicles, would be 3,489 tons per year for 2005 (SNL 1996c), which is 596 tons per year below the 1996 baseline. These projections of carbon monoxide emissions are based on estimates of 13,582 vehicles per day entering SNL/NM, a 30 mi-per-day-per-vehicle average commuting distance, and 261 working days per year. The EPA mobile source emission factor model, *MOBILE5a*, was used to project emission factors for the years from 1996 through 2005. The

resulting emission factors show a reduction in carbon monoxide emission rates for each successive year. The reduction is based on the model assumption that future vehicles will have inherently lower emission rates and that more stringent inspection and maintenance programs will maintain the lower rates. The trend of lower carbon monoxide emissions projected from SNL/NM would also occur for a similar mix of vehicles operating in the Bernalillo county area due to improvements in vehicle fleet emissions. Projected carbon monoxide emissions for Bernalillo county for 2005 would be 206 tons per day, or 75,190 tons per year (AEHD 1998). The contribution of carbon monoxide emissions from vehicles commuting to and from SNL/NM and from SNL/NM-operated on-base vehicles in 2005, as a percent of the total county highway mobile sources carbon monoxide emissions, would be 4.6 under the No Action Alternative.

Total carbon monoxide emissions are shown in **Table 5.3.7 3**. Estimates of future construction activities include use of small diesel generators, air compressors, front-end loaders, dozers, and dump trucks. Emissions for the construction activities have been estimated based on exhaust pollutant estimates for diesel construction equipment.

Total carbon monoxide emissions for the No Action Alternative are 596 tons per year less than the 1996 baseline, well below the 100 tons/year incremental increase above baseline that would require a conformity determination. In addition, the total carbon monoxide emissions for the No Action Alternative were found to be approximately 2.7 percent of the maintenance areas emissions of carbon monoxide. As a result, the DOE has concluded that no conformity determination is required for the No Action Alternative.

Lurance Canyon Burn Site

SNL/NM uses the Lurance Canyon Burn Site to test the responses of shipping containers, aerospace components, and other items to high-temperature conditions. Concentrations of pollutants from operations at the fire testing facilities under the No Action Alternative are represented by the emissions from the 42 tests performed during 1996. These tests consumed 10,400 gal of JP-8 aviation fuel and other aviation fuels and 16,050 lb of sawdust (or wood) (SNL/NM 1997a).

The largest of the tests, consuming 1,000 gal of JP-8 fuel, was used to represent the test with the maximum emissions for purposes of modeling. Concentrations of pollutants resulting from test emissions were calculated

using the *OBODM* model (Bjorklund et al. 1997). The results for the criteria pollutants are presented in **Table 5.3.7 4**, along with the applicable Federal (40 CFR Part 50) and New Mexico state (20 NMAC 2.3) standards for each pollutant. Emissions of criteria pollutants resulting from activities at the Lurance Canyon Burn Site are presented in **Table 4.9 2**.

A total of 89 chemical pollutants resulting from the tests were also evaluated. Each of these pollutants was compared with the respective occupational exposure limit (OEL)/100 guideline, and each of the comparisons indicates that the chemical concentrations are below the guideline. **Table D.1 31** in Appendix D contains the list of chemical emissions resulting from tests at the Lurance Canyon Burn Site.

Occupational Exposure Limit (OEL)

The occupational exposure limit is a time-weighted average concentration for a conventional 8-hour workday and a 40-hour workweek, to which it is believed that nearly all workers may be repeatedly exposed, day after day, without adverse effect. The minimum OEL obtained from four reference sources divided by a safety factor of 100 is used as the screening guideline to determine chemicals of concern (COCs).

Chemical Pollutants

Approximately 465 chemicals, including hazardous air pollutants (HAPs), toxic air pollutants (TAPs), and volatile organic compounds (VOCs), were identified for evaluation from the CIS, CheMaster, and HCPI databases. These chemicals were purchased by the 12 facilities listed in **Table 5.3.7 5** during 1996. The table lists all facilities that purchased chemicals at SNL/NM in 1996. **Figure 5.3.7 2** shows the locations of these 12 facilities.

Hazardous chemicals purchased during 1996 are categorized into two groups: noncarcinogenic chemicals and carcinogenic chemicals. The list of 465 chemicals purchased during 1996 includes fifteen EPA-confirmed carcinogenic chemicals that were purchased by 5 facilities. The remaining chemicals are categorized as noncarcinogenic chemicals. Each group is evaluated using a screening technique based on 1/100 of the relevant OEL for noncarcinogens or 1/100 of the relevant unit risk factor for carcinogens in order to identify those chemicals of potential concern.

Table 5.3.7 3. Carbon Monoxide Emissions from SNL/NM Under the No Action Alternative (Tons per Year)

STATIONARY SOURCES	MOBILE SOURCES	CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES	LURANCE CANYON BURN SITE	TOTAL
18.36 ^a	3,489	132	0.78 ^b	3,640.14

Sources: SNL/NM 1998a, SNL 1996c

^a Includes incremental carbon monoxide emissions from an insignificant boiler and emergency generator in Building 701 and a 600-kw-capacity generator in Building 870b added between 1996 and 2008.

^b The number of tests at the Lurance Canyon Burn Site for the No Action Alternative are projected to be equal to those in 1996.

Table 5.3.7 4. Criteria Pollutant Concentrations from the Lurance Canyon Burn Site with Applicable National and New Mexico Ambient Air Quality Standards Under the No Action Alternative

POLLUTANT	AVERAGE TIME	NAAQS (ppm[μg/m ³])	NMAAQS (ppm[μg/m ³])	NO ACTION CONCENTRATION (ppm[μg/m ³])	PERCENT OF STANDARD
<i>Carbon Monoxide</i>	8 hours	9[8,564]	8.7[8,279]	0.023[21.45]	< 1
	1 hour	35[33,305]	13.1[12,466]	0.18[171.6]	1.4
<i>Nitrogen Dioxide</i>	Annual	0.053[83]	0.05[78]	6.4x10 ⁻⁷ [0.001]	< 1
	24 hours	-	0.10[156]	1.18x10 ⁻⁴ [0.184]	< 1
<i>PM₁₀^a</i>	Annual	50 ^b	-	0.018 ^b	< 1
	24 hours	150 ^b	-	6.51 ^b	4.3
<i>Sulfur Dioxide</i>	Annual	0.03[65]	0.02[44]	4.6x10 ⁻⁷ [0.001]	< 1
	24 hours	0.14[305]	0.10[218]	1.7x10 ⁻⁴ [0.367]	< 1
	3 hours	0.50[1,088]	-	0.001[2.94]	< 1
<i>TSP</i>	Annual	-	60 ^b	0.018 ^b	< 1
	24 hours	-	150 ^b	6.51 ^b	4.3

Sources: 20 NMAC 2.3, 40 CFR Part 50, SNL 1997a

mg/m³: micrograms per cubic meter

°R: degrees Rankin

ft: feet

NAAQS: National Ambient Air Quality Standards

NMAAQS: New Mexico Ambient Air Quality Standards

PM₁₀: particulate matter less than 10 microns in diameter

ppm: parts per million

TSP: total suspended particulates

^a PM₁₀ assumed equal to TSP

^b mg/m³

Note: The standards for some of the pollutants are stated in ppm. These values were converted to mg/m³ with appropriate corrections for temperature (530° R) and pressure (elevation 5,400 ft) following New Mexico Dispersion Modeling Guidelines (NMAPCB 1996).

Table 5.3.7 5. SNL/NM Facilities from which Chemical Emissions were Modeled

TECHNICAL AREA	BUILDING NUMBER	FACILITY NAME
<i>I</i>	605	Steam plant
<i>I</i>	858	Microelectronics Development Laboratory (MDL)
<i>I</i>	870	Neutron Generator Facility (NGF)
<i>I</i>	878	Advanced Manufacturing Processes Laboratory (AMPL)
<i>I</i>	893	Compound Semiconductor Research Laboratory (CSRL)
<i>I</i>	897	Integrated Materials Research Laboratory (IMRL)
<i>II</i>	905	Explosive Components Facility (ECF)
<i>III</i>	6920	Radioactive and Mixed Waste Management Facility (RMWMF)
<i>IV</i>	963	Repetitive High Energy Pulsed Power Unit II (RHEPP II)
<i>IV</i>	981	Short-Pulse High Intensity Nanosecond X-Radiator (SPHINX)
<i>IV</i>	986	Repetitive High Energy Pulsed Power Unit I (RHEPP I)
<i>V</i>	6580	Hot Cell Facility (HCF)

Source: SNL/NM 1998a

Unit Risk Factor

The unit risk factor is a dose response parameter used to identify lifetime carcinogenic health effects relative to the level of chemical exposure (risk per unit concentration). The unit risk factor multiplied by the exposure concentration equals the excess lifetime cancer risk. The carcinogenic chemical guideline used to screen the carcinogenic chemicals represents a lifetime cancer risk of 1.0×10^{-8} . It is calculated by dividing 1.0×10^{-8} risk by the chemical-specific unit risk factor. This results in a chemical concentration below which no health effect is expected.

Noncarcinogenic Chemical Screening

Noncarcinogenic chemicals that could cause air quality impacts at SNL/NM are identified through a progressive series of screening steps detailed in Appendix D in which each successive step reduces the number of pollutants to only those chemicals that have a reasonable chance of being chemicals of concern.

Only 30 noncarcinogenic chemicals from 5 facilities exceed the screening level based upon emission rates


calculated from purchases. Only 1 of the 30 noncarcinogenic chemicals exceeded the screening level based upon facility-estimated emission rates. The human health impacts from this chemical, chromium trioxide (Building 870), are presented in Section 5.3.8. The results of the screening analysis are presented in detail in Appendix D.

Carcinogenic Chemical Screening

Table 5.3.7 6 presents those carcinogenic chemicals with estimated emission rates greater than the screening level. Human health impacts from these 10 carcinogenic chemicals are presented in Section 5.3.8.

Summary of Nonradiological Air Quality Impacts

Under the No Action Alternative, nonradiological air quality concentrations for criteria and chemical pollutants are below regulatory standards and human health guidelines. Maximum concentrations of criteria pollutants from operation of the steam plant, electric power generator plant, boiler and emergency generator in Building 701, and 600-kw-capacity generator in Building 870b represent a maximum of 96 percent of the allowable regulatory limit at a public access area. Thirty noncarcinogenic chemicals exceed the screening levels based upon emission rates calculated from purchased quantities, but only one noncarcinogenic chemical



Source: SNL/NM 1997a

Figure 5.3.7 2. Major Chemical-Emitting Facilities at SNL/NM
Twelve SNL/NM facilities emit the majority of chemicals.

Table 5.3.7 6. Annual Carcinogenic Chemical Concentrations from Facility Emissions Under the No Action Alternative

CHEMICALS EXCEEDING SCREENING LEVELS	BUILDING SOURCE	NO ACTION CONCENTRATION (ppb/ $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$)
<i>Chloroform (Trichloromethane)</i>	6580	1.45×10^{-3} [5.89×10^{-3}]
<i>Dichloromethane (Methylene chloride)</i>	870	7.31×10^{-2} [2.11×10^{-1}]
<i>Dichloromethane (Methylene chloride)</i>	878	2.66×10^{-3} [7.67×10^{-3}]
<i>Formaldehyde</i>	878	4.77×10^{-4} [4.87×10^{-4}]
<i>Trichloroethene</i>	878	8.74×10^{-3} [3.90×10^{-2}]
<i>1,2-Dichloroethane (Ethylene dichloride)</i>	893	2.93×10^{-4} [9.85×10^{-4}]
<i>1,4-Dichloro-2-butene</i>	897	3.96×10^{-5} [1.68×10^{-4}]
<i>Acrylonitrile</i>	897	1.52×10^{-4} [2.74×10^{-4}]
<i>Chloroform (Trichloromethane)</i>	897	1.25×10^{-3} [5.07×10^{-3}]
<i>Trichloroethene</i>	897	1.58×10^{-3} [7.06×10^{-3}]

Source: SNL/NM 1998a
 mg/m³: micrograms per cubic meter
 ppb: parts per billion
 Bldg. 6580 Hot Cell Facility (HCF)

Bldg. 870 Neutron Generator Facility
 Bldg. 878 Advanced Manufacturing Processes Laboratory (AMPL)
 Bldg. 893 Compound Semiconductor Research Laboratory (CSRL)
 Bldg. 897 Integrated Materials Research Laboratory (IMRL)

exceeds the screening levels based upon process engineering estimates of actual emission rates. Further analysis of this one noncarcinogenic chemical is performed in Section 5.3.8. The risks due to exposure of the 10 carcinogenic chemicals that exceeded the screening levels are evaluated in Section 5.3.8, Human Health and Worker Safety.

5.3.7.2 Radiological Air Quality

The SWEIS analysis reviewed the radiological emissions from all SNL/NM facilities. Section 4.9.2 identifies 17 SNL/NM facilities as producing radiological emissions. Based on historic SNL/NM radionuclide emissions data, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) (40 CFR Part 61), compliance reports, and the *SNL/NM Facilities and Safety Information Documents* (FSID) (SNL/NM 1998ee), 10 of the 17 SNL/NM facilities were modeled for radiological impacts (Table 5.3.7 7). The ACRR would be operated under one of two configurations: medical isotopes production (primarily molybdenum-99 production) or DP. However, for the purpose of conservative analysis, the ACRR was evaluated under simultaneous operation of both configurations. Based on the review of historical dose evaluations, facilities other than these 10 would not contribute more than 0.01 mrem/yr (0.1 percent of the NESHAP limit) to the MEI and were screened from further consideration in the SWEIS. The modeled

releases to the environment would result in a calculated dose to the MEI and the population within 50 mi of TA-V. TA-V was selected as a center for the population within a 50-mi radius, because the majority of radiological emissions would be from TA-V, specifically the HCF, and TA-V is historically addressed for annual SNL/NM NESHAP compliance (SNL/NM 1996u). The *CAP88-PC* computer model (DOE 1997e) was used to calculate the doses. Details on the *CAP88-PC* model, radionuclide emissions, model and source parameters, exposures, meteorological data, and population data are presented in Appendix D. Figure 5.3.7 3 shows the locations of the 10 facilities modeled in the SWEIS. Table 5.3.7 7 presents the estimated radiological emissions from the 10 SNL/NM facilities under the No Action Alternative. The radiological emissions from each facility were estimated based on SNL/NM planned operations and tests projected into the future. Detailed information is available in the FSID (SNL/NM 1998ee). The ACRR and HCF emissions for base year 1996 are different due to the refurbishing operations to change over to medical isotopes production configuration. The SPR emissions were estimated to be higher than the base year. This was due to instituting NESHAP requirements for confirmatory measurements of radiological air emissions where measured emission factors were determined for both the SPR and the ACRR. These measured emission factors were found to be higher than the calculated emission factors. These measurements are

Table 5.3.7 7. Radiological Emissions from Sources at SNL/NM Under the No Action Alternative

FACILITY NAME	TECHNICAL AREA	RADIONUCLIDE ^a	RELEASE (Ci/yr)
Annular Core Research Reactor (ACRR) (DP configuration), Building 6588	V	Argon-41	2.6
Annular Core Research Reactor (ACRR) (medical isotopes production configuration), Building 6588	V	Argon-41 Tritium	1.1 1.1
Explosive Components Facility (ECF), Building 905	II	Tritium	2.0x10 ⁻³
High-Energy Radiation Megavolt Electron Source (HERMES III), Building 970	IV	Nitrogen-13 Oxygen-15	1.245x10 ⁻³ 1.245x10 ⁻⁴
Hot Cell Facility (HCF), Building 6580	V	Iodine-131 Iodine-132 Iodine-133 Iodine-134 Iodine-135 Krypton-83m Krypton-85 Krypton-85m Krypton-87 Krypton-88 Xenon-131m Xenon-133 Xenon-133m Xenon-135 Xenon-135m	1.17 3.0 5.4 0.22 3.3 198.0 0.19 290.0 57.0 480.0 1.8 2,160.0 102.0 2,070.0 360.0
Mixed Waste Landfill (MWL)	III	Tritium	0.29
Neutron Generator Facility (NGF), Building 870	I	Tritium	156.0
Radioactive and Mixed Waste Management Facility (RMWMF), Building 6920	III	Tritium	2.203 ^b
Radiographic Integrated Test Stand (RITS), Building 970	IV	Nitrogen-13	0.12
Sandia Pulsed Reactor (SPR), Building 6590	V	Argon-41	9.5


Source: SNL/NM 1998a

Ci/yr: curies per year

DP: Defense Programs

SNL/CA: Sandia National Laboratories/California

^a Radiological emissions are projections based on planned activities, projects, and programs. Radionuclide releases are not the same as those presented in Chapter 4.^b Because SNL/CA tritium-contaminated oil levels handled at the RMWMF during the base year were abnormally high, this maximum level of emissions was assumed to be released in any year and, therefore, was constant for all alternatives.



Source: Original

Figure 5.3.7 3. Locations of Radionuclide-Releasing Facilities at SNL/NM
The 10 SNL/NM facilities that release radionuclides are in 5 technical areas.

source-specific to the SPR and ACRR and would not affect the calculations or measurements for other facilities.

Because the general public and USAF personnel have access to SNL/NM, 14 core receptor locations and 2 offsite receptor locations of public concern were considered for dose impacts evaluations (see Appendix D.2). Based on NESHAP reports, 16 onsite and 6 offsite additional receptor locations were also evaluated. A total of 38 receptor locations were evaluated for dose impacts. The core receptor locations include schools, hospitals, a museum, and clubs, and were considered for analysis because of potential impacts to children, the sick, and the elderly. The 32 modeled onsite and core receptor locations and locations of public concern are shown in Figure 5.3.7 4.

The dose to an individual at each receptor location and to the population within 50 mi from the radionuclide emissions from each source was calculated using the *CAP88-PC* model. The public receptor receiving the maximum reported dose is identified as the MEI. The model-calculated dose contributions, including external, inhalation, and ingestion exposure pathways from each of the 10 sources, calculated individually at each receptor location, were combined to determine the overall SNL/NM site-wide normal operations dose to the MEI. Under the No Action Alternative, the maximum effective dose equivalent (EDE) to the MEI from all exposure pathways from all modeled sources was calculated to be 0.15 mrem/yr. The MEI is located at the Kirtland Underground Munitions and Maintenance Storage Complex (KUMMSC), north of TA-V. This location is consistent with the location of the MEI historically identified in the annual NESHAP compliance reports. The EDE contributions from these 10 sources to this highest combined MEI dose are presented in Table 5.3.7 8. Table 5.3.7 9 presents the doses to 38 onsite, core, and offsite receptor locations. The potential doses for these additional locations would be much lower than the MEI dose. Under the No Action Alternative, the total collective dose to the population of 732,523 within a 50-mi radius of TA-V was calculated to be 5.0 person-rem per year. Section 5.3.8 discusses the human health impacts of radiological emissions at SNL/NM. The contributions from the 10 modeled sources to the overall SNL/NM site-wide normal operations collective dose to the population within 50 mi are also presented in Table 5.3.7 8. The average dose to an individual (collective dose divided by the total population) in the population within 50 mi of TA-V would be 6.8×10^{-3} mrem/yr.

The calculated total MEI dose of 0.15 mrem/yr would be much lower than the regulatory limit of 10 mrem/yr to an MEI from SNL/NM site-wide total airborne releases of radiological materials (40 CFR Part 61). This dose is small compared to an individual background radiation dose of 360 mrem/yr (see Figure 4.10 2). The calculated collective dose from SNL/NM operations to the population within 50 mi of TA-V, 5.0 person-rem per year, is much lower than the collective dose to the population from background radiation. Based on the individual background radiation dose, the population within 50 mi of TA-V would receive 263,700 person-rem per year.

5.3.8 Human Health and Worker Safety

The implementation of the No Action Alternative could result in impacts to public health and worker health and safety from both normal facility operations and postulated accident scenarios. The impacts would be the result of radiological and nonradiological releases from SNL/NM operations. The following sections describe these impacts.

A receptor is any individual who could be affected by SNL/NM operations. Health risk assessments for receptors at specific locations in the immediate SNL/NM vicinity were used to characterize the health risks for all possible receptors.

Fourteen core receptor locations were consistent among the evaluations for impacts due to routine operations, chemical and radiological emissions, and potential facility accidents at SNL/NM. These receptor locations were selected based on a review of historic NESHAP compliance reports, which discuss the location of the MEI member of public and take into consideration that the general public and Air Force personnel have access to SNL/NM. Other factors taken into account include information contained in the *SNL/NM Facility Source Documents* (SNL/NM 1998a), receptor locations in close proximity to the sources, the nearest site boundary in the prevailing wind directions, and the presence of potentially sensitive receptors such as children, the sick, and the elderly. These 14 receptor locations are listed below.

- Child Development Center-East
- Child Development Center-West
- Coronado Club
- Golf Course (Clubhouse)
- Kirtland Elementary School




Figure 5.3.7 4. Normal Operational Onsite and Core Receptor Locations
Thirty-two onsite and core receptor locations were evaluated for potential normal operation impacts.

Source: SNL/NM 1996u

Table 5.3.7 8. Summary of Dose Estimates from Radioactive Air Emissions to the SNL/NM Public Under the No Action Alternative

SOURCE	ANNUAL MEI DOSE, EDE (mrem)	ANNUAL POPULATION DOSE, PERSON-REM
<i>Annular Core Research Reactor (ACRR) (DP configuration)</i>	4.2×10^{-4}	7.2×10^{-3}
<i>Annular Core Research Reactor (ACRR) (medical isotopes production configuration)</i>	2.1×10^{-4}	5.36×10^{-3}
<i>Explosive Components Facility (ECF)</i>	9.9×10^{-9}	4.19×10^{-6}
<i>High-Energy Radiation Megavolt Electron Source (HERMES III)</i>	1.0×10^{-8}	2.1×10^{-7}
<i>Hot Cell Facility (HCF)</i>	1.5×10^{-1}	4.61
<i>Mixed Waste Landfill (MWL)</i>	4.0×10^{-6}	6.16×10^{-4}
<i>Neutron Generator Facility (NGF)</i>	7.4×10^{-4}	3.22×10^{-1}
<i>Radioactive and Mixed Waste Management Facility (RMWMF)</i>	7.5×10^{-6}	3.24×10^{-3}
<i>Radiographic Integrated Test Stand (RITS)</i>	9.8×10^{-7}	4.5×10^{-7}
<i>Sandia Pulsed Reactor (SPR)</i>	1.3×10^{-3}	2.54×10^{-2}
TOTAL MEI DOSE	0.15	-
50-MILE POPULATION COLLECTIVE DOSE	-	5.0

Sources: DOE 1997e, SNL/NM 1998a
 DP: Defense Programs
 EDE: effective dose equivalent
 MEI: maximally exposed individual
 mrem: millirem

Note: Although the Annular Core Research Reactor is expected to be operated under DP configuration intermittently, for this analysis it was assumed to be operated simultaneously with the medical isotopes production configuration. Its contribution to the total dose is not appreciable.

Table 5.3.7 9. Summary of Dose Estimates from Radioactive Air Emissions to 38 Onsite and Offsite Receptors Under the No Action Alternative

RECEPTOR	ANNUAL RECEPTOR DOSE, EDE (mrem)
ONSITE AND NEAR-SITE RECEPTORS	
<i>Albuquerque International Sunport (Bldg. 1064)</i>	1.8×10^{-2}
<i>Albuquerque International Sunport (Bldg. 760)</i>	3.9×10^{-2}
<i>Building 20706</i>	2.8×10^{-2}
<i>Building 24499</i>	2.0×10^{-2}
<i>Child Development Center-East</i>	1.8×10^{-2}
<i>Child Development Center-West</i>	1.9×10^{-2}
<i>Civil Engineering Research Facility (Bldg. 5701)</i>	1.2×10^{-2}
<i>Coronado Club</i>	2.0×10^{-2}
<i>Coyote Canyon Control Center</i>	1.2×10^{-2}
<i>Golf Course Clubhouse</i>	7.2×10^{-2}

Table 5.3.7 9. Summary of Dose Estimates from Radioactive Air Emissions to 38 Onsite and Offsite Receptors Under the No Action Alternative (concluded)

RECEPTOR	ANNUAL RECEPTOR DOSE, EDE (mrem)
<i>Golf Course Maintenance Area</i>	4.5×10^{-2}
<i>Kirtland Elementary School</i>	1.9×10^{-2}
<i>KAFB Firestation #4 (Bldg. 9002)</i>	1.7×10^{-2}
<i>KAFB Landfill</i>	2.9×10^{-2}
<i>Kirtland Underground Munitions and Maintenance Storage Complex (KUMMSC)</i>	1.5×10^{-1}
<i>Loop Housing</i>	2.1×10^{-2}
<i>Lovelace Hospital</i>	1.4×10^{-2}
<i>Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute</i>	1.2×10^{-2}
<i>Manzano Offices (Fire Station)</i>	3.4×10^{-2}
<i>Maxwell Housing</i>	2.2×10^{-2}
<i>National Atomic Museum</i>	2.5×10^{-2}
<i>Pershing Park Housing</i>	1.7×10^{-2}
<i>Riding Stables</i>	6.3×10^{-2}
<i>Sandia Base Elementary</i>	1.7×10^{-2}
<i>Sandia Federal Credit Union</i>	3.1×10^{-2}
<i>Shandiin Day Care Center</i>	2.2×10^{-2}
<i>Technical Onsite Inspection Facility</i>	3.3×10^{-2}
<i>Veterans Affairs Medical Center</i>	2.7×10^{-2}
<i>Wherry Elementary School</i>	1.8×10^{-2}
<i>Zia Park Housing</i>	2.4×10^{-2}
OFFSITE RECEPTORS	
<i>Albuquerque City Offices</i>	5.1×10^{-2}
<i>East Resident</i>	2.4×10^{-2}
<i>Eubank Gate Area (Bldg. 8895)</i>	4.5×10^{-2}
<i>Four Hills Subdivision</i>	4.1×10^{-2}
<i>Isleta Gaming Palace</i>	2.7×10^{-2}
<i>Northeast Resident</i>	3.0×10^{-2}
<i>Seismic Center (USGS)</i>	2.7×10^{-2}
<i>Tijeras Arroyo (West)</i>	6.3×10^{-2}

Sources: DOE 1997e, SNL/NM 1998a
 EDE: effective dose equivalent
 MEI: maximally exposed individual

mrem: millirem
 USGS: U.S. Geological Survey

KAFB Housing (Zia Housing)
 Kirtland Underground Munitions and Maintenance
 Storage Complex (KUMMSC)
 Lovelace Hospital
 National Atomic Museum
 Riding Stables
 Sandia Base Elementary School
 Shandiin Day Care Center
 Veterans Affairs Medical Center (Hospital)
 Wherry Elementary School

In addition to these 14 core receptor locations, 2 locations of public concern, the Four Hills Subdivision and the Isleta Gaming Palace, were also evaluated for human health. The specific evaluations of chemical air emissions, radiological air emissions, and facility accidents also included additional receptor locations unique to the needs of the resource area, in order to complete their analyses of impacts (see discussions in radiological air, chemical air, and accident analyses).

5.3.8.1 Normal Operations

This section provides information on public health and worker health and safety under the No Action Alternative. It assesses the potential human health impacts associated with releases of radioactive and nonradioactive hazardous material from SNL/NM normal operations. Human health risk analyses identify potential health effects to all possible receptors, such as SNL/NM employees, contractors, visitors, and members of the public within and outside the KAFB boundary. For detailed discussions of analytical methods and results, along with terminology, definitions, and descriptions, see Appendix E.


Radiological and nonradiological hazardous material released by SNL/NM during normal operations reach the environment and potentially reach people in different ways (Figure 5.3.8-1). See specific sections in Chapter 5 on geology and soils, water, and air quality for a description of SNL/NM's impacts to the different environmental media. These sections discuss historic results from environmental sampling programs and predictive modeling of future conditions. They also present quantitative and qualitative assessments of the potential exposure pathways associated with these media. The air pathway is the primary exposure pathway identified in the SWEIS that has the potential to carry materials directly from SNL/NM facilities to the

environment and then to people who are exposed directly by way of inhalation. Secondary air exposure pathways exist from the indirect ingestion of pollutants by way of foods, including crops contaminated by airborne pollutants and livestock products from animals ingesting contaminated crops.

Other pathways investigated include groundwater, surface water, and soils. The potential primary exposure pathway of directly ingesting contaminated water was investigated, but the determination was made that the area of polluted groundwater beneath SNL/NM would not migrate to areas planned or currently in use for the drinking water supply (see Appendix B). People would not be exposed through ingesting surface water because SNL/NM normal operations would not affect surface water resources (see Sections 5.3.4, 5.4.4, and 5.5.4). Affected soils at SNL/NM would be controlled under the ER Project. Potential routine (nonremedial) releases of contaminated soils or dust are controlled on a site-specific basis, thus preventing potential exposures by way of inhalation or ingestion (DOE 1996c).

The different health risks identified for specific receptor locations, individual exposure scenarios, and the potential maximum exposures adequately characterize health risks from SNL/NM normal operations.

Health risk analyses are presented for potential exposures at each specific receptor location and for the maximum potential exposures to radiation and chemical air releases. Figure 5.3.8-2 shows the core- and public concern-receptor locations selected for health risk analyses. The maximum potential exposure to radiation is known to likely occur within KAFB at the KUMMSC, based on analysis of years of data collected to meet NESHAP requirements. Health risk at the KUMMSC receptor location, therefore, represents the maximum potential health risk from radiation and is referred to as the MEI for normal operations. A location where the maximum potential exposure to chemical air releases could occur was not identified because of limited historical chemical air emissions information. Instead, a bounding value for health risk from chemical air emissions was calculated based on a hypothetical worst-case exposure scenario. The hypothetical worst-case exposure scenario assumed simultaneous exposure to the estimated maximum offsite concentration of each chemical. Because these estimated concentrations are expected to occur at different locations, this exposure level would be implausible. The actual potential maximum exposure to chemical air emissions and the associated health risks are identified as less than this upper-bound health risk value.



Source: Original

Figure 5.3.8 1. Primary and Secondary Complete Exposure Pathways Associated with SNL/NM Normal Operations

Radiological and nonradiological hazardous material released by SNL/NM operations have the potential to reach people through different exposure pathways.




Figure 5.3.8 2. Receptor Locations in the SNL/NM Vicinity Assessed for Human Health Impacts
 Specific receptor locations in the SNL/NM vicinity are used to assess human health risk from SNL/NM normal operations.

Maximally Exposed Individual

The maximally exposed individual is referred to as the MEI. This is a hypothetical member of the general public assumed to be located outdoors in a public area where the radiation dose is highest. This individual is assumed to be an adult who is exposed to the entire plume in an unshielded condition. The impacts on the MEI are, therefore, greater than the impacts to any member of the public located onsite or offsite.

A range of health risks was used to evaluate the possibility of adverse health impacts due to SNL/NM normal operations. Health risks depend on a person actually coming in contact with hazardous material released into the environment. Receptor location, estimated time of exposure to the material, and age of the receptor are among the parameters used to establish exposure scenarios. In the case of transport by way of the air pathway, exposure also varies with wind direction and distance from the source. This equates to variability in potential health risks.

Chemical Air Release Pathways

Air releases of hazardous chemicals from laboratories and other chemical operations at SNL/NM are reported in compliance with Superfund Amendments Reauthorization Act (SARA) Title III requirements. Actual monitoring of emissions from each potential building source is not required. Estimates of total pounds emitted of HAPs, TAPs, and VOCs were based on the conservative assumption that the entire purchased amounts of chemicals would be released. For purposes of assessing routine exposures to chemical releases from SNL/NM normal operations, potential emissions were first estimated and then evaluated against screening TEVs that are based on the OELs/100 for noncarcinogens, and a 10^{-8} cancer risk for carcinogens (see Appendix D). Only those chemical sources (buildings and amounts) exceeding the screening TEVs could be expected to result in potential exposures to receptors in the SNL/NM vicinity. Air exposure concentrations were estimated and used to evaluate potential health risk. Concentrations of chemicals having toxicity dose-response information become the basis for calculating the hazard index (HI) and excess lifetime cancer risk (ELCR) values under different exposure scenarios. This chemical assessment process identified seven individual chemicals of concern (COCs) (three

chemicals are common) under the No Action Alternative (see Appendix E, Table E.3 2). These COCs are associated with SNL/NM operations in Buildings 878 (Advanced Manufacturing Processes Laboratory [AMPL]), 893 (Compound Semiconductor Research Laboratory [CSRL]), 897 (Integrated Materials Research Laboratory [IMRL]), 6580 (HCF), and 870 (NGF).

The potential for human contact with airborne chemicals would vary with time and distance from the SNL/NM building source. The health risk and corresponding potential for adverse health effects is a range of values. Several receptor locations, individual exposure scenarios, and a hypothetical worst-case exposure scenario were used to present the range of health risks from airborne chemicals in the SNL/NM vicinity. Adult and child and residential and visitor risk assessments were calculated. The health risk values presented are the total risk to a receptor due to chronic exposure to all COCs.

The calculation of HIs and ELCRs takes into account potentially sensitive subpopulations. To take into account differences among individuals, such as breathing rate or bodyweight within the potentially exposed population, the EPA recommends doing both a reasonable maximum exposed (RME) and an average exposed individual (AEI) risk assessment (EPA 1989). The assessment of the RME uses upper bound (90th percentile) intake parameters to describe the individual. The assessment of the AEI uses central tendency (50th percentile) intake parameters to describe the individual (see Appendix E, Table E.5 1). The risks to the AEI are applicable to the general population, while risks to the RME are applicable to individuals within the population with a greater potential intake under the same exposure scenario.

Potential exposures (exposure point concentrations) to chemical air releases at specific receptor locations in the SNL/NM vicinity were estimated for normal SNL/NM operations and are shown in Appendix E, Table E.3 2. The potential health risks at these specific receptor locations due to the estimated exposure levels are shown in Table 5.3.8 1. These potential health risks would be very low and no adverse health effects would be expected at these risk levels. In addition, the assessment of the hypothetical worst-case exposure scenario bounds (sets an upper value to) the analysis of health risk. The estimated upper bound values for health risk from noncarcinogenic chemical releases under the No Action Alternative are HIs of less than 1, and from carcinogenic chemicals, are ELCR values of less than 10^{-6} (see Appendix E, Table E.6 3).

Table 5.3.8 1. Human Health Impacts in the Vicinity of SNL/NM from Chemical Air Emissions Under the No Action Alternative

RECEPTOR LOCATIONS	RECEPTOR	TOTAL HAZARD INDEX RME/AEI	TOTAL EXCESS LIFETIME CANCER RISK RME/AEI
RESIDENTIAL SCENARIOS			
<i>Four Hills Subdivision^a</i>	Adult	<0.01/<0.01	$3.7 \times 10^{-11} / 2.3 \times 10^{-11}$
	Child	<0.01/<0.01	$1.5 \times 10^{-11} / 1.5 \times 10^{-11}$
<i>Isleta Gaming Palace</i>	Adult	<0.01/<0.01	$1.6 \times 10^{-9} / 1.7 \times 10^{-11}$
	Child	<0.01/<0.01	$1.1 \times 10^{-9} / 1.3 \times 10^{-11}$
<i>KAFB Housing (Zia Park Housing)</i>	Adult	<0.01/<0.01	$6.7 \times 10^{-10} / 7.0 \times 10^{-12}$
	Child	<0.01/<0.01	$4.7 \times 10^{-10} / 5.3 \times 10^{-12}$
VISITOR SCENARIOS			
<i>Child Development Center-East</i>	Child	<0.01/<0.01	$6.1 \times 10^{-10} / 6.9 \times 10^{-12}$
<i>Child Development Center-West</i>	Child	<0.01/<0.01	$1.2 \times 10^{-10} / 1.4 \times 10^{-12}$
<i>Coronado Club</i>	Adult	<0.01/<0.01	$1.1 \times 10^{-9} / 1.1 \times 10^{-11}$
	Child	<0.01/<0.01	$7.4 \times 10^{-10} / 8.4 \times 10^{-12}$
<i>Golf Course (Clubhouse)</i>	Adult	<0.01/<0.01	$3.8 \times 10^{-10} / 3.9 \times 10^{-12}$
<i>Kirtland Elementary School</i>	Child	<0.01/<0.01	$1.0 \times 10^{-10} / 1.1 \times 10^{-12}$
<i>Kirtland Underground Munitions & Maintenance Storage Complex (KUMMSC)^b</i>	Adult	<0.01/<0.01	$3.8 \times 10^{-10} / 4.0 \times 10^{-12}$
	Child	<0.01/<0.01	$3.0 \times 10^{-10} / 3.1 \times 10^{-12}$
<i>Lovelace Hospital</i>	Adult	<0.01/<0.01	$2.1 \times 10^{-10} / 2.3 \times 10^{-12}$
	Child	<0.01/<0.01	$2.1 \times 10^{-10} / 2.3 \times 10^{-12}$
<i>National Atomic Museum</i>	Adult	<0.01/<0.01	$1.8 \times 10^{-9} / 1.9 \times 10^{-11}$
	Child	<0.01/<0.01	$1.3 \times 10^{-9} / 1.4 \times 10^{-11}$
<i>Riding Stables</i>	Adult	<0.01/<0.01	$3.0 \times 10^{-10} / 3.0 \times 10^{-12}$
<i>Sandia Base Elementary School</i>	Child	<0.01/<0.01	$8.2 \times 10^{-10} / 9.3 \times 10^{-12}$
<i>Shandiin Day Care Center</i>	Child	<0.01/<0.01	$6.9 \times 10^{-10} / 7.8 \times 10^{-12}$
<i>Veterans Affairs Medical Center</i>	Adult	<0.01/<0.01	$2.9 \times 10^{-10} / 3.0 \times 10^{-12}$
<i>Wherry Elementary School</i>	Child	<0.01/<0.01	$4.6 \times 10^{-10} / 5.2 \times 10^{-12}$

Source: SmartRISK 1996

RME: reasonable maximum exposed

AEI: average exposed individual

^a Four Hills Subdivision receptor location impacts are based on Lurance Canyon Burn Site open burning air emissions, not SNL/NM building air emissions.^b This receptor location was analyzed using a worker scenario, as discussed in Appendix E.5.

Notes: Calculations were completed using SmartRISK. See the beginning of Section 5.3.8 for a discussion of selection of receptor locations.

Measures of Nonradiological Health Risks

Chemicals of concern are categorized by health effect. Exposure to some chemicals can cause cancer, while others have a noncarcinogenic health effect, such as damage to a specific organ of the body (target organ). Other chemicals have the potential to induce both carcinogenic and noncarcinogenic health effects.

The risk of a noncarcinogenic health effect occurring is expressed as a Hazard Index (HI). Hazard quotients are derived for different chemicals from the ratio of the estimated exposure level to the reference exposure level expected not to cause a health effect, and then summed to get a Total HI. The hazard quotient assumes that there is a level of exposure (reference exposure) below which it is unlikely for even sensitive populations to experience adverse health effects. If the Total HI is less than 1, health effects are not expected. If an HI exceeds 1, there may be concern for potential health effects; however, it should not be interpreted as a probability for actually occurring. The level of concern does not increase linearly with HIs above 1 (EPA 1989).

Excess Lifetime Cancer Risk (ELCR) is the increased chance of getting cancer in addition to all other causes or susceptibilities in a person's life. For example, if exposures to air emissions of a specific chemical equate to a ELCR of 10^{-7} , a person has an additional 1-in-10 million lifetime chance of getting cancer from that exposure. ELCR is the product of the estimated exposure level and the chemical-specific cancer slope factor that represents the health effect per unit intake over a lifetime. ELCR values for different chemicals are summed to obtain the Total ELCR.

Under the Superfund Program, the EPA has established a 10^{-6} ELCR (1 in 1 million persons) as the point of departure for establishing remediation goals. It expresses EPA's preference for setting clean-up levels at the more protective end of the risk range (10^{-4} to 10^{-6}). Setting an acceptable risk level becomes a site-specific decision based on long-term use of the site (40 CFR Part 300). The background 1997 estimated fatal cancer rate in New Mexico is 146 per 100,000 persons (ACS 1997).

Radiation Air Release Pathways

Air releases of radionuclides from SNL/NM operations would result in low radiation exposures to people in the SNL/NM vicinity. Table 5.3.7 8 identifies the radiation dose to the potential MEI and the collective radiation dose to the population within the ROI, associated with these releases. The risk estimator of 500 fatal cancers per 1 M person-rem to the public converts radiation dose to latent fatal cancer risk. The potential maximum annual exposure to radiation from SNL/NM radiological facilities of 0.15 mrem would occur within the site boundary at the KUMMSC and increase the MEI lifetime risk of fatal cancer by 7.5×10^{-8} (see Table 5.3.8 2). In other words, the likelihood of the MEI developing fatal cancer from a 1-year dose from SNL/NM operations is less than 1 chance in 10 M. The annual collective dose of 5.0 person-rem to the population increases the number of fatal cancers in the entire population within the ROI by 2.5×10^{-3} . Therefore, no LCFs would be likely to occur in the ROI population due to SNL/NM radiological air releases.

Other receptors in the SNL/NM vicinity would receive lower exposures to radiation than the MEI, based on wind direction and distance from the facility sources. Radiation doses at specific receptor locations, including schools, hospitals, and day care centers in the SNL/NM vicinity are identified in Table 5.3.7 9. The range in potential human health effects associated with the radiation doses at several of these locations are shown in Table 5.3.8 2. The increase in lifetime cancer risk at many of the specific receptor locations from a 1-year dose from SNL/NM operations is lower than the increase in lifetime cancer risk to the MEI receptor located at the KUMMSC.

Receptors in the SNL/NM vicinity could also be exposed to air releases of radionuclides by way of the indirect pathway of ingesting food that contains radionuclides. *CAP88-PC* integrates doses from this pathway in the collective dose estimation for the population within the ROI, but does not integrate it into the exposure dose estimated for the potential onsite MEI receptor. Ingesting potentially contaminated foods accounts for approximately 11 percent (0.55 person-rem of the 5.0 person-rem collective population dose) of the population dose, which means it also accounts for approximately 11 percent of the health risk value. When the same percent contribution is assumed, this pathway potentially increases the lifetime risk of fatal cancer to the MEI by 11 percent (8.3×10^{-9}), less than 1 chance in 10 M.

Table 5.3.8 2. Human Health Impacts in the SNL/NM Vicinity from Radiological Air Emissions Under the No Action Alternative

RECEPTOR LOCATIONS	LIFETIME RISK OF FATAL CANCER FROM A 1-YEAR DOSE
<i>Child Development Center-East</i>	9.0×10^{-9}
<i>Child Development Center-West</i>	9.5×10^{-9}
<i>Coronado Club</i>	1.0×10^{-8}
<i>Four Hills Subdivision</i>	2.1×10^{-8}
<i>Golf Course (Clubhouse)</i>	3.6×10^{-8}
<i>Kirtland Elementary School</i>	9.5×10^{-9}
<i>KAFB Housing (Zia Park Housing)</i>	1.1×10^{-8}
<i>Kirtland Underground Munitions & Maintenance Storage Complex^a (KUMMSC)</i>	7.5×10^{-8}
<i>Lovelace Hospital</i>	7.0×10^{-9}
<i>National Atomic Museum</i>	1.3×10^{-8}
<i>Riding Stables</i>	3.2×10^{-8}
<i>Sandia Base Elementary School</i>	8.5×10^{-9}
<i>Shandiin Day Care Center</i>	1.1×10^{-8}
<i>Isleta Gaming Palace</i>	1.4×10^{-8}
<i>Veterans Affairs Medical Center</i>	1.4×10^{-8}
<i>Wherry Elementary School</i>	9.0×10^{-9}

Sources: DOE 1997e, SNL/NM 1998a

MEI: maximally exposed individual

^a The radiological MEI receptor location for normal operations

Note: Calculations were completed using CAP88-PC.

Measures of Radiological Health Risks

The National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements has adopted numerical values, known as risk estimators, that associate radiation dose to increased risk of developing fatal cancer. These values were recommended by the International Council on Radiation Protection and Measurement (ICRP 1991).

The risk estimator of 500 excess fatal cancers per 10^6 (million) person-rem, used to assess health effects to the public, takes into account children, the elderly, and other potentially sensitive receptors. The risk estimator of 400 excess fatal cancers per 10^6 (million) person-rem, used for workers, is a lower number, assuming that the worker population is a healthy adult population.

A 1 M person-rem exposure dose is equivalent to 1 million people exposed to 1 rem each. That is, 0.0005 fatal cancers per person-rem and 0.0004 fatal cancers per person-rem are multiplied by the dose to obtain the number of fatal cancers from the exposure to radiation.

For an individual, excess cancer risk is the increase in the person's chance (probability) of getting fatal cancer in a lifetime. For the population, the risk of an excess latent cancer fatality (LCF) is the additional increase in the total number of cancer fatalities in the entire ROI population from the collective population radiation dose. For all practical purposes, an LCF of less than 1 means that no additional cancer fatalities are expected.

Nonfatal Cancers and Genetic Disorders

Radiation exposures can cause nonfatal cancers and genetic disorders. The NCRP has adopted risk estimators developed by the ICRP for the public for assessing these health effects from radiation (ICRP 1991). The public dose-to-risk conversion factors recommended for nonfatal cancer and genetic disorders are 100 and 130 health effects per 1 M person-rem, respectively. The SNL/NM maximum annual dose would increase the lifetime risk of nonfatal cancers and genetic disorders to the MEI by 1.5×10^{-8} and 2.0×10^{-8} , respectively, which would be less than 1 chance in 50 M. The SNL/NM annual collective dose to the ROI population would increase the number of nonfatal

cancers and genetic disorders by 5.0×10^{-4} and 6.5×10^{-4} , respectively, which is interpreted that no additional nonfatal cancers or genetic disorders would be likely to occur within the ROI due to radiological air releases from SNL/NM normal operations.

Transportation

The potential human health risks and accident fatalities associated with transporting various radiological materials for SNL/NM operations are discussed in Section 5.3.9. The ratio of the total travel distance to the distance traveled within the ROI determines the estimated dose to the population along the travel route within the ROI. The distance traveled within the 50-mile ROI is conservatively estimated as 10 percent of the total distance traveled. Therefore, 10 percent of the total radiological dose (off-link and on-link) calculated for all radiological materials transported is considered as an additional human health impact to the population along the transport route within the ROI (see Appendix G). Ten percent of the annual collective population dose from transportation activities would increase the number of LCFs by 8.3×10^{-4} , thus increasing the total number of fatal cancers in the ROI to 3.3×10^{-3} . Therefore, it is likely that no additional LCFs would occur in the ROI population due to SNL/NM radiological material transportation activities, even when impacts are summed with impacts due to SNL/NM radiological air releases.

Composite Cancer Risk

The increase in lifetime cancer risk due to SNL/NM operations is associated with both the small amounts of radionuclides and small amounts of carcinogenic chemicals emitted into the air. Composite cancer risk due to both radiation and chemical exposures at the same location was assessed. To assess a composite cancer risk capturing the greatest potential cancer risk from exposure to radiation, the sum of the radiological MEI cancer risk and the chemical cancer risk at the same location (KUMMSC) was calculated. Cancer risk from the annual dose to the MEI, accumulated over a 30-year exposure duration, would be 2.3×10^{-6} , or less than

Historic Cancer Rate

For the U.S., the 1997 cancer mortality rate was 173 deaths per 100,000 persons. For the state of New Mexico, the rate was 146 deaths per 100,000 persons.

1 chance in 434,000. Thirty years is consistent with the exposure used in calculating the chemical cancer risk at the KUMMSC; the contribution to cancer risk from exposure to chemicals would be so small that when the chemical cancer risk is added to the MEI fatal cancer risk, the value would not increase (the increased lifetime cancer risk remains 2.3×10^{-6}). Therefore, the radiation exposure would be the majority of the risk (see Table E.6-3).

To assess a composite cancer risk capturing the highest potential cancer risk from chemicals, the upper bound value for cancer risk from chemicals, which assumes a hypothetical worst-case exposure scenario, and the radiological MEI (KUMMSC) cancer risk were summed. This is an impossible scenario because these exposures would not occur at the same location. However, it is a conservative assessment capturing the upper bound/chemical risk (See Table E.6-3). The upper bound composite increased lifetime cancer risk would be 2.4×10^{-6} , or less than 1 in 416,000. This would be within the EPA's established cancer risk range for the protection of human health of 10^{-6} to 10^{-4} (40 CFR Part 300). SNL/NM's potential contribution (from low exposures to chemicals and radiation) to an individual's lifetime cancer risk is very low, considering that overall in the U.S., men have a 1-in-2 lifetime risk of developing cancer, and for women the risk is 1-in-3. Approximately 1 out of every 4 deaths in the U.S. is from cancer (ACS 1997).

Worker Health and Safety

Operations at SNL/NM have to comply with DOE Orders, Federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) requirements, and occupational radiation protection requirements (10 CFR Part 835) for worker health and safety. These requirements regulate the work environment and minimize the likelihood of work-related chemical and radiation exposures, illnesses, and injuries. Periodic accidents, injuries, and illnesses do occur in the workforce. Most of the risks to worker health and safety are from common industrial accidents such as falls, slips, trips, contact with objects that result in sprains, cuts, abrasions, fractures, and other injuries to the body. Exposures to hazardous substances (chemical and radiological) are minimized or prevented through monitoring and using personal protective equipment. Overall, the SNL/NM injury and illness rates are much lower than those for private industry (national or local) and similar to those for the DOE as a whole (see Section 4.10).

Based on a 5-percent increase in the worker population under the No Action Alternative (Section 5.3.12) and the assumption that the SNL/NM nonfatal injury and illness rate per 100 workers would remain consistent with the 5-year average derived for 1992 through 1996, the total number of impacts to workers would increase slightly. Impacts for the entire SNL/NM workforce are projected to be zero fatalities per year, an average of 47 mrem/yr radiation dose (total effective dose equivalent [TEDE]) to the radiation-badged worker (based on the base year of 1996), approximately 311 nonfatal injuries and illnesses per year, and 1 or 2 confirmed chemical exposures annually.

Routine air emissions evaluated for potential exposures to specific receptors in the SNL/NM vicinity have the potential to impact noninvolved workers at SNL/NM. A noninvolved worker is an SNL/NM worker not associated with the operations of the facility and, therefore, not exposed during chemical or radiological work-related activities. Potential noninvolved worker exposures to airborne radiation are identified using the KUMMSC receptor location (Table 5.3.8-2). Potential noninvolved worker exposures to airborne chemicals are identified using a receptor location at the center of TA-I near the SNL/NM chemical facility sources. Based on an exposure scenario for a worker, health risks from chemicals to the noninvolved worker would be below a HI of 1 and less than 10^{-6} for an ELCR (see Appendix E, Table E.6-3).

Noninvolved Worker

A noninvolved worker is a SNL/NM worker not associated with the operations of the facility. For accidents, this worker is conservatively assumed to be located at 100 m from the accident for the entire duration of the accident in an unshielded condition. For routine operations, this worker is located nearest the source of emission.

The risk of cancer fatality from the annual average individual worker dose, annual maximum worker dose, and annual workforce collective dose for radiation workers (those working in radiation-designated areas) is shown in Table 5.3.8-3. Health risks from the annual average individual and annual maximum worker doses would be expected to remain constant for all three alternatives (based on the Radioactive Exposure

Table 5.3.8 3. Radiation Doses (TEDE)^a and Health Impacts to Workers from SNL/NM Operations Under the No Action Alternative

RADIATION WORKER DOSE RATES	RADIATION DOSE	RISK OF CANCER FATALITY FROM A 1-YEAR DOSE
<i>Annual Average Individual Worker Dose</i>	47 ^b (mrem/year)	1.9x10 ⁻⁵
<i>Annual Maximum Worker Dose</i>	845 ^b (mrem/year)	3.4x10 ⁻⁴
RADIATION WORKER DOSE RATES	RADIATION DOSE	NUMBER OF LATENT CANCER FATALITIES
<i>Annual Workforce Collective Dose</i>	17 (person-rem/year)	6.8x10 ⁻³

Source: SNL/NM 1997k

mrem: millirem

TEDE: total effective dose equivalent

^a Average measured TEDE means the collective TEDE divided by the number of individuals with a measured dose greater than 10 mrem.

^b Annual average individual and annual maximum worker doses are expected to remain consistent with the baseline year 1996 (see Section 4.10).

Note: Because not all badged workers are radiation workers, radiation workers refers to those badges with greater than 10 mrem above background measurements used in the calculations.

Monitoring System [REMS] database dose information for 1996) (see Appendix E, Section E.6.1.1). The annual workforce collective dose was estimated for the radiation worker population calculated under the No Action Alternative, based on the ICRP risk estimator of 400 fatal cancers per 1 M person-rem among workers, and was associated with 6.8x10⁻³ additional fatal cancers in the entire radiation worker population. For assessment purposes, this equates to no additional LCFs in the radiation worker population under the No Action Alternative.

Nonfatal Cancers and Genetic Disorders

The worker dose-to-risk conversion factor used to assess potential nonfatal cancers and genetic disorders is 80 health effects per 1 M person-rem. The SNL/NM annual workforce collective dose to the radiation worker population increases the number of nonfatal cancers and genetic disorders by 1.4x10⁻³ each. In other words, no additional nonfatal cancers or genetic disorders would be likely to occur in the radiation worker population under the No Action Alternative.

Nonionizing Radiation

Sources of nonionizing radiant energy at SNL/NM include both laser and accelerator facilities. The laser light source can damage the unprotected eye and may also damage equipment. The SAs for the SNL/NM laser facilities report that these facilities operate in accordance with American National Standards Institute (ANSI) guidelines that require that light paths be isolated from workers and from other equipment (SNL/NM 1996b). Accelerators generate electromagnetic pulse (EMP) that could present a high-voltage hazard to personnel. ANSI guidelines require mitigation measures such as shielding to block high voltage hazards from personnel and, during tests shots, exclude personnel from high-bay areas. However, based on the measurements from pulsed-power facilities, the EMP exposures to personnel outside the high-bay would be less than the AC61 standard of 100 kV/m (SNL/NM 1996b). Therefore, routine high voltage impacts to SNL/NM workers and the public would not occur.

5.3.8.2 Accidents

This section describes the potential impacts to workers and the public from accidents involving the release of radioactive and/or chemical materials, explosions, and other hazards under the No Action Alternative. The methods used to estimate the accident impacts are described in Section 5.2.9. Additional details on the accident analyses and impacts are presented in Appendix F. Mitigation measures, engineered safety features, administrative controls, and the emergency planning and preparedness programs designed to prevent and/or minimize the impacts of accidents are described in Section 5.6.

Site-Wide Earthquake

An earthquake in the Albuquerque, New Mexico, area has the potential for human injury and building damage throughout the local region. Due to differences in structural design, SNL/NM buildings and structures vary in their capabilities to withstand earthquake forces. Any magnitude earthquake has the potential to cause injury to workers in and around buildings and damage to structures from the physical forces and effects of the earthquake. Additional injury to workers and the public would be possible from explosions and from exposure to chemical and radioactive materials that could be released from buildings and storage containers. Facilities in TA-I are the predominant source of chemical materials that could be released during an earthquake. Facilities in

The Richter Scale

The Richter Scale measures the strength of an earthquake. Only people very sensitive to motion changes can detect an earthquake that measures 3.5 or less on this scale. The worst earthquake ever recorded was 8.9 on the Richter Scale. A 0.2-gravity earthquake would measure in the range of 6.2 to 6.9 on the Richter Scale. The largest earthquake in New Mexico occurred in the Socorro area on November 15, 1906 and had a magnitude equivalent to about 6.0 on the Richter scale; it was felt throughout most of New Mexico and in parts of Arizona and Texas.

TA-V are the predominant source of radioactive materials that could be released. The ECF in TA-II is the predominant source of explosive materials. Lesser quantities of radioactive materials in TAs-I and -II could also be released and cause exposures to workers and the public.

In the event of an earthquake (Uniform Building Code [UBC], 0.17 gravity [g]), various buildings in TA-I could be affected and various chemicals could be released (see Appendix F, Table F.7-7); larger magnitude earthquakes could cause more serious impacts. The shape and direction of released chemical plumes would depend upon local meteorological conditions and physical structures. All potential plumes and concentration levels exceeding the ERPG-2 are shown as shaded areas in Figure 5.3.8-3. Some of the potentially affected area extends offsite. Within the shaded area, to a distance of 3,800 ft, there could be as many as 5,300 persons at risk of exposure depending on the time of day and plume shape and direction. However, in the event of a chemical release, the plumes would cause exposures in excess of ERPG-2 to only a portion of the 5,300 persons at risk.

Emergency Response Planning Guideline Level 2

The ERPG-2 is the maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing or developing irreversible or other serious health effects or symptoms that could impair their abilities to take protective action.




Mitigation features designed to limit chemical release from storage containers, rooms, and buildings would limit or reduce plume size, concentration levels, and exposures. Emergency procedures, sheltering, and evacuations would also minimize exposures to workers and the public.

Nuclear facilities in TAs-I, -II, and -V could also be damaged during an earthquake. The frequency of an earthquake (0.17 g) that could cause the release of radioactive materials from TAs -I and -II facilities is 1.0×10^{-3} per year, or 1 chance in 1,000 per year. The frequency of a more severe earthquake (0.22 g) that could also cause the release of radioactive materials from TAs -I (NG-1), -II (ECF-1), and -V facilities is 7.0×10^{-4} per year or 1 chance in 1,500 per year. The consequences of a 0.22- g earthquake are shown in Table 5.3.8-4; descriptions of the listed accidents are given later in this section and in Appendix F.2. If a 0.22- g earthquake was to occur, there would be less than one tenth of an additional LCF in the total population within 50 mi of the site. The largest impact to the MEI and largest impact to the noninvolved worker would be an increased probability of LCF of 6.9×10^{-6} and 3.0×10^{-2} , respectively, associated with the HC-1 accident scenario. The risks for these receptors can be estimated by multiplying these consequence values by the probability (frequency) of earthquake. If a stronger earthquake was to occur, larger releases of radioactive materials would be possible and could cause greater impacts.

A severe earthquake could also cause damage to other SNL/NM facilities and result in environmental impacts. For example, the large quantities of oil stored in external tanks and in accelerator buildings in TA-IV could potentially be spilled and cause impacts to the ecosystem and water resources. Underground natural gas lines could break and ignite, causing brush and forest fires that could further damage facilities and injure persons in the vicinity. Hydrogen storage tanks in TA-I could be damaged, causing hydrogen combustion or explosion and potential injury to persons in the vicinity. Explosives in the ECF in TA-II and smaller quantities in other facilities could also be accidentally detonated during an earthquake with injury to persons in the vicinity. Occupants of all facilities would be at risk of injury as a result of the earthquake forces and building damage.

Facility Hazards

Some of the facilities at SNL/NM contain occupational hazards with the potential to endanger the health and safety of involved workers in the vicinity of an accident.



qSource: Original
 Note: See Appendix F.7, Figure F7 1

Figure 5.3.8 3. Areas Above ERPG-2 Levels from a Site-Wide Earthquake Under the No Action Alternative

The encircled areas represent locations where approximately 5,300 people are at risk of exposure to chemical concentrations above ERPG-2.

Table 5.3.8 4 Site-Wide Earthquake Radiological Impacts Under the No Action Alternative

ACCIDENT ID ^a	FREQUENCY (per year)	ADDITIONAL LATENT CANCER FATALITIES WITHIN 50-MILES POPULATION	INCREASED PROBABILITY OF LATENT CANCER FATALITY	
			MAXIMALLY EXPOSED INDIVIDUAL ^b	NONINVOLVED WORKER ^c
TECHNICAL AREA -I				
NG-1	7.0x10 ⁻⁴	5.1x10 ⁻⁵	1.4x10 ⁻⁹	3.2x10 ⁻⁶
TECHNICAL AREA -II				
ECF-1	7.0x10 ⁻⁴	3.0x10 ⁻⁶	1.5x10 ⁻¹⁰	1.9x10 ⁻⁷
TECHNICAL AREA -V				
AM-2	7.0x10 ⁻⁴	2.0x10 ⁻³	2.4x10 ⁻⁷	7.4x10 ⁻⁵
HC-1	7.0x10 ⁻⁴	6.4x10 ⁻²	6.9x10 ⁻⁶	3.0x10 ⁻²
SP-1	7.0x10 ⁻⁴	9.2x10 ⁻³	5.8x10 ⁻⁷	2.7x10 ⁻⁴
AR-5	7.0x10 ⁻⁴	5.9x10 ⁻³	8.4x10 ⁻⁷	2.2x10 ⁻⁴

Source: Original (See also Appendix F, Tables F.7-4 and F.7-5)

^a Facility Accident Descriptors:

- Neutron Generator Facility: NG-1
- Explosive Component Facility: ECF-1
- Annular Core Research Reactor-Medical Isotope Production: AM-2
- Annular Core Research Reactor-Defense Programs: AR-5
- Hot Cell Facility: HC-1
- Sandia Pulsed Reactor: SP-1

^b The maximally exposed individual is located at the Golf Course and the consequences can be added.

^c Because the noninvolved worker is located 100 meters from the release point, the location varies relative to each technical area. Therefore, the consequences to the noninvolved worker can only be added for a given technical area.

Note: In the No Action Alternative, the Annular Core Research Reactor can be operated in either the medical isotopes production or Defense Programs configuration. The highest consequence (AR-5) was used.

Some of these facilities also contain hazardous materials that, in the event of an accident, could endanger the health and safety of people outside the immediate vicinity of an accident and beyond. These people include noninvolved SNL/NM workers, members of the military assigned to KAFB, and members of the public located within the KAFB boundary and offsite. Offsite consequences are determined to a 50-mile radius around the affected facility.

Explosion, radiological, and chemical accidents with the largest impacts to workers and the public have been analyzed, as discussed in the following sections. Potential accidents associated with other facility hazards such as lasers, electricity, x-rays, transformer oil, noise, explosive test debris, pyrotechnics, and compressed gases could affect the health and safety of the involved workers. However, the impacts to noninvolved workers and the public for these other accidents would be lower than the impacts from explosion, radiological, and chemical accidents described in the SWEIS (see Appendix F, Table F6 3).

The DOE recognizes the potential adverse effects for workers, the public, and the environment that could

result from the deterioration of SNL/NM equipment, structures, and facilities. However, the analysis of potential accidents discussed in this section assumes that deterioration of equipment, structures, and facilities would not affect the occurrence, progression, and effects of accidents. The basis for this assumption is that the DOE safety analysis process, specified in DOE Orders and standards, would require periodic assessments of facility safety to ensure that operations are being performed within an approved safety envelope. The process would also require an assessment of all unresolved safety questions that would result from any change in a facility or operation that could affect the operations authorization basis. Depending on the results of the assessment, modifications to the facility and/or operational procedures would be implemented to maintain operations within the authorization basis.

Explosion Accidents

Explosive materials are stored, handled, transported, and used at some SNL/NM facilities. Administrative controls and facility design would help prevent an explosion accident and limit the impacts to personnel, if an accident was to occur. The ECF, for example, contains

large quantities of explosives for use in its testing programs. Hydrogen trailers are another large source of explosive material. There are five hydrogen trailers parked near facilities or routinely transported to facilities from remote locations.

The largest quantity of hydrogen with the highest potential for consequences to both SNL/NM workers and facilities is a set of horizontally mounted cylinders, with a storage capacity of approximately 90,000 standard cubic feet (SCF), located approximately east of the CSRL, Building 893, in TA-I. An explosion at the hydrogen cylinder location near the CSRL was selected for detailed analysis to estimate the bounding impacts of an explosion accident. If a hydrogen explosion was to occur in this relatively populated area of TA-I, individuals in the area could be injured and nearby property could be damaged. Involved workers within 61 ft of an explosion could be seriously injured and would have a 50 percent chance of survival. Involved workers out to a distance of 126 ft from the explosion could receive damage to their eardrums and lungs. The resulting overpressure from this explosion and impacts to personnel and property would diminish with distance, as shown in Table 5.3.8 5.

The actual number of persons in the vicinity of an accident depends upon many factors, making the actual number of potential fatalities uncertain. Factors include the time of day (morning, lunchtime, after hours), location of the people (or the amount of relative

shielding), and spread of the pressure waves within a complex arrangement of buildings, alleys, and walkways.

This bounding facility explosion was postulated to occur from an accidental uncontrolled release of hydrogen, stored in a tank outside the CSRL building, caused by human errors (such as mishandling activities) or equipment failures (such as a pipe joint failure), and the presence of an ignition source (such as a spark) near the location of release. For an uncontrolled release of hydrogen to explode, multiple failures would have to occur; therefore, this accident scenario would be extremely unlikely (that is, between 1×10^{-6} and 1×10^{-4} per year).

The human organs most vulnerable to shock explosions are the ears and lungs because they contain air or other gases. The damage would be done at the gas-tissue interface, where flaking and tearing could occur. Both the ear and the lung responses would be dependent not only on the overpressure, but also on impulse and body orientation; the shorter the pulse width, the higher the pressure the body could tolerate. An overpressure of approximately 50 psi would result in a 50 percent fatality rate; approximately 10 psi would result in eardrum rupture. These overpressure estimates are based on a square pressure wave with a pulse duration greater than 10 msec, and their effects could vary depending on body orientation to the pressure wave.

Structural damage produced by air blasts would depend on the type of structural material. An overpressure of

Table 5.3.8 5. Impacts of an Explosion Accident Under the No Action Alternative

DISTANCE TO RECEPTOR OR PROPERTY (ft)	PEAK REFLECTIVE PRESSURE (psi) (472 lbm TNT EQUIVALENT)	COMMENTS
25	650	Peak pressure.
61	50	For involved workers, there would be a 50% survival rate for pressures in excess of 50 psi.
126	10	For involved workers, there would be a 50% rate of ear rupture for pressures in excess of 10 psi. Total destruction of buildings could be expected for pressures in excess of 10 psi.
370	2.0	Pressures in excess of 2 to 3 psi would cause concrete or cinder block walls to shatter.
657	1.0	Pressures in excess of 1 psi would cause a house to be demolished.

Source: DOE 1992b [See also Appendix F, Table F4 1]
ft: feet

lbm TNT equivalent: weight in pounds of equivalent mass of trinitrotoluene
psi: pounds per square inch

1 psi would cause partial demolition of houses (rendering them uninhabitable); an overpressure of 2 to 3 psi would shatter unreinforced concrete or cinder block walls; and an overpressure in excess of 10 psi would cause total destruction of buildings.

Radiological Accidents

The largest quantities of radioactive materials at risk for radiological accidents are located in TA-V. The Manzano Waste Storage Facilities, and TAs-I, -II, and -IV also contain radioactive material, but in smaller amounts. The nuclear facilities in TA-V include the ACRR, SPR, HCF, and Gamma Irradiation Facility (GIF). The New Gamma Irradiation Facility (NGIF) is under construction in TA-V. Accident scenarios for the ACRR facility were considered and analyzed for both the medical isotopes production and DP testing configurations. The HCF has been reconfigured for medical isotopes production, and the accidents analyzed reflect this mode of operation. Accidents have also been analyzed for storage of radioactive materials in the HCF not associated with medical isotopes production.

The most serious radiological accident impacts associated with facilities under the No Action Alternative are shown in Table 5.3.8 6. The table lists a set of accidents and their consequences in terms of an increased probability of an LCF for exposed individuals and increased number of LCFs for the offsite population. Other radiological accidents could also occur at these facilities, but their impacts would be within the envelope of the selected set of accidents.

The accident scenarios shown in Table 5.3.8 6 are briefly described below and in more detail in Appendix F.2.

The following descriptions correspond to accidents presented in Tables 5.3.8 4 and 5.3.8 6.

ACRR-Medical Isotopes Production

AM-1 Airplane Crash, Collapse of Bridge Crane For the ACRR facility, release from an airplane crash would be due to the bridge crane falling into the reactor pool, impacting the reactor superstructure, and resulting in the rupture of four fuel elements in the reactor core.

AM-2 Earthquake (0.22 g) and Collapse of Bridge Crane The postulated site-wide earthquake would cause the crane to fall onto the reactor superstructure with resultant rupture of four fuel elements. The releases for this scenario were assumed to be the same as those for the airplane crash scenario (scenario AM-1).

AM-3 Fuel Element Rupture This scenario would be initiated by a pinhole leak in the cladding of a fuel element through which water would be drawn by heat-up/cool-down cycles. Steam generation during a pulse might build up internal pressure and rupture the cladding. The fission products from one fuel element were assumed to be released into the reactor pool.

AM-4 Rupture of One Molybdenum-99 Target It was postulated that one target would rupture in the core after a 21-kW, 7-day irradiation. This accident was postulated to bound accidents involving targets that might take place during irradiation. The consequences were based on the rupture of one irradiated target in the target grid assembly in the reactor core.

AM-5 Fuel Handling Accident, One Irradiated Fuel Element Rupture The accident was postulated to occur outside of the reactor pool, so there would be no pool mitigation. While being transferred from the ACRR pool to the GIF pool, an irradiated fuel element is dropped, impacts a hard surface, and ruptures.

AM-6 Airplane Crash and Fire in Reactor Room with Unirradiated Fuel and Targets Present The scenario postulates an airplane crash into the reactor building while the reactor is shut down in preparation for refueling. New fuel elements would be present in the reactor room awaiting insertion into the core. In addition, fresh targets would also be present, awaiting insertion after refueling. The airplane would penetrate the building and cause a large fire in the reactor room.

AM-7 Target Rupture During Transfer from ACRR to HCF A target rupture would occur in transit between the ACRR and the HCF as a result of an unspecified incident involving transport equipment or operation.

HCF

HM-1 Operator Error During Molybdenum-99 Target Processing An operator inadvertently opens the wrong valve or opens the correct valves at the wrong time. Mechanical failures of valves or transfer lines could occur, releasing the waste gases from the decay tank (cold trap).

HM-2 Operator Error During Iodine-125 Target Processing This scenario is similar to HM-1, but would occur while iodine-125 targets, rather than molybdenum-99 targets, are being processed. This scenario was postulated to occur 72 hours after

Table 5.3.8 6. Potential Impacts of Radiological Facility Accidents Under the No Action Alternative

FACILITY/MODE	ACCIDENT ID	ACCIDENT SCENARIO DESCRIPTION	ACCIDENT FREQUENCY (per year)	ADDITIONAL LATENT CANCER FATALITIES TO THE 50-MILE POPULATION	INCREASED PROBABILITY OF LATENT CANCER FATALITY	
					MAXIMALLY EXPOSED INDIVIDUAL	NONINVOLVED WORKER
<i>Annular Core Research Reactor medical isotopes production configuration</i>	<i>AM-1</i>	Airplane crash - collapse of bridge crane	6.30×10^{-6}	2.0×10^{-3}	2.4×10^{-7}	7.4×10^{-5}
	<i>AM-3</i>	Rupture of waterlogged fuel element	1.0×10^{-2} to 1.0×10^{-4}	4.9×10^{-4}	5.4×10^{-8}	3.8×10^{-6}
	<i>AM-4</i>	Rupture of one molybdenum-99 target	1.0×10^{-4} to 1.0×10^{-6}	3.9×10^{-4}	4.3×10^{-8}	3.0×10^{-6}
	<i>AM-5</i>	Fuel handling accident - irradiated element	1.0×10^{-4} to 1.0×10^{-6}	4.9×10^{-3}	6.1×10^{-7}	7.6×10^{-5}
	<i>AM-6</i>	Airplane crash and fire in reactor room with unirradiated fuel and targets present	6.3×10^{-6}	1.6×10^{-6}	1.0×10^{-10}	4.9×10^{-8}
	<i>AM-7</i>	Target rupture during Annular Core Research Reactor to Hot Cell Facility transfer	$< 1.0 \times 10^{-6}$	3.9×10^{-4}	4.9×10^{-8}	1.4×10^{-5}
	<i>Hot Cell Facility medical isotopes production</i>	<i>HM-1</i>	Operator error - molybdenum-99 target processing	1.0×10^{-1} to 1.0×10^{-2}	3.8×10^{-5}	3.3×10^{-9}
<i>HM-2</i>		Operator error - iodine-125 target processing	1.0×10^{-1} to 1.0×10^{-2}	1.6×10^{-6}	1.0×10^{-10}	4.2×10^{-9}
<i>HM-4</i>		Fire in glovebox	1.0×10^{-2} to 1.0×10^{-4}	2.6×10^{-3}	2.4×10^{-7}	2.3×10^{-6}
<i>Hot Cell Facility Room 108 storage</i>	<i>HS-1</i>	Fire in room 108, average inventories	3.3×10^{-5}	2.1×10^{-3}	1.8×10^{-7}	2.0×10^{-7}
	<i>HS-2</i>	Fire in room 108, maximum inventories	2.0×10^{-7}	7.9×10^{-2}	6.6×10^{-6}	7.4×10^{-6}

Table 5.3.8 6. Potential Impacts of Radiological Facility Accidents Under the No Action Alternative (concluded)

FACILITY/MODE	ACCIDENT ID	ACCIDENT SCENARIO DESCRIPTION	ACCIDENT FREQUENCY (per year)	ADDITIONAL LATENT CANCER FATALITIES TO THE 50-MILE POPULATION	INCREASED PROBABILITY OF LATENT CANCER FATALITY	
					MAXIMALLY EXPOSED INDIVIDUAL	NONINVOLVED WORKER
<i>Sandia Pulsed Reactor</i>	<i>S3M-2</i>	Control-element misadjustment before insert	1.0×10^{-4} to 1.0×10^{-6}	1.2×10^{-3}	1.5×10^{-7}	2.5×10^{-4}
	<i>S3M-3</i>	Failure of a fissionable experiment	1.0×10^{-4} to 1.0×10^{-6}	7.9×10^{-3}	8.4×10^{-7}	3.8×10^{-3}
	<i>SS-1</i>	Airplane crash into North Vault storage vault	6.3×10^{-6}	9.2×10^{-3}	5.8×10^{-7}	5.5×10^{-4}
<i>Annular Core Research Reactor Defense Programs Configuration</i>	<i>AR-1</i>	Uncontrolled addition of reactivity	$<1.0 \times 10^{-6}$	7.3×10^{-3}	9.3×10^{-7}	1.2×10^{-4}
	<i>AR-2</i>	Rupture of waterlogged fuel element	1.0×10^{-1} to 1.0×10^{-2}	1.3×10^{-3}	1.7×10^{-7}	1.2×10^{-5}
	<i>AR-4</i>	Fire in reactor room with experiment present	1.0×10^{-4} to 1.0×10^{-6}	9.0×10^{-3}	1.0×10^{-6}	1.4×10^{-4}
	<i>AR-6</i>	Airplane crash - collapse of bridge crane	6.3×10^{-6}	5.9×10^{-3}	8.4×10^{-7}	2.2×10^{-4}

Source: Original

TA-V Facility Accident Descriptors:

ACRR - Medical Isotope Production: AM-1, AM-3, AM-4, AM-5, AM-6, AM-7

Hot Cell - Medical Isotope Production: HM-1, HM-2, HM-4

Hot Cell - Room 108 Storage: HS-1, HS-2

SPR: S3M-2, S3M3, SS-1

ACRR- Defense Programs: AR-1, AR-2, AR-4, AR-6

irradiation. Cold trap valves would be left open when the gas is being transferred between decay storage tanks.

HM-4 Fire in Steel Containment Box Used for Processing Targets It was postulated that a large fire in the steel containment box would result in the release of the gases in the decay tank (cold trap), as in scenario HM-1, plus the fission products from one irradiated target being processed.

HS-1 Fire in Room 108 A general combustible fire would be ignited by an event such as an electrical short, forklift incident, or other unspecified circumstance. Various radioactive materials ranging from fissile material to fission products in various forms would be stored in Room 108.

HS-2 Fire in Room 108 This scenario, discussed above under the HS-1 scenario, involves a larger consequence and lower frequency.

HC-1 Earthquake (0.22 g) and Building Collapse This scenario is an earthquake-induced building collapse, with fire in a steel containment box and in Room 108 of the HCF. The impacts are represented by the impacts for accidents HM-4 and HS-1.

SPR

S3M-2 Control Element Misadjustment Before Pulse Element Insertion Control element positions are set for each operation to produce the desired pulse size. Control element misadjustment before pulse element insertion could result in a larger-than-anticipated superprompt critical pulse. The estimated upper limit total worth insertion of reactivity would result in the nearly complete destruction of the core and subsequent release of an abnormal amount of fission products into the reactor room and the environment.

S3M-3 Failure of a Fissionable Experiment The experiment involves the rapid heating of uranium or plutonium rods to excite the fundamental oscillation modes of the material. Plutonium experiments are required to incorporate two levels of containment; however, to encompass the worst-case, the scenario assumes no containment and the complete melt of 7,000 g of plutonium.

SS-1 Airplane Crash into North Vault (NOVA) The SWEIS analysis postulated an airplane crash into the vault, causing a large fire that releases stored radioactive material. An experiment containing plutonium-239, similar to the experiment used in scenario S3M-3 and representative of other plutonium components tested at TA-V, was assumed to be stored in the NOVA.

SP-1 Earthquake (0.22 g) and Building Collapse This scenario is an earthquake-induced SPR building collapse. This accident scenario is represented by the release from SS-1.

S4-1. This scenario is the same as S3M-3, except that the accident would occur during operation of the SPR-IV reactor rather than the SPR IIIm reactor.

ACRR-DP

AR-1 Uncontrolled Addition of Reactivity An uncontrolled amount of reactivity is inserted into the core over a time frame of 80 msec. This accident is assumed to occur without regard to some initiating event or failure of a reactivity control system or violation of prescribed procedures. The absolute magnitude of the reactivity change could be caused by the addition of reactivity from either the removal of negative reactivity (control rods, transient rods, or negative worth experiment) or positive reactivity (positive worth experiment). In terms of operational capabilities, the reactivity would represent the total available in the transient bank coupled to an unplanned removal of a large negative worth experiment in the same time frame.

AR-2 Waterlogged Fuel Element Ruptures This event would be initiated by failure of a single waterlogged fuel element during a pulse from low initial power and subsequent damage to adjacent elements. The pulse would be assumed to occur when the maximum fission product inventories have built up in the core. Adjacent elements would be assumed to be damaged by the rupture of the waterlogged element. The analysis assumes failure of a total of four fuel elements, with ejection of the fuel from all four elements into the pool water.

AR-4 Fire in Reactor Room with Experiment Present A fire could affect fissionable material in an experiment, and small quantities of uranium oxide and other contaminants could be released into the local atmosphere. To bound the potential consequences of this type of scenario, the SWEIS conservatively assumed a large fire in the reactor room without specific analysis of combustible loading and ignition sources. Also, to bound the potential consequences, an experiment containing plutonium was assumed to be present in the reactor room.

AR-5 Earthquake (0.22 g) and Collapse of Bridge Crane This scenario is a seismic event that would cause the 15-ton bridge crane to fall directly on the reactor superstructure. This is assumed to damage

24 fuel elements (approximately 10 percent of the core) to the extent that their entire inventory would be released.

AR-6 Airplane Crash, Collapse of Bridge Crane In order to bound the consequences of an airplane crash, it was postulated that the crash would knock the bridge crane off its rails onto the reactor superstructure. The SWEIS analysis postulates that an airplane crash would cause collapse of the bridge crane, which would be assumed to fall directly on the reactor superstructure and damage 24 fuel elements (approximately 10 percent of the core).

NGF

NG-1 Catastrophic Release of NGF Tritium Inventory The SNL/NM SWEIS source documents provide the material at risk for this scenario in the form of facility tritium inventories of 836 Ci (SNL/NM 1998a).

ECF

ECF-1 Catastrophic Release of ECF Tritium Inventory The source documents indicate that the expected tritium inventory present at the ECF is 49 Ci. The tritium inventory is based on the amount involved in the shelf-life test (SNL/NM 1998a).

The accident for a single facility with the highest consequences to the public would be a fire in Room 108 at the HCF in TA-V (HS-2). If this accident was to occur, there would be an additional 7.9×10^{-2} LCFs in the offsite population within 50 mi of the site. There would be a increased probability of an LCF for an MEI and a noninvolved worker of 6.6×10^{-6} and 7.4×10^{-6} , respectively. The estimated frequency of occurrence for this accident is 2.0×10^{-7} per year, or less than 1 chance in 5,000,000 per year.

Involved workers run the highest risk of injury or fatality in the event of many radiological accidents discussed in this section as well as the many others that could occur. Although there are protective measures and administrative controls to protect involved workers, they are usually in the immediate vicinity of the accident where they could be exposed to radioactivity.

The impacts to the other receptors would be less than for the MEI. Details on the impacts to all receptors analyzed are provided in Appendix F.2.

Chemical Accidents

Many SNL/NM facilities store and use a variety of hazardous chemicals. The quantities of chemicals vary,

ranging from small amounts in individual laboratories to bulk amounts in specially designed storage areas. In addition, the effects of chemical exposure on personnel would depend upon its characteristics, and could range from minor to fatal. Minor accidents within a laboratory room, such as a spill, could result in injury to involved workers in the immediate vicinity. A catastrophic accident such as a large uncontrolled fire, explosion, earthquake, or aircraft crash could have the potential for more serious impacts to involved workers and the public. A catastrophic accident could also release various chemicals from multiple release points and increase the potential for human exposure and serious injury.

In order to assess the impacts of chemical accidents in a bounding manner, chemical inventories at facilities were estimated and ranked using a systematic procedure described in Appendix F.3; that is, a risk hazard index (RHI). The RHI is an indicator of a specific chemical's potential to cause human injury and fatality that factors in the chemical toxicity, volatility, and inventory. For the chemical with the highest RHI in each building, a catastrophic accident involving total release of the building inventory was postulated as the bounding event, then estimates were made of chemical concentrations at various distances from the accident. The results are shown in Table 5.3.8 7. Building inventory and 50 percent of the building largest single source values are shown for the source term to reflect the variability and uncertainty in the actual amount of the chemical that could be present at the time of an accident. Similarly, estimates are shown for the range of distances within which the ERPG-2 would be exceeded. The ERPG-2 is an accepted guideline for public exposure (see Appendix F.3 for an explanation of the various ERPG levels).

In the event of a severe chemical accident in TA-I, involved workers, noninvolved workers, KAFB personnel, onsite residents, and onsite members of the public would be at risk of being exposed to chemical concentrations in excess of ERPG-2 levels. The number of individuals at risk during normal business hours is shown in Table 5.3.8 8. Although Table 5.3.8 8 shows the maximum number of people at risk, the actual number exposed would depend on the time of day, location of people, wind conditions, and other factors, and would be much less than that shown.

As shown in Table 5.3.8 7, the worst-case chemical accident would be a catastrophic release of arsine from Building 893 in TA-I. If this accident was to occur and 20 lb of arsine was released, individuals within 2,640 ft

Table 5.3.8 7. Potential Impacts of Chemical Accidents under the No Action Alternative

BUILDING	CHEMICAL	SOURCE TERM		ERPG-2 LEVEL (ppm)	ERPG-2 EXCEEDANCE DISTANCE		FREQUENCY (per year)
		BUILDING INVENTORY (lb)	50% OF BUILDING LARGEST SINGLE SOURCE (lb)		BUILDING INVENTORY (ft)	50% OF BUILDING LARGEST SINGLE SOURCE (ft)	
823	Nitrous oxide	32.17	15.26	125	348	237	1.0×10^{-3} to 1.0×10^{-4}
858	Chlorine	106.4	53.2	3	3,726	2,598	1.0×10^{-3} to 9.7×10^{-5}
869	Nitric acid	18.6	9.3	15	666	465	1.0×10^{-3} to 1.0×10^{-4}
878	Nitrous oxide	50	25	125	438	309	1.0×10^{-3} to 3.2×10^{-5}
880	Hydrofluoric acid	2	1	20	219	153	1.0×10^{-3} to 1.0×10^{-4}
883	Phosphine	6.8	3.4	2.5	1,440	1,002	1.0×10^{-3} to 1.0×10^{-4}
884	Hydrofluoric acid	10	5	20	504	351	1.0×10^{-3} to 1.0×10^{-4}
888	Fluorine	0.07	0.04	1	207	93	1.0×10^{-3} to 1.0×10^{-4}
893	Arsine	65	20	1	4,884	2,640	1.0×10^{-3} to 1.0×10^{-4}
897	Chlorine	4.4	2.2	3	699	486	1.0×10^{-3} to 6.6×10^{-5}
905	Thionyl chloride	101.1	50.5	5	2,067	1,434	1.0×10^{-3} to 9.0×10^{-5}

Sources: DOE 1996f, NSC 1995 [See also Appendix F, Tables F.3 4 and F5 2]

ERPG: Emergency Response Planning Guideline

ft: feet

lb: pound

ppm: parts per million

TA: technical area

Note: Frequency ranges from 1.0×10^{-3} for an earthquake in TA-I to 1.0×10^{-4} for an airplane crash into a generic building.

Table 5.3.8 8. Maximum Impacts of Chemical Accidents on Individuals Within KAFB Under the No Action Alternative

BUILDING	CHEMICAL NAME	RELEASE (lb)	ALOHA RADIUS REQUIRED TO REACH ERPG-2 LEVEL (ft)	NUMBER OF PEOPLE WITHIN ERPG-2
823	Nitrous Oxide	32.17	348	844
858	Chlorine	106.41	3,726	3,783
869	Nitric Acid	18.6	666	1,511
878	Nitrous Oxide	50	438	880
880	Hydrofluoric Acid	2	219	529
883	Phosphine	6.8	1,440	3,743
884	Hydrofluoric Acid	10	504	800
888	Fluorine	0.07	207	0
893	Arsine	65	4,884	8,254
897	Chlorine	4.4	699	625
905	Thionyl Chloride	101.1	2,067	1,356

Source: Bleakly 1998c (See also Appendix F, Table F.3 6)

ALOHA: Areal Location of Hazardous Atmosphere (model)

ERPG: Emergency Response Planning Guideline

ft: feet

lb: pound



of the point of release would receive exposures that exceed the ERPG-2. If the building arsine inventory (65 lb) was released, individuals within a distance of 4,884 ft from the point of release would receive exposures that exceed the ERPG-2. Figure 5.3.8 4 illustrates the KAFB locations that would be affected by these worst-case chemical accident scenarios involving the release of arsine or chlorine from Buildings 893 and 858, respectively. The circles on the figure correspond to the distances within which the ERPG-2 would be exceeded. However, the actual affected area within the circles would depend upon wind conditions, and only a small portion of the circular area would be affected. In the event of a release, the area exceeding the ERPG-2 would be shaped by the wind and nearby buildings, perhaps affecting 1/16th to 1/10th of the circular area out to the indicated distance. Some individuals within the ERPG-2 circle close to the release point could experience or develop irreversible or other serious health effects or symptoms that could impair their abilities to take protective action. For any release, the seriousness of an exposure would generally decrease for distances further from the point of release.

In the event of an aircraft crash or earthquake involving buildings with various chemical inventories, multiple

chemicals would be released. Although the impacts of mixed chemicals could be greater than individual chemicals, their behavior, dispersion, and health effects can be complex and have, therefore, not been considered quantitatively. An earthquake could also cause the release of like chemicals from multiple buildings and lead to increased concentrations where individual plumes overlap. The potential and impacts for overlapping plumes are discussed in Appendix F.7.

Aircraft Crash

Military, civilian, and commercial aircraft with various cargo land and take off on runways adjacent to KAFB. These aircraft could potentially crash into or in the vicinity of SNL/NM facilities. If such an accident were to occur, it could act as an initiator of other events at a facility that could lead to the release of hazardous radioactive and/or chemical materials. The frequency of an aircraft crash into a facility at SNL/NM and the extent of injury to personnel and damage to property and the environment depend upon many factors. Factors include aircraft size, type, speed, and impact angle; air traffic patterns and take-off/landing frequencies; and the dimensions of the facility and the robustness of its construction. Estimates of an aircraft crash into



Source: Original
Note: See Table 5.3.8 8

Figure 5.3.8 4. Projected Extent of ERPG-2 Levels from Accidental Release of Arsine (Bldg. 893) and Chlorine (Bldg. 858)

Circled areas represent the distances within which an ERPG-2 level would be exceeded for an accidental release of arsine (Building 893) and/or chlorine (Building 858) under the No Action Alternative.

SNL/NM facilities have been made and are discussed in Appendix F, Section F.5. Aircraft crash frequencies were used where applicable as facility accident initiating events.

Other Accidents

Other types of potential accidents would have impacts that were not measured in terms of LCFs or chemical concentrations. These could cause serious injury or fatality for humans or impacts to the nonhuman environment such as the ecology, historic properties, or sensitive cultural sites.

Brush Fires Small fires are expected and planned for during outdoor testing that involves propellants and explosives. The potential exists for brush and forest fires when hot test debris or projectiles come in contact with combustible elements in the environment. One such incident was reported in 1993 in TA-III when a rocket motor detonated during a sled track impact test and resulted in a 40-ac brush fire. An accident at the Aerial Cable Facility in the Coyote Test Field resulted in a fire that swept up the side of a mountain before being extinguished by SNL/NM workers. Many others have occurred that were contained in the immediate vicinity of the test area. Measures would be taken to prevent fires and, should a fire occur, the effects would be mitigated by activating fire fighting facilities in the test area (DOE 1995a, SNL/NM 1993d, SNL/NM 1998i).

Natural Phenomena Naturally occurring events such as tornadoes, lightning, floods, and heavy snow, as documented in existing SNL/NM safety documentation, were considered for their potential to initiate the accidental release of radioactive, chemical, and other hazardous materials that affect workers and the public. Any of these events, should they occur, could also lead to serious injury or fatality as a result of the physical and destructive forces associated with the events. The risks of such events to workers and the public would be equivalent to everyday risks from naturally occurring events to the general public wherever they work and reside.

Spills and Leaks The potential would exist throughout SNL/NM for the accidental spill of radioactive, chemical, or other hazardous materials. The effects of such spills on workers and the public through airborne pathways were considered earlier in this section. The impacts from pathways other than airborne would normally be bounded by exposure from airborne pathways. Any spill of a hazardous substance would have the potential for impacts to the

nonhuman elements of the environment. A spill could make its way into surface and groundwater systems, affecting water quality and aquatic life. Spills of flammable substance could cause fires that damage plant and animal life and other land resources. There have been spills of hazardous substances at the SNL/NM site that had the potential to affect the nonhuman elements of the environment. In 1994, over 100 gal of oil were spilled at the Centrifuge Complex in TA-III when a hydraulic pump failed during a centrifuge test, causing a potential impact to the nonhuman elements of the environment. Also in 1994, a small spill of transformer oil occurred from an oil storage tank in TA-IV when a gasket failed and, at the Coyote Test Field, a leaking underground storage tank containing ethylene glycol was discovered.

Radiological and Chemical Contamination Some accidents analyzed in this section, and others that were considered but not analyzed, could potentially impact the nonhuman elements of the environment. Any accidentally released chemicals would result in concentrations that would typically decrease with increasing distance from the point of release. While chemical concentrations would diminish over distance to a point where a human hazard would no longer be present, the concentrations could still affect other elements of the environment such as the ecology, water quality, and cultural resources. Radiological releases could also affect nonhuman elements of the environment. After an accident, SNL/NM, through their spill and pollution control and radiological emergency response plans, are required to assess the potential for ground contamination; if contamination exceeds guidance levels, plans will be developed for remediation.

Industrial In addition to radioactive and chemical materials and explosives, many SNL/NM facilities conduct operations and use materials and equipment that could also be potentially hazardous to workers. These hazards are typically referred to as normal industrial hazards, not unlike similar hazards that workers are exposed to throughout the nation, and include working with electricity, climbing ladders, welding, and driving forklifts. The SWEIS acknowledges the existence of, but does not analyze, normal industrial hazards. All operations and activities at SNL/NM facilities, as well as all DOE facilities, would be subject to administrative procedures and safety features designed to prevent accidents and mitigate their consequences should they occur.

5.3.9 Transportation

Under the No Action Alternative, transportation impacts were assessed for each of three ROIs: KAFB; major Albuquerque roadways; and major roadways between Albuquerque and specific waste disposal facilities, vendors, and other DOE facilities. This analysis involved estimating the number of trips made by SNL/NM-associated vehicles under normal operations in each of these transportation corridors. Transportation projections were based on data provided by SNL/NM or material inventory multipliers developed and presented in Appendix A.

5.3.9.1 Transportation of Material and Wastes

The number of material shipments received by SNL/NM is generally proportional to total SNL/NM material consumption. According to facility projections, material consumption under the No Action Alternative would increase by 84 percent overall through the year 2003, and by 96 percent through the year 2008. Therefore, total material shipments would also increase during the same time frame, although not necessarily for all types of material.

Radioactive and explosive material shipments are often delivered through government carriers, unless the quantities and activities being transported are low enough to meet the Federal guidelines and restrictions in place for authorized commercial transporters. Government carriers operate on an as-needed basis; thus, the increase in material inventory under the No Action Alternative would result in a similar increase in these kinds of shipments.

Due to their primary shipment method, there would be very little change to the number of chemical shipments made to SNL/NM. Chemicals that are ordered infrequently and in small quantities under the just-in-time (JIT) program are usually shipped to SNL/NM by way of commercial carriers such as Federal Express and United Parcel Service (UPS). These carriers make daily shipments to SNL/NM to deliver packages other than chemicals, and an increase in the volume of chemicals they handle per shipment would not generally increase shipment frequency. Similarly, major chemical vendors who deliver their own material, rather than use a commercial carrier, also usually make daily shipments to SNL/NM. Therefore, any increase in the volume of material that major vendors ship per load would not have an impact on the frequency of those shipments. Thus, chemical shipments would remain at approximately the same level regardless of the fluctuations in material consumption.

Considering the above factors, overall material transportation due to normal operations would increase by 50 percent over baseline levels through the year 2003 and by 52 percent through the year 2008. The anticipated annual and daily material receipts and shipments for each material category are presented in Table 5.3.9 1. The analysis assumed that SNL/NM has 250 work days per calendar year.

Waste Transportation

With the exception of solid waste, the amount of waste shipped from SNL/NM to disposal facilities correlates directly to SNL/NM waste generation levels. Overall, waste shipments offsite would also increase under the No Action Alternative. Waste numbers for 2003 and 2008 include waste currently disposed of at the KAFB landfill, approximately 741 shipments for all alternatives. The total anticipated waste shipments during all operations for each type of waste are presented in Table 5.3.9 2 and Appendix G, Table G.3 3.

This analysis indicates there would be an actual 302 percent increase in all offsite waste shipments through the year 2003 and a 305 percent increase through the year 2008 under the No Action Alternative (see Appendix G for details). Of this increase, 285 percent is considered to be waste currently disposed of at the KAFB landfill. This leaves real increases of 17 percent through 2003 and 20 percent through the year 2008.

Specials Projects

Two special project wastes, ER Project and legacy, were addressed separately due to their one-time operation/project status and in order to avoid skewing the SNL/NM normal operations impact. Legacy wastes would be anticipated to account for an additional 18 shipments of LLW, 3 shipments of LLMW, and 2 shipments of TRU/MTRU wastes over the 10-year time frame (see Figures 4.12 1, 4.12 2, and 4.12 3). In 1998 through 2000, the ER Project could account for up to an additional 312 offsite shipments of LLW, 101 offsite shipments of LLMW, 2 offsite shipments of RCRA waste, 5 offsite shipments of Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) waste, and 75 shipments of nonhazardous waste. Both of these special projects have been included within the total facility risks.

Offsite Receipts and Shipments of Material and Waste

The bounding case for this analysis assumed that each material and waste shipment is composed of two trips: one to and one from SNL/NM. Thus, in 2008, the total

Table 5.3.9 1. SNL/NM Annual Material Receipts/Shipments Under the No Action Alternative

MATERIAL TYPE	BASE YEAR (1997) ANNUAL SHIPMENTS	NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE ANNUAL SHIPMENTS	
		2003	2008
<i>Radioactive</i>	305	562	597
<i>Radioactive (medical isotopes production)</i>	<i>Receiving</i>	0	16
	<i>Shipping</i>	0	1,140
<i>Chemical</i>	2,750	2,750	2,750
<i>Explosive</i>	303	557	593
TOTAL	3,358	5,025	5,096

Sources: FWENC 1998a, b; SNL/NM 1998s, 1998z, 1998a

Table 5.3.9 2. Annual (Summary) Waste Shipments from Normal Operations Under the No Action Alternative

WASTE TYPE	BASE YEAR SHIPMENTS	2003 SHIPMENTS	2008 SHIPMENTS
<i>LLW (1996)^a</i>	4	13	13
<i>LLMW (1996)</i>	1	3	3
<i>Hazardous (RCRA+TSCA) (1997)</i>	102	118	122
<i>Recyclable^{a,b} (Hazardous and Nonhazardous) (1997)</i>	86	231	231
<i>Solid^b (Municipal, Construction, and Demolition) (1997)</i>	51	650	650

Sources: Rinchem 1998a; SNL/NM 1998a, 1998y, n.d.(d)
 LLMW: low-level mixed waste
 LLW: low-level waste
 MTRU: mixed transuranic
 RCRA: Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

TRU: transuranic
 TSCA: Toxic Substances Control Act
^a Excludes decontamination and decommissioning
^b Recyclable and solid wastes currently handled by the KAFB landfill could be shipped offsite in the future, contributing an additional 741 shipments.

number of trips made by material and waste transporters under this alternative would be 12,296 (total shipments x 2). Assuming that the year is comprised of 250 work days, the average work day traffic within KAFB contributed by these carriers would be approximately 49 trips. This comprises 0.17 percent of all SNL/NM commuter trips (28,522 trips per day) entering and exiting KAFB in 2008. The total SNL/NM vehicular traffic under this alternative would comprise 36 percent of total 2008 KAFB traffic. SNL/NM waste and material truck traffic would account for 0.06 percent of KAFB traffic. Therefore, the overall KAFB traffic would remain constant under the No Action Alternative.

Shipments of Material and Waste in the Albuquerque Area

Total SNL/NM placarded material and waste shipments comprise 0.96 percent of the total placarded truck traffic shipments entering the greater Albuquerque area during the base year (1996 or 1997). Although a 70-percent increase in SNL/NM placarded material and waste truck traffic would be expected by 2008, the SNL/NM truck component would represent only 1.4 percent of all placarded trucks entering Albuquerque. This increase includes waste currently managed at the KAFB landfill and new shipments from medical isotopes production. ER Project wastes and legacy wastes are addressed

Placarded Trucks

Trucks that carry any quantity of a hazardous material are required to have U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) markings on each side and end. These trucks are called placarded trucks. These markings, requirements, and exclusions are defined in 49 CFR Part 172.500. There are nine categories of material (hazard class or division number) placards, such as explosive, radioactive, oxygen, flammable gas, and combustible. Examples are shown below.



separately under special projects. Thus, the impacts under the No Action Alternative would be negligible (see Table 5.3.9 3).

Table 5.3.9 3. 24-Hour Placarded Material and Waste Truck Traffic Counts Under the No Action Alternative

ROUTE (ALL TRAFFIC) ^a	BASE YEAR (1995) (480,577) ^c	2003 (526,712) ^c	2008 (555,547) ^c
<i>I-25 North</i> (52,400)	230	253	268
<i>I-25 South</i> (18,000)	94	103	110
<i>I-40 West</i> (16,400)	621	683	725
<i>I-40 East</i> (54,200)	569	626	664
TOTAL (141,000)	1,514	1,665	1,767
<i>SNL/NM^d</i>	14.5	24.3	24.6

Sources: Scientific Services 1995, SNL/NM 1998a

I: Interstate

^a Total vehicle count for all types of vehicles entering and departing Albuquerque

^b All placarded trucks entering the city

^c Bernalillo county population projections

^d SNL/NM placarded trucks (daily average)

Shipments of Material and Waste Outside of Albuquerque

All material and waste transported by truck between SNL/NM and locations outside of Albuquerque must enter and depart the city by way of Interstate-25 or Interstate-40. Table 5.3.9 3 presents the impacts to those corridors from material and waste shipments under the No Action Alternative. The specific remote facility locations are listed in Section 4.11. Daily SNL/NM material and waste truck figures were derived for comparison purposes by dividing the annual waste and material shipment totals in Tables 5.3.9 1 and 5.3.9 2 by the approximately 250 work days in a calendar year.

Albuquerque population projections were also taken into consideration. The 2020 Socioeconomic Forecast projects a 30-percent population increase in Bernalillo county from the base year (1995) (MRGCOG 1997b), and it was assumed for the bounding case that this would increase proportionally at a rate of 1.2 percent per year for all traffic. For this analysis, it was assumed the total placarded truck traffic would also increase by 1.2 percent annually.

The SNL/NM overall material and waste truck traffic component would be expected to increase from 14.5 shipments per day to 24.6 shipments per day by 2008. While this would represent a 70-percent increase in SNL/NM shipments per day, SNL/NM shipments of

24.6 per day would represent only 1.4 percent of the total number of shipments (1,767) on the Albuquerque interstates. Furthermore, the SNL/NM truck traffic would comprise less than 0.015 percent of all traffic, including all types of vehicles, projected to be entering and departing Albuquerque in 2008. For the base year (1996 or 1997), waste leaving Albuquerque represented 35 percent of the total shipments, with an additional 20 percent going to Rio Rancho. Because most materials are supplied through the JIT vendors, origination points are generally not known. However, most vendors use local suppliers; therefore, in the base year, 82 percent of material was assumed to be provided locally, with the remaining 18 percent coming from outside Albuquerque. Thus, the impact to this ROI from the No Action Alternative would be negligible.

5.3.9.2 Other Transportation (Traffic)

Overall vehicular traffic impacts under the No Action Alternative were assessed by projecting the total increased number of SNL/NM commuter vehicles traveling to and from SNL/NM in 2003 and 2008. The term commuter includes all vehicles operated by SNL/NM employees, contractors, and visitors; DOE employees; and additional traffic, such as delivery vehicles.

Traffic on KAFB

Table 5.3.9 4 presents general anticipated traffic impacts at KAFB under the No Action Alternative. The number of SNL/NM commuter vehicles traveling to the site each work day was conservatively assumed to increase at the same rate as the SNL/NM work force level (Section 5.3.12, Socioeconomics). KAFB operations and commuter levels were assumed to remain constant through 2008. Based on this analysis, overall KAFB traffic would increase by 1.8 percent under this alternative. Air quality impacts resulting from traffic are discussed in Section 5.3.7.

Table 5.3.9 5 shows projected 24-hour KAFB vehicular flow for each of the three main gates under the No Action Alternative. It was assumed that the Carlisle and Truman gates would be used primarily by KAFB personnel and not by SNL/NM employees. For the bounding case for this analysis, it was assumed that the SNL/NM contribution to total KAFB flow at each gate would fluctuate by the same factor as the total fluctuation in SNL/NM traffic under this alternative.

Based on this analysis, the daily KAFB gate traffic would increase by 1.8 percent under the No Action Alternative. This minimal change would not have an appreciable impact on service at the gates.

Table 5.3.9 4. KAFB Daily Traffic Projections Under the No Action Alternative

COMPONENT	BASE YEAR (1996-1997)			2003			2008			CHANGE IN BASE YEAR BY 2008 (%)
	%	VEHICLES	TRIPS	%	VEHICLES	TRIPS	%	VEHICLES	TRIPS	
SNL/NM Commuters	36	13,582	27,164	37	14,125	28,250	37	14,261	28,522	5
KAFB Commuters	64	24,145	48,290	63	24,145	48,290	63	24,145	48,290	0
Total KAFB Commuter Traffic	100	37,727	75,453	100	38,170	76,640	100	38,406	76,812	1.8
SNL/NM Material & Waste Transporters	0.04	14.5	29	0.06	24.3	49	0.06	24.6	49	70 ^a

Sources: SNL/NM 1997a, 1998a

^aThis increase represents inclusion of waste currently managed at the KAFB landfill and new shipments from medical isotopes production.

Table 5.3.9 5. Total KAFB Gate Traffic Under the No Action Alternative

GATE	BASE YEAR (1996)			NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE						% CHANGE IN BASE YEAR BY 2008
				2003			2008			
	24-HOUR SNL/NM ^a	24-HOUR TOTAL ^b	PEAK HOUR ^c	24-HOUR SNL/NM	24-HOUR TOTAL	PEAK HOUR	24-HOUR SNL/NM	24-HOUR TOTAL	PEAK HOUR	GATE TOTAL
Wyoming	7,141	19,835	1,941	7,427	20,121	1,972	7,498	20,192	1,976	1.8
Eubank	5,324	14,788	2,683	5,537	15,001	2,726	5,590	15,053	2,731	1.8
Gibson	8,108	22,523	1,571	8,432	22,847	1,596	8,513	22,928	1,599	1.8
Average	6,858	19,048	2,065	7,132	19,323	2,098	7,200	19,391	2,102	1.8

Sources: Bohannon-Huston 1995, SNL/NM 1997a

^a SNL/NM commuter and transporter trips per day equals 36 percent of total KAFB trips per day

^b Total KAFB trips per day

^c Total KAFB trips per hour, 1996 traffic counts

Short-term adverse traffic impacts would potentially occur onsite during routine construction activities at KAFB due to traffic lane restrictions, reduced speeds in construction areas, and traffic increases in slowly moving heavy equipment. These common occurrences would take place during the modification of Gibson Boulevard to Eubank Boulevard, as part of a bypass of KAFB, or any other construction project. The degree of traffic impact would be a function of the location, extent of the project scope, and duration. Building construction and onsite roadway rehabilitation are currently planned under the No Action Alternative. Short-term circulation impacts would potentially occur if vehicles are re-routed to avoid construction areas. However, it is anticipated that adequate detour routes and signage would be provided and that the impacts would be minimal and limited in duration.

Traffic in the Albuquerque Area

To determine the traffic impacts in the Albuquerque traffic corridor, roadways most likely to be affected by SNL/NM traffic were selected for analysis. The bounding case used the projected SNL/NM traffic contributions from Table 5.3.9 5 to approximate the SNL/NM component of the total traffic count for each roadway. For worst-case impacts, the SNL/NM traffic component was assumed to be equivalent to the total SNL/NM traffic at the nearest gate. In actuality, a significant percentage of traffic would likely diffuse onto other nearby roads, which would greatly reduce the magnitude of the SNL/NM component. The SNL/NM component was also assumed to increase at the same rate on each roadway in proportion to the SNL/NM projected work force level.

Albuquerque population projections were also taken into consideration. The 2020 Socioeconomic Forecast (MRGCOG 1997b) projects a 30-percent population increase in Bernalillo county from the base year (1995), and it was assumed for the bounding case that this would increase proportionally at a rate of 1.2 percent per year. For this analysis, it was also assumed the total roadway traffic flow would increase by the same 1.2 percent annually. The projected impacts to these roadways under the No Action Alternative, according to the bounding case factors, are presented in Table 5.3.9 6.

This analysis indicates that although SNL/NM traffic would increase slightly, the SNL/NM component of total Albuquerque traffic would actually decrease from 19 percent to 17 percent by 2008. This is due to the general population growth in Bernalillo county, which would exceed SNL/NM's growth rate.

Traffic Outside of Albuquerque

The additional local SNL/NM traffic under the No Action Alternative would have minimal impacts on transportation routes between Albuquerque and other DOE facilities, vendors, and disposal facilities (see Section 4.11 for a list of these facilities). In a worst-case assessment, the baseline year SNL/NM component would represent an average 18.8 percent of the total traffic count (144,000 vehicles per day) on major roadways entering and departing Albuquerque. This assumes that all SNL/NM traffic would actually enter and depart Albuquerque by way of the interstates every day, although a significant portion of SNL/NM traffic would more likely diffuse onto other roadways and remain in Albuquerque. Regardless, the overall SNL/NM traffic component would actually decrease under the No Action Alternative by the year 2008. This is due to the projected general population growth in Bernalillo county, which would exceed SNL/NM's growth rate.

Offsite and onsite transportation activities were compared to determine if offsite shipments were conservatively bounding for estimating risk to the public (see Appendix G). The primary factor considered was distance traveled and the potential for public exposure. The longest anticipated route for a routine shipment was selected for a conservative analysis. Mountaintop, Pennsylvania, was chosen for radioactive material and Silverdale, Washington, was chosen for explosive material. Both locations exceed 1,500 mi from SNL/NM. The longest distance chosen for onsite transfers was 12 mi. One 1,500-mi shipment would approximate 125 onsite transfers of 12 mi. Onsite transfers would be in areas of very limited public access compared to offsite transportation activities, providing another level of public protection. Based on these assumptions, offsite transportation hazards would bound onsite transfers.

5.3.9.3 Transportation Risks Associated with Normal Operations

Incident-Free Exposure

The bounding case for this analysis used the representative distances traveled by SNL/NM waste and material carriers, as listed in Table 5.3.9 7. These distances were based on the average distance traveled by trucks in route to other facilities under the No Action Alternative.

Truck emissions are a function of the number of truck shipments to and from SNL/NM. The bounding case for

Table 5.3.9 6. Albuquerque Daily Traffic Counts Under the No Action Alternative

ROADWAY		BASE YEAR ^a (480,577) ^b		2003 (526,712) ^b		2008 (555,547) ^b		% CHANGE IN BASE YEAR BY 2008
		DAILY ^c	PEAK ^d	DAILY	PEAK	DAILY	PEAK	DAILY
<i>Gibson west at Louisiana</i>	TOTAL	15,671	2,066	17,175	2,264	18,116	2,388	+15.6
	SNL/NM	8,108	1,069	8,432	1,111	8,513	1,122	+5
	% SNL/NM	52		49		47		-9.6
<i>Wyoming south of Lomas</i>	TOTAL	37,639	2,293	41,252	2,513	43,511	2,651	+15.6
	SNL/NM	7,141	435	7,427	452	7,498	457	+5
	% SNL/NM	19		18		17		-10.5
<i>Eubank south of Copper</i>	TOTAL	14,572	1,852	15,971	2,030	16,845	2,141	+15.6
	SNL/NM	5,324	677	5,537	704	5,590	710	+5
	% SNL/NM	37		35		33		-10.8
<i>Interstate 25 at Gibson^e</i>	TOTAL	91,000		99,736		105,196		+15.6
	SNL/NM	8,108		8,432		8,513		+5
	% SNL/NM	8.9		8.5		8.1		-9.0
<i>Interstate 40 at Eubank^e</i>	TOTAL	90,300		98,969		104,387		+15.6
	SNL/NM	5,324		5,697		5,590		+5
	% SNL/NM	5.9		5.8		5.4		-8.5
<i>Wyoming north of KAFB gate</i>	TOTAL	20,272	1,749	22,218	1,917	23,434	2,022	+15.6
	SNL/NM	7,141	612	7,427	636	7,498	642	+5
	% SNL/NM	35		33		32		-8.6

Sources: MRGCOG 1997b, 1997c; SNL/NM 1997b, 1998a; UNM 1997b

^aThe base year varies depending on information provided in the *Facilities and Safety Information Document* (SNL/NM 1997b). Typically, the base year is 1996 or 1997, as appropriate.

^bBernalillo county population projections

^cVehicles per day, 1996 *Traffic Flows for the Greater Albuquerque Area*

^dVehicles per hour, 1996 - 1998 *Traffic Counts*

^ePeak hour counts are not available for this intersection.

a truck emissions impact analysis assumed that the greatest risk occurs when shipments are transported through urban areas, such as the Albuquerque transportation corridor, because these areas are most susceptible to emissions-related problems. To evaluate the actual risk associated with SNL/NM truck shipments, the most common origin and destination of all shipments of concern were compiled to determine the urban distance each material or waste would be transported (Section 4.11). Table 5.3.9 8 presents truck emissions impacts resulting from the No Action Alternative, projected for 2008, the year determined to pose the greatest increased risk.

Based on this analysis, the truck emissions due to increased SNL/NM truck traffic under the No Action Alternative would increase by 71 percent through the year 2008.

The impact analysis of incident-free exposure from material and waste shipments was conducted using the HIGHWAY computer code as part of the RADTRAN 4 modeling program (SNL 1992a). The distance parameters presented in Table 5.3.9 7 were used to project the incident-free exposure impacts to the public and crew resulting from this alternative. The projected public and crew dose calculations are presented in Table 5.3.9 9.

Table 5.3.9 7. Truck Traffic Bounding Case Distances

MATERIAL TYPES^a	ORIGIN-DESTINATION	DISTANCE (km)
Radioactive	SNL/NM Bounding distance to Mountain Top, PA	3,022
Chemical	Albuquerque to SNL/NM	40
Explosive	SNL/NM to Silverdale, WA	2,406
LLW	SNL/NM to Clive, UT	1,722
LLMW (Receipt)	SNL/CA to SNL/NM	1,780
LLMW (Shipment)	SNL/NM to Savannah River Site, SC	2,548
Hazardous Waste (Shipment)	SNL/NM to Clive, UT	1,722
Hazardous Waste (Receipt)	Local	13
Hazardous Waste (California) (Recyclable)	SNL/NM to Anaheim, CA	1,306
Hazardous Waste (Local) (Recyclable)	SNL/NM to Albuquerque, NM	32
Hazardous Solid Waste (D&D)	Local	32
Nonhazardous Solid Waste (Recyclable)	Local	32
Nonhazardous Landscaping (Recyclable)	SNL/NM to Rio Rancho, NM	50
Solid Waste (Municipal and C&D)	SNL/NM to Rio Rancho Sanitary Landfill, NM	50
TRU/MTRU Waste	SNL/NM to Los Alamos National Laboratory, NM	167
Hazardous Waste TSCA-PCBs (D&D)	SNL/NM to Clive, UT	1,722
Hazardous Waste TSCA-Asbestos (D&D)	SNL/NM to Mountainair, NM	190
LLW (D&D)	SNL/NM to Clive, UT	1,722
Biohazardous Waste (Medical)	SNL/NM to Aragonite, UT	1,114
Legacy LLW (Storage)	SNL/NM to Clive, UT	1,722
Legacy LLMW (Storage)	SNL/NM to Savannah River Site, SC	2,548
Legacy TRU/MTRU (Storage)	SNL/NM to Los Alamos National Laboratory, NM	167
LLW (ER Project)	SNL/NM to Clive, UT	1,722
LLMW (ER Project)	SNL/NM to Savannah River Site, SC	2,548
RCRA Hazardous Waste (ER Project)	SNL/NM to Clive, UT	1,722
Nonhazardous Solid Waste (ER Project)	SNL/NM to Rio Rancho, NM	50

Sources: SNL 1992a, SNL/NM 1998a, DOE 1996h

C&D: construction and demolition

D&D: decontamination and decommissioning

ER: environmental restoration

km: kilometers

LLMW: low-level mixed waste

LLW: low-level waste

MTRU: mixed transuranic waste

PCB: polychlorinated biphenyl

RCRA: *Resource Conservation and Recovery Act*

TRU: transuranic waste

TSCA: *Toxic Substances Control Act*^a Material types are used in or generated from normal operations unless otherwise noted.

**Table 5.3.9 8. No Action Alternative
Incident-Free Exposure: Truck Emissions**

CARGO	UNIT RISK FACTOR PER URBAN KILO-METER	URBAN DISTANCE TRAVELED PER SHIPMENT (km)	LCFs PER ROUND TRIP SHIPMENT	ANNUAL SHIPMENTS			ANNUAL LCFs		
				BASE YEAR ^a	2003	2008	BASE YEAR ^a	2003	2008
<i>NORMAL ROUTINE OPERATIONS</i>									
<i>RAD Materials</i>	1.0×10^{-7}	73.0	1.5×10^{-5}	305	562	597	4.6×10^{-3}	8.4×10^{-3}	9.0×10^{-3}
<i>Explosives</i>	1.0×10^{-7}	48.0	9.6×10^{-6}	303	557	593	2.9×10^{-3}	8.3×10^{-3}	5.7×10^{-3}
<i>Chemicals</i>	1.0×10^{-7}	8.0	1.6×10^{-6}	2,750	2,750	2,750	4.4×10^{-3}	4.4×10^{-3}	4.4×10^{-3}
<i>LLW</i>	1.0×10^{-7}	33.0	6.6×10^{-6}	4	13	13	2.6×10^{-5}	8.6×10^{-5}	8.6×10^{-5}
<i>LLMW (shipments)</i>	1.0×10^{-7}	40.6	8.1×10^{-6}	1	3	3	8.1×10^{-6}	2.4×10^{-5}	2.4×10^{-5}
<i>LLMW (receipts)</i>	1.0×10^{-7}	35.6	7.1×10^{-6}	0	1	1	0	7.1×10^{-6}	7.1×10^{-6}
<i>Medical Isotopes Production (receipts)</i>	1.0×10^{-7}	NA	NA	NA	16	16	NA	2.0×10^{-3}	2.0×10^{-3}
<i>Medical Isotopes Production (shipments)</i>					1,140	1,140			
<i>Hazardous Waste</i>	1.0×10^{-7}	33.0	6.6×10^{-6}	64	80	84	4.2×10^{-4}	5.3×10^{-4}	5.5×10^{-4}
<i>Recyclable Hazardous to California</i>	1.0×10^{-7}	23.0	4.6×10^{-6}	2	3	3	9.2×10^{-6}	1.4×10^{-5}	1.4×10^{-5}
<i>Recyclable Hazardous to New Mexico</i>	1.0×10^{-7}	6.4	1.3×10^{-6}	6	8	8	7.8×10^{-6}	1.0×10^{-5}	1.0×10^{-5}
<i>Solid Waste</i>	1.0×10^{-7}	10.0	2.0×10^{-6}	51	51	51	1.0×10^{-4}	1.0×10^{-4}	1.0×10^{-4}
<i>D&D Hazardous Waste TSCA-PCBs</i>	1.0×10^{-7}	33.0	6.6×10^{-6}	1	1	1	6.6×10^{-6}	6.6×10^{-6}	6.6×10^{-6}
<i>D&D Hazardous Waste TSCA-Asbestos</i>	1.0×10^{-7}	10.0	2.0×10^{-6}	14	14	14	2.8×10^{-5}	2.8×10^{-5}	2.8×10^{-5}
<i>Biohazardous Waste</i>	1.0×10^{-7}	24.0	4.8×10^{-6}	1	1	1	4.8×10^{-6}	4.8×10^{-6}	4.8×10^{-6}
<i>Recyclable D&D Hazardous Waste</i>	1.0×10^{-7}	6.4	1.3×10^{-6}	22	22	22	2.9×10^{-5}	2.9×10^{-5}	2.9×10^{-5}
<i>Recyclable Nonhazardous Solid Waste</i>	1.0×10^{-7}	6.4	1.3×10^{-6}	78	78	78	1.0×10^{-4}	1.0×10^{-4}	1.0×10^{-4}
<i>Nonhazardous Landscaping Waste</i>	1.0×10^{-7}	10	2.0×10^{-6}	NA	142	142	NA	2.8×10^{-4}	2.8×10^{-4}

**Table 5.3.9 8. No Action Alternative
Incident-Free Exposure: Truck Emissions (concluded)**

CARGO	UNIT RISK FACTOR PER URBAN KILO-METER	URBAN DISTANCE TRAVELED PER SHIPMENT (km)	LCFs PER ROUND TRIP SHIPMENT	ANNUAL SHIPMENTS			ANNUAL LCFs		
				BASE YEAR ^a	2003	2008	BASE YEAR ^a	2003	2008
Construction and Demolition Solid Waste	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	10	2.0x10 ⁻⁶	NA	599	599	NA	1.2x10 ⁻³	1.2x10 ⁻³
RCRA Hazardous Waste (receipt)	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	3	6.0x10 ⁻⁷	12	25	25	7.2x10 ⁻⁶	1.5x10 ⁻⁵	1.5x10 ⁻⁵
LLW (D&D)	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	33	6.6x10 ⁻⁶	4	4	4	2.6x10 ⁻⁵	2.6x10 ⁻⁵	2.6x10 ⁻⁵
TOTAL^b							1.33x10⁻²	2.3x10⁻²	2.4x10⁻²
SPECIAL PROJECT OPERATIONS/TOTAL SHIPMENTS									
TRU/MTRU	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	8.4	1.7x10 ⁻⁶	0	1	3	0	1.7x10 ⁻⁶	5.1x10 ⁻⁶
TRU/MTRU (legacy)	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	8.4	1.7x10 ⁻⁶	0	0	2	0	0	3.4x10 ⁻⁶
LLW (legacy)	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	33	6.6x10 ⁻⁶	0	0	56	0	0	3.7x10 ⁻⁴
LLMW (legacy)	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	40.6	8.1x10 ⁻⁶	0	0	8	0	0	6.5x10 ⁻⁵
LLW (ER)	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	33	6.6x10 ⁻⁶	0	0	136	0	0	9.0x10 ⁻⁴
LLMW (ER)	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	40.6	8.1x10 ⁻⁶	0	0	5	0	0	4.1x10 ⁻⁵
Hazardous Waste (ER)	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	33	6.6x10 ⁻⁶	0	0	113	0	0	7.5x10 ⁻⁴
Nonhazardous Solid Waste(ER)	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	10	2.0x10 ⁻⁶	0	0	9	0	0	1.8x10 ⁻⁵
TOTAL^b							0	1.7x10⁻⁶	2.1x10⁻³

Sources: DOE 1996h; SNL/NM 1982, 1997b, 1998a; SNL 1992a

D&D: decontamination and decommissioning

ER: environmental restoration

km: kilometers

LCFs: latent cancer fatalities

LLMW: low-level mixed waste

LLW: low-level waste

MTRU: mixed transuranic

NA: Not applicable

PCB: polychlorinated biphenyl

RAD: radiological

RCRA: Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

TRU: transuranic

TSCA: Toxic Substances Control Act

^a The base year varies depending on information provided in the Facilities and Safety Information Document (SNL/NM 1997b). Typically, the base year is 1996 or 1997, as appropriate.^b Lifetime estimated LCFs from annual shipments and total special project shipments

Table 5.3.9 9. Doses to Crew and Public Under the No Action Alternative

CARGO	ANNUAL DOSE/ TRUCK CREW (PERSON-REM)			ANNUAL DOSE/ GENERAL PUBLIC (PERSON-REM)			ANNUAL LCFs		
	BASE YEAR ^a	2003	2008	BASE YEAR ^a	2003	2008	BASE YEAR ^a	2003	2008
<i>NORMAL ROUTINE OPERATIONS</i>									
<i>RAD Materials</i>	9.8	18.0	19.1	82.4	151.7	161.2	4.5×10^{-2}	8.3×10^{-2}	8.8×10^{-2}
<i>LLW</i>	0.21	0.68	0.68	0.6	2.0	2.0	3.8×10^{-4}	1.3×10^{-3}	1.3×10^{-3}
<i>LLMW</i>	2.6×10^{-2}	9.6×10^{-2}	9.6×10^{-2}	0.26	0.88	0.88	1.4×10^{-4}	4.8×10^{-4}	4.8×10^{-4}
<i>Medical Isotopes Production</i>	NA	7.4	7.4	NA	21.2	21.2	NA	1.4×10^{-2}	1.4×10^{-2}
<i>LLW (D&D)</i>	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.60	0.60	0.60	3.8×10^{-4}	3.8×10^{-4}	3.8×10^{-4}
<i>TOTAL^b</i>							4.6×10^{-2}	9.9×10^{-2}	0.1
<i>SPECIAL PROJECT OPERATIONS/TOTAL SHIPMENTS</i>									
<i>TRU/MTRU</i>	0	1.8×10^{-3}	5.4×10^{-3}	0	1.0×10^{-2}	3.0×10^{-2}	0	5.7×10^{-6}	1.7×10^{-5}
<i>TRU/MTRU (legacy)</i>	0	0	3.6×10^{-3}	0	0	2.0×10^{-2}	0	0	1.1×10^{-5}
<i>LLW (legacy+ER)</i>	0	0	10.0	0	0	28.8	0	0	1.8×10^{-2}
<i>LLMW (legacy+ER)</i>	0	0	0.34	0	0	3.4	0	0	1.8×10^{-3}
<i>TOTAL^b</i>							0	5.7×10^{-6}	2.0×10^{-2}

Sources: SNL 1986, 1992a; SNL/NM 1997b, 1998a; DOE 1996h

D&D: decontamination and decommissioning

ER: environmental restoration

LCFs: latent cancer fatalities

LLMW: low-level mixed waste

LLW: low-level waste

MTRU: mixed transuranic

NA: not applicable

RAD: radiological

rem: roentgen equivalent, man

TRU: transuranic

^a The base year varies depending on information provided in the *Facilities and Safety Information Document* (SNL/NM 1997b). Typically, the base year is 1996 or 1997, as appropriate.^b Lifetime estimated total LCFs from annual shipments and total special project shipments

This table shows that the greatest radiological impacts to the truck crew and the public under the No Action Alternative would result from increased radioactive material shipments.

In the absence of an accident that compromises package integrity, no incident-free chemical or explosive exposure would be foreseen to affect the public, workers, or vehicle transport crews under this alternative.

5.3.9.4 Transportation Risks Associated with Accidents

General Accidents

Accident impacts resulting from the No Action Alternative were developed using the projections for 2003 and 2008. The bounding case assumed that the percent increase in accidents would be equal to the percent increase in SNL/NM traffic under this alternative. Therefore, SNL/NM traffic accidents would increase from the base year (1996 or 1997) by 4 percent through 2003 and by 5 percent over the base year occurrences through the year 2008.

Hazardous Material/ Waste-Related Accidents

In conjunction with traffic fatality statistics (SNL 1986a), the SNL/NM material and waste shipments projected in Table 5.3.9 1 and Table 5.3.9 2 were used to project the truck accident fatality incidence rate that would be expected under the No Action Alternative. Details of the analysis are presented in Appendix G. These impacts are presented in Table 5.3.9 10. Based on this analysis, accident fatalities due to SNL/NM truck transportation would nearly double through the year 2008. This would mean that fatalities would go from 0.22 in the base year (1996 or 1997) to 0.49 by 2008.

5.3.9.5 Radiological Transportation Accidents

The annual risks to the population due to transportation accidents that potentially involve radiological releases resulting from the No Action Alternative are presented in Table 5.3.9 11.

This analysis indicates that the incidences of LCFs due to the worst-case radiological transportation accident would increase from 9.0×10^{-6} to 2.6×10^{-5} LCFs by 2008 under the No Action Alternative. In addition, 5.5×10^{-5} LCFs could result from legacy and ER Project waste shipments. For more information, see Appendix G.

Risks due to radiological, chemical, and explosives accidents were evaluated and are discussed in detail in Appendix F. The bounding transportation accident analysis involves explosion of a tractor-trailer containing 40,000 ft³ of hydrogen. Based on the results presented in Appendix F, Table F.4 1, the hydrogen explosion would result in structural damage to buildings up to a distance of 91 m from the truck. Fatalities would result up to a distance of 15 to 18 m from the truck, while eardrum ruptures would occur up to a distance of 36 m from the truck.

5.3.10 Waste Generation

Implementation of the No Action Alternative would not cause any major changes in the types of waste streams generated onsite. Except for new operations, waste generation levels at SNL/NM would remain constant or increase slightly, consistent with slight increases in laboratory operations. These increased waste volumes would be partially offset by increased waste minimization and pollution prevention programs, which project a 33-percent overall decrease in total waste disposal needs by FY 2000. Therefore, the increased generation activities would not exceed existing waste management disposal capacities.

For projection purposes, the baseline waste generation data were considered to be constant for existing facilities, with no major increases or decreases in the amount of wastes generated. Operations waste are considered to be derived from mission-related work. Nonoperations waste are generated from special programs. New operations are discussed separately in order to show the maximum likely existing operational increases. Waste generation levels for special program waste, such as for the ER Project, are derived separately from the representative facilities projections under special projects. However, the amount of waste generated is anticipated to reflect proportional increases or decreases in SNL/NM activity levels over the next 10 years, with the exception of waste that would be generated by new operations. The waste quantities projected, listed in Table 5.3.10 1, represent a site-wide aggregate of quantities for each type of waste stream from existing selected facilities. As appropriate, the balance of operations (not selected facilities or special projects) waste generated is discussed within the individual waste sections. Units shown for each waste type are based on how industrial facilities charge commercial clients for disposal of these wastes.

Table 5.3.9 10. Truck Transportation Traffic Fatalities Under the No Action Alternative

CARGO	TRAFFIC FATALITY RATE: CREW AND GENERAL PUBLIC PER SHIPMENT ^a	ANNUAL FATALITIES		
		BASE YEAR ^b	2003	2008
NORMAL ROUTINE OPERATIONS				
<i>RAD Material</i>	3.5×10^{-4}	1.1×10^{-1}	2.0×10^{-1}	2.1×10^{-1}
<i>Explosives</i>	2.9×10^{-4}	8.8×10^{-2}	1.6×10^{-1}	1.7×10^{-1}
<i>Chemicals</i>	2.1×10^{-6}	5.8×10^{-3}	5.8×10^{-3}	5.8×10^{-3}
<i>LLW</i>	2.2×10^{-4}	8.8×10^{-4}	2.9×10^{-3}	2.9×10^{-3}
<i>Medical Isotopes Production</i>	NA	NA	6.0×10^{-3}	6.0×10^{-3}
<i>LLMW (shipments)</i>	3.0×10^{-4}	3.0×10^{-4}	9.0×10^{-4}	9.0×10^{-4}
<i>LLMW (receipts)</i>	2.1×10^{-4}	0	2.1×10^{-4}	2.1×10^{-4}
<i>Hazardous Waste</i>	2.2×10^{-4}	1.4×10^{-2}	1.8×10^{-2}	1.9×10^{-2}
<i>Recyclable Hazardous to California</i>	1.5×10^{-4}	3.0×10^{-4}	4.5×10^{-4}	4.5×10^{-4}
<i>Recyclable Hazardous to New Mexico</i>	1.6×10^{-6}	9.6×10^{-6}	1.3×10^{-5}	1.3×10^{-5}
<i>Solid Waste</i>	2.6×10^{-6}	1.3×10^{-4}	1.3×10^{-4}	1.3×10^{-4}
<i>D&D Hazardous Waste TSCA-PCBs</i>	2.2×10^{-4}	2.2×10^{-4}	2.2×10^{-4}	2.2×10^{-4}
<i>D&D Hazardous Waste TSCA-Asbestos</i>	2.2×10^{-5}	3.1×10^{-4}	3.1×10^{-4}	3.1×10^{-4}
<i>Biohazardous Waste</i>	1.4×10^{-4}	1.4×10^{-4}	1.4×10^{-4}	1.4×10^{-4}
<i>Recyclable D&D Hazardous Waste</i>	1.6×10^{-6}	3.5×10^{-5}	3.5×10^{-5}	3.5×10^{-5}
<i>Recyclable Nonhazardous Solid Waste</i>	1.6×10^{-6}	1.2×10^{-4}	1.2×10^{-4}	1.2×10^{-4}
<i>Nonhazardous Landscaping Waste</i>	2.6×10^{-6}	NA	3.7×10^{-4}	3.7×10^{-4}
<i>Construction and Demolition Solid Waste</i>	2.6×10^{-6}	NA	1.6×10^{-3}	1.6×10^{-3}
<i>RCRA Hazardous Waste (receipt)</i>	6.7×10^{-7}	8.0×10^{-6}	1.7×10^{-5}	1.7×10^{-5}
<i>LLW (D&D)</i>	2.2×10^{-4}	8.8×10^{-4}	8.8×10^{-4}	8.8×10^{-4}
TOTAL^c		0.22	0.40	0.42
SPECIAL PROJECT OPERATIONS/TOTAL SHIPMENTS				
<i>TRU/MTRU</i>	1.9×10^{-5}	0	1.9×10^{-5}	5.7×10^{-5}
<i>TRU/MTRU (Legacy)</i>	1.9×10^{-5}	0	0	3.8×10^{-5}
<i>LLW (Legacy)</i>	2.2×10^{-4}	0	0	1.2×10^{-2}

Table 5.3.9 10. Truck Transportation Traffic Fatalities Under the No Action Alternative (concluded)

CARGO	TRAFFIC FATALITY RATE: CREW AND GENERAL PUBLIC PER SHIPMENT ^a	ANNUAL FATALITIES		
		BASE YEAR ^b	2003	2008
<i>LLMW (Legacy)</i>	3.0×10^{-4}	0	0	2.4×10^{-3}
<i>LLW (ER)</i>	2.2×10^{-4}	0	0	3.0×10^{-2}
<i>LLMW (ER)</i>	3.0×10^{-4}	0	0	1.5×10^{-3}
<i>Hazardous Waste (ER)</i>	2.2×10^{-4}	0	0	2.5×10^{-2}
<i>Nonhazardous Solid Waste(ER)</i>	2.6×10^{-6}	0	0	2.3×10^{-5}
TOTAL^c		0	1.9×10^{-5}	7.1×10^{-2}

Sources: SNL 1986, 1992a; SNL/NM 1997b, 1998a

D&D: decontamination and decommissioning

ER: environmental restoration

LLW: low-level waste

LLMW: low-level mixed waste

MTRU: mixed transuranic

NA: Not applicable

PCB: polychlorinated biphenyl

RAD: radiological

RCRA: *Resource Conservation and Recovery Act*

TRU: transuranic

TSCA: *Toxic Substances Control Act*

^a Round trip

^b The base year varies depending on information provided in the *Facilities and Safety Information Document* (SNL/NM 1997b). Typically, the base year is 1996 or 1997, as appropriate.

^c Lifetime estimated total fatalities from annual shipments and total special project shipments

Table 5.3.9 11. Doses to Population Due to Transportation Radiological Accident, Maximum Annual Radiological Accident Risk for Highway Shipments

CARGO	ANNUAL DOSE TO POPULATION PERSON-REM			LCFs		
	BASE YEAR ^a	2003	2008	BASE YEAR ^a	2003	2008
NORMAL ROUTINE OPERATIONS						
RAD Materials	1.3×10^{-2}	2.4×10^{-2}	2.7×10^{-2}	6.6×10^{-6}	1.2×10^{-5}	1.3×10^{-5}
LLW	2.3×10^{-3}	7.5×10^{-3}	7.5×10^{-3}	1.2×10^{-6}	3.8×10^{-6}	3.8×10^{-6}
LLMW	3.8×10^{-5}	1.1×10^{-4}	1.1×10^{-4}	1.7×10^{-8}	5.3×10^{-8}	5.3×10^{-8}
Medical Isotopes Production	NA	1.5×10^{-2}	1.5×10^{-2}	NA	7.5×10^{-6}	7.5×10^{-6}
LLW (D&D)	2.3×10^{-3}	2.3×10^{-3}	2.3×10^{-3}	1.2×10^{-6}	1.2×10^{-6}	1.2×10^{-6}
TOTAL^b				9.0×10^{-6}	2.5×10^{-5}	2.6×10^{-5}
SPECIAL PROJECT OPERATIONS/TOTAL SHIPMENTS						
TRU/MTRU	0	3.4×10^{-6}	1.0×10^{-5}	0	1.7×10^{-9}	5.1×10^{-9}
TRU/MTRU (Legacy)	0	0	6.8×10^{-6}	0	0	3.4×10^{-9}
LLW (Legacy + ER)	0	0	0.11	0	0	5.5×10^{-5}
LLMW (Legacy + ER)	0	0	4.4×10^{-4}	0	0	2.2×10^{-7}
TOTAL^b				0	1.7×10^{-9}	5.5×10^{-5}

Sources: DOE 1996h; SNL 1992a; SNL/NM 1997b, 1998a

D&D: decontamination and decommissioning

ER: environmental restoration

LCFs: latent cancer fatalities

LLMW: low-level mixed waste

LLW: low-level waste

MTRU: mixed transuranic

RAD: radiological

rem: roentgen equivalent, man

TRU: transuranic

^a The base year varies depending on information provided in the *Facilities and Safety Information Document* (SNL/NM 1997b). Typically, the base year is 1996 or 1997, as appropriate.

^b Lifetime estimated total LCFs

**Table 5.3.10 1. Total Waste Generation
Under the No Action Alternative**

ALL WASTE		UNIT	BASE YEAR ^a	NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE	
				5-YEAR	10-YEAR
RADIOACTIVE WASTE					
Low-Level Waste (500 kg/m³)	Existing Operations	m ³ (kg)	16(8,000)	20(10,000)	20(10,000)
	New Operations	m ³ (kg)	4(2,000)	75(37,500)	76(38,000)
	SNL/NM Balance of Operations	m ³ (kg)	74(37,000)	74(37,000)	74(37,000)
	SNL/NM Total LLW	m ³ (kg)	94(47,000)	169(84,500)	170(85,000)
	Percent change		0.0%	79.2%	80.4%
Low-Level Mixed Waste (550 kg/m³)	Existing Operations	m ³ (kg)	3.85(2,120)	4.58(2,520)	4.58(2,520)
	New Operations	m ³ (kg)	0.20(110)	0.48(260)	0.48(260)
	SNL/NM Balance of Operations	m ³ (kg)	0.28(150)	0.28(150)	0.28(150)
	SNL/NM Total LLMW	m ³ (kg)	4.33(2,380)	5.34(2,940)	5.34(2,940)
	Percent change		0.0%	23.3%	23.3%
TRU Waste (310 kg/m³)	Existing Operations	m ³ (kg)	-	0.28(87)	0.28(87)
	New Operations	m ³ (kg)	-	-	-
	SNL/NM Balance of Operations	m ³ (kg)	-	-	-
	SNL/NM Total TRU	m ³ (kg)	-	0.28(987)	0.28(87)
MTRU Waste (76 kg/m³)	Existing Operations	m ³ (kg)	0.45(34)	0.65(49)	0.65(49)
	New Operations	m ³ (kg)	-	-	-
	SNL/NM Balance of Operations	m ³ (kg)	-	-	-
	SNL/NM Total MTRU	m ³ (kg)	0.45(34)	0.65(49)	0.65(49)
	Percent change		0.0%	43.8%	43.8%
RADIOACTIVE WASTE TOTAL^c	Existing Operations	m³(kg)	20.34 (10,154)	25.10 (2,656)	25.21 (12,656)
	New Operations	m³(kg)	4.62(2,110)	75.87 (37,760)	76.86 (38,260)
	SNL/NM Balance of Operations	m³(kg)	73.92 (37,150)	73.92 (37,150)	73.92 (37,150)
	SNL/NM Total Radioactive Waste	m³(kg)	98.88 (49,414)	174.88 (87,566)	175.99 (89,066)
	Percent change		0.0%	76.9%	78.0%

Table 5.3.10 1. Total Waste Generation Under the No Action Alternative (concluded)

ALL WASTE	UNIT	BASE YEAR ^a	NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE	
			5-YEAR	10-YEAR
RCRA HAZARDOUS WASTE				
<i>Existing Operations</i>	kg	16,187	19,682	20,780
<i>New Operations</i>	kg	398	1,243	1,300
<i>SNL/NM Balance of Operations</i>	kg	39,267	49,544	52,278
<i>SNL/NM Total RCRA Hazardous</i>	kg	55,852	70,469	74,358
	m ³	44.3	55.9	59.0
<i>Percent change</i>		0.0%	26.2%	33.1%
SOLID WASTE				
<i>SNL/NM Total Solid Waste^b</i>	m ³ (kg)	0.6M (2,022)	0.6M (2,006)	0.6M (1,955)
<i>Percent change</i>		0.0%	-0.8%	-3.3%
WASTEWATER				
<i>Existing Operations (net increase)</i>	M gal	49	62	84
<i>New Operations</i>	M gal	0	4	4
<i>SNL/NM Balance of Operations</i>	M gal	231	224	216
<i>SNL/NM Total Wastewater</i>	M gal	280	290	304
<i>Percent change</i>		0.0%	+3.6%	+8.6%

Sources: SNL/NM 1997b, 1998a, 1998c, 1998t

m³: cubic meter

kg: kilogram

LLMW: low-level mixed waste

LLW: low-level waste

M: million

M gal: million gallons

MTRU: mixed transuranic

RCRA: Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

TRU: transuranic

^a The base year varies depending on information provided in the *Facilities and Safety Information Document* (SNL/NM 1997b). Typically, the base year is 1996 or 1997, as appropriate.^b Individual breakdowns of solid waste for existing, new, and balance of operations are unavailable because of tracking methods.^c Numbers are rounded and may differ from calculated values.

Note: Densities provided are from Table H.3 1.

5.3.10.1 Radioactive Wastes

Under the No Action Alternative, SNL/NM would potentially generate LLW, LLMW, and TRU and MTRU wastes. However, SNL/NM would not generate any high-level waste. Projections for waste generation at selected facilities from new and existing operations are shown in Appendix H.

Existing Operations

Under the No Action Alternative, SNL/NM anticipates a maximum 23 percent increase in the generation of LLW from existing operations over the next 10 years. LLW is shipped offsite for final disposal. LLMW generation would increase by 19 percent for existing operations through 2008. Under the *Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Part B Permit Application for Hazardous Waste Management Units* (SNL/NM 1996a), some treatment of the hazardous component of LLMW could be performed at SNL/NM (Table 4.12 2). LLMW for which no onsite treatment is available is shipped offsite for treatment and disposal. SNL/NM also projects that approximately 0.28 m³ of TRU waste would be generated annually. The existing TRU/MTRU wastes stored onsite, as well as all future TRU/MTRU wastes, would be transferred to LANL for certification, prior to disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), as indicated in the Waste Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (DOE 1997i) Record of Decision (ROD)(DOE 1998n). Projected MTRU waste generation would increase by 0.2 m³ annually, approximately equal to one 55-gal drum. MTRU waste would also be transferred to LANL for certification. Existing SNL/NM operations would use less than 1 percent (0.21 percent) annually of the available radioactive waste storage capacity. This is considered to be less than significant.

New Operations

SNL/NM anticipates a maximum of 76.4 m³ of LLW would be generated from new operations annually over the next 10 years. The majority of the increase would be primarily due to the full implementation of medical isotopes production in 2003. These operations, described in the Medical Isotopes Production Project: Molybdenum-99 and Related Isotopes Environmental Impact Statement (DOE 1996b), would account for over 80 percent of the total projected LLW in 2003 and 2008.

However, due to the nature of the waste, it would be managed at the generation facility to minimize worker exposure until offsite disposal. LLMW generation from all new onsite sources would be a maximum of 0.48 m³ annually through 2008.

SNL/NM does not expect to generate TRU or MTRU wastes from new operations. Approximately 190 kg of spent fuel would be generated over the 10-year period. Spent fuel is further discussed in Appendix A as a material resource.

Balance of Operations

The waste generation level for the balance of operations was determined for each type of radioactive waste (Table 5.3.10 1). Only LLW and LLMW would be affected. Because of plant mission operations at SNL/NM would account for an additional 73.6 m³ per year of LLW. These same operations would account for an additional 0.28 m³ of LLW per year. The overall operations impact for this alternative would increase by 80 percent for LLW and 23 percent for LLMW.

Current Capacity

Previously generated radioactive wastes (legacy wastes) occupy approximately 494 m³ of the available 11,866 m³ of total radioactive waste storage capacity at the RMWMF and its associated storage areas. This represents 4.2 percent of the total available capacity. Therefore, there would be sufficient capacity to accommodate anticipated increases in radioactive wastes.

Special Projects

Projections indicate the ER Project, a special project beyond the scope of normal operations, will be the single largest waste generator at SNL/NM in 1998. The ER Project will produce a total of approximately 2,862 m³ of LLW and 221 m³ of LLMW, primarily contaminated soil and debris, prior to the end of the project in 2004. Projected ER Project waste volumes are presented in Table 5.3.10 2. ER Project wastes are stored and handled at the point of generation prior to disposal offsite. Management of ER waste is not expected to impact overall SNL/NM waste management operations. Actual field cleanup is now expected to be completed by 2002, with ER Project waste disposed of by 2004. Prior to disposal, ER Project waste must be properly characterized. Therefore, lag time is built into the project schedule between field remediation and actual disposal of waste.

Table 5.3.10 2. Estimated Volumes of Environmental Restoration Project Waste Generated From 1996 through 2000^a

YEAR	MATRIX DEBRIS	SOIL	SOIL/ DEBRIS	SOIL/ DEBRIS/ PPE	PURGE WATER	SEPTAGE	LIQUID	TOTAL (ft ³)	TOTAL (m ³)	TOTAL (kg)
HAZARDOUS WASTE (RCRA)										
1996	-	8,944.0	27.0	-	-	378.0	351.0	9,700.0	274.7	314,981
1997	1,080.0	140.4	-	-	-	-	7.0	1,227.4	34.8	39,957
1998	118,152.0	584,388	5,159.7	-	-	764.1	70.2	708,534	20,066.1	23 M
1999	-	16,019.1	8,499.6	-	-	-	7.0	24,525.7	694.6	796,402
2000	54,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	54,000	1,529.3	1.7 M
TOTAL	173,232	609,491.5	13,686.3	-	-	1,142.1	435.2	797,987.1	22,599.5	27.8 M
RADIOACTIVE WASTE (LLW)										
1996	540.0	8,217.7	-	1,809.0	-	2,646.0	-	13,212.7	374.2	429,046
1997	540.0	8,439.6	35.1	-	-	-	-	9,014.7	255.3	292,727
1998	540.0	77,728.7	7.0	-	-	-	-	78,275.7	2,216.8	2.5 M
1999	-	547	-	-	-	-	-	547	15.5	17,762
2000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	1,620.0	94,933	42.1	1,809.0	-	2,646.0	-	101,050	2,861.8	3.2 M
MIXED WASTE (LLMW)										
1996	2,286.9	61	-	-	-	-	-	347.9	66.5	76,232
1997	3,518.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,572.1	99.6	114,240
1998	1,080.0	-	35.1	-	-	764.1	-	1,879.2	53.2	61,022
1999	27.0	-	35.1	-	-	-	-	62.1	1.8	2,017
2000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	6,912.0	61	70.2	-	-	-	-	7,807.3	221.1	250,000

Table 5.3.10 2. Estimated Volumes of Environmental Restoration Project Waste Generated From 1996 through 2000^a (concluded)

YEAR	MATRIX DEBRIS	SOIL	SOIL/ DEBRIS	SOIL/ DEBRIS/ PPE	PURGE WATER	SEPTAGE	LIQUID	TOTAL (ft ³)	TOTAL (m ³)	TOTAL (kg)
TSCA WASTE										
1996	-	135.0	-	-	-	-	-	135.0	3.8	4,384
1997	-	189.0	-	-	-	-	-	189.0	5.4	6,137
1998	-	31,833	-	-	-	-	-	31,833.0	901.5	1.0 M
1999	-	31,023.0	-	-	-	-	-	31,023.0	878.6	1.0 M
2000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
TOTAL	-	63,180	-	-	-	-	-	63,180	1,789.3	2.0 M
NONHAZARDOUS WASTE										
1996	-	1,350.0	27.0	-	-	-162.0	-	1,539.0	43.6	49,975
1997	-	-	2,646.0	-	-	-	-	2,646.0	74.9	85,921
1998	-	1,422.9	2,430.0	-	-	-	-	3,852.9	109.1	125,112
1999	-	-	1,350.0	-	-	-	-	1,350.0	38.2	43,837
2000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
TOTAL	-	2,772.9	6,453.0	-	-	162.0	-	9,387.9	265.9	310,000
GRAND TOTAL	181,764.0	770,438.4	20,251.6	1,809.0	0.0	4,714.2	435.2	979,412.4	27,737.5	33.6 M

Source: SNL/NM 1998m

ft³: cubic feet

LLW: low-level waste

LLMW: low-level mixed waste

m³: cubic meters

M: million

PPE: personal protective equipment

RCRA: Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

TSCA: Toxic Substances Control Act

^a Baseline totals and projections generated by SNL/NM on 2/9/98

Note: All wastes are assumed to have the average density for the 1997 LLW shipments.

5.3.10.2 Hazardous Waste

Existing Operations

As shown on Table 5.3.10 1, under the No Action Alternative, SNL/NM anticipates a maximum 33 percent increase (over the base year [1996 or 1997]) in the overall generation of RCRA hazardous waste through 2008. Projections for selected facilities for new and existing operations are presented in Appendix H. Projected RCRA hazardous waste generation is shown in Figure 4.12 4.

No appreciable change in the generation of explosive waste would occur. Therefore, the TTF, with a treatment capacity of 9.1 kg of waste per burn, would continue to accommodate those wastes generated from the Light-Initiated High Explosive Facility. The majority of explosive waste would be disposed of at SNL/NM or through KAFB.

New Operations

SNL/NM anticipates annual generation of a maximum of 1,300 kg of hazardous waste by new operations over the next 10 years. The majority of the increase would be primarily due to the full implementation of medical isotopes production operations associated with the Medical Isotopes Production Project (MIPP) in 2003. These operations, described in the Medical Isotopes Production Project: Molybdenum-99 and Related Isotopes Environmental Impact Statement (DOE 1996b), would account for less than 2 percent of the total projected hazardous waste in 2003 and 2008.

New SNL/NM operations would use less than 1 percent annually of the available hazardous waste storage capacity, which is considered to be a minimal impact.

Balance of Operations

It was assumed that the RCRA hazardous waste levels for the balance of operations at SNL/NM would increase by the same proportion as RCRA wastes for selected facilities, because selected facilities represent the overall plant. Consequently, multipliers were used to project RCRA hazardous waste levels under all three alternatives. In the base year, the existing selected facilities generated 16,187 kg out of a total of 55,852 kg of all operational RCRA waste. The remainder, 39,267 kg, is the balance of operations RCRA hazardous waste. For 2003, this would increase to a maximum of 49,544 kg, and to 52,278 kg by 2008.

Current Capacity

The total volume of hazardous waste generated requiring offsite disposal at licensed/approved facilities would not exceed the existing 286.5 m³ of storage and handling capacities at the HWMF and its associated storage buildings. The outside nonpermitted bermed storage area for nonhazardous waste is not included in the onsite storage capacity calculations. Projections indicate that a maximum of 26 percent of the existing hazardous waste capacity would be used. SNL/NM routinely ships hazardous waste to various offsite commercial disposal facilities. Most, if not all, waste is shipped in less than one year to meet regulatory requirements. Based on these projections and continued operations at selected facilities under the No Action Alternative, the hazardous waste generation impacts would continue to be minimal.

Special Projects

During field remediation, the ER Project would produce an additional 26 M kg of hazardous waste by 2002. Final disposal would be accomplished by 2004. Projected ER Project hazardous waste volumes are shown in Table 5.3.10 2. ER Project waste handling is discussed in Section 4.12.6.

Additionally, other facility maintenance and infrastructure support (as outlined in Section 2.3.5) would continue. This program would directly impact the quantity of TSCA hazardous waste requiring disposal. As a result, SNL/NM would continue to generate TSCA hazardous waste, primarily polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and asbestos that are removed from transformers and buildings. Since the main PCB relamping and transformer removal has been completed, quantities of TSCA waste have dropped to approximately 122,000 kg per year, and should remain at that level (Figures 4.12 5 and 4.12 6).

The total volume of TSCA waste would eventually decrease as the targeted facilities are removed. Currently, SNL/NM has 674 buildings providing a total of 5,020,014 gross ft² of office and operational space. The number of buildings would be reduced to 465 buildings totaling approximately 4,885,600 gross ft². This program would remove 138 small office buildings, temporary structures, and trailers accounting for 179,204 gross ft² within FY 1998 and FY 1999 at SNL/NM. During FY 2000 through FY 2002, 49 additional buildings, accounting for 108,937 gross ft², are potentially scheduled for removal. During FY 2003 to FY 2008, an additional 29 buildings would be removed with a total of

84,132 gross ft². To make up for the loss of office and operational space, seven additional buildings would be built, adding approximately 240,000 gross ft². No predictions are made for years beyond FY 2008. Separate NEPA review may be required in the future depending on the scale and extent of the work involrd.

5.3.10.3 All Other Wastes

SNL/NM operations also involve the four additional waste management activity areas discussed below.

Biohazardous (Medical) Waste

The total volume of medical waste would generally remain a function of the total number of full-time employees and subcontractors at SNL/NM. In 1997, 2,463 kg of medical waste were disposed of at an approved offsite facility. Under the No Action Alternative, biohazardous waste generation would increase to 3,279 kg by 2008. The existing waste handling capabilities would be adequate to accommodate this waste. No additional offsite impacts would occur, because offsite disposal capacity would continue to be sufficient.

Nonhazardous Chemical Waste

In 1998, the ER Project will generate approximately 125,112 kg of nonhazardous waste (Table 5.3.10 2). The maximum quantity of operations nonhazardous waste generated annually at SNL/NM and managed by the HWMF would be 92,290 kg, based on the waste multiplier (see Appendix H) developed for RCRA hazardous waste (Rinchem 1998a). Existing commercial disposal facilities would still have adequate capacities to handle the continued generation of nonhazardous waste, thus no additional impacts would be anticipated.

Municipal Solid Waste

Site-wide solid waste generation trends at SNL/NM would generally remain a function of total building area and the number of full-time and subcontractor employees. This function is based on general building operations activities, such as maintenance and cleaning, and, to a lesser extent, the general office waste created by SNL/NM employees. Over the 10-year time frame, a decrease of an estimated 3 percent is anticipated. Despite the projected 5 percent personnel increase, no appreciable onsite impacts to disposal facilities would occur because existing waste handling capabilities are already in place. As existing buildings are replaced, personnel are moved to make more efficient use of the

space. No additional offsite impacts would occur, because offsite disposal capacity would continue to be sufficient. However, a substantial amount of construction and demolition (C&D), a special class of solid waste, would potentially be generated under the facility modernization program described above. Quantities of C&D waste associated with the facility modernization program were projected to be similar to prior years. This waste is disposed of at KAFB and does not currently create an offsite impact. Table 5.3.10 3 summarizes construction debris disposal at the KAFB landfill. If this waste required shipment offsite, similar quantities would go to a regional commercial landfill.

Wastewater

Waste water would increase throughout SNL/NM due to varying levels of operation within each facility. SNL/NM would generate a maximum of approximately 304 M gal of wastewater annually. However, SNL/NM entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with KAFB, the DOE, the city of Albuquerque, and the state of New Mexico to reduce its water use by 30 percent by 2004 (SNL/NM 1997p). The Microelectronics Development Laboratory (MDL) is the single largest generator of wastewater at 77 Mgal per year (Table 3.6 1). Reduction efforts would focus on the MDL in order to reduce the amount of wastewater being generated. See Section 5.3.2 for additional discussion of wastewater quantities and capacities.

5.3.11 Noise and Vibration

The implementation of the No Action Alternative would result in a continuation of the noise and vibration impacts currently experienced during operations at SNL/NM facilities. Section 5.3.11.1 describes potential noise impacts, and Section 5.3.11.2 describes potential impacts from vibrations.

5.3.11.1 Noise

The environmental concern about noise is twofold: first, repetitive exposure to loud noise leads to hearing impairment and eventual hearing loss; and second, noise may be a community nuisance at levels below those that cause hearing impairment. Two noise provisions that apply to SNL/NM address these concerns. The first provision is DOE 5480.10, Contractor Industrial Hygiene Program, which sets standards to protect workers in noisy occupations. Under this provision, workers without hearing protection may only be exposed to continuous sources at 85 dBA for up to 8 hours per

Table 5.3.10 3. SNL/NM Construction and Debris Waste Volumes Managed at KAFB

SOURCE	1996			1997			1998 ^a		
	WASTE (yd ³)	TONNAGE CONVERSION	% OF TOTAL	WASTE (yd ³)	TONNAGE CONVERSION	% OF TOTAL	WASTE (yd ³)	TONNAGE CONVERSION	% OF TOTAL
CONSTRUCTION & DEMOLITION									
<i>DOE</i>	324.50	129.80	0.14	167.25	66.90	0.16	104.00	41.60	0.18
<i>DOE Contractors</i>	837.00	334.80	0.37	1,520.00	608.00	1.49	392.00	156.80	0.67
<i>SNL/NM</i>	4,177.05	1,670.82	1.84	4,563.00	1,825.20	4.47	2,140.25	856.10	3.68
<i>SNL/NM Contractors</i>	13,471.00	5,388.40	5.94	10,070.00	4,028.00	9.86%	4,293.00	1,717.20	7.38
TOTAL (yd³ [m³])	226,822.30 [172,000]	90,728.92	100	102,119.00 [77,600]	40,847.60	100	58,146.75 [44,200]	23,258.70	100
YARD AND LANDSCAPE									
<i>DOE</i>	10.00	1.50	0.75	-	-	0	-	-	0
<i>DOE Contractors</i>	-	-	0	-	-	0	-	-	0
<i>SNL/NM</i>	386.00	57.90	29.11	19.00	2.85	16.81	-	-	0
<i>SNL/NM Contractors</i>	427.00	64.05	32.20	17.00	2.55	15.04	-	-	0
TOTAL (yd³ [m³])	1,326.00 [1,000]	198.90	100	113.00 [86]	16.95	100	-	-	0
COMPOST AND WOODPILE									
<i>DOE</i>	206.25	30.94	1.89	80.00	12.00	1.21	16.00	2.40	0.88
<i>DOE Contractors</i>	-	-	0	2.00	0.30	0.03	-	-	0
<i>SNL/NM</i>	2,607.75	391.16	23.96	1,642.25	246.34	24.79	724.25	108.64	39.78
<i>SNL/NM Contractors</i>	527.00	79.05	4.84	217.00	32.55	3.28	40.00	6.00	2.20
TOTAL	10,885.25 [8,300]	1,632.79	100	6,625.00 [5,000]	993.75	100	1,820.75 [1,400]	273.11	100

Source: Houston 1998b

yd³: cubic yards^a 1998 number represents January through June 1998

day and to impulse noise at 140 dBA per event. The Hearing Conservation Program was initiated by SNL/NM to comply with DOE 5480.10 by limiting the time workers are exposed to noise. The louder the noise, the shorter the allowable exposure time for a worker.

The second provision is the city of Albuquerque Noise Control Ordinance (Ord. 21-1975, §9 9 1). This ordinance sets a limit on the amount of noise that may be produced above ambient levels in the city limits. This ordinance applies to any SNL/NM operation that is loud enough to be heard in neighborhoods bordering KAFB and that exceeds the limits cited in the ordinance. The ordinance allows a maximum allowable limit of 50 dBA, or 10 dBA above the ambient noise level, whichever is greater.

The No Action Alternative provides for SNL/NM to operate at current planned levels, which include baseline background noise levels and short-term noise impacts from SNL/NM test activities. Impulse noise-producing test activities are projected to increase 20 percent over 1996 levels for 2003 and 35 percent over the 1996 baseline number of test activities by 2008. Background noise levels would continue at similar levels from generators, air conditioners, and ventilation systems, but would increase due to additional vehicular traffic and aircraft noise. The range of background noise associated with these sources ranges from 50 to 70 dB (SNL/NM 1997a).

Construction noise, resulting from building new facilities, such as Building 701 in TA-I currently under construction, also contributes to the No Action Alternative background noise levels at SNL/NM. Table 5.3.11 1 presents typical noise levels associated with construction equipment that would contribute to the background noise levels at SNL/NM during construction activities. These construction noise levels would contribute to the ambient background noise levels for the duration of construction, after which ambient background noise levels would return to pre-construction levels.

Large-scale impulse noise producing activities, such as explosives detonations, generate a pressure wave that is an atmospheric phenomenon visualized as ripples produced when a stone is thrown into a still body of water. The sudden increase in atmospheric pressure produced by these traveling pressure waves, called overpressure, is initially greater than the ambient atmospheric pressure and is responsible for disturbances such as noise and for building damage such as glass breakage. Building damage is sometimes blamed on ground vibration caused by explosive detonations, whereas the damage is often the result of the traveling pressure waves. These impulse noise levels resemble a dull thud and generally are considered an annoyance because of startle effects and window vibrations.

Table 5.3.11 1. Typical Noise Levels from Construction and Industrial Equipment

CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY	EQUIPMENT	NOISE LEVEL AT 50 FEET dBA
<i>Constructing Foundation</i>	Truck	91
	Concrete mixer	85
	Jack hammer	88
	Pneumatic Tools	85
<i>Erecting Work</i>	Paver	89
	Derrick	88
<i>Finishing Work</i>	Truck	91
	Paver	89
<i>Miscellaneous</i>	Generator	76
	Compressor	81
	Winch	88

Source: SNL/NM 1997a
dBA: decibels, A-weighted scale

Air blast noise is associated with SNL/NM test activities performed primarily at TA-III, the Coyote Test Field, and other outdoor test facilities. Table 5.3.11 2 presents a summary of the short-term noise impacts from SNL/NM test activities, including expected noise levels at various locations throughout KAFB. The table column labeled Source provides the maximum dB level of the originating test activity at the various test facilities at SNL/NM. The remaining columns present dB levels at various locations throughout SNL/NM and KAFB. The maximum noise level at a given receptor occurs at the ground hazard area boundary for a 1,000-lb explosive test at the 10,000-ft sled track, a 40-pound explosive test at the Terminal Ballistics Complex, and a 155-mm gun firing at the outdoor firing range.

Ground Hazard Area

The ground hazard area boundary is a delineated zone around a test site intended to restrict personnel from potentially harmful operations. These areas protect personnel from potential exposure to noise as well as toxic air emissions, metal fragments, and other potentially hazardous conditions. The ground hazard area is enforced by a combination of warning lights and signs, spotters, fences, barricades, and gates to demarcate the ground hazard area boundary. Personnel are required to leave a test site before testing and must evacuate beyond the ground hazard area boundary. Heavily constructed buildings at the test facilities shield personnel who remain inside the ground hazard area boundary to monitor tests. Procedures require personnel to remain indoors until a test is completed. Personnel wear hearing protection equipment approved by the DOE Line Support, Pollution Prevention, and Environmental Programs Department. The program satisfies the requirements of DOE 5480.10. Monitoring activities conducted by SNL/NM, indicate that exposure of the work force does not exceed allowable exposure limits (SNL/NM 1997a).

Figure 5.3.11 1 presents noise contours at each of the SNL/NM test facilities producing air blast noise. The outside contour represents the 140-dB contour resulting from the maximum sound-producing event at the site. The receptor locations presented in Table 5.3.11 2 are also shown on the figure.

Figure 5.3.11 1 indicates that the 140 dB contour from tests performed at Thunder Range crosses into the Pueblo of Isleta buffer zone. The Thunder Range Complex was used from 1969 through 1993 to support development, safety, reliability, and certification tests of Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)/DOE weapon systems. The testing activity at the complex declined substantially during the early 1990s, and the last test at the complex was conducted during the third quarter of 1993. The current use is for the disassembly and evaluation of special items and siting for radar studies. Although the special items may contain explosive materials, the site is not used for explosives testing by SNL/NM.

Located to the southwest of the Thunder Range is the Air Force Research Laboratory (formerly Philips Laboratory and Air Force Weapons Laboratory) Conventional High Explosives and Simulation Test (CHEST) Site, also shown on maps as Chestnut Site or Range. The Chestnut Range is used for explosive tests. Although SNL/NM explosive testing activities at Thunder Range have ceased, Chestnut Range continues to be used as an active explosives testing site by the USAF and its contractors. Table 5.3.11 2 presents short-term noise impacts at receptor locations located throughout KAFB from test activities performed at Thunder Range.

For each air blast test activity, the distance at which the 50-dB, 24-hour average noise level extends beyond the source is within the 140-dB contour. The city of Albuquerque noise control ordinance is not violated as long as the extent of the 50-dB, 24-hour average noise level remains within the KAFB boundary (SNL/NM 1997a).

Noise from test activities at SNL/NM, including rocket motors, explosives, and large caliber guns, would have minimal effect on the nearby communities. Impulse noise from these activities would be of short duration and would be concentrated in the lower frequency range. Low frequency noises are not perceived well by humans because the human ear hears higher frequencies better. A loud steady or continuous noise above 85 dB would produce adverse effects on exposed people. For example, it would render conversation nearly impossible. A single impulsive noise, on the other hand, even as high as 130 to 140 dB, produced by a sonic boom, explosion, or collision impact test, would be concentrated in the low frequencies that are relatively unimportant in oral communication. In addition, brief noises would tend to be masked by continuous noise or background noise such as vehicular traffic.

Table 5.3.11 2. Short-Term Noise Impacts of SNL/NM Test Activities (dB)

FACILITY	TIMES PER YEAR	SOURCE ^a	1 ^b	2 ^c	3 ^a	4 ^a	5 ^a	6 ^a	7 ^a	8 ^a	9 ^a	10 ^a	11 ^a	12 ^a	13 ^a
10,000-FT SLED TRACK															
<i>Explosive Weight (lbs TNT)</i>															
50	32	151	131	96	96	109	102	103	103	113	123	115	110	111	114
250	4	156	136	101	102	114	108	108	108	118	128	120	115	116	119
1,000	10	161	140	106	106	119	112	113	113	123	132	125	120	120	123
<i>Rocket Motors (numbers type)</i>															
25 HVARs		137	119	100	100	101	96	103	103	107	121	107	106	106	125
1 Sprint	<1	155	137	118	119	120	115	122	122	126	140	126	125	124	143
Sonic Booms	100	149	131	112	112	114	109	116	116	120	134	120	118	118	137
Collision Impacts		145	127	102	102	109	104	106	106	113	123	115	111	111	115
CENTRIFUGE COMPLEX															
Explosives	3	140	126	88	88	93	87	100	100	140	113	116	122	122	107
Collision Impacts	50	117	105	76	76	78	75	83	83	117	93	95	101	101	88
Motors	3	86	64	35	35	37	34	42	42	76	52	54	60	60	47
TERMINAL BALLISTICS COMPLEX															
Explosive Weight (40 lbs TNT)	10	150	140	97	98	108	100	106	105	118	150	119	114	114	119
OUTDOOR FIRING RANGE															
155-mm gun	-	151	140	107	107	121	123	114	114	128	151	128	120	120	121
.30-caliber gun	-	100	80	47	48	54	48	52	52	61	90	62	58	58	62
DROP/IMPACT COMPLEX															
Rockets		135	117	92	92	100	93	98	99	113	107	135	108	111	104
Collision Impacts	100	119	109	76	76	84	77	83	83	97	91	119	92	95	88

Table 5.3.11 2. Short-Term Noise Impacts of SNL/NM Test Activities (dB) (concluded)

FACILITY	TIMES PER YEAR	SOURCE ^a	1 ^b	2 ^c	3 ^a	4 ^a	5 ^a	6 ^a	7 ^a	8 ^a	9 ^a	10 ^a	11 ^a	12 ^a	13 ^a
RADIANT HEAT FACILITY															
<i>Explosive Weight (< 1 lb TNT)</i>	15	139	128	88	88	92	85	100	99	125	105	111	121	121	106
NORTH THUNDER RANGE															
<i>Explosive weight (lbs TNT)</i>															
50		NA	NA	116	117	121	119	122	124	127	127	130	126	127	124
250	150	NA	NA	121	123	126	124	127	129	132	132	135	131	132	129
450		NA	NA	123	124	128	126	129	131	134	134	137	133	134	131
SOUTH THUNDER RANGE															
<i>Explosive weight (lbs TNT)</i>															
50		NA	NA	115	116	122	121	120	121	124	126	127	124	124	123
1,000	120	NA	NA	125	126	132	131	130	131	133	135	136	133	133	132
4,000		NA	NA	129	130	136	135	134	135	138	140	141	138	138	137

Source: DOE n.d. (a)

dB: decibel

dBA: decibels, A-weighted scale

ft: foot

HVAR: High Velocity Aircraft Rocket

lb: pound

mm: millimeter

TNT: trinitrotoluene

^a Area remote from most noise sources except distant aircraft and vehicular traffic
Noise range is 40-65 dBA

^b Affected by aircraft operating from the Albuquerque International Sunport
Expected noise range 76-93 dBA

^c Affected by aircraft operating from the Albuquerque International Sunport
Expected noise range 90-102 dBA

1: Ground Hazard Area

2: Military housing along Pennsylvania Street at KAFB

3: Mobile home trailer park in Four Hills

4: Western boundary of KAFB

5: Pueblo of Isleta boundary located south of SNL/NM. There are no residences along this boundary

6: Golf course at KAFB

7: Riding stables at KAFB

8: Centrifuge Complex


9: Terminal Ballistics Complex

10: Drop/Impact Complex

11: Main gate TA-III

12: TA-V

13: Sled Track Complex (Control Building)



Sources: DOE n.d. (a), SNL/NM 1997a

Figure 5.3.11 1. Noise Contours Produced by SNL/NM Test Facilities
 Air blast noise produced by SNL/NM test facilities reach receptor locations in TA-III.

5.3.11.2 Vibration

Vibration concerns include annoyance to residents of nearby neighborhoods and potential structural damage to buildings adjacent to KAFB from test activities generating ground vibration at SNL/NM. The threshold range where vibration is viewed as unpleasant varies from 0.1 inch to 4 inches per second. For the typical frequencies generated by explosives, the threshold for annoyance ranges from 0.2 inch per second to 0.5 inch per second. The threshold level at which minor structural damage can begin to occur in 0.01 percent of structures is set at 2.0 inches per second (DOE 1997).

The frequency of impulse noise under the No Action Alternative, based upon projected frequencies of impulse noise testing activities for 2008, would increase approximately 35 percent above the 1996 baseline frequency. Although impulsive noise may produce a startle reaction, window vibrations, or public annoyance in some people, the effects on the public would be minor. Ground vibrations would remain confined to the immediate test area within the ground hazard area.

5.3.12 Socioeconomics

The implementation of the No Action Alternative would result in no changes to the demographic characteristics, economy, and community services in the ROI. The following discussion of impacts is based on a bounding economic analysis.

5.3.12.1 Demographic Characteristics

The No Action Alternative would not likely result in any noticeable change in existing demographic characteristics within the ROI (Section 4.14.3). Overall expenditures and employment at SNL/NM should remain relatively constant through 2008, which would, in turn, tend to maintain demographic characteristics within the ROI.

5.3.12.2 Economic Base

The No Action Alternative would not likely result in any noticeable change in the existing economic base within the ROI (Section 4.14.3). The total estimated economic activity associated with SNL/NM in 1996 was \$3.93 B (Table 5.3.12-1). This represented 9.3 percent of the activity in the ROI (DOE 1997j). Overall expenditures and employment should remain relatively constant through 2008. Historically, increases or decreases in operational levels of activities at SNL/NM have been gradual and/or have fluctuated by 1 or 2 percent per year (SNL/NM 1997a).

Blast Overpressure Versus Ground Vibration

An explosion creates both blast overpressure and ground vibration, either of which is capable of causing disturbance and/or damage. When an explosive charge is detonated in air, the gaseous products expand rapidly and compress the surrounding air. The compressed air moves outward like a ripple on a pond with great speed, thus initiating a shock wave or region of blast overpressure. Depending on the difference between the region of high pressure and the surrounding air, the potential exists for disturbance or damage to be done to objects that are within the path of the pressure wave. For example, if an overpressure wave hits a glass window, the glass is subject to momentary high pressure on one side, which can result in its breaking. The potential for damage depends on how close a structure is to the blast and the magnitude of the explosion.

An explosion will also cause the ground to shake upon detonation. Like blast overpressure, this ground vibration moves out from the point of detonation like waves on a pond due to the elasticity of the earth. The potential for damage from ground vibration depends on how much the earth moves or shakes. The greater the movement, which is measured as inches per second, the more likely it is that structural damage will occur. As with blast overpressure, damage will be greater if a structure is closer to a large explosion.

For analysis and consideration, Table 5.3.12-1 presents an estimate of the impacts under the No Action Alternative on the ROI economy from a 5-percent increase in operational levels of activity and associated increases in expenditures, income, and employment, both direct and indirect, at SNL/NM. The 5-percent increase was selected to bound increases for the selected facilities under the alternative and potential indirect increases across all other SNL/NM facilities. Additionally, the historical increases have been gradual; the 5-percent increase was projected over the 10-year period of the SWEIS (SNL/NM 1998a, SNL/NM 1997a). If operations at SNL/NM were to increase by 5 percent over current levels, overall economic activity within the ROI would be expected to increase by about 0.4 percent, with slightly smaller increases in income and

Table 5.3.12 1. SNL/NM s Impact on Central New Mexico s Economy if Operations Were to Increase 5 Percent

ECONOMIC MEASURE	FY 1996 ^a			ASSUMING A 5% INCREASE IN OPERATIONS			
	SNL/NM	TOTAL ROI	PERCENT OF ROI	SNL/NM	TOTAL ROI	PERCENT OF ROI	PERCENT CHANGE
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY (\$ BILLIONS)							
<i>Direct expenditures</i>	1.43			1.50			
<i>Indirect and induced</i>	2.50			2.63			
Total economic activity	3.93	42.40	9.3	4.13	42.60	9.7	0.4
<i>Economic activity multiplier: 2.75^b</i>							
INCOME (\$ BILLIONS)							
<i>Net wages and salaries</i>	0.48			0.50			
<i>Indirect and induced</i>	0.58			0.61			
Total income	1.07	13.40	8.0	1.11	13.45	8.3	0.3
<i>Income multiplier: 2.21^b</i>							
EMPLOYMENT (NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES)							
<i>SNL/NM employment</i>	7,652			8,035			
<i>Indirect and induced</i>	18,826			19,765			
Total employment	26,478	331,800	8.0	27,800	333,122	8.3	0.3
<i>Employment multiplier: 3.46^b</i>							

Source: DOE 1997j

FY: fiscal year

ROI: region of influence

^a Modeled results from DOE 1997j^b The use of multipliers in calculating economic impacts in the ROI is explained in Section 4.14.3.

employment at about 0.3 percent. As presented in Table 5.3.12 1, a 5-percent increase in SNL/NM activity operational levels by 2008 would generate an increase in total economic activity in the ROI from \$42.4 B to \$42.6 B. This would amount to a total increase of \$200 M in additional economic activity (an average increase of \$20 M per year) within the ROI. Total income at SNL/NM would increase from \$1.07 B to \$1.11 B, for a total of \$40 M in additional income (an average increase of \$4 M per year). Total employment in the ROI would increase from 331,800 to 333,122 or a total of 1,322 additional jobs (an average increase of 132 jobs per year) within the ROI. The increased economic activity over the baseline would be small.

During the next 10-year period, contributory effects from other industrial and economic sectors within the

ROI would reduce or mask some of SNL/NM s effects on the ROI economy. This reduction or masking would occur if the estimated total employment in the ROI increases from 331,800 to 403,605 by 2008 (UNM 1997b). The ROI is experiencing and is expected to continue to experience strong growth. For a discussion on socioeconomic cumulative impacts, see Section 6.4.11.

5.3.12.3 Housing and Community Services

The No Action Alternative would not likely result in any noticeable change in existing housing and community services within the ROI (Section 4.14.3). Overall expenditures and employment at SNL/NM should remain relatively constant through 2008, which would, in turn, tend to maintain housing availability, value, and levels of service. Contributory effects from other

industrial and economic sectors within the ROI should reduce or mask SNL/NM's proportional impact.

5.3.13 Environmental Justice

As indicated in Sections 5.3.1, 5.3.2, 5.3.3, 5.3.5, 5.3.10, 5.3.11, and 5.3.12, no discernible adverse impacts to land and visual resources, infrastructure, geology and soils, biological and ecological resources, waste generation, noise, or socioeconomics are anticipated under the No Action Alternative. Thus, no disproportionately high and adverse impacts to minority or low-income communities are anticipated for these resource areas. The small potential impacts to geology and soils would be further reduced through the ER Project (see Section 5.3.3).

The city of Albuquerque water supply system operates by interconnecting all areas of the city. The overlapping capability means the entire population shares impacts to the aquifer equally regardless of the location of a specific community. Impacts to the basin-wide aquifer are dominated by the city of Albuquerque (including citizens, businesses, and nonbusiness entities) by a 70 to 1 ratio with respect to SNL/NM. A localized impact of aquifer drawdown occurs as a result of SNL/NM operations; however, the local communities dominate this impact (see Section 5.3.4). Because the potential adverse impact from SNL/NM operations affects all communities equally, no disproportionately high and adverse impacts to minority or low-income communities are anticipated for this resource area.

As discussed in Section 5.3.6, the potential for impacts to cultural resources from explosive test debris, off-road vehicle traffic, and unintended fires would be minimal. Continued SNL/NM security would likely result in a positive impact on the resources, as archaeological sites remain protected. As a result of the ongoing consultation with 15 Native American tribes, no TCPs have been identified at SNL/NM; however, several tribes have requested that they be consulted under the *Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act* (NAGPRA) if human remains are discovered within the ROI. These consultations will continue. If specific TCPs are identified, any impacts of SNL/NM activities on the TCP and any impacts of restricting access to the TCP

would be determined in consultation with Native American tribes and further NEPA review would be conducted, if appropriate.

The concentrations of chemical contaminants from air emissions and the dose to the ROI from radiological air emissions would be below regulatory standards and human health guidelines. The potential impacts to nonradiological air quality and radiological air quality would be minimal (see Sections 5.3.7.1 and 5.3.7.2). Thus, no disproportionately high and adverse impacts to minority or low-income communities would be anticipated for this resource area.

As presented in Section 5.3.8, SNL/NM operations would have minimal potential to adversely affect human health for offsite residents or onsite workers. Thus, no disproportionately high and adverse impacts to minority or low-income communities would be anticipated for this resource area.

As shown in Section 5.3.9, impacts to public health from transporting materials and waste to offsite facilities would be estimated to be 0.1 excess LCFs per year from incident-free transportation and 0.65 deaths or injuries per year from transportation accidents. Transportation along Gibson, Louisiana, Wyoming, and Eubank Boulevards includes low-income and minority neighborhoods. According to the April 1997 Sandia Report Addressing Environmental Justice Under the National Environmental Policy Act at Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico (SNL 1997f), five block groups located near KAFB gates have high potential for environmental justice-related impacts. Four of these block groups lie between Louisiana and Wyoming Boulevards south of Central (see Figure 4.15-3). No disproportionately high and adverse impacts to minority or low-income communities would be anticipated for this resource area.

Based on the analyses of all the resource areas and topic areas, impacts that would result during the course of normal operations would not pose disproportionately high and adverse health or environmental impacts on minority and low-income populations. Table 5.3.13-1 provides a brief summary of potential impacts to each resource or topic area.

Table 5.3.13 1. Summary of Potential Environmental Justice Impacts Under the No Action Alternative

RESOURCE OR TOPIC AREA	SUMMARIZED EFFECT	EFFECT ON RESOURCE OR TOPIC AREA ROI	PROPORTIONAL EFFECT ON	
			LOW-INCOME	MINORITY NEIGHBORHOODS
<i>Land Use and Visual Resources</i>	No changes in land use; minor changes in developed areas of SNL/NM	Not adverse	Not adverse	Not adverse
<i>Infrastructure</i>	All projected activities within capacities of existing road and utility systems	Not adverse	Not adverse	Not adverse
<i>Geology and Soils</i>	SNL/NM activities are not anticipated to destabilize slopes. Minimal deposition of contaminants to soils and continued removal of existing contaminants under the ER Program	Not adverse	Not adverse	Not adverse
<i>Water Resources and Hydrology</i>	SNL/NM groundwater use is projected to account for 11% of local aquifer drawdown.	Adverse	Not adverse	Not adverse
<i>Biological and Ecological Resources</i>	No significant adverse impacts are projected for biological and ecological resources.	Not adverse	Not adverse	Not adverse
<i>Cultural Resources (A TCP study is being conducted)</i>	Explosive testing debris, off-road vehicle traffic, and unintended fires would present a low potential for impacts.	Not adverse	Not adverse	Not adverse
<i>Air Quality Nonradiological Air</i>	Emissions would be below the most stringent standards, which define the pollutant concentrations below which there are no adverse impacts to human health and the environment. Concentrations would be below regulatory standards and human health guidelines. SNL/NM carbon monoxide emissions would account for 5.7% of Bernalillo county carbon monoxide emissions.	Not adverse	Not adverse	Not adverse
<i>Air Quality Radiological Air</i>	MEI: 0.15 mrem/yr Collective ROI dose: 5.0 person-rem/yr Average collective ROI dose: 6.8×10^{-3} mrem/yr	Not adverse	Not adverse	Not adverse

Table 5.3.13 1. Summary of Potential Environmental Justice Impacts Under the No Action Alternative (concluded)

RESOURCE OR TOPIC AREA	SUMMARIZED EFFECT	EFFECT ON RESOURCE OR TOPIC AREA ROI	PROPORTIONAL EFFECT ON	
			LOW-INCOME	MINORITY NEIGHBORHOODS
Human Health and Worker Safety	MEI lifetime risk of fatal cancer increases by 7.5×10^{-8} 2.5×10^{-3} fatal cancers (additional ROI)/yr Risk of cancer fatality to workforce is 6.8×10^{-3}	Not adverse	Not adverse	Not adverse
Transportation	Total annual material shipments: 5,096 Total KAFB traffic (daily vehicles): 38,406 Incident-free exposure, truck emissions - annual LCFs: 2.4×10^{-2} Incident-free exposure, dose - annual LCFs: 0.1	Not adverse	Not adverse	Not adverse
Waste Generation	All waste projections within capacities of existing waste management operations	Not adverse	Not adverse	Not adverse
Noise and Vibration	Effects would be limited to windows rattling or startle reaction. Background noise levels would continue at current levels from generators, air conditioners, and ventilation systems, but increase due to additional vehicular traffic, aircraft noise, and temporary construction projects (range from 50 to 70 dB).	Not adverse	Not adverse	Not adverse
Socioeconomics	SNL/NM employees: 8,035 SNL/NM total economic activity: \$4.13 B/yr Percent of ROI total economic activity: 9.7%	Not adverse ^a	Not adverse	Not adverse

Source: Original
 B: billion
 dB: decibel
 ER: environmental restoration
 LCF: latent cancer fatality
 MEI: maximally exposed individual

mrem: millirem
 ROI: region of influence
 SNL/NM: Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico
 TCP: traditional cultural property
 yr: year
^a SNL/NM represents approximately 10% of the total economic activity in the ROI.

5.4 EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE

Under the Expanded Operations Alternative, DOE and interagency programs and activities at SNL/NM would increase to the highest reasonable activity levels that current facilities could support.

5.4.1 Land Use and Visual Resources

The implementation of the Expanded Operations Alternative would not affect the existing land use patterns or visual resources at SNL/NM facilities on KAFB. Sections 5.4.1.1 and 5.4.1.2 discuss these resource areas in relation to the Expanded Operations Alternative.

5.4.1.1 Land Use

Under the Expanded Operations Alternative, there would be no additional impacts to existing land resources on KAFB. The extent of DOE land and USAF-permitted acreage currently available for use by SNL/NM facilities on KAFB would remain the same. Similarly, operations would remain consistent with industrial/research park uses and would have no foreseeable effects on established land-use patterns or requirements. Any new SNL/NM facilities, upgrades, and other actions associated with this alternative would not require changes to current land ownership or classification status because these activities would take place in or near existing facilities, within previously disturbed or developed areas, or on land already under DOE control. SNL/NM does not anticipate a need for additional land at testing sites on permitted or withdrawn areas in association with this alternative. At locations on permitted land where operations would be declining or shut down by the owning organization, SNL/NM would continue to hold the sites to conduct periodic safety checks and complete any environmental restoration actions (Section 5.3.3.1). Before the land could be returned to the USAF, SNL/NM would be responsible for conducting any demolition work and restoring the land to its condition when originally acquired (SNL 1997a).

5.4.1.2 Visual Resources

No additional impacts to visual resources are anticipated that would adversely change the overall appearance of the existing landscape, obscure views, or alter the visibility of SNL/NM structures. Any new facilities, expansions, and upgrades would be planned at or near existing facilities and in areas with common scenic quality. The efforts

initiated by SNL/NM to incorporate campus-style design would continue. This style contains established principles and design guidance that provide a framework for the physical development and redevelopment of SNL/NM sites. The guidance covers building massing, facades, colors, building orientation and entries, traffic circulation corridors, standardized signage, and landscaping, including low-water-use plant selections. These efforts would be consistent with the high concern for scenery due to the number of observers and users in the area.

Based on increased operational levels associated under the Expanded Operations Alternative, activities at outdoor testing facilities in the Coyote Test Field and the Withdrawn Area would increase; however, there would be no development at these areas that would alter existing visual resources. Some testing activities that produce smoke and dust of variable quantity and duration would take place, but these conditions would be periodic and short-term and would not change the visual characteristics of the area. Where decommissioning, demolition, or ER work are planned, actions would be taken such as backfilling, reducing sideslopes, applying topsoil, reseeding, and establishing plant growth to restore the area to its condition when originally acquired by SNL/NM.

5.4.2 Infrastructure

As discussed in Section 5.3.2, the infrastructure analysis looked for potential incremental changes to SNL/NM services, utilities, and facilities by alternative. The two areas where incremental changes were identified are site-wide utility demands and four selected infrastructure facilities, including the steam plant, RMWWMF, HWWMF, and TTF. See Section 2.3 for a discussion of how the four infrastructure facilities were selected.

With regard to site-wide utility demands, most SNL/NM facilities do not meter utility use. For the Expanded Operations Alternative, the highest number reported under the No Action Alternative was used as the basis for projecting utility use. Any incremental changes from the base year and Expanded Operations Alternative projections in utility demands for the selected facilities (see Chapter 2) were taken into account by adjusting site-wide demand accordingly, as presented in Table 5.4.2 1. Facility-specific utility data are presented in Chapter 3, Table 3.6 1.

As discussed in Section 5.3.2, analysis of the selected infrastructure facilities relied on the projected throughput and operational capacities as presented in Table 5.4.2 2.

Table 5.4.2 1. Annual^a SNL/NM Utility Usage (Plus 10%) and Capacities Under the Expanded Operations Alternative

RESOURCE/ DATA SOURCE	BASE YEAR USAGE	EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE ANNUAL USAGE	SYSTEM CAPACITY ^b	SNL/NM USAGE ^c AS PERCENT OF CAPACITY	OTHER KAFB USAGE AS PERCENT OF CAPACITY
WATER USE (PLUS 10%, see note)					
<i>Site-Wide Demand^d</i>	440 M gal	440 M gal	2 B gal	22	32
<i>Selected Facilities/ Facility Groups^e</i>	0 M gal	55 M gal	NA		
TOTAL	440 M gal	495 M gal (545 M gal)	2 B gal	25 (27)	32
WASTEWATER DISCHARGE (PLUS 10%)					
<i>Site-Wide Demand^d</i>	280 M gal	280 M gal	850 M gal	33	25
<i>Selected Facilities/ Facility Groups^e</i>	0 M gal	41.6 M gal	NA		
TOTAL	280 M gal	322 M gal (354 M gal)	850 M gal	38 (42)	25
ELECTRICAL USE (PLUS 10%)					
<i>Site-Wide Demand^d</i>	197,000 MWh	197,000 MWh	1,095,000 ^f MWh	18	28
<i>Selected Facilities/ Facility Groups^e</i>	0 MWh	525 MWh	NA		
TOTAL	197,000 MWh	198,000 MWh (218,000 MWh)	1,095,000^f MWh	18 (20)	28
NATURAL GAS USE (PLUS 10%)					
<i>Site-Wide Demand^{d,g}</i>	475 M ft ³	475 M ft ³	2.3 B ft ³	22	31
<i>Selected Facilities/ Facility Groups^{e,h}</i>	0 M ft ³	0 M ft ³	NA		
TOTAL	475 M ft³	475 M ft³ (522.5 M ft³)	2.3 B ft³	22 (24)	31

Table 5.4.2 1. Annual^a SNL/NM Utility Usage (Plus 10%) and Capacities Under the Expanded Operations Alternative (concluded)

RESOURCE/ DATA SOURCE	BASE YEAR USAGE	EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE ANNUAL USAGE	SYSTEM CAPACITY ^b	SNL/NM USAGE ^c AS PERCENT OF CAPACITY	OTHER KAFB USAGE AS PERCENT OF CAPACITY
MISCELLANEOUS					
<i>Fuel Oil^{h,i}</i>	7,000 gal	7,000 gal	Not limited by infrastructure	NA	NA
<i>Propane^h</i>	383,000 gal	383,000 gal	Not limited by infrastructure	NA	NA

Sources: SNL 1997a; SNL/NM 1998a, c; USAF 1998a, 1997

B: billion

ft³: cubic feet

FY: fiscal year

gal: gallon

M: million

MW: megawatt

MWh: megawatt hour

NA: Not applicable

psi: pounds per square inch

^a Base Year is 1996 or 1997, the most representative of usage. Not necessarily the same as in Chapter 4. Although not accounted for in the table, SNL/NM expects to reduce water usage by 0 percent by the year 2004 (see Table 5.3.2 1 for conservation-based scenario).

^b Capacity means the actual or calculated maximum amount of water, wastewater, or other resource that can be used, discharged, or consumed.

^c Usage means the annual actual or calculated amount of water, wastewater, or other resource used, discharged, or consumed.

^d Prorated based on the following square footage: Base Year = 5.266 M; FY 2003 = 5.143 M; FY 2008 = 4.986 M

^e Adjustment for contribution from selected facilities/facility groups as reported in SNL/NM 1998a

^f Based on 125-MW rating

^g Estimated based on 60 psi

^h No adjustments were reported in SNL/NM 1998a

ⁱ Fuel oil is used in emergency situations at the steam plant and is not dependent upon square footage.

Note: Ten percent was added to show that system capacities are more than adequate.

Table 5.4.2 2. Selected (Infrastructure) Facility Annual Throughput^a and Capacities Under the Expanded Operations Alternative

FACILITY ^d	BASE YEAR ANNUAL 1997	EXPANDED OPERATIONS ANNUAL THROUGHPUT	FACILITY CAPACITY ANNUAL	THROUGHPUT AS PERCENT OF CAPACITY
<i>Steam Plant (Steam Produced)^e</i>	544 M lb	544 M lb	3.33 B lb ^b	16
<i>HWMF (Waste Handled)^e</i>	203,000 kg	214,000 kg	579,000 kg ^c	38
<i>RMWMF (Waste Handled)^e</i>	1.6 M lb	2.7 M lb	2.7 M lb	100
<i>TTF (Waste Handled)^e</i>	Minimal	1,200 lb	7,300 lb ^b	16

Source: SNL/NM 1998a

B: billion

ft³: cubic feet

HWMF: Hazardous Waste Management Facility

kg: kilogram

lb: pound

M: million

RMWMF: Radioactive and Mixed Waste Management Facility

TTF: Thermal Treatment Facility

^a Throughput means the amount of steam produced or waste handled.

^b Permit capacity

^c This is the capacity for single-shift work with current employment level, not permit capacity.

^d See Section 2.3 for a discussion on how these facilities were selected.

^e See Table 3.6 1, Infrastructure category

Implementation of the Expanded Operations Alternative would result in demands on infrastructure generally increasing over the next 10 years (Table 5.4.2 1). Annual consumption of water, electricity, natural gas, fuel oil, and propane would be consistent with recent historic levels (SNL/NM 1998c). Small fluctuations in projected utility consumption rates would occur due to annual changes in weather. Table 5.4.2 1 includes a 10-percent increase for water, wastewater, electricity, and natural gas to show that system capacity would not be adversely affected if actual consumption exceeded projected consumption. More than 35 percent of the KAFB capacity would remain available.

Under the Expanded Operations Alternative, the current infrastructure resources would be capable of accommodating SNL/NM facility requirements and no major additional infrastructure facilities are proposed to be built. Generally, infrastructure facilities' operational levels and levels of support activities are projected to remain consistent with recent historical support levels. Although accounted for, SNL/NM D&D programs would reduce overall impacts to SNL/NM infrastructure. Specific details on infrastructure systems are presented in the *1998 Sites Comprehensive Plan* (SNL 1997a). Additional details on water resources are provided in Section 5.4.4. Traffic-related impacts are presented in Section 5.4.9. KAFB utility usage is specifically discussed in Section 6.2.

Steam production would continue at 544 M lb per year, which represents 16 percent of capacity. A discussion on the steam distribution system production capacity is provided in Section 5.3.2.

The HWMF would manage approximately 579,000 kg of waste per year (Table 5.4.2 2). Annual waste management would increase to 37,707 ft³ per year at the RMWME. Additional capacity exists with the HWMF and RMWME by adding more hours to the work schedule. The TTF would process wastes at recent historical levels. Small fluctuations would occur due to normal operations. Actual generation rates would likely decrease over the next 10 years due to ongoing waste minimization and waste avoidance efforts and improved efficiencies (SNL/NM 1997a). Projected waste generation rates and waste facilities are further discussed in Section 5.4.10.

5.4.3 Geology and Soils

The implementation of the Expanded Operations Alternative would increase activities at SNL/NM, thereby increasing the potential for soil contamination, as described in Section 5.4.3.1. As with the No Action Alternative, there would be no increase in the likelihood of impacts to slope stability (Section 5.4.3.2).

5.4.3.1 Soil Contamination

Section 5.3.3 describes the methods used to evaluate soil contamination at SNL/NM. It focuses on near-surface (zero to 1 ft deep) soil contamination at SNL/NM sites, particularly those investigated for the ER Project. The DOE has committed to managing 162 of 182 ER sites as inactive; the remaining 20 sites are still listed active. Of concern to the DOE among these active sites are outdoor testing areas where normal operations or accidents could result in the deposition of contaminants on the ground surface.

The more frequently tests are undertaken, the greater the probability of an occurrence that results in soil contamination. The Expanded Operations Alternative would increase the likelihood of soil contamination over the No Action Alternative. The number of Lurance Canyon certification burn tests, for example, would increase from 12 to 55 per year. Accordingly, the once in 10 years event, which would require decontamination and cleanup of up to 7,000 µg of DU per g of soil over a 1,000-ft² area, might be expected to occur once every 2 years. SNL/NM conducts immediate cleanup actions (SNL/NM 1998a) and periodic site surveys (SNL 1997e) to clean up these sites to levels that meet future land use standards.

5.4.3.2 Slope Stability

Section 5.3.3 describes the relevance of and methods used to evaluate slope stability. Four areas were selected for a detailed, qualitative evaluation: the southern boundary of TA-IV, the Aerial Cable Facility, the Lurance Canyon Burn Site, and the Electro-Explosive Research Facility. The likelihood of slope failure at these locations would be remote.

Under the Expanded Operations Alternative, no changes in activity types or frequencies would be projected for TA-IV and the Electro-Explosive Research Facility (SNL/NM 1998a). An increase in testing would be expected at the Aerial Cable Facility and the Lurance Canyon Burn Site, with some tests increasing by a factor of five over 1996 levels (SNL/NM 1998a). No slope destabilizing activities have been identified at the Lurance Canyon Burn Site. Accidental burns of vegetation from hot missile debris could become more frequent at the Aerial Cable Facility. This could cause a decrease in vegetation cover. However, this area is mostly bedrock with a thin soil veneer, and no evidence of slope instability was observed in a previously burned area. Therefore, no effect on slope stability would be projected under the Expanded Operations Alternative, with the likelihood of slope failure continuing to remain remote.

5.4.4 Water Resources and Hydrology

Impacts from the implementation of the Expanded Operations Alternative would not differ substantively from impacts described in Section 5.3.4 for the No Action Alternative. Impacts to groundwater quality and quantity and surface water quality and quantity are described in Sections 5.4.4.1, 5.4.4.2, 5.4.4.3, and 5.4.4.4, respectively.

5.4.4.1 Groundwater Quality

Section 5.3.4 identifies sources of groundwater contamination and presents modeling of the CWL. All groundwater quality impacts described in Section 5.3.4.1 are alternative-independent—the Expanded Operations Alternative would not cause any change in the nature or extent of groundwater contamination. Contamination of groundwater would remain an adverse impact as discussed in Section 5.3.4.1. No changes in rate and scope of ER Project remediation activities are projected for the Expanded Operations Alternative.

5.4.4.2 Groundwater Quantity

Under the Expanded Operations Alternative, using the groundwater quantity analysis described in Section 5.3.4.2 and projected SNL/NM water use for 1998 to 2008, 628 M ft³ of water would be withdrawn over the 10-year operational period in comparison with 605 M ft³ under the No Action Alternative. Under the Expanded Operations Alternative, this amount would account for approximately 12 percent of the 5,384 M ft³ of groundwater withdrawal in the vicinity of KAFB from 1998 to 2008, compared to 11 percent under the No Action Alternative.

The impacts described in Section 5.3.4.2 would not vary in any significant manner under the Expanded Operations Alternative. Aquifer drawdown would remain an adverse impact.

5.4.4.3 Surface Water Quality

SNL/NM impacts to surface water quality are discussed in Section 5.3.4. This discussion compares results of water quality analyses in Tijeras Arroyo (from samples collected during storm events), near the downstream boundary of KAFB, with NMWQCC stream standards. No constituents in the analyses exceeded these standards. Further, the three major potential contributors to surface water contamination (ER Project sites; permitted storm water discharges from TAs-I, -II, and -IV; and outdoor testing facilities) were evaluated based on potential contaminants and likelihood of migration.

Under the Expanded Operations Alternative, two changes could occur in the potential contributors to surface water contamination.

A projected increase in staff of 10 percent over current levels (Section 5.4.12) could potentially add to the quantity of oil and grease runoff from permitted storm water discharges in TAs-I, -II, and -IV. The most recent storm water monitoring shows oil and grease concentrations ranging from 0.60 to 1.4 mg/L (SNL 1997d). Although there are no quantitative NPDES or state limits for oil and grease, these concentrations are near detection limits. A 10-percent increase in these values would have no discernible environmental consequence, especially considering dilution that would occur in Tijeras Arroyo during periods of runoff.

An increase in the frequency of outdoor tests could result in an increase of radioactive materials deposited on the ground surface. Surface water sampling in Tijeras Arroyo has shown concentrations of radionuclides consistent with background levels. Only two outdoor testing sites, the Aerial Cable Facility and the Lurance Canyon Burn Site, have a defined path to Tijeras Arroyo. Some types of tests at both of these facilities would increase by a factor of five from the baseline year (1996) under the Expanded Operations Alternative. However, to date, surface water sampling has not shown evidence of contamination resulting from tests, and both sites are located at least 10 mi upstream of the point where Tijeras Arroyo exits KAFB. Therefore, concentrations of radionuclides at the exit point of Tijeras Arroyo from KAFB would be anticipated to remain the same under the Expanded Operations Alternative.

5.4.4.4 Surface Water Quantity

The method used to estimate the SNL/NM contribution to surface water quantity is described under the No Action Alternative (Section 5.3.4) and Appendix B. The analysis calculates the quantities of excess surface water runoff from developed areas of SNL/NM and the discharge of process and sanitary water to Albuquerque Southside Water Reclamation Plant. Under the No Action Alternative, the estimated total excess surface water contribution to the Rio Grande would be between 40.7 and 41.3 M ft³ annually. The vast majority of this contribution (40.6 M ft³) would be from discharges to the water reclamation plant.

Storm Water Runoff

The Expanded Operations Alternative would result in only minor net differences in building and parking lot areas.

These differences would not significantly change the developed (impervious) area of SNL/NM from the 0.72-mi² area projected under the No Action Alternative. Therefore, excess surface water runoff would continue at 100,000 to 700,000 ft³ per year, as estimated under the No Action Alternative (Appendix B).

Discharge to Sanitary Sewer

The estimated annual volume of water to be discharged to the sanitary sewer under the Expanded Operations Alternative would be 43.0 M ft³ (322 M gal), a 6 percent increase from the No Action Alternative (Section 5.3.4). Combined with the excess surface water runoff, the estimated total SNL/NM effect on surface water quantity would be between 43.1 and 43.7 M ft³ annually. This would represent approximately 0.07 percent of Rio Grande flow at the discharge points. Under the Expanded Operations Alternative, no detrimental effects to the Rio Grande from the quantity of SNL/NM water discharged would be likely.

5.4.5 Biological and Ecological Resources

Implementation of the Expanded Operations Alternative would result in impacts to biological and ecological resources similar to those under the No Action Alternative (see Section 5.3.5). There would be slightly increased levels of noise and activity under this alternative due to more frequent outdoor explosions. Impacts to biological and ecological resources would be minimal. Inventory and management of the biological resources by SNL/NM, KAFB, and the USFS would continue to protect the animals, plants, and sensitive species on KAFB.

Outdoor activities would have a slight increase in the probability of unintended fires, off-road vehicular traffic, noise, small explosive debris, and plumes of smoke. The increased level of activity would be unlikely to cause the loss of any known species or plant community at KAFB. The area of disturbed vegetation would be increased, but the effect on the viability of plant communities would be negligible.

There would be no effect to the Federally endangered peregrine falcon, as discussed in Section 5.3.5. It is not anticipated that there would be adverse effects to the viability of populations of any sensitive species.

Potential increases in contaminant loads due to increased operations affecting animals and plants would be negligible based on annual ecological monitoring data

(SNL/NM 1997u). See Section 5.4.3 for a discussion of contaminant loads and geology and soils impacts.

5.4.6 Cultural Resources

The implementation of the Expanded Operations Alternative would have low to negligible impacts to cultural resources due to 1) the absence of prehistoric or historic archaeological sites on DOE-administered land, 2) the nature of the cultural resources found in the ROI (see Appendix C), 3) compliance with applicable regulations and established procedures for the protection and conservation of cultural resources located on lands administered by the DOE and on lands administered by other agencies and used by the DOE (see Section 4.8.3.2 and Chapter 7), and 4) the largely benign nature of SNL/NM activities near cultural resources.

Implementation of the regulations and procedures would make unlikely adverse impacts from construction, demolition, decontamination, renovation, or ER Project activities.

Under the Expanded Operations Alternative, prehistoric and historic cultural resources could potentially be affected by activities performed at five SNL/NM facilities, although the potential for impact would be low to negligible. These facilities consist of the Aerial Cable Facility, Lurance Canyon Burn Site, Thunder Range, Sled Track Complex, and Terminal Ballistics Complex. The first three facilities are located on land not owned by the DOE. Impacts could potentially result from three activities at these facilities: production of explosive testing debris and shrapnel, off-road vehicle traffic, and unintended fires and fire suppression. An increase in the frequency of these activities under the Expanded Operations Alternative would not result in a change in the potential for impacts from the No Action Alternative the potential would remain low to negligible.

Another source of potential impact derives from the restricted access present at KAFB and at individual SNL/NM facilities. Restriction of access to areas within the ROI would have positive effects on cultural resources themselves. Under the Expanded Operations Alternative, current security levels that restrict access would be maintained for KAFB in general and would increase in frequency for specific SNL/NM facilities during various activities. These added restrictions would result in an increased level of protection for cultural resources located within the ROI and especially within the facility secure zones.

5.4.7 Air Quality

The implementation of the Expanded Operations Alternative would result in the nonradiological and radiological impacts to air quality described in Sections 5.4.7.1 and 5.4.7.2, respectively. The methods used to calculate these impacts are similar to those used to calculate air quality impacts for the No Action Alternative (Section 5.3.7).

5.4.7.1 Nonradiological Air Quality

Criteria Pollutants

Impacts of criteria pollutant concentrations resulting from the Expanded Operations Alternative were estimated by modeling emission sources using the EPA *ISCST3* (dated 97363) model. The emission rates for the steam plant, which were used as input in the model, are the same as those presented under the No Action Alternative. It is estimated that this level of operation would be sufficient to supply steam to all facilities under the Expanded Operations Alternative because no additional floor space is anticipated. In addition to the steam plant emissions, emissions from the four 600-kw emergency generators in Building 862, the boiler and emergency generator in Building 701, and the 600-kw generator in Building 870b were used as input into the model.

The OLM was used to calculate the nitrogen dioxide concentration as was done under the No Action Alternative. Background concentrations of nitrogen dioxide from monitoring station 2ZR for the 24-hour average concentration and the annual average concentration of 0.029 ppm (46 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$) and 0.008 ppm (13 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$) respectively, were added to the modeled nitrogen dioxide concentrations. The resulting concentrations of criteria pollutants are estimated to be comparable to the No Action Alternative concentrations presented in Table 5.3.7 1. Criteria pollutant concentrations under the Expanded Operations Alternative would be below applicable Federal and New Mexico state standards.

Mobile Sources

Mobile source (motor vehicle) emissions under the Expanded Operations Alternative would include carbon monoxide emissions estimated from increased commuter traffic. The estimated commuter traffic would be 110 percent of that under the No Action Alternative, or 14,940 commuter vehicles and 660 on-base vehicles.

The carbon monoxide emission factor was determined by the EPA mobile source emission factor model *MOBILE5a*, projected to 2005, and would be 28.5 g per mile (SNL 1996c).

The projected carbon monoxide emissions for SNL/NM under the Expanded Operations Alternative, based on the aforementioned assumptions and modeled emission factor, would be 3,837 tons per year. This represents an increase of 348 tons per year from the No Action Alternative; however, this still represents a decrease of 250 tons per year from the 1996 baseline (see Table D.1 30). Projected carbon monoxide emissions for Bernalillo county for 2005 are 206 tons per day, or 75,190 tons per year (AEHD 1998). The contribution of carbon monoxide emissions from vehicles commuting to and from SNL/NM and SNL/NM-operated on-base vehicles in 2005, as a percent of the total county highway mobile source carbon monoxide emissions, would be 5.1 percent.

Total carbon monoxide emissions are shown in Table 5.4.7 1. Estimates from construction activities are included and are the same as those described in Section 5.3.7.1 for the No Action Alternative.

Total carbon monoxide emissions for the Expanded Operations Alternative are 243 tons per year less than the 1996 baseline, well below the 100 tons per year incremental increase above baseline that would require a conformity determination. In addition, the total carbon monoxide emissions for the Expanded Operations Alternative were found to be approximately 3 percent of the maintenance areas emissions of carbon monoxide. As a result, the DOE has concluded that no conformity

Table 5.4.7 1. Carbon Monoxide Emissions (tons per year) from SNL/NM under the Expanded Operations Alternative

STATIONARY SOURCES	MOBILE SOURCES	CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES	BURN SITE	TOTAL
18.36 ^a	3,837	132	4.5 ^b	3,991.86

Sources: SNL/NM 1998a, SNL 1996c

lb: pound

SNL/NM: Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico

^a Includes incremental carbon monoxide emissions from an insignificant boiler and emergency generator in Building 701 and a 600-kw-capacity generator in Building 870b added between 1996 and 2008.

^b Represents carbon monoxide emissions from combustion of 400,200 lb of JP-8 fuel.

determination is required for the Expanded Operations Alternative.

Lurance Canyon Burn Site

Estimates of the criteria pollutant emissions under the Expanded Operations Alternative for the Lurance Canyon Burn Site were based on a reasonable upper bound quantity of JP-8 fuel burned (1,000 gal), which is equal to that used to estimate criteria pollutant emissions under the No Action Alternative. The frequency of tests is expected to increase for the Expanded Operations Alternative, therefore, increasing the throughput of JP-8 fuel burned for the year. The proposed operating permit limits for the Lurance Canyon Burn Site were based on the following fuel throughputs:

- 36,000 lb of sawdust or wood
- 12,000 lb for a sawdust-propellant-acetone mixture
- 400,200 lb of JP-8 fuel

14,400 lb of urethane foam

100 lb of explosives

Concentrations of pollutants resulting from test emissions were calculated using the *OBODM* (Bjorklund et al. 1997). The results for the criteria pollutants are presented in Table 5.4.7 2 along with applicable Federal (40 CFR Part 50) and New Mexico state standards (20 NMAC 2.3) for each pollutant. The maximum percent of a criteria pollutant standard is 4.3 percent for the NMAAQS for the 24-hour average PM_{10} .

Eighty-nine chemical pollutants, resulting from the tests performed at the Lurance Canyon Burn Site, were also evaluated. Each of these pollutants was compared with the respective OEL/100 guideline and each comparison indicated the chemical concentrations would be below the guideline. Appendix D contains the list of chemical concentrations resulting from the estimated Expanded Operations Alternative tests at the Lurance Canyon Burn Site.

Table 5.4.7 2. Criteria Pollutant Concentrations from Lurance Canyon Burn Site with Applicable National and New Mexico Ambient Air Quality Standards Under the Expanded Operations Alternative

POLLUTANT	AVERAGE TIME	NAAQS (ppm [$\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$])	NMAAQS (ppm [$\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$])	EXPANDED OPERATIONS CONCENTRATION (ppm [$\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$])	PERCENT OF STANDARD
<i>Carbon Monoxide</i>	8 hours	9[8,564]	8.7[8,279]	0.023[21.45]	< 1
	1 hour	35[33,305]	13.1[12,466]	0.18[171.6]	1.4
<i>Nitrogen Dioxide</i>	Annual	0.053[83]	0.05[78]	6.4×10^{-7} [0.001]	< 1
	24 hours	-	0.10[156]	1.18×10^{-4} [0.184]	< 1
PM_{10}^a	Annual	50	-	0.018 ^b	< 1
	24 hours	150	-	6.51 ^b	4.3
<i>Sulfur Dioxide</i>	Annual	0.03[65]	0.02[44]	4.6×10^{-7} [0.001]	< 1
	24 hours	0.14[305]	0.10[218]	1.7×10^{-4} [0.367]	< 1
	3 hours	0.50[1,088]	-	0.001[2.94]	< 1
<i>TSP^c</i>	Annual	-	60 ^b	0.018 ^b	< 1
	24 hours	-	150 ^b	6.51 ^b	4.3

Sources: 20 NMAC 2.3, 40 CFR 50, Bjorklund et al. 1997, SNL 1997a,

$\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$: micrograms per cubic meter

^oR: degrees Rankin

ft: feet

NAAQS: National Ambient Air Quality Standards

NMAAQS: New Mexico Ambient Air Quality Standards

PM_{10} : particulate matter smaller than 10 microns in diameter

ppm: parts per million

TSP: total suspended particulates

^a PM_{10} assumed equal to TSP

^b $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$

Note: The standards for some of the pollutants are stated in ppm. These values were converted to $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ with appropriate corrections for temperature (530° R) and pressure (elevation 5,400 ft) following New Mexico Dispersion Modeling Guidelines (NMPCB 1996).

Noncarcinogenic Chemical Screening

Estimates of noncarcinogenic chemical emissions under the Expanded Operations Alternative were determined by extrapolating the No Action Alternative noncarcinogenic chemical emissions to the level of expanded operations for each of the selected facilities. The same screening process described for the No Action Alternative was performed to reduce the number of chemicals to those that exceed the screening level. The screening analysis considered those chemicals screened under the No Action Alternative from the same 12 facilities located in TAs-I, -II, -III, -IV, and -V and shown in Table 5.3.7 5. One noncarcinogenic chemical, chromium trioxide from Building 870, would exceed the screening level under the Expanded Operations Alternative.

Carcinogenic Chemical Screening

Carcinogenic chemical emissions under the Expanded Operations Alternative were determined by extrapolating the No Action Alternative carcinogenic chemical emissions to the level of expanded operations for each of the selected facilities. The same screening process described for the No Action Alternative was performed to reduce the number of carcinogenic chemicals to those that exceed the screening level. The screening analysis considered those chemicals screened under the No Action Alternative from the same 12 facilities located in TAs-I, -II, -III, -IV, and -V and shown in Table 5.3.7 5. Ten carcinogenic chemicals from five facilities would exceed the screening level. Table 5.4.7 3 presents concentrations for those carcinogenic chemicals with estimated emission rates greater than the screening level.

Under the Expanded Operations Alternative, nonradiological air quality concentrations for criteria and chemical pollutants would be below regulatory standards and human health guidelines. Maximum concentrations of criteria pollutants from operation of the steam plant, electric power generator plant, boiler and emergency generator in Building 701, and 600-kw-capacity generator in Building 870b would represent a maximum of 96 percent of the allowable regulatory limit at a public access area. Noncarcinogenic chemicals that exceed the screening levels, based upon emission rates calculated from purchased quantities (Appendix D, Tables D.1 6, D.1 10, D.1 14, and D.1 18), do not exceed the screening levels based upon process engineering estimates of actual emission rates, with the exception of chromium trioxide from Building 870 (Appendix D, Table D.1 21). Further analysis of chromium trioxide is performed in Section 5.3.8 to determine human health

Table 5.4.7 3. Annual Carcinogenic Chemical Concentrations from Facility Emissions Under the Expanded Operations Alternative

CHEMICALS EXCEEDING SCREENING LEVELS	BUILDING SOURCE	EXPANDED OPERATIONS CONCENTRATION (ppb[$\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$])
<i>Chloroform (Trichloromethane)</i>	6580	1.09×10^{-3} [4.42×10^{-3}]
<i>Dichloromethane (Methylene Chloride)</i>	870	7.31×10^{-2} [2.11×10^{-1}]
<i>Dichloromethane (Methylene Chloride)</i>	878	3.53×10^{-3} [1.02×10^{-2}]
<i>Formaldehyde</i>	878	6.36×10^{-4} [6.49×10^{-4}]
<i>Trichloroethene</i>	878	1.16×10^{-2} [5.20×10^{-2}]
<i>1,2-Dichloroethane (Ethylene Dichloride)</i>	893	5.86×10^{-4} [1.97×10^{-3}]
<i>1,4-Dichloro-2-Butene</i>	897	3.96×10^{-5} [1.68×10^{-4}]
<i>Acrylonitrile</i>	897	1.52×10^{-4} [2.74×10^{-4}]
<i>Chloroform (Trichloromethane)</i>	897	1.25×10^{-3} [5.07×10^{-3}]
<i>Trichloroethene</i>	897	1.58×10^{-3} [7.06×10^{-3}]

Source: SNL/NM 1998a

ppb: parts per billion

$\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$: micrograms per cubic meter

Bldg. 6580 Hot Cell Facility (HCF)

Bldg. 870 Neutron Generator Facility (NGF)

Bldg. 878 Advanced Manufacturing Processes Laboratory (AMPL)

Bldg. 893 Compound Semiconductor Research Laboratory (CSRL)

Bldg. 897 Integrated Materials Research Laboratory (IMRL)

impacts from noncarcinogenic chemical emissions from SNL/NM. The risk due to exposure of the 10 carcinogenic chemicals that exceed the carcinogenic chemical screening guidelines (Appendix D, Table D.1 25) are further evaluated in Section 5.4.8, Human Health and Worker Safety.

5.4.7.2 Radiological Air Quality

The SWEIS analysis reviewed the radiological emissions from all SNL/NM facilities. Section 4.9.2 identifies 17 SNL/NM facilities as producing radiological emissions. Based on historic SNL/NM radionuclide emissions data, NESHAP compliance reports, and the FSID (SNL/NM 1998ee), 10 of the 17 SNL/NM facilities were modeled for radiological impacts (Table 5.4.7 4). ACRR operations under DP configuration were assumed comparable to Annular Core Pulsed Reactor II (ACPR-II)

Table 5.4.7 4. Radiological Emissions from Sources at SNL/NM Under the Expanded Operations Alternative

FACILITY NAME	TECHNICAL AREA	RADIONUCLIDE ^a	RELEASE (Ci/yr)
<i>Annular Core Pulsed Reactor (ACPR-II DP configuration), Building 6588</i>	V	Argon-41	7.8
<i>Annular Core Research Reactor (ACRR, medical isotopes production configuration), Building 6588</i>	V	Argon-41 Tritium	2.2 2.2
<i>Explosive Components Facility (ECF), Building 905</i>	II	Tritium	2.0x10 ⁻³
<i>High-Energy Radiation Megavolt Electron Source (HERMES III), Building 970</i>	IV	Nitrogen-13 Oxygen-15	3.603x10 ⁻³ 3.603x10 ⁻⁴
<i>Hot Cell Facility (HCF), Building 6580</i>	V	Iodine-131 Iodine-132 Iodine-133 Iodine-134 Iodine-135 Krypton-83m Krypton-85 Krypton-85m Krypton-87 Krypton-88 Xenon-131m Xenon-133 Xenon-133m Xenon-135 Xenon-135m	3.90 10 18 0.72 11 660 0.63 970 190 1,600 5.9 7,200 340 6,900 1,200
<i>Mixed Waste Landfill (MWL)</i>	III	Tritium	0.29
<i>Neutron Generator Facility (NGF), Building 870</i>	I	Tritium	156
<i>Radioactive and Mixed Waste Management Facility (RMWMF), Building 6920</i>	III	Tritium	2.203 ^b
<i>Radiographic Integrated Test Stand (RITS), Building 970</i>	IV	Nitrogen-13	0.16
<i>Sandia Pulsed Reactor (SPR), Building 6590</i>	V	Argon-41	30

Source: SNL/NM 1998a

DP: Defense Programs

Ci/yr: curies per year

SNL/CA: Sandia National Laboratories/California

^a Radiological emissions are projections based on planned activities, projects, and programs. Radionuclide releases are not the same as those presented in Chapter 4.^b Because SNL/CA tritium-contaminated oil levels handled at RMWMF during the base year were abnormally high, this maximum level of emissions was assumed to be released in any year and, therefore, was constant for all alternatives.

operations, and, for the purpose of conservative analysis, the ACRR was evaluated under simultaneous operation of both configurations. For analysis purposes, based on the review of historical dose evaluations, other facilities that would not contribute more than 0.01 mrem/yr (0.1 percent of the NESHAP limit) to the MEI were screened from further consideration in the SWEIS. The modeled releases to the environment would result in a calculated dose to the MEI and the population within 50 mi of TA-V. TA-V was selected as a center for the population within a 50-mi radius, because the majority of radiological emissions would be from TA-V, specifically the HCF, and TA-V is historically addressed for annual SNL/NM NESHAP compliance (SNL/NM 1996u).

The *CAP88-PC* computer model (DOE 1997e) was used to calculate the doses. Details on the *CAP88-PC* model, radionuclide emissions, model and source parameters, exposures, meteorological data, and population data are presented in Appendix D. Figure 5.3.7 3 shows the locations of the 10 facilities modeled in the SWEIS. Table 5.4.7 4 presents the estimated radiological emissions from the 10 SNL/NM facilities under the Expanded Operations Alternative. The radiological emissions from each facility were estimated based on SNL/NM planned operations and tests projected into the future. Detailed information is available in the FSID (SNL/NM 1998ee). The ACRR and HCF emissions for base year 1996 are different due to the refurbishing operations to change over to medical isotope production configuration. The SPR emissions were estimated to be higher than emissions during the base year. This is due to instituting NESHAP requirements for confirmatory measurements of radiological air emissions where measured emission factors were determined for both the SPR and the ACRR. These measured emission factors were found to be higher than the calculated emission factors. These measurements are source-specific to the SPR and ACRR and would not affect the calculations or measurements for other facilities.

Because the general public and USAF personnel have access to SNL/NM, 14 core receptor locations and 2 offsite receptor locations of public concern were considered for dose impact evaluations (see Appendix D.2). Based on NESHAP reports, 16 onsite and 6 offsite additional receptor locations were also evaluated. A total of 38 receptor locations were evaluated for dose impacts. The core receptor locations include schools, hospitals, a museum, and clubs, and were considered for analysis because of potential impacts to

children, the sick, and the elderly. The 32 modeled onsite and core receptor locations are shown in Figure 5.3.7 4.

The dose to an individual at each receptor location and to the population within 50 mi from the radionuclide emission from each source were calculated using the *CAP88-PC* model. The public receptor receiving the maximum dose was identified as the MEI. The model-calculated dose contributions, including external, inhalation, and ingestion exposure pathways from each of the 10 sources, calculated individually at each receptor location, were combined at each modeled receptor to determine the overall SNL/NM site-wide normal operations dose to the MEI. Under the Expanded Operations Alternative, the maximum EDE to the MEI from all exposure pathways from all modeled sources was calculated to be 0.51 mrem/yr. The MEI having the highest combined dose would be located at the KUMMSC, north of TA-V. This location is consistent with the location of the MEI historically identified in the annual NESHAP compliance reports. The EDE contributions from these 10 sources to this combined MEI dose are presented in Table 5.4.7 5. Table 5.4.7 6 presents the doses at the 38 onsite, core, and offsite receptor locations. The potential doses for these additional locations would be much lower than the highest combined MEI dose. The total collective dose to the population of 732,523 within a 50-mi radius of TA-V was calculated to be 15.8 person-rem per year under the Expanded Operations Alternative. The contributions from all of the 10 modeled sources to the overall SNL/NM site-wide normal operations collective dose to the population within 50 mi are also presented in Table 5.4.7 4. The average dose to an individual in the population within 50 mi of TA-V (collective dose divided by the total population) would be 2.16×10^{-2} mrem/yr.

The calculated total MEI dose of 0.51 mrem/yr would be much lower than the regulatory limit of 10 mrem/yr to an MEI from SNL/NM site-wide total airborne releases of radiological materials (40 CFR Part 61). This dose would be small compared to an individual background radiation dose of 360 mrem/yr (see Figure 4.10 2). The calculated collective dose from SNL/NM operations to the population within 50 mi, 15.8 person-rem per year, would be much lower than the collective dose to the population from background radiation. Based on this individual background radiation dose, the population within 50 mi of TA-V would receive 263,700 person-rem per year.

Table 5.4.7 5. Summary of Dose Estimates from Radioactive Air Emissions to the SNL/NM Public Under the Expanded Operations Alternative

SOURCE	ANNUAL MEI DOSE, EDE (mrem)	ANNUAL POPULATION DOSE (person-rem)
<i>Annular Core Pulsed Reactor II (ACPR-II) (DP configuration)</i>	1.3×10^{-3}	2.16×10^{-2}
<i>Annular Core Research Reactor (ACRR) (medical isotopes production configuration)</i>	4.2×10^{-4}	1.07×10^{-2}
<i>Explosive Components Facility (ECF)</i>	9.9×10^{-9}	4.19×10^{-6}
<i>High-Energy Radiation Megavolt Electron Source (HERMES III)</i>	3.0×10^{-8}	6.06×10^{-7}
<i>Hot Cell Facility (HCF)</i>	5.0×10^{-1}	1.54×10^1
<i>Mixed Waste Landfill (MWL)</i>	4.0×10^{-6}	6.16×10^{-4}
<i>Neutron Generator Facility (NGF)</i>	7.4×10^{-4}	3.22×10^{-1}
<i>Radioactive and Mixed Waste Management Facility (RMWMF)</i>	7.5×10^{-6}	3.24×10^{-3}
<i>Radiographic Integrated Test Stand (RITS)</i>	1.3×10^{-6}	2.69×10^{-5}
<i>Sandia Pulsed Reactor (SPR)</i>	4.3×10^{-3}	8.01×10^{-2}
TOTAL MEI DOSE	0.51	-
50-MILE POPULATION COLLECTIVE DOSE	-	15.8

Sources: DOE 1997e, SNL/NM 1998a

DP: Defense Programs

EDE: effective dose equivalent

MEI: maximally exposed individual

mrem: millirem

rem: Roentgen equivalent, man

Note: Although the Annular Core Pulsed Reactor-II is expected to be operated under DP configuration intermittently, for this analysis, it was assumed to be operated simultaneously with the ACRR under medical isotopes production configuration. Its contribution to the total dose would not be appreciable.

Table 5.4.7 6. Summary of Dose Estimates from Radioactive Air Emissions to 38 Onsite and Offsite Receptors Under the Expanded Operations Alternative

RECEPTOR	ANNUAL RECEPTOR DOSE, EDE (mrem)
ONSITE AND NEAR-SITE RECEPTORS	
<i>Albuquerque International Sunport (Bldg. 1064)</i>	5.7×10^{-2}
<i>Albuquerque International Sunport (Bldg. 760)</i>	1.2×10^{-1}
<i>Building 20706</i>	7.8×10^{-2}
<i>Building 24499</i>	5.5×10^{-2}
<i>Child Development Center-East</i>	5.4×10^{-2}
<i>Child Development Center-West</i>	6.2×10^{-2}
<i>Civil Engineering Research Facility (Bldg. 5701)</i>	4.0×10^{-2}
<i>Coronado Club</i>	5.5×10^{-2}
<i>Coyote Canyon Control Center</i>	4.0×10^{-2}
<i>Golf Course Clubhouse</i>	2.3×10^{-2}
<i>Golf Course Maintenance Area</i>	1.5×10^{-1}
<i>Kirtland Elementary School</i>	6.1×10^{-2}
<i>KAFB Firestation #4 (Bldg. 9002)</i>	5.9×10^{-2}
<i>KAFB Landfill</i>	9.1×10^{-2}
<i>Kirtland Underground Munitions and Maintenance Storage Complex (KUMMSC)</i>	5.1×10^{-1}
<i>Loop Housing</i>	5.3×10^{-2}
<i>Lovelace Hospital</i>	4.5×10^{-2}
<i>Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute</i>	4.2×10^{-2}
<i>Manzano Offices (Fire Station)</i>	1.1×10^{-1}
<i>Maxwell Housing</i>	7.2×10^{-2}
<i>National Atomic Museum</i>	6.9×10^{-2}
<i>Pershing Park Housing</i>	5.1×10^{-2}
<i>Riding Stables</i>	2.1×10^{-1}
<i>Sandia Base Elementary</i>	4.3×10^{-2}
<i>Sandia Federal Credit Union</i>	7.7×10^{-2}
<i>Shandiin Day Care Center</i>	6.3×10^{-2}
<i>Technical Onsite Inspection Facility</i>	9.8×10^{-2}
<i>Veterans Affairs Medical Center</i>	8.4×10^{-2}
<i>Wherry Elementary School</i>	5.2×10^{-2}
<i>Zia Park Housing</i>	6.6×10^{-2}

Table 5.4.7 6. Summary of Dose Estimates from Radioactive Air Emissions to 38 Onsite and Offsite Receptors Under the Expanded Operations Alternative (concluded)

RECEPTOR	ANNUAL RECEPTOR DOSE, EDE (mrem)
OFFSITE RECEPTORS	
<i>Albuquerque City Offices</i>	1.5×10^{-1}
<i>East Resident</i>	5.8×10^{-2}
<i>Eubank Gate Area (Bldg. 8895)</i>	1.1×10^{-1}
<i>Four Hills Subdivision</i>	1.1×10^{-1}
<i>Isleta Gaming Palace</i>	6.6×10^{-2}
<i>Northeast Resident</i>	7.8×10^{-2}
<i>Seismic Center (USGS)</i>	6.8×10^{-2}
<i>Tijeras Arroyo (West)</i>	1.9×10^{-1}

Sources: DOE 1997e, SNL/NM 1998a
EDE: effective dose equivalent

mrem: millirem
USGS: U. S. Geological Survey

5.4.8 Human Health and Worker Safety

Implementation of the Expanded Operations Alternative would result in the human health and worker safety impacts described in the following sections for normal operations and accident conditions.

5.4.8.1 Normal Operations

This section provides information on public health and worker health and safety under the Expanded Operations Alternative. It assesses the potential human health effects associated with routine releases of radioactive and nonradioactive hazardous material from SNL/NM normal operations. For detailed discussions of analytical methods and results, along with terminology, definitions, and descriptions, see Appendix E.

Health risk analyses are presented for potential exposures at specific receptor locations and for the potential maximum exposures to radiation and chemical air releases. For a description of receptor locations, exposure scenarios, and environmental pathways selected for assessing human health impacts, see Section 5.3.8.

Chemical Air Release Pathways

Under the Expanded Operations Alternative, chemical use would be more than the quantities projected under the No Action Alternative. As a result, air exposure concentrations at receptor locations are projected to increase slightly (Appendix E, Table E.3-3). The chemical assessment process, described in Section 5.3.8

for chemical air release pathways, identified seven COCs (see Appendix E, Table E.3-3). Three of the seven COCs are the same for different buildings. These COCs are associated with SNL/NM operations in Buildings 878 (AMPL), 893 (CSRL), 897 (IMRL), 6580 (HCF), and 870 (NGF).

Several receptor locations, individual exposure scenarios, and a hypothetical worst-case exposure scenario present the range of health risks from chemicals in the air in the SNL/NM vicinity. Adult, child, residential, and visitor risk assessments were calculated. Table 5.4.8-1 lists the human health impacts from the estimated exposures to chemical air releases from SNL/NM facility operations. These potential health risks are low and no adverse health effects would occur at these risk levels. Assessing the hypothetical worst-case exposure scenario establishes the upper bound value for health risk. Under the Expanded Alternative, the upper bound values for health risk from noncarcinogenic chemicals would be HIs of less than 1; the ELCRs would be less than 10^{-6} from carcinogenic chemicals (Table E.6-4).

Radiation Air Release Pathways

Projected air releases of radionuclides under the Expanded Operations Alternative would result in slightly higher radiation exposures to both the potential MEI and the population in the ROI. The maximum radiation doses calculated are presented in Section 5.4.7.2. The risk estimator of 500 fatal cancers per 1 M person-rem to the public was used to convert dose to fatal cancer risk.

Table 5.4.8 1. Human Health Impacts in the SNL/NM Vicinity from Chemical Air Emissions Under the Expanded Operations Alternative

RECEPTOR LOCATIONS	RECEPTOR	TOTAL HAZARD INDEX RME/AEI	TOTAL EXCESS LIFETIME CANCER RISK RME/AEI
RESIDENTIAL SCENARIOS			
<i>Four Hills Subdivision^a</i>	Adult	<0.01/<0.01	2.1x10 ⁻¹⁰ /1.3x10 ⁻¹⁰
	Child	<0.01/<0.01	8.5x10 ⁻¹¹ /8.5x10 ⁻¹¹
<i>Isleta Gaming Palace</i>	Adult	<0.01/<0.01	4.6x10 ⁻¹⁰ /4.7x10 ⁻¹²
	Child	<0.01/<0.01	3.2x10 ⁻¹⁰ /3.6x10 ⁻¹²
<i>KAFB Housing (Zia Park Housing)</i>	Adult	<0.01/<0.01	8.1x10 ⁻¹⁰ /8.4x10 ⁻¹²
	Child	<0.01/<0.01	5.7x10 ⁻¹⁰ /6.4x10 ⁻¹²
VISITOR SCENARIOS			
<i>Child Development Center-East</i>	Child	<0.01/<0.01	5.5x10 ⁻¹⁰ /6.2x10 ⁻¹²
<i>Child Development Center-West</i>	Child	<0.01/<0.01	1.2x10 ⁻¹⁰ /1.4x10 ⁻¹²
<i>Coronado Club</i>	Adult	<0.01/<0.01	1.0x10 ⁻⁹ /1.0x10 ⁻¹¹
	Child	<0.01/<0.01	7.0x10 ⁻¹⁰ /7.8x10 ⁻¹²
<i>Golf Course (Club House)</i>	Adult	<0.01/<0.01	5.1x10 ⁻¹⁰ /5.3x10 ⁻¹²
<i>Kirtland Elementary School</i>	Child	<0.01/<0.01	4.7x10 ⁻¹¹ /5.2x10 ⁻¹³
<i>Kirtland Underground Munitions and Maintenance Storage Complex (KUMMSC)^b</i>	Adult	<0.01/<0.01	3.5x10 ⁻¹⁰ /3.7x10 ⁻¹²
<i>Lovelace Hospital</i>	Adult	<0.01/<0.01	2.8x10 ⁻¹⁰ /2.9x10 ⁻¹²
	Child	<0.01/<0.01	1.9x10 ⁻¹⁰ /2.2x10 ⁻¹²
<i>National Atomic Museum</i>	Adult	<0.01/<0.01	2.1x10 ⁻⁹ /2.1x10 ⁻¹¹
	Child	<0.01/<0.01	1.4x10 ⁻⁹ /1.6x10 ⁻¹¹
<i>Riding Stables</i>	Adult	<0.01/<0.01	3.0x10 ⁻¹⁰ /3.1x10 ⁻¹²
<i>Sandia Base Elementary School</i>	Child	<0.01/<0.01	6.3x10 ⁻¹⁰ /7.2x10 ⁻¹²
<i>Shandiin Day Care Center</i>	Child	<0.01/<0.01	8.2x10 ⁻¹⁰ /9.3x10 ⁻¹²
<i>Veterans Affairs Medical Center</i>	Adult	<0.01/<0.01	3.4x10 ⁻¹⁰ /3.5x10 ⁻¹²
<i>Wherry Elementary</i>	Child	<0.01/<0.01	4.2x10 ⁻¹⁰ /4.7x10 ⁻¹²

Source: SmartRISK 1996

RME: Reasonable maximum exposed

AEI: Average exposed individual

^a Four Hills Subdivision receptor location impacts were based on Lurance Canyon Burn Site open burning air emissions, not SNL/NM building air emissions.^b This receptor location was analyzed using a worker scenario, as discussed in Appendix E.5

Note: See Section 5.3.8 for a discussion of selection of receptor locations.

The maximum annual exposure dose resulting from SNL/NM sources would occur in the KAFB boundary at the KUMMSC and would increase the MEI's lifetime risk of fatal cancer by 2.6×10^{-7} . In other words, the likelihood of the MEI developing fatal cancer from a 1-year dose from SNL/NM operations would be less than 1 chance in 4 M. The annual collective dose to the population due to these releases would increase the number of fatal cancers in the entire population within the ROI by 7.9×10^{-3} . This value is less than 1; therefore, no LCFs would be likely to occur in the ROI population due to SNL/NM radiological air releases.

To estimate a range in the potential for human health effects, radiation doses were calculated at specific receptor locations in the SNL/NM vicinity and are presented in Table 5.4.7-6. Table 5.4.8-2 lists the associated radiological health risks to receptors at several of these locations. Receptors at most of these locations would have a considerably lower risk than the highest

lifetime risk determined for the potential onsite MEI at the KUMMSC.

Receptors in the SNL/NM vicinity also have the potential to be exposed to air releases of radionuclides by way of the indirect air pathway: ingesting food that contains radionuclides. *CAP88-PC* integrates doses from this pathway in the collective dose estimation for the population within the ROI, but does not integrate it into the dose evaluation for the potential onsite MEI receptor. The estimated percentage of the population dose from ingesting potentially contaminated food would be approximately 10 percent (1.62 person-rem of the 15.8 person-rem annual collective population dose), which means it would also account for approximately 10 percent of the health risk value. When the same percent contribution is assumed, the lifetime risk of fatal cancer to the MEI from a 1-year dose would be increased by 2.6×10^{-8} (10 percent). The overall cancer risk to the MEI from radiation would still remain less than 1 chance in 4 M.

Table 5.4.8-2. Human Health Impacts in the SNL/NM Vicinity from Radiological Air Emissions Under the Expanded Operations Alternative

RECEPTOR LOCATIONS	LIFETIME RISK OF FATAL CANCER FROM A 1-YEAR DOSE
<i>Child Development Center-East</i>	2.7×10^{-8}
<i>Child Development Center-West</i>	3.1×10^{-8}
<i>Coronado Club</i>	2.8×10^{-8}
<i>Four Hills Subdivision</i>	5.5×10^{-8}
<i>Golf Course (Club House)</i>	1.2×10^{-7}
<i>Kirtland Elementary School</i>	3.1×10^{-8}
<i>KAFB Housing (Zia Park Housing)</i>	3.3×10^{-8}
<i>Kirtland Underground Munitions and Maintenance Storage Complex (KUMMSC)^a</i>	2.6×10^{-7}
<i>Lovelace Hospital</i>	2.3×10^{-8}
<i>National Atomic Museum</i>	3.5×10^{-8}
<i>Riding Stables</i>	1.1×10^{-7}
<i>Sandia Base Elementary School</i>	2.2×10^{-8}
<i>Shandiin Day Care Center</i>	3.2×10^{-8}
<i>Isleta Gaming Palace</i>	3.3×10^{-8}
<i>Veterans Affairs Medical Center</i>	4.2×10^{-8}
<i>Wherry Elementary School</i>	2.6×10^{-8}

Sources: DOE 1997e, SNL/NM 1998a
MEI: maximally exposed individual

^a The radiological MEI location for normal operations.
Note: Calculations were completed using *CAP88-PC*

Nonfatal Cancers and Genetic Disorders

Radiation exposures can cause nonfatal cancers and genetic disorders. The NCRP has adopted risk estimators recommended by the ICRP for the public for assessing these health effects from radiation (ICRP 1991). The SNL/NM maximum annual dose to the MEI would increase the lifetime risk of nonfatal cancers and genetic disorders by 5.1×10^{-8} and 6.6×10^{-8} , respectively, which would be less than 1 chance in 15 M. The SNL/NM annual collective radiation dose to the population within the ROI would increase the number of nonfatal cancers and genetic disorders by 1.6×10^{-3} and 2.1×10^{-3} , respectively. This means that no additional nonfatal cancers or genetic disorders would be likely to occur within the ROI population from SNL/NM radiological air releases.

Transportation

The potential human health risks and accident fatalities for transporting of various radiological materials for SNL/NM operations are discussed in Section 5.4.9. The radiological dose to the population along the route within the ROI was estimated by assuming that 10 percent of the total travel distance would occur within the ROI. Therefore, 10 percent of the total radiological dose (off link and on link), calculated for all radiological materials transport, would be considered as an additional human health impact to the population along the route within the ROI (see Appendix G). This percentage of the annual collective population dose from transportation activity would increase the ROI number of LCFs by 2.5×10^{-3} . Adding this to the number of LCFs associated with the annual collective population dose due to routine air releases would change the risk to 1.0×10^{-2} . In other words, no additional LCFs in the ROI would likely occur from SNL/NM radiological materials transportation activities.

Composite Cancer Risk

Annual radiation dose accumulates over the total number of years the person is exposed. The radiological MEI lifetime risk of fatal cancer following a 30-year exposure time would be 7.8×10^{-6} , or less than 1 chance in 128,000. Thirty years is consistent with the exposure used in calculating the lifetime chemical cancer risk. To assess a composite cancer risk capturing the greatest potential cancer risk from radiation exposure, the fatal cancer risk to the MEI and the chemical ELCR at the same location (KUMMSC) were summed. For the KUMMSC location, the contribution of risk from exposure to chemicals would not increase the risk from

radiation exposure (the increased lifetime risk of fatal cancer would remain 7.8×10^{-6}), and it was concluded that the majority of the risk would be from the potential exposure to radiation (see Table E.6 2).

To assess a composite cancer risk capturing the highest potential risk from chemicals, the upper bound risk value for cancer risk from chemicals, which assumes a hypothetical worst-case exposure scenario, was added to the radiological MEI (KUMMSC) cancer risk (see Table E.6 4). This is an implausible scenario used only to bound the analysis. The composite cancer risk would be 7.9×10^{-6} . This would still be within the EPA's cancer risk range established for the protection of human health of 10^{-6} to 10^{-4} (40 CFR Part 300). This would be a risk of less than 1 chance in 126,000. The SNL/NM potential contribution (from potential exposures to chemicals and radiation) to an individual's lifetime cancer risk would be very low, considering that, overall in the U.S., men have a 1-in-2 lifetime risk of developing cancer and for women the risk is 1-in-3. Approximately 1 of every 4 deaths in the U.S. is from cancer (ACS 1997).

Worker Health and Safety

Under the Expanded Operations Alternative, worker safety impacts would vary only slightly from under the No Action Alternative. Impacts to the entire workforce were assessed based on a 10 percent increase in the worker population (see Section 5.4.12) and the assumption that the SNL/NM worker injury/illness rate per 100 workers would remain consistent with the 5-year average derived for 1992 through 1996. Impacts expected would be zero fatalities per year, approximately 326 nonfatal injuries/illnesses per year, an average of 47 mrem per year radiation dose (TEDE) to the radiation-badged worker, and 1 or 2 confirmed chemical exposures per year.

Routine air emissions evaluated for potential exposures to specific receptors in the SNL/NM vicinity would have the potential to impact noninvolved workers at SNL/NM. A noninvolved worker is not exposed to chemical or radiological work-related activities, but is potentially exposed because they work at SNL/NM in the vicinity of facility releases. Potential noninvolved worker exposures to airborne radiation were identified using the KUMMSC receptor location (Table 5.4.8 2). Potential noninvolved worker exposures to airborne chemicals were identified using a receptor location at the center of TA-I, near SNL/NM's chemical facility sources. Based on an exposure scenario for a worker, health risks from chemicals to the noninvolved worker would be

below a HI of 1 and less than 10^{-6} for an ELCR (see Appendix E, Table E.6 4).

The risks of cancer fatality from the annual average individual worker dose, annual maximum worker dose, and annual workforce collective dose (to the radiation worker population) are shown in Table 5.4.8 3. Health risks from the annual average individual and annual maximum worker doses would remain constant for each alternative (based on the REMS database dose information for 1996) (see Appendix E, Section E.6.1.1). The ICRP risk estimator of 400 fatal cancers per 1 M person-rem among workers was used to convert dose to risk of LCF. The annual workforce collective dose would be associated with 7.6×10^{-3} additional fatal cancers for the entire radiation worker population (those working in radiation-designated areas). For assessment purposes, this would equate to no additional LCFs in the radiation worker population under the Expanded Operations Alternative.

Table 5.4.8 3. Radiation Doses (TEDE^a) and Health Impacts to Workers from SNL/NM Operations Under the Expanded Operations Alternative

RADIATION WORKER DOSE RATES	RADIATION DOSE	RISK OF CANCER FATALITY FROM A 1-YEAR DOSE
<i>Annual Average Individual Worker Dose</i>	47 ^b (mrem/year)	1.9×10^{-5}
<i>Annual Maximum Worker Dose</i>	845 ^b (mrem/year)	3.4×10^{-4}
RADIATION WORKER DOSE RATES	RADIATION DOSE	NUMBER OF LCFs
<i>Annual Workforce Collective Dose</i>	19 (person-rem/year)	7.6×10^{-3}

Source: SNL/NM 1997k

LCFs: latent cancer fatalities

mrem/yr: millirems per year

rem: roentgen equivalent, man

TEDE: total effective dose equivalent

^a Average measured TEDE means the collective TEDE divided by the number of individuals with a measured dose greater than 10 mrem.

^b Annual average individual and annual maximum worker doses would be expected to remain consistent with the base year, 1996 (see Section 4.10).

Note: Because not all badged workers are radiation workers, radiation workers means those badges with greater than 10 mrem above background measurements used in the calculations.

Nonfatal Cancer and Genetic Disorders

The SNL/NM maximum annual dose to the radiation worker population would increase the number of nonfatal cancer and genetic disorders by 1.5×10^{-3} , based on the risk estimator of 80 health effects per 1 M person-rem used for both effects. In other words, no additional nonfatal cancers or genetic disorders would be likely to occur in the radiation worker population due to operations under the Expanded Operations Alternative.

Nonionizing Radiation

Sources of nonionizing radiant energy at SNL/NM include both laser and accelerator facilities. The SAs for the SNL/NM laser facilities report that the lasers are operated according to ANSI guidelines, which require that light paths are isolated from workers and from other equipment (SNL/NM 1996b). For accelerators that generate EMP and that could present a high-voltage hazard to personnel, ANSI guidelines require mitigation measures such as shielding to block high-voltage hazards from personnel and, during tests shots, exclude personnel from high-bay areas. Based on measurements from SNL/NM's pulsed power facilities, the EMP exposures to personnel outside the high-bay would be less than the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) standard of 100 kV/m (SNL/NM 1996b). Therefore, routine high-voltage impacts to SNL/NM workers and the public would not occur.

5.4.8.2 Accidents

This section describes, under the Expanded Operations Alternative, the potential impacts to workers and the public of potential accidents involving the release of radioactive and/or chemical materials, explosions, and other hazards. Additional details on the accident analyses and impacts are presented in Appendix F.

Site-Wide Earthquake

An earthquake in the Albuquerque, New Mexico, area has the potential for human injury and building damage throughout the local region. Due to differences in structural design, SNL/NM buildings and structures vary in their capabilities to withstand earthquake forces. Any magnitude earthquake has the potential to cause injury to workers in and around buildings and damage to structures from the physical forces and effects of the earthquake. Additional injury to workers and the public would be possible from explosions and from exposure to chemical and radioactive materials that could be released

from buildings and storage containers. Facilities in TA-I are the predominant source of chemical materials that could be released during an earthquake. Facilities in TA-V are the predominant source of radioactive materials that could be released. The ECF in TA-II is the predominant source of explosive materials. Lesser quantities of radioactive materials in TAs-I and -II could also be released and cause exposures to workers and the public.

In the event of an earthquake (UBC, 0.17 *g*), various buildings in TA-I could be affected and various chemicals could be released (see Appendix F, Table F7-7). Larger magnitude earthquakes could cause more serious impacts. The shape and direction of the chemical plumes would depend upon local meteorological conditions and physical structures. All potential plumes and concentration levels exceeding ERPG-2 are shown as shaded areas in Figure 5.4.8-1. Some of the potentially affected area extends offsite. Within the shaded area, out to a distance of 3,800 ft, there could be as many as 5,300 persons at risk of exposure depending on the time of day and plume shape and direction. However, in the event of a release of chemicals, the plumes would cause exposures in excess of ERPG-2 to only a portion of the 5,300 persons at risk. Mitigation features designed to limit the release of chemicals from storage containers, rooms, and buildings would limit or reduce plume size, concentration levels, and exposures. Emergency procedures and sheltering would also minimize exposures to workers and the public.

Nuclear facilities in TAs-I, -II, and -V could also be damaged during an earthquake. The frequency of an earthquake (0.17 *g*) that could cause the release of radioactive materials from TAs-I and -II facilities is 1.0×10^{-3} per year, or 1 chance in 1,000 per year. The frequency of an earthquake (0.22 *g*) that could cause the release of radioactive materials from TAs-I (NG-1), -II (ECF-1), and -V facilities is 7.0×10^{-4} per year, or 1 chance in 1,500 per year. The consequences are shown in Table 5.4.8-4. Descriptions of accident scenarios are given in Section 5.3.8.2 and Appendix F. If a 0.22-*g* earthquake was to occur, there would be an estimated 6.4×10^{-2} additional LCFs in the total population within 50 mi of the site associated with the HC-1 accident scenario. The MEI and noninvolved worker would have an increased probability of LCF of 6.9×10^{-6} and 3.0×10^{-2} , respectively, associated with the HC-1 accident. The risks for these receptors can be estimated by multiplying these consequence values by the probability (frequency) of earthquake. If a stronger earthquake was to occur, larger releases of radioactive materials would be possible and could cause greater impacts.



A severe earthquake could also cause damage to other SNL/NM facilities and result in environmental impacts. For example, the large quantities of oil stored in external tanks and in accelerator buildings in TA-IV could potentially be spilled and cause impacts to the ecosystem and water resources. Underground natural gas lines could break and ignite causing brush and forest fires that could further damage facilities and persons in the vicinity. Hydrogen storage tanks in TA-I could be damaged, causing hydrogen combustion or explosion and potential injury to persons in the vicinity. Explosives in the ECF in TA-II and smaller quantities in other facilities could also be accidentally detonated during an earthquake with an injury to persons in the vicinity. Occupants of all facilities would be at risk of injury as a result of the earthquake forces and building damage.

Facility Hazards

Some of the facilities at SNL/NM contain occupational hazards with the potential to endanger the health and safety of involved workers in the vicinity of an accident. Some of these facilities also contain hazardous materials that, in the event of an accident, could endanger the health and safety of people within the immediate vicinity and beyond. These people include noninvolved SNL/NM workers, members of the military assigned to KAFB, members of the public located within the KAFB boundary and offsite. Offsite consequences were determined to a 50-mi radius around the affected facility.

Radiological, chemical, and explosion accidents with the largest impacts to workers and the public have been analyzed as discussed in the following sections. Potential accidents associated with other facility hazards such as lasers, electricity, X-rays, transformer oil, noise, shrapnel, pyrotechnics, and compressed gases could affect the health and safety of the involved workers. However, the impacts to noninvolved workers and the public for these other accidents would be lower than the impacts from radiological, chemical, and explosion accidents described in the SWEIS (Appendix F, Table F6-3).

The DOE recognizes the potential adverse effects for workers, the public, and the environment that could result for the deterioration of SNL/NM equipment, structures, and facilities. However, the analysis of potential accidents discussed in this section assumes that the expected deterioration of equipment, structures, and facilities would not affect the occurrence, progression, and effects of accidents. The basis for this assumption is that the DOE safety analysis process, specified in DOE Orders and standards, would require periodic



Source: Original
 Note: see Appendix F.7, Figure F7 1

Figure 5.4.8 1. Areas Above ERPG-2 Levels from a Site-Wide Earthquake Under the Expanded Operations Alternative

The encircled areas represent locations where approximately 5,300 people would be at risk of exposure to chemical concentrations above ERPG-2.

Table 5.4.8 4. Site-Wide Earthquake Radiological Impacts Under the Expanded Operations Alternative

ACCIDENT ID ^a	FREQUENCY (per year)	ADDITIONAL LATENT CANCER FATALITIES IN 50-MILE POPULATION	INCREASED PROBABILITY OF LATENT CANCER FATALITY	
			MAXIMALLY EXPOSED INDIVIDUAL ^b	NONINVOLVED WORKER ^c
TECHNICAL AREA-I				
NG-1	7.0x10 ⁻⁴	5.1x10 ⁻⁵	1.4x10 ⁻⁹	3.2x10 ⁻⁶
TECHNICAL AREA-II				
ECF-1	7.0x10 ⁻⁴	3.0x10 ⁻⁶	1.5x10 ⁻¹⁰	1.9x10 ⁻⁷
TECHNICAL AREA-V				
AM-2	7.0x10 ⁻⁴	2.0x10 ⁻³	2.4x10 ⁻⁷	7.4x10 ⁻⁵
HC-1	7.0x10 ⁻⁴	6.4x10 ⁻²	6.9x10 ⁻⁶	3.0x10 ⁻²
SP-1	7.0x10 ⁻⁴	9.2x10 ⁻³	5.8x10 ⁻⁷	2.7x10 ⁻⁴

Source: Original (See also Appendix F, Tables F.7 4 and F.7 5)

^a Facility Accident Descriptors:

Neutron Generator Facility: NG-1

Explosive Component Facility: ECF-1

Annular Core Research Reactor-Medical Isotope Production: AM-2

Hot Cell Facility: HC-1

Sandia Pulsed Reactor: SP-1

^b The maximally exposed individual is located at the Golf Course and the consequences can be added.

^c Because the uninjured worker is located 100 meters from the release point, the location varies relative to each technical area. Therefore, the consequences to the noninvolved worker can only be added for a given technical area.

assessments of facility safety to ensure that operations are being performed in an approved safety envelop. The process would also require an assessment of all unresolved safety questions that would result from any change in a facility or operation that could affect the operation's authorization basis. Depending on the results of the assessment, modifications to the facility and/or operational procedures would be implemented to maintain operations in the authorization basis.

Explosion Accidents

Explosive materials are stored, handled, transported, and used at some SNL/NM facilities. Administrative controls and facility design would help prevent an explosion accident and limit the impacts to personnel, if an accident was to occur. The ECF, for example, contains large quantities of explosives for use in its testing programs. Hydrogen trailers are another large source of explosive material. There would be approximately five hydrogen trailers parked near facilities or routinely transported to facilities from remote locations.

The largest quantity of hydrogen with the highest potential for consequences to both SNL/NM workers and facilities is a set of horizontally mounted cylinders, with storage capacity of approximately 90,000 SCF, located approximately east of the CSRL, Building 893,

in TA-I. An explosion at the hydrogen storage cylinders located near the CSRL was selected for detailed analysis to estimate the bounding impacts of an explosion accident. If a hydrogen explosion was to occur in this relatively populated area of TA-I, individuals in the area could be injured and nearby property could be damaged. Involved workers within 61 ft of an explosion could be seriously injured and would have a 50 percent chance of survival. Involved workers out to a distance of 126 ft from the explosion could receive damage to their eardrums and lungs. The resulting overpressure from this explosion and impacts to personnel and property would diminish with distance, as shown in Table 5.4.8 5.

The actual number of persons in the vicinity of the accident depends upon many factors and the actual number of potential fatalities is uncertain. Factors include the time of day (start of work day, lunchtime, after hours), the actual location of the people (amount of shielding between the hydrogen tank and the person), and the actual spread of the pressure waves in a very complex arrangement of buildings, alleys, and walkways.

This bounding facility explosion was postulated to occur from an accidental uncontrolled release of hydrogen stored in a tank outside the CSRL building caused by human errors (such as mishandling activities) or equipment failures (such as a pipe joint failure) and the presence of an ignition source (such as a spark) near the

Table 5.4.8 5. Impacts of an Explosion Accident Under the Expanded Operations Alternative

DISTANCE TO RECEPTOR OR PROPERTY (ft)	PEAK REFLECTIVE PRESSURE (psi) (472 lbm TNT EQUIVALENT)	COMMENTS
25	650	Peak pressure.
61	50	For individual workers, there would be a 50% survival rate for pressures in excess of 50 psi.
126	10	For individual workers, there would be a 50% rate of ear rupture for pressures in excess of 10 psi. Total destruction of buildings could be expected for pressures in excess of 10 psi.
370	2	Pressures in excess of 2 to 3 psi would cause concrete or cinder block walls to shatter.
657	1	Pressures in excess of 1 psi would cause a house to be demolished.

Source: DOE 1992b (See also Appendix F, Table F.4.1)
ft: feet
lbm: poundmass

psi: pounds per square inch
TNT: trinitrotoluene

location of release. Because multiple failures would have to occur for an uncontrolled release of hydrogen to lead to an explosion, this accident scenario would be extremely unlikely (that is, between 1×10^{-6} and 1×10^{-4} per year).

The human organs most vulnerable to shock explosions are the ears and lungs because they contain air or other gases. The damage would be done at the gas-tissue interface, where flaking and tearing could occur. Both the ear and the lung responses would be dependent not only on the overpressure, but also on impulse and body orientation. The shorter the pulse width, the higher the pressure the body could tolerate. An overpressure of approximately 50 psi would result in a 50 percent fatality rate; approximately 10 psi would result in eardrum rupture. These overpressure estimates are based on a square pressure wave with a pulse duration greater than 10 msec, and their effects could vary depending on body orientation to the pressure wave.

Structural damage produced by airblasts would depend on the type of structural material. An overpressure of on the order of 1 psi would cause partial demolition of houses (rendering them uninhabitable). An overpressure of 2 to 3 psi would shatter unreinforced concrete or cinder block walls; and an overpressure of 10 psi would probably cause total destruction of buildings.

Radiological Accidents

The largest quantities of radioactive materials at risk for radiological accidents are located in TA-V. The Manzano

Waste Storage Facilities and TAs-I, -II, and -IV also contain radioactive material, but in smaller amounts. The nuclear facilities in TA-V include the ACRR, SPR, HCF and GIF. The NGIF is under construction in TA-V. The planned primary use of the ACRR is medical isotope production (primarily molybdenum-99). The HCF has been reconfigured for medical isotope production and the accidents analyzed reflect this mode of operation. The DP configuration would be conducted in a new Annular Core Pulsed Reactor II (ACPR-II) located in TA-V. It was assumed that the ACPR-II would be a reconstituted version of the ACRR and would behave during accidents exactly as described in the ACRR SAR. Accidents have also been analyzed for storage of radioactive materials in the HCF not associated with molybdenum-99 production. Potential accidents at TA-I, TA-IV, and the Manzano Waste Storage Facilities are discussed in Appendix F.2.

The most serious radiological accident impacts under the Expanded Operations Alternative are shown in Table 5.4.8-6. The table lists a set of accidents and their consequences in terms of an increased probability of an LCF for an exposed individual and an increased number of LCFs for the offsite population. Other radiological accidents could also occur at these facilities, but their consequences would be within the envelope of the selected set of accidents.

The accident with the highest consequences to the public would be a fire in Room 108 at the HCF in TA-V (HS-2). If this accident was to occur, there would be

Table 5.4.8 6. Potential Impacts of Radiological Facility Accidents Under the Expanded Operations Alternative

FACILITY	ACCIDENT ID	SCENARIO	FREQUENCY (per year)	ADDITIONAL LATENT CANCER FATALITIES TO 50-MILE POPULATION	INCREASED PROBABILITY OF LATENT CANCER FATALITY	
					MAXIMALLY EXPOSED INDIVIDUAL	NONINVOLVED WORKER
Annular Core Research Reactor-Medical Isotopes Production Configuration	AM-1	Airplane crash - collapse of bridge crane	6.3×10^{-6}	2.0×10^{-3}	2.4×10^{-7}	7.4×10^{-5}
	AM-3	Rupture of waterlogged fuel element	1.0×10^{-2} to 1.0×10^{-4}	4.9×10^{-4}	5.4×10^{-8}	3.8×10^{-6}
	AM-4	Rupture of one molybdenum-99 target	1.0×10^{-4} to 1.0×10^{-6}	3.9×10^{-4}	4.3×10^{-8}	3.0×10^{-6}
	AM-5	Fuel handling accident - irradiated element	1.0×10^{-4} to 1.0×10^{-6}	4.9×10^{-3}	6.1×10^{-7}	7.6×10^{-5}
	AM-6	Airplane crash and fire in reactor room with unirradiated fuel and targets present	6.3×10^{-6}	1.6×10^{-6}	1.0×10^{-10}	4.9×10^{-8}
	AM-7	Target rupture during Annular Core Research Reactor to Hot Cell Facility transfer	$< 1.0 \times 10^{-6}$	3.9×10^{-4}	4.9×10^{-8}	1.4×10^{-5}
	Hot Cell Facility-Medical Isotopes Production	HM-1	Operator error - molybdenum-99 target processing	1.0×10^{-1} to 1.0×10^{-2}	3.8×10^{-5}	3.3×10^{-9}
HM-2		Operator error iodine-125 target processing	1.0×10^{-1} to 1.0×10^{-2}	1.6×10^{-6}	1.0×10^{-10}	4.2×10^{-9}
HM-4		Fire in steel containment box	1.0×10^{-2} to 1.0×10^{-4}	2.6×10^{-3}	2.4×10^{-7}	2.3×10^{-6}
Hot Cell Facility Room 108 Storage	HS-1	Fire in room 108, average inventories	3.3×10^{-5}	2.1×10^{-3}	1.8×10^{-7}	2.0×10^{-7}
	HS-2	Fire in room 108, maximum inventories	2.0×10^{-7}	7.9×10^{-2}	6.6×10^{-6}	7.4×10^{-6}

**Table 5.4.8 6. Potential Impacts of Radiological Facility
Accidents Under the Expanded Operations Alternative (concluded)**

FACILITY	ACCIDENT ID	SCENARIO	FREQUENCY (per year)	ADDITIONAL LATENT CANCER FATALITIES TO 50-MILE POPULATION	INCREASED PROBABILITY OF LATENT CANCER FATALITY	
					MAXIMALLY EXPOSED INDIVIDUAL	NONINVOLVED WORKER
Sandia Pulsed Reactor	S3M-2	Control element misadjustment before insert	1.0×10^{-4} to 1.0×10^{-6}	1.2×10^{-3}	1.5×10^{-7}	2.5×10^{-4}
	S3M-3	Failure of a fissionable experiment	1.0×10^{-4} to 1.0×10^{-6}	7.9×10^{-3}	8.4×10^{-7}	3.8×10^{-1}
	SS-1	Airplane crash into North Vault storage vault	6.3×10^{-6}	9.2×10^{-3}	5.8×10^{-7}	5.5×10^{-4}
	S4-1	Control-element misadjustment before insert	1.0×10^{-4} to 1.0×10^{-6}	2.2×10^{-3}	2.7×10^{-7}	4.7×10^{-4}
Annular Core Pulsed Reactor-II, Defense Programs	AR-1	Uncontrolled addition of reactivity	$< 1.0 \times 10^{-6}$	7.3×10^{-3}	9.3×10^{-7}	1.2×10^{-4}
	AR-2	Rupture of waterlogged fuel element	1.0×10^{-1} to 1.0×10^{-2}	1.3×10^{-3}	1.7×10^{-7}	1.2×10^{-5}
	AR-4	Fire in reactor room with experiment present	1.0×10^{-4} to 1.0×10^{-6}	9.0×10^{-3}	1.0×10^{-6}	1.4×10^{-4}
	AR-6	Airplane crash, collapse of bridge crane	6.3×10^{-6}	5.9×10^{-3}	8.4×10^{-7}	2.2×10^{-4}

Source: Original

ACPR: Annular Core Pulsed Reactor

ACRR: Annular Core Research Reactor

SPR: Sandia Pulsed Reactor

TA: technical area

TA-V Facility Accident Descriptors:

ACRR - Medical Isotope Production: AM-1, AM-3, AM-4, AM-5, AM-6, AM-7

Hot Cell - Medical Isotope Production: HM-1, HM-2, HM-4

Hot Cell - Room 108 Storage: HS-1, HS-2

SPR: S3M-2, S3M3, SS-1, S4-1

ACPR-II-Defense Programs: AR-1, AR-2, AR-4, AR-6

7.9×10^{-2} additional LCFs in the offsite population within 50 mi of the site. There would be increased probabilities of an LCF for the MEI and a noninvolved worker of 6.6×10^{-6} and 7.4×10^{-6} , respectively. The estimated frequency of occurrence for this accident would be 2.0×10^{-7} per year or less than 1 chance in 5,000,000 per year.

Involved workers run the highest risk of injury or fatality in the event of many radiological accidents discussed in this section as well as the many others that could occur. Although there are protective measures and administrative controls to protect involved workers, they are usually in the immediate vicinity of the accidents where they could be exposed to radioactivity.

Accident scenarios for the Expanded Operations Alternative have been described in Section 5.3.8.2.

The impacts to all other receptors would be less than for the MEI. Details on the impacts to all receptors analyzed are provided in Appendix F.2.

Chemical Accidents

Many SNL/NM facilities store and use a variety of hazardous chemicals. For the chemical with the highest RHI in a building, a catastrophic accident and total release of the building inventory was postulated as the bounding event, and estimates were made of the chemicals concentrations at various distances from the accident. The source terms are shown in Table 5.4.8 7.

Building inventory and 50 percent of the largest single source are shown to reflect the variability and uncertainty in the actual amount of the chemical that could be present in inventory at the time of an accident. Similarly, estimates are shown for the range of distances within which the ERPG-2 would be exceeded. The ERPG-2 is an accepted guideline for public exposure (see Appendix F.3 for an explanation of ERPG levels).

In the event of a severe chemical accident in TA-I, involved workers, noninvolved workers, KAFB personnel, onsite residents, and onsite members of the public would be at risk of being exposed to chemical concentrations in excess of ERPG-2 levels. The number of individuals at risk during normal business hours is shown in Table 5.4.8 8. Although Table 5.4.8 8 shows the maximum number of people at risk, the actual number exposed would depend on the time of day, location of people, wind conditions, and other factors, and would be much less than that shown.

As shown in Table 5.4.8 8, the worst-case chemical accident would be a catastrophic release of arsine from

Building 893 in TA-I. If this accident was to occur and the average inventory (source term) of 20 lb of arsine was released, individuals within 2,640 ft of the point of release would receive exposures that exceed the ERPG-2. If the building inventory of 65 lb of arsine was released, individuals within a distance of 4,884 ft from the point of release would receive exposures that exceed the ERPG-2. Figure 5.4.8 2 illustrates the KAFB locations that would be affected by these worst-case chemical accident scenarios involving the release of arsine or chlorine from Buildings 893 and 858, respectively. The circles on the figure correspond to the distances within which the ERPG-2 would be exceeded. However, the actual affected area within the circles would depend upon wind conditions, and only a small portion of the area would be affected. In the event of a release, the area exceeding the ERPG-2 would be shaped by the wind and nearby buildings, perhaps affecting 1/16th to 1/10th of the circular area out to the indicated distance. All individuals exposed for 1 hour or more at these distances could experience or develop irreversible or other serious health effects or symptoms that could impair their abilities to take protective action. For any release, the seriousness of an exposure would generally decrease for distances further from the point of release.

In the event of an aircraft crash or earthquake involving buildings with various chemical inventories, multiple chemicals would be released. Although the impacts of mixed chemicals could be greater than individual chemicals, their behavior, dispersion, and health effects can be complex and have therefore, not been considered quantitatively. An earthquake could also cause the release of like chemicals from multiple buildings and lead to increased concentration where individual plumes overlap. The potential and impacts for overlapping plumes are discussed in Appendix F.3.

Other Accidents

Other types of potential accidents were identified whose impacts are not measured in terms of LCFs or chemical concentrations. These could cause serious injury or fatality for humans and/or impacts to the nonhuman environment such as the ecology, historical sites, or sensitive cultural sites.

Brush Fires Small fires are expected and planned for during outdoor testing that involves propellants and explosives. The potential exists for brush and forest fires when hot test debris or projectiles come in contact with combustible elements in the environment. One such incident was reported in 1993 in TA-III when a rocket motor detonated

Table 5.4.8 7. Potential Impacts of Chemical Accidents Under the Expanded Operations Alternative

BUILDING	CHEMICAL	SOURCE TERM		ERPG-2 LEVEL OF CONCERN (ppm)	EXCEEDANCE DISTANCE		FREQUENCY (per year)
		BUILDING INVENTORY (lb)	50% OF LARGEST SINGLE SOURCE (lb)		BUILDING INVENTORY (ft)	50% OF LARGEST SINGLE SOURCE (ft)	
823	Nitrous oxide	32.17	15.26	125	348	237	1.0x10 ⁻³ to 1.0x10 ⁻⁴
858	Chlorine	106.4	53.2	3	3,726	2,598	1.0x10 ⁻³ to 9.7x10 ⁻⁵
869	Nitric acid	18.6	9.3	15	666	465	1.0x10 ⁻³ to 1.0x10 ⁻⁴
878	Nitrous oxide	50	25	125	438	309	1.0x10 ⁻³ to 3.2x10 ⁻⁵
880	Hydrofluoric acid	2	1	20	219	153	1.0x10 ⁻³ to 1.0x10 ⁻⁴
883	Phosphine	6.8	3.4	2.5	1,440	1,002	1.0x10 ⁻³ to 1.0x10 ⁻⁴
884	Hydrofluoric acid	10	5	20	504	351	1.0x10 ⁻³ to 1.0x10 ⁻⁴
888	Fluorine	0.07	0.04	1	207	93	1.0x10 ⁻³ to 1.0x10 ⁻⁴
893	Arsine	65	20	1	4,884	2,640	1.0x10 ⁻³ to 1.0x10 ⁻⁴
897	Chlorine	4.4	2.2	3	699	486	1.0x10 ⁻³ to 6.6x10 ⁻⁵
905	Thionyl chloride	101.1	50.5	5	2,067	1,434	1.0x10 ⁻³ to 9.0x10 ⁻⁵

Sources: NSC 1995, SNL/NM 1998a (See also Appendix F, Tables F.3 3 and F.3 4)
 ERPG: Emergency Response Planning Guideline
 ft: feet
 lb: pound
 ppm: parts per million

Table 5.4.8 8. Maximum Impacts of Chemical Accidents on Individuals Within the KAFB Under the Expanded Operations Alternative

BUILDING	CHEMICAL NAME	RELEASE (lb)	ALOHA RADIUS REQUIRED TO REACH ERPG-2 LEVEL (ft)	NUMBER OF PEOPLE WITHIN ERPG-2
823	Nitrous oxide	32.17	348	844
858	Chlorine	106.41	3,726	3,783
869	Nitric acid	18.6	666	1,511
878	Nitrous Oxide	50	438	880
880	Hydrofluoric acid	2	219	529
883	Phosphine	6.8	1,440	3,743
884	Hydrofluoric acid	10	504	800
888	Fluorine	0.07	207	0
893	Arsine	65	4,884	8,254
897	Chlorine	4.4	699	625
905	Thionyl chloride	101.1	2,067	1,356



Source: Bleakly 1998c (See also Appendix F, Table F.3) \emptyset
 ALOHA: Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres (model)
 ERPG: Emergency Response Planning Guideline

ft: feet
 lb: pound

during a sled track impact test and resulted in a 40-ac brush fire. Another accident occurred at the Aerial Cable Facility in the Coyote Test Field, which resulted in a fire that swept up the side of a mountain before being extinguished by SNL/NM workers. Many others have also occurred that were contained in the immediate vicinity of the test area. Measures would be taken to prevent fires and, should a fire occur, the effects would be mitigated by activating fire fighting facilities in the test area (DOE 1995a, SNL/NM 1993d, SNL/NM 1998i).

Natural Phenomena Naturally occurring events such as tornadoes, lightning, floods, and heavy snow, as documented in existing SNL/NM safety documentation, have been considered for their potential to initiate the accidental release of radioactive, chemical, and other hazardous materials that affect workers and the public. Any of these events, should they occur, could also lead to serious injury or fatality as a result of the physical and destructive forces associated with the events. The risks of such events to workers and the public would be equivalent to everyday risks from naturally occurring events to the general public wherever they work and reside.

Spills and Leaks The potential would exist throughout SNL/NM for the accidental spill of radioactive, chemical, or other hazardous materials. The effects of such spills on workers and the public through airborne pathways were considered earlier in this section. The impacts from pathways other than airborne would normally be bounded by exposure from airborne pathways. Any spill of a hazardous substance would have the potential for impacts to the nonhuman elements of the environment. A spill could make its way into surface and groundwater systems, affecting water quality and aquatic life. Spills of flammable substances could cause fires that damage plant and animal life and other land resources. There have been spills of hazardous substances at the SNL/NM site that had the potential to affect the nonhuman elements of the environment. In 1994, over 100 gal of oil were spilled at the Centrifuge Complex in TA-III when a hydraulic pump failed during a centrifuge test, causing a potential impact to the nonhuman elements of the environment. Also in 1994, a small spill of transformer oil occurred from an oil storage tank in TA-IV when a gasket failed and, at the Coyote Test Field, a leaking underground storage tank containing ethylene glycol was discovered.



Sources: Original
 Note: see Table 5.4.8 8

Figure 5.4.8 2. Projected Extent of ERPG-2 Levels from Accidental Release of Arsinic Acid (Bldg. 893) and Chlorine (Bldg. 858)

Circled areas represent the distances within which an ERPG-2 level would be exceeded for an accidental release of arsinic acid (Building 893) and/or chlorine (Building 858) under the Expanded Operations Alternative.

Radiological and Chemical Contamination Some accidents analyzed in this section and others, that were considered but not analyzed, could potentially impact the nonhuman elements of the environment. Any accidentally released chemicals would result in concentrations that would typically decrease with increasing distance from the point of release. While chemical concentrations would diminish over distance to a point where a human hazard would no longer be present, the concentrations could still affect other elements of the environment such as the ecology, water quality, and cultural resources. Radiological releases could also affect nonhuman elements of the environment. After an accident, SNL/NM, through their spill and pollution control and radiological emergency response plans, would be required to assess the potential for ground contamination; if contamination exceeds guidance levels, plans would be developed for remediation.

Industrial Besides radioactive and chemical materials and explosives, many SNL/NM facilities conduct operations and use materials and equipment that could be potentially hazardous to workers. These hazards are typically referred to as normal industrial hazards, not unlike similar hazards that workers are exposed to throughout the nation, and include working with electricity, climbing ladders, welding, and driving forklifts. All operations and activities at SNL/NM facilities, as well as all DOE facilities, would be subject to administrative procedures and safety features designed to prevent accidents and mitigate their consequences should they occur.

5.4.9 Transportation

The implementation of the Expanded Operations Alternative would result in transportation impacts for each of three ROIs: KAFB; major Albuquerque roadways; and major roadways between Albuquerque and specific waste disposal facilities, vendors, and other DOE facilities. This analysis involved estimating the number of trips made by SNL/NM-associated vehicles under normal operations in each of these transportation corridors. Transportation evaluation and multipliers are discussed in Section 5.3.9, Appendix A, and Appendix G.

5.4.9.1 Transportation of Material and Wastes

In general, the number of material shipments received by SNL/NM would be proportional to total SNL/NM

material consumption. According to facility projections, material consumption under the Expanded Operations Alternative would increase by 484 percent over baseline levels. Thus, total material shipments would also increase, although not necessarily for all types of material.

Radioactive and explosive material shipments are often delivered by government carriers, unless the quantities and activities being transported are low enough to meet the Federal guidelines and restrictions in place for authorized commercial transporters. Government carriers operate on an as-needed basis, thus the general increase in material inventory under the Expanded Operations Alternative would result in a similar increase in these kinds of shipments.

Due to their shipment method, there would be very little impact to the number of chemical shipments that are made to SNL/NM. JIT chemicals, which are ordered infrequently and in small quantities, are usually shipped to SNL/NM by way of commercial carriers such as Federal Express and UPS. These carriers make daily shipments to SNL/NM to deliver packages other than chemicals, and an increase in the volume of chemicals they handle per shipment would not increase their frequency. Similarly, major chemical vendors who deliver their own material, rather than use a commercial carrier, also generally make daily shipments to SNL/NM. Therefore, any increase in the volume of material that major vendors ship per load would not have an impact on the frequency of those shipments. Thus, chemical shipments would remain at approximately the same level regardless of the fluctuations in material consumption.

Considering the above factors, overall material transportation due to normal operations would increase by 123 percent over baseline levels. The anticipated changes in annual and daily material shipments for each material category are presented in Table 5.4.9-1. The analysis assumed that SNL/NM has 250 work days per calendar year.

Waste Transportation

The amount of waste shipped from SNL/NM to disposal facilities would correlate directly to SNL/NM waste generation levels. The overall offsite waste shipments would increase by 320 percent under the Expanded Operations Alternative. Of this increase, 285 percent is considered to be waste currently disposed of at the KAFB landfill. This leaves a real projected increase of 35 percent under the Expanded Operations Alternative.

Table 5.4.9 1. SNL/NM Annual Material Shipments Under the Expanded Operations Alternative

MATERIAL TYPE	ANNUAL SHIPMENTS	
	BASE YEAR ^a	EXPANDED OPERATIONS
Radioactive	305	1,782
Radioactive (medical isotopes production configuration)	<i>Receiving</i>	0
	<i>Shipping</i>	0
Chemical	2,750	2,750
Explosive	303	1,771
TOTAL	3,358	7,498

Sources: SNL/NM 1997b, 1998a

^a The base year varies depending on information provided in the *Facilities and Safety Information Document* (SNL/NM 1997b). Typically, the base year is 1996 or 1997, as appropriate.

The total anticipated changes in waste shipments during all operations for each type of waste are presented in Table 5.4.9 2 and Appendix G, Table G.3 3.

Table 5.4.9 2. Annual Waste Shipments from Normal Operations Under the Expanded Operations Alternative

WASTE TYPE	BASE YEAR SHIPMENTS	EXPANDED OPERATIONS SHIPMENTS
LLW^a (1996)	4	21
LLMW (1996)	1	3
Hazardous (RCRA+TSCA)^a (1997)	102	150
Recyclable (Hazardous and Nonhazardous)^{a,b} (1997)	86	233
Solid^a (Municipal, Construction, and Demolition)^b (1996)	51	650

Sources: Rinchem 1998a; SNL/NM 1998a, 1998y, n.d. (d)

LLMW: low-level mixed waste

LLW: low-level waste

MTRU: mixed transuranic

RCRA: *Resource Conservation and Recovery Act*

TRU: transuranic

TSCA: *Toxic Substances Control Act*^a Excludes decontamination and decommissioning^b Recyclable and solid wastes currently handled by the KAFB landfill could be shipped offsite, contributing an additional 741 shipments.

Specials Projects

Two special project wastes, ER Project and legacy, were addressed separately due to their one-time operation/project status and in order to avoid skewing the SNL/NM normal operations impact. Legacy wastes would be anticipated to account for an additional 18 shipments of LLW, 3 shipments of LLMW, and 2 shipments of TRU/MTRU wastes over the 10-year time frame (see Figures 4.12 1, 4.12 2, and 4.12 3). In 1998 through 2000, the ER Project could account for up to an additional 312 offsite shipments of LLW, 101 offsite shipments of LLMW, 2 offsite shipments of RCRA waste, 5 offsite shipments of TSCA waste, and 75 shipments of nonhazardous waste. Both of these special projects have been included within the total facility risks.

Offsite Receipts and Shipments of Material and Waste

The bounding case for this analysis assumed that each material and waste shipment is composed of two trips: one to and one from SNL/NM. Thus, the total number of trips made by material and waste transporters under the Expanded Operations Alternative would be 17,182 (total shipments x 2). Assuming that the year is comprised of 250 work days, the average work day traffic within KAFB contributed by these carriers would be 69 trips. This would be small in comparison to the 29,880 trips of SNL/NM vehicles entering and exiting KAFB under this alternative (SNL/NM 1998a, SNL 1996c). Therefore, the overall traffic impacts on

KAFB from increased SNL/NM material and waste shipments under the Expanded Operations Alternative would be negligible.

Shipments of Material and Waste in the Albuquerque Area

The total SNL/NM placarded material and waste shipment traffic would comprise 1.9 percent, or 69 trips per day, of the total placarded truck traffic (1,767) entering the greater Albuquerque area during the applicable base year (1996 or 1997). Although a 137-percent increase in SNL/NM placarded material and waste truck traffic would be expected, this increase would represent the inclusion of waste currently managed at the KAFB landfill and new shipments from the MIPP. ER Project wastes and legacy wastes are addressed separately under special projects. Thus, the impacts under the Expanded Operations Alternative would be minimal.

Shipments of Material and Waste Outside of Albuquerque

All material and waste transported to and from SNL/NM from outside Albuquerque must enter and depart the city by way of Interstate-25 or Interstate-40. Table 5.4.9 3 presents the impacts to those corridors from material and waste shipments under the Expanded Operations Alternative. Specific remote facility locations are listed in Section 4.11. Daily SNL/NM shipment

Table 5.4.9 3. 24-Hour Placarded Material and Waste Truck Traffic Counts Under the Expanded Operations Alternative

ROUTE (ALL TRAFFIC) ^a	BASE YEAR ^b	EXPANDED OPERATIONS
<i>I-25 North (52,400)</i>	230	268
<i>I-25 South (18,000)</i>	94	110
<i>I-40 West (16,400)</i>	621	725
<i>I-40 East (54,200)</i>	569	664
TOTAL (141,000)	1,514	1,767
SNL/NM^c	14.5	34.4

Sources: SNL/NM 1997b, 1998a; Scientific Services 1995

I: Interstate

^a Total vehicle count for all types of vehicles entering and departing Albuquerque

^b The base year varies depending on information provided in the *Facilities and Safety Information Document* (SNL/NM 1997b). Typically, the base year is 1996 or 1997, as appropriate.

^c SNL/NM placarded trucks

figures were derived for comparison purposes by dividing the annual waste and material shipment totals in Tables 5.4.9 1 and 5.4.9 2 by the approximately 250 work days in a calendar year.

Based on this analysis, SNL/NM material and waste shipments would be expected to increase in frequency by 137 percent under this alternative. However, the SNL/NM truck traffic would only comprise 0.021 percent, or 34.4 shipments per day, of all traffic (165,000 vehicles per day), including all types of vehicles, projected to be entering and departing Albuquerque by way of interstates. For the applicable base year (1996 or 1997), waste leaving Albuquerque represented 35 percent of the total shipments, with an additional 20 percent going to Rio Rancho. Because most materials are supplied through the JIT vendors, origination points are generally not known. However, most vendors use local suppliers; therefore, in the base year, 82 percent of material was assumed to be provided locally, with the remaining 18 percent coming from outside Albuquerque. Thus, the impact to this ROI from the Expanded Operations Alternative would be negligible.

5.4.9.2 Other Transportation (Traffic)

Overall vehicular traffic impacts under the Expanded Operations Alternative were assessed by projecting the total increased number of SNL/NM commuter vehicles traveling to and from SNL/NM. The term commuter includes all vehicles operated by SNL/NM employees, contractors, and visitors; DOE employees; and additional traffic, such as delivery vehicles.

Traffic on KAFB

Table 5.4.9 4 presents general anticipated traffic impacts at KAFB under the Expanded Operations Alternative. The number of SNL/NM commuter vehicles traveling to and from the site each work day was conservatively assumed to increase at the same rate as the SNL/NM work force level (see Section 5.4.12). Based on this analysis, overall KAFB traffic would increase by 3.6 percent under this alternative.

Table 5.4.9 5 shows projected 24-hour KAFB vehicular flow for each of the three main gates under the Expanded Operations Alternative. It was assumed that the Carlisle and Truman gates would be used primarily by KAFB personnel and not by SNL/NM employees. For the bounding case for this analysis, it was assumed that the SNL/NM contribution to total KAFB flow at each gate would fluctuate by the same factor as the total

Table 5.4.9 4. KAFB Daily Traffic Projections Under the Expanded Operations Alternative

COMPONENT	BASE YEAR ^a			EXPANDED OPERATIONS			% CHANGE IN BASE YEAR VERSUS EXPANDED
	%	VEHICLES	TRIPS	%	VEHICLES	TRIPS	
<i>SNL/NM Commuters</i>	36	13,582	27,164	38	14,940	29,880	10
<i>KAFB Commuters</i>	64	24,145	48,290	63	24,145	48,290	0
TOTAL KAFB COMMUTER TRAFFIC	100	37,727	75,453	100	39,085	78,170	3.6
<i>SNL/NM Waste & Material Transporters</i>	0.04	14.5	29	0.09	34.4	69	137 ^b

Sources: SNL/NM 1997a, 1997b

^a The base year varies depending on information provided in the *Facilities and Safety Information Document* (SNL/NM 1997b). Typically, the base year is 1996 or 1997, as appropriate.^b SNL/NM commuter and transporter trips per day equals 36 percent of total KAFB trips per day.^c Total KAFB trips per day.^d Total KAFB trips per hour, traffic counts**Table 5.4.9 5. Total KAFB Gate Traffic Under the Expanded Operations Alternative**

GATE	BASE YEAR ^a			EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE			% CHANGE GATE TOTAL
	24-HOUR SNL/NM ^b	24-HOUR TOTAL ^c	PEAK HOUR ^d	24-HOUR SNL/NM	24-HOUR TOTAL	PEAK HOUR	
<i>Wyoming</i>	7,141	19,835	1,941	7,855	20,549	2,011	3.6
<i>Eubank</i>	5,324	14,788	2,683	5,856	15,320	2,951	3.6
<i>Gibson</i>	8,108	22,523	1,571	8,919	23,334	1,628	3.6
AVERAGE	6,858	19,048	2,065	7,543	19,734	2,197	3.6

Sources: SNL/NM 1997a, 1997b; Bohannon-Huston 1995

^a The base year varies depending on information provided in the *Facilities and Safety Information Document* (SNL/NM 1997b). Typically, the base year is 1996 or 1997, as appropriate.^b This increase represents inclusion of waste managed at the KAFB landfill and new shipments from medical isotopes production.

fluctuation in SNL/NM traffic under the Expanded Operations Alternative.

Based on this analysis, the daily KAFB gate traffic would increase by 3.6 percent under the Expanded Operations Alternative (Table 5.4.9 5). This minimal change would not have an appreciable impact on service at the gates.

Short-term adverse traffic impacts would potentially occur onsite during routine construction activities at KAFB due to traffic lane restrictions, reduced speeds in construction areas, and traffic increases in slower moving heavy equipment. These common occurrences would be similar to those under the No Action Alternative. Building construction and onsite roadway rehabilitation are currently planned under the Expanded Operations Alternative. Short-term circulation impacts would

potentially occur if vehicles are re-routed to avoid construction areas. However, it is anticipated that adequate detour routes and signage would be provided and that the impacts would be minimal and limited in duration.

Traffic in the Albuquerque Area

To determine the traffic impacts in the Albuquerque traffic corridor, roadways most likely to be affected by SNL/NM traffic were selected for analysis. The bounding case used the projected SNL/NM traffic contributions from Table 5.4.9 5 to approximate the SNL/NM component of the total traffic count for each roadway. For worst-case impacts, the SNL/NM traffic component was assumed to be equivalent to the total SNL/NM traffic at the nearest gate. In actuality, a

significant percentage of traffic would likely diffuse onto other nearby roads, which would greatly reduce the magnitude of the SNL/NM component. The projected impacts to these roadways under the Expanded Operations Alternative, according to the bounding case factors, are presented in Table 5.4.9 6.

This represents an overall average increase of 10 percent of the SNL/NM traffic component on these roadways. However, the total traffic on these roadways would only increase by 2.9 percent overall under the Expanded Operations Alternative.

Traffic Outside of Albuquerque

The additional local SNL/NM traffic under the Expanded Operations Alternative would have minimal impacts on

transportation routes between Albuquerque and other DOE facilities, vendors, and disposal facilities (see Section 4.11 for a list of these facilities). In a worst-case assessment, the applicable base year (1996 or 1997) SNL/NM component represents an average 19 percent of the total traffic count (141,000 vehicles per day) on major roadways entering and departing Albuquerque (MRGCOG 1997b). Under the Expanded Operations Alternative, the SNL/NM component would decrease to 18.1 percent of total vehicular traffic due to the increase in Albuquerque population and commuters. This assumes that all SNL/NM traffic would actually enter and depart Albuquerque by way of the interstates every day, although a significant portion of SNL/NM traffic would more likely diffuse onto other roadways and remain in Albuquerque.

Table 5.4.9 6. Albuquerque Daily Traffic Counts Under the Expanded Operations Alternative

ROADWAY		BASE YEAR ^a		EXPANDED OPERATIONS		% CHANGE
		DAILY ^b	PEAK ^c	DAILY	PEAK	DAILY
Gibson West at Louisiana	Total	15,671	2,066	16,482	2,172	+5
	SNL/NM	8,108	1,069	8,919	1,176	+10
	% SNL/NM	52		54		+4
Wyoming South of Lomas	Total	37,639	2,293	38,353	2,337	+2
	SNL/NM	7,141	435	7,855	479	+10
	% SNL/NM	19		20		+5
Eubank South of Copper	Total	14,572	1,852	15,104	1,920	+4
	SNL/NM	5,324	677	5,856	744	+10
	% SNL/NM	37		39		+5
Interstate-25 at Gibson^d	Total	91,000	-	91,811	-	+1
	SNL/NM	8,108	-	8,919	-	+10
	% SNL/NM	8.9		9.7		+9
Interstate-40 at Eubank^d	Total	90,300	-	90,832	-	+0.6
	SNL/NM	5,324	-	5,856	-	+10
	% SNL/NM	5.9		6.5		+10
Wyoming North of KAFB Gate	Total	20,272	1,749	20,986	1,811	+4
	SNL/NM	7,141	612	7,855	673	+10
	% SNL/NM	35		37		+6

Sources: MRGCOG 1997b, 1997c; SNL/NM 1997b, 1998a; UNM 1997b

^a The base year varies depending on information provided in the *Facilities and Safety Information Document* (SNL/NM 1997b). Typically, the base year is 1996 or 1997, as appropriate.

^b Vehicles per day, 1996 *Traffic Flows for the Greater Albuquerque Area*

^c Vehicles per hour, 1996 - 1998 *Traffic Counts*

^d Peak hour counts for this intersection are not available.

5.4.9.3 Transportation Risk Associated with Normal Operations

Incident-Free Exposure

The bounding case for this analysis used the representative distances traveled by SNL/NM waste and material carriers, as listed in Table 5.3.9-7. These distances were based on the average distance traveled by trucks in route to other facilities under all alternatives.

Truck emissions impacts are a function of the number of truck shipments to and from SNL/NM. The bounding case for truck emissions impact analysis assumed that the greatest risk is when these shipments are transported through urban areas, such as the Albuquerque transportation corridor, because these areas are most susceptible to emissions related problems. To evaluate the actual risk associated with SNL/NM truck shipments, the most common origin and destination of all shipments of concern were compiled to determine the urban distance each material or waste would be transported (Section 4.11). Table 5.4.9-7 presents projected truck emissions impacts resulting from the Expanded Operations Alternative.

Based on this analysis, the emissions impacts due to increased truck traffic under the Expanded Operations Alternative would increase from 1.33×10^{-2} to 6.4×10^{-2} annual LCFs.

The impact analysis of incident-free exposure from material and waste shipments was conducted using the *HIGHWAY* computer code as part of the *RADTRAN 4* modeling program (SNL 1992q). The distance parameters presented in Table 5.3.9-7 were used to project the incident-free exposure impacts to the public and crew resulting from this alternative. The projected public and crew dose calculations are presented in Table 5.4.9-8. This table shows that the greatest radiological impacts to the truck crew and the public under the Expanded Operations Alternative would result from increased radioactive material shipments.

In the absence of an accident that compromises package integrity, no incident-free chemical or explosive exposure would be foreseen to affect the public, workers, or vehicle transport crews under this alternative.

5.4.9.4 Transportation Risks Associated with Accidents

General Accidents

The bounding case for general vehicular traffic impacts under the Expanded Operations Alternative assumes that the percent increase in accidents would be equal to the

percent increase in SNL/NM traffic. Therefore, SNL/NM traffic accidents would increase by 10 percent under this alternative.

Hazardous Material/ Waste-Related Accidents

In conjunction with traffic fatality statistics (SNL 1986), the SNL/NM material and waste shipments projected in Tables 5.4.9-1 and 5.4.9-2 were used to project the truck accident fatality incidence rate that would be expected under the Expanded Operations Alternative. These impacts for the bounding case are presented in Table 5.4.9-9 with details in Appendix G. Based on this analysis, accident fatalities due to SNL/NM truck transportation would increase from 0.22 to 1.3 (1.2 plus 7.1×10^{-2}) under this alternative.

5.4.9.5 Radiological Transportation Accidents

The annual risk to population due to transportation accidents that potentially involve radiological releases resulting from the Expanded Operations Alternative are presented in Table 5.4.9-10.

This analysis indicates that under normal routine operations, LCFs would increase from 9.0×10^{-6} to 1.3×10^{-4} in incidents of LCFs due to the worst-case radiological transportation accident under the Expanded Operations Alternative. In addition, 5.5×10^{-5} LCFs would result from legacy and ER Project waste shipments. For more information, see Appendix G.

Risks due to radiological, chemical, and explosives accidents are evaluated in detail in Appendix F. The bounding transportation accident analysis involves explosion of a tractor-trailer containing 40,000 ft³ of hydrogen. Based on the results presented in Appendix F, Table F4-1, the hydrogen explosion would result in structural damage to buildings up to a distance of 91 m from the truck. Fatalities would result up to a distance of 15 to 18 m from the truck, while eardrum ruptures would occur up to a distance of 36 m from the truck.

5.4.10 Waste Generation

The implementation of the Expanded Operations Alternative would not result in any major changes in the types of waste streams generated onsite. However, waste generation activities would increase overall if each facility were to operate at total production capacity. These increased waste volumes would be partially offset by increased waste minimization and pollution prevention programs, which project a 33-percent overall decrease in total waste disposal needs by FY 2000. Therefore, the increased generation

**Table 5.4.9 7. Expanded Operations Alternative
Incident-Free Exposure: Truck Emissions**

CARGO	UNIT RISK FACTOR PER URBAN KILOMETER	URBAN DISTANCE TRAVELED PER SHIPMENT (km)	LCFs PER ROUND TRIP SHIPMENT	ANNUAL NO. SHIPMENTS		ANNUAL LCFs	
				BASE YEAR ^a	EXPANDED OPERATIONS	BASE YEAR ^a	EXPANDED OPERATIONS
NORMAL ROUTINE OPERATIONS							
<i>RAD Materials</i>	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	73	1.5x10 ⁻⁵	305	1,782	4.6x10 ⁻³	2.8x10 ⁻²
<i>Explosives</i>	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	48	9.6x10 ⁻⁶	303	1,771	2.9x10 ⁻³	1.7x10 ⁻²
<i>Chemicals</i>	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	8	1.6x10 ⁻⁶	2,750	2,750	4.4x10 ⁻³	4.4x10 ⁻³
<i>LLW</i>	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	33	6.6x10 ⁻⁶	4	21	2.6x10 ⁻⁵	1.4x10 ⁻⁴
<i>Medical Isotopes Production (Receipts)</i>				0	55		
<i>Medical Isotopes Production (Shipments)</i>	NA	NA	NA	0	1,140	0	1.0x10 ⁻²
<i>LLMW (Shipments)</i>	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	40.6	8.1x10 ⁻⁶	1	3	8.1x10 ⁻⁶	2.4x10 ⁻⁵
<i>LLMW (Receipts)</i>	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	35.6	7.1x10 ⁻⁶	0	1	0	7.1x10 ⁻⁶
<i>Hazardous Waste</i>	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	33	6.6x10 ⁻⁶	64	112	4.2x10 ⁻⁴	7.4x10 ⁻⁴
<i>Recyclable Hazardous to CA</i>	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	23	4.6x10 ⁻⁶	2	4	9.2x10 ⁻⁶	1.8x10 ⁻⁵
<i>Recyclable Hazardous to NM</i>	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	6.4	1.3x10 ⁻⁶	6	11	7.8x10 ⁻⁶	1.4x10 ⁻⁵
<i>Solid Waste</i>	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	10	2.0x10 ⁻⁶	51	51	1.0x10 ⁻⁴	1.0x10 ⁻⁴
<i>D&D Hazardous Waste TSCA-PCBs</i>	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	33	6.6x10 ⁻⁶	1	1	6.6x10 ⁻⁶	6.6x10 ⁻⁶
<i>D&D Hazardous Waste TSCA-Asbestos</i>	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	10	2.0x10 ⁻⁶	14	14	2.8x10 ⁻⁵	2.8x10 ⁻⁵
<i>Biohazardous Waste</i>	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	24	4.8x10 ⁻⁶	1	1	4.8x10 ⁻⁶	4.8x10 ⁻⁶
<i>Recyclable D&D Hazardous Waste</i>	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	6.4	1.3x10 ⁻⁶	22	22	2.9x10 ⁻⁵	2.9x10 ⁻⁵
<i>Recyclable Nonhazardous Solid Waste</i>	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	6.4	1.3x10 ⁻⁶	78	78	1.0x10 ⁻⁴	1.0x10 ⁻⁴
<i>Nonhazardous Landscaping Waste</i>	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	10	2.0x10 ⁻⁶	NA	142	NA	2.8x10 ⁻⁴
<i>Construction and Demolition Solid Waste</i>	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	10	2.0x10 ⁻⁶	NA	599	NA	1.2x10 ⁻³
<i>RCRA Hazardous Waste (Receipt)</i>	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	3	6.0x10 ⁻⁷	12	25	7.2x10 ⁻⁶	1.5x10 ⁻⁵
<i>LLW (D&D)</i>	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	33	6.6x10 ⁻⁶	4	4	2.6x10 ⁻⁵	2.6x10 ⁻⁵
TOTAL^b						1.33x10²	6.2x10⁻²

**Table 5.4.9 7. Expanded Operations Alternative
Incident-Free Exposure: Truck Emissions (concluded)**

CARGO	UNIT RISK FACTOR PER URBAN KILOMETER	URBAN DISTANCE TRAVELED PER SHIPMENT (km)	LCFs PER ROUND TRIP SHIPMENT	ANNUAL NO. SHIPMENTS		ANNUAL LCFs	
				BASE YEAR ^a	EXPANDED OPERATIONS	BASE YEAR ^a	EXPANDED OPERATIONS
SPECIAL PROJECT OPERATIONS/TOTAL SHIPMENTS							
TRU/MTRU	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	8.4	1.7x10 ⁻⁶	0	4	0	6.8x10 ⁻⁶
TRU/MTRU (Legacy)	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	8.4	1.7x10 ⁻⁶	0	2	0	3.4x10 ⁻⁶
LLW (Legacy)	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	33	6.6x10 ⁻⁶	0	56	0	3.7x10 ⁻⁴
LLMW (Legacy)	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	40.6	8.1x10 ⁻⁶	0	8	0	6.5x10 ⁻⁵
LLW (ER)	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	33	6.6x10 ⁻⁶	0	136	0	9.0x10 ⁻⁴
LLMW (ER)	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	40.6	8.1x10 ⁻⁶	0	5	0	4.1x10 ⁻⁵
Hazardous Waste (ER)	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	33	6.6x10 ⁻⁶	0	113	0	7.5x10 ⁻⁴
Nonhazardous Solid Waste(ER)	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	10	2.0x10 ⁻⁶	0	9	0	1.8x10 ⁻⁵
TOTAL^b						0	2.1x10⁻³

Sources: DOE 1996h; SNL 1992a; SNL/NM 1997b, 1982, 1998a

D&D: decontamination and decommissioning

ER: environmental restoration

km: kilometers

LCFs: latent cancer fatalities

LLMW: low-level mixed waste

LLW: low-level waste

MTRU: mixed transuranic

NA: not applicable

PCB: polychlorinated biphenyl

RAD: radiological

RCRA: Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

TRU: transuranic

TSCA: Toxic Substances Control Act

^a The base year varies depending on information provided in the *Facilities and Safety Information Document* (SNL/NM 1997b). Typically, the base year is 1996 or 1997, as appropriate.

^b Lifetime estimated total LCFs

**Table 5.4.9 8. Doses to Crew and Public
Under the Expanded Operations Alternative**

CARGO	ANNUAL DOSE/TRUCK CREW (person-rem)		ANNUAL DOSE/GENERAL PUBLIC (person-rem)		ANNUAL LCFs	
	BASE YEAR ^a	EXPANDED OPERATIONS	BASE YEAR ^a	EXPANDED OPERATIONS	BASE YEAR ^a	EXPANDED OPERATIONS
NORMAL ROUTINE OPERATIONS						
RAD Materials	9.8	57.0	82.4	481.1	4.5×10^{-2}	0.26
LLW	0.21	1.1	0.6	3.2	3.8×10^{-4}	2.0×10^{-3}
LLMW	2.6×10^{-2}	9.6×10^{-2}	0.26	0.88	1.4×10^{-4}	4.8×10^{-4}
Medical Isotopes Production	0	25.4	0	73	0	4.7×10^{-2}
LLW (D&D)	0.21	0.21	0.60	0.60	3.8×10^{-4}	3.8×10^{-4}
TOTAL^b					4.6×10^{-2}	0.31
SPECIAL PROJECT OPERATIONS/TOTAL SHIPMENTS						
TRU/MTRU	0	7.2×10^{-3}	0	4.0×10^{-2}	0	2.3×10^{-5}
TRU/MTRU (Legacy)	0	3.6×10^{-3}	0	2.0×10^{-2}	0	1.1×10^{-5}
LLW (Legacy + ER)	0	10	0	28.8	0	1.8×10^{-2}
LLMW (Legacy + ER)	0	0.34	0	3.4	0	1.8×10^{-3}
TOTAL^b					0	2.0×10^{-2}

Sources: DOE 1996h, SNL 1992a; SNL/NM 1997b, 1998a

D&D: decontamination and decommissioning

ER: environmental restoration

LCFs: latent cancer fatalities

LLMW: low-level mixed waste

LLW: low-level waste

MTRU: mixed transuranic

RAD: radiological

rem: Roentgen equivalent, man

TRU: transuranic

^a The base year varies depending on information provided in the *Facilities and Safety Information Document* (SNL/NM 1997b). Typically, the base year is 1996 or 1997, as appropriate.

^b Lifetime estimated total fatalities from annual shipments and total special shipments

**Table 5.4.9 9. Truck Transportation Traffic Fatalities
Under the Expanded Operations Alternative**

CARGO	TRAFFIC FATALITY RATE: CREW AND GENERAL PUBLIC PER SHIPMENT (ROUND TRIP)	ANNUAL FATALITIES	
		BASE YEAR ^a	EXPANDED OPERATIONS
NORMAL ROUTINE OPERATIONS			
<i>RAD Materials</i>	3.5×10^{-4}	0.11	0.62
<i>Explosives</i>	2.9×10^{-4}	8.8×10^{-2}	0.51
<i>Chemicals</i>	2.1×10^{-6}	5.8×10^{-3}	5.8×10^{-3}
<i>LLW</i>	2.2×10^{-4}	8.8×10^{-4}	4.6×10^{-3}
<i>Medical Isotopes Production</i>	NA	NA	2.1×10^{-2}
<i>LLMW (Shipments)</i>	3.0×10^{-4}	3.0×10^{-4}	9.0×10^{-4}
<i>LLMW (Receipts)</i>	2.1×10^{-4}	0	2.1×10^{-4}
<i>Hazardous Waste</i>	2.2×10^{-4}	1.4×10^{-2}	2.5×10^{-2}
<i>Recyclable Hazardous to California</i>	1.5×10^{-4}	3.0×10^{-4}	6.0×10^{-4}
<i>Recyclable Hazardous to New Mexico</i>	1.6×10^{-6}	9.6×10^{-6}	1.8×10^{-5}
<i>Solid Waste</i>	2.6×10^{-6}	1.3×10^{-4}	1.3×10^{-4}
<i>D&D Hazardous Waste TSCA-PCBs</i>	2.2×10^{-4}	2.2×10^{-4}	2.2×10^{-4}
<i>D&D Hazardous Waste TSCA-Asbestos</i>	2.2×10^{-5}	3.1×10^{-4}	3.1×10^{-4}
<i>Biohazardous Waste</i>	1.4×10^{-4}	1.4×10^{-4}	1.4×10^{-4}
<i>Recyclable D&D Hazardous Waste</i>	1.6×10^{-6}	3.5×10^{-5}	3.5×10^{-5}
<i>Recyclable Nonhazardous Solid Waste</i>	1.6×10^{-6}	1.2×10^{-4}	1.2×10^{-4}
<i>Nonhazardous Landscaping Waste</i>	2.6×10^{-6}	NA	3.7×10^{-4}
<i>Construction and Demolition Solid Waste</i>	2.6×10^{-6}	NA	1.6×10^{-3}
<i>RCRA Hazardous Waste (Receipt)</i>	6.7×10^{-7}	8.0×10^{-6}	1.7×10^{-5}
<i>Low Level Waste (D&D)</i>	2.2×10^{-6}	8.8×10^{-4}	8.8×10^{-4}
TOTAL^b		0.22	1.2
SPECIAL PROJECT OPERATIONS			
<i>TRU/MTRU</i>	1.9×10^{-5}	0	3.8×10^{-5}
<i>TRU/MTRU (Legacy)</i>	1.9×10^{-5}	0	3.8×10^{-5}
<i>LLW (Legacy)</i>	2.2×10^{-4}	0	1.2×10^{-2}
<i>LLMW (Legacy)</i>	3.0×10^{-4}	0	2.4×10^{-3}
<i>LLW (ER)</i>	2.2×10^{-4}	0	3.0×10^{-2}

Table 5.4.9 9. Truck Transportation Traffic Fatalities Under the Expanded Operations Alternative (concluded)

CARGO	TRAFFIC FATALITY RATE: CREW AND GENERAL PUBLIC PER SHIPMENT (ROUND TRIP)	ANNUAL FATALITIES	
		BASE YEAR ^a	EXPANDED OPERATIONS
<i>LLMW (ER)</i>	3.0×10^{-4}	0	1.5×10^{-3}
<i>Hazardous Waste (ER)</i>	2.2×10^{-4}	0	2.5×10^{-2}
<i>Nonhazardous Solid Waste (ER)</i>	2.6×10^{-6}	0	2.3×10^{-5}
TOTAL^b		0	7.1×10^{-2}

Sources: SNL/NM 1997b, 1998a
 D&D: decontamination and decommissioning
 ER: environmental restoration
 LLMW: low-level mixed waste
 LLW: low-level waste
 MTRU: mixed transuranic
 NA: not applicable

PCB: polychlorinated biphenyl
 RAD: radiological
 RCRA: *Resource Conservation and Recovery Act*
 TRU: transuranic
 TSCA: *Toxic Substances Control Act*

^a The base year varies depending on information provided in the *Facilities and Safety Information Document* (SNL/NM 1997b). Typically, the base year is 1996 or 1997, as appropriate.

^b Lifetime estimated total traffic fatalities from annual shipments

Table 5.4.9 10. Doses to Population Due to Transportation Radiological Accident, Maximum Annual Radiological Accident Risk for Highway Shipments

CARGO	ANNUAL DOSE TO POPULATION person-rem		LCFs	
	BASE YEAR ^a	EXPANDED OPERATIONS	BASE YEAR ^a	EXPANDED OPERATIONS
NORMAL ROUTINE OPERATIONS				
<i>Radioactive</i>	1.3×10^{-2}	7.7×10^{-2}	6.6×10^{-6}	3.9×10^{-5}
<i>LLW</i>	2.3×10^{-3}	1.2×10^{-2}	1.2×10^{-6}	6.0×10^{-6}
<i>LLMW</i>	3.8×10^{-5}	1.1×10^{-4}	1.7×10^{-8}	5.3×10^{-8}
<i>Medical Isotopes Production</i>	0	5.2×10^{-2}	0	3.0×10^{-5}
<i>LLW (D&D)</i>	2.3×10^{-3}	2.3×10^{-3}	1.2×10^{-6}	1.2×10^{-6}
TOTAL^b			9.0×10^{-6}	7.6×10^{-5}
SPECIAL PROJECT OPERATIONS/TOTAL SHIPMENTS				
<i>TRU/MTRU</i>	0	1.0×10^{-5}	0	5.0×10^{-9}
<i>TRU/MTRU (Legacy)</i>	0	6.8×10^{-6}	0	3.4×10^{-9}
<i>LLW (Legacy+ER)</i>	0	0.11	0	5.5×10^{-5}
<i>LLMW (Legacy+ER)</i>	0	4.4×10^{-4}	0	2.2×10^{-7}
TOTAL^b			0	5.5×10^{-5}

Sources: DOE 1996a, SNL 1992a, SNL/NM 1998a
 D&D: decontamination and decommissioning
 ER: environmental restoration
 LCFs: latent cancer fatalities
 LLMW: low-level mixed waste
 LLW: low-level waste

MTRU: mixed transuranic
 rem: roentgen equivalent, man
 TRU: transuranic

^a The base year varies depending on information provided in the *Facilities and Safety Information Document* (SNL/NM 1997b). Typically, the base year is 1996 or 1997, as appropriate.

^b Lifetime estimated LCFs

activities would not exceed existing waste management disposal capacities.

For projection purposes, the baseline waste generation data were considered to be constant for existing facilities, with no major increases or decreases in the amount of wastes generated. Operations waste are considered to be derived from missions-related work. Nonoperations waste are generated from special programs. New operations are discussed separately in order to show the maximum existing operational increases that could be expected. Waste generation levels for special program waste, such as for the ER Project, are derived separately from the representative facilities projections under special operations. The waste quantities projected, listed in Table 5.4.10-1, represent a site-wide aggregate of quantities for each type of waste stream from existing selected facilities. As appropriate, the balance of operations (not selected facilities or special projects) waste generated is discussed within the individual waste sections. Units shown for each waste type are based on how industrial facilities charge commercial clients for disposal of these wastes.

5.4.10.1 Radioactive Wastes

Under the Expanded Operations Alternative, SNL/NM would potentially generate LLW, LLMW, and TRU and MTRU waste. However, SNL/NM would not generate any high-level waste. Projections for waste generation at selected facilities from new and existing operations are shown in Appendix H.

Existing Operations

Under the Expanded Operations Alternative, SNL/NM anticipates a maximum 61 percent increase in the generation of LLW from existing operations at selected facilities over the next 10 years. LLW generated by SNL/NM is and will continue to be transported offsite to appropriate DOE-approved disposal facilities, such as the NTS. Similarly, LLMW generation would increase by 49 percent for existing operations at selected facilities through 2008. Under the *Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Part B, Permit Application for Hazardous Waste Management Units* (SNL/NM 1996a), some treatment of the hazardous component of LLMW could be performed at SNL/NM (Table 4.12-2). LLMW for which no onsite treatment is available would be shipped offsite for treatment and disposal. SNL/NM also projects that approximately 0.59 m³ of TRU waste would be generated annually. The existing TRU/MTRU wastes stored onsite, as well as future TRU/MTRU wastes,

would be transferred to LANL for certification, prior to their disposal at the WIPP as indicated in the Waste Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (DOE 1997i) ROD (DOE 1998n). Projected MTRU waste generated would increase 100 percent to a level of 0.91 m³ annually. Existing SNL/NM operations would use less than 1 percent annually of the available radioactive waste storage capacity. This would be a minimal impact.

New Operations

SNL/NM anticipates a maximum of 181 m³ of LLW would be generated from new operations annually over the next 10 years. The majority of the increase would be due primarily to the full implementation of the medical isotopes production operations in 2003. These operations, described in the *Medical Isotopes Production Project: Molybdenum-99 and Related Isotopes Environmental Impact Statement* (DOE 1996b), would account for more than 83 percent of the total projected LLW under the Expanded Operations Alternative. However, due to the nature of the waste, it would be managed at the generation facility to minimize worker exposure until disposal offsite. LLMW generation from all new onsite sources would be a maximum of 7.31 m³ annually through 2008.

SNL/NM does not expect to generate TRU and MTRU wastes from new operations. Approximately 399 kg of spent fuel would be generated over the 10-year period. Spent fuel is further discussed in Appendix A as a material resource.

Balance of Operations

The waste generation level for the balance of operations was determined for each type of radioactive waste (Table 5.4.10-1). Only LLW and LLMW would be affected. Balance of operations mission operations at SNL/NM would account for an additional 74 m³ per year of LLW. These same operations would account for an additional 0.28 m³ of LLMW per year. The overall operations impacts for this alternative would increase by approximately 198 percent for LLW and 69 percent for LLMW.

Current Capacity

Previously generated radioactive wastes (legacy waste) occupy approximately 494 m³ of the available 11,866 m³ of total radioactive waste storage capacity at the RMWMF and its associated storage areas. This represents approximately 4.2 percent of the total available capacity.

Table 5.4.10 1. Waste Generation for Existing Selected SNL/NM Facilities Under the Expanded Operations Alternative

ALL WASTE		UNIT	BASE YEAR ^a	EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE
RADIOACTIVE WASTE				
Low-Level Waste (500 kg/m³)	Existing Operations	m ³ (kg)	16(8,000)	26(13,000)
	New Operations	m ³ (kg)	4(2,000)	181(90,500)
	SNL/NM Balance of Operations	m ³ (kg)	74(37,000)	74(37,000)
	SNL/NM Total LLW	m ³ (kg)	94(47,000)	280(140,000)
	Percent change	m ³ (kg)	0.0%	197.9%
Low-Level Mixed Waste (550 kg/m³)	Existing Operations	m ³ (kg)	3.85(2,120)	5.75(3,160)
	New Operations	m ³ (kg)	0.20(110)	1.27(700)
	SNL/NM Balance of Operations	m ³ (kg)	0.28(150)	0.28(40)
	SNL/NM Total LLMW	m ³ (kg)	4.33(2,380)	7.31(3,900)
	Percent change	m ³ (kg)	0.0%	68.7%
TRU Waste (310 kg/m³)	Existing Operations	m ³ (kg)	-	0.59(180)
	New Operations	m ³ (kg)	-	0.14(40)
	SNL/NM Balance of Operations	m ³ (kg)	-	-
	SNL/NM Total TRU	m ³ (kg)	-	0.74(210)
MTRU Waste (76 kg/m³)	Existing Operations	m ³ (kg)	0.45(34)	0.91(70)
	New Operations	m ³ (kg)	-	0.14(10)
	SNL/NM Balance of Operations	m ³ (kg)	-	-
	SNL/NM Total MTRU	m ³ (kg)	0.45(34)	1.05(80)
	Percent change		0.0%	131.3%
RADIOACTIVE WASTE TOTAL^c	Existing Operations	m³(kg)	20.34 (10,154)	33.06(16,550)
	New Operations	m³(kg)	4.62(2,110)	182.41(91,450)
	SNL/NM Balance of Operations	m³(kg)	73.92 (37,150)	73.92(37,050)
	SNL/NM Total Radioactive Waste	m³(kg)	98.88 (49,414)	289.39(145,050)
	Percent change		0.0%	192.7%

Table 5.4.10 1. Waste Generation for Existing Selected SNL/NM Facilities Under the Expanded Operations Alternative (concluded)

ALL WASTE	UNIT	BASE YEAR ^a	EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE
RCRA HAZARDOUS WASTE			
<i>Existing Operations</i>	kg	16,187	25,074
<i>New Operations</i>	kg	398	2,337
<i>SNL/NM Balance of Operations</i>	kg	39,267	64,902
<i>SNL/NM Total RCRA Hazardous</i>	kg	55,852	92,314
	m ³	44.3	73.2
<i>Percent Change</i>		0.0%	65.3%
SOLID WASTE			
<i>SNL/NM Total Solid Waste^b</i>	m ³ (kg)	2,022 (0.6M)	2,022 (0.6M)
<i>Percent Change</i>		0.0%	0.0%
WASTEWATER			
<i>Existing Operations</i>	M gal	49	86
<i>New Operations</i>	M gal	0	5
<i>SNL/NM Balance of Operations</i>	M gal	231	231
<i>SNL/NM Total Wastewater</i>	M gal	280	322
<i>Percent Change</i>		0.0%	15%

Sources: SNL/NM 1998a, 1997b, 1998c, 1998t

kg: kilogram

LLMW: low-level mixed waste

LLW: low-level waste

M: million

M gal: million gallons

m³: cubic meters

MTRU: mixed transuranic

RCRA: Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

TRU: transuranic

^a The base year varies depending on information provided in the *Facilities and Safety Information Document* (SNL/NM 1997b). Typically, the base year is 1996 or 1997, as appropriate.^b Individual breakdowns of solid waste for existing, new, and balance of operations are unavailable because of tracking methods.^c Numbers are rounded and may differ from calculated values.

Therefore, there would be sufficient capacity to accommodate the anticipated increases in radioactive wastes.

Special Projects

Projections indicate that the ER Project, a special project beyond the scope of existing operations, will be the single largest waste generator at SNL/NM in 1998. The ER Project would produce approximately 2,862 m³ of LLW and 221 m³ of LLMW, primarily contaminated soil and debris prior to the end of the project in 2004. ER Project wastes are stored and handled at the point of generation prior to offsite disposal. Management of ER Project waste would not be expected to impact overall SNL/NM waste management operations. Actual cleanup is now expected to be completed by 2002, with ER waste

disposed of by 2004. ER Project waste must be properly characterized. Therefore, lag time is built into the project schedule between field remediation and actual disposal of waste.

5.4.10.2 Hazardous Waste

Existing Operations

As shown on Table 5.4.10 1, under the Expanded Operations Alternative, SNL/NM anticipates an increase in the generation of RCRA hazardous waste from existing operations from 16,187 kg in the base year to 25,074 kg per year. Projections for selected facilities for new and existing operations are shown in Appendix H. Projected RCRA hazardous waste generation is presented in Figure 4.12 4.

No appreciable change in the generation of explosive waste would occur. Therefore, the TTF, with a treatment capacity of 9.1 kg of waste per burn, would continue to accommodate those wastes generated from the Light-Initiated High Explosive Facility at SNL/NM. The majority of explosive waste would be disposed of at SNL/NM or through KAFB.

New Operations

SNL/NM anticipates annual generation of a maximum of 2,337 kg of hazardous waste by new operations over the next 10 years. The majority of the increase would be primarily due to the full implementation of medical isotopes production operation, associated with the MIPP in 2003. These operations, described in the *Medical Isotopes Production Project: Molybdenum-99 and Related Isotopes Environmental Impact Statement* (DOE 1996b), would account for less than 3 percent (2.5 percent) of the total projected hazardous waste generation under the Expanded Operations Alternative.

New SNL/NM operations would use less than 1 percent annually of the available hazardous waste storage capacity, which is considered to be a minimal impact.

Balance of Operations

It was assumed that the RCRA hazardous waste levels for the balance of operations at SNL/NM would increase by the same proportion as RCRA waste for selected facilities, because selected facilities represent the overall plant. Consequently, multipliers were used to project RCRA hazardous waste levels under all three alternatives. In the base year, balance of operations generated 39,267 kg of RCRA hazardous waste. For the Expanded Operations Alternative, the maximum projected balance of operations amount would be 64,902 kg.

Current Capacity

Under the Expanded Operations Alternative, the total volume of hazardous waste generated at SNL/NM requiring offsite disposal at licensed/approved facilities, would not exceed the existing 286.5 m³ of storage and handling capacities at the HWMF and its associated storage buildings. The outside nonpermitted bermed storage area for nonhazardous waste was not included in the onsite storage capacity calculations. SNL/NM routinely ships hazardous waste to various offsite commercial disposal facilities. Projections provide that a maximum of 26 percent of the existing hazardous waste capacity would be used. Most, if not all, waste would be shipped in less than 1 year to meet regulatory

requirements. Based on these projections and on continued operations at selected facilities under the Expanded Operations Alternative, the hazardous waste generation impacts would continue to be minimal.

Special Projects

During field remediation, the ER Project would be the single largest waste generator at SNL/NM and would produce approximately 26 M kg of hazardous waste by 2002. Final disposal would be accomplished by 2004. Projected ER hazardous waste volumes are presented in Table 5.3.10. ER waste handling is discussed in Section 4.12.6.

D&D operations would continue (as outlined in Section 2.3.5). This program would directly impact the quantity of TSCA hazardous waste requiring disposal. Under this modernization program, SNL/NM would continue to generate TSCA hazardous waste, primarily PCBs and asbestos that are removed from transformers and buildings. Since the main PCB relamping and transformer removal has been completed, quantities of TSCA waste have dropped to approximately 122,000 kg per year and should remain at that level (Figures 4.12.5 and 4.12.6).

The total volume of TSCA waste would eventually decrease as the targeted facilities are removed. Currently, SNL/NM has 674 buildings providing a total of 5 M gross ft² of office and operational space. Through this facility modernization program, the number of buildings would be reduced to 465, totaling approximately 4.9 M gross ft². This program would remove 138 buildings accounting for 179,204 gross ft² within FY 1998 and FY 1999 at SNL/NM. During FY 2000 through FY 2002, 49 additional buildings, accounting for 108,937 gross ft², are potentially scheduled for removal. Over the long term, an additional 29 buildings would be removed with a total of 84,132 gross ft². To make up for the loss of office and operational space, seven additional buildings would be built, adding a total of approximately 240,000 gross ft². No predictions are made for years beyond 2007.

5.4.10.3 All Other Wastes

All SNL/NM operations also involve four additional waste management activity areas, discussed below.

Biohazardous (Medical) Waste

The total volume of medical waste would generally remain a function of the total number of full-time employees and subcontractors at SNL/NM. In 1997,

2,463 kg of medical waste were disposed of at an approved offsite commercial facility. Under the Expanded Operations Alternative, approximately 4,071 kg of medical waste would be generated. The existing waste handling capabilities would be adequate to accommodate this waste. No additional offsite impacts would occur, because offsite disposal capacity would continue to be sufficient.

Nonhazardous Chemical Waste

In 1998, the ER Project will generate approximately 125,112 kg of nonhazardous waste (Table 5.3.10 2). The maximum quantity of nonhazardous waste generated annually at SNL/NM and managed by the HWMF would be 114,576 kg, based on the waste multiplier (see Appendix H) developed for RCRA hazardous waste (Rinchem 1998a). Existing commercial disposal facilities would still have adequate capacities to handle the continued generation of nonhazardous waste, thus no additional impacts would be anticipated.

Municipal Solid Waste

Site-wide solid waste generation trends at SNL/NM would generally remain a function of total building area and the number of full-time and subcontractor employees. This function is based on general build operations activities, such as maintenance and cleaning, and, to a lesser extent, the general office waste created by SNL/NM employees. Despite the projected 10 percent personnel increase, no appreciable onsite impacts to disposal facilities would be anticipated because existing waste handling capabilities are already in place. As existing buildings are replaced, personnel are moved to make more efficient use of the space. No additional offsite impacts would occur, because offsite disposal capacity would continue to be sufficient. However, a significant amount of C&D waste, a special class of solid waste, would potentially be generated under the facility modernization program described above. Quantities of C&D waste associated with the facility modernization program projected to be similar to prior years. This waste is disposed of at KAFB and does not currently create an offsite impact. Table 5.3.10 3 summarizes construction debris disposal.

Wastewater

Under the Expanded Operations Alternative, increases in process and domestic water use would occur throughout SNL/NM due to varying levels of operation within each facility. SNL/NM would generate approximately 322 M gal

of wastewater annually. However, SNL/NM entered into an MOU with KAFB, the DOE, the city of Albuquerque, and the state of New Mexico to reduce its water use by 30 percent by 2004 (SNL/NM 1997p). The MDL would be the single facility discharging the largest wastewater volume at SNL/NM. Reduction efforts would focus on the MDL to reduce the amount of process wastewater being generated. See Section 5.3.2 for additional discussion of wastewater quantities and capacities.

5.4.11 Noise and Vibration

Projections of the number of impulse noise tests under the Expanded Operations Alternative indicate a 250 percent increase in tests over those of the 1996 baseline 73.2 number and a 184 percent increase above No Action Alternative levels. These test activities originate from facilities located in TA-III and the Coyote Test Field and are remote from other SNL/NM TAs and the site boundary. There would be no increase in the magnitude of explosions during test activities that would result in a larger impulse noise for the Expanded Operations Alternative.

The level of impulse noise activities under the Expanded Operations Alternative would be an average of approximately one impulse noise event per hour for an 8-hour work day and a 261-day work year. Only a small fraction of these tests would be of sufficient magnitude to be heard or felt beyond the site boundary. The vast majority of tests would be expected to be below background noise levels for receptor locations beyond the KAFB boundary and would, therefore, be unnoticed by those neighborhoods bounding the site. Building damage is sometimes blamed on ground vibrations caused by explosive detonations, whereas the damage is often the result of the traveling pressure waves. The impulse noise levels resemble a dull thud and generally are considered an annoyance because of startle effects, including window vibrations. The effects on the public would be minor. Ground vibrations would remain confined to the immediate test area within the ground hazard area.

5.4.12 Socioeconomics

Implementation of the Expanded Operations Alternative would result in no appreciable impacts to demographic characteristics, economy, and community services in the ROI, as discussed below. The discussion of impacts is based on a bounding economic analysis based on projections in *SNL/NM Facility Source Documents* (SNL/NM 1998a) and potential indirect increases across all SNL/NM facilities, as discussed in Section 5.2.11.

5.4.12.1 Demographic Characteristics

The Expanded Operations Alternative would not be likely to have any noticeable change in existing demographic characteristics within the ROI (Section 4.14.3). Under this alternative, overall expenditures and employment at SNL/NM would expand gradually at a steady rate through 2008.

5.4.12.2 Economic Base

The Expanded Operations Alternative would not be likely to have a noticeable change in the existing economic base in the ROI (Section 4.14.3). Historically, increases or decreases in operational levels of activities at SNL/NM have been gradual and/or fluctuated about 1 or 2 percent per year (SNL/NM 1997a). Under this alternative, overall expenditures and employment at

SNL/NM would expand at a gradual steady rate through 2008.

Table 5.4.12 1 presents an estimate of the Expanded Operations Alternative impacts on the ROI economy from a 10-percent increase in operational levels of activity and associated increases in expenditures, income, and employment, both direct and indirect, at SNL/NM. Operational activities associated with selected facilities are included in the totals presented in the table. If operations at SNL/NM were to increase by 10 percent over current levels, overall economic activity within the ROI would be expected to increase by about 0.8 percent, with slightly smaller increases in income and employment at about 0.7 percent. As presented in Table 5.4.12 1, a 10-percent increase in operational levels of activity at SNL/NM through 2008 would help generate

Table 5.4.12 1. SNL/NM's Impact on Central New Mexico's Economy if Operations Were to Increase by 10 Percent

ECONOMIC MEASURE	FY 1996 ^a			ASSUMING A 10% INCREASE IN OPERATIONS			
	SNL/NM	TOTAL ROI	PERCENT OF ROI	SNL/NM	TOTAL ROI	PERCENT OF ROI	PERCENT CHANGE
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY (\$ BILLIONS)							
<i>Direct Expenditures</i>	1.43			1.57			
<i>Indirect & Induced</i>	2.50			2.75			
TOTAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY	3.93	42.40	9.3	4.32	42.80	10.1	0.8
<i>Economic Activity Multiplier: 2.75^b</i>							
INCOME (\$ BILLIONS)							
<i>Net Wages & Salaries</i>	0.48			0.53			
<i>Indirect & Induced</i>	0.58			0.64			
TOTAL INCOME	1.06	13.40	7.9	1.17	13.51	8.7	0.8
<i>Income Multiplier: 2.21^b</i>							
EMPLOYMENT (NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES)							
<i>SNL/NM Employment</i>	7,652			8,417			
<i>Indirect & Induced</i>	18,826			20,706			
TOTAL EMPLOYMENT	26,478	331,800	8	29,123	334,446	8.7	0.7
<i>Employment Multiplier: 3.46^b</i>							

Source: DOE 1997]
 FY: fiscal year
 ROI: region of influence

^a Modeled results from DOE 1997]
^b The use of multipliers in calculating economic impacts in the ROI is explained in Section 4.14.3.

\$4.33 B in economic activity out of a total ROI activity of \$42.8 B, contribute \$1.17 B in income out of a total ROI income level of \$13.51 B, and represent 29,123 jobs out of a total of 334,446 jobs within the ROI.

Section 6.4.11 discusses the cumulative impact of the Expanded Operations Alternative within the ROI and the expected growth from other industrial and economic sectors.

5.4.12.3 Housing and Community Services

The Expanded Operations Alternative would not create a noticeable change in existing housing and community services within the ROI (Section 4.14.3). Under this alternative, overall expenditures and employment at SNL/NM would expand at a steady rate through 2008; however, the contributory effects from other industrial and economic sectors within the ROI would be greater than SNL/NM's (Section 6.4.11).

5.4.13 Environmental Justice

In general, SNL/NM operations under the Expanded Operations Alternative would have no known disproportionately high or adverse health or environmental impacts on low-income or minority populations within the ROI. One area of concern is water resources and hydrology. Anticipated water resources adverse impacts would equally affect all communities in the area (see Section 5.4.4). Thus, no disproportionately high and adverse impacts to minority and low-income communities would be anticipated for this resource area.

Table 5.4.13-1 provides a brief summary of impacts for each resource or topic area under the Expanded Operations Alternative. It also identifies areas where the impacts do not vary from the No Action Alternative. See Section 5.3.13 for an expanded discussion of environmental justice issues by resource area.

Table 5.4.13 1. Summary of Potential Environmental Justice Impacts Under the Expanded Operations Alternative

RESOURCE OR TOPIC AREA	SUMMARIZED EFFECT	EFFECT ON RESOURCE OR TOPIC AREA ROI	PROPORTIONAL EFFECT ON	
			LOW-INCOME	MINORITY NEIGHBORHOODS
<i>Land Use and Visual Resources, Infrastructure, Geology and Soils, Biological and Ecological Resources, Cultural Resources^o, Waste Generation</i>	Same as under the No Action Alternative	Same as under the No Action Alternative	Same as under the No Action Alternative	Same as under the No Action Alternative
<i>Water Resources and Hydrology</i>	SNL/NM groundwater use is projected to account for 12% of local aquifer drawdown.	Adverse effect	Not adverse effect	Not adverse effect
<i>Air Quality Nonradiological Air</i>	Emissions would be below the most stringent standards, which define the pollutant concentrations below which there are no adverse impacts to human health and the environment. Concentrations would be below regulatory standards and human health guidelines. SNL/NM carbon monoxide emissions would account for 6.3% of Bernalillo county carbon monoxide emissions.	Not adverse	Not adverse	Not adverse
<i>Air Quality Radiological Air</i>	MEI 0.51: mrem/yr Collective ROI dose: 15.8 person-rem/yr Average collective ROI dose: 2.16×10^{-2} mrem/yr	Not adverse	Not adverse	Not adverse
<i>Human Health and Worker Safety</i>	MEI lifetime risk of fatal cancer increases by 2.6×10^{-7} Fatal cancers (additional ROI): 7.9×10^{-3} Risk of cancer fatality to workforce is 7.6×10^{-3}	Not adverse	Not adverse	Not adverse
<i>Transportation</i>	Total annual material shipments: 6,303 Total KAFB traffic (daily vehicles): 39,085 Incident-free exposure, truck emissions - annual LCFs: 6.2×10^{-2} Incident-free exposure, dose - annual LCFs: 0.31	Not adverse	Not adverse	Not adverse

Table 5.4.13 1. Summary of Potential Environmental Justice Impacts Under the Expanded Operations Alternative (concluded)

RESOURCE OR TOPIC AREA	SUMMARIZED EFFECT	EFFECT ON RESOURCE OR TOPIC AREA ROI	PROPORTIONAL EFFECT ON	
			LOW-INCOME	MINORITY NEIGHBORHOODS
Noise and Vibration	Four-fold increase in test activities over 1996 levels, an average of less than one impulse noise event per hour for an 8-hour work day and a 261-day work year. Only a fraction of these tests would be of sufficient magnitude to be heard or felt beyond the site boundary. The vast majority of tests would be expected to be below background noise levels for receptor locations beyond the KAFB boundary and would, therefore, be unnoticed in neighborhoods bounding the site.	Not adverse	Not adverse	Not adverse
Socioeconomics	SNL/NM employees: 8,417 SNL/NM total economic activity: \$4.32 B/yr Percent of ROI total economic activity: 10.1%	Not adverse	Not adverse	Not adverse

Source: Original
 B: billion
 KAFB: Kirtland Air Force Base
 LCF: latent cancer fatalities
 MEI: maximally exposed individual
 mrem: millirem
 rem: Roentgen equivalent, man

ROI: region of influence
 TCPs: traditional cultural properties
 SNL/NM: Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico
 yr: year
^a No TCPs have been identified; ongoing consultations may yet result in determination of impacts.

5.5 REDUCED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE

Under the Reduced Operations Alternative, DOE and interagency programs and activities at SNL/NM would decrease to the minimal operations needed to maintain SNL/NM facilities and equipment in an operational readiness mode. This section describes the impacts that would result from this alternative.

5.5.1 Land Use and Visual Resources

The implementation of the Reduced Operations Alternative would not affect the existing land use patterns or visual resources at SNL/NM facilities on KAFB. Sections 5.5.1.1 and 5.5.1.2 discuss these resource areas in relation to the Reduced Operations Alternative.

5.5.1.1 Land Use

Under the Reduced Operations Alternative, there would be no additional impacts to existing land resources on KAFB. The extent of DOE land and USAF-permitted acreage currently available for use by SNL/NM facilities on KAFB would remain relatively the same. Similarly, operations would remain consistent with industrial/research park uses and would have no foreseeable effect on established land use patterns or requirements. At locations on permitted land where operations would decline or be shut down by the owning organization, SNL/NM would continue to hold the sites to conduct periodic safety checks and complete any ER actions (Section 5.3.3.1). Before returning the land to the USAF, SNL/NM would be responsible for conducting any demolition work and restoring the land to its condition when originally acquired (SNL 1997a).

5.5.1.2 Visual Resources

No additional impacts to visual resources would be likely to adversely change the overall appearance of the existing landscape. Efforts initiated by SNL/NM to incorporate and maintain campus-style design would continue. This style contains established principles and design guidance that provide a framework for the physical development and redevelopment of SNL/NM sites. The guidance covers building massing, facades, colors, building orientation and entries, traffic circulation corridors, standardized signage, and landscaping, including low-water-use plant selections. These efforts would be consistent with the high concern for scenery due to the numbers of observers and users in the area.

Based on the reduced levels of operation association with this alternative, activities at outdoor testing facilities in the Coyote Test Field and the Withdrawn Area would decline. Some testing activities that produce smoke and dust of variable quantity and duration would take place, but these conditions would be periodic, short-term, and would not change the visual characteristics of the area. Where decommissioning, demolition, or ER work are planned, actions would be taken such as backfilling, reducing side slopes, applying topsoil, reseeded, and establishing plant growth to restore the area to its condition when originally acquired.

5.5.2 Infrastructure

As discussed in Section 5.3.2, the infrastructure analysis looked for potential incremental changes to SNL/NM services, utilities, and facilities by alternative. The two areas where incremental changes were identified are site-wide utility demands and four selected infrastructure facilities: the steam plant, RMWWMF, HWWMF, and TTF. See Section 2.3 for a discussion of how the four facilities were selected for analysis.

With regard to site-wide utility demands, most SNL/NM facilities do not meter utility use. For the Reduced Operations Alternative, the lowest number reported in the No Action Alternative was used as the basis for projecting utility use. Any incremental changes between the base year and the Reduced Operations Alternative projections in utility demands for the selected facilities (see Chapter 2) were taken into account by adjusting site-wide demand accordingly as presented in Table 5.5.2 1. Facility-specific utility data are presented in Chapter 3, Table 3.6 1.

As discussed in Section 5.3.2, analysis of the selected infrastructure facilities relied on the projected throughput and operational capacities as presented in Table 5.5.2 2.

The implementation of the Reduced Operations Alternative would generally lessen the demands on infrastructure (Table 5.5.2 1). Water consumption would decrease approximately 24 M gal per year to 416 M gal per year. SNL/NM would generate approximately 268 M gal of wastewater per year. Annual electrical consumption would decline to 185,000 MWh. Small fluctuations in projected utility consumption rates would occur due to annual changes in weather.

The current infrastructure resources would be capable of accommodating SNL/NM facility requirements under the Reduced Operations Alternative. These levels of

Table 5.5.2 1. Annual^a SNL/NM Utility Usage and Capacities Under the Reduced Operations Alternative

RESOURCE/ DATA SOURCE	BASE YEAR USAGE	REDUCED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE ANNUAL USAGE	SYSTEM CAPACITY	SNL/NM USAGE AS PERCENT OF CAPACITY
WATER USE^b				
<i>Site-wide demand^f</i>	440 M gal	417 M gal	2.0 B gal	21
<i>Selected facilities^g</i>	0 M gal	-1.4 M gal	NA	
TOTAL	440 M gal	416 M gal	2.0 B gal	21
WASTEWATER DISCHARGE				
<i>Site-wide demand^f</i>	280 M gal	265 M gal	850 M gal	31
<i>Selected facilities^g</i>	0 M gal	3.3 M gal	NA	
TOTAL	280 M gal	268 M gal	850 M gal	32
ELECTRICAL USE				
<i>Site-wide demand^f</i>	197,000 MWh	186,000 MWh	1,095,000 ^d MWh	16
<i>Selected facilities^g</i>	0 MWh	-775 MWh	NA	
TOTAL	197,000 MWh	185,000 MWh	1,095,000^d MWh	16
NATURAL GAS USE				
<i>Site-wide demand^{f,e}</i>	475 M ft ³	450 M ft ³	2.3 B ft ³	20
<i>Selected facilities^{g,h}</i>	0 M ft ³	-65 M ft ³	NA	
TOTAL	475 M ft³	385 M ft³	2.3 B ft³	18
MISCELLANEOUS				
<i>Fuel oil^{f,h}</i>	7,000 gal	7,000 gal	Not limited by infrastructure	NA
<i>Propane^h</i>	383,000 gal	362,000 gal	Not limited by infrastructure	NA

Sources: DOE 1997k; SNL 1997a; SNL/NM 1998a, c; USAF 1998a

B: billion

ft³: cubic feet

FY: fiscal year

gal: gallon

M: million

MW: megawatt

MWh: megawatt hour

NA: Not applicable

psi: pounds per square inch

^a Base Year is 1996 or 1997, the most representative of usage. Not necessarily the same as in Chapter 4.^b Although not accounted for in the table, SNL/NM expects to reduce water by 30 percent by the year 2004 (see Table 5.3.2 1 for conservation based scenario).^c Prorated based on the following M square footage: Base Year = 5.266; FY 2003 = 5.143; FY 2008 = 4.986^d Based on 125-MW rating^e Estimated based on 60 psi^f Fuel oil is used in emergency situations at the Steam Plant and is not dependent upon square footage.^g Adjustment for contribution from selected facilities as reported in SNL/NM 1998a^h No adjustments were reported in SNL/NM 1998a. Estimate based on 260 M ft³ (at 14.7 psi) reduction at steam plant converted to 65 M ft³ at 60 psi

Table 5.5.2 2. Selected (Infrastructure) Facility Annual Throughput^a and Capacities Under the Reduced Operations Alternative

FACILITY ^d	BASE YEAR 1997	REDUCED OPERATIONS ANNUAL THROUGHPUT	SYSTEM CAPACITY ANNUAL	THROUGHPUT AS PERCENT OF CAPACITY
<i>Steam Plant (steam produced)^e</i>	544 M lb	362 M lb	3.33 B lb	11
<i>HWMF (waste handled)^e</i>	203,000 kg	175,000 kg	579,000 kg ^c	30
<i>RMWMF (waste handled)^e</i>	1.6 M lb	0.8 M lb	2.7 M lb ^c	30
<i>TTF (waste handled)^e</i>	Minimal	Minimal	7,300 lb/yr ^b	1

Source: SNL/NM 1998a

B: billion

ft³: cubic feet

HWMF: Hazardous Waste Management Facility

kg: kilogram

lb: pound

M: million

RMWMF: Radioactive and Mixed Waste Management Facility

TTF: Thermal Treatment Facility

yr: year

^a Throughput means the amount of steam produced or waste handled.

^b Permit capacity

^c This is the capacity for single-shift work with current employment level, not permit capacity.

^d See Section 2.3 for discussion on how these facilities were selected.

^e See Table 3.6 1, Infrastructure category.

support would be compatible with system requirements and less than those under the No Action Alternative. Specific details on these systems are presented in the *1998 Sites Comprehensive Plan* (SNL 1997a). KAFB utility usage is discussed in Section 6.2.

Impacts associated with the four facilities analyzed would be less than those expected under the No Action Alternative. Throughput and capacities are presented in Table 5.5.2 2. As shown in the table, ample capacity exists for the four facilities.

5.5.3 Geology and Soils

The implementation of the Reduced Operations Alternative would result in the continuation or lessening of impacts related to soil contamination and slope stability, as described in Sections 5.5.3.1 and 5.5.3.2, respectively.

5.5.3.1 Soil Contamination

Section 5.3.3 presents the methods used in evaluating soil contamination at SNL/NM. It focuses on near-surface (zero to 1 ft deep) soil contamination at SNL/NM sites, particularly those investigated under the ER Project. The DOE has committed to clean up 162 of 182 ER sites. The remaining 20 sites would be listed as active. Of concern among these active sites are outdoor testing areas where normal operations or accidents could

result in the deposition of contaminants on the ground surface.

Under the Reduced Operations Alternative, the frequency of tests would be curtailed such that future soil contamination occurrences requiring cleanup would be unlikely. For example, at the Lurance Canyon Burn site, certification tests would decrease from 12 to 1 per year. Accordingly, the once-in-10-year event (contamination and cleanup of up to 7,000 µg of DU per g of soil over a 1,000-ft² area) might be expected to occur once every 120 years.

SNL/NM conducts immediate cleanup actions (SNL/NM 1998a) and periodic site surveys (SNL 1997e) to clean up these sites to levels that meet future land use standards.

5.5.3.2 Slope Stability

Section 5.3.3 presents the relevance of and methods used to evaluate slope stability. Four areas were selected for a detailed, qualitative evaluation: the southern boundary of TA-IV, the Aerial Cable Facility, the Lurance Canyon Burn Site, and the Electro-Explosive Research Facility. Slope failure at these locations would be remote.

Under the Reduced Operations Alternative, no changes in activity types or frequencies would be projected for TA-IV and the Electro-Explosive Research Facility (SNL/NM 1998a). A decrease in testing would be

expected at the Aerial Cable Facility and the Lurance Canyon Burn Site (SNL/NM 1998a). No slope destabilizing activities have been identified at the Lurance Canyon Burn Site. Accidental burns of vegetation from hot missile debris could become less frequent at the Aerial Cable Facility, although no evidence of slope instability has been observed from a previous burn. The likelihood of slope failure resulting from SNL/NM activities would continue to be remote under this alternative.

5.5.4 Water Resources and Hydrology

Impacts from the implementation of the Reduced Operations Alternative would not differ substantively from the impacts described in Section 5.3.4 for the No Action Alternative. Impacts to groundwater quality and quantity and surface water quality and quantity are described in Sections 5.5.4.1, 5.5.4.2, 5.5.4.3, and 5.5.4.4, respectively.

5.5.4.1 Groundwater Quality

Section 5.3.4 identifies sources of groundwater contamination and presents modeling of the CWL. All groundwater quality impacts described in Section 5.3.4.1 would be alternative-independent. The Reduced Operations Alternative would not cause any change in the nature or extent of groundwater contamination. Contamination of groundwater would remain an adverse impact as discussed in Section 5.3.4.1. No changes in rate and scope of ER Project remediation activities are projected under the Reduced Operations Alternative.

5.5.4.2 Groundwater Quantity

Using the groundwater quantity analysis described in Section 5.3.4.2 and the projected SNL/NM water use from 1998 to 2008 under the Reduced Operations Alternative, 571 M ft³ of water would be withdrawn over the 10-year operational period, in comparison to 605 M ft³ under the No Action Alternative. Both these amounts account for approximately 11 percent of the projected 5,326 M ft³ of groundwater withdrawal in the KAFB vicinity from 1998 to 2008. The SNL/NM water use for either alternative, therefore, corresponds to 11 percent of this projected withdrawal.

The impacts described in Section 5.3.4.2 would not vary in any significant manner under the Reduced Operations Alternative. Aquifer drawdown would remain an adverse impact.

5.5.4.3 Surface Water Quality

SNL/NM impacts to surface water quality are discussed in the No Action Alternative (Section 5.3.4). This discussion compares results of water quality analyses in Tijeras Arroyo (from samples collected during storm events) near the downstream boundary of KAFB, with NMWQCC stream standards. No constituents in the analyses exceeded these standards. Further, the three major potential contributors to surface water contamination (ER Project sites; permitted storm water discharges from TAs-I, -II, and -IV; and outdoor testing facilities) were evaluated based on potential contaminants and likelihood of migration.

Under the Reduced Operations Alternative, the following two changes could occur in the major potential contributors to surface water contamination:

A projected 5 percent decrease in staff below current levels (Section 5.5.12) could potentially reduce the quantity of oil and grease runoff from permitted storm water discharges in TAs-I, -II, and -IV. The most recent storm water monitoring shows oil and grease concentrations ranging from 0.60 to 1.4 mg/L (SNL 1997a). Although there are no quantitative NPDES or state limits for oil and grease, these concentrations are near detection limits. A further reduction would have no deleterious effects.

A reduction in the frequency of outdoor tests could result in a decrease of radioactive materials deposited on the ground surface. To date, surface water sampling has not shown evidence of contamination resulting from tests; reducing the frequency of outdoor tests would further reduce the likelihood of such contamination. Therefore, concentrations of radionuclides at the exit point of Tijeras Arroyo from KAFB would be anticipated to remain substantially the same under the Reduced Operations Alternative.

5.5.4.4 Surface Water Quantity

The method used to estimate the SNL/NM contribution to surface water quantity is described in Section 5.3.4 and in Appendix B. The analysis calculates the quantities of excess surface water runoff from developed areas of SNL/NM, and the discharge of process and sanitary water to Albuquerque's Southside Water Reclamation Plant. Under the No Action Alternative, the estimated total excess surface water contribution to the Rio Grande would be between 40.7 and 41.3 M ft³ annually. The vast majority of this contribution (40.6 M ft³) would be from discharge to the water reclamation plant.

Storm Water Runoff

Under the Reduced Operations Alternative, only minor net differences in building and parking lot areas would be likely. These differences would not significantly change the developed (impervious) area of SNL/NM from the 0.72-mi² area projected under the No Action Alternative. Therefore, excess storm water runoff would continue at 100,000 to 700,000 ft³ per year, as estimated under the No Action Alternative (Appendix B).

Discharge to Sanitary Sewer

The estimated annual volume of water to be discharged to the sanitary sewer under the Reduced Operations Alternative would be 35.8 M ft³ (268 M gal), 13 percent less than under the No Action Alternative (Section 5.3.4). Combined with the excess storm water runoff, the total estimated SNL/NM effect on surface water quantity would be between 35.9 and 36.5 M ft³ annually. This would represent approximately 0.06 percent of Rio Grande flow at the discharge points. Under the Reduced Operations Alternative, no detrimental effects to the Rio Grande from the quantity of SNL/NM water discharged would be likely.

5.5.5 Biological and Ecological Resources

Impacts to biological and ecological resources resulting from implementation of the Reduced Operations Alternative would be similar to those under the No Action Alternative. There would be slightly decreased levels of noise and activity under this alternative. Impacts to biological and ecological resources would be minimal. Inventory and management of the biological resources by SNL/NM, KAFB, and the USFS would continue to protect the animals, plants, and sensitive species on KAFB.

Outdoor activities would result in a slight decrease in the probability of unintended fires, off-road traffic, noise, small explosive debris, and plumes of smoke. The decreased level of activity would be unlikely to cause the loss of any known species or plant community at KAFB. The area of vegetation disturbed would be decreased, and the effect on the viability of plant communities would be negligible.

Under the Reduced Operations Alternative, there would be no effect to the Federally endangered peregrine falcon, as discussed in Section 5.3.5. It is not anticipated that there would be adverse effects to the viability of populations of any sensitive species.

Potential contaminant loads due to this alternative impacting plants and animals would be expected to be smaller than under the No Action Alternative and continue to be negligible based on annual ecological monitoring data (SNL/NM 1997u). See Section 5.5.3 for a discussion of contaminant loads and geology and soils impacts.

5.5.6 Cultural Resources

Implementation of the Reduced Operations Alternative would have low to negligible impacts to cultural resources due to 1) the absence of prehistoric or historic archaeological sites on DOE-administered land, 2) the nature of the cultural resources found in the ROI (see Appendix C), 3) compliance with applicable regulations and established procedures for the protection and conservation of cultural resources located on lands administered by the DOE and on lands administered by other agencies and used by the DOE (see Section 4.8.3.2 and Chapter 7), and 4) the nature of SNL/NM activities near cultural resources. Implementation of the regulations and procedures would make unlikely any adverse impacts resulting from construction, demolition, decontamination, renovation, or ER Project activities.

Under the Reduced Operations Alternative, prehistoric and historic cultural resources could potentially be affected by activities performed at five SNL/NM facilities, although the potential for impact would be low to negligible. These facilities consist of the Aerial Cable Facility, Lurance Canyon Burn Site, Thunder Range, Sled Track Complex, and Terminal Ballistics Complex. The first three facilities are located on land not owned by the DOE. Impacts could potentially result from three activities at these facilities: production of explosive testing debris and shrapnel, off-road vehicle traffic, and unintended fires and fire suppression. A decrease in the frequency of these activities under the Reduced Operations Alternative would result in a lower potential for impacts than the No Action Alternative.

Another source of potential impact derives from the restricted access present at KAFB and at individual SNL/NM facilities. Restricted access to areas within the ROI would have positive effects on cultural resources themselves. Under the Reduced Operations Alternative, current security levels that restrict access would be maintained for KAFB in general, but would diminish in frequency for specific SNL/NM facilities during various activities due to the reduced frequency of these activities. This would result in a decreased frequency of added protection at SNL/NM facilities for cultural resources.

5.5.7 Air Quality

The implementation of the Reduced Operations Alternative would result in air quality impacts that would be less than or equal to those estimated for the No Action Alternative (see Section 5.3.7). Section 5.5.7.1 describes nonradiological air quality impacts under the Reduced Operations Alternative, and Section 5.5.7.2 describes radiological impacts.

5.5.7.1 Nonradiological Air Quality

The Reduced Operations Alternative reflects minimum levels of activity required to maintain a facility's assigned capability. In some facilities, this alternative includes activity levels that would represent an increase over the base period activity levels (typically 1991 through 1995). In these cases, the activity levels would be those that, during the baseline period, have not been exercised sufficiently to maintain capability or to satisfy assigned theoretical or experimental research and development product requirements of the DOE.

Criteria Pollutants

The criteria pollutants generated under the Reduced Operations Alternative would be less than or equal to those described for the No Action Alternative. The sources of criteria pollutants would include the steam plant, electric power generator plant, boiler and emergency generator in Building 701, and the 600-kw-capacity generator in Building 870b. The criteria pollutant sources represent SNL/NM infrastructure and are not influenced by mission-specific activity levels. These sources would operate at levels comparable to those projected for the No Action Alternative. Table 5.3.7-1 presents the No Action Alternative criteria pollutant concentrations. Although this alternative reflects the minimum activity levels required to maintain a facility's assigned capability, the requirement for heat and emergency electric power would be likely to remain at the No Action Alternative level.

Mobile Sources

Motor vehicle emissions under the Reduced Operations Alternative would include carbon monoxide emissions from decreased commuter traffic. The estimated commuter traffic would be 97 percent of that under the No Action Alternative, or 13,175 commuter vehicles and 582 on-base vehicles. The carbon monoxide emission factor is determined by the EPA mobile source emission factor model *MOBILE5a*, projected to 2005, or 28.5 g per mi (SNL 1996c). Projected carbon monoxide

emissions for SNL/NM under the Reduced Operations Alternative, based on the aforementioned assumptions and modeled emission factor, would be 3,385 tons per year, which is 702 tons per year less than the 1996 baseline. Projected carbon monoxide emissions for Bernalillo county for 2005 would be 206 tons per day, or 75,190 tons per year (AEHD 1998). The contribution of carbon monoxide emissions from vehicles commuting to and from SNL/NM and SNL/NM-operated on-base vehicles in 2005 would be 4.5 percent of the total county highway mobile sources carbon monoxide emissions. These estimates represent the Reduced Operations Alternative contribution of carbon monoxide emissions from mobile sources from SNL/NM.

Total carbon monoxide emissions will, therefore, also be less than those presumed for the No Action Alternative; and similarly, the DOE has concluded that no conformity determination is required for the Reduced Operations Alternative.

Lurance Canyon Burn Site

Lurance Canyon Burn Site emissions criteria and chemical pollutants are bounded by the No Action Alternative emissions. Operations at the Lurance Canyon Burn Site would be at or below the level of operations presented for the No Action Alternative. Table 5.3.7-4 presents the criteria pollutant concentrations estimated at the KAFB site boundary for the No Action Alternative level of activity, representing a test using 1,000 gal of JP-8 fuel. For each of the criteria pollutants (carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, PM₁₀, and sulfur dioxide), for each of the averaging times, the modeled concentrations would be less than 5 percent of the applicable national and New Mexico ambient air quality standards. None of the chemical pollutants from tests performed at the facility would result in modeled concentrations above the OEL/100 guideline used to screen the chemical emissions for further analysis. Tests conducted at the Lurance Canyon Burn Site under the Reduced Operations Alternative would result in criteria and chemical pollutant concentrations less than or equal to those under the No Action Alternative.

Chemical Pollutants (Noncarcinogenic and Carcinogenic)

The estimated chemical usage under the Reduced Operations Alternative would be less than that under the No Action Alternative, resulting in concentrations less than or equal to those presented in Table 5.3.7-6. The usage of chemicals is based on mission activity levels,

which for the Reduced Operations Alternative would be less than those under the No Action Alternative level of activity. The estimates of chemical usage for the Reduced Operations Alternative for 5 of the 12 major chemical users range from a factor of 1.0 to 0.2 times the chemical usage for the base year 1996, and less than under the No Action Alternative usage for each facility.

5.5.7.2 Radiological Air Quality

The SWEIS analysis reviewed the radiological emissions from all SNL/NM facilities. Section 4.9.2 identifies 17 SNL/NM facilities as producing radiological emissions. Based on historic SNL/NM radionuclide emissions data, NESHAP compliance reports, and the FSID (SNL/NM 1998ee), 10 of the 17 SNL/NM facilities were modeled for radiological impacts (Table 5.5.7-1). The ACRR would be operated under one of two configurations: medical isotope production (primarily molybdenum-99 production) or DP. However, for the purpose of conservative analysis, the ACRR was evaluated under simultaneous operation of both configurations. For analysis purposes, based on the review of historical dose evaluations, other facilities that would not contribute more than 0.01 mrem/yr (0.1 percent of the NESHAP limit) to the MEI were screened from further consideration in the SWEIS. The modeled releases to the environment would result in a calculated dose to the MEI and the population within 50 mi of TA-V. TA-V was selected as a center for the population within a 50-mi radius, because the majority of radiological emissions would be from TA-V, specifically the HCF, and TA-V is historically addressed for annual SNL/NM NESHAP compliance.

The *CAP88-PC* computer model (DOE 1997e) was used to calculate the doses. Details on the *CAP88-PC* model, radionuclide emissions, model and source parameters, exposures, meteorological data, and population data are presented in Appendix D. Figure 5.3.7-3 shows the locations of the 10 facilities modeled in the SWEIS. Table 5.5.7-1 presents the estimated radiological emissions from the 10 SNL/NM facilities under the Reduced Operations Alternative. The radiological emissions from each facility were estimated based on SNL/NM planned operations and tests projected into the future. Detailed information is available in the FSID (SNL/NM 1998ee). The ACRR and HCF emissions for base year 1996 are different due to the refurbishing operations to change over to medical isotope production configuration. The SPR emissions were estimated to be higher than emissions during the base year. This is due to

instituting NESHAP requirements for confirmatory measurements of radiological air emissions where measured emission factors were determined for both the SPR and the ACRR. These measured emission factors were found to be higher than the calculated emission factors. These measurements are source-specific to the SPR and ACRR and would not affect the calculations or measurements for other facilities.

Because the general public and USAF personnel have access to SNL/NM, 14 core receptor locations and 2 offsite receptor locations of public concern were considered for dose impact evaluations (see Appendix D.2). Based on NESHAP reports, 16 onsite and 6 offsite additional receptor locations were also evaluated. A total of 38 receptor locations were evaluated for dose impacts. The core receptor locations include schools, hospitals, a museum, and clubs, and were considered for analysis because of potential impacts to children, the sick, and the elderly. The 32 modeled onsite and core receptor locations are shown in Figure 5.3.7-4.

The dose to an individual at each receptor and to the population within 50 mi from the radionuclide emissions from each source was calculated using the *CAP88-PC* model. The receptor receiving the maximum dose was identified as the MEI. The model-calculated dose contributions, including external, inhalation, and ingestion from each of the 10 sources, calculated individually at each receptor location, were combined to determine the overall SNL/NM site-wide normal operations dose to the MEI. Under the Reduced Operations Alternative, the maximum EDE to the MEI from all exposure pathways from all modeled sources was calculated to be 0.020 mrem per year. This MEI having the highest combined dose would be located at the Eubank gate area, offsite of SNL/NM. The EDE contributions from these 10 sources to this combined MEI dose are presented in Table 5.5.7-2. Table 5.5.7-3 presents the doses to 38 onsite, core, and offsite receptor locations. The potential doses for these additional locations would be much lower than the highest combined MEI dose. Under the Reduced Operations Alternative, the total collective dose to the population of 732,523 within a 50-mi radius of TA-V was calculated to be 0.80 person-rem per year. The contributions from all of the 10 modeled sources to the overall SNL/NM site-wide normal operations collective dose to the population within 50 mi are also presented in Table 5.5.7-2. The average dose to an individual in the population within 50 mi of TA-V (collective dose divided by the total population) would be 1.1×10^{-3} mrem per year.

Table 5.5.7 1. Radiological Emissions from Sources at SNL/NM Under the Reduced Operations Alternative

FACILITY NAME	TECHNICAL AREA	RADIONUCLIDE ^a	RELEASE (Ci/year)
<i>Annular Core Research Reactor (ACRR, medical isotopes production configuration), Building 6588</i>	V	Argon-41	0.24
		Tritium	0.24
<i>Explosive Components Facility (ECF), Building 905</i>	II	Tritium	2.0x10 ⁻³
<i>High-Energy Radiation Megavolt Electron Source (HERMES III), Building 970</i>	IV	Nitrogen-13	1.0x10 ⁻⁴
		Oxygen-15	1.0x10 ⁻⁵
<i>Hot Cell Facility (HCF), Building 6580</i>	V	Iodine-131	0.117
		Iodine-132	0.3
		Iodine-133	0.54
		Iodine-134	0.022
		Iodine-135	0.33
		Krypton-83m	19.8
		Krypton-85	0.019
		Krypton-85m	29.0
		Krypton-87	5.7
		Krypton-88	48.0
		Xenon-131m	0.18
		Xenon-133	216.0
		Xenon-133m	10.2
Xenon-135	207.0		
Xenon-135m	36.0		
<i>Mixed Waste Landfill (MWL)</i>	III	Tritium	0.29
<i>Neutron Generator Facility (NGF), Building 870</i>	I	Tritium	156
<i>Radioactive and Mixed Waste Management Facility (RMWMF), Building 6920</i>	III	Tritium	2.203 ^b
<i>Radiographic Integrated Test Stand (RITS), Building 970</i>	IV	Nitrogen-13	0.02
<i>Sandia Pulsed Reactor (SPR), Building 6590</i>	V	Argon-41	2.85

Source: SNL/NM 1998a
 Ci/year: curies per year
 DP: Defense Programs
 SNL/CA: Sandia National Laboratories/California

^a Radiological emissions are projections based on planned activities, projects, and programs. Radionuclide releases are not the same as those presented in Chapter 4.

^b Because SNL/CA tritium-contaminated oil levels handled at RMWMF during the base year were abnormally high, this maximum level of emissions was assumed to be released in any year and, therefore, was constant for all alternatives.

Table 5.5.7 2. Summary of Dose Estimates to SNL/NM Public Under the Reduced Operations Alternative from Radioactive Air Emissions

SOURCE	ANNUAL MEI DOSE, EDE (mrem)	ANNUAL POPULATION DOSE, person-rem
<i>Annular Core Research Reactor (ACRR, medical isotopes production configuration)</i>	7.1×10^{-6}	1.2×10^{-3}
<i>Explosive Components Facility (ECF)</i>	1.9×10^{-8}	4.19×10^{-7}
<i>High-Energy Radiation Megavolt Electron Source (HERMES III)</i>	2.2×10^{-9}	1.7×10^{-8}
<i>Hot Cell Facility (HCF)</i>	2.8×10^{-3}	0.461
<i>Mixed Waste Landfill (MWL)</i>	4.9×10^{-6}	6.16×10^{-4}
<i>Neutron Generator Facility (NGF)</i>	1.7×10^{-2}	0.322
<i>Radioactive and Mixed Waste Management Facility (RMWMF)</i>	1.9×10^{-5}	3.24×10^{-3}
<i>Radiographic Integrated Test Stand (RITS)</i>	4.5×10^{-7}	3.4×10^{-6}
<i>Sandia Pulsed Reactor (SPR)</i>	3.1×10^{-5}	7.6×10^{-3}
TOTAL MEI DOSE	2.0×10^{-2}	-
50-MILE POPULATION COLLECTIVE DOSE	-	0.80

Sources: DOE 1997e, SNL/NM 1998a
 DP: Defense Programs
 EDE: effective dose equivalent
 MEI: maximally exposed individual
 mrem: millirem

Note: Although the Annular Core Research Reactor is expected to be operated under DP configuration intermittently, for this analysis, it was assumed to be operated continuously in conjunction with molybdenum-99 production. Its contribution to the total dose would not be appreciable.

The calculated total MEI dose of 0.020 mrem per year (see Table 5.5.7 2) would be much lower than the regulatory limit of 10 mrem per year to an MEI from SNL/NM site-wide total airborne releases of radiological materials (40 CFR Part 61). This dose would be small compared to an individual background radiation dose of 360 mrem per year (see Figure 4.10 2). The calculated collective dose from SNL/NM operations to the population within 50 mi of TA-V would be 0.80 person-rem per year, which would be much lower than the collective dose from background radiation. Based on this individual radiation dose, the population within 50 mi of TA-V would receive 263,700 person-rem per year.

5.5.8 Human Health and Worker Safety

The implementation of the Reduced Operations Alternative would result in human health and worker safety impacts for normal and accident conditions, as detailed in the following sections.

5.5.8.1 Normal Operations

This section provides information on public health and worker health and safety under the Reduced Operations Alternative. It assesses the potential human health effects associated with routine releases of radioactive and nonradioactive hazardous material from normal SNL/NM operations. For detailed discussions of analytical methods and results along with terminology, definitions, and descriptions, see Appendix E.

Health risk analyses are presented for potential exposures at specific receptor locations and for the potential maximum exposures to radiation and chemical air releases. For a description of receptor locations, exposure scenarios, and environmental pathways selected for assessing human health impacts, see Section 5.3.8.

Chemical Air Release Pathways

Under the Reduced Operations Alternative, chemical use would be less than the quantities anticipated under the No Action Alternative. Therefore, the exposure to

Table 5.5.7 3. Summary of Dose Estimates From Radioactive Air Emissions to 38 Onsite and Offsite Receptors Under the Reduced Operations Alternative

RECEPTOR	ANNUAL RECEPTOR DOSE, EDE (mrem)
ONSITE AND NEAR-SITE RECEPTORS	
<i>Albuquerque International Sunport (Bldg. 1064)</i>	3.6×10^{-3}
<i>Albuquerque International Sunport (Bldg. 760)</i>	5.4×10^{-3}
<i>Building 20706</i>	7.8×10^{-3}
<i>Building 24499</i>	7.5×10^{-3}
<i>Child Development Center-East</i>	5.1×10^{-3}
<i>Child Development Center-West</i>	2.6×10^{-3}
<i>Civil Engineering Research Facility (Bldg. 5701)</i>	1.4×10^{-3}
<i>Coronado Club</i>	5.7×10^{-3}
<i>Coyote Canyon Control Center</i>	1.4×10^{-3}
<i>Golf Course Clubhouse</i>	7.9×10^{-3}
<i>Golf Course Maintenance Area</i>	5.5×10^{-3}
<i>Kirtland Elementary School</i>	2.5×10^{-3}
<i>KAFB Firestation #4 (Bldg. 9002)</i>	1.9×10^{-3}
<i>KAFB Landfill</i>	5.0×10^{-3}
<i>Kirtland Underground Munitions and Maintenance Storage Complex (KUMMSC)</i>	1.6×10^{-2}
<i>Loop Housing</i>	8.4×10^{-3}
<i>Lovelace Hospital</i>	2.8×10^{-3}
<i>Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute</i>	1.4×10^{-3}
<i>Manzano Offices (Fire Station)</i>	3.8×10^{-3}
<i>Maxwell Housing</i>	2.2×10^{-3}
<i>National Atomic Museum</i>	9.0×10^{-3}
<i>Pershing Park Housing</i>	4.9×10^{-3}
<i>Riding Stables</i>	6.8×10^{-3}
<i>Sandia Base Elementary</i>	4.1×10^{-3}
<i>Sandia Federal Credit Union</i>	1.4×10^{-2}
<i>Shandiin Day Care Center</i>	6.3×10^{-3}
<i>Technical Onsite Inspection Facility</i>	6.8×10^{-3}
<i>Veterans Affairs Medical Center</i>	4.0×10^{-3}
<i>Wherry Elementary School</i>	4.5×10^{-3}

Table 5.5.7 3. Summary of Dose Estimates From Radioactive Air Emissions to 38 Onsite and Offsite Receptors Under the Reduced Operations Alternative (concluded)

RECEPTOR	ANNUAL RECEPTOR DOSE, EDE (mrem)
<i>Zia Park Housing</i>	5.8×10^{-3}
OFFSITE RECEPTORS	
<i>Albuquerque City Offices</i>	1.5×10^{-2}
<i>East Resident</i>	1.1×10^{-2}
<i>Eubank Gate Area (Bldg. 8895)</i>	2.0×10^{-2}
<i>Four Hills Subdivision</i>	1.0×10^{-2}
<i>Isleta Gaming Palace</i>	1.1×10^{-2}
<i>Northeast Resident</i>	1.2×10^{-2}
<i>Seismic Center (USGS)</i>	1.1×10^{-2}
<i>Tijeras Arroyo (West)</i>	1.5×10^{-2}

Sources: DOE 1997e, SNL/NM 1998a
EDE: effective dose equivalent

mrem: millirem
USGS: U. S. Geological Survey

receptors would also decrease. Potential exposure concentrations of chemicals under the Reduced Operations Alternative are estimated and shown in Appendix E, Table E.3 4. The chemical assessment process, described in Section 5.3.8 for chemical air release pathways, identified seven COCs under the Reduced Operations Alternative. Several of the COCs are common among the three facilities. These COCs are associated with SNL/NM operations in Buildings 878 (AMPL), 897 (IMRL), and 870 (NGF).

The health risk and corresponding potential for adverse health effects from airborne exposures to chemicals is a range of values. Several receptor locations, individual exposure scenarios, and a hypothetical worst-case exposure scenario were used to represent this range. Adult, child, residential, and visitor risk assessments were calculated. Table 5.5.8 1 lists the human health impacts from the estimated exposures to chemical air releases from SNL/NM facility operations. These potential health risks would be low and no adverse health effects would occur at these risk levels. Assessing the hypothetical worst-case exposure scenario for chemicals establishes the upper limit (bounding value) to health risk. Under the Reduced Operations Alternative, the upper bound value for health risk from noncarcinogenic chemicals would be HIs of less than 1; from carcinogenic chemicals, the ELCRs would be less than 10^{-6} (see Table E.6 5).

Radiation Air Release Pathways

Under the Reduced Operations Alternative, air releases of radionuclides would be lower than those projected under the No Action Alternative. Section 5.5.7 identifies these lower doses to the MEI and the population within the ROI. Radiological health effects would also be lower under the Reduced Operations Alternative. The greatest dose resulting from the SNL/NM yearly air release of radionuclides would occur offsite at the Eubank gate and would increase the lifetime risk of fatal cancer to the MEI by 1.0×10^{-8} . This means that the likelihood of fatal cancer to the MEI from a 1-year dose from SNL/NM normal operations would be less than 1 chance in 100 M. The annual collective dose to the population due to these releases would increase the annual number of fatal cancers in the entire population within the ROI by 4.0×10^{-4} . Therefore, no additional LCFs would be likely to occur in the ROI due to SNL/NM radiological air releases.

To estimate a range in the potential for human health effects, radiation doses at specific receptor locations such as schools, hospitals, and daycare centers in the SNL/NM vicinity were calculated. These doses are identified in Table 5.5.7 3. Radiological health risks associated with the doses to receptors at several of these locations are presented in Table 5.5.8 2. The risk from radiation at these receptor locations would be much lower than the highest risk determined for the MEI receptor offsite at the Eubank gate.

Table 5.5.8 1. Human Health Impacts in the Vicinity of SNL/NM from Chemical Air Emissions Under the Reduced Operations Alternative

RECEPTOR LOCATIONS	RECEPTOR	TOTAL HAZARD INDEX RME/AEI	TOTAL EXCESS LIFETIME CANCER RISK RME/AEI
RESIDENTIAL SCENARIOS			
<i>Four Hills Subdivision^a</i>	Adult	<0.01/<0.01	$1.8 \times 10^{-11} / 1.1 \times 10^{-11}$
	Child	<0.01/<0.01	$7.4 \times 10^{-12} / 7.4 \times 10^{-12}$
<i>Isleta Gaming Palace</i>	Adult	<0.01/<0.01	$1.7 \times 10^{-10} / 1.7 \times 10^{-12}$
	Child	<0.01/<0.01	$1.2 \times 10^{-10} / 1.3 \times 10^{-12}$
<i>KAFB Housing (Zia Park Housing)</i>	Adult	<0.01/<0.01	$3.6 \times 10^{-10} / 3.8 \times 10^{-12}$
	Child	<0.01/<0.01	$2.5 \times 10^{-10} / 2.9 \times 10^{-12}$
VISITOR SCENARIOS			
<i>Child Development Center-East</i>	Child	<0.01/<0.01	$3.4 \times 10^{-10} / 3.9 \times 10^{-12}$
<i>Child Development Center-West</i>	Child	<0.01/<0.01	$6.7 \times 10^{-11} / 7.6 \times 10^{-13}$
<i>Coronado Club</i>	Adult	<0.01/<0.01	$5.9 \times 10^{-10} / 6.0 \times 10^{-12}$
	Child	<0.01/<0.01	$4.1 \times 10^{-10} / 4.6 \times 10^{-12}$
<i>Golf Course (Clubhouse)</i>	Adult	<0.01/<0.01	$1.9 \times 10^{-11} / 1.9 \times 10^{-12}$
<i>Kirtland Elementary School</i>	Child	<0.01/<0.01	$5.5 \times 10^{-11} / 6.2 \times 10^{-13}$
<i>Kirtland Underground Munitions and Maintenance Storage Complex (KUMMSC)^b</i>	Adult	<0.01/<0.01	$1.8 \times 10^{-10} / 1.8 \times 10^{-12}$
<i>Lovelace Hospital</i>	Adult	<0.01/<0.01	$1.6 \times 10^{-10} / 1.7 \times 10^{-12}$
	Child	<0.01/<0.01	$1.1 \times 10^{-10} / 1.3 \times 10^{-12}$
<i>National Atomic Museum</i>	Adult	<0.01/<0.01	$9.9 \times 10^{-10} / 1.0 \times 10^{-11}$
	Child	<0.01/<0.01	$6.9 \times 10^{-10} / 7.8 \times 10^{-12}$
<i>Riding Stables</i>	Adult	<0.01/<0.01	$9.7 \times 10^{-11} / 1.0 \times 10^{-12}$
<i>Sandia Base Elementary School</i>	Child	<0.01/<0.01	$4.7 \times 10^{-10} / 5.3 \times 10^{-12}$
<i>Shandiin Day Care Center</i>	Child	<0.01/<0.01	$3.7 \times 10^{-10} / 4.2 \times 10^{-12}$
<i>Veterans Affairs Medical Center</i>	Adult	<0.01/<0.01	$1.6 \times 10^{-10} / 1.6 \times 10^{-12}$
<i>Wherry Elementary School</i>	Child	<0.01/<0.01	$2.5 \times 10^{-10} / 2.8 \times 10^{-12}$

Source: SmartRISK 1996

AEI: average exposed individual

RME: reasonable maximum exposed

^a Four Hills Subdivision receptor location impacts were based on Lurance Canyon Burn Site open burning air emissions, not SNL/NM building air emissions.^b This receptor location was analyzed using a worker scenario, as discussed in Appendix E.5.

Note: See Section 5.3.8 for a discussion of selection of receptor locations.

Table 5.5.8 2. Human Health Impacts in the SNL/NM Vicinity from Radiological Air Emissions Under the Reduced Operations Alternative

RECEPTOR LOCATIONS	LIFETIME RISK OF FATAL CANCER FROM A 1-YEAR DOSE
<i>Child Development Center-East</i>	2.6×10^{-9}
<i>Child Development Center-West</i>	1.3×10^{-9}
<i>Coronado Club</i>	2.9×10^{-9}
<i>Four Hills Subdivision</i>	5.0×10^{-9}
<i>Golf Course (Clubhouse)</i>	4.0×10^{-9}
<i>Kirtland Elementary School</i>	1.3×10^{-9}
<i>KAFB Housing (Zia Park Housing)</i>	2.9×10^{-9}
<i>Kirtland Underground Munitions & Maintenance Storage Complex (KUMMSC)^a</i>	8.0×10^{-9}
<i>Lovelace Hospital</i>	1.4×10^{-9}
<i>National Atomic Museum</i>	4.5×10^{-9}
<i>Riding Stables</i>	3.4×10^{-9}
<i>Sandia Base Elementary School</i>	2.1×10^{-9}
<i>Shandiin Day Care Center</i>	3.2×10^{-9}
<i>Isleta Gaming Palace</i>	5.5×10^{-9}
<i>Veterans Affairs Medical Center</i>	2.0×10^{-9}
<i>Wherry Elementary School</i>	2.3×10^{-9}

Sources: DOE 1997e, SNL/NM 1998a
MEI: maximally exposed individual

^a The radiological MEI location for normal operations.
Note: Calculations were completed using CAP88-PC.

Receptors in the SNL/NM vicinity would also have the potential to be exposed to radionuclides by way of the indirect air pathway of ingesting food that contains radionuclides. CAP88-PC integrates doses from this pathway in the collective dose estimation for the population within the ROI, but does not integrate it to the dose evaluation for the potential onsite MEI receptor. The estimated percentage of the population dose from ingesting potentially contaminated food would be 18 percent (0.101 person-rem of the 0.80 person-rem collective population dose) which means it would also account for approximately 13 percent of the health risk value. When the same percent contribution is assumed, the potential onsite MEI's lifetime risk of fatal cancer from a 1-year dose would be increased by 1.0×10^{-9} (18 percent) under the Reduced Operations Alternative. Overall, the cancer risk to the MEI from radiation would remain less than 1 chance in 100 M.

Nonfatal Cancers and Genetic Disorders

Radiation exposures can cause nonfatal cancers and genetic disorders. The NCRP has adopted risk estimators developed by the ICRP for the public assessing these health effects from radiation (ICRP 1991). Under the Reduced Operations Alternative, SNL/NM's maximum annual dose to the MEI would increase the lifetime risk of nonfatal cancers and genetic disorders by 1.6×10^{-9} and 2.1×10^{-9} , respectively, which would be less than 1 chance in 475 M. The SNL/NM annual collective dose to the ROI population would increase the number of nonfatal cancers and genetic disorders by 8.0×10^{-5} and 1.0×10^{-4} , respectively. This means that no additional nonfatal cancers or genetic disorders would be likely to occur in the ROI population from SNL/NM radiological air releases.

Transportation

The potential human health risks and accident fatalities for transporting various radiological materials for SNL/NM operations are discussed in Section 5.5.9. The radiological dose to the population along the route within the ROI was estimated by assuming 10 percent of the total travel distance would occur within the ROI. Therefore, 10 percent of the total radiological dose (off link and on link) calculated for all radiological materials transport would be considered as an additional human health impact to the population along the route within the ROI (see Appendix G). This percentage of the annual collective dose to the population along the route due to transportation activities would increase the ROI number of LCFs by 2.0×10^{-4} . Adding this to the number of LCFs associated with the annual collective population dose from routine air releases would change the risk to 6.0×10^{-4} . In other words, no additional LCFs in the ROI population would likely occur from SNL/NM radiological material transportation activities.

Composite Cancer Risk

The increase in lifetime cancer risk due to SNL/NM normal operations is associated with both the small amounts of radionuclides and small amounts of carcinogenic chemicals emitted into the air. The composite cancer risk associated with the Reduced Operations Alternative would be lower than that calculated for either the No Action or Expanded Operations Alternatives. Under those alternatives, the composite cancer risk values calculated would all be within the EPA risk range established for the protection of human health of 10^{-6} to 10^{-4} (40 CFR Part 300). This would be a risk of less than 1 chance in 1 M. The SNL/NM potential contribution to an individual's lifetime cancer risk is very low considering that in the U.S., men have a 1-in-2 lifetime risk and women have a 1-in-3 lifetime risk of developing cancer. One out of every four deaths in the U.S. is from cancer (ACS 1997).

Worker Health and Safety

Under the Reduced Operations Alternative, the worker safety assessment shows impacts would be less than those under the No Action Alternative. Worker health consequences would be the same as those presented in Section 4.10 for the period 1992 through 1996. Tables and figures in Section 4.10 show that for the entire SNL/NM worker population, zero fatalities per year, an average of 47 mrem per year radiation dose (TEDE) to radiation-badged workers, approximately 287 nonfatal

injuries and illnesses per year, and 1 or 2 confirmed chemical exposures occurred annually from 1992 through 1996.

Routine air emissions evaluated for potential exposures to specific receptors in the SNL/NM vicinity have the potential to impact noninvolved workers at SNL/NM. A noninvolved worker is not exposed to chemical or radiological work related activities but is potentially exposed because they work at SNL/NM in the vicinity of facility releases. Potential exposures to airborne radiation were identified using the KUMMSC receptor location. Potential exposures to airborne chemicals were identified using a receptor location at the center of TA-I, near SNL/NM's chemical facility sources. Based on an exposure scenario for a worker, health risks from chemicals to the noninvolved worker would be below a HI of 1 and less than 10^{-6} for an ELCR (see Appendix E, Table E.6-5).

The average annual individual worker dose, annual maximum worker dose, and annual workforce collective dose for the radiation workers under the Reduced Operations Alternative are identified in Table 5.5.8-3.

Table 5.5.8-3. Radiation Doses (TEDE)^a and Health Impacts to Workers from SNL/NM Operations Under the Reduced Operations Alternative

RADIATION WORKER DOSE RATES	RADIATION DOSE	RISK OF CANCER FATALITY FROM A 1-YEAR DOSE
<i>Annual Average Individual Worker Dose</i>	47 ^b (mrem/yr)	1.9×10^{-5}
<i>Annual Maximum Worker Dose</i>	845 ^b (mrem/yr)	3.4×10^{-4}
RADIATION WORKER DOSE RATES	RADIATION DOSE	NUMBER OF LCFs
<i>Annual Workforce Collective Dose</i>	10 (person-rem/year)	4.0×10^{-3}

Source: SNL/NM 1997k

mrem/yr: millirems per year

TEDE: total effective dose equivalent

^a Average measured TEDE means the collective TEDE divided by the number of individuals with a measured dose greater than 10 mrem.

^b Annual average individual and annual maximum worker doses would be expected to remain consistent with the base year, 1996 (see Section 4.10).

Note: Because not all badged workers are radiation workers, radiation workers means those badges with greater than 10 mrem above background measurements used in the calculations.

Health risks from the annual average individual and annual maximum worker doses would be expected to remain constant for all alternatives (based on the REMS database dose information for 1996). The annual collective dose to the radiation worker population at SNL/NM would be lower than under the No Action Alternative. This would equate to a lower risk of fatal cancer to the radiation worker population under the Reduced Operations Alternative.

Nonfatal Cancers and Genetic Disorders

The SNL/NM maximum annual dose to the radiation worker population would increase the number of nonfatal cancers and genetic disorders by 8.0×10^{-4} , based on the ICRP dose-to-risk conversion factor for workers of 80 health effects per 1 M person-rem for both effects. In other words, no additional nonfatal cancers or genetic disorders would be likely to occur in the SNL/NM radiation worker population due to operations. The annual average and annual maximum workers dose and associated potential health impacts would remain consistent with 1996 values.

Nonionizing Radiation

Routine high-voltage impacts to SNL/NM and the public would not occur.

5.5.8.2 Accidents

This section describes, under the Reduced Operations Alternative, the potential impacts to workers and the public for accidents involving the release of radioactive and/or chemical materials, explosions, and other hazards. Additional details on the accident analyses and impacts are presented in Appendix F.

Site-Wide Earthquake



An earthquake in the Albuquerque, New Mexico, area has the potential for human injury and building damage throughout the local region. Due to differences in structural design, SNL/NM buildings and structures vary in their capabilities to withstand earthquake forces. Any magnitude earthquake has the potential to cause injury to workers in and around buildings and damage to structures from the physical forces and effects of the earthquake. Additional injury to workers and the public would be possible from explosions and from exposure to chemical and radioactive materials that could be released from buildings and storage containers. Facilities in TA-I are the predominant source of chemical materials that could be released during an earthquake. Facilities in

TA-V are the predominant source of radioactive materials that could be released. The ECF in TA-II is the predominant source of explosive materials. Lesser quantities of radioactive materials in TAs-I and -II could also be released and cause exposures to workers and the public.

In the event of an earthquake (UBC, 0.17 *g*), various buildings in TA-I could be affected and various chemicals could be released (see Appendix F, Table F7-7). Larger magnitude earthquakes could cause more serious impacts. The shape and direction of the chemical plumes would depend upon local meteorological conditions and physical structures. All potential plumes and concentration levels exceeding ERPG-2 are shown as shaded areas in Figure 5.5.8-1. Some of the potentially affected area extends offsite. Within the shaded area, out to a distance of 3,800 ft, there could be as many as 5,300 persons at risk of exposure depending on the time of day and plume shape and direction. However, in the event of a release of chemicals, the plumes would cause exposures in excess of ERPG-2 to only a portion of the 5,300 persons at risk. Mitigation features designed to limit the release of chemicals from storage containers, rooms, and buildings would limit or reduce plume size, concentration levels, and exposures. Emergency procedures and sheltering would also minimize exposures to workers and the public.

Nuclear facilities in TAs-I, -II, and -V could also be damaged during an earthquake. The frequency of an earthquake (0.17 *g*) that could cause the release of radioactive materials from TAs-I and -II facilities is 1.0×10^{-3} per year, or 1 chance in 1,000 per year. The frequency of an earthquake (0.22 *g*) that could cause the release of radioactive materials from TAs-I (NG-1), -II (ECF-1), and -V facilities is 7.0×10^{-4} per year, or 1 chance in 1,500 per year. The consequences are shown in Table 5.5.8-4. If a 0.22-*g* earthquake was to occur, there would be an estimated 6.4×10^{-2} additional LCFs in the total population within 50 mi of the site, associated with the HC-1 accident scenario. The MEI and noninvolved worker would have an increased probability of LCF of 6.9×10^{-6} and 3.0×10^{-2} , respectively, associated with the HC-1 accident scenario. The risks for these receptors can be estimated by multiplying these consequence values by the probability (frequency) of earthquake. If a stronger earthquake was to occur, larger releases of radioactive materials would be possible and could cause greater impacts.

A severe earthquake could also cause damage to other SNL/NM facilities and result in environmental impacts.



Source: Original
 Note: see Appendix F, Figure F7 1

Figure 5.58 1. Area Above ERPG-2 Levels from a Site-Wide Earthquake Under the Reduced Operations Alternative
The encircled areas represent locations where approximately 5,300 people are at risk of exposure to chemical concentrations above ERPG-2.

Table 5.5.8 4. Site-Wide Earthquake Radiological Impacts Under the Reduced Operations Alternative

ACCIDENT ID ^a	FREQUENCY (per year)	ADDITIONAL LATENT CANCER FATALITIES WITHIN 50-MILE POPULATION	INCREASED PROBABILITY OF LATENT CANCER FATALITY	
			MAXIMALLY EXPOSED INDIVIDUAL ^b	NONINVOLVED WORKER ^c
TECHNICAL AREA -I				
NG-1	7.0x10 ⁻⁴	5.1x10 ⁻⁵	1.4x10 ⁻⁹	3.2x10 ⁻⁶
TECHNICAL AREA -II				
ECF-1	7.0x10 ⁻⁴	3.0x10 ⁻⁶	1.5x10 ⁻¹⁰	1.9x10 ⁻⁷
TECHNICAL AREA -V				
AM-2	7.0x10 ⁻⁴	2.0x10 ⁻³	2.4x10 ⁻⁷	7.4x10 ⁻⁵
HC-1	7.0x10 ⁻⁴	6.4x10 ⁻²	6.9x10 ⁻⁶	3.0x10 ⁻²
SP-1	7.0x10 ⁻⁴	9.2x10 ⁻³	5.8x10 ⁻⁷	2.7x10 ⁻⁴

Source: Original (See also Appendix F, Tables F.7-4 and F.7-5)

^a Facility Accident Descriptors:

- Neutron Generator Facility: NG-1
- Explosive Component Facility: ECF-1
- Annular Core Research Reactor-Medical Isotope Production: AM-2
- Hot Cell Facility: HC-1

Sandia Pulsed Reactor: SP-1

^b The maximally exposed individual would be located at the Golf Course and the consequences can be added.

^c Because the noninvolved worker is located 100 meters from the release point, the location varies relative to each technical area. Therefore, the consequences to the noninvolved worker can only be added for a given technical area.

For example, the large quantities of oil stored in external tanks and in accelerator buildings in TA-IV could potentially be spilled and cause impacts to the ecosystem and water resources. Underground natural gas lines could break and ignite causing brush and forest fires that could further damage facilities and persons in the vicinity. Hydrogen storage tanks in TA-I could be damaged, causing hydrogen combustion or explosion and potential injury to persons in the vicinity. Explosives in the ECF in TA-II and smaller quantities in other facilities could also be accidentally detonated during an earthquake with potential injury to persons in the vicinity. Occupants of all facilities would be at risk of injury as a result of the earthquake forces and building damage.

Facility Hazards

Some of the facilities at SNL/NM could contain occupational hazards with the potential to endanger the health and safety of involved workers near an accident. Some of these facilities also contain hazardous materials that, in case of an accident, could endanger the health and safety of people within the immediate vicinity and beyond. These people include noninvolved workers, members of the military assigned to KAFB, and a member of the public located within the KAFB

boundary and offsite. Offsite consequences were determined to a 50-mi radius around the affected facility.

Radiological, chemical, and explosion accidents with the largest impacts to workers and the public have been analyzed, as discussed in the following sections. Potential accidents associated with other facility hazards such as lasers, electricity, X-rays, transformer oil, noise, shrapnel, pyrotechnics, and compressed gases could affect the health and safety of involved workers, but the impacts to noninvolved workers and the public for these other accidents would be lower than the impacts from radiological, chemical, and explosion accidents described in the SWEIS (Appendix F, Table F6-3).

The DOE recognizes the potential adverse effects for workers, the public, and the environment caused by deterioration of SNL/NM equipment, structures, and facilities. However, the analysis of potential accidents discussed in this section assumes that the expected deterioration of equipment, structures, and facilities would not affect the occurrence, progression, and effects of accidents. The basis for this assumption is that the DOE safety analysis process, specified in DOE Orders and standards, would require periodic assessments of facility safety to ensure that operations are being performed within an approved safety envelop. The

process would also require an assessment of all unresolved safety questions that would result from any change in a facility or operation that could affect the operations authorization basis. Depending on the results of the assessment, modifications to the facility and/or operational procedures would be implemented to maintain operations within the authorization basis.

Explosion Accidents

Explosive materials are stored, handled, transported, and used at some SNL/NM facilities. Administrative controls and facility design would help prevent an explosion accident and limit the impacts to personnel, if an accident was to occur. The ECF, for example, contains large quantities of explosives for use in its testing programs. Hydrogen trailers are another large source of explosive material. There would be approximately five hydrogen trailers parked near facilities or routinely transported to facilities from remote locations.

The largest quantity of hydrogen with the highest potential for consequences to both SNL/NM workers and facilities is a set of horizontally mounted cylinders, with a storage capacity of approximately 90,000 SCF, located approximately east of the CSRL, Building 893, in TA-I. An explosion at the hydrogen storage cylinders near the CSRL was selected for detailed analysis to estimate the bounding impacts of an explosion accident. If a hydrogen explosion was to occur in this relatively

populated area of TA-I, individuals in the area could be injured and nearby property could be damaged. Involved workers within 61 ft of an explosion could be seriously injured and would have a 50 percent chance of survival. Involved workers out to a distance of 126 ft from the explosion could receive damage to their eardrums and lungs. The resulting overpressure from this explosion and impacts to personnel and property would diminish with distance, as shown in Table 5.5.8 5.

The actual number of persons in the vicinity of the accident depends upon many factors and the actual number of potential fatalities is uncertain. Factors include the time of day (start of work day, lunchtime, after hours), the actual location of the people (amount of shielding between the hydrogen tank and the person), and the actual spread of the pressure waves in a very complex arrangement of buildings, alleys, and walkways.

This bounding facility explosion was postulated to occur from an accidental uncontrolled release of hydrogen, stored in a tank outside the CSRL building, caused by human errors (such as mishandling activities) or equipment failures (such as a pipe joint failure) and the presence of an ignition source (such as a spark) near the location of release. Because multiple failures would have to occur for an uncontrolled release of hydrogen to lead to an explosion, this accident scenario would be extremely unlikely (that is, between 1×10^{-6} and 1×10^{-4} per year).

Table 5.5.8 5. Impacts of an Explosion Accident Under the Reduced Operations Alternative

DISTANCE TO RECEPTOR OR PROPERTY (ft)	PEAK REFLECTIVE PRESSURE (psi) (472 lbm TNT EQUIVALENT)	COMMENTS
25	650	Peak pressure
61	50	For involved workers, there would be a 50% survival rate for pressures in excess of 50 psi.
126	10	For involved workers, there would be a 50% rate of eardrum rupture for pressures in excess of 10 psi. Total destruction of buildings could be expected for pressures in excess of 10 psi.
370	2.0	Pressures in excess of 2 to 3 psi would cause concrete or cinder block walls to shatter.
657	1.0	Pressures in excess of 1 psi would cause a house to be demolished.

Source: DOE 1992b (See also Appendix F, Table F4 1)
ft: feet
lbm: pound mass

psi: pounds per square inch
TNT: trinitrotoluene

The human organs most vulnerable to shock explosions are the ears and lungs because they contain air or other gases. The damage would be done at the gas-tissue interface, where flaking and tearing could occur. Both the ear and the lung responses would be dependent not only on the overpressure, but also on impulse and body orientation. The shorter the pulse width, the higher the pressure the body could tolerate. An overpressure of approximately 50 psi would result in a 50 percent fatality rate; approximately 10 psi would result in eardrum rupture. These overpressure estimates are based on a square pressure wave with a pulse duration greater than 10 msec, and their effects could vary depending on body orientation to the pressure wave.

Structural damage produced by airblasts would depend on the type of structural material. An overpressure on the order of 1 pound psi would cause partial demolition of houses (rendering them uninhabitable). An overpressure of 2 to 3 psi would shatter unreinforced concrete or cinder block walls shattering; An overpressure of 10 psi would probably cause total destruction of buildings.

Radiological Accidents

The largest quantities of radioactive materials at risk for radiological accidents are located in TA-V. The Manzano Waste Storage Facilities, and TAs-I, -II, and -IV also contain radioactive material, but in smaller amounts. The nuclear facilities in TA-V include the ACRR, SPR, HCF and GIF. The NGIF is under construction in TA-V. The planned primary use of the ACRR is medical isotope production (primarily molybdenum-99). The HCF has been reconfigured for medical isotope production, and the accidents analyzed reflect this mode of operation. Accidents have also been analyzed for storage of radioactive materials in the HCF not associated with molybdenum-99 production.

The most serious radiological accident impacts associated with SNL/NM facilities under the Reduced Operations Alternative are shown in Table 5.5.8 6. The table lists a set of accidents and their consequences in terms of an increased probability of an LCF for an exposed individual and an increased number of LCFs for the offsite population. Other radiological accidents could also occur at these facilities, but their impacts would be within the envelope of the selected set of accidents.

The accident at a single facility with the highest consequences to the public would be a fire in Room 108 at the HCF in TA-V (HS-2). If this accident was to occur, there would be 7.9×10^{-2} additional LCFs in the

offsite population within 50 mi of the site. There would be an increased probability of an LCF for an MEI and a noninvolved worker of 6.6×10^{-6} and 7.4×10^{-6} , respectively. The estimated frequency of occurrence for this accident would be 2.0×10^{-7} per year, or less than 1 chance in 5,000,000 per year. Involved workers run the highest risk of injury or fatality in case of many radiological accidents discussed in this section, as well as the many others that could occur. Although there are protective measures and administrative controls to protect involved workers, they are usually in the immediate vicinity of the accidents where they could be exposed to radioactivity. Accident scenarios for the Reduced Operations Alternative are described in Section 5.3.8.2.

The impacts of accidents have also been analyzed for other receptors located on the KAFB site. The impacts to all other receptors would be less than for the MEI. Details on the impacts to the core receptors are provided in Appendix F.2.

Chemical Accidents

Many SNL/NM facilities store and use a variety of hazardous chemicals. For the chemical with the highest RHI in a building, a catastrophic accident and total release of the building inventory was postulated as the bounding event and estimates were made of the chemical concentrations at various distances from the accident. The results are shown in Table 5.5.8 7.

Building inventory and 50 percent of the largest single source are shown for the source term to reflect the variability and uncertainty in the actual amount of the chemical that could be present at the time of an accident. Similarly, estimates are shown for the range of distances within which the ERPG-2 would be exceeded. The ERPG-2 is an accepted guideline for public exposure (see Appendix F3 for the description of the various ERPG levels).

In case of the most severe chemical accident in TA-I, involved workers, noninvolved workers, KAFB personnel, onsite residents, and onsite members of the public would be at risk of being exposed to chemical concentrations in excess of ERPG-2 levels. The maximum number of individuals at risk is shown in Table 5.5.8 8. The actual number exposed would depend on the time of day, location of people, wind conditions, and other factors, but would be much less than what is shown.

As shown in Table 5.5.8 7, the worst-case chemical accident would be a catastrophic release of arsine from

Table 5.5.8 6. Potential Impacts of Radiological Facility Accidents Under the Reduced Operations Alternative

FACILITY	ACCIDENT ID ^a	SCENARIO	FREQUENCY PER YEAR	ADDITIONAL LATENT CANCER FATALITIES TO 50-MILE POPULATION	INCREASED PROBABILITY OF LATENT CANCER FATALITY	
					MAXIMALLY EXPOSED INDIVIDUAL	NONINVOLVED WORKER
<i>Annular Core Research Reactor-medical isotopes production configuration</i>	<i>AM-1</i>	Airplane crash - collapse of bridge crane	6.3×10^{-6}	2.0×10^{-3}	2.4×10^{-7}	7.4×10^{-5}
	<i>AM-3</i>	Rupture of waterlogged fuel element	1.0×10^{-2} to 1.0×10^{-4}	4.9×10^{-4}	5.4×10^{-8}	3.8×10^{-6}
	<i>AM-4</i>	Rupture of one molybdenum-99 target	1.0×10^{-4} to 1.0×10^{-6}	3.9×10^{-4}	4.3×10^{-8}	3.0×10^{-6}
	<i>AM-5</i>	Fuel handling accident - irradiated element	1.0×10^{-4} to 1.0×10^{-6}	4.9×10^{-3}	6.1×10^{-7}	7.6×10^{-5}
	<i>AM-6</i>	Airplane crash and fire in reactor room with unirradiated fuel and targets present	6.3×10^{-6}	1.6×10^{-6}	1.0×10^{-10}	4.9×10^{-8}
	<i>AM-7</i>	Target rupture during Annular Core Research Reactor to Hot Cell Facility transfer	$<1.0 \times 10^{-6}$	3.9×10^{-4}	4.9×10^{-8}	1.4×10^{-5}
	<i>Hot Cell Facility-medical isotopes production</i>	<i>HM-1</i>	Operator error - molybdenum-99 target processing	1.0×10^{-1} to 1.0×10^{-2}	3.8×10^{-5}	3.3×10^{-9}
<i>HM-2</i>		Operator error - iodine-125 target processing	1.0×10^{-1} to 1.0×10^{-2}	1.6×10^{-6}	1.0×10^{-10}	4.2×10^{-9}
<i>HM-4</i>		Fire in glovebox	1.0×10^{-2} to 1.0×10^{-4}	2.6×10^{-3}	2.4×10^{-7}	2.3×10^{-6}
<i>Hot Cell Facility-Room 108 Storage</i>	<i>HS-1</i>	Fire in room 108, average inventories	3.3×10^{-5}	2.1×10^{-3}	1.8×10^{-7}	2.0×10^{-7}

**Table 5.5.8 6. Potential Impacts of Radiological Facility
Accidents Under the Reduced Operations Alternative (concluded)**

FACILITY	ACCIDENT ID ^a	SCENARIO	FREQUENCY PER YEAR	ADDITIONAL LATENT CANCER FATALITIES TO 50-MILE POPULATION	INCREASED PROBABILITY OF LATENT CANCER FATALITY	
					MAXIMALLY EXPOSED INDIVIDUAL	NONINVOLVED WORKER
Hot Cell Facility- Room 108 Storage (continued)	HS-2	Fire in room 108, maximum inventories	2.0×10^{-7}	7.9×10^{-2}	6.6×10^{-6}	7.4×10^{-6}
	S3M-2	Control-element misadjustment before insert	1.0×10^{-4} to 1.0×10^{-6}	1.2×10^{-3}	1.5×10^{-7}	2.5×10^{-4}
Sandia Pulsed Reactor	S3M-3	Failure of a fissionable experiment	1.0×10^{-4} to 1.0×10^{-6}	7.9×10^{-3}	8.4×10^{-7}	3.8×10^{-3}
	SS-1	Airplane crash into North Vault storage vault	6.3×10^{-6}	9.2×10^{-3}	5.8×10^{-7}	5.5×10^{-4}

Source: Original

ACRR: Annular Core Research Reactor

SPR: Sandia Pulsed Reactor

TA: technical area

^a TA-V Facility Accident Descriptors:

ACRR - Medical Isotope Production: AM-1, AM-3, AM-4, AM-5, AM-6, AM-7

Hot Cell - Medical Isotope Production: HM-1, HM-2, HM-4

Hot Cell - Room 108 Storage: HS-1, HS-2

SPR: S3M-2, S3M-3, SS-1

Table 5.5.8 7. Potential Impacts of Chemical Accidents Under the Reduced Operations Alternative

BUILDING	CHEMICAL	SOURCE TERM		ERPG-2 LEVEL OF CONCERN (ppm)	EXCEEDANCE DISTANCE		FREQUENCY ^a (PER YEAR)
		HIGH (lb)	AVERAGE (lb)		BUILDING INVENTORY (ft)	50% OF LARGEST SINGLE SOURCE (ft)	
823	Nitrous oxide	32.17	15.26	125	348	237	1.0x10 ⁻³ to 1.0x10 ⁻⁴
858	Chlorine	106.4	53.2	3	3,726	2,598	1.0x10 ⁻³ to 9.7x10 ⁻⁵
869	Nitric acid	18.6	9.3	15	666	465	1.0x10 ⁻³ to 1.0x10 ⁻⁴
878	Nitrous oxide	50	25	125	438	309	1.0x10 ⁻³ to 3.2x10 ⁻⁵
880	Hydrofluoric acid	2	1	20	219	153	1.0x10 ⁻³ to 1.0x10 ⁻⁴
883	Phosphine	6.8	3.4	2.5	1,440	1,002	1.0x10 ⁻³ to 1.0x10 ⁻⁴
884	Hydrofluoric acid	10	5	20	504	351	1.0x10 ⁻³ to 1.0x10 ⁻⁴
888	Fluorine	0.07	0.04	1	207	93	1.0x10 ⁻³ to 1.0x10 ⁻⁴
893	Arsine	65	20	1	4,884	2,640	1.0x10 ⁻³ to 1.0x10 ⁻⁴
897	Chlorine	4.4	2.2	3	699	486	1.0x10 ⁻³ to 6.6x10 ⁻⁵
905	Thionyl chloride	101.1	50.5	5	2,067	1,434	1.0x10 ⁻³ to 9.0x10 ⁻⁵

Source: Original (See also Appendix F, Tables F.3-4 and F.5-2)

Average: Average Inventory

ERPG: Emergency Response Planning Guideline

ft: feet

High: High Inventory

lb: pounds

ppm: parts per million

TA: technical area

^aFrequency ranges from 1.0x10⁻³ from an earthquake in TA-I to 1.0x10⁻⁴ for an aircraft crash into a generic building in TA-I, or a lower number based on an aircraft crash described in Appendix F.5.

Table 5.5.8 8. Impacts of Chemical Accidents on Individuals Within KAFB

BUILDING	CHEMICAL NAME	RELEASE (lb)	ALOHA RADIUS REQUIRED TO REACH ERPG-2 LEVEL (ft)	NUMBER OF PEOPLE WITHIN ERPG-2
823	Nitrous oxide	32.17	348	844
858	Chlorine	106.41	3,726	3,783
869	Nitric acid	18.6	666	1,511
878	Nitrous oxide	50	438	880
880	Hydrofluoric acid	2	219	529
883	Phosphine	6.8	1,440	3,743
884	Hydrofluoric acid	10	504	800
888	Fluorine	0.07	207	0
893	Arsine	65	4,884	8,254
897	Chlorine	4.4	699	625
905	Thionyl chloride	101.1	2,067	1,356

Source: Original (See also Appendix F, Table F3)
 ALOHA: Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres (model)
 ERPG: Emergency Response Planning Guideline

ft: feet
 lb: pound

Building 893 in TA-I. If this accident was to occur and 20 lb of arsine was released, individuals within 2,640 ft of the point of release would receive exposures that exceed the ERPG-2. If the building inventory of 65 lb of arsine was released, individuals within a distance of 4,884 ft from the point of release would receive exposures that exceed the ERPG-2. Figure 5.5.8-2 illustrates the KAFB locations that would be affected by worst-case chemical accident scenarios involving the release of arsine or chlorine from Buildings 893 and 858, respectively. The circles on the figure correspond to the distances within which the ERPG-2 would be exceeded. However, the actual affected area within the circles would depend upon wind conditions, and only a small portion of the circular area would be affected. In the event of a release, the area exceeding the level of concern would be shaped by the wind and nearby buildings, perhaps affecting 1/16th to 1/10th of the circular area out to the indicated distance. All individuals exposed for 1 hour or more at these distances could experience or develop irreversible or other serious health effects or symptoms that could impair their abilities to take protective action. For any release, the seriousness of any exposure would generally decrease for distances further from the point of release.



In case of an aircraft crash or earthquake involving buildings with various chemical inventories, multiple

chemicals would be released and could mix and interact. Although the impacts of mixed chemicals could be greater than individual chemicals, their behavior, dispersion, and health effects can be complex and have therefore, not been considered quantitatively. An earthquake could also cause the release of like chemicals from multiple buildings and lead to increased concentration where individual plumes overlap. The potential and impacts for overlapping plumes are discussed in Appendix F.3.

Other Accidents

Other types of potential accidents have been identified whose impacts are not measured in terms of LCFs or chemical concentrations. These could cause serious injury or fatality for humans or impacts to the nonhuman environment such as the ecology, historical sites, or sensitive cultural sites.

Brush Fires Small fires are expected and planned for during outdoor testing that involves propellants and explosives. The potential exists for brush and forest fires when hot test debris or projectiles come in contact with combustible elements in the environment. One such incident was reported in 1993 in TA-III when a rocket motor detonated during a sled track impact test and resulted in a 40-ac brush fire. Another accident occurred at the Aerial



Source: Original
 Note: see Appendix F.3, Table F3.4

Figure 5.5.8 2. Projected Extent of ERPG-2 Levels from Accidental Release of Arsine (Bldg. 893) and Chlorine (Bldg. 858)

Circled areas represent the distances within which an ERPG-2 level would be exceeded for an accidental release of arsine (Building 893) and/or chlorine (Building 858) under the Reduced Operations Alternative.

Cable Facility in the Coyote Test Field, which resulted in a fire that swept up the side of a mountain before being extinguished by SNL/NM workers. Many others have also occurred that were contained in the immediate vicinity of the test area. Measures would be taken to prevent fires and, should a fire occur, the effects would be mitigated by activating fire fighting facilities in the test area (DOE 1995a, SNL/NM 1993d, SNL/NM 1998i).

Natural Phenomena Naturally occurring events such as tornadoes, lightning, floods, and heavy snow, as documented in existing SNL/NM safety documentation, were considered for their potential to initiate the accidental release of radioactive, chemical, and other hazardous materials that affect workers and the public. Any of these events, should they occur, could also lead to serious injury or fatality because of the physical and destructive forces associated with the events. The risks of such events to workers and the public would be equivalent to everyday risks from naturally occurring events to the general public wherever they work and reside.

Spills and Leaks The potential would exist throughout SNL/NM for the accidental spill of radioactive, chemical, or other hazardous materials. The effects of such spills on workers and the public through airborne pathways were considered earlier in this section. The impacts from pathways other than airborne would normally be bounded by exposure from airborne pathways. Any spill of a hazardous substance would have the potential for impacts to the nonhuman elements of the environment. A spill could make its way into surface and groundwater systems, affecting water quality and aquatic life. Spills of flammable substance could cause fires that damage plant and animal life and other land resources. There have been spills of hazardous substances at the SNL/NM site that had the potential to affect the nonhuman elements of the environment. In 1994, over 100 gal of oil were spilled at the Centrifuge Complex in TA-III when a hydraulic pump failed during a centrifuge test causing a potential impact to the nonhuman elements of the environment. In addition, in 1994, a small spill of transformer oil occurred from an oil storage tank in TA-IV when a gasket failed and, at the Coyote Test Field, a leaking underground storage tank containing ethylene glycol was discovered.

Radiological and Chemical Contamination Some accidents analyzed in this section and others, that were considered but not analyzed, could potentially

affect the nonhuman elements of the environment. Any accidentally released chemicals would result in concentrations that would typically decrease with increasing distance from the point of release. While chemical concentrations would diminish over distance to a point where a human hazard would no longer be present, the concentrations could still affect other elements of the environment such as the ecology, water quality, and cultural resources. Radiological releases could also affect nonhuman elements of the environment. After an accident, SNL/NM, through their spill and pollution control and radiological emergency response plans, would be required to assess the potential for ground contamination; if contamination exceeds guidance levels, plans would be developed for remediation.

Industrial Besides radioactive and chemical materials and explosives, many SNL/NM facilities conduct operations and use materials and equipment that could also be potentially hazardous to workers. These hazards are typically referred to as normal industrial hazards, not unlike similar hazards that workers are exposed to throughout the nation, and include working with electricity, climbing ladders, welding, and driving forklifts. All operations and activities at SNL/NM facilities, as well as all DOE facilities, would be subject to administrative procedures and safety features designed to prevent accidents and mitigate their consequences should they occur.

5.5.9 Transportation

Under the Reduced Operations Alternative, transportation impacts were assessed for each of three ROIs: KAFB; major Albuquerque roadways; and major roadways between Albuquerque and specific waste disposal facilities, vendors, and other DOE facilities. This analysis involved estimating the number of trips made by SNL/NM-associated vehicles under normal operations in each of these transportation corridors. Transportation evaluators and activity multipliers are discussed in Section 5.3.9, Appendix A, and Appendix G.

5.5.9.1 Transportation of Material and Wastes

The number of material shipments received by SNL/NM is generally proportional to total SNL/NM material consumption. According to facility projections, material consumption under the Reduced Operations Alternative is projected to decrease by 54 percent from current levels. Thus, total material shipments would also decrease, although not necessarily for all types of material.

Radioactive and explosive material shipments are often delivered through government carriers, unless the quantities and activities being transported are low enough to meet the Federal guidelines and restrictions in place for authorized commercial transporters.

Government carriers operate on an as-needed basis, thus the general decrease in material inventory under the Reduced Operations Alternative would result in a similar decrease in these kinds of shipments.

Due to their shipment method, there would be very little impact to the number of chemical shipments that are made to SNL/NM. JIT chemicals, which are ordered infrequently and in small quantities, are usually shipped to SNL/NM by way of commercial carriers such as Federal Express and UPS. These carriers make daily shipments to SNL/NM to deliver packages other than chemicals, and a slight decrease in the volume of chemicals they handle per shipment would not likely decrease their frequency. Similarly, major chemical vendors who deliver their own material, rather than use a commercial carrier, also generally make daily shipments to SNL/NM. Therefore, any slight decrease in the volume of material that major vendors ship per load would not have an impact on the frequency of those shipments. Thus, chemical shipments would remain at approximately the same level regardless of the fluctuations in material consumption.

Considering the above factors, overall material transportation due to normal operations would increase by 24 percent over current levels. This increase would be due to shipment requirements of the medical isotopes

production project. The anticipated changes in annual and daily material shipments for each material category are presented in Table 5.5.9 1. The analysis assumed that SNL/NM has 250 work days per calendar year.

Waste Transportation

The amount of waste shipped from SNL/NM to disposal facilities correlates directly to SNL/NM waste generation levels. Overall offsite waste shipments would increase by 291 percent. Of this increase, 285 percent is considered to be waste currently disposed of at the KAFB landfill. This leaves a real projected increase of 6 percent under the Reduced Operations Alternative. The total anticipated changes in waste shipments during all operations for each type of waste are presented in Table 5.5.9 2 and Appendix G, Table G.3 3.

Specials Projects

Two special project wastes, ER Project and legacy, were addressed separately due to their one-time operation/ project status and in order to avoid skewing the SNL/NM normal operations impact. Legacy wastes would be anticipated to account for an additional 18 shipments of LLW, 3 shipments of LLMW, and 2 shipments of TRU/ MTRU wastes over the 10-year time frame (see Figures 4.12 1, 4.12 2, and 4.12 3). In 1998 through 2000, the ER Project could account for up to an additional 312 offsite shipments of LLW, 101 offsite shipments of LLMW, 2 offsite shipments of RCRA waste, 5 offsite shipments of TSCA waste, and 75 shipments of nonhazardous waste. Both of these special projects have been included within the total facility risks.

Table 5.5.9 1. SNL/NM Annual Material Shipments Under the Reduced Operations Alternative

MATERIAL TYPE	BASE YEAR ^a	REDUCED OPERATIONS
	ANNUAL SHIPMENTS	ANNUAL SHIPMENTS
<i>Radioactive</i>	305	140
<i>Radioactive (medical isotopes production)</i>	<i>Receiving</i>	2
	<i>Shipping</i>	1,140
<i>Chemical</i>	2,750	2,750
<i>Explosive</i>	303	138
TOTAL	3,358	4,170

Sources: SNL/NM 1997b, 1998a

^a The base year varies depending on information provided in the *Facilities and Safety Information Document* (SNL/NM 1997b). Typically, the base year is 1996 or 1997, as appropriate.

Table 5.5.9 2. Annual Waste Shipments Under the Reduced Operations Alternative

WASTE TYPE	BASE YEAR SHIPMENTS	REDUCED OPERATIONS SHIPMENTS
<i>LLW^c (1996)</i>	4	8
<i>LLMW (1996)</i>	1	3
<i>Hazardous (RCRA+TSCA) (1997)</i>	102	95
<i>Recyclable (Hazardous and Nonhazardous)^{a,b} (1997)</i>	86	8
<i>Solid (Municipal, Construction, and Demolition)^b (1997)</i>	51	650

Sources: Rinchem 1998a; SNL/NM 1998a, 1998b, n.d. (d)

LLMW: low-level mixed waste

LLW: low-level waste

MTRU: mixed transuranic

RCRA: Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

TRU: transuranic

TSCA: Toxic Substances Control Act

^a Excludes decontamination and decommissioning

^b Recyclable and solid wastes currently handled by the KAFB landfill could be shipped offsite in the future, contributing an additional 741 shipments.

Offsite Receipts and Shipments of Material and Waste

The bounding case for this analysis assumed that each material and waste shipment is composed of two trips: one to and one from SNL/NM. Thus, the total number of trips made by material and waste transporters under this alternative would be 10,374 (total shipments x 2). Assuming that the year is comprised of 250 work days, the average work day traffic within KAFB contributed by these carriers would be 41 trips. This is small compared to 26,349 trips of SNL/NM vehicles entering and exiting KAFB under this alternative (SNL 1996a, SNL/NM 1998a). Therefore, the overall traffic impacts on KAFB from SNL/NM material and waste shipments under the Reduced Operations Alternative would be minimal.

Shipments of Material and Waste in the Albuquerque Area

The total SNL/NM placarded material and waste shipment traffic under this alternative would comprise only 1.2 percent, or 41 shipments per day, of the total placarded truck traffic (1,767) entering the greater Albuquerque area. Although a 43-percent increase in

SNL/NM placarded material and waste truck traffic would be expected, this increase would represent the inclusion of waste currently managed at KAFB landfill and new shipments from the MIPP. ER Project and legacy waste are addressed separately under special projects. Thus, the impacts under the Reduced Operations Alternative would be insignificant.

Shipments of Material and Waste Outside of Albuquerque

All material and waste transported to and from SNL/NM from outside of Albuquerque must enter and depart the city by way of Interstate 25 or Interstate 40. Table 5.5.9 3 presents the impacts to those corridors from material and waste shipments under the Reduced Operations Alternative. The specific remote facility locations are listed in Section 4.11. Daily SNL/NM shipment figures were derived for comparison purposes by dividing the annual waste and material shipment totals in Tables 5.5.9 1 and 5.5.9 2 by the approximately 250 work days in a calendar year.

Table 5.5.9 3. 24-Hour Placarded Material and Waste Traffic Counts Under the Reduced Operations Alternative

ROUTE (ALL TRAFFIC) ^a	BASE YEAR ^b	REDUCED OPERATIONS
<i>I-25 North (52,400)</i>	230	268
<i>I-25 South (18,000)</i>	94	110
<i>I-40 West (16,400)</i>	621	725
<i>I-40 East (54,200)</i>	569	664
TOTAL (141,000)	1,514	1,767
SNL/NM^c	14.5	20.7

Sources: Scientific Services 1995; SNL/NM 1997b, 1998a

I: Interstate

^a Total vehicle count for all types of vehicles entering and departing Albuquerque

^b The base year varies depending on information provided in the Facilities and Safety Information Document (SNL/NM 1997b). Typically, the base year is 1996 or 1997, as appropriate.

^c SNL/NM placarded trucks

Based on this analysis, overall SNL/NM material and waste shipments would be expected to increase in frequency by 43 percent under this alternative. Furthermore, the reduced SNL/NM truck traffic would only comprise less than 0.013 percent of all traffic (165,000 vehicles per day), including all types of vehicles, projected to be entering and departing Albuquerque by way of interstates. For the base year (1996 or 1997), waste leaving Albuquerque represented 35 percent of the total shipments, with an additional

20 percent going to Rio Rancho. Because most materials are supplied through the JIT vendors, origination points are generally not known. However, most vendors use local suppliers; therefore, in the base year, 82 percent of material was assumed to be provided locally, with the remaining 18 percent coming from outside Albuquerque. Thus, the impact to this ROI from the Reduced Operations Alternative would be insignificant.

5.5.9.2 Other Transportation (Traffic)

Overall vehicular traffic impacts under the Reduced Operations Alternative were assessed by projecting the total number of SNL/NM commuter vehicles that would be traveling to and from SNL/NM. The term commuter includes all vehicles operated by SNL/NM employees, contractors, and visitors; DOE employees; and additional traffic, such as delivery vehicles.

Traffic on KAFB

Table 5.5.9 4 presents general anticipated traffic impacts at KAFB under the Reduced Operations Alternative. The number of SNL/NM commuter vehicles traveling to and from the site each work day was conservatively assumed to decrease at the same rate as the SNL/NM work force levels (see Section 5.5.12). Based on this analysis, overall KAFB traffic would decrease by 1 percent under this alternative.

Table 5.5.9 5 shows projected 24-hour KAFB vehicular flow for each of the three main gates under the Reduced Operations Alternative. It was assumed that the Carlisle and Truman gates would be used primarily by KAFB personnel and not by SNL/NM employees. For the bounding case for this analysis, it was assumed that the SNL/NM contribution to total KAFB flow at each gate

would fluctuate by the same factor as the total fluctuation in SNL/NM traffic under the Reduced Operations Alternative. Based on this analysis, the daily KAFB gate traffic would decrease by 1 percent under the Reduced Operations Alternative. This minimal change would not have an appreciable impact on the level of service at the gates.

Traffic in the Albuquerque Area

To determine the traffic impacts in the Albuquerque traffic corridor, roadways most likely to be affected by SNL/NM traffic were selected for analysis. The bounding case used the projected SNL/NM traffic contributions from Table 5.5.9 5 to approximate the SNL/NM component of the total traffic count for each roadway. For worst-case impacts, the SNL/NM traffic component was assumed to be equivalent to the total SNL/NM traffic at the nearest gate. In actuality, a significant percentage of traffic would likely diffuse onto other nearby roads, which would greatly reduce the magnitude of the SNL/NM component. The projected impacts to these roadways under the Reduced Operations Alternative, according to the bounding case factors, are presented in Table 5.5.9 6.

Based on this analysis, there would be a 3 percent overall average decrease in the SNL/NM traffic component on these roadways under the Reduced Operations Alternative. There would also be a 0.8 percent decrease in the total vehicular traffic.

Traffic Outside of Albuquerque

The additional local SNL/NM traffic under the Reduced Operations Alternative would have minimal impacts on transportation routes between Albuquerque and other

Table 5.5.9 4. KAFB Daily Traffic Projections Under the Reduced Operations Alternative

COMPONENT	BASE YEAR ^a			REDUCED OPERATIONS			CHANGE (%)
	%	VEHICLES	TRIPS	%	VEHICLES	TRIPS	
SNL/NM Commuters	36	13,582	27,164	35	13,174	26,349	-3
KAFB Commuters	64	24,145	48,290	65	24,145	48,290	0
TOTAL KAFB COMMUTER TRAFFIC	100	37,727	75,453	100	37,319	74,639	-1
SNL/NM Waste & Material Transporters	0.04	14.5	29	0.06	20.7	41	+43 ^b

Sources: SNL/NM 1997a, 1997b

^a The base year varies depending on information provided in the *Facilities and Safety Information Document* (SNL/NM 1997b). Typically, the base year is 1996 or 1997, as appropriate.

^b This increase represents inclusion of waste currently managed at the KAFB landfill and new shipments from the medical isotopes production project.

Table 5.5.9 5. Total KAFB Gate Traffic Under the Reduced Operations Alternative

GATE	BASE YEAR ^a			REDUCED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE			% CHANGE GATE TOTAL
	24-HOUR SNL/NM ^b	24-HOUR TOTAL ^c	PEAK HOUR ^d	24-HOUR SNL/NM	24-HOUR TOTAL	PEAK HOUR	
<i>Wyoming</i>	7,141	19,835	1,941	6,927	19,621	1,922	-1
<i>Eubank</i>	5,324	14,788	2,683	5,164	14,626	2,656	-1
<i>Gibson</i>	8,108	22,523	1,571	7,865	22,280	1,555	-1

Sources: Bohannon-Huston 1995; SNL/NM 1997a, 1997b

^a The base year varies depending on information provided in the *Facilities and Safety Information Document* (SNL/NM 1997b). Typically, the base year is 1996 or 1997, as appropriate.

^b SNL/NM commuter and transporter trips per day equals 36 percent of total KAFB trips per day

^c Total KAFB trips per day

^d Total KAFB trips per hour, 1996 traffic counts

Table 5.5.9 6. Albuquerque Daily Traffic Counts Under the Reduced Operations Alternative

ROADWAY		BASE YEAR ^a		REDUCED OPERATIONS		% CHANGE
		DAILY ^b	PEAK ^c	DAILY	PEAK	DAILY
<i>Gibson west at Louisiana</i>	TOTAL	15,671	2,066	15,428	2,034	-1.6
	SNL/NM	8,108	1,069	7,865	1,037	-3
	% SNL/NM	52		51		-2
<i>Wyoming south of Lomas</i>	TOTAL	37,639	2,293	37,853	2,280	-0.6
	SNL/NM	7,141	435	6,927	423	-3
	% SNL/NM	19		18.6		-2
<i>Eubank south of Copper</i>	TOTAL	14,572	1,852	14,732	1,832	-1.1
	SNL/NM	5,324	677	5,164	657	-3
	% SNL/NM	37		36		-3
<i>Interstate 25 at Gibson^d</i>	TOTAL	91,000		91,243		-0.3
	SNL/NM	8,108		7,865		-3
	% SNL/NM	8.9		8.6		-3
<i>Interstate 40 at Eubank^d</i>	TOTAL	90,300		90,460		-0.2
	SNL/NM	5,324		5,164		-3
	% SNL/NM	5.9		5.7		-3
<i>Wyoming north of KAFB gate</i>	TOTAL	20,272	1,749	20,486	1,731	-1.0
	SNL/NM	7,141	612	6,927	594	-3
	% SNL/NM	35		34		-3

Sources: MRGCOG 1997b, 1997c; SNL/NM 1997b, 1998a; UNM 1997b

^a The base year varies depending on information provided in the *Facilities and Safety Information Document* (SNL/NM 1997b). Typically, the base year is 1996 or 1997, as appropriate.

^b Vehicles per day, 1996 *Traffic Flows for the Greater Albuquerque Area*

^c Vehicles per hour, 1996-1998 *Traffic Counts*

^d Peak hour counts for this intersection are not available

DOE facilities, vendors, and disposal facilities (see Section 4.11 for a list of these facilities). In a worst-case assessment, the SNL/NM component represents an average 19 percent of the total traffic count (144,000 vehicles per day) on major roadways entering and departing Albuquerque in the base year (MRGCOG 1997b). Under the Reduced Operations Alternative, the SNL/NM component would decrease to 16 percent of total vehicular traffic due to the increase in Albuquerque population and commuters. This assumes that all SNL/NM traffic would actually enter and depart Albuquerque by way of the interstates every day, although a significant portion of SNL/NM traffic would more likely diffuse onto other roadways or remain in Albuquerque.

5.5.9.3 Transportation Risks Associated with Normal Operations

Incident-Free Exposure

The bounding case for this analysis used the representative distances traveled by SNL/NM waste and material carriers, as listed in Table 5.3.9 7. These distances were based on the average distance traveled by trucks in route to other facilities under all alternatives.

Truck emissions impacts are a function of the number of truck shipments to and from SNL/NM. The bounding case for truck emissions impact analysis assumed that the greatest risk is when these shipments are transported through urban areas, such as the Albuquerque transportation corridor, because these areas are most susceptible to emissions related problems. To evaluate the actual risk associated with SNL/NM truck shipments, the most common origins and destinations of all shipments of concern were compiled to determine the urban distance each material or waste would be transported (Section 4.11). Table 5.5.9 7 presents projected truck emissions impacts resulting from the Reduced Operations Alternative.

The impact analysis of incident-free exposure from material and waste shipments was conducted using the *HIGHWAY* computer code as part of the *RADTRAN 4* modeling program (SNL 1992a). The distance parameters presented in Table 5.3.9 7 were used to project the incident-free exposure impacts to the public and crew resulting from this alternative. The projected public and crew dose calculations are presented in Table 5.5.9 8.

This table shows that the LCFs due to annual shipments of radioactive material and wastes under the Reduced

Operations Alternative would decrease appreciably although the magnitude is small.

In the absence of an accident that compromises package integrity, no incident-free chemical or explosive exposure would be foreseen to affect the public, workers, or vehicle transport crews under this alternative.

5.5.9.4 Transportation Risks Associated with Accidents

General Accidents

The bounding case for general vehicular traffic impacts under the Reduced Operations Alternative assumed that the percent decrease in accidents would be equal to the percent decrease in SNL/NM traffic. Therefore, SNL/NM traffic accidents would decrease by 3 percent under this alternative.

Hazardous Material Waste-Related Accidents

The SNL/NM material and waste shipments projected in Table 5.5.9 1 and Table 5.5.9 2 were used in conjunction with traffic fatality statistics (SNL 1986) to project the truck accident fatality incidence rate that would be expected under the Reduced Operations Alternative. The details are presented in Appendix G. These impacts are presented in Table 5.5.9 9. Based on this analysis, accident fatalities due to SNL/NM truck transportation would decrease from 0.22 to 0.18 under this alternative.

Radiological Transportation Accidents

The annual risk to population due to transportation accidents that potentially involve radiological releases resulting from the Reduced Operations Alternative are presented in Table 5.5.9 10. This analysis indicates that under normal routine operations, LCFs would decrease from 9.0×10^{-6} to 7.5×10^{-6} in incidents due to the worst-case radiological transportation accident under the Reduced Operations Alternative. In addition, 5×10^{-5} LCFs would result from legacy and ER Project waste shipments. For more information see Appendix G.

Risks due to radiological, chemical and explosives accidents are evaluated in detail in Appendix F. The bounding transportation accident analysis involves explosion of a tractor-trailer containing 40,000 ft³ of hydrogen. Based on the results presented in Appendix F, Table F.4 1, the hydrogen explosion

**Table 5.5.9 7. Reduced Operations Alternative
Incident-Free Exposure: Truck Emissions**

CARGO	UNIT RISK FACTOR PER URBAN KILOMETER	URBAN DISTANCE TRAVELED PER SHIPMENT (km)	LCFs PER ROUND TRIP SHIPMENT	ANNUAL NO. SHIPMENTS		ANNUAL LCFs	
				BASE YEAR ^a	REDUCED OPERATIONS	BASE YEAR ^a	REDUCED OPERATIONS
NORMAL ROUTINE OPERATIONS							
<i>RAD Materials</i>	1.0×10^{-7}	73.0	1.5×10^{-5}	305	140	4.6×10^{-3}	2.1×10^{-3}
<i>Explosives</i>	1.0×10^{-7}	48.0	9.6×10^{-6}	303	138	2.9×10^{-3}	1.3×10^{-3}
<i>Chemicals</i>	1.0×10^{-7}	8.0	1.6×10^{-6}	2,750	2,750	4.4×10^{-3}	4.4×10^{-3}
<i>LLW</i>	1.0×10^{-7}	33.0	6.6×10^{-6}	4	8	2.6×10^{-5}	5.3×10^{-5}
<i>Medical Isotopes Production (receipts)</i>	1.0×10^{-7}	NA	NA	0	2	NA	3.5×10^{-4}
<i>Medical Isotopes Production (shipments)</i>				0	1,140		
<i>LLMW (shipments)</i>	1.0×10^{-7}	40.6	8.1×10^{-6}	1	3	8.1×10^{-6}	2.4×10^{-5}
<i>LLMW (receipts)</i>	1.0×10^{-7}	35.6	7.1×10^{-6}	0	1	7.1×10^{-6}	7.1×10^{-6}
<i>Hazardous Waste</i>	1.0×10^{-7}	33.0	6.6×10^{-6}	64	58	4.2×10^{-4}	3.8×10^{-4}
<i>Recyclable Hazardous to California</i>	1.0×10^{-7}	23.0	4.6×10^{-6}	2	2	9.2×10^{-6}	9.2×10^{-6}
<i>Recyclable Hazardous to New Mexico</i>	1.0×10^{-7}	6.4	1.3×10^{-6}	6	6	7.8×10^{-6}	7.8×10^{-6}
<i>Solid Waste</i>	1.0×10^{-7}	10.0	2.0×10^{-6}	51	51	1.0×10^{-4}	1.0×10^{-4}
<i>D&D Hazardous Waste TSCA-PCBs</i>	1.0×10^{-7}	33.0	6.6×10^{-6}	1	1	6.6×10^{-6}	6.6×10^{-6}
<i>D&D Hazardous Waste TSCA-Asbestos</i>	1.0×10^{-7}	10.0	2.0×10^{-6}	14	14	2.8×10^{-5}	2.8×10^{-5}
<i>Biohazardous Waste</i>	1.0×10^{-7}	24.0	4.8×10^{-6}	1	1	4.8×10^{-6}	4.8×10^{-6}
<i>Recyclable D&D Hazardous Waste</i>	1.0×10^{-7}	6.4	1.3×10^{-6}	22	22	2.9×10^{-5}	2.9×10^{-5}
<i>Recyclable Nonhazardous Solid Waste</i>	1.0×10^{-7}	6.4	1.3×10^{-6}	78	78	1.0×10^{-4}	1.0×10^{-4}
<i>Nonhazardous Landscaping Waste</i>	1.0×10^{-7}	10	2.0×10^{-6}	NA	142	NA	2.8×10^{-4}

**Table 5.5.9 7. Reduced Operations Alternative
Incident-Free Exposure: Truck Emissions (concluded)**

CARGO	UNIT RISK FACTOR PER URBAN KILOMETER	URBAN DISTANCE TRAVELED PER SHIPMENT (km)	LCFs PER ROUND TRIP SHIPMENT	ANNUAL NO. SHIPMENTS		ANNUAL LCFs	
				BASE YEAR ^a	REDUCED OPERATIONS	BASE YEAR ^a	REDUCED OPERATIONS
Construction and Demolition Solid Waste	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	10	2.0x10 ⁻⁶	NA	599	NA	1.2x10 ⁻³
RCRA Hazardous Waste (Receipt)	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	3	6.0x10 ⁻⁷	12	25	7.2x10 ⁻⁶	1.5x10 ⁻⁵
LLW (D&D)	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	33	6.6x10 ⁻⁶	4	4	2.6x10 ⁻⁵	2.6x10 ⁻⁵
TOTAL^b						1.33x10⁻²	1.1x10⁻²
SPECIAL PROJECT OPERATIONS							
TRU/MTRU	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	8.4	1.7x10 ⁻⁶	0	2	0	3.4x10 ⁻⁶
TRU/MTRU (legacy)	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	8.4	1.7x10 ⁻⁶	0	2	0	3.4x10 ⁻⁶
LLW (legacy)	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	33	6.6x10 ⁻⁶	0	56	0	3.7x10 ⁻⁴
LLMW (legacy)	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	40.6	8.1x10 ⁻⁶	0	8	0	6.5x10 ⁻⁵
LLW (ER)	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	33	6.6x10 ⁻⁶	0	136	0	9.0x10 ⁻⁴
LLMW (ER)	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	40.6	8.1x10 ⁻⁶	0	5	0	4.1x10 ⁻⁵
Hazardous Waste (ER)	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	33	6.6x10 ⁻⁶	0	113	0	7.5x10 ⁻⁴
Nonhazardous Solid Waste (ER)	1.0x10 ⁻⁷	10	2.0x10 ⁻⁶	0	9	0	1.8x10 ⁻⁵
TOTAL^b						0	2.1x10⁻³

Sources: DOE 1996h; SNL 1992a; SNL/NM 1982, 1997b, 1998a

D&D: decontamination and decommissioning

ER: environmental restoration

km: kilometer

LCFs: latent cancer fatalities

LLMW: low-level mixed waste

LLW: low-level waste

MTRU: mixed transuranic

NA: not applicable

PCB: polychlorinated biphenyl

RAD: radiological

RCRA: Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

TRU: transuranic

TSCA: Toxic Substances Control Act

^a The base year varies depending on information provided in the Facilities and Safety Information Document (SNL/NM 1997b). Typically, the base year is 1996 or 1997, as appropriate.

^b Lifetime estimated total LCFs

Table 5.5.9 8. Doses to Crew and Public Under the Reduced Operations Alternative

CARGO	ANNUAL DOSE/TRUCK CREW (person-rem)		ANNUAL DOSE/GENERAL PUBLIC (person-rem)		ANNUAL LCFs	
	BASE YEAR ^a	REDUCED OPERATIONS	BASE YEAR ^a	REDUCED OPERATIONS	BASE YEAR ^a	REDUCED OPERATIONS
NORMAL ROUTINE OPERATIONS						
<i>RAD Materials</i>	9.8	4.5	82.4	37.8	4.5×10^{-2}	2.1×10^{-2}
<i>LLW</i>	0.21	0.41	0.6	1.2	3.8×10^{-4}	7.6×10^{-4}
<i>LLMW</i>	2.6×10^{-2}	9.6×10^{-2}	0.26	0.88	1.4×10^{-4}	4.8×10^{-4}
<i>Medical Isotopes Production</i>	0	0.92	0	2.7	0	1.7×10^{-3}
<i>LLW (D&D)</i>	0.21	0.21	0.60	0.60	3.8×10^{-4}	3.8×10^{-4}
TOTAL^b					4.6×10^{-2}	2.4×10^{-2}
SPECIAL PROJECT OPERATIONS						
<i>TRU/MTRU</i>	0	3.6×10^{-3}	0	2.0×10^{-2}	0	1.1×10^{-5}
<i>TRU/MTRU (Legacy)</i>	0	3.6×10^{-3}	0	2.0×10^{-2}	0	1.1×10^{-5}
<i>LLW (Legacy + ER)</i>	0	10.0	0	28.8	0	1.8×10^{-2}
<i>LLMW (Legacy + ER)</i>	0	0.34	0	3.4	0	1.8×10^{-3}
TOTAL^b					0	2.0×10^{-2}

Sources: DOE 1996h, SNL 1992a, SNL/NM 1997b, 1998a

D&D: decontamination and decommissioning

ER: environmental restoration

LCFs: latent cancer fatalities

LLMW: low-level mixed waste

LLW: low-level waste

MTRU: mixed transuranic

RAD: radiological

rem: roentgen equivalent, man

TRU: transuranic

^a The base year varies depending on information provided in the *Facilities and Safety Information Document* (SNL/NM 1997b). Typically, the base year is 1996 or 1997, as appropriate.^b Lifetime estimated total LCFs

Table 5.5.9 9. Truck Transportation Traffic Fatalities Under the Reduced Operations Alternative

CARGO	TRAFFIC FATALITY RATE: CREW AND GENERAL PUBLIC PER SHIPMENT (ROUND TRIP)	ANNUAL FATALITIES	
		BASE YEAR ^a	REDUCED OPERATIONS
NORMAL ROUTINE OPERATIONS			
<i>RAD Materials</i>	3.5×10^{-4}	0.11	4.9×10^{-2}
<i>Explosives</i>	2.9×10^{-4}	8.8×10^{-2}	4.0×10^{-2}
<i>Chemicals</i>	2.1×10^{-6}	5.8×10^{-3}	5.8×10^{-3}
<i>LLW</i>	2.2×10^{-4}	8.8×10^{-4}	1.8×10^{-3}
<i>Medical Isotopes Production</i>	NA	NA	7.7×10^{-4}
<i>LLMW (shipments)</i>	3.0×10^{-4}	3.0×10^{-4}	9.0×10^{-4}
<i>LLMW (receipts)</i>	2.1×10^{-4}	0	2.1×10^{-4}
<i>Hazardous Waste</i>	2.2×10^{-4}	1.4×10^{-2}	1.3×10^{-2}
<i>Recyclable Hazardous to California</i>	1.5×10^{-4}	3.0×10^{-4}	3.0×10^{-4}
<i>Recyclable Hazardous to New Mexico</i>	1.6×10^{-7}	9.6×10^{-6}	9.6×10^{-6}
<i>Solid Waste</i>	2.6×10^{-6}	1.3×10^{-5}	1.3×10^{-4}
<i>D&D Hazardous Waste TSCA-PCBs</i>	2.2×10^{-4}	2.2×10^{-4}	2.2×10^{-4}
<i>D&D Hazardous Waste TSCA-Asbestos</i>	2.2×10^{-5}	3.1×10^{-4}	3.1×10^{-4}
<i>Biohazardous Waste</i>	1.4×10^{-4}	1.4×10^{-4}	1.4×10^{-4}
<i>Recyclable D&D Hazardous Waste</i>	1.6×10^{-6}	3.5×10^{-5}	3.5×10^{-5}
<i>Recyclable Nonhazardous Solid Waste</i>	1.6×10^{-6}	1.2×10^{-4}	1.2×10^{-4}
<i>Nonhazardous Landscaping Waste</i>	2.6×10^{-6}	NA	3.7×10^{-4}
<i>Construction and Demolition Solid Waste</i>	2.6×10^{-6}	NA	1.6×10^{-3}
<i>RCRA Hazardous Waste (receipt)</i>	6.7×10^{-7}	8.0×10^{-6}	1.7×10^{-5}
<i>Low-level waste (D&D)</i>	2.2×10^{-6}	8.8×10^{-4}	8.8×10^{-4}
TOTAL^b		0.22	0.11
SPECIAL PROJECT OPERATIONS			
<i>TRU/MTRU</i>	1.9×10^{-5}	0	3.8×10^{-5}
<i>TRU/MTRU (Legacy)</i>	1.9×10^{-5}	0	3.8×10^{-5}
<i>LLW (Legacy)</i>	2.2×10^{-4}	0	1.2×10^{-2}

Table 5.5.9 9. Truck Transportation Traffic Fatalities Under the Reduced Operations Alternative (concluded)

CARGO	TRAFFIC FATALITY RATE: CREW AND GENERAL PUBLIC PER SHIPMENT (ROUND TRIP)	ANNUAL FATALITIES	
		BASE YEAR ^a	REDUCED OPERATIONS
<i>LLMW (Legacy)</i>	3.0x10 ⁻⁴	0	2.4x10 ⁻³
<i>LLW (ER)</i>	2.2x10 ⁻⁴	0	3.0x10 ⁻²
<i>LLMW (ER)</i>	3.0x10 ⁻⁴	0	1.5x10 ⁻³
<i>Hazardous Waste (ER)</i>	2.2x10 ⁻⁴	0	2.5x10 ⁻²
<i>Nonhazardous Solid Waste(ER)</i>	2.6x10 ⁻⁶	0	2.3x10 ⁻⁵
TOTAL^b		0	7.1x10 ⁻²

Sources: SNL 1986, 1992a; SNL/NM 1997b, 1998a
 D&D: decontamination and decommissioning
 ER: environmental restoration
 LLW: low-level waste
 LLMW: low-level mixed waste
 MTRU: mixed transuranic
 NA: not applicable
 PCB: polychlorinated biphenyl

RAD: radiological
 RCRA: Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
 TRU: transuranic
 TSCA: Toxic Substances Control Act
^a The base year varies depending on information provided in the *Facilities and Safety Information Document* (SNL/NM 1997b). Typically, the base year is 1996 or 1997, as appropriate.
^b Lifetime estimated total fatalities from annual shipments and total special project shipments

Table 5.5.9 10. Doses to Population Due to Transportation Radiological Accident, Maximum Annual Radiological Accident Risk for Highway Shipments

CARGO	ANNUAL DOSE TO POPULATION PERSON-REM		LCFs	
	BASE YEAR ^a	REDUCED OPERATIONS	BASE YEAR ^a	REDUCED OPERATIONS
NORMAL ROUTINE OPERATIONS				
<i>Radioactive Material</i>	1.3 x10 ⁻²	6.0x10 ⁻³	6.6x10 ⁻⁶	3.0x10 ⁻⁶
<i>LLW</i>	2.3x10 ⁻³	4.6x10 ⁻³	1.2x10 ⁻⁶	2.3x10 ⁻⁶
<i>LLMW</i>	3.8x10 ⁻⁵	1.1x10 ⁻⁴	1.7x10 ⁻⁸	5.3x10 ⁻⁸
<i>Medical Isotopes Production</i>	0	1.9x10 ⁻³	0	9.6x10 ⁻⁷
<i>LLW (D&D)</i>	2.3x10 ⁻³	2.3x10 ⁻³	1.2x10 ⁻⁶	1.2x10 ⁻⁶
TOTAL^b			9.0x10⁻⁶	7.5x10⁻⁶
SPECIAL PROJECT OPERATIONS				
<i>TRU/MTRU</i>	0	3.4x10 ⁻⁶	0	3.4x10 ⁻⁹
<i>TRU/MTRU (Legacy)</i>	0	6.8x10 ⁻⁶	0	3.4x10 ⁻⁹
<i>LLW (Legacy + ER)</i>	0	0.11	0	5.5x10 ⁻⁵
<i>LLMW (Legacy + ER)</i>	0	4.4x10 ⁻⁴	0	2.2x10 ⁻⁷
TOTAL^b			0	5.5x10⁻⁵

Sources: DOE 1996h; SNL 1992a; SNL/NM 1997b, 1998a
 D&D: decontamination and decommissioning
 ER: environmental restoration
 LCFs: latent cancer fatalities
 LLMW: low-level mixed waste
 LLW: low-level waste

MTRU: mixed transuranic
 TRU: transuranic
^a The base year varies depending on information provided in the *Facilities and Safety Information Document* (SNL/NM 1997b). Typically, the base year is 1996 or 1997, as appropriate.
^b Lifetime estimated total LCFs

would result in structural damage to buildings up to a distance of 91 m from the truck. Fatalities would result up to a distance of 15 to 18 m from the truck, while eardrum ruptures would occur up to a distance of 36 m from the truck.

5.5.10 Waste Generation

Implementation of the Reduced Operations Alternative would not result in any major changes in the types of waste streams generated onsite. Except for new operations, waste generation levels at SNL/NM would remain constant or decrease slightly, consistent with slight decreases in laboratory operations. These lower waste volumes would be enhanced by the waste minimization and pollution prevention programs, which project a 33-percent overall decrease in total waste disposal needs by FY 2000. Therefore, the decreased generation activities would not exceed current existing waste management disposal capacities.

For projection purposes, the baseline waste generation data were considered to be constant for existing facilities with no major increases or decreases in the amount of wastes generated. Operations waste are considered to be derived from mission-related work. Nonoperations waste are generated from special programs. New operations are discussed separately in order to show the maximum likely existing operational increases. Waste generation levels for special operations waste, such as for the ER Project, are derived separately from the representative facilities' projections under special projects. However, the amount of waste generated is anticipated to reflect proportionally increases or decreases in SNL/NM activity levels over the next 10 years, with the exception of waste to be generated by new programs. The waste quantities projected, listed in Table 5.5.10-1, represent a site-wide aggregate of quantities for each type of waste stream from existing selected facilities. As appropriate, the balance of operations (not selected facilities or special projects) waste generated is discussed within the individual waste sections. Units shown for each waste type are based on how industrial facilities charge commercial clients for disposal of these wastes.

5.5.10.1 Radioactive Wastes

Only three types of radioactive waste, LLW, LLMW, and MTRU waste, would potentially be generated under the Reduced Operations Alternative. SNL/NM would not generate any high-level waste or TRU waste. Projections for waste generation at selected facilities from new and existing operations are presented in Appendix H.

Existing Operations

Under the Reduced Operations Alternative, SNL/NM anticipates a maximum 20 percent decrease in the generation of LLW from existing operations over the next 10 years. LLW generated by SNL/NM is and will continue to be transported offsite to appropriate DOE-approved disposal facilities, such as the NTS. LLMW generation would decrease by 13 percent for existing operations through 2008. Under the *Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Part B, Permit Application for Hazardous Waste Management Units* (SNL/NM 1996a), some treatment of the hazardous component of LLMW could be performed at SNL/NM (Table 4.12-2). LLMW for which no onsite treatment is available would be shipped offsite for treatment and disposal. SNL/NM also projects no TRU waste would be generated annually. The existing TRU/MTRU wastes stored onsite, as well as all future TRU/MTRU wastes, are anticipated to be transferred to LANL for certification, as indicated in the Waste Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (DOE 1997i) ROD (DOE 1998n), prior to disposal at the WIPP. Projected MTRU waste generated would decrease to 0.23 m³ annually. Existing SNL/NM operations would use less than 1 percent (0.17 percent) annually of the available radioactive waste storage capacity.

New Operations

SNL/NM anticipates a maximum of 10.8 m³ of LLW would be generated from new operations annually over the next 10 years. The majority of this increase would be primarily due to the full implementation of medical isotopes production operations in 2003. These operations, described in the *Medical Isotopes Production Project: Molybdenum-99 and Related Isotopes Environmental Impact Statement* (DOE 1996b), would account for over 47 percent of the total projected LLW in the Reduced Operations Alternative. However, due to the nature of the waste, it would be managed at the generation facility to minimize worker exposure until disposal offsite. LLMW generation from all new onsite sources would be a maximum of 0.14 m³ annually through 2008.

SNL/NM does not expect to generate TRU or MTRU wastes from new operations. Approximately 42 kg of spent fuel would be generated over the 10-year period. Spent fuel is further discussed in Appendix A as a material resource.

Table 5.5.10 1. Waste Generation for Existing Selected SNL/NM Facilities Under the Reduced Operations Alternative

ALL WASTE		UNIT	BASE YEAR ^a	REDUCED ALTERNATIVE
RADIOACTIVE WASTE				
Low-Level Waste (500 kg/m³)	Existing Operations	m ³ (kg)	16(8,000)	18(9,000)
	New Operations	m ³ (kg)	4(2,000)	11(5,500)
	SNL/NM Balance of Operations	m ³ (kg)	74(37,000)	74(37,000)
	SNL/NM Total LLW	m ³ (kg)	94(47,000)	102(51,000)
	Percent change		0.0%	8.8%
Low-Level Mixed Waste (550 kg/m³)	Existing Operations	m ³ (kg)	3.85(2,120)	3.36(1,850)
	New Operations	m ³ (kg)	0.20(110)	0.14(80)
	SNL/NM Balance of Operations	m ³ (kg)	0.28(150)	0.28(150)
	SNL/NM Total LLMW	m ³ (kg)	4.33(2,380)	3.79(2,080)
	Percent change		0.0%	-12.6%
TRU Waste (310 kg/m³)	Existing Operations	m ³ (kg)	-	-
	New Operations	m ³ (kg)	-	-
	SNL/NM Balance of Operations	m ³ (kg)	-	-
	SNL/NM Total TRU	m ³ (kg)	-	-
MTRU Waste (76 kg/m³)	Existing Operations	m ³ (kg)	0.45(34)	0.23(26)
	New Operations	m ³ (kg)	-	-
	SNL/NM Balance of Operations	m ³ (kg)	-	-
	SNL/NM Total MTRU	m ³ (kg)	0.45(34)	0.23(26)
	Percent change		0.0%	-50.0%
RADIOACTIVE WASTE TOTAL^c	Existing Operations	m³(kg)	20.34 (10,154)	21.55 (10,876)
	New Operations	m³(kg)	4.62(2,110)	10.96 (5,580)
	SNL/NM Balance of Operations	m³(kg)	73.92 (37,150)	73.92 (37,150)
	SNL/NM Total Radioactive Waste	m³(kg)	98.88 (49,414)	106.42 (53,606)
	Percent change		0.0%	7.6%

**Table 5.5.10 1. Total Waste Generation Facilities
Under the Reduced Operations Alternative (concluded)**

ALL WASTE	UNIT	BASE YEAR ^a	REDUCED ALTERNATIVE
RCRA HAZARDOUS WASTE			
<i>Existing Operations</i>	kg	16,187	15,176
<i>New Operations</i>	kg	398	598
<i>SNL/NM Balance of Operations</i>	kg	39,267	37,349
<i>SNL/NM Total RCRA Hazardous</i>	kg	55,852	53,123
	m ³	44.3	42.1
<i>Percent change</i>		0.0%	-4.9%
SOLID WASTE			
<i>SNL/NM Total Solid Waste^b</i>	m ³ (kg)	0.6M (2,022)	0.6M (1,955)
<i>Percent change</i>		0.0%	-3.3%
WASTEWATER			
<i>Existing Operations</i>	M gal	49	51
<i>New Operations</i>	M gal	0	3
<i>SNL/NM Balance of Operations</i>	M gal	231	214
<i>SNL/NM Total Wastewater</i>	M gal	280	268
<i>Percent change</i>		0.0%	-4.3%

Sources: SNL/NM 1997b, 1998a, 1998c, 1998t

kg: kilogram

LLMW: low-level mixed waste

LLW: low-level waste

M: million

M gal: million gallons

m³: cubic meter

MTRU: mixed transuranic

RCRA: Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

TRU: transuranic

^a The base year varies depending on information provided in the *Facilities and Safety Information Document* (SNL/NM 1997b). Typically, the base year is 1996 or 1997, as appropriate.

^b Individual breakdowns of solid waste for existing, new, and balance of operations are unavailable because of tracking methods.

^c Numbers are rounded and may differ from calculated values.

Note: Densities shown are found in Table H.3 1.

Balance of Operations

The waste level for the balance of operations was determined for each type of radioactive waste (Table 5.5.10 1). Only LLW and LLMW would be affected. Balance of operations at SNL/NM would account for an additional 73.6 m³ per year of LLW. These same operations would account for an additional 0.28 m³ of LLMW per year. The overall operations impacts for this alternative would increase by 9 percent for LLW and would decrease by 13 percent for LLMW.

Current Capacity

Previously generated radioactive wastes (legacy waste) occupy approximately 494 m³ of the available 11,866 m³ of total radioactive waste storage capacity at the RMWMF and its associated storage areas. This

represents approximately 4.2 percent of the total available capacity. Therefore, there is sufficient capacity to accommodate the anticipated decrease in radioactive wastes generated.

Special Projects

Projections indicate the ER Project, a special project beyond the scope of normal operations, will actually be the single largest waste generator at SNL/NM in 1998. The ER Project will produce approximately 2,862 m³ of LLW and 221 m³ of LLMW, primarily contaminated soil and debris, prior to the end of the project in 2004 (Table 5.3.10 2). Actual cleanup is now expected to be completed by 2002, with ER Project wastes disposed of by 2004. Prior to disposal, ER Project waste must be properly characterized. Therefore, lag time is built into

the project schedule between field remediation and actual disposal of waste.

5.5.10.2 Hazardous Waste

Existing Operations

As shown on Table 5.5.10 1, under the Reduced Operations Alternative, SNL/NM anticipates a decrease in the generation of RCRA hazardous waste from 16,187 kg in the base year to 15,176 kg per year. Projections are shown in Appendix H. Projected RCRA hazardous waste generation is presented in Figure 4.12 4.

No appreciable change in the generation of explosive waste would occur. Therefore, the TTF, with a treatment capacity of 9.1 kg of waste per burn, would continue to accommodate those wastes, as discussed in the No Action Alternative. The majority of explosive waste would be disposed of at SNL/NM or through KAFB.

New Operations

SNL/NM anticipates annual generation of a maximum of approximately 600 kg of hazardous waste by new operations over the next 10 years. The increase would be primarily due to the full implementation of medical isotopes production operations associated with the MIPP in 2003. These operations, described in the *Medical Isotopes Production Project: Molybdenum-99 and Related Isotopes Environmental Impact Statement* (DOE 1996b), would account for less than 2 percent (1.2 percent) of the total projected hazardous waste in 2003 and 2008.

New SNL/NM operations would use less than 1 percent (0.2 percent) annually of the available hazardous waste storage capacity at SNL/NM. This is considered to be a minimal impact.

Balance of Operations

It was assumed that the RCRA hazardous waste levels for the balance of operations at SNL/NM would decrease by the same proportion as RCRA wastes for selected facilities, because facilities represent the overall plant. Consequently, multipliers were used to project RCRA hazardous waste levels under all three alternatives. In the base year, the selected facilities will generate 16,187 kg out of a total of 55,852 kg of all operational RCRA waste. The remainder, 39,267 kg, is the balance of operations RCRA hazardous waste. For the Reduced Operations Alternative, the maximum projected balance of operations amount would be 37,349 kg.

Current Capacity

Under the Reduced Operations Alternative, the total volume of hazardous waste generated at SNL/NM requiring offsite disposal at licensed/approved facilities, would not exceed the existing 286.5 m³ of storage and handling capacities at the HWMF and its associated storage buildings. The outside nonpermitted bermed storage area for nonhazardous waste was not included in the onsite storage capacity calculations. Hazardous waste is routinely shipped out on a monthly basis to various offsite disposal facilities by SNL/NM. Projections indicate that a maximum of 15.4 percent of the existing hazardous waste capacity would be used. Therefore, a minimum of six years capacity exists for the hazardous waste based on the highest level of generation. Most, if not all, waste would be shipped in less than 1 year to meet regulatory requirements. Based on these projections and continued operations at selected facilities under the Reduced Operations Alternative, the hazardous waste generation impacts would continue to be minimal.

Special Projects

During field remediation, the ER Project, likely the single largest waste generator at SNL/NM in 1998, would produce an additional 26 M kg of hazardous waste by 2002 (Table 5.3.10 2). Final disposal would be accomplished by 2004. ER Project waste must be properly characterized. Therefore, lag time is built into the project schedule between field remediation and actual disposal of waste.

D&D operations would continue (as outlined in Section 2.3.5). This program would directly impact the quantity of TSCA hazardous waste requiring disposal. Under this modernization program, SNL/NM would continue to generate TSCA hazardous waste, primarily PCBs and asbestos that are removed from transformers and buildings. Since the main PCB relamping and transformer removal is now completed, quantities of TSCA waste have dropped to approximately 122,000 kg per year and should remain at that level (Figures 4.12 5 and 4.12 6).

The total volume of TSCA waste would eventually decrease as the targeted facilities are removed. Currently, SNL/NM has 674 buildings providing a total of 5 M gross ft² of office and operational space. Through this facility modernization program, the number of buildings would be reduced to 465 buildings totaling approximately 4.9 M gross ft². This program would remove 138 buildings accounting for 179,204 gross ft²

within FY 1998 and FY 1999 at SNL/NM. During FY 2000 through FY 2002, 49 additional buildings accounting for 108,937 gross ft² are potentially scheduled for removal. Over the long term, an additional 29 buildings would be removed with a total of 84,132 gross ft². To make up for the loss of office and operational space, seven additional buildings would be built, adding approximately 240,000 gross ft². No predictions are made for years beyond 2007.

5.5.10.3 All Other Wastes

All SNL/NM operations also involve four additional waste management activity areas, discussed below.

Biohazardous (Medical) Waste

The total volume of medical waste would generally remain a function of the total number of full-time employees and subcontractors located at SNL/NM. Under the Reduced Operations Alternative, approximately 2,423 kg of medical waste would be generated. The existing waste handling capabilities would be adequate to accommodate this waste. No additional offsite impacts would occur, because offsite disposal capacity would continue to be sufficient.

Nonhazardous Chemical Waste

The maximum quantity of nonhazardous waste generated annually at SNL/NM and managed by the HWMF under the Reduced Operations Alternative would be 65,934 kg, based on the waste multiplier (see Appendix A) developed for RCRA waste (Rinchem 1998a). Existing commercial disposal facilities would have adequate capacities to handle the continued generation of nonhazardous waste; thus, no additional impacts would be anticipated.

Municipal Solid Waste

Site-wide solid waste generation trends at SNL/NM would generally remain a function of total building area and the number of full-time and subcontractor employees. This function is based on general build operations activities, such as maintenance and cleaning, and, to a lesser extent, the general office waste created by SNL/NM employees. Over the 10-year time frame, a decrease of 2.2 percent would be anticipated. Despite the projected 3 percent personnel decrease, no appreciable onsite impacts to disposal facilities would be anticipated because existing waste handling capabilities are already in place. As existing buildings are replaced, personnel would be moved to make more efficient use of the space.

No additional offsite impacts would occur, since offsite disposal capacity would continue to be sufficient. However, a significant amount of C&D waste, a special class of solid waste, would potentially be generated under the facility modernization program described above. Quantities of C&D waste associated with the facility modernization program were projected to be similar to prior years. This waste would be disposed of at KAFB and would not create an offsite impact. Table 5.3.10-3 summarizes construction debris disposal.

Wastewater

SNL/NM would generate approximately 268 M gal of wastewater annually. However, SNL/NM entered into an MOU with KAFB, the DOE, the city of Albuquerque, and the state of New Mexico to reduce its water use by 30 percent by 2004 (SNL/NM 1997p). The MDL would be the single facility discharging the largest volume of wastewater at SNL/NM. Reduction efforts would focus on the MDL in order to reduce the amount of process wastewater being generated. See Section 5.3.2 for additional discussion of wastewater quantities and capacities.

5.5.11 Noise and Vibration

Implementation of the Reduced Operations Alternative could include activity levels at some facilities that would increase over the 1996 baseline activity levels. In these cases, the activity levels would be those that were not exercised sufficiently during the baseline period to maintain the capability or to satisfy testing requirements of the DOE.

The frequency of impulse noise events under the Reduced Operations Alternative is projected to be 65 percent less than the 1996 baseline level of activity and approximately 75 percent less than the 2008 No Action Alternative level for all test activities combined. This level of activity would result in an average of approximately 1.5 impulse noise tests per day, compared to an average of 5.5 impulse noise tests per day under the 2008 No Action Alternative. Only a small fraction of these tests would be of sufficient magnitude to be heard or felt beyond the site boundary. The vast majority of tests would be expected to be below background noise levels for receptor locations beyond the KAFB boundary and would, therefore, be unnoticed by the neighborhoods bounding the site. These impulse noise levels resemble a dull thud and generally are considered an annoyance because of startle effects, including window vibrations. The effects on the public would be minor.

5.5.12 Socioeconomics

The implementation of the Reduced Operations Alternative would result in no noticeable changes in the socioeconomic categories discussed in the following sections. Environmental impacts to demographic characteristics, economy, and community services in the ROI under the Reduced Operations Alternative are discussed below. The discussion of impacts is based on a bounding economic analysis.

5.5.12.1 Demographic Characteristics

The Reduced Operations Alternative would not likely generate a noticeable change in the existing demographic characteristics within the ROI (Section 4.14.3). Under this alternative, overall expenditures and employment at SNL/NM would decrease gradually and then remain constant through 2008.

5.5.12.2 Economic Base

The Reduced Operations Alternative would not be likely to result in a noticeable economic change in the existing economic base within the ROI (Section 4.14.3).

Table 5.5.12-1 presents an estimate of the Reduced Operations Alternative impacts on the ROI economy from a 3-percent decrease in operational levels of activity and associated decreases in expenditures, income, and employment, both direct and indirect, at SNL/NM. Minimal operational activities associated with selected facilities are included in the totals presented in the table. If operations at SNL/NM were to decrease by 3 percent over current levels, overall economic activity and income within the ROI would be expected to decrease by about 0.3 percent. As presented in Table 5.5.12-1, a 3-percent decrease in operational levels of activity at SNL/NM through 2008 would result in a decrease from \$42.4 B to \$42.28 B, amounting to a \$120-M total reduction in

Table 5.5.12-1. SNL/NM's Impact on Central New Mexico's Economy if Operations Were to Decrease by 3 Percent

ECONOMIC MEASURE	FY 1996 ^a			ASSUMING A 3-PERCENT DECREASE IN OPERATIONS			
	SNL/NM	TOTAL ROI	PERCENT OF ROI	SNL/NM	TOTAL ROI	PERCENT OF ROI	PERCENT CHANGE
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY (\$ BILLIONS)							
<i>Direct Expenditures</i>	1.43			1.39			
<i>Indirect & Induced</i>	<u>2.50</u>	42.4	9.3	<u>2.43</u>	42.28	9.0	-0.3
<i>Total Economic Activity</i>	3.93			3.81			
<i>Economic Activity Multiplier: 2.75^b</i>							
INCOME (\$ BILLIONS)							
<i>Net Wages & Salaries</i>	0.48			0.47			
<i>Indirect & Induced</i>	<u>0.58</u>	13.4	8.0	<u>0.56</u>	13.37	7.7	-0.3
<i>Total Income</i>	1.07			1.03			
<i>Income Multiplier: 2.21^b</i>							
EMPLOYMENT (NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES)							
<i>SNL/NM Employment</i>	7,652			7,422			
<i>Indirect & Induced</i>	<u>18,826</u>	331,800	8.0	<u>18,259</u>	331,004	7.6	-0.4
<i>Total Employment</i>	26,478			25,682			
<i>Employment Multiplier: 3.46^b</i>							

Source: DOE 1997]
ROI: region of influence
FY: fiscal year

^a Modeled results from DOE 1997]

^b The use of multipliers in calculating economic impacts in the ROI is explained in Section 4.14.3.

economic activity (an average loss of \$12 M per year). Total income would decrease from \$1.07 B to \$1.03 B, amounting to a \$40-M reduction in total income (an average loss of \$4 M per year). Total employment would decrease from 331,800 to 331,004, amounting to a reduction of 796 total jobs (an average loss of 80 jobs per year) in the ROI. By 2008, contributory effects from other industrial and economic sectors within the ROI would reduce or mask some of SNL/NM's effect on the ROI economy (Section 6.4.1).

5.5.12.3 Housing and Community Services

The Reduced Operations Alternative would not be likely to have a noticeable impact on existing housing and community services within the ROI (Section 4.14.3). Under this alternative, overall expenditures and employment at SNL/NM would decrease gradually and then remain constant through 2008. Contributory effects from other industrial and economic sectors within the ROI would reduce or mask the SNL/NM proportional impact.

5.5.13 Environmental Justice

In general, SNL/NM operations under the Reduced Operations Alternative would have no known disproportionately high or adverse health or environmental impacts on minority or low-income populations within the ROI. One area of concern is water resources and hydrology. Anticipated water resources adverse impacts would equally affect all communities in the area (see Section 5.5.4). Thus, no disproportionately high and adverse impacts to minority or low-income communities are anticipated for this resource area.

Table 5.5.13-1 provides a brief summary of environmental justice impacts on each resource or topic area under the Reduced Operations Alternative. It also identifies areas where the impacts do not vary from the No Action Alternative. See Section 5.3.13 for an expanded discussion of environmental justice issues by resource area.

Table 5.5.13 1. Summary of Potential Environmental Justice Impacts Under the Reduced Operations Alternative

RESOURCE OR TOPIC AREA	SUMMARIZED EFFECT	EFFECT ON RESOURCE OR TOPIC AREA ROI	PROPORTIONAL EFFECT ON	
			LOW-INCOME	MINORITY NEIGHBORHOODS
<i>Land Use and Visual Resources, Infrastructure, Geology and Soils, Water Resources and Hydrology^a, Biological and Ecological Resources, Cultural Resources^b, and Waste Generation</i>	Same as under the No Action Alternative	Same as under the No Action Alternative	Same as under the No Action Alternative	Same as under the No Action Alternative
<i>Air Quality Nonradiological Air</i>	Emissions would be below the most stringent standards, which define the pollutant concentrations below which there are no adverse impacts to human health and the environment. Concentrations would be below regulatory standards and human health guidelines. SNL/NM carbon monoxide emissions would be 5.6% of Bernalillo County carbon monoxide emissions.	Not adverse	Not adverse	Not adverse
<i>Air Quality Radiological Air</i>	MEI: 0.020 mrem/yr Collective ROI dose: 0.80 person-rem/yr Average collective dose in ROI: 1.1×10^{-3} mrem/yr	Not adverse	Not adverse	Not adverse
<i>Human Health and Worker Safety</i>	MEI lifetime risk of fatal cancer would increase by 8.0×10^{-9} Fatal cancers (additional ROI): 4.0×10^{-4} Risk of cancer fatality to workforce is 4.0×10^{-3}	Not adverse	Not adverse	Not adverse
<i>Transportation</i>	Total annual material shipments: 4,170 Total KAFB traffic (daily vehicles): 37,319 Incident-free exposure, truck emissions - annual LCFs: 1.1×10^{-2} Incident-free exposure, dose - annual LCFs: 2.4×10^{-2}	Not adverse	Not adverse	Not adverse

Table 5.5.13 1. Summary of Potential Environmental Justice Impacts Under the Reduced Operations Alternative (concluded)

RESOURCE OR TOPIC AREA	SUMMARIZED EFFECT	EFFECT ON RESOURCE OR TOPIC AREA ROI	PROPORTIONAL EFFECT ON	
			LOW-INCOME	MINORITY NEIGHBORHOODS
Noise and Vibration	Test activities would be 85% less than the 1996 level, an average of approximately 1.5 impulse noise tests per week. Only a fraction of these tests would be of sufficient magnitude to be heard or felt beyond the site boundary. The vast majority of tests would be expected to be below background noise levels for receptor locations beyond the KAFB boundary and would, therefore, be unnoticed in neighborhoods bounding the site.	Not adverse	Not adverse	Not adverse
Socioeconomics	SNL/NM employees: 7,422 SNL/NM total economic activity: \$3.81 B/yr Percent of ROI total economic activity: 9%	Not adverse	Not adverse	Not adverse

Source: Original

B: billion

LCFs: latent cancer fatalities

MEI: maximally exposed individual

mrem: millirem

ROI: region of influence

TCPs: traditional cultural properties

yr: year

^a Groundwater withdrawal was considered adverse; however, the effects are not disproportionately high and adverse to low-income and minority neighborhoods.

^b No TCPs have been identified; ongoing consultations may yet result in determination of impacts.

^c SNL/NM represents approximately 10% of the total economic activity in the ROI.

5.6 MITIGATION MEASURES

The regulations promulgated by the CEQ to implement the procedural provisions of NEPA (42 U.S.C. §4321) require that an EIS include a discussion of appropriate mitigation measures (40 CFR §1502.14[f] and 16[h]). The term mitigation includes the following (40 CFR §1508.20):

- avoiding an impact by not taking an action or parts of an action;
- minimizing impacts by limiting the degree or magnitude of an action and its implementation;
- rectifying an impact by repairing, rehabilitating, or restoring the affected environment;
- reducing or eliminating the impact by preservation and maintenance operations during the life of the action; and
- compensating for the impact by replacing or providing substitute resources or environments.

This section describes mitigation measures by resource area, along with descriptions and key proactive initiatives. These mitigation measures and proactive initiatives address the range of potential impacts of continuing to operate SNL/NM.

SNL/NM operates under existing programs and controls, including regulations, policies, contractual requirements, and administrative procedures, to mitigate impacts. The existing programs and controls are too numerous to list completely. Examples include the Fire Protection Program, Pollution Prevention and Waste Minimization Programs, Water and Energy Conservation Programs, and a Natural Resource Management Plan.

In large part, these programs and controls effectively reduce the need for additional mitigation measures in a majority of resource areas evaluated in the SWEIS. Also, as presented in Chapter 5, the majority of resource area impacts would not pose substantial harm to the environment or the public, and thus mitigation measures would not be required or anticipated. However, several resource areas, including cultural resources and environmental justice, present potential mitigation measures.

The description of these potential mitigation measures does not constitute a commitment to undertake any of them. Any such commitments would be reflected in the ROD following the Final SWEIS, with a more detailed

description and implementation plan in a Mitigation Action Plan published following the ROD.

5.6.1 Resource-Specific Mitigation Measures

Resource-specific mitigation measures are discussed below. Unless otherwise noted, the analyses in Chapter 5 assume that these measures would not be implemented.

5.6.2 Land Use and Visual Resources

No land use or visual resources impacts are anticipated that would require specific mitigation measures. Because land use on KAFB is influenced by a variety of landowners, permit arrangements, and withdrawal agreements, future land use is a complex issue. As a proactive means of developing future use options for properties owned by the DOE or permitted for its use on KAFB, SNL/NM is participating in a Future Use Options Logistics and Support Working Group with the DOE as the lead. Additional members of this group include other DOE affiliates (such as the Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute, Nonproliferation and National Security Institute (NNSI), TSD, KAFB, USFS, NMED, and EPA). Public involvement is encouraged through the DOE/SNL Citizens Advisory Board, which has been instrumental in providing interim recommendations on future land use options. These recommendations recognize the high probability of continued Federal use of KAFB and propose, for future use planning and cleanup level determination, reasonable land use classifications based on residential, recreational, and industrial use (SNL 1997a, Keystone 1995).

Improving the visual quality of SNL/NM is currently accomplished through incorporating Campus Design Guidelines. These guidelines contain a set of principles and detailed design guidance for the physical development and redevelopment of SNL/NM sites. They include guidance for building massing, facades, color palettes, building orientation and entries, circulation corridors, standardized signage, and landscaping, including low-water use plant selections. All new and modified facilities will be brought into compliance with these guidelines over time. They have been endorsed by senior management of SNL/NM and are administered through the Corporate Projects Department, the Sites Planning Department, and the Campus Development Committee (SNL 1997a). Where decommissioning, demolition, or environmental restoration are planned, actions will be taken to restore the area to its

approximate natural condition by backfilling, reducing side slopes, applying topsoil, reseeding, and establishing plant growth (SNL/NM 1997a).

5.6.3 Infrastructure

SNL/NM site infrastructure resources are capable of accommodating any of the alternatives with regular maintenance, repair, and upgrades. No mitigation measures would be anticipated.

5.6.4 Geology and Soils

Of the two analyses (slope stability and soil contamination) conducted for the Geology and Soils resource area, negligible environmental impacts were noted. Therefore, no mitigation measures would be required. Slope stability has not been an issue at SNL/NM because of the location of major facilities on relatively level ground and the stable bedrock-dominated mountainous areas. For soil contamination, this finding assumes SNL/NM's continued compliance with applicable regulations regarding the management and disposal of waste. Mitigation measures for potential releases of hazardous or radioactive materials at outdoor testing areas would be part of future operations (SNL 1997e).

5.6.5 Water Resources and Hydrology

Groundwater contamination exists at the CWL as a result of prior waste disposal activities. Groundwater contamination also exists in an area beneath TAs-I and -II, although contamination may not be of SNL/NM origin (see discussion in Section 5.3.4.1). At the Lurance Canyon Burn Site, nitrates exceeding the MCL have been detected in groundwater, but may be naturally occurring. Investigations or cleanup are underway at all of these sites, and further actions will be coordinated with the NMED.

The groundwater quantity analysis established SNL/NM's current and future contribution to local aquifer drawdown to be approximately 11 percent. To mitigate impacts to groundwater supplies, SNL/NM has announced a plan to cut water usage by 30 percent (SNL/NM 1997a). However, the effectiveness of any SNL/NM conservation initiative in reducing aquifer drawdown must be evaluated in the context of SNL/NM's portion of aquifer usage, determined to be approximately 1 percent (see Chapter 6). Accordingly, significant water conservation by SNL/NM will have a limited effect on regional aquifer drawdown.

5.6.6 Biological and Ecological Resources

Surveys for the presence or absence of threatened and endangered species and sensitive species, as well as for migratory bird nests, would be conducted at sites prior to commencing activities that could result in ground disturbance or destruction. If any of these species are encountered at a site, avoidance measures would be implemented. Such measures could include scheduling the activities outside of the breeding season and transplanting populations to another location. Migratory bird nests and birds occupying those nests, which could be affected by the activity, would be removed in accordance with the *Migratory Bird Treaty Act* (MBTA) (16 U.S.C. §703) permit from the USFWS. These thirteen species of birds would include, for example, the western burrowing owl and the gray vireo (see 4.7).

5.6.7 Cultural Resources

The likelihood for discovery or identification of previously unrecorded archaeological sites or TCPs in the ROI is high. Currently, there are no identified archaeological sites or TCPs on DOE-administered land within the ROI. If resources are discovered as a consequence of ongoing consultation, the stipulations outlined in the *National Historic Preservation Act* (NHPA) (16 U.S.C. §470 as amended) and its regulations (36 CFR Part 800) would be followed. Activities in the immediate vicinity of the discovery would cease until the significance and disposition of the resource could be determined in consultation with the New Mexico SHPO, Native American tribes with cultural affiliation, and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation. The inadvertent discovery of Native American human remains or funerary objects (associated or unassociated) would require adherence to the *Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act* (NAGPRA) (25 U.S.C. §3001). The activity leading to the discovery would stop and would be delayed for 30 days after certification that notification to the agency or tribes had been received. Protection of the individual or objects *in situ* or while curated would be initiated and continue until disposition of the individual or objects is completed. A notice of the discovery would be sent to the Native American tribes with the closest known cultural affiliation, and direction would be requested for treatment and disposition of the items. For land that is permitted to the DOE by another agency, the stipulations in the permits

governing the management and treatment of cultural resources would determine which agency is responsible for each of the steps identified above.

The additional security that is enforced at selected facilities during certain activities would increase protection of archaeological sites and TCPs from inadvertent and intentional damage. Although no specific TCPs have been identified within the ROI, if any are identified on DOE-administered land in the future, access to these sites could become an issue. If TCPs are identified and access is desired, the DOE would consult with the appropriate Native American tribe to develop an agreement and procedure for access to the specific TCP. For lands permitted to the DOE by the USAF or USFS, such agreements would potentially involve multiple Federal agencies. Any agreement would have to take into account the additional security enforced by that particular SNL/NM facility.

5.6.8 Air Quality

5.6.8.1 Nonradiological Air Quality

Mitigation measures to control the emissions of chemical and criteria pollutants would not be required under the alternatives. The health impacts associated with the atmospheric release of chemicals were evaluated in Sections 5.3.8.1, 5.4.8.1, and 5.5.8.1. No health effects were identified.

5.6.8.2 Radiological Air Quality

Under each alternative, the calculated radiological annual dose due to air emissions from SNL/NM operations to the MEI and total population within 50 mi of SNL/NM would be minimal and not expected to have any adverse impacts. Therefore, no mitigation measures would be required.

5.6.9 Human Health and Worker Safety

5.6.9.1 Normal Operations

Adverse human health effects are not expected under any of the alternatives. Therefore, no mitigation measures would be necessary to protect human health.

5.6.9.2 Accidents

DOE operations at SNL/NM are conducted in strict accordance with DOE orders, laws, and regulatory requirements to minimize the chances of an accidental release of chemical and radiological materials. Measures

can be taken to prevent accidents and, in the event of an accident, to eliminate, lessen, or compensate for potential impacts. For example, engineered safety features and administrative controls are designed to prevent accidents from occurring or stop the progression of the accident. Other measures taken following an accident would minimize impacts to workers, the public, and the environment. For example, air filtration systems, room and building barriers, and air locks that contain releases of hazardous materials, dikes for controlling spills, fire-fighting equipment, evacuating workers and/or the public, restricting the consumption of contaminated food and water, cleaning up contaminated areas, and restricting public access to contaminated areas are existing means to mitigate the adverse effects of accidents. Specific measures for preventing and mitigating accident impacts depend on the accident scenarios, facility locations, and other factors. For this reason, additional existing mitigation measures and their effects are discussed in the context of specific accidents, where applicable, in Appendix F.

Emergency Preparedness and Emergency Plan

SNL/NM has prepared and maintains an Emergency Plan (Sandia 1993zz) in accordance with DOE requirements. The plan uses inputs from the HA process, SARs, site development plans, and other documents to establish the basic requirements for emergency response. The plan establishes an Emergency Response Organization that is responsible for minimizing the effect of an emergency incident on people, property, and the environment. SNL/NM maintains a working relationship with offsite authorities. The goal is to share information that might be needed during an event, establish response interfaces, maintain rapport, and share resources when requested for event mitigation. The city of Albuquerque, county of Bernalillo, state of New Mexico, KAFB, U.S. Department of Agriculture, USFS, and the DOE have established roles and responsibilities for emergency response. These include the notification processes for each of the response groups and mutual aid in the event of an emergency. SNL/NM, upon request from the DOE, would respond with technical support to transportation accidents involving radiological and hazardous materials. No emergency response roles are identified between SNL/NM and tribal organizations.

5.6.10 Transportation

5.6.10.1 Normal Operations

The transportation of many different materials and waste streams from SNL/NM operations and projects results in a continuous need for proper packaging, labeling, and manifesting. General transportation requirements are anticipated to decrease in 2003 and 2008, based on full implementation of waste minimization/pollution prevention projects. To minimize the impact to the environment, SNL/NM, whenever possible, would transport full shipments of waste materials offsite for treatment and disposal within the programmatic goals and schedules. Using the JIT procurement system would minimize the quantities of materials transported (for example, more packages, smaller quantities) by using specific chemical providers, thereby reducing the number of trips.

Special projects such as the ER Project and shipments of legacy wastes would, in the short-term, increase total transportation requirements for radioactive and hazardous waste. Mitigation measures for the different wastes are discussed in Section 5.6.11.

5.6.11 Waste Generation

5.6.11.1 Waste Generation

No impacts from waste generation would be anticipated. Therefore, no specific mitigation measures would be required. However, the generation of the many different waste streams from SNL/NM operations and projects poses a continuous need for the proper packaging, labeling, manifesting, transportation, storage, and ultimate disposal of the waste. General waste trends are anticipated to decrease in quantity for 2003 and 2008 based on full implementation of waste minimization/pollution prevention projects. All waste management is considered to be part of the general infrastructure of SNL/NM and has been identified as such in facility documents.

Radioactive Wastes

As part of the effort to minimize the total quantity of radioactive wastes that are generated at SNL/NM facilities, all wastes originating from a Radioactive Materials Management Area (RMMA) must be identified prior to pick-up and disposal. A RMMA is an area where the reasonable potential exists for contamination due to the presence of unconfined or unencapsulated radioactive material, or an area that is exposed to beams

or other sources of particles (neutron, proton, and so on) capable of causing activation. Managers of all facilities must document the location of any RMMAs. Procedures to minimize the generation of radioactive wastes are developed with the Generator Interface and Pollution Prevention Department, Health Protection Department, and the Radiation Protection Operation Department.

The ER Project has been the largest single contributor of LLW and LLMW. Based on current program objectives, the ER Project will be completed around 2004, depending on funding of cleanup projects and NMED approval. Once sites are cleaned up, significant reductions in total waste volumes generated are anticipated. Procedures for this project are detailed in the EA for the ER Project (DOE 1996c). ER Project waste generation would be minimized through a detailed sampling analysis. Site-specific restoration details would be negotiated and approved by the DOE and the NMED program to determine contamination of waste materials from ER sites.

Hazardous Waste

Under the DOE and the NMED, RCRA hazardous waste would be closely managed with annual audits to determine SNL/NM's level of compliance. RCRA hazardous waste operations at SNL/NM are covered under a SNL/NM permit. The largest single contributor of RCRA hazardous waste would be the ER Project. Based on current program objectives, the ER Project will be completed around 2004, depending on funding of cleanup projects and state of NMED approval. Once sites are cleaned up, significant reductions in the total waste volumes being generated would be anticipated. Procedures for this project are detailed in the EA for the ER Project (DOE 1996c). Site-specific restoration details would be negotiated and approved by the DOE and the NMED. In order to more effectively handle and treat hazardous waste generated by this program a CAMU has been constructed. This will minimize the amount of waste generated and pollution generated through packaging and transportation operations. Waste generation would be minimized through a detailed sampling analysis program to determine contamination of waste materials from ER sites and treatment requirements.

As TSCA hazardous wastes (PCBs and asbestos) are removed from existing facilities, the total volume of this type of waste material would decrease. Proper sampling and management of TSCA wastes would reduce overall quantities generated at SNL/NM.

Biohazardous Medical Waste

The total volume of biohazardous waste would remain a function of the total number of full-time employees and subcontractors located at SNL/NM. Proper management of biohazardous wastes would reduce overall quantities and the combined cost for disposal of this waste to SNL/NM.

Wastewater

Measures are currently being implemented that will reduce the total process water used, this will directly reduce the wastewater being generated. SNL/NM entered into a MOU with KAFB, the DOE, the city of Albuquerque, and the state of New Mexico to reduce its water use by 30 percent by 2004 (SNL/NM 1997a). The MDL accounts for approximately 90 percent of all process wastewater generated by SNL/NM. Recycling efforts would focus on the MDL in order to reduce the amount of process wastewater being generated. If all of the planned water conservation projects are implemented, 63 to 205 M gal of the current 440 M gal of the water used per year at SNL/NM would be saved. Section 5.3.2 discusses wastewater quantities and capacities.

Waste Minimization/Pollution Prevention Program

The Waste Minimization/Pollution Prevention Program is a central element of the SNL/NM Environment Safety and Health management strategy, and day-to-day operations. The program was developed to change the corporate culture, including pollution prevention practices, into everyday activities and tasks. As a result, reducing or eliminating the generation of waste has become an integral part of the philosophy and operations at SNL/NM. SNL/NM developed a formal program plan that provides programmatic guidance, specifying strategies, activities, and methods that are to be employed to reduce the quantity and toxicity of waste and pollutants, to conserve energy and resources, and to encourage the purchase of products with recycled content.

SNL/NM also employs a comprehensive waste minimization program to reduce the quantity of chemical and radioactive wastes generated onsite. The key components of this program are identified in the *SNL/NM Pollution Prevention Plan* (SNL/NM 1997p). These include having senior SNL/NM management committed to the plan, identifying quantitative source reduction and recycling goals, performing Pollution

Prevention Opportunity Assessments, and incorporating pollution prevention designs and training into new facilities or processes.

Another aspect of the SNL/NM environmental management strategy includes the implementation of a comprehensive recycling program to reduce the amount of waste generated onsite. Annual projections for recycled waste are presented in Figures 5.3.10 1, 5.3.10 2, and 5.3.10 3. Actual waste trends are shown for RCRA hazardous, TSCA PCB, and TSCA asbestos wastes in Figures 5.3.10 4, 5.3.10 5, and 5.3.10 6. SNL/NM has identified an overall goal to reduce the generation of radioactive and hazardous wastes onsite by 50 percent from the 1993 level, and to reduce the annual generation of sanitary waste by 33 percent.

5.6.12 Noise and Vibration

No impacts would be anticipated; therefore, no specific mitigation measures would be required. However, the existing Weather Watch Program is used by KAFB meteorologists to help engineers select a time for testing when atmospheric conditions are most favorable for deadening sound. These conditions exist during cloudless days with unstable air as opposed to meteorological conditions that favor noise propagation such as when it is overcast or there is an inversion (DOE 1997e).

5.6.13 Socioeconomics

No mitigation measures would be required.

5.6.14 Environmental Justice

In general, no mitigation measures would be required. If access to traditional cultural sites becomes an issue, the DOE would consult with the respective Native American tribe to develop an agreement and procedure for access to specific sites. Any agreement would have to take into account the additional security enforced by that particular SNL/NM facility.

5.7 UNAVOIDABLE ADVERSE EFFECTS

Under any of the three alternatives, SNL/NM operations would require the use of large quantities of groundwater, approximately 400 to 500 M gal per year. Analysis shows that the regional demands on the Albuquerque-Belen Basin aquifer would continue to exceed recharge. SNL/NM's portion of water use in Albuquerque would be less than 2 percent (400 M gal

per year, compared to 35 B gal per year). Although SNL/NM could use waste avoidance measures and has committed to a 30-percent reduction by 2004, water use would be unavoidable.

Other areas where effects would be small but unavoidable include human health, worker safety, transportation, and waste generation.

During normal operations at SNL/NM, a minimal amount of radioactive material and activation products would be released to the environment. However, any radiation dose received by a member of the public from emissions from SNL/NM would be too small to distinguish from naturally occurring background radiation. During normal operations, even with a strong as-low-as-reasonably-achievable (ALARA) program and engineering and administrative controls, some radiological exposures to workers would be expected.

In addition, because hazardous and toxic chemicals would be routinely handled at SNL/NM facilities, worker exposure to these chemicals would be unavoidable. However, no onsite chemical concentrations would exceed the Occupational Exposure Limit (OEL) guidelines. Analysis has shown that chemical pollutant emissions would be of minimal consequence and would not pose a danger to the public. For details on the human health and worker safety impacts, see Sections 5.3.8.1, 5.4.8.1, and 5.5.8.1, and Appendix E.

Under any alternative, many different materials and waste streams would be transported at SNL/NM, and such transport would have unavoidable adverse consequences. Transporting materials along public routes would impose unavoidable effects on the environment, which include health effects from radioactive materials and truck emissions.

SNL/NM operations would generate a variety of wastes (including radioactive, biohazardous, solid, liquid, gas, and sanitary) as an unavoidable result of normal operations. Although SNL/NM uses pollution prevention and waste avoidance measures, generation of chemical and radioactive wastes would be unavoidable. SNL/NM would continue to further reduce hazards and potential exposures through the continued success of pollution prevention and waste avoidance measures. Details regarding waste generation impacts are presented in Sections 5.3.10, 5.4.10, and 5.5.10 for each alternative. Appendix H contains expanded information on SNL/NM operations regarding waste generation.

5.8 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOCAL SHORT-TERM USES OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE MAINTENANCE AND ENHANCEMENT OF LONG-TERM PRODUCTIVITY

The implementation of any of the alternatives would cause some adverse impacts to the environment and permanently commit some resources to specific SNL/NM activities. The alternatives for SNL/NM would require the short-term use of resources (for example, fuel, electricity, water, material, land, expertise, and labor) to reach the long-term goal of achieving DOE's missions in national security, energy resources, environmental quality, and science and technology.

5.9 IRREVERSIBLE AND IRRETRIEVABLE EFFECTS

Operations at SNL/NM under any of the three alternatives would require an irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources. A commitment of resources is irreversible when its primary or secondary impacts limit the future options for a resource. For example, as a landfill receives waste, the primary impact is a limit on waste capacity. The secondary impact is a limit on future land use options. An irretrievable commitment refers to the use or consumption of a resource that is neither renewable nor recoverable for use by future generations. This section discusses four major resources—water, land, material, and energy—that are committed irreversibly or irretrievably under the three alternatives.

5.9.1 Water

All SNL/NM water needs are met by groundwater. Regional demand on the Albuquerque-Belen Basin aquifer continues to exceed recharge. Therefore, large portions of the water resources that support SNL/NM operations represent expenditure of a nonrenewable resource. The maximum consumption of water under the three alternatives would be 463 M gal per year (No Action Alternative, Section 5.3.2), 495 M gal per year (Expanded Operations Alternative, Section 5.4.2), and 416 M gal per year (Reduced Operations Alternative, Section 5.5.2).

5.9.2 Land

SNL/NM has in the past used onsite landfills for chemical and radioactive waste disposal of SNL/NM-generated wastes. These sites and other ER Project sites are essentially unavailable for use for other purposes due to a variety of factors. These include construction-related criteria involving soil compacting, regulatory restrictions, and compatibility issues related to DOE missions. The total acreage removed from future or unrestricted use is yet-to-be-determined, because some sites (for example, the CWL) would require continued monitoring, limited access, limited use, and potentially require other future corrective actions for an extended period of time.

5.9.3 Material

Resources irreversibly and irretrievably committed during the 10-year period of the SWEIS, associated

with the operation of SNL/NM in support of DOE missions and programs include construction, maintenance, and operational support materials. Consumption of these widely available materials would not be expected to result in critical shortages. Appendix A contains information related to the types and quantities of materials used, stored, and shipped to support SNL/NM operations.

5.9.4 Energy

The irretrievable commitment of resources during construction and operation of the facilities would include nonrenewable fuels to generate heat and power. Energy would be expended in the form of electricity and natural gas. The maximum consumption of electricity, 198,000 MWh per year, would occur under the Expanded Operations Alternative. Corresponding natural gas consumption would be at 475 M ft³ per year (see Section 5.4.2).

CHAPTER 6

Cumulative Effects Analysis

The Council on Environmental Quality regulations implementing the *National Environmental Policy Act* (NEPA) define cumulative effects as “the impact on the environment which results from the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency (Federal or non-Federal) or person undertakes such other actions” (40 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] §1508.7). The regulations further explain that “cumulative effects can result from individually minor but collectively significant actions taking place over a period of time.” The cumulative effects analysis presented in this Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement (SWEIS) is based on the incremental actions in the region and the operations at Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico (SNL/NM), as detailed in Chapter 5.

Based upon examination of the potential environmental effects of direct and indirect actions, coupled with other agency and U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) actions in the region and private actions, the DOE determined the following resource areas were likely to have a potential for cumulative effects and needed to be analyzed in detail: land use, infrastructure, water resources and hydrology, soils, biological and ecological resources, cultural resources, air quality, human health and worker safety, waste generation, transportation, noise and vibration, socioeconomics, and environmental justice. This chapter provides a detailed description of seven additional DOE facilities that are not included in the impact analysis presented in Chapter 5, a brief overview of U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) activities at Kirtland Air Force Base (KAFB), and the cumulative effects on resource areas of the activities at facilities selected for study in this SWEIS.

6.1 METHODS OF ANALYSIS

The DOE assessed cumulative effects by combining the potential effects of the Expanded Operations Alternative with the effects of other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable activities in the regions of influence (ROIs). The Expanded Operations Alternative was chosen to assess and present a bounding scenario of potential cumulative effects. This approach allowed a conservative analysis or a maximum estimation of cumulative

impacts. Differences in impacts from the other alternatives are noted if they would cause any variation in the analysis. The extent of the ROIs varies widely from one resource area to another. The ROIs used in the cumulative effects analysis are the same as the ROIs presented in Chapter 4.

6.2 DOE FACILITIES/DoD ACTIVITIES

This section describes seven additional DOE facilities and their activities and operations. These include the DOE Albuquerque Operations Office (AL), Energy Training Complex (ETC), Transportation Safeguards Division (TSD), Nonproliferation and National Security Institute (NNSI), Ross Aviation, Inc. (Ross), Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute (formerly the Inhalation Toxicology Research Institute), and Federal Manufacturing & Technology/New Mexico (FM&T/NM) (also known as AlliedSignal) (Figure 6.2–1). The operations of these facilities and any contribution to impacts to specific resource areas are summarized in the sections that follow (Sections 6.2.1 through 6.2.7). Table 6.2–1 lists various parameters related to the operation of the additional DOE facilities.

In general, activities at the seven additional DOE facilities are similar to the activities described in Chapters 2 and 3. The potential impacts to resources described in Chapter 5 are largely representative of the type of impacts resulting from these seven DOE facilities. These seven facilities were not included in Chapter 5 because they are not SNL/NM's activities. Routine operations of these facilities involve maintenance support services, ongoing custodial services, security services, and training services. None of these activities pose any major threat or harm to the environment, and the potential for environmental impacts is low. Standard safety procedures, environmental safeguards, and hazardous waste and materials management are conducted at the facilities in accordance with applicable U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), DoD, DOE, and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) requirements. Similarly, Section 6.2.8 describes DoD activities at KAFB, including operations and environmental quality.




Figure 6.2-1. Additional DOE Facilities at KAFB
Other DOE operations, not related to SNL/NM, are located at KAFB.

Source: Original

Table 6.2–1. Summary of Parameters and Activities of Additional DOE Facilities at KAFB

PARAMETER	ALBUQUERQUE OPERATIONS OFFICE	ENERGY TRAINING CENTER	TRANSPORTATION SAFEGUARDS DIVISION	NNSI	ROSS AVIATION	LOVELACE RESPIRATORY RESEARCH INSTITUTE	FM&T/NM
FTEs	840	20	80	130	70	225	282
Utilities	Electric power from PNM; water from city; steam from SNL/NM sources; natural gas provided through KAFB; some diesel fuel storage for emergency generators	Electric power from PNM; water from city	Electric power from KAFB; water from KAFB and city	Electric power from KAFB; water from KAFB and city	Electric power from KAFB; water from KAFB and city	Electric power from KAFB; water from KAFB and city	Electric power from KAFB; water from KAFB and city
Wastes^a	Wastes managed through SNL/NM and KAFB	Wastes managed through KAFB	Wastes managed through SNL/NM and KAFB	Wastes managed through SNL/NM and KAFB	Wastes managed by Ross	Wastes managed through SNL/NM and KAFB	Wastes managed through SNL/NM and KAFB
Special Materials	None	None	Classified materials and explosives	Weapons, ordnance, oil, gasoline, paint, cleaning compounds, insecticides	Jet fuel, batteries, and some handling of radioactive materials	Radioactive materials	Paint, fuel, cleaning compounds, oil, pyrotechnic, and ammunition material

Sources: DOE 1998f, SNL/NM 1997j

FM&T/NM: Federal Manufacturing & Technology/New Mexico

FTE: full-time equivalent

KAFB: Kirtland Air Force Base

LLW: low-level waste

NNSI: Nonproliferation and National Security Institute

PNM: Public Service Company of New Mexico

TA: technical area

TRU: transuranic

^aWaste volumes are accounted for in total volumes by waste category as managed by SNL/NM and KAFB (see balance of operations totals in Tables H.3–2 and H.3–8).

Site-wide municipal solid waste is covered in Table H.3–14. Individual facility waste generation rates by waste category were not reported (DOE 1998f) but are believed to be small due to the nature and scope of operations conducted at these facilities.

6.2.1 Albuquerque Operations Office

The DOE implements many of its mission lines and programs through assignments to field organizations. Since the establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission in 1946, AL's primary assignment has been the field management of the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile. AL performs this mission for Defense Programs (DP) and its customer, the DoD's Strategic Command. Other missions are restoring the environment and ensuring a strong scientific and technology base. AL uses Federal resources to accomplish mission objectives and to oversee the contractors who manage and operate major facilities located throughout the country. These facilities include research and engineering laboratories, nuclear weapons production plants, and environmental management sites.

The site is located on land owned by the Federal government. The main AL site is located on KAFB. Some DOE buildings are on property owned by the DOE, although many are on property owned by the U.S. Air Force (USAF) and permitted to the DOE. Two USAF buildings are also adjacent to DOE buildings. The AL complex occupies approximately 6 ac of DOE-owned land and 6.7 ac of land under a use permit from the USAF. Additionally, DOE owns an 86 ac parcel of vacant land located along the west side of Eubank Boulevard just outside the northern boundary of KAFB (see Section 4.3).

Facilities and Operations

The main AL site includes 40 buildings, of which 30 are bounded by a security fence. Buildings on the main site include five three-story office buildings, several portable trailers used as temporary office space, eight one-story buildings, an interconnect, one maintenance shop, a shipping and receiving building, a wellness center/snack bar, and a child development center. Most activities at AL are administrative in nature. Hazards are typical of an office environment that might result in falls on stairways, minor cuts or abrasions, back strains, and the like.

As of April 1998, approximately 840 personnel were located in this complex. Approximately 100 other DOE employees were located within SNL/NM Technical Area (TA)-I, in the AL Kirtland Area Office (KAO), and in a number of smaller offices associated with activities described below.

6.2.2 Energy Training Center

AL operates the ETC, located approximately 3 mi west of the main AL site previously described. The ETC consists of approximately 10 ac of land permitted to the DOE by the USAF. The facility is an historic complex registered with the New Mexico Historical Society. It was originally constructed in 1936 as the Sandia School, a group of buildings housing an all-girls school. Since that time, it has served during World War II as the location for an Army and USAF convalescent hospital, the first location of the New Mexico Institute of Mining & Technology, the location for some of Sandia Laboratories' first physicists, the offices of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the KAFB West Officers' Club. The facility has recently undergone major interior renovations to support DOE's technical training program functions, while maintaining its historical character.

The ETC has the capacity for multifaceted training and development and for large conferences and meetings. The ETC's operations are funded solely by the DOE; however, the Department shares the facilities with SNL/NM contractors; other Federal, state, and local agencies; and the local community, thereby generating ongoing cost savings for the Federal government, its laboratories, and its customers. The site includes eight buildings, with a gross building area of 53,996 ft², and an adjacent parking lot. The ETC contains 15 training and meeting rooms accommodating up to 700 attendees, an auditorium with a 300-seat capacity, and a computer training room. The ETC also has a customer service complex, offering a variety of support services to accommodate training and meeting needs. Hazards existing at the ETC are those typical of an office building.

6.2.3 Transportation Safeguards Division

Established in 1975, the DOE's TSD provides for safe and secure movement and continual surveillance and accountability of government-owned special nuclear material, nuclear weapons, and weapon components throughout the U.S., by way of DOE-owned and -operated tractor trailers. There are three TSD facilities located in different areas of KAFB: the Albuquerque Courier Section, the Training Center and Annex, and the TSD Administrative Offices and Secure Communications Center (SECOM). These facilities are described below. SNL/NM manages and disposes of all hazardous waste generated by TSD. A description of the transport activity for weapon components and radioactive materials may be found in the *Stockpile Stewardship and*

Management [SSM] Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement [PEIS] (DOE 1996a) and the Final Environmental Impact Statement [EIS] for Continued Operation of the Pantex Plant and Associated Storage of Nuclear Weapons (DOE 1996k).

Albuquerque Courier Section

The TSD Albuquerque Courier Section is located in a fenced area within SNL/NM's TA-I. The facility consists of eight administrative buildings; one vehicle maintenance facility (VMF); a Mobile Electronic Maintenance Facility (MEMF); and a safe, secure transport (SST) parking area in support of TSD's operations. The buildings on the site are prefabricated metal buildings, approximately 30 ft by 60 ft, located on approximately 3 ac of land.

TSD's Albuquerque Courier Section has approximately 80 employees including both Federal and contractor personnel. Activities are mainly administrative in nature, but also include special agent trip preparation and vehicle maintenance. There is an armory located in one of the buildings. Limited amounts of Class 1.3 and 1.4 munitions are stored separately from the firearms for immediate protective force response. The MEMF functions primarily as an electronics equipment testing, maintenance, and repair facility for TSD vehicles. The VMF, which is adjacent to the Albuquerque Courier Section, is operated by SNL/NM to perform routine maintenance on the SSTs and escort vans. Most of TSD's functions are administrative or standard vehicle maintenance, and the associated hazards are typical of those activities.

Training Center and Annex

TSD's Training Center and Annex consist of 11 administrative buildings, 1 armory, 8 storage bunkers, and an SST parking area in support of the TSD's operations. The Training Center and Annex are located in Coyote Canyon on approximately 619 ac of property leased from the USAF. The buildings are prefabricated metal, approximately 30 ft by 60 ft. There is an armory located in one of the buildings. DoD-approved and -licensed bunkers for housing munitions are located across the road from the Annex.

TSD's Training Center and Annex operations are performed by approximately 40 contractor personnel. Activities include administrative functions, special agent classroom training, engagement simulation system equipment storage, and firearm maintenance and storage.

The Training Center and Annex are used for training, development, and logistical support. Similar to TSD's Albuquerque Courier Section, most of the Training Center and Annex activities consist of office and classroom training and the typical hazards are those associated with such activities. As mentioned, munitions are stored onsite, but are not used in this area.

Administrative Office and Secure Communications Center

The administrative offices of TSD are encompassed in the description of the main AL office site. SECOM is also located within this area. There are 15 TSD personnel who operate the equipment that continuously tracks the DOE's SST vehicles over the road, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. SECOM provides management of nuclear material shipments, reliable communications, emergency response, and remote command and control of five relay stations. Backup tracking systems, including a voice system and a digital vehicle monitoring system, are also available for use in case the primary SECOM tracking system should fail. Hazards existing at TSD administrative offices are those typical of an office setting.

6.2.4 Nonproliferation and National Security Institute

In May 1984, the Secretary of Energy authorized the establishment of the Central Training Academy (CTA), which is located on land owned by the USAF and permitted to the DOE. The CTA, now known as the NNSI, is composed of two facilities, the campus and the live-fire range. The campus is located in the foothills and canyons of the Manzanita Mountains on KAFB. The live-fire range is located in Coyote Canyon on 85 ac approximately 6 mi east of the campus. The land and buildings for both facilities are administered by KAFB, and the buildings occupy approximately 41 ac. The live-fire range is on U.S. Forest Service (USFS) land that has been withdrawn to the USAF and subsequently permitted to the DOE. Safety zones associated with the live-fire range also extend into the DOE portion of the Withdrawn Area.

The NNSI provides the effective and efficient training and professional development of safeguards security personnel throughout the DOE who are, or may become, involved in security training and program management for safeguards and security training at all DOE facilities. The NNSI provides training in various security disciplines such as tactical response, supervisor and instructor certification, advanced weaponry, threat

analysis, material control and accountability, and safety officer certification. SNL/NM manages and disposes of small quantities of hazardous waste generated at the live-fire range.

Facilities and Operations

The NNSI campus consists of eight permanent buildings, used under a 15-year permit from the USAF, and several portable buildings. Under the terms of the permit, the USAF is responsible for all subsurface utilities and facilities such as sewer, water, fuel, telephone, and power lines.

There are five firearms ranges, including two pistol ranges, two rifle ranges, and a research and development (R&D) range. There are a number of support facilities for range operations such as a range administration building with a paramedic facility, three range control towers, a small tactical simulator tower, a tactical training facility, an armory, a machine shop, classroom space, a small ammunition bunker, and a structure used for weapons cleaning. Small quantities of chemicals, including paint, adhesives, fertilizer, oil, gasoline, cleaning compounds, and insecticides, are used and stored at these facilities.

Most of the campus activities are those associated with an educational facility or office environment and the typical hazards are those associated with such activities. Live-fire range instruction includes basic firearms instructor training, armorer training, rappelling, tactical movement with firearms, and safety officer range instruction. Activities at the NNSI firing range could involve hazards of types and magnitudes that are not as common. Because training at the live-fire range involves live ammunition, the possibility of a traumatic accident exists. Although these activities present certain risks, existing safety procedures reduce these risks. Overall, the risks are considered low. A paramedic is on duty during all potentially hazardous training courses and has advanced life support and emergency first aid equipment and trauma supplies on hand.

The NNSI has an Interdependent Support Agreement with KAFB to provide fire protection and other support activities. The risk of fire at the campus is consistent with that of any business or educational facility. Most of the buildings within the NNSI campus have fire detection systems in place. The risk of fire in the administrative area of the live-fire range is also low. In the range areas, the most likely fire-related incident is one wherein diversionary devices are used during training. The fire

potential has been recognized, and safe operating procedures require that diversionary devices be used only in designated areas. Organizations using pyrotechnic devices are required to provide their own fire watch and means of extinguishing fires. Very limited amounts of flammable liquids are maintained at the NNSI. Gasoline is stored in one 500-gal aboveground tank or in approved 5-gal safety cans and secured in National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)-approved flammable storage cabinets.

The live-fire range munitions storage area is inside a fenced enclosure east of the administration area. Aboveground storage containers are used for storage of small arms ammunition and diversionary devices. Munitions are stored in accordance with safe operating procedures, the DOE *Explosive Safety Manual* (DOE M 440.1-1), and the DOE *Firearms Safety Technical Standard* (DOE-STD-1091-96), which consider risks, quantities, distances, compatibility, and procedural requirements. Regular inspections are conducted to ensure compliance with storage and transportation requirements.

6.2.5 Ross Aviation, Inc.

Ross is the air transportation support services contractor for TSD. Ross has been involved in both operating and maintaining large transport-category and small multi-engine aircraft in support of DOE operations for over two decades. Ross operates from facilities and land owned by the 377th Air Base Wing, KAFB, and permitted to the DOE. The Ross site is located on KAFB and covers approximately 11.4 ac. Ross's facilities and operations on KAFB are described below. A description of the transportation of weapon components and radioactive materials may be found in the SSM PEIS (DOE 1996a) and the Pantex EIS (DOE 1996k).

Facilities and Operations

The facilities consist of the main 42,412-ft² aircraft hangar, two guard buildings, a portable modular building, a hazardous materials storage area, a parking lot, and a 3,200-ft² maintenance support facility, which houses various workshops. The aircraft that Ross operates in support of the DOE air service contract are government-owned.

Ross transports cargo to and from DOE production plants, national laboratories, test sites, and military facilities and provides special passenger and cargo flights on demand. Ross operates from facilities located on

KAFB land, permitted to the DOE by the USAF, adjacent to the Albuquerque International Sunport. Ross operates and maintains a fleet of seven aircraft that include the deHavilland DHC-6, Beechcraft B-200, Lear 35A, and Douglas DC-9 aircraft. The DHC-6 aircraft are used for research-related activities. The size and mix of the fleet are adjusted in response to DOE mission line requirements. Loading and unloading of radioactive materials at the Albuquerque location are frequently conducted on the south side of the runway at KAFB. On rare occasions, shipments are loaded at the Ross facility.

Ross maintains a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)-approved repair station at this site and is certified to perform maintenance on each of the DOE's aircraft. All maintenance, except DC-9 major maintenance, is performed at Ross's facilities in the city of Albuquerque. The DC-9 major maintenance is performed under contract by Air Canada at their maintenance center located in Montreal, Canada.

There is no permanent or bulk storage of gasoline or jet fuel on the site. Jet fuel is purchased on an as-needed basis from the USAF and is kept in two 5,000-gal-capacity tank trucks until dispensed. In addition, 10,000 gal of jet fuel are kept in mobile fuel trucks. Ross operates and maintains the fuel trucks within the DOT requirements. During routine aircraft maintenance, some spent jet fuel and oil are generated and are recycled by a local contractor. Ross Aviation generates hazardous wastes in quantities less than 1,000 kg per month, and is, therefore, considered a small-quantity generator of hazardous wastes under the *Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)* (42 United States Code [U.S.C.] §6901). Solid waste from the site is transported to the city of Albuquerque landfill by a commercial service provider under contract to the DOE. Cardboard and paper are recycled through the KAFB recycling program.

6.2.6 Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute

The Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute is located on land owned by the Federal government; administered by the U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management (BLM); and withdrawn for use by the USAF at KAFB. AL maintains a permit from the USAF for use of the land, which is renewed every five years. The primary permit includes the main site, a water line from SNL/NM TA-III, an elevated water tank site, and a high-voltage power transmission line. The site covers approximately 144 ac.

The buildings and most major equipment at the Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute are owned by the DOE. The facility was formerly a single-program laboratory under the DOE's Office of Energy Research and was operated for the DOE by the Lovelace Biomedical and Environment Research Institute, Inc. (LBERI), under a cost-reimbursable, no-fee management and operating (M&O) contract between DOE, LBERI, and The Lovelace Institute, LBERI's corporate parent. The M&O contract terminated in September 1996. On October 1, 1996, the DOE leased the buildings and equipment to LBERI for a period of five years, for operation of a private biomedical research institute now known as the Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute. The DOE has continued to fund work by LBERI under a five-year cooperative agreement that began in October 1996. The DOE, as the landlord, continues to be responsible for major maintenance at the facility. LBERI conducts private work at the facility funded through various grants, contracts, and philanthropic contributions. Use of the facility by LBERI must be within the scope of the DOE lease arrangement and the conditions of the USAF permit to DOE.

The initial research program at Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute focused on the human health consequences associated with the inhalation of airborne radioactive fission products. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the research program expanded to include research on the transuranic (TRU) alpha-emitting radionuclides. In the mid-1970s, the research program was broadened further to examine the potential health effects of airborne chemicals released from energy use and energy production sources such as coal combustion and gasification, solar collectors, and light-duty diesel engines. Since 1980, the program focus has shifted to include more basic research, with an emphasis on understanding the fundamental biological response of the respiratory tract to inhaled materials.

Site Description

The Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute complex is located approximately 10 mi south of the city of Albuquerque on KAFB. The main site covers approximately 144 ac, of which approximately 40 ac are developed. In addition to the main site, 9 ac are associated with water pumping, storage, and distribution, and electrical power distribution. The site is on a high, semi-arid alluvial fan, surrounded by KAFB to the north, east, and west, and by the Pueblo of Isleta to the south.

Facilities and Operations

Most of the Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute's research operations and facilities are concentrated within a 20-ac area, with the remaining acreage used for roads, storage, buffer area, environmental monitoring, and utilities. Total building square footage is approximately 290,000 ft². Approximately 50 percent of the space is devoted to bench-scale laboratory operations. Facilities for animal housing occupy about 25 percent of the space. Warehouse storage; engineering and maintenance shops; environment, safety, and health facilities; and waste storage buildings comprise the remainder of the space. The site includes unique facilities for conducting long-term inhalation toxicology studies using laboratory animals under carefully controlled conditions. These facilities are designed with specialized air handling systems, are isolated from other laboratories, and may be used for research on radioactive or potentially carcinogenic materials. The scale of the work is best portrayed by the fact that materials under investigation are used in concentrations to which people are, or may be, typically exposed, and that about half of the work involves materials that are common air pollutants.

There are three main categories of operations at the facility. About 5 to 10 percent of laboratory operations is devoted to work with aerosols. Characterization of aerosols is conducted for purposes such as designing atmospheric pollutant detectors, identifying the effectiveness of respirator filters, and developing effective medication delivery carriers for inhaler devices. Aerosols are prepared for use in animal exposure tests for determination of effects from inhalation of various chemicals and nuclear materials.

Much of the work (approximately 40 percent) includes conducting exposure studies using test aerosols with laboratory animals, primarily rodents. Work is typically conducted with microgram to milligram quantities of materials and is carried out within enclosures for health protection measures and to treat air exhaust. Examples of this type of research include

- determining radiation dose and injury to critical lung cells following exposure to radon, *in vivo* and *in vitro*;
- characterizing xenobiotic-metabolizing enzymes produced from exposure to cigarette smoke in the respiratory tract of rodents;
- determining the relationship between airway dimensions and airflow following exposure to various energy-related aerosols; and

- conducting histopathological examination of lung tissue collected from uranium miners.

An additional 15 to 20 percent may be described as analytical chemistry operations. Work in this category is typically related to characterizing the biochemical mechanisms of respiratory disease. Examples of this type of research include

- testing the metabolic action of benzene and its metabolites in the liver and bone marrow of rodents,
- developing cellular models of radiation-induced carcinogenesis in rodents,
- identifying intrinsic human genes that govern susceptibility to radon-induced cancer, and
- investigating the cellular mechanisms of granulomatous disease from inhaled beryllium.

A wide variety of hazardous chemicals, some of which are carcinogenic, biological agents, and radioactive materials in small quantities, are handled in the facility. Air effluents are treated with various techniques such as high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filtration, activated charcoal filtration, and thermal oxidation. Air effluents are permitted under a Title V operating permit with the Albuquerque/Bernalillo County Air Quality Control District (A/BC AQCD).

Sanitary wastewater is discharged to the KAFB main line and a monitoring station is located upstream of that juncture. The facility is a small-quantity generator under RCRA regulations. Occasional small quantities of low-level waste are shipped to the Nevada Test Site (NTS), and very small amounts of TRU waste are occasionally shipped to SNL/NM. Hazardous and sanitary waste disposal is contracted to a local firm.

6.2.7 Federal Manufacturing & Technology/New Mexico (AlliedSignal)

FM&T/NM (also known as AlliedSignal) is an operating division of AlliedSignal FM&T in Kansas City, Missouri. FM&T/NM is an M&O contractor to the DOE. FM&T/NM operates six facilities, two in the city of Albuquerque and four at various locations on KAFB.

FM&T/NM is primarily tasked with producing or procuring nonnuclear components for the DOE's national security mission at the Kansas City Plant. FM&T/NM is an applied-science and engineering organization engaged in research, analysis, testing, and field operations that principally support the TSD, as well

as the national laboratories, other DOE contractors, the DoD, and other Federal agencies.

FM&T/NM provides a wide range of technical support activities to the DOE and other Federal agencies in multi-disciplined fields. Activities include technical support in electronic and mechanical fabrication; electronic, mechanical, and optical design and development; accelerator design; experimental physics; software development, data gathering, and analysis; computer-based training; security system development and installation; security force training; drafting; videography; calibration; and support to the nation's nuclear SST system. These activities routinely involve field operations within the U.S. and occasionally involve worldwide field operations. FM&T/NM often uses the significant manufacturing capabilities of the Kansas City Plant to provide support to their customers.

Facilities and Operations

FM&T/NM operates facilities at the following sites in Bernalillo county, New Mexico: NC-135 Area, KAFB; Craddock Facility at 2540 Alamo SE; Mobile Electronic Maintenance Facility, Building 854, TSD Albuquerque Courier Section, KAFB; Electronics Site, KAFB; Transportation Safeguards Training Center Annex (2 buildings), KAFB; and Air Park Facility at 2100 Air Park SE.

The main facility is the NC-135 area. This site covers 20.5 ac with 3 concrete flight pads and multiple buildings totaling 56,728 ft². FM&T/NM administrative operations are located here, including engineering functions; various electronic equipment testing, repair, and fabrication areas; a spray paint shop; a small machine shop; and a facility maintenance area.

The Craddock Facility is a leased facility used for machine and metal work. The Air Park Facility is a leased facility used for classroom training. The remaining locations support TSD operations and are described under those operations.

All operations and processes conducted at FM&T/NM are of a type and nature routinely encountered by the public in general industry. Small quantities of chemicals typical of machining and electronics repair are used. FM&T/NM meets the definition of a small-quantity generator or conditionally exempt small-quantity generator.

6.2.8 U.S. Department of Defense Activities

The following section describes DoD activities at KAFB. The description of activities and the analysis of potential environmental impacts is not meant to be exhaustive or be totally inclusive of all DoD activities and operations. KAFB maintains an environmental management division that is independent of the DOE's environmental management division. KAFB is responsible for ensuring USAF compliance with all applicable Federal, state, and local environmental regulations.

Operations

KAFB is an Air Force Materiel Command base sharing installation facilities and infrastructure with over 200 associate organizations, including AL, KAO, and SNL/NM. DoD units on the base serve a variety of operational, research, and development missions, representing all branches of the DoD. The base covers approximately 51,560 ac in Bernalillo county adjacent to the southeast boundary of the city of Albuquerque.

The host organization at KAFB is the 377th Air Base Wing. The mission of the wing is to provide munitions maintenance, readiness, and base operating support to base associate organizations. Base support functions include civil engineering, transportation, medical, financial, and personnel services. The 898th Munitions Squadron, which operates the Kirtland Underground Munitions and Maintenance Storage Complex (KUMMSC), is a significant organization within the 377th Air Base Wing. Their mission is to receive, store, maintain, modify, and ship weapons and components. This function is available to all uniformed services and to the DOE worldwide.

Following are other major DoD associate organizations at KAFB and their missions.

- *Headquarters, USAF Operational Test and Evaluation Center*—Responsible for planning and conducting realistic, objective, and impartial testing and evaluation of USAF weapons systems, in an operational setting, to determine their effectiveness and suitability in meeting the needs of the USAF mission.
- *Field Command, Defense Special Weapons Agency (FCDSWA)*—As the field element of the Defense Nuclear Agency, the FCDSWA's major responsibilities include maintaining the database on all nuclear weapons in the national stockpile and conducting nuclear weapons effects tests using high

explosives, thermal, electromagnetic pulse, and radiation simulation facilities. FCDSWA also operates the Interservice Nuclear Weapons School at KAFB, which provides both classroom instruction and field exercises in handling emergency situations involving nuclear weapons.

- *The Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL)*—Headquartered at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, AFRL (formerly known as the Phillips Laboratory) is responsible for space system, ballistic missile, geophysics, and directed energy system research. AFRL operations at KAFB are as follows:
- *AFRL Directed Energy Directorate*—Demonstrates the technical feasibility of lasers and imaging systems; also involved in the development of high-energy plasmas, microwave technology, electromagnetic pulse hardening, and advanced techniques and computer simulations for weapon effects.
- *AFRL Space Vehicle Directorate*—Develops spacecraft and ballistic missile technologies. The primary focus is on structures, power and thermal management, sensors, electronics, and geophysics.
- *The 58th Special Operations Wing (58th SOW)*—The 58th SOW is one of two flying wings at KAFB and is responsible for training all USAF helicopter and HC-130 Special Operations crews and pararescue specialists, handling over 1,000 students per year.
- *Headquarters, New Mexico Air National Guard*—Provides ready units and personnel as needed to support Federal, state, and community requirements out of a number of locations throughout New Mexico.
- *The 150th Fighter Wing (New Mexico Air National Guard)*—The other flying wing at KAFB, flying F-16 C/D aircraft in support of the Air National Guard's overall mission.
- *The Air Force Safety Center (AFSC)*—AFSC manages the USAF Mishap Prevention Program and the USAF Nuclear Surety Program. The AFSC field operating agency develops regulatory guidance, provides technical assistance in all safety disciplines, and maintains the USAF safety database. AFSC also maintains an Aircraft Crash Investigation site on KAFB.
- *The Air Force Inspection Agency*—Provides objective and independent assessments of USAF leadership and management functions to enhance readiness, discipline, efficiency, and effectiveness.

The Manzano Area is a major facility at KAFB. The Manzano Area was built in 1947 and became functional

in 1950 as a location for storing and maintaining weapons during the Cold War. The Manzano Area consists of four weapons maintenance plants located inside the Manzanita Mountains as well as 122 storage magazines, 81 of which are covered with earth, and 41 are tunneled into the side of the mountain.

In June 1992, the Manzano Area was deactivated. The associated material and function was moved to the KUMMSC and the 898th Munitions Squadron. Currently, the maintenance bays are used primarily for classified research and development activities, and the bunkers are used for storing a variety of materials and administrative records.

The Manzano Area remains a controlled-access facility with a perimeter fence and a cipher-locked gate. Since 1992, SNL/NM has provided security. The perimeter intrusion detection and alarm system was deactivated with the termination of the main mission in 1992, although individual facilities continue to have intrusion alarms.

Environmental Quality

Hazardous Waste

Air Force installations typically generate waste solvents, oils, paints, paint sludges, and some R&D chemical wastes that are regulated as hazardous waste. KAFB's hazardous waste management plan sets local management procedures for managing hazardous waste and preventing pollution. The plan incorporates Federal (including Air Force), state, and local requirements regarding hazardous waste and applies to all host and associate organizations that generate hazardous waste on KAFB.

Solid Waste

KAFB collects all refuse, through a private contractor, from military family housing units and all support and associate-occupied areas of the installation. Collected refuse is then disposed of at a regional landfill off KAFB.

Fuel Storage Tanks

Fuel storage tanks represent a potential threat to the environment. Existing underground storage tanks have a phaseout schedule based on age, and all are scheduled to be upgraded with cathodic protection and spill/overflow control by December 1998.

Aircraft are fueled and defueled using tanker trucks. This also represents a potential for spills and leaks to the

environment. KAFB has an annual throughput of about 15.7 M gal of JP-8 fuel, 257,000 gal of gasoline, and 243,500 gal of low-sulfur diesel fuel. JP-4 fuel is stored in two external roof tanks (one 2-M gal and one 4-M gal) located at the bulk fuel storage area. One 10,000-gal gasoline aboveground tank and two (one 10,000-gal and one 5,000-gal) low-sulfur diesel fuel aboveground tanks are also located at the bulk fuel storage area.

Used oil is periodically collected by a commercial contractor for offsite recycling. Used oil is randomly sampled by KAFB Environmental Management for the presence of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and RCRA constituents.

Environmental Restoration Program

KAFB conducts an environmental restoration program under the Air Force's Installation Restoration Program (IRP). There are currently 70 IRP sites and 12 areas of concern.

Air Emissions Sources and Inventory

Air Force installations typically have numerous sources of air pollutant emissions that are regulated and may require permits for construction and operation. Primary emissions sources are steam and hot water generation plants, paint shops, aircraft and ground vehicles, and processes and test activities. KAFB currently has two air permits in effect. The Title V permit application was submitted in December 1995 and lists over 340 "significant" sources. Approximately 150 of these sources are aerospace ground equipment, largely transportable generators, heaters, and cooling units, that are used intermittently. Another 60 are backup generators used to supply power to buildings during outages.

The SWEIS analysis (see Chapter 5, Air Quality) of chemical air emissions from SNL/NM show no individual or aggregate emissions of concern to human health. Emissions from KAFB are also unlikely to be of concern to human health because, like SNL/NM, hazardous chemical air emissions are below levels requiring monitoring by the *Clean Air Act* (42 U.S.C. §7401) or local air quality regulations. Carbon monoxide emissions from vehicle are the primary air pollutant of concern. Total carbon monoxide from SNL/NM and KAFB show decreasing trends and, combined, are less than 10 percent of the total carbon monoxide emissions in the area.


6.3 OTHER ACTIVITIES IN THE REGION OF INFLUENCE

Numerous other activities exist in the KAFB ROI that are not DOE- or DoD-related. The city of Albuquerque and its suburbs form the state's largest metropolitan area, with a population over 500,000. Over 400 local manufacturers produce a wide range of products, including electronic components, baked goods, computers, construction materials, and heavy trailers. The ROI has numerous existing and planned industrial facilities and residences with permitted air emissions and discharges to surface waters. Permitted sources generally include electric generating stations, computer chip production, construction materials industries, and other manufacturing facilities. The approximate locations of these activities are highlighted in Figure 6.3–1. KAFB has residential and commercial centers onsite as well as to the north, south, west, and northeast. There are many local and regional influences as well as private and public activities (such as USFS, city, and county).

The activities described in the SWEIS are by no means inclusive, but serve to highlight some major influences in the region and to provide perspective on the contribution to the environmental impacts posed by activities at KAFB within the various ROIs. Activities considered in the cumulative effects analysis include city-wide water use, residential land developments, regional transportation activities, energy utilities, and various construction materials industries.

Transportation Corridor Projects

The Southeast Transportation Corridor is part of Bernalillo county's long-range transportation plans. This corridor is planned as part of a loop road system southeast of the Albuquerque International Sunport. The proposed corridor roughly follows the alignment of the Tijeras Arroyo (Figure 6.3–2). In addition, a proposed Gibson Boulevard Corridor would extend the corridor from the Gibson/Interstate I-25 interchange eastward to an intersection with Juan Tabo Boulevard. Gibson Boulevard currently terminates at Louisiana Boulevard. A major infrastructure project funded by the city of Albuquerque, the corridor is planned as the southern segment of a system of roadways that would eventually ring large portions of the metropolitan area. Segments of the corridor may be planned as a limited-access, high-capacity arterial, and other segments may retain their current character as commercial corridors. Gibson Boulevard runs parallel to segments of KAFB's and



Source: Original

Figure 6.3-1. Additional Activities Near KAFB

Numerous other activities exist in the KAFB regions of influence that are not related to the U.S. Department of Energy or the U.S. Department of Defense.




Figure 6.3-2. Near-Future Projects on and near KAFB
There are new and proposed construction projects in the region of influence.

Source: Original

Albuquerque International Sunport's perimeters. The improvements will enhance east-west vehicle circulation and may provide additional buffering to KAFB's northern boundary. The project is likely to occur prior to 2000 and would result in the relocation of some gates and the demolition of some KAFB housing.

Petroleum Products Pipeline

The Navajo Refining Company recently submitted a right-of-way application to the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) for a proposed petroleum product pipeline that would cross KAFB. The proposed pipeline could affect DOE activities on KAFB, such as SNL/NM, the NNSI, and the TSD.

The BLM's Albuquerque Field Office coordinated a review of the right-of-way application for the proposed petroleum products pipeline with local officials from KAFB, the DOE KAO, and the USFS Sandia Ranger District. The DOE determined that the proposed route would impact current DOE research and development test activities that pose national security and personnel safety concerns. Testing by the DOE and its contractors could not be scheduled and coordinated with private interests due to national security issues, and an easement giving access to private interests could not be provided. In addition, the proposed route would pass through existing explosive safety zones and environmental restoration sites.

The proposed petroleum pipeline was also determined to be inconsistent with the intended land use. The withdrawn lands permitted to DOE on KAFB are designated for research and development and testing activities.

6.3.1 Land Development

Numerous existing residential and commercial developments surround KAFB. New projects outside of KAFB are also ongoing. Several proposed developments include Valle del Sol to be located southwest of KAFB, which calls for an extension of University Boulevard. Development would occur on approximately 520 acres. Mesa del Sol is another planned community south of KAFB that encompasses approximately 13,000 acres of undeveloped land. Current development plans estimate a maximum population of 97,500 persons. These developments are discussed further in Section 6.4.1.

6.4 CUMULATIVE EFFECTS BY RESOURCE AREA

This section describes the environmental effects of implementing the Expanded Operations Alternative on selected resource areas when combined with effects resulting from past and present activities at SNL/NM and other identified past, present, and reasonable foreseeable actions taken by public and private entities in the ROI. Activities examined include DOE activities at SNL/NM, DOE activities at the seven additional facilities, KAFB and DoD activities, and local and regional influences. Table 6.4–1 summarizes estimated parameters associated with SNL/NM, DOE, and KAFB activities. These parameters are presented to illustrate a comparison of the contributions of each entity. The parameters presented for SNL/NM represent annual figures under the Expanded Operations Alternative. The parameters presented for the seven other DOE facilities and KAFB represent 1998 data. Parameters for certain waste streams were in some cases not available. Estimates, including results of qualitative analysis, were used as necessary.

6.4.1 Land Use

The presence of a small incremental effect to land use resulting from operations of the DOE, SNL/NM, and KAFB would not significantly contribute to impacts resulting from other past, present, or reasonably foreseeable actions taken by public and private entities in the ROI. The analysis of cumulative land use effects is an examination of the DOE Expanded Operations Alternative at SNL/NM and near-future projects on and near KAFB (Figure 6.3–2). The ROI is defined as land SNL/NM uses in and adjacent to KAFB. This includes lands belonging to the city of Albuquerque, Bernalillo county, state of New Mexico, USFS, and the Pueblo of Isleta. Cumulative land use effects take into consideration the use of open land, adequacy of buffer zones surrounding site activities, and any potential conflicts between existing or projected onsite and offsite programs and operations. The extent of land used by SNL/NM in and adjacent to KAFB is sufficient for current and future requirements. While urban growth and development is expected to continue in specific areas around KAFB, these activities do not hinder, nor are they restrained by, SNL/NM operations.

DOE Operations

In accordance with DOE policy to manage its land and facilities as valuable national resources, a Future Use

Table 6.4–1. Parameters for SNL/NM, DOE, and KAFB Activities

PARAMETERS	UNITS	SNL/NM ^a EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE	SEVEN OTHER DOE FACILITIES	KAFB/DoD
<i>Number of Workers</i>	FTEs	8,417	2,138 ^b	9,863 ^c
<i>Water</i>	gal/yr	495 M	21.3 M ^b	910 M ^d
<i>Wastewater</i>	gal/yr	322 M	2.78 M ^b	335 M ^d
<i>Electric Power</i>	MWh	198,000	12.5 ^b	307,000 ^d
<i>Annual Radiation Population Dose</i>	person-rem	15.8	1.3x10 ^{-4b}	5.0
<i>Discharge to Sanitary Sewer</i>	gal/yr	322 M	2.78 M ^b	335 M ^d
<i>RCRA Hazardous Waste</i>	kg/yr	97,331	Negligible (see note)	43,455 ^e
<i>LLW</i>	m ³ /yr	280	Negligible	100 ^h
<i>LLMW</i>	m ³ /yr	7.31	Negligible	0.5 ⁱ
<i>MTRU Waste</i>	m ³ /yr	0.74	Negligible	1 ^j
<i>Groundwater Withdrawal</i>	M ft ³ /yr	59.3	2.53	85.16
<i>Vehicular Traffic (individual)</i>	Individual trips	29,880	NA	48,290
<i>Solid Waste</i>	m ³ /yr	2,022	Small (see note)	2,900
<i>Recycled Hazardous Waste</i>	kg/yr	NA	NA	53,253
<i>Vehicles (Number of)</i>	vehicles	14,940 ^f	2,000 ^b	24,145 ^d
<i>ER/IRP Sites (Number of)</i>	sites	182	NA	70 ^g
<i>(Proposed NFA)</i>	sites	122	NA	8 ^g
<i>(Approved NFA)</i>	sites	48	NA	28 ^g

Sources: ^aSNL/NM 1998a, ^bDOE 1998a, ^cUNM 1997a, ^dUSAF 1998a, ^eHouston 1998, ^fSNL/NM 1997a, ^gGooch 1998

^hConverted using 0.1 m³/Ci from Ci/yr—LLW.

ⁱConverted using 1,500 lb/m³ from 720 lb/yr—LLMW.

^jConverted using 1,500 lb/m³ from 1,500 lb/m³—MTRU.

Ci: Curie

DoD: U.S. Department of Defense

DOE: U.S. Department of Energy

ft³: cubic feet

FTE: full-time equivalent

gal: gallon

IRP: Installation Restoration Program

KAFB: Kirtland Air Force Base

kg: kilogram

lb: pound

LLMW: low-level mixed waste

LLW: low-level waste

M: million

m³: cubic meter

MTRU: mixed transuranic

MWh: megawatt-hour

NA: not available

NFA: no further action

RCRA: *Resource Conservation and Recovery Act*

SNL/NM: Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico

yr: year

Note: Negligible—Actual quantities are not reported; however, due to nature and scope of operations, waste volumes are assumed to be negligible.

Small—Actual quantities are not reported; however, due to nature and scope of operations, waste volumes are assumed to be small.

Initiative was established in 1994 to define appropriate short- and long-term future uses for DOE land and facilities on KAFB. The initiative emphasizes environmental restoration and site development planning activities. This initiative created the Future Use Logistics and Support Working Group, consisting of

representatives from the DOE and its affiliates, USAF, USFS, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and New Mexico Environment Department (NMED). A citizens advisory board played a key role as a contributor of public input (Keystone 1995, SNL 1997a).

Preliminary recommendations recognized the high probability of continued Federal activity within KAFB for the foreseeable future. Under this continued use scenario, the Federal government would maintain institutional control of the site and restrict access. DP is the landlord for DOE laboratory operations on DOE-owned land and is expected to continue the use of the property in support of its missions. Based on current and expected future use and conditions, interim recommendations by the working group with input from the citizens advisory board have been given to DOE (Keystone 1995, SNL 1997a).

Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico

SNL/NM is the largest of the DOE affiliates on KAFB and represents a major portion of continuing Federal investment. In general, future plans for SNL/NM include improved pedestrian and vehicular circulation and transportation and infrastructure upgrades planned in coordination with the USAF and the city of Albuquerque (SNL 1997c).

The main areas for limited future facility development include the east periphery of TA-I and TA-II. TA-I will have increased redevelopment potential as temporary and substandard structures are removed, such as buildings that have exceeded their useful life and cannot be cost effectively retained in service, or major renovations are achieved. ER sites within TA-II are planned for cleanup or are being proposed to the EPA for no further action (NFA). The success of these efforts will greatly increase the redevelopment potential of this area. TA-IV continues to have development opportunities, but its growth is limited by the Tijeras Arroyo to the east and south and USAF operations to the west. Due to buffer zones required by continuing activities in TA-III and TA-V, development opportunities will remain limited in those areas (SNL 1997c).

A number of near future facilities in SNL/NM's Five-Year Plan, which are in various phases of construction, have been reviewed under NEPA and approved. Most approved projects occur within the TAs in areas that are considered previously disturbed or underdeveloped. Examples include the Process and Environmental Technology Laboratory, Joint Computational Engineering Laboratory, and Advanced Manufacturing Prototyping Facility, all located within TA-I, and the New Gamma Irradiation Facility, located in TA-V (SNL 1997a).

Two additional facilities, the Sandia Visitor Center and Cooperative Monitoring Center, are not within TA boundaries, but are planned on undeveloped land owned

by the DOE adjacent to Eubank Boulevard, in association with the proposed Sandia Science and Technology Park (SNL 1997a). A decision to develop this land will be addressed in future NEPA documentation.

The Sandia Science and Technology Park was initiated by SNL/NM to develop a high-technology campus that would strengthen alliances and advance partnerships with industry. Adjacent to KAFB on both sides of Eubank Boulevard, the planning area encompasses approximately 200 ac, with land ownership divided among the DOE, New Mexico State Land Office, Albuquerque Public Schools, and two private landowners. The project's planning and feasibility group consists of representatives from SNL/NM, the DOE, KAFB, the city of Albuquerque, and the state of New Mexico.

Additional DOE Facilities

In addition to SNL/NM, seven other DOE facilities are located on KAFB, as described in Section 6.2. The majority of these facilities operate on land owned by the USAF and permitted to the DOE; however, AL is partially located on DOE-owned land and the Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute is located on land withdrawn from the BLM by the USAF and permitted to the DOE. None of these operations affect land use based on current and projected operations for the foreseeable future (DOE 1998f).

U.S. Air Force Operations

Major portions of existing land use patterns on KAFB are the result of combining previously separate military installations. The most developed area is in the northwest where a variety of activities take place in association with day-to-day operations. Associated land uses that are likely to continue include airfield and aircraft operations/maintenance, housing units, industrial areas, community commercial and service functions, administration and research areas, training sites, associate-owned land (such as the DOE) and open space (USAF 1998a).

Because of the variety of military activities on KAFB, a major emphasis of continued development by the USAF is to merge related land uses and similar functions. There are a number of sites available for future use that are either vacant or have been previously developed but scheduled for demolition or realignment of function. Future changes to the overall land use pattern on KAFB will be incremental and focus on consolidation (USAF 1998a).

U.S. Forest Service

The USFS has proposed opening portions of the Cibola National Forest currently withdrawn from public use by the USAF and the DOE in the preferred alternative of its *Environmental Analysis Ecosystem Management Plan for National Forest Lands in and Adjacent to the Military Withdrawal* (USFS 1996). The area under consideration consists of approximately 200 ac and 900 ac within the DOE and USAF withdrawals, respectively, and represents 5.3 percent of the total of 20,486 ac withdrawn from public access. The returned land would allow for the establishment and authorized public use of a ridge-top trail system. The DOE and USAF do not oppose the return of this property for recreational purposes and are currently in communication with the USFS. No time frame for completion of this action has yet been established (USFS 1996).

State of New Mexico

One potential impact to land use in the ROI is represented by the proposed Mesa del Sol development initiated by the state of New Mexico. Mesa del Sol is a planned community encompassing approximately 13,000 ac of undeveloped land south of the Albuquerque International Sunport and west of the KAFB boundary. The land is held in trust by the New Mexico State Land Office for the University of New Mexico and New Mexico Public Schools and was annexed by the city of Albuquerque in 1993, increasing the land area of the city by 20 percent. Current development assessments estimate a maximum population of 97,500 persons with 39 neighborhoods in urban and rural villages and in other activity centers (NMSLO 1997). A regional recreation center, consisting of a square-mile area of playing fields and other amenities anchored by an outdoor performing arts amphitheater, is the only project designed to date (USAF 1998a).

Due to USAF and DOE activities in areas adjacent to Mesa del Sol, the New Mexico State Land Office is reserving a 2,700-ac area along the development's eastern border for future planning. This effort is being made to ensure that land uses in that area, historically leased by the DOE as a buffer zone, are compatible for all parties concerned (NMSLO 1997).

Bernalillo County

Valle del Sol is a proposed affordable housing project on approximately 520 ac within the Tijeras Arroyo area of unincorporated Bernalillo county, southwest of KAFB and north of Mesa del Sol. The USAF has joined the city of

Albuquerque in opposing the project, which would require significant site engineering to accommodate residential use. In addition, the development would place homes in an area adversely affected by noise resulting from current airport traffic (NMSLO 1997, USAF 1998a).

The Southeast Transportation Corridor is a proposed transportation link. The corridor would connect Interstates-25 and -40, bypassing the current interchange as shown in Figure 6.3–2. It is anticipated that this project would require an EIS involving several state, Federal, and local agencies.

Pueblo of Isleta

The expanse of land immediately south of KAFB, owned by the Pueblo of Isleta, has historically been and remains open rangeland used for grazing. Over 6,300 ac are currently leased by the DOE as a buffer zone in connection with SNL/NM operations at TA-III. It is likely that the surrounding area will remain open space, as the majority of Pueblo development has occurred and is expected to continue in the vicinity of the Broadway Boulevard/Interstate-25 interchange. Casino gambling and golfing activities have also been established there (NMSLO 1997, USAF 1998a).

City of Albuquerque

As the largest metropolitan entity in the area, the city of Albuquerque is engaged in several projects that could potentially affect land use adjacent to KAFB. Activities associated with the Albuquerque International Sunport and city road networks are most influential.

The city's Aviation Department is considering extending the northwest-southeast runway (Runway 12-30) to improve movement of air freight vehicles. This proposal may result in land use conflicts with existing topography and current KAFB transportation networks in the area. The north-south runway (Runway 17-35) is being studied for closure, which may result in redevelopment of the area for new or extended airport terminal facilities (COA 1997a) or new aircraft/transportation complexes (USAF 1998a).

The city's Public Works Department is currently involved in two transportation projects: the Gibson Boulevard East Corridor Study and the Eubank Boulevard Extension. The former proposes a high-speed, limited-access arterial, approximately 8 mi long, extending from the Gibson Boulevard/Interstate-25 interchange eastward along existing Gibson Boulevard, through a portion of KAFB, along existing Southern Boulevard, and northward to the

Juan Tabo Boulevard/Interstate-40 interchange. The corridor would enter KAFB at Louisiana Boulevard and run east along its northern boundary. The project is intended to enhance the city's east-west traffic and may also provide additional buffering to KAFB. Construction would result in the relocation of several KAFB entry gates and the demolition of some military housing. The USAF supports the project, as long as provisions for gates are maintained, demolished structures are replaced, and the effects of noise and lighting on adjacent military housing areas are mitigated (USAF 1998a).

The city also proposes to widen Eubank Boulevard from four to six lanes along the segment that runs north from the KAFB boundary to Central Avenue. This project is intended to improve general access into the area and would be of particular benefit if the Sandia Science and Technology Park were to go forward, as well as for general urban renewal and economic development planning efforts in the area. Improvements to the Eubank Gate area could also be made, extending Eubank Boulevard on KAFB to Pennsylvania Avenue, thereby improving traffic flow to the southern portion of the installation (SNL 1997a, USAF 1998a).

6.4.2 Infrastructure

This section describes the impacts to infrastructure from DoD activities at KAFB, activities within the Albuquerque area, activities at SNL/NM (as discussed in Chapter 5), additional DOE activities at KAFB, and cumulative impacts on infrastructure. A primary area of concern is regional demands on the Albuquerque-Belen Basin aquifer. With or without conservation measures, demand exceeds aquifer recharge. Therefore, the city of Albuquerque has begun acquiring other water supply sources (see Section 6.4.4).

DoD Activities at KAFB

In general, the projected demands on infrastructure supporting DoD activities at KAFB would likely decrease over the next 10 years (Table 6.4–2). DoD's water consumption would potentially decrease from 910 M gal to an estimated 637 M gal per year. Annual electrical consumption would probably stay at 307,000 MWh. Consumption of natural gas, fuel oil, and propane would remain at recent historic levels. Small fluctuations in utility consumption rates would occur due to annual changes in weather.

The current infrastructure resources are capable of accommodating KAFB demands. No additional

infrastructure facilities would be built to support KAFB. Buildings, services, communications, maintenance programs, roads, material storage, and waste storage activities supporting these facilities would not change substantially from recent historic levels. Specific details on these systems are presented in the *Comprehensive Plan, Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico* (USAF 1998a).

Other Activities in the Albuquerque Area

The demands on water supply and wastewater infrastructure in the city of Albuquerque would likely decrease over the next 10 years through expected conservation efforts. Water consumption would potentially decrease from 35 B gal to 30 B gal per year. Estimated annual electrical consumption would increase to 79 TWh by 2008 (Sullivan 1998), as the city's population increases. Consumption of natural gas, fuel oil, and propane would likely increase as a function of population growth. Small fluctuations in utility consumption rates would occur due to annual changes in weather.

The city of Albuquerque's infrastructure resources are capable of accommodating current demands. The demand on the aquifer, with or without conservation, exceeds aquifer recharge; therefore, the city would need to acquire other water supply sources. Future water supply projects would include use of Rio Grande water and San Juan/Chama water to compensate for the reduced capability of the Albuquerque-Belen Basin aquifer (CABQ n.d.[a][c]). See Section 6.4.4 for additional information regarding the Albuquerque-Belen Basin aquifer.

Additional power production plants would be needed if demand continues to rise at the rate experienced during most of the 1990s. City services, communications, maintenance programs, roads, and waste disposal activities supporting residents would likely continue to increase as population increases.

SNL/NM Activities at KAFB

As discussed in Section 5.4.2, demands on the infrastructure supporting SNL/NM activities would increase over the next 10 years due to the Expanded Operations Alternative requirements (Table 6.4–2). SNL/NM's water consumption at KAFB would likely increase from 440 M gal to 495 M gal per year. Annual electrical consumption would likely increase to 198,000 MWh. Consumption of natural gas, fuel oil, and propane would remain at recent historic levels. Small

Table 6.4–2. Utility Usage and Utility Capacity

UTILITY	BASE YEAR ^a USAGE	PROJECTION	SYSTEM CAPACITY ANNUAL	PROJECTION AS PERCENT OF CAPACITY
DoD ACTIVITIES AT KAFB				
<i>Water</i>	910 M gal	637 M gal	2.0 B gal	32%
<i>Wastewater (Discharge)</i>	355 M gal	214 M gal	850 M gal	25%
<i>Electricity</i>	307,000 MWh	307,000 MWh	1.1 M MWh ^b	28%
ALBUQUERQUE				
<i>Water</i>	35 B gal	30 B gal ^c	72 B gal	42%
<i>Wastewater (Discharge)</i>	21.8 B gal	18.7 B gal ^d	27.7 B gal	68%
<i>Electricity</i>	70 TWh	79 TWh	95 TWh ^d	80%
SNL/NM ACTIVITIES AT KAFB (EXPANDED OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE)				
<i>Water</i>	440 M gal	495 M gal ^d	2.0 B gal	22%
<i>Wastewater (Discharge)</i>	280 M gal	322 M gal ^d	850 M gal	33%
<i>Electricity</i>	197,000 MWh	198,000 MWh	1.1 M MWh ^b	18%
ADDITIONAL DOE ACTIVITIES^e				
<i>Water</i>	21.3 M gal	18.9 M gal	2.0 B gal	Less than 1%
<i>Wastewater (Discharge)</i>	2.78 M gal	2.58 M gal	850 M gal	Less than 1%
<i>Electricity</i>	12.5 MWh	10.7 MWh	1.1 M MWh ^b	Less than 1%

Sources: DOE 1997k, 1998a, 1998c; COA n.d.(a)(b)(c); Sullivan 1998
 B: billion
 DOE/AL: U.S. Department of Energy/Albuquerque Operations Office
 ETC: Energy Training Complex
 FM&T/NM: Federal Manufacturing & Technology/New Mexico
 gal: gallon
 NNSI: Nonproliferation and National Security Institute
 TWh: terawatt-hour
 TSD: Transportation Safeguards Division

M: million
 MWh: megawatt-hour
^aBase year is 1996 or 1997, whichever is the most representative of usage.
^bBased on 125-MW rating
^c2006 projection
^dEstimation by 2008, based on 20 percent capacity currently available.
^eIncludes utility estimations for DOE/AL complex, Ross Aviation, NNSI, TSD, Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute, and FM&T/NM. ETC utilities are supplied through the city of Albuquerque infrastructure and were not included in the table.

fluctuations in utility consumption rates would occur due to annual changes in weather.

The current infrastructure resources are capable of accommodating the facilities' demands. No additional infrastructure facilities would be built to support these facilities. Buildings, services, communications, maintenance programs, roads, material storage, and waste storage activities supporting these facilities would not change substantially from recent historic levels. Specific details on these systems are presented in the *SNL Sites Comprehensive Plan FY 1998-2007* (SNL 1997a).

Additional DOE Activities at KAFB

The demands on the infrastructure supporting the seven additional DOE activities would likely decrease over the next 10 years due to the intended conservation commitments (Table 6.4–2). DOE's water consumption at KAFB would likely decrease from 21.3 M gal to 18.9 M gal per year. Annual electrical consumption would likely decrease to 10.7 MWh. Consumption of natural gas, fuel oil, and propane would remain at recent historic levels. Small fluctuations in utility consumption rates would occur due to annual changes in weather.

The current infrastructure resources are capable of accommodating the facilities' demands. No additional infrastructure facilities would be built to support these facilities. Buildings, services, communications, maintenance programs, roads, material storage, and waste storage activities supporting these facilities would not change substantially from recent historic levels. Specific details on these systems are presented in the *U.S. Department of Energy "Other" DOE Facilities* (DOE 1998f).

Summary of Infrastructure Cumulative Impacts

As shown in Table 6.4–2, current and planned utility usage for water, wastewater, and electricity for KAFB, including SNL/NM, is within the capacities of existing systems. No additional infrastructure facilities would be built to support KAFB. Buildings, services, communications, maintenance programs, roads, material storage, and waste storage activities supporting these facilities would not change substantially from recent historic levels. Specific details on these systems are presented in the *Comprehensive Plan, Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico* (USAF 1998a), and the *SNL Sites Comprehensive Plan FY 1998-2007* (SNL 1997a).

As shown in Table 6.4–2, the expected water use of 1.15 B gal (SNL/NM's [Expanded Operations Alternative] 495 M gal plus DoD's 637 M gal plus DOE's 18.9 M gal) for the entire KAFB represents approximately 3 percent of the expected water use (30 B gal) by the city of Albuquerque. Similarly, by 2008, the 539 M gal projected amount of wastewater at KAFB (includes SNL/NM) would represent 3 percent of the expected wastewater processed (18.7 B gal) by the city of Albuquerque. If water conservation goals are met by SNL/NM and DoD/KAFB, these estimates of water use and wastewater discharge would be expected to decline.

Additionally, the Albuquerque area would consume 79 TWh per year of electricity. The entire KAFB consumption of 505,000 MWh per year by 2008 represents less than 1 percent of the ROI.

Because sufficient capacities exist, actual effect to infrastructure would not contribute significantly to any impacts that result from any other identified past, present, or reasonably foreseeable actions that may be taken by public and private entities in the ROI. Additionally, the city of Albuquerque is the largest user and consumer of infrastructure resources in the ROI.

6.4.3 Soils

There are limited, if any, cumulative impacts related to soils. Areas of soil contamination resulting from SNL/NM

activities are distinct from other onsite entities, such as USAF facilities or IRP sites. No combined effects to human health or the environment would be expected at these areas.

6.4.4 Water Resources and Hydrology

Locations of known or suspected groundwater contamination are presented in Section 4.6. All locations, with the possible exception of Sandia North (beneath TAs-I and -II), are discrete areas of concern with no cumulative effect issues. Definitive attribution of contaminants at Sandia North has not been made. It is unclear whether contamination is a result of one source or many sources, and whether the source is the result of activities by SNL/NM, the USAF, the city of Albuquerque, or another entity. An environmental monitoring program (SNL 1997d) is in place to detect and track any migration of groundwater contamination so it does not become a public health concern.

The USAF operates 14 production wells on KAFB. A presentation of infrastructure capacity is given in Section 6.4.2. These wells supply water to the USAF, SNL/NM, and other DoD, DOE, and associate-occupied facilities at KAFB. These wells draw water from the Santa Fe Group aquifer system in the Albuquerque-Belen Basin aquifer, the same aquifer system that is the exclusive source of potable water for cities and towns north and south of SNL/NM, including Albuquerque and Rio Rancho. As explained in Section 4.6.3, an excess of withdrawal over recharge results in a continuing decline in groundwater levels in this aquifer. In the vicinity of KAFB, the water levels have been declining as much as 3 ft per year over the past 12 years (Section 5.3.4).

The majority of water withdrawn from the aquifer is by the city of Albuquerque, accounting for 78 percent of basin-wide groundwater withdrawals for the years 1985 through 1996 (Table 6.4–3). The total KAFB withdrawal over this period was 3 percent of basin-wide withdrawals. For the year 1996, SNL/NM water use was 58.9 M ft³, 0.88 percent of the basin-wide withdrawal for the year (SNL/NM 1997a). The presence of a small incremental effect to the groundwater resources resulting from SNL/NM, would potentially contribute to impacts resulting from other identified past, present, or reasonably foreseeable actions taken by public and private entities in the ROI.

The impact analysis performed for this SWEIS determined that SNL/NM would account for 11 percent of projected groundwater withdrawal in the immediate vicinity of KAFB over the period 1998 to 2008 (Section 5.3.4.2 and Appendix B.2). The analysis described in Section 5.3.4.2 examines all local groundwater withdrawals, thereby

Table 6.4–3. 1985 through 1996 Groundwater Withdrawal in the Albuquerque-Belen Basin

YEAR	BASIN-WIDE		KAFB
	CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE WELLS (M ft ³)	PRIVATE AND OTHER MUNICIPAL WELLS (M ft ³)	KIRTLAND WITHDRAWAL (INCLUDES SNL/NM) (M ft ³)
1985	4,343	1,172	232.3
1986	4,538	1,186	237.4
1987	4,813	1,170	210.1
1988	4,796	1,222	199
1989	5,513	1,498	258.1
1990	5,095	1,401	208
1991	5,057	1,443	219.7
1992	5,026	1,456	235.7
1993	5,349	1,959	201.2
1994	5,376	1,665	166.7
1995	5,396	1,506	151.7
1996	5,209	1,489	155.5
TOTAL	60,510	17,170	2,475

Sources: USAF 1998b, USGS 1995
ft³: cubic feet
KAFB: Kirtland Air Force Base

M: million
SNL/NM: Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico

accounting for some level of cumulative impacts. It was possible to estimate SNL/NM withdrawal as a percentage of basin-wide withdrawal for each alternative. Assuming a 1.5-percent per year compounded population growth factor (COA n.d.[b]) and a 30-percent city of Albuquerque water conservation goal to be achieved by 2004 (COA n.d.[a]), projected SNL/NM usage would be approximately 1 percent of basin-wide withdrawal (Appendix B.2).

This analysis may underestimate basin-wide usage as private and other municipal users have not necessarily committed to water reduction goals. Likewise, SNL/NM's water conservation commitment of a 30-percent reduction in water use (SNL/NM 1998b) is not included in the calculation of SNL/NM quantities. This analysis would, therefore, tend to overestimate the SNL/NM contribution to basin-wide withdrawal. Nonetheless, the 1998 to 2008 SNL/NM usage would remain about 1 percent of basin-wide withdrawal for any alternative, and absolute water usage for any alternative would not exceed the 1996 base year (58.9 M ft³).

The San Juan/Chama Project (COA n.d.[a]) is scheduled to come on-line in 2004. This project would allow the city of Albuquerque to meet its normal water demands from Rio Grande water. Groundwater withdrawals would be used only to supplement these normal demands. If this project is completed as scheduled, SNL/NM water use, as a percentage of basin-wide groundwater withdrawal, would increase substantially.

Therefore, the small incremental effect to groundwater would not contribute significantly to any impacts resulting from any other identified past, present, or reasonably foreseeable actions that may be taken by public and private entities in the ROI.

Storm water runoff from SNL/NM facilities or ER Project sites and USAF facilities or IRP sites could potentially combine in arroyos during storm events. The presence of contamination in surface soils, on paved surfaces, or from any discharges, could result in cumulative impacts to the surface water resource.

However, analyses of surface water samples, discussed in Section 5.3.4, have repeatedly shown no surface water contamination near the downstream exit point of surface water from KAFB. No activities analyzed under the alternatives in the SWEIS are projected to increase the quantity of contaminants available for transport by surface water.

6.4.5 Biological and Ecological Resources

Because of the restricted access and limited planned development at KAFB, there has been a beneficial impact on biological and ecological resources. The presence of populations of the grama grass cacti on KAFB may, in fact, be due to the restriction on grazing. There is no indication that there has been a decline in wildlife or plant biodiversity as a result of activities conducted by SNL/NM. Potential effects to animals and plants due to soil contaminants have been found to be minimal.

Man-made activities, roads, fences and other infrastructure have fragmented wildlife habitat in portions of KAFB. This disruption in natural habitat patterns will continue because of the presence and activities of the DoD, USFS, DOE, and the surrounding population of the city of Albuquerque. KAFB is adjacent to Federal lands that are managed, in part, for wildlife and forest health. Management activities include wildlife habitat improvement, wildlife management plans, biomonitoring, and prescribed burning to improve forest health and decrease the threat of a wildfire.

Therefore, there is no incremental effect on biological and ecological resources resulting from continuing SNL/NM operations that would contribute significantly to any other identified impacts that result from past, present, or reasonably foreseeable actions that may be taken by public and private entities in the ROI.

6.4.6 Cultural Resources

Actions taken by the DOE, SNL/NM, the USAF, and the USFS in the ROI, such as construction, testing activities, military exercises, infrastructure maintenance, decontamination and decommissioning (D&D), fire suppression, and any other ground-disturbing activities would be accomplished in accordance with Federal laws and regulations. Compliance with these laws and regulations, which involves consultation with the agency cultural resource managers and the New Mexico State

Historic Preservation Officer, would preclude adverse impacts to cultural resources. The DOE has adopted department-wide orders and guidelines (DOE 1988a; DOE 1993d,e,f) that address the management of cultural resources and would remove the potential for appreciable incremental adverse effects resulting from past, present, or reasonably foreseeable future activities under the Expanded Operations Alternative in the ROI.

6.4.7 Air Quality

Nonradiological Air Quality

The analysis of cumulative air quality impacts involves examination of the DOE's proposed action at SNL/NM (defined as the next 10 years of foreseeable activities, 1998 to 2008) and reasonably foreseeable activities within the ROI. The *New Mexico Air Pollution Control Bureau Dispersion Modeling Guidelines* defines the ROI for air quality as the maximum extent of a source's "significant" impact (NMAPCB 1996). The maximum extent of impact of the primary major stationary source at SNL/NM (the steam plant) is approximately 15 mi. A 15-mi radius about the SNL/NM steam plant falls largely within Bernalillo county, with a small portion extending into northern Valencia county to the south.

The air quality cumulative effects address the criteria pollutants: carbon monoxide, lead, particulate matter less than 10 microns in diameter (PM₁₀), sulfur dioxide, ozone, and nitrogen dioxide. The criteria pollutant emissions represent the major sources of pollutants from SNL/NM, as well as from emission sources from within the ROI.

This analysis of air quality cumulative effects from criteria pollutants is very similar to that in Chapter 5, because the ROI in both analyses is the same and there is no reasonable way to completely isolate the contributions of various sources when using monitoring data. The analysis in Chapter 5, however, provides more of a focus on effects from SNL/NM by using the following sources of data:

- modeled concentrations at the National Atomic Museum from SNL/NM 1996 actual emissions, and
- modeled concentrations at the National Atomic Museum from new sources that are planned for SNL/NM in the future.

Background concentrations added to this data set include

- concentrations consisting of carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, and sulfur dioxide from monitoring stations located in the Albuquerque area,

but subject to lesser influences from SNL/NM sources;

- background PM₁₀ concentrations provided in the New Mexico state modeling guideline; and
- criteria pollutant concentrations resulting from operation of the Cobisa Power Station.

The discussion in this chapter provides the best available view of cumulative air quality effects in the vicinity of SNL/NM by selecting the following sources of data:

- the Criteria Pollutant Monitoring Station (CPMS) located in TA-I, for 1996, representing pollutant concentrations from SNL/NM and KAFB sources;
- modeled concentrations of criteria pollutants at the CPMS resulting from additional sources at SNL/NM added between 1996 and 2008; and
- the pollutant concentrations resulting from operation of the Cobisa Power Station.

The discussion in this chapter also provides more information on sources other than SNL/NM.

The Cobisa Power Station, to be located at Rio Bravo and Broadway SW in the southern part of Albuquerque, is expected to be in service by the summer of 2000. The plant will be a single gas-fired turbine peaking unit to be used primarily during peak demand periods with a permitted carbon monoxide emission rate of 23.3 tons per day. In addition to burning natural gas as a fuel, the plant will have the capability to burn No. 2 fuel oil.

Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) incremental concentrations were calculated for Class II areas for each of the two fuels consumed. A Class II area may be considered any area outside of the facility boundary, excluding Class I areas. The No. 2 fuel oil produces the highest incremental concentrations of nitrogen dioxide, sulfur dioxide, and PM₁₀. The incremental concentrations for No. 2 fuel oil for these criteria pollutants were included in Table 6.4–4 as additional background concentrations contributing to cumulative criteria pollutant concentrations.

As for future concentrations of the remaining criteria pollutants, lead and ozone, it is uncertain as to whether or not the concentrations will increase, decrease, or remain the same within the ROI.

Major sources of nitrogen dioxide in the ROI include major energy utilities and construction materials industries. Major sources of PM₁₀ in the ROI include construction materials industries and wood-burning

fireplaces and stoves during the winter months. KAFB is a major source with respect to criteria pollutant emissions. A major source is one that has allowable emissions in excess of 100 tons per year of any regulated pollutant. KAFB's allowable emissions of nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, PM₁₀, and volatile organic compounds are greater than 100 tons per year. The majority of these sources are noncontinuous and spatially distributed over a large area. Many of these are portable generators for servicing and starting aircraft.

No changes in future emissions were reported for the seven other DOE facilities (DOE 1998f). The cumulative effects from their contributions, compared to other sources on KAFB, would remain small considering the nature and scope of operations at these seven facilities.

The total air pollutant concentrations in Table 6.4–4 consist of background criteria pollutant concentrations (which include concentrations generated by KAFB, the DOE, and SNL/NM) in the vicinity of SNL/NM, the additions from the new Cobisa Power Plant scheduled to begin operation in 2000, and the incremental concentrations from modeling new sources added at SNL/NM through 2008. The 1996 criteria pollutant concentrations were assumed to represent an estimate of the background concentrations for the year 2008. The criteria pollutant monitoring station (CPMS) located in TA-I was selected to represent the background criteria pollutant concentrations in the vicinity of SNL/NM. This monitoring station is the closest station to SNL/NM emission sources and is, therefore, representative of the air quality in the vicinity of the maximum effects from the alternatives. The pollutant concentrations measured by the CPMS also include contributions from sources at SNL/NM. All criteria pollutants for each of the respective averaging periods are below the National Ambient Air Quality Standards or New Mexico Ambient Air Quality Standards.

The incremental contribution to carbon monoxide emissions under the Expanded Operations Alternative for SNL/NM commuter traffic is estimated to be 5.1 percent of the carbon monoxide emissions from highway sources within Bernalillo county in 2005. The concurrent contribution to carbon monoxide emissions from KAFB commuter traffic is estimated at 6,128 tons per year, or 8.2 percent of the carbon monoxide emissions from highway sources within Bernalillo county (SNL 1996c). The cumulative contribution of carbon monoxide emissions in 2005 for SNL/NM and KAFB commuter traffic is estimated at 13.3 percent of the total

Table 6.4–4. Cumulative Criteria Pollutant Concentrations from Incremental SNL/NM Stationary Sources, Background Monitoring Data, and Cobisa Power Station with Applicable National and New Mexico Ambient Air Quality Standards

POLLUTANT	AVERAGING TIME	NAAQS (ppm [$\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$])	NMAAQs (ppm [$\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$])	CUMULATIVE CONCENTRATION (ppm [$\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$])	PERCENT OF STANDARD
Carbon Monoxide	1 hour	35[33,305]	13.1[12,466]	8.5[8,130]	65
	8 hours	9[8,564]	8.7[8,279]	2.9[2,787]	34
	Annual	-	-	0.8[743]	NA
Lead	30 Days	-	-	0.0021 ^a	NA
	Quarterly	1.5 ^a	-	0.001 ^{a,b}	0.07
Nitrogen Dioxide	Annual	0.053[83]	0.05[78]	0.014[21.5]	28
	24 hours	-	0.10[156]	0.044[69.2]	44
TSP	Annual	-	60 ^a	15.01 ^a	25
	30 days	-	90 ^a	NA	NA
	7 days	-	110 ^a	NA	NA
	24 hours	-	150 ^a	53.5 ^a	36
PM₁₀	Annual	50 ^a	-	15.01 ^{a,d}	30
	24 hours	150 ^a	-	53.5 ^{a,d}	36
Sulfur Dioxide	Annual	0.03[65]	0.02[44]	0.0005[1.17]	3
	24 hours	0.14[305]	0.10[218]	0.006[13.8]	6
	3 hours	0.50[1,088]	-	0.029[62.1]	6
Ozone	Annual	-	-	0.033[54]	NA
	1 hour	0.12[196]	-	0.103[168] ^c	85.8
Hydrogen Sulfide	1 hour	-	0.01[12]	NA	NA
Total Reduced Sulfur	0.5 hour	-	0.03[33]	NA	NA

Sources: 20 NMAC 2.3, 40 CFR Part 50, SNL/NM 1997c

- indicates no standard for listed averaging time

°R: degree Rankin

CPMS: criteria pollutants monitoring station

ft: feet

kw: kilowatt

NA: not available

NAAQS: National Ambient Air Quality Standards

NMAAQs: New Mexico Ambient Air Quality Standards

PM₁₀: particulate matter less than 10 microns in diameter

ppm: parts per million

TSP: total suspended particulates

 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$: micrograms per cubic meter^a $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ ^bHighest quarterly lead monitoring data measured at the CPMS site in 1996^cHighest one-hour ozone monitoring data measured at the CPMS in 1996^dPM₁₀ is assumed equal to TSPNotes: 1) Some of the pollutants are stated in ppm. These values were converted to $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ with appropriate corrections for temperature (530°R) and pressure (elevation 5,400 ft) following New Mexico Dispersion Modeling Guidelines (NMAPCB 1996).

2) Cumulative concentrations consist of 1996 CPMS concentrations, modeled concentrations from an "insignificant" boiler and emergency generator in Building 701 and a 600-kw-capacity generator in Building 870b, and Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) Class II incremental concentrations from Cobisa Power Station.

carbon monoxide emissions from highway mobile sources within Bernalillo county.

Projections of carbon monoxide emissions from vehicles in Bernalillo county, based on *The Maintenance Plan for*

Carbon Monoxide-Albuquerque/Bernalillo County, New Mexico (A/BC AQCB 1998), show a downward trend from 1996 through the year 2000, with a constant rate through the year 2005. This is a worst-case scenario, assuming that none of the action scenarios to further

reduce carbon monoxide emissions in the county would be performed. The reduction in carbon monoxide emissions during this period reflects better emission controls on future vehicles and maintenance and inspection programs to ensure peak emission control performance.

Radiological Air Quality

Two facilities (not operated by SNL/NM) with potential radiological air emissions were identified. The dose effects from each are combined with the calculated maximum dose under the Expanded Operations Alternative. These facilities are the Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute, located on KAFB east, and KAFB's 377th Air Base Wing IRP sites (RW-10, RW-68).

The Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute evaluated and presented the dose to the maximally exposed individual (MEI), located at a distance of 5.7 mi west-northwest, as a part of the NESHAP compliance for the calendar year 1996 (DOE 1997g). The collective dose to population was not evaluated. To be consistent with the dose evaluations performed for the Expanded Operations Alternative for the SWEIS, the *CAP88-PC* model (DOE 1997e) was used to calculate the dose to the MEI and the total population within 50 mi, assuming Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute's total radiological air emissions centered at TA-V. The calculated MEI dose of 6.1×10^{-6} mrem/yr is lower than the Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute's reported value of 3.7×10^{-5} mrem/yr, due to different meteorological data and receptor location. However, the

collective dose to the population was calculated to evaluate the potential cumulative effects on a consistent basis. Table 6.4–5 presents these doses for cumulative effects. For the year 1994, KAFB evaluated and presented the dose to the MEI at a distance of 2.2 mi in all directions, using EPA's screening computer model *COMPLY*. The reported dose to the MEI was 4.9 mrem/yr (USAF 1995b). Because the dose to the MEI was calculated based on using a screening type of model, it is claimed that the actual dose to the MEI from all sources combined is most likely to be many orders of magnitude smaller than this reported value (USAF 1995b). No collective dose to the population was evaluated for these sites. Therefore, in order to be consistent with the dose evaluations performed for the Expanded Operations Alternative for the SWEIS, the *CAP88-PC* model was used to calculate the dose to the MEI and to the total population within 50 mi, assuming KAFB's IRP total radiological air emissions are centered at TA-V.

The calculated MEI dose of 0.26 mrem/yr is lower than the KAFB-reported value of 4.9 mrem/yr; however, it is considered reasonable, based on the statement that the actual dose value could be many orders of magnitude lower compared to the reported value of 4.9 mrem/yr (USAF 1995b). Table 6.4–5 presents these doses for cumulative effects. The calculated total cumulative dose to the MEI of 0.77 mrem/yr is much lower than the regulatory limit of 10 mrem/yr. Even with the NESHAP reported doses to the MEI for the Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute and KAFB facilities, the total cumulative MEI dose of 5.4 mrem/yr is also lower than the regulatory limit of 10 mrem/yr. These doses are also

Table 6.4–5. Summary of Annual Cumulative Radiological Dose Estimates to the Public from All Sources on KAFB

FACILITY/SOURCE	ANNUAL MEI DOSE (EDE) (mrem)	ANNUAL POPULATION DOSE (person-rem)
<i>SNL/NM Expanded Operations Alternative</i>	0.51	15.8
<i>Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute</i>	6.1×10^{-6} ^a 3.7×10^{-5} ^b	1.3×10^{-4} ^a
<i>Kirtland Air Force Base</i>	0.26 ^a 4.9 ^b	5 ^a
TOTAL FROM ALL SOURCES	0.77 5.4 ^c	20.8 ^d

Sources: DOE 1997g, USAF 1995b

EDE: effective dose equivalent

MEI: maximally exposed individual

mrem: millirem

NESHAP: National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants

^a *CAP88-PC* modeled values (DOE 1997e)

^b Reflects the NESHAP reported values

^c Based on NESHAP reported values

^d Based on *CAP88-PC* modeled values

small compared to an individual background radiation dose of 360 mrem/yr. In summary, a small incremental effect to radiological air quality resulting from DOE, SNL/NM, and KAFB operations would not significantly contribute to impacts resulting from past, present, or reasonably foreseeable future actions taken by public and private entities in the ROI.

6.4.8 Human Health and Worker Safety

SNL/NM’s location, adjacent to the city of Albuquerque and co-located with KAFB, other DOE facilities, and private industry, makes it possible that cumulative environmental effects exist. The potential for SNL/NM to contribute significantly to the cumulative effects from all present, past, and reasonably foreseeable future activities within the ROI was examined qualitatively and quantitatively in the area of human health and worker safety. Specifically, consequence analyses, presented in Chapter 5, identify human health and worker safety effects and were used to select other similar impact sources within the ROI for this cumulative effects assessment.

Occupational

The occupational health and safety of workers at SNL/NM is site-specific and would not be affected by other activities occurring within the ROI. Cumulative effects to workers would be the same as the effects presented in the consequence analyses for worker health and safety in Chapter 5 under each of the operational alternatives.

Air Quality – Criteria Pollutants

Air quality within the ROI is affected by numerous sources. The levels of criteria pollutants—carbon monoxide, lead, PM₁₀, sulfur dioxide, ozone, and nitrogen dioxide—are regulated regionally. SNL/NM’s

contribution and potential for air quality effects to affect the attainment of air quality standards are presented in Section 6.4.6. SNL/NM has a very small contribution to the overall attainment of regulated levels of these criteria pollutants within the ROI. Therefore, SNL/NM would not be a major source for human health effects from criteria air pollutants within the ROI.

Air Quality - Chemicals

Chemical air pollutants released by SNL/NM could have a cumulative effect with releases from other sources within the ROI. However, SNL/NM’s chemical air releases show no potential for adverse health effects and similar analyses are not available for other sources. Therefore, to present an assessment of all potential sources of chemical air pollutants in the SNL/NM vicinity, a health-risk assessment was done using ambient air sampling data collected by chemical air monitoring stations at SNL/NM for volatile organic compounds (VOCs). The chemical air concentrations were assumed to be representative of local air quality, including other sources besides SNL/NM. A possible cumulative health risk was calculated from this information using maximum chemical concentrations (Table 6.4–6). Minimal health effects would be expected from these risk levels.

Air Quality – Radiological

Two facilities, not associated with but in proximity to SNL/NM, have potential radiological air emissions. These facilities are the Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute, located on KAFB east, and the KAFB 377th Air Base Wing IRP sites (RW-10, RW-68). The human health effects associated with maximum emissions from these sources were combined with calculated maximum health impacts from the SNL/NM Expanded Operations Alternative. The radiological doses calculated or reported to the MEI and to the population within 50 mi are discussed in Section 6.4.6.2. Based on the

Table 6.4–6. Cumulative Human Health Impacts Based on 1996 SNL/NM Onsite Ambient Volatile Organic Compound Air Monitoring

VOC CHEMICAL AIR MONITORING DATA	RECEPTOR	TOTAL HAZARD INDEX RME/AEI	TOTAL EXCESS LIFETIME CANCER RISK RME/AEI
<i>Onsite VOC Monitoring Stations (Maximum Concentrations)</i>	Adult	0.04/<0.01	9.36x10 ⁻⁵ /3.79x10 ⁻⁶
	Child	0.07/<0.01	3.42x10 ⁻⁵ /3.28x10 ⁻⁶

Source: SmartRISK 1996
 <: less than
 AEI: Average Exposed Individual

RME: Reasonable Maximum Exposed
 VOC: volatile organic compound

radiological risk estimator of 500 fatal cancers per 1 M person-rem to the public (ICRP 1991), the lifetime risk of fatal cancer from a 1-year dose to the MEI and the number of excess fatal cancers in the population within 50 mi of SNL/NM were calculated and are presented in Table 6.4–7. With regard to cumulative impacts, these results identify no additional fatal cancers in the population and a very low increased lifetime risk of cancer to individuals.

Environmental Restoration

Releases of hazardous and radiological materials from SNL/NM operations into surface soils, surface water, and groundwater have existed from historic operations. No additional releases are anticipated by future routine operations, but should they occur as a result of accidents under any of the alternatives, mitigation of impacts would take place. Cleanup of the historic contamination in these environmental media at SNL/NM is scheduled for completion by 2004 under the ER Project.

The SNL/NM ER Project consists of more than 180 individual ER sites, within approximately 157 solid waste management units. Many of these sites (more than 50), after sampling or further investigation, have been identified as requiring NFA (DOE 1996c). A site would qualify for an NFA status if SNL/NM could demonstrate that the site poses no threat to human health or the environment. The DOE determined that the proposed environmental restoration actions would not significantly affect the quality of the human environment, and a Finding of No Significant Impact was signed on March 25, 1996 (DOE 1996c).

Environmental restoration site-specific risk assessments completed to date by SNL/NM show human health impacts from cleanup of historically contaminated sites would result in less than 10 mrem additional radiation dose per year to the population, a chemical exposures Hazard Index of less than 1, and an excess lifetime cancer risk of less than 10^{-6} . These impacts would only slightly increase if added to SNL/NM health impacts under the Expanded Operations Alternative. The overall health risk remains below levels considered by regulators to be protective of human health.

Other DOE Facilities

Cumulative human health impacts potentially exist from normal operations at the seven additional DOE facilities and other operations within KAFB. For example, the TSD is responsible for the maintenance and operation of weapons transportation equipment. TSD operations use hazardous chemicals and involve both air and ground transportation of hazardous materials. The NNSI, located in Coyote Canyon, has possible environmental soil contamination from deposits of lead at the firing range. Although none of the impacts from these facilities appear to be substantial incremental contributors of human health impacts within the ROI, any increases in future operational levels could increase the potential for cumulative impacts.

When considered in combination with impacts identified for the SNL/NM SWEIS operational alternatives and given the available data, it appears that these potential cumulative effects would relate to very low risk levels. Other nonrelated activities in the ROI may

Table 6.4–7. Summary of Annual Cumulative Health Impacts from all Radiological Emission Sources at KAFB

FACILITY SOURCE	ANNUAL EXCESS RISK OF FATAL CANCER MEI	ANNUAL EXCESS NUMBER OF FATAL CANCERS POPULATION
<i>SNL/NM-Expanded Operations Alternative</i>	2.6×10^{-7}	7.9×10^{-3}
<i>Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute</i>	3.1×10^{-12} ^a 1.9×10^{-11} ^b	6.5×10^{-8} ^a
<i>KAFB</i>	1.3×10^{-7} ^a 2.5×10^{-6} ^b	2.5×10^{-3} ^a
TOTAL FROM ALL SOURCES	3.9×10^{-7} ^a 2.8×10^{-6} ^b	1.04×10^{-2}

Sources: DOE 1997e, g; USAF 1995b

MEI: maximally exposed individual

NESHAP: National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants

^aBased on CAP88-PC modeled values

^bNESHAP-reported values

affect human health. However, they were not presented here because impacts were not similar or additive in nature and are not distinguishable within the ROI.

In summary, the presence of a small incremental effect to human health and worker safety resulting from SNL/NM operations would not significantly contribute to impacts resulting from any other identified past, present, or reasonably foreseeable actions taken by public and private entities in the ROI.

6.4.9 Transportation

Albuquerque's two major interstate highways, Interstate-25 and Interstate-40, handle large volumes of local traffic as well as regional commerce. As the city has grown, the overall impact of SNL/NM activities has decreased as a percentage of vehicle volume. This trend is projected to continue due to population growth and several new planned communities. Major arteries into KAFB are being improved based upon projected community needs and traffic flow patterns. Short-term and construction work will continue to disrupt transportation for a limited time. KAFB gate counts presented in Chapter 5 represent a total of all personnel living or working on KAFB.

Airport ground traffic has grown steadily as the airport has expanded to meet the needs of the region, which overshadows SNL/NM traffic effects. Although air traffic will continue to expand, sufficient capacity exists to meet the projected needs of the combined commercial and military operations.

Currently, the ER Project is in the process of remediating past disposal sites, thus generating a large volume of waste over a relatively short period of time. This has the short-term impact of increasing transportation and waste management requirements to the region. More detailed information is presented in Chapters 4 and 5.

In summary, a small incremental effect to transportation resulting from SNL/NM operations would not significantly contribute to impacts resulting from any other identified past, present, or reasonably foreseeable actions taken by public and private entities in the ROI.

6.4.10 Waste Generation

Multiple users of KAFB have a cumulative impact on the waste generated and transported from various facilities. In general, with the implementation of waste minimization programs, the DOE and DoD programs have, to the extent possible, minimized their impact on

local and regional waste management facilities. Based on the available data, the capacity to handle the anticipated waste streams being generated by all facilities is considered to be sufficient for the foreseeable future. Projected waste generation from the planned research park or the materials center is within the capacities for the local region. The current trend at SNL/NM is to maintain all hazardous materials in quantities sufficient for identifiable programmatic needs. As a result, materials are moved more frequently but in smaller quantities. This reduces the generation of legacy-type wastes and minimizes consequences in the event of an accident. In addition, the potential exists for offsite shipments of solid waste to the local landfill to increase if KAFB closes its onsite landfill.

None of the seven DOE facilities manage hazardous waste under a RCRA hazardous waste permit. While some of the DOE facilities manage other types of wastes, including radioactive; historically, the wastes are generated infrequently and in small quantities. Municipal solid waste is managed through existing infrastructure provided by KAFB, SNL/NM, and the city of Albuquerque. No changes in waste generation rates were estimated for the seven DOE facilities (DOE 1998f).

In summary, a small incremental increase in waste generation resulting from SNL/NM operations would not significantly contribute to impacts resulting from any other identified past, present, or reasonably foreseeable actions taken by public and private entities in the ROI.

6.4.11 Noise and Vibration

While the ROI associated with noise and vibration at SNL/NM includes the Albuquerque basin, the primary area of interest is the area surrounding SNL/NM. Potential sources contributing to noise and vibration include increases in Albuquerque International Sunport air traffic and potential offsite construction activities. Any increase in the number of receptors (people) exposed to noise and vibration could result in increased cumulative effects.

Activities under the Expanded Operations Alternative would result in increased levels of noise/vibration due to increased vehicular traffic, testing activities, and construction. For this alternative, there would be an estimated 10 percent increase in commuter traffic to SNL/NM in 2008. Projections of the number of impulse noise tests for this alternative indicate a threefold increase

in tests over those of the 1996 base year. These test activities would originate from facilities located in TA-III and the Coyote Test Field and would be remote relative to SNL/NM TAs and offsite receptors. Vehicular traffic and testing activities would likely result in a greater frequency of noise and vibration at current levels of intensity, similar to those presently experienced, whereas construction would be expected to increase peak noise levels. Construction activities would add to the ambient background noise levels at SNL/NM.

As is the case for SNL/NM vehicular traffic, increases in regional air and vehicular traffic would result in longer duration peak levels, with these levels remaining within current dB(A) ranges. Air traffic at Albuquerque International Sunport consists of a mix of commercial and military aircraft. Military fighter jets produce the highest single event noise level of any aircraft using the airport. The noise levels generated by the commercial jet aircraft vary significantly for each type of aircraft. The older low-bypass-ratio engines (Stage II) generate significantly higher noise levels than the newer generation high-bypass-ratio engines (Stage III). The average sound exposure level for Stage II aircraft is 10 to 15 dB(A) higher than for Stage III aircraft. It is expected that the older Stage II aircraft will be phased out of the fleet mix by the year 2000 and replaced with Stage III aircraft (KAFB 1998). Military fighter jet use of the Albuquerque International Sunport was assumed to remain similar to that observed during a 1997 noise survey. Therefore, the cumulative ambient background noise level in the vicinity of SNL/NM would be similar to or lower than current levels due to the phaseout of older Stage II aircraft. Construction in general, and at the Mesa del Sol project in particular, would also contribute to ambient background noise levels. The Mesa del Sol project, when completed, would also increase the number of receptors adjacent to SNL/NM, thereby further contributing to cumulative noise and vibration effects.

In summary, noise and vibration would remain within current dB(A) ranges, but increase in duration or frequency. Population increases would result in a greater number of receptors subject to noise and vibration effects. The small incremental effect resulting from SNL/NM operations would not significantly contribute to impacts resulting from any other identified past, present, or reasonably foreseeable actions taken by public and private entities in the ROI.

6.4.12 Socioeconomics

The recent growth in central New Mexico, which has resulted in regional economic and population changes, would be expected to continue as a result of growth in the private sector. Even with a 10 percent increase in SNL/NM expenditures and employment, as analyzed under the Expanded Operations Alternative, growth would not be expected to increase significantly from SNL/NM contributions.

No noticeable impact on existing demographic characteristics is anticipated. Overall expenditures and employment at SNL/NM are expected to expand gradually at a steady rate over the 10-year study period, which would, in turn, tend to maintain demographic characteristics within the ROI.

The steady rate was assumed because, historically, any increases or decreases in operational levels of activities at SNL/NM have been gradual and/or have fluctuated approximately one or two percent per year (SNL/NM 1997a).

According to the University of New Mexico, Bureau of Business and Economic Research, the population of the ROI will increase from 683,676 in 1996 to 856,927 in 2010 (UNM 1997b). Assuming a straight-line increase over time, approximately 12,375 people are added to the ROI each year. By 2008, the population of the ROI will be approximately 832,176.

In 1996, the number of people employed in the ROI was reported as 331,800. This represents 48.5 percent of the entire ROI (331,800/683,676). Assuming the same ratio in 2008, approximately 403,605 people would be employed.

Under the Expanded Operations Alternative, SNL/NM employment would increase by an estimated 765 employees, from 7,652 to 8,417. The 765 additional employees at SNL/NM would induce or indirectly add an estimated 2,646 employees to the ROI by 2008 for a total of 3,411 new jobs.

By 2008, the number of employed in the ROI would increase from 331,800 to 403,605, or 71,805 people. Excluding the SNL/NM direct and indirect contribution to the increase (3,411), the ROI employment increase would be 68,394.

By 2008, SNL/NM would represent 8,417 employees of 403,605 total employees in the ROI. This represents 2 percent of the ROI. The projected increase in jobs associated with SNL/NM (3,411), represents 5 percent of the projected job growth in the ROI.

Table 6.4–8 presents an estimate of the cumulative effects on the ROI economy from a 10-percent increase in operational levels of activity and associated increases in expenditures, income, and employment, both direct and indirect, at SNL/NM. Operational activities associated with selected facilities are included in the totals. If operations at SNL/NM were to increase by 10 percent over current levels, overall economic activity within the ROI would be expected to increase by about 0.8 percent, with slightly smaller increases in income and employment at about 0.7 percent. As presented in Table 6.4–8, a 10-percent increase in operational levels of activity at SNL/NM over the 10-year study would generate a total of \$400 M in additional economic activity (\$42.8 B minus \$42.4 B) (an average increase of \$40 M per year), a total of \$100 M in additional income (an average increase of \$10 M per year), and a total of 2,646 additional jobs (an

average increase of 265 jobs per year) in the ROI. During the 10-year study period, contributory effects from other industrial and economic sectors within the ROI would reduce or mask some of SNL/NM's effects on the ROI economy.

No measurable cumulative effects on existing housing and community services within the ROI are anticipated (Section 4.14.3). Overall expenditures and employment at SNL/NM are expected to expand at a steady rate over the 10-year study period, which would, in turn, tend to maintain housing availability, value, and levels of service.

In summary, a small incremental effect to socioeconomic resulting from SNL/NM operations would not significantly contribute to impacts resulting from any other identified past, present, or reasonably foreseeable actions taken by public and private entities in the ROI.

Table 6.4–8. Impact on Central New Mexico's Economy if SNL/NM Operations Increased by 10 Percent

ECONOMIC MEASURE	FY 1996 ^a			ASSUMING A 10% INCREASE IN OPERATIONS			
	SNL/NM	TOTAL ROI	PERCENT OF ROI	SNL/NM	TOTAL ROI	PERCENT OF ROI	PERCENT CHANGE
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY (\$ BILLIONS)							
<i>Direct Expenditures</i>	1.43			1.57			
<i>Indirect & Induced</i>	<u>2.50</u>	42.4	9.3	<u>2.75</u>	42.80	10.1	0.8
<i>Total Economic Activity</i>	3.93			4.32			
<i>Economic Activity Multiplier: 2.75^b</i>							
INCOME (\$ BILLIONS)							
<i>Net Wages & Salaries</i>	0.48			0.53			
<i>Indirect & Induced</i>	<u>0.58</u>	13.4	8	<u>0.64</u>	13.51	8.7	0.7
<i>Total Income</i>	1.06			1.17			
<i>Income Multiplier: 2.21^b</i>							
EMPLOYMENT (NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES)							
<i>SNL/NM Employment</i>	7,652			8,417			
<i>Indirect & Induced</i>	<u>18,826</u>	331,800	8	<u>20,706</u>	334,446	8.7	0.7
<i>Total Employment</i>	26,478			29,123			
<i>Employment Multiplier: 3.46^b</i>							

Source: DOE 1997j

FY: fiscal year

ROI: region of influence

SNL/NM: Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico

^a Modeled results from SNL/NM 1997g

^b The use of multipliers in calculating economic effects in the ROI is explained in Section 4.14.3.

6.4.13 Environmental Justice

The estimated effects presented in Chapter 6 and in Chapter 5 under the Expanded Operations Alternative would be expected to bound environmental justice impacts. Under the Expanded Operations Alternative, effects were considered on groundwater quality and groundwater quantity (Section 5.4.4), cultural resources (Section 5.4.6), air quality (Section 5.4.7), noise

emissions (Section 5.4.11), transportation (Section 5.4.9), human health during normal operations and facility accidents (Section 5.4.8), and socioeconomics (Section 5.4.12). The cumulative impacts presented would have no known disproportionately high or adverse health or environmental impacts on low-income or minority populations within the ROI.

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CHAPTER 7

Applicable Laws, Regulations, and Other Requirements

Environmental compliance requirements, including statutes, regulations, and orders, which are applicable to the proposed action and alternatives, will be presented in this chapter.

7.1 INTRODUCTION

As part of the *National Environmental Policy Act* (NEPA) process, the Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico (SNL/NM) Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement (SWEIS) should consider, in determining the significance of impacts, if actions described under the SWEIS alternatives threaten to violate any Federal, state, or local law or requirement and must list all required Federal permits, licenses, or other entitlements (40 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] §1508.27(b)(10) and §1502.25, respectively). This chapter summarizes assessment of the major existing environmental requirements, agreements, and permits that relate to continuing operations at SNL/NM.

In addition to this introduction, Chapter 7 is divided into two sections. Section 7.2 describes general environmental laws, regulations, and other requirements under which the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) must proceed in preparing the SWEIS. Section 7.3 describes specific environmental requirements for each resource area.

7.2 GENERAL ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH, SAFETY LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS

7.2.1 Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. §2011)

The *Atomic Energy Act* (AEA) of 1954 makes the Federal government responsible for regulatory control of the production, possession, and use of three types of radioactive material: source, special nuclear, and byproduct. Regulations promulgated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) under the AEA establish standards for the management of these radioactive materials, licensing of nuclear facilities, and protection of the public and property against radiation. The AEA authorizes the DOE to set radiation protection standards for itself and its contractors for DOE nuclear facilities and provides exclusions from

NRC licensing for defense production facilities. The NRC regulates private and commercial nuclear activities, but currently has no regulating authority at most DOE facilities. In December 1996, the DOE announced that it would begin a process of transferring oversight of nuclear safety to the NRC for all DOE nuclear facilities (DOE 1996a). The transfer, which requires legislative action, is to be phased-in over a 10-year period.

The AEA authorizes the DOE to establish standards that protect health and minimize danger to life or property from activities under the DOE's jurisdiction. The mechanisms through which DOE manages its facilities are the promulgation of regulations and the issuance of DOE orders and associated standards and guidance. Requirements for the protection of environment, safety, and health (ES&H) are implemented at DOE sites primarily through contractual mechanisms, which establish the applicable DOE requirements for management and operating contractors.

7.2.2 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as Amended (42 U.S.C. §4321)

NEPA requires Federal agencies to evaluate the environmental impacts of proposed actions on the quality of the human environment and to document this evaluation with a succinct statement. The act also created the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), which oversees the NEPA process. NEPA requires an agency to consider the environmental impacts of an action, prior to taking action that would preclude any reasonable alternative actions. It also provides for public input into the decision-making process.

7.2.3 Regulations for Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act (40 CFR Parts 1500-1508)

The implementing regulations for NEPA were developed by the CEQ. These regulations seek to

integrate the NEPA process into the early planning phase of a project to insure appropriate consideration of NEPA policies and to eliminate delay;

emphasize cooperative consultation among agencies before the environmental document is prepared;

identify at an early stage the significant environmental issues deserving of study and de-emphasize insignificant issues, thus, narrowing the scope of the environmental document;

provide a mechanism for putting appropriate time limits on the environmental documentation process; and

provide for public participation in the NEPA process.

7.2.4 National Environmental Policy Act Implementing Procedures (10 CFR Part 1021)

The DOE established its NEPA implementing procedures to meet the requirements of Section 102(2) of NEPA, CEQ implementing regulations, and Executive Order (EO) 11514, *Protection and Enhancement of Environmental Quality* (35 Federal Register [FR] 4247). The procedures formalize the DOE's policy to follow the letter and spirit of NEPA, comply fully with the CEQ regulations, and apply the NEPA review process early in the planning stages for DOE proposals. The SWEIS is being prepared under 10 CFR §1021.330, programmatic (including site-wide) NEPA documents, requiring preparation of site-wide environmental documentation for certain of its large, multiple-facility sites.

7.2.5 Protection and Enhancement of Environmental Quality (EO 11514)

Under EO 11514, Federal agencies are required to monitor and control their activities continually to protect and enhance the quality of the environment (35 FR 4247). It directs agencies to develop programs and measures to protect and enhance environmental quality and further directs heads of agencies to consult with appropriate Federal, state, and local agencies in carrying out their activities as they affect the quality of the environment. EO 11514 contains requirements to ensure that Federal agencies include the public in the decision-making process. This order was in part responsible for the development of the DOE

implementing procedures for NEPA and DOE Order 451.1A, *National Environmental Policy Act Compliance Program*.

7.2.6 Federal Compliance with Pollution Control Standards (EO 12088)

Under EO 12088, the head of each executive agency is responsible for ensuring that all necessary actions are taken for the prevention, control, and abatement of environmental pollution with respect to Federal facilities and activities under their control (43 FR 47707). Specifically, they must ensure compliance with applicable pollution control standards, including those established by, but not limited to, the *Clean Air Act* (CAA), *Noise Control Act* (NCA), *Clean Water Act* (CWA), *Safe Drinking Water Act* (SDWA), *Toxic Substances Control Act* (TSCA), and *Resource Conservation and Recovery Act* (RCRA).

7.2.7 DOE O 451.1A, National Environmental Policy Act Compliance Program

This order establishes DOE internal program requirements and responsibilities for implementing NEPA, CEQ implementing regulations, and DOE NEPA implementing procedures.

7.2.8 DOE 5400.1, General Environmental Protection Program

This order establishes the environmental protection program requirements, authorities, and responsibilities for DOE operations for ensuring compliance with applicable Federal, state, and local environmental protection laws and regulations, EOs, and internal DOE policies. This order also provides for environmental protection standards, notification and reporting requirements for discharges and unplanned releases, environmental protection and program plans, and environmental monitoring and surveillance requirements. It establishes formal recognition that DOE's environmental management activities are extensively, but not entirely, regulated by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), state, and local environmental agencies, and it provides requirements for satisfying these externally imposed regulations. In addition, it establishes requirements for those environmental protection programs that are not externally regulated.

7.2.9 New Mexico Environmental Oversight and Monitoring Agreement

This agreement, known as the Agreement in Principle, between the DOE and the state of New Mexico, provides for the DOE's technical and financial support of state activities in environmental oversight, monitoring, access, and emergency response. The agreement, which was initially signed in October 1990, covers SNL/NM, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), and the Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute. Under the agreement, the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) is the lead state agency and provides independent environmental monitoring and emergency planning review services related to all DOE activities at these sites in New Mexico. On October 2, 1995, the DOE and NMED extended the Agreement in Principle for an additional five years.

7.3 ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH, AND SAFETY LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS FOR EACH RESOURCE AREA

Because SNL/NM was constructed and began operations in the 1940s, before the advent of current environmental requirements, operational nuclear safety and national security were the dominant factors in the early design and operation of facilities. With the enactment of environmental laws and regulations from the 1960s to the present, resources and philosophies have changed to place greater emphasis on achieving compliance with all applicable environmental requirements. Due to its long history, SNL/NM has had difficulty in achieving compliance with some regulatory requirements and has a legacy from past management practices of environmental cleanup requirements for waste, spills, and releases. All environmental protection, legacy environmental cleanup, and operational compliance activities at SNL/NM are covered by laws, regulations, permits, and DOE orders. Several compliance orders and agreements are also in effect with regulatory agencies to bring SNL/NM into full compliance with some regulatory requirements. In general, the DOE and SNL/NM must now comply with applicable Federal and state requirements to the same extent as any other entity. Noncompliance with these requirements can lead to enforcement actions.

Applicable environmental laws, regulations, and other requirements have been identified for each of the resources evaluated in this SWEIS. These are discussed below by resource.

7.3.1 Land Use and Visual Resources

7.3.1.1 National Forest Management Act of 1976, as Amended (16 U.S.C. §472a)

This act reorganized, expanded, and otherwise amended the *Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974*, which called for the management of renewable resources on national forest lands. The act requires the Secretary of Agriculture to assess forest lands; develop a management program based on multiple-use, sustained-yield principles; and implement a resource management plan for each unit of the national forest system. It is the primary statute governing the administration of national forests.

7.3.1.2 Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (43 U.S.C. §§1701-1784)

This act governs the use of Federal lands that may be overseen by several agencies and establishes procedures for land withdrawals and rights-of-way.

7.3.1.3 Public Land Order 995 (19 FR 5443)

This order revokes previous land withdrawal orders and withdraws from public use, approximately 21,163 acres of the Cibola National Forest for use by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) in connection with Kirtland Air Force Base (KAFB).

7.3.1.4 Public Land Order 4569 (34 FR 1139)

This order withdraws from public use, 4,594 acres of the Cibola National Forest for use by the DOE for research and development.

7.3.1.5 DOE P 430.1, DOE Land Use and Facility Policy

This policy governs DOE's management of its land and facilities as valuable national resources, based on the principles of ecosystem management and sustainable development.

7.3.2 Infrastructure

7.3.2.1 Hazardous Materials (29 CFR Part 1910, Subpart H)

This regulation provides the health and safety requirements for work with and around hazardous materials. This subpart covers work involving compressed gas cylinders, hazardous compounds and elements (such as acetylene, explosive agents, and hydrogen), and mechanical processes involving dip tanks and spray finish units. It includes Subpart 1910.120, *Hazardous Waste Operations*, which is the main health and safety regulation for work in hazardous waste operations.

7.3.2.2 Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response (29 CFR §1910.120)

This regulation specifies requirements for conducting waste operations and response activities. These requirements include both activity and training requirements for personnel.

7.3.2.3 Materials Handling and Storage (29 CFR Part 1910, Subpart N)

This regulation specifies requirements for material handling equipment such as cranes, derricks, helicopters, slings, and powered industrial trucks. This subpart covers the minimum distance a worker must be from a single rim and multi-piece rim wheel while servicing the tire and the maintenance and use of forklifts, cranes, and derricks.

7.3.2.4 Toxic and Hazardous Substances (29 CFR Part 1910, Subpart Z)

This regulation provides requirements for performing air monitoring and medical monitoring for a variety of hazardous chemicals and materials such as asbestos, methyl chloromethyl ether, vinyl chloride, benzene, bloodborne pathogens, and cotton dust. It also establishes acceptable levels for toxic and hazardous substances in the blood of workers, as well as proper collection and measuring techniques.

7.3.2.5 DOE 5480.1B, Environmental, Safety, and Health Program for Department of Energy Operations

This order applies to ES&H programs at all government-owned, contractor-operated facilities including the occupational safety and health programs for DOE

contractor employees at facilities where the contracts include the occupational safety and health contract clause specified in 48 CFR, *Federal Acquisition Regulations*. This order also applies to environmental protection programs and programs for protection against accidental loss or damage to property as provided by law or contract and as implemented by the appropriate contracting officer.

7.3.2.6 DOE 5480.4, Environmental Protection, Safety and Health Protection Standards

This order specifies the requirements for the application of mandatory ES&H standards applicable to all DOE and DOE contractor operations, provides a listing of reference ES&H standards, identifies the sources of the mandatory and reference ES&H standards, and specifies several mandatory and reference standards applicable to nuclear criticality protection for all DOE nuclear facilities. It also mandates that hazardous waste regulations set forth in 40 CFR Parts 260-265 be followed as a matter of policy.

7.3.2.7 DOE 5480.5, Safety of Nuclear Facilities

This order establishes nuclear facility safety program requirements. It requires that ES&H programs include administrative and procedural controls that delineate

clear lines of responsibility and methods for operation under normal and emergency conditions;

a system of configuration control that requires independent safety review and approval of all changes to components, equipment, procedures, and systems required for the facility's safety;

criticality safety program requirements for fissile material storage and handling facilities/operations;

decontamination and decommissioning requirements of DOE facilities; and

emergency plans to handle potential accidents.

7.3.3 Geology and Soils

Regulatory environmental protection statutes governing geology and soils are addressed under other resource areas in this chapter. They include the *Resource Conservation and Recovery Act* (RCRA) (42 U.S.C. §6901), the *Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act* (CERCLA) (42 U.S.C. §6902), and the 1986 amendment to the CERCLA, the *Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act* (SARA) (42 U.S.C. §6902, as amended).

7.3.4 Water Resources and Hydrology

7.3.4.1 Clean Water Act of 1948, as Amended (33 U.S.C. §1251)

The goals of the CWA are to restore and maintain waters of the U.S. in order to protect human health and safety and to provide for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife. The act authorizes regulations that establish limitations and permitting requirements for hazardous substances being discharged from point sources, dredge or fill operations at wetlands and other waters of the U.S., stormwater discharges from industrial runoff, and oil discharges. Key elements of the act include nationally applicable, technology-based effluent limitations set by the EPA for specific industry categories, and water quality standards set by states.

The EPA is the regulating authority for point source and stormwater discharge permits in New Mexico. Permits are issued and enforced by the EPA Region 6 in Dallas, Texas. New Mexico does not have a state point source discharge permit program. However, the NMED performs some compliance evaluation inspections and monitoring for the EPA through a water quality grant issued under Section 106 of the CWA. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers administers the dredge or fill material permit program (Section 404) of the act.

The CWA contains provisions for the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), a permitting program for the discharge of pollutants from any point source into waters of the U.S. Individual NPDES permits set parameters and maximum contaminant levels for specified pollutants at specific outfall sites. EPA Region 6 issued SNL/NM NPDES Storm Water Multi-Sector General Permit Number NMR05A181 on August 25, 1997.

To comply with the CWA, the city of Albuquerque issues wastewater permits under the *City of Albuquerque Sewer Use and Wastewater Control Ordinance* (Ordinance 21-1985). Under this ordinance, SNL/NM is subject to limitations on volumes and constituent concentrations for wastewater discharged to the sanitary sewer.

7.3.4.2 Safe Drinking Water Act of 1944, as Amended (42 U.S.C. §300f)

The SDWA sets national standards for contaminant levels in public drinking water systems, regulates the use of underground injection wells, and prescribes standards for groundwater aquifers that are a sole source of drinking water. Primary enforcement responsibility for

the act is by the states. The EPA has given the NMED authority to administer and enforce Federal drinking water regulations and standards in New Mexico. The act authorizes regulations that establish national drinking water standards for contaminants in public drinking water systems. The EPA maintains oversight responsibilities over the states, sets new contaminant standards as appropriate, and maintains separate enforcement responsibility for the Underground Injection Control Program.

The SDWA applies to Federal facilities that own or operate a public water system. A public water system is defined as a system for the provision of piped water for human consumption that has at least 15 service connections or regularly serves at least 25 individuals. KAFB provides drinking water to SNL/NM and other associate occupants of the base. KAFB is required to monitor drinking water quality for organic and inorganic compounds, radionuclides, metals, turbidity, and total coliforms.

7.3.4.3 National Drinking Water Regulations (40 CFR Parts 141-143)

These regulations establish primary (40 CFR Part 141) and secondary (40 CFR Part 143) drinking water standards; 40 CFR Part 141 also establishes regulations applicable to public water systems. Although the primary standards are Federally enforceable (40 CFR Part 142), the secondary standards are intended as guidelines for the states. The primary and secondary standards have been adopted by New Mexico. Along with inorganic and organic constituents, the primary standards also establish limits for radioactive releases to drinking water. The annual dose to the general public from radioactive releases to drinking water is limited to 4 mrem. The DOE also establishes this same level in DOE 5400.5, *Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment*. The secondary standards relate to contaminants in drinking water that primarily affect aesthetic qualities related to public acceptance of drinking water.

7.3.4.4 Spill Control and Countermeasures Plan (40 CFR Part 112)

SNL/NM has a spill control and countermeasures plan, as required by 40 CFR Part 112. The 1990 *Oil Pollution Act* rewrote sections of the CWA. This plan requires that secondary containment be provided for all above-ground storage tanks. The plan also provides for spill control at oil storage sites at SNL/NM. This plan meets requirements of both EPA and NMED for control of spills to surface areas and below the ground surface.

7.3.4.5 Standards for Use or Disposal of Sewage Sludge (40 CFR Part 503)

The purpose of these standards is to establish numerical, management, and operational standards for the beneficial use or disposal of sewage sludge through land application or surface disposal. Under these regulations, SNL/NM is required to collect representative samples of sewage sludge to demonstrate that it is not a hazardous waste and that it meets the minimum Federal standards for pollutant concentrations.

7.3.4.6 DOE 5400.1, General Environmental Protection Program

This order requires SNL/NM to prepare a groundwater protection management program plan (GWPMPP) and to implement the program outlined by that plan. GWPMPP also fulfills the requirements of Chapter IV, Section 9, of the order, which requires development of a groundwater monitoring plan. The groundwater monitoring plan identifies all DOE requirements and regulations applicable to groundwater protection and includes strategies for sampling, analysis, and data management.

Chapter IV, Section 9c, of DOE 5400.1 requires that groundwater monitoring be determined by site-specific characteristics and, where appropriate, that groundwater monitoring programs be designed and implemented in accordance with RCRA regulations 40 CFR Part 264, Subpart F, or 40 CFR Part 265, Subpart F. These regulations also require that monitoring for radionuclides be in accordance with DOE 5400.5, *Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment*.

7.3.4.7 New Mexico Standard for Interstate and Intrastate Streams (20 NMAC 6.1)

This regulation includes a set of general standards applicable to all surface water in the state (including ephemeral streams) and additional or more stringent standards for designated bodies of water. The general standards include criteria for stream bottom deposits; floating solids, oil, and grease; color; odor and taste of fish; plant nutrients; toxic substances; radioactivity; pathogens; temperature; turbidity; salinity; and dissolved gases. Water flowing in arroyos within KAFB is subject to these quality standards.

7.3.5 Biological and Ecological Resources

7.3.5.1 Endangered Species Act of 1973, as Amended (16 U.S.C. §1531)

The *Endangered Species Act* requires that Federal agencies ensure that any actions authorized, funded, or carried out by the agency are not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any threatened or endangered species or destroy or adversely modify critical habitat. The act is jointly administered by the U.S. Department of Commerce, National Marine Fisheries Service, and the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI)/U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS). Under the act, agencies undergo a process of informal and formal consultation, which may include preparation of a biological assessment, to determine if a threatened or endangered species would be affected by planned agency activities.

The DOE has consulted with the USFWS, U.S. Forest Service (USFS), Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), New Mexico Game and Fish Department (NMGFD), and New Mexico Forestry and Resources Conservation Division (Energy, Minerals, and Natural Resources Department) regarding concerns each agency may have about the impact of SNL/NM activities on protected animal and plant species.

7.3.5.2 Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918, as Amended (16 U.S.C. §703)

This act protects migratory birds by making it unlawful to pursue, take, attempt to take, capture, possess, or kill any migratory bird, or any part, nest, or egg of any such bird, unless and except as permitted by regulation. The act is intended to protect birds that have common migratory patterns within the U.S., Canada, Mexico, Japan, and Russia.

7.3.5.3 Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act of 1940 (16 U.S.C. §668)

This act makes it unlawful to capture, kill, destroy, molest, or disturb bald (American) and golden eagles, their nests, or their eggs anywhere in the U.S. A permit must be obtained from the DOI to relocate a nest that interferes with resource development or recovery operations.

**7.3.5.4 National Forest Management Act of 1976
(16 U.S.C. §§1600-1614)**

This act requires the Secretary of Agriculture to assess forest lands; develop a management program based on multiple-use, sustained-yield principles; and implement a resource management plan for each unit of the national forest system. Resource management plans must be in accordance with NEPA.

**7.3.5.5 Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1934
(16 U.S.C. §661, *et seq.*)**

This act requires Federal agencies involved in actions that result in structural modification or control of any natural stream or body of water for any purpose to take action to protect the fish and wildlife resources that may be affected by the action.

**7.3.5.6 Section 404 of the Clean Water Act of 1948
(33 U.S.C. §1344)**

Section 404 of the CWA requires permits to authorize the discharge of dredged or fill material into navigable waters or wetlands and to authorize certain structures or work in or affecting navigable waters. Authority to issue permits resides with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Individual permits issued by the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers under Section 404 are reviewed at the Federal level by EPA. At the state level, the Surface Water Quality Bureau of the NMED provides Section 401 certification for Section 404 permits.

**7.3.5.7 Protection of Wetlands (EO 11988) and
Floodplain Management (EO 11990)**

EO 11990 requires government agencies to avoid short- and long-term adverse impacts to wetlands whenever a practicable alternative exists (42 FR 26961). EO 11988 directs Federal agencies to establish procedures to ensure that the potential effects of flood hazards and floodplain management are considered for any action undertaken (42 FR 26951). Impacts to floodplains are to be avoided to the extent practicable. The DOE issued regulations (10 CFR Part 1022) that establish procedures for compliance with these EOs. No floodplain/wetlands impacts were identified for the SWEIS for which a floodplain/wetlands assessment is required.

**7.3.5.8 New Mexico Endangered Plant Species Act
(NMSA 75-6)**

This act protects endangered plant species within New Mexico. An endangered plant species is defined as any

plant whose prospects of survival within the state of New Mexico are in jeopardy or are likely to become jeopardized in the foreseeable future. Species of plants determined to be endangered may not be taken, possessed, transported, exported from the state, processed, or sold.

**7.3.5.9 New Mexico Wildlife Conservation Act
(NMSA 17-2, Part 3)**

This act establishes requirements for protecting wildlife, primarily related to taking for sport purposes, and permits for collecting and use. The act also protects endangered and threatened animals listed by the state of New Mexico.

**7.3.5.10 New Mexico Raptor Protection Act
(NMSA 17-2-14)**

This act makes it unlawful to take, attempt to take, possess, trap or ensnare or injure, maim, or destroy any of the species of hawks, owls, and vultures.

**7.3.5.11 New Mexico Wetlands Regulations
(NMSA 75-8-2)**

New Mexico has promulgated regulations for the protection of wetlands. New Mexico's definition of wetlands is identical to the Federal definition, except that constructed wetlands are not included. The DOE follows these regulations in evaluating proposed actions for wetlands impacts.

7.3.6 Cultural Resources**7.3.6.1 National Historic Preservation Act of 1966,
as Amended (16 U.S.C. §470)**

This act directs that sites with significant national historic value be placed on the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP). Government agencies must locate and inventory historic properties and cultural resources under their jurisdiction prior to taking an action that might harm them, with the intent of minimizing such harm through appropriate mitigation actions. As required by Section 106 of the act, proposed SNL/NM activities are evaluated in consultation with the State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO) for possible effects on cultural resources. Most surveys are conducted on DOE property; however, when appropriate, surveys are conducted on land owned by other Federal agencies. The DOE holds discussions, as appropriate, with various Native American tribes to

determine how new SNL/NM activities might affect cultural resources. The tribes are also requested to provide input on what mitigation measures they want implemented before SNL/NM begins an activity. The DOE must also obtain comments from the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation prior to taking a proposed action at SNL/NM.

7.3.6.2 The American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978 (42 U.S.C. §1996)

This act establishes that it is the policy of the United States to protect and preserve for Native Americans their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise their traditional religions. This includes access to sites, uses and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonies and traditional rites. In accordance with the *American Indian Religious Freedom Act*, SNL/NM activities are planned so that they do not adversely affect the practice of traditional religions. Tribal groups are notified of projected construction activities and are asked to inform the DOE if any activity will affect a traditional cultural property.

7.3.6.3 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1992 (42 U.S.C. §2000bb)

This act states that the Federal government will not, through its actions, substantially burden a person's free exercise of religion. If a government action will burden the exercise of religion, the agency involved must demonstrate that the action is in the furtherance of a compelling government interest and that the action is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling interest.

7.3.6.4 The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990 (25 U.S.C. §3001)

This act states that tribal descendants shall own Native American human remains and cultural items discovered on Federal lands after November 16, 1990. When items are discovered during an activity on Federal lands, the activity is to cease and the appropriate tribal government is to be notified. Work on the activity can resume 30 days after the receipt of certification that notice has been received by the tribal government. A consultation process is used to determine which tribe(s) is affiliated with the items, and disposition and treatment of the items is accomplished in accordance with the wishes of the affiliated tribe.

7.3.6.5 Archaeological Resource Protection Act of 1979, as Amended (16 U.S.C. §470aa)

This act requires the preservation and management of archaeological resources on lands administered by Federal agencies. SNL/NM maintains a cultural resources management database, and this information continues to be used in planning remediation and other construction activities to prevent damage to or destruction of archaeological resources at SNL/NM. Archaeological survey reports are prepared for the DOE by cultural resource specialists and are submitted to the SHPO for review and concurrence.

7.3.6.6 Protection of Historic and Cultural Properties (36 CFR Part 800)

This regulation defines the process used by Federal agencies to meet their responsibilities under Section 106 of the *National Historic Preservation Act*. Section 106 of the act requires Federal agencies to take into account the effects of the agency's activities on properties included in or eligible for the NRHP and, prior to approval of an undertaking, to afford the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation a reasonable opportunity to comment on the activity. The overall goal is to accommodate historic preservation concerns during Federal undertakings.

7.3.6.7 National Historic Preservation (EO 11593)

This EO requires Federal agencies, including the DOE, to locate, inventory, and nominate properties under their jurisdiction or control to the NRHP if those properties qualify (36 FR 8921). The DOE is required to provide the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation the opportunity to comment on possible impacts of a proposed activity on any potentially eligible or listed resources.

7.3.6.8 Indian Sacred Sites (EO 13007)

This EO requires that each executive branch agency with statutory or administrative responsibility for the management of Federal lands shall, to the extent practicable, permitted by law, and not clearly inconsistent with essential agency functions, accommodate access to and ceremonial use of sacred sites by Native American religious practitioners and avoid adversely affecting the physical integrity of such sacred sites (61 FR 26771).

7.3.7 Air Quality

7.3.7.1 Clean Air Act of 1955, as Amended (42 U.S.C. §7401)

The CAA establishes air quality standards to protect public health and the environment from the harmful effects of air pollution. The act requires establishment of national standards of performance for new stationary sources of atmospheric pollutants, emissions limitations for any new or modified structure that emits or may emit an air pollutant, and standards for emission of hazardous air pollutants. In addition, the CAA requires that specific emission increases be evaluated to prevent a significant deterioration in air quality.

The *Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990*, signed into law on November 15, 1990, enhanced and expanded existing authorities and created new programs in the areas of permitting, enforcement, and operations in nonattainment areas (areas not meeting air quality standards), control of acid rain, regulation of air toxins, mobile sources, and protection of the ozone layer. Section 118 of the act and EO 12088, *Federal Compliance With Pollution Control Standards* (43 FR 47707), require that each Federal agency, such as the DOE, with jurisdiction over any property or facility that might result in the discharge of air pollutants, comply with all Federal, state, interstate, and local requirements with regard to the control and abatement of air pollution to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity.

The EPA is the regulating authority for the CAA. However, the EPA has granted authority to the state of New Mexico for regulating air quality under an approved state implementation plan (SIP). The EPA has not yet delegated to the state the authority for implementing the regulations promulgated for stratospheric ozone protection and the accidental release provisions of the act. The EPA also continues to regulate the radionuclide National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) and radon emissions. In New Mexico, all of the CAA regulations, with these exceptions, have been adopted by the state as part of the SIP and are regulated under the *New Mexico Air Quality Control Act* (New Mexico Statutes Annotated [NMSA] 74-2).

On July 18, 1997, EPA adopted a new National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) for particulate matter with a diameter less than or equal to 2.5 micrometers (PM_{2.5}) and reference methods for determining

attainment with the standard. On June 5, 1998, SNL/NM became subject to a new 8-hour, 0.08-ppm ozone standard, replacing the previous 1-hour, 0.12-ppm ozone standard (63 FR 31066). Both standards will be incorporated into the SIP for New Mexico and be applicable to SNL/NM. Determination of attainment of both standards is based on a reference method using 3-year averaging.

In addition to the existing Federal programs, the *Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990* mandates new programs that may affect future SNL/NM programs. These programs require technology for controlling hazardous air pollutants and replacing chlorofluorocarbons. Regulations are still being developed to implement these aspects of the act.

7.3.7.2 Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation Plans, New Mexico (40 CFR Part 52)

This regulation provides for a revision to the New Mexico SIP. It provides changes to the plan to clarify that any monitoring approved for the source (and included in the Federally enforceable operating permit) may form the basis of the compliance certification, and any credible evidence may be used for purposes of enforcement in Federal court.

7.3.7.3 Protection of Environment: National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (40 CFR Part 61)

This regulation limits the radiation dose to the public from airborne radionuclide emissions from DOE facilities to 10 mrem/yr effective dose equivalent (EDE) (40 CFR §61.92). The standards also prescribe emission monitoring and test procedures for determining compliance with the 10 mrem/yr standard and reporting and permit provisions.

7.3.7.4 Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs (40 CFR Part 68)

The intent of this regulation is to prevent accidental releases to the air and mitigate the consequences of such releases by focusing prevention measures on chemicals that pose the greatest risk to the public and the environment. This regulation requires the preparation of risk management plans for listed regulated chemicals at SNL/NM by June 1999 and within 3 years after listing any new regulated chemical.

**7.3.7.5 Protection of Stratospheric Ozone
(40 CFR Part 82)**

The primary purposes of this regulation are to eliminate the production of certain ozone-depleting substances and require users of the substances to reduce emissions to the atmosphere through recycling and mandatory use of certified maintenance technicians. These requirements are applicable to SNL/NM and are implemented accordingly.

7.3.7.6 DOE 5400.5, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment

This order incorporates EPA NESHAP standards for public doses from air emissions and provides for additional monitoring and evaluation of the total public radiation dose from other pathways. The DOE's annual limit of radiation dose to a member of the general public from all DOE facilities is 100 mrem from all pathways. Unplanned releases of radioactive effluents to the air are also reported and analyzed under provisions of this order.

**7.3.7.7 New Mexico Air Quality Control Act
(NMSA 74-2)**

Nonradioactive air emissions from SNL/NM facilities are subject to the regulatory requirements established under this act. The New Mexico Environmental Improvement Board (NMEIB), as provided by the act, regulates air quality through a series of air quality control regulations. These regulations also include emission standards for emission sources and processes such as open burning, boilers, and asphalt plants. These regulations are administered by the NMED.

**7.3.7.8 New Mexico Ambient Air Quality Standards
(20 NMAC 2.3)**

The objective of this regulation is to establish ambient air quality standards for the areas of New Mexico under the jurisdiction of the NMEIB. The adoption of these statewide ambient air quality standards does not prohibit the promulgation of standards for specific areas, functions, and conditions within the state by municipalities and certain counties. Standards are established in the regulations for total suspended particulates, sulfur dioxide, hydrogen sulfide, total reduced sulfur, carbon monoxide, and nitrogen dioxide.

**7.3.7.9 New Mexico Operating Permits
(20 NMAC 2.70)**

On July 21, 1992, the EPA promulgated 40 CFR Part 70, *Operating Permit Program*, which implements Title V of the CAA. The purposes of this program are to identify all the air quality regulations and emission limitations applicable to an air pollution source and establish monitoring, record-keeping, and reporting requirements necessary to demonstrate continued compliance with these requirements. This regulation required each state to develop an operating permit program meeting the minimum requirements set forth in 40 CFR Part 70 and submit their program to the EPA for review by November 1993. The NMED Operating Permit Program was approved by the EPA in 1993. It requires that all major producers of air pollution obtain an operating permit from NMED. Due to SNL/NM's potential to emit large quantities of regulated air pollutants (nitrogen oxides and carbon monoxide primarily from steam plants), SNL/NM is considered a major source. In accordance with this regulation, SNL/NM submitted an operating permit application to NMED in 1996.

**7.3.7.10 New Mexico Construction Permits
(20 NMAC 2.72)**

Provisions of this regulation require construction permits for any new or modified source of any regulated air contaminant if the source is expected to exceed threshold emission rates. More than 500 toxic air pollutants are regulated, and each chemical's threshold hourly rate is based on its toxicity. Each new or modified air emission source is reviewed and conservative estimates are made of maximum hourly chemical use and emissions. These estimates are compared with the applicable 20 New Mexico Administrative Code (NMAC) 2.72 limits to determine whether additional permits are required.

**7.3.7.11 Prevention of Significant Deterioration
(20 NMAC 2.74)**

This regulation has stringent requirements that must be addressed before construction can begin on any new, large, stationary source. Under this regulation, wilderness areas, national parks, and national monuments receive special protection. All of the new or modified air emission sources at SNL/NM are reviewed for compliance with the requirements of 20 NMAC 2.74. Because the total emissions of any criteria pollutant from SNL/NM are below the prevention-of-significant-deterioration-threshold of 250 tons a year, currently this regulation does not apply to SNL/NM.

7.3.7.12 Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (20 NMAC 2.78)

This regulation has adopted by reference all of the Federal NESHAP provisions, except those for radionuclides and residential wood heaters. The only two nonradionuclide NESHAP provisions applicable to SNL/NM are those for asbestos and beryllium.

Under NESHAP provisions for asbestos, SNL/NM is required to notify NMED of asbestos removal operations and disposal quantities and to ensure that these operations produce no visible emissions. Asbestos removal activities involving less than 160 ft² are covered by an annual small-job notification to NMED. Projects involving greater amounts of asbestos require separate advance notification to NMED. Quantities of asbestos wastes for both small and large jobs are reported to NMED on a quarterly basis. These reports include any asbestos contaminated, or potentially contaminated, with radionuclides. Radioactively contaminated material is disposed of in a designated radioactive asbestos burial area. Nonradioactive asbestos is transported offsite to designated commercial asbestos disposal areas.

The beryllium NESHAP provisions include requirements for preconstruction and preoperation approval of beryllium machining operations and for start-up testing of stack emissions from these operations. Before the beryllium NESHAP became applicable for DOE operations in the mid-1980s, NMED, DOE, and SNL/NM agreed to follow the NMED new-source preconstruction/preoperation approval process for large, existing beryllium-machining operations at SNL/NM. Since then, several very small beryllium-machining operations that were already in existence have been registered with NMED.

7.3.7.13 Conformity of General Federal Actions to the State Implementation Plan (20 NMAC 2.98)

The purpose of this regulation is to implement Section 176(c) of the CAA and regulations under 40 CFR Part 51, Subpart W, *Determining Conformity of General Federal Actions to State or Federal Implementation Plans*, with respect to the conformity of general Federal actions to the SIP. Under those authorities, no department, agency or instrumentality of the Federal government shall engage in, support in any way or provide financial assistance for, license or permit, or approve any activity that does not conform to a SIP. This regulation sets forth policy, criteria, and procedures for demonstrating and assuring conformity of such actions to the SIP.

7.3.8 Human Health and Worker Safety (Including Accidents)

7.3.8.1 Occupational Radiation Protection (10 CFR Part 835)

This regulation derives regulatory requirements from the AEA and not from OSHA. 10 CFR Part 835 establishes worker radiation protection standards limiting exposures from ionizing radiation. For the occupational worker, the standard is 5 rem (5,000 mrems) in any one year; and for the public the standard is 100 mrems/yr. The standards for both internal and external exposure are described in Subpart C. The as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) goal is set forth as the approach to be implemented by the DOE for radiation protection of workers and the general public. The management and control of radiation exposure will involve ALARA when considering individual and collective exposures.

7.3.8.2 Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. §651)

The *Occupational Safety and Health Act* (OSHA) of 1970, administered and enforced by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), establishes a national policy to provide safe and healthful working conditions for every working man and woman. States are encouraged to assume responsibility for administration of their own safety and health standards. Only public employers, (that is, Federal, state, and municipal governments) and mining employers are excluded. Mining employers are covered by other safety and health acts. Federal agencies such as the DOE must have in place equivalent safety standards, as a minimum.

OSHA standards are designed to reduce on-the-job injuries and to develop health standards to limit workers risk of developing occupational disease. OSHA standards are universal and cover hazards that exist in a wide variety of industries. These are compiled as general industry standards. 29 CFR Part 1910 covers general industry standards, including walking and working surfaces, platforms and their use, health and environmental controls, hazardous materials, personal protective equipment, medical and first aid, fire protection, compressed gas and air equipment, materials handling and storage, machinery and machine guarding, hand and portable tools, welding, cutting and brazing, electrical, commercial diving, and toxic and hazardous substances. OSHA has promulgated industry-specific standards for construction, agriculture, and maritime sectors.

The provisions of Section 19 of the OSHA; EO 12196 (45 FR 12769); and Part 1925 (*Safety and Health Standards for Federal Service Contracts*) and Part 1960 (*Basic Program Elements for Federal Employees OSHA*) of Title 29 identify OSHA's applicability to DOE operations. These provisions are summarized as follow:

Furnish employees with places and conditions of employment that are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm.

Set up procedures for responding to employee reports of unsafe and unhealthful working conditions.

Acquire, maintain, and require the use of approved personal protective equipment and safety equipment.

Inspect all workplaces at least annually with participation by representatives of employees.

Establish procedures to ensure that no employee is subject to restraint, interference, coercion, discrimination, or reprisal for exercising his/her right under the agency's safety and health program.

Post notices of unsafe or unhealthful working conditions found during inspections.

Ensure prompt abatement of hazardous conditions. Employees exposed to the conditions must be so informed and Imminent-danger corrections must be made immediately.

Set up management information systems to keep records of occupational accidents, injuries, illnesses, and their causes, and post annual summaries of injuries and illnesses for a minimum of 30 days at each establishment.

Conduct occupational safety and health training programs for top management, supervisors, safety and health personnel, employees, and employee representatives.

Occupational Safety and Health Standards (29 CFR Part 1910)

29 CFR Part 1910 provides standards for safe operations of facilities. Part 1910 includes 19 subparts, all of which are applied to SNL/NM operations. These subparts cover items such as toxic and hazardous substances, personal protective equipment, material handling and storage, permissible exposure limits, general environmental controls, and reporting of occupational accidents, injuries, and illnesses.

Federal Employee Occupational Safety and Health Programs and Related Matters (29 CFR Part 1960)

29 CFR Part 1960 provides regulations and guidelines for implementation of EO 12196, *Occupational Safety and Health Programs for Federal Employees*, which establishes requirements and procedures for Federal agencies to provide occupational safety and health programs for their employees (45 FR 12769). Federal agencies such as the DOE must have in place equivalent safety standards, as a minimum.

The head of each Federal agency is charged with the responsibility to establish and maintain an effective and comprehensive occupational safety and health program which is consistent with the standards set by OSHA for private sector employees. That broad mandate is further defined by EO 12196, which identifies the responsibilities of the agencies and the role of the Secretary of Labor in developing, implementing, and evaluating such programs.

DOE safety standards are specified in DOE Orders. Although OSHA does not directly apply to DOE employees, SNL/NM's prime contract with the DOE requires adherence to DOE 440.1, which states that contractors and contractor employees shall adhere to DOE-prescribed OSHA standards and requirements (29 CFR) for worker safety. Sandia Corporation, as a private company, is required to abide by OSHA regulations as well as any DOE contractual obligations or requirements in its operation of SNL/NM. These two sets of agency requirements (DOE and OSHA) may overlap in numerous health and safety areas.

Recording and Reporting Occupational Injuries and Illnesses (29 CFR Part 1904)

29 CFR Part 1904 specifies *The Record-Keeping Guidelines For Occupational Injuries and Illnesses, 1986*, which contains the description of the system requirements that businesses must follow in keeping records of work-related occupational deaths, injuries, or illnesses. It includes requirements for recording and reporting to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, all occupational injuries and illnesses requiring more than a first-aid response and reporting of all occupational fatalities. These occupational injury and illness records have multiple purposes. Mainly, they are to provide information for employers and employees, raising their awareness of the frequency and kinds of injuries and

illnesses occurring in the workplace and their related hazards. They also serve as a management tool for the administration of company safety and health programs. The information is also used by OSHA compliance staff to focus their inspections on the safety and health hazards revealed by the injury and illness records. Lastly, the records may be used to produce statistical data on the incidence of workplace injuries and illnesses, thereby measuring the magnitude of the injury and illness problem across the country.

New Mexico-Approved State Plans for Enforcement of State OSHA Standards (29 CFR Part 1952, Subpart DD)

29 CFR Part 1952 establishes the record-keeping and reporting requirements for states that have their own occupational safety and health programs and that have been approved by OSHA to enforce safety and health regulations in their own state. The state of New Mexico has adopted the *Federal Field Operations Manual* and all the Federal standards except those related to the maritime sector. The plan identifies the New Mexico Environmental Improvement Agency (NMEIA), with its subordinate organization, the Occupational Radiation Protection Division (ORPD), as the state agency designated to administer the plan. In addition, the ORPD will enforce state standards under the *Radiation Protection Act* (Ch. 284, Laws of 1971, NMSA 12-9-1 through 12-9-11). In the event of a conflict of standards, employee protection will be enforced using the more stringent regulation.

DOE O 232.1A Occurrence Reporting and Processing of Operations Information

DOE O 232.1 establishes a system for occurrence reporting and defines a number of situations that must be formally reported, all of which are important to the overall safety, health, and security of workers in the workplace. Many of the elements contained in cancelled DOE 5000.3B, *Occurrence Reporting and Processing of Operations Information*, are linked with DOE 232.1. These requirements include the categorization of occurrences that have potential safety, environmental, health, or operational significance; DOE notification of these occurrences; and the development and submission of documented follow-up reports. Occurrence reports must be done in a timely manner and contain sufficient information describing the occurrence, significance, causal factors, and corrective actions. Occurrence reporting increases sensitivity to potentially unsafe

conditions, requires analysis to determine causes of events, is a vehicle for formal corrective actions, and fosters lessons-learned programs. The documentation and distribution requirements for the occurrence reports are satisfied through the use of a centralized, unclassified operational database called the Occurrence Reporting and Processing System (ORPS) (DOE 1998o).

DOE O 231.1, Environment, Safety, and Health Reporting

The objective of this order is to ensure the collection and reporting of information on environment, safety, and health that is required by law or regulation or that is essential for evaluation of DOE operations and for identifying opportunities for improvement needed for planning purposes within the DOE. Elements contained in this order link to requirements specified in parts of cancelled DOE 5483.1A, *Occupational Safety and Health Program for DOE Contractor Employees at Government-Owned Contractor-Operated Facilities*, and parts of cancelled DOE 5484.1, *Environmental Protection, Safety, and Health Protection Information Reporting Requirements*. Requirements for an annual site environmental report, containing summary environmental data, are set forth in DOE O 231.1. It also specifies the need for the annual reporting of occupational safety and health information to the Secretary of Energy in order to allow the Secretary to comply with 29 CFR Part 1960.

DOE 5400.5, Radiation Protection of the Public and Environment

This order establishes standards and requirements for operations of the DOE and its contractors with respect to protection of members of the public and the environment against undue risk from radiation. This order provides for general standards; requirements for radiation protection of the public and the environment; derived concentration guides for air and water; and guidelines, limits, and controls for residual radioactive materials. The order also establishes the DOE's objective to operate its facilities and conduct its activities so that radiation exposures to members of the public are maintained within the limits established by this order, and to control radioactive contamination through the management of the DOE's real and personal property. This order limits the annual EDE to any member of the public from all sources to 100 millirems per year. The requirements of this order are being incorporated into a nuclear safety regulation.

DOE O 440.1A, Worker Protection Management for DOE Federal and Contractor Employees

The purpose of DOE O 440.1A is to establish the framework for an effective worker protection program that will reduce or prevent injuries, illnesses, and accidental losses by providing Federal and contractor employees with a safe work environment. This order replaces elements contained in cancelled DOE 5480.4. It contains requirements for mandatory environmental, safety, and health standards for areas such as fire protection, threshold limit value (TLVs) for chemical substances and physical agents in the workplace and other industrial hygiene requirements; construction safety, general safety, explosives safety, firearms safety, and motor vehicle safety. It also establishes radiological protection program requirements that, combined with 10 CFR Part 835 and associated implementation guidance, form the basis of a comprehensive radiological protection program.

DOE 5480.1B, Environment, Safety, and Health Program for Department of Energy Operations

The purpose of DOE 5480.1B is to establish the environment, safety, and health program for the DOE. It establishes standards and requirements for the DOE and DOE contractor operations regarding protection of the public and the environment from undue radiological risk. It contains the DOE's policy of adopting and implementing radiation protection standards consistent with those of the NRC. These standards are applied to DOE facilities and activities not subject to NRC licensing.

The related DOE 5480.4 specifies application of the mandatory ES&H standards applicable to all DOE contractor operations, provision of a listing of reference ES&H standards, and identification of the sources of these standards. This order is applicable for all facility design, construction, operation, modification, and decommissioning actions.

DOE 5483.1A, Occupational Safety and Health Program for DOE Contractor Employees at Government-Owned Contractor-Operated Facilities

DOE 5483.1A establishes requirements and procedures to ensure that occupational safety and health standards under the AEA and other statutes provide government-

owned, contractor-operated facility employees with occupational safety and health protection, consistent with that afforded private industry employees through the OSHA. DOE O 440.1A contains elements linked to 5483.1A to provide for the future replacement of 5483.1A. Together, these orders form a framework for an effective worker protection program that will reduce or prevent accidental losses, injuries, and illnesses by providing DOE Federal and contractor workers with a safe and healthful workplace. The standards of this order are mandatory as a matter of DOE policy. Areas covered include, but are not limited to, hazardous waste management, fire protection, occupational health including radiation and chemical safety, and construction safety.

7.3.8.3 DOE O 225.1A, Accident Investigations

The objective of this DOE Order is to prescribe requirements for conducting investigations of certain accidents occurring at DOE sites. The prevention of recurrence of such accidents is also prescribed. The order aims to contribute to the improved environmental protection and safety of DOE employees, contractors, and the public. Requirements set forth in this order include the categorization of accidents, the notification of other agencies, the conduct of investigations of the accidents, and the closeout of the investigations.

7.3.8.4 Accidents

*Risk Management Program Rule
(40 CFR Part 68, Subpart G)*

This rule establishes the contents of Risk Management Plans (RMP) that the owner or operator of a facility handling regulated substances must submit to the EPA. An RMP includes information on the accidental release prevention and emergency response policies in effect, regulated substances handled, worst-case release scenario(s), the general accidental release prevention program and chemical-specific prevention steps, a 5-year accident history, the emergency response program, and planned changes to improve safety. In addition, the owner or operator must complete a single registration form that covers all regulated substances handled.

*DOE 5480.23,
Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports*

This order establishes requirements for contractors responsible for the design, construction, operation, decontamination, or decommissioning of nuclear

facilities to develop safety analyses reports (SAR) that establish and evaluate the adequacy of the safety basis of the facilities. The purposes and objectives of SARs are to accomplish the following:

- provide the basis for approval of new facilities and operations, major modifications thereto, and eventual decommissioning;
- define and control the safety basis and commitments;
- support DOE and contractor management safety oversight of facilities and operations; and
- be the primary reference on facility safety for use by the responsible contractor.

This order applies to all DOE elements and to covered contractors to the extent implemented under a contract or other agreement.

Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Report, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE-STD-3009-94)

The purpose of this standard is to describe the SAR preparation method that is acceptable to the DOE. It was developed to assist Hazard Category 2 and 3 facilities in preparing SARs that will satisfy the requirements of the DOE 5480.23, *Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports*. Hazard Category 1 facilities are typically expected to be Category A reactors, for which extensive precedents for SARs already exist.

Guidance provided by this standard is generally applicable to any facility required to document its safety basis in accordance with the DOE 5480.23. For new facilities for which conceptual design or construction activities are in progress, elements of this guidance may be more appropriately handled as an integral part of the overall design requirement process. The methodology provided by DOE-STD-3009-94 focuses more on characterizing facility safety, with or without well-documented design information, than on the determination of facility design. Accordingly, contractors for facilities that are documenting conceptual designs for preliminary SARs should apply the process and format of this standard to the extent it is judged to be of benefit.

Beyond conceptual design and construction, the methodology described in this standard is applicable to the spectrum of missions expected to occur over the lifetime of a facility (production, shutdown/standby, decontamination, and decommissioning). As the phases

of facility life change, suitable methodology is provided for use in updating an existing SAR and in developing a new SAR if the new mission is no longer adequately encompassed by the existing SAR. This integration of the SAR with changes in facility mission and associated updates should be controlled as part of an overall safety management plan.

Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with DOE 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports (DOE-STD-1027-92)

This standard is to be used with the DOE 5480.23, *Nuclear Safety Analysis Report*, and may not be applicable to other DOE orders. Regarding the applicability of the other nuclear safety orders to those facilities that fall below Category 3 criteria, as defined by the standard, program senior officials shall provide guidance, as appropriate. The DOE has the responsibility to establish rules, regulations, and orders, as necessary, to protect health or to minimize danger to life or property. In carrying out this responsibility, the DOE has issued Order 5480.23, which specifies requirements for safety analyses involving DOE nuclear facilities, and for submittal, review, and approval of contractor plans to meet these requirements.

The purpose of DOE-STD-1027-92 is to establish guidance for the preparation and review of hazard categorization and accident analysis techniques as required in DOE 5480.23. This order requires further guidance to ensure consistency across all nuclear facilities within DOE complex. DOE-STD-1027-92 imposes no new requirements on nuclear facilities. Instead, it focuses on

- the definition of the standard identifying nuclear facilities required to have SARs in order to comply with DOE 5480.23;
- the SAR implementation plan and schedule;
- the hazardous categorization methodology to be applied to all facilities; and
- the accident analysis techniques appropriate for the graded approach addressed in DOE 5480.23.

The objective of a graded approach is to apportion SAR requirements for analysis, evaluation, and documentation to the potential hazards associated with a particular operating DOE nuclear facility.

7.3.9 Transportation

7.3.9.1 Hazardous Materials Transportation Act of 1994 (49 U.S.C. §5101, *et seq.*)

Under this act, the Secretary of Transportation may establish regulations for the safe transport of hazardous materials. Such regulations may be applicable to manufacturers as well as transporters. Covered activities include packing, handling, labeling, marking, and routing of hazardous materials, as well as manufacturing, marking, maintaining, repairing, and testing of packages or containers used in the transportation of such materials.

7.3.9.2 DOE 1540.1A, Materials Transportation and Traffic Management

This order establishes DOE policies and procedures for the management of materials transportation activities, including traffic management, for other than intrabuilding and intrasite transfers. The provisions of this order apply to all elements of the DOE involved in transportation activities and responsible for the payment or reimbursement of charges for transportation services. It is DOE policy to ensure that traffic and transportation management shall be accomplished in a manner commensurate with operational requirements for transportation services, established practices and procedures for transportation safety, economy, efficiency, and cargo security, national transportation policy as established in 49 U.S.C. §1801 *et seq.*, *Transportation*, and implemented by the Federal agencies, and applicable Federal, state, local, and international transportation regulations.

7.3.9.3 DOE 5480.3, Safety Requirements for the Packaging and Transportation of Hazardous Materials, Hazardous Substances, and Hazardous Wastes

This order establishes safety requirements and procedures for the packaging and transporting of hazardous materials, hazardous substances, and hazardous waste including fissile materials. The provisions of this order apply to all DOE elements and contractors performing work for DOE, who are involved with the packaging or transporting (that is, shipping, carrying, or receiving) of hazardous materials, hazardous substances, or hazardous wastes. Packaging used by the DOE for hazardous materials shipments is either certified to meet specific performance requirements or built to specifications described in the DOE hazardous materials regulations (40 CFR Parts 171-173 and 177-180 and 10 CFR Part 71).

7.3.9.4 DOE 5610.12, Packaging and Offsite Transportation of Nuclear Components and Special Assemblies Associated with the Nuclear Explosives and Weapon Safety Program

This order establishes DOE policy, requirements, objectives, authorities, procedures, and responsibilities for the safe packaging and offsite transportation of nuclear components and special assemblies associated with the nuclear weapons program requiring the use of the Transportation Safeguards System. This order is part of DOE 5610-series of orders that implement the DOE's Nuclear Explosives and Weapon Safety Program, conducted in the interest of national security or in support of mutual defense treaty obligations and agreements.

7.3.9.5 International Atomic Energy Agency, Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials (1996 Edition)

The International Atomic Energy Agency, a specialized agency of the United Nations, is the primary international organization that enforces a system of safeguards to ensure that nonnuclear weapons states do not divert shipments of sensitive nuclear-related equipment from peaceful applications to the production of nuclear weapons. The agency's regulations for transporting radioactive materials have gained worldwide adoption, helping to control the radiation hazards associated with all modes of transport. They cover general provisions, activity limits and material restrictions, requirements and controls for transport, test procedures, and administrative requirements. Schedules are also included detailing transport requirements for specific radioactive material consignments.

7.3.9.6 International Civil Aviation Organization, Technical Instruction for Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air, plus Supplement (Doc. 9284-AN/905)

The International Civil Aviation Organization was created in 1944 to promote the safe and orderly development of civil aviation in the world. As a specialized agency of the United Nations, it sets international standards and regulations necessary for the safety, security, efficiency, and regularity of air transport and serves as the medium for cooperation in all fields of civil aviation among its 183 contracting states. This technical guide provides requirements and standards for shipping dangerous goods by aircraft throughout the world.

7.3.9.7 International Air Transport Association, Dangerous Goods Regulations (38th Edition, 1996)

These regulations were published to provide procedures for the shipper and operator for the safe commercial air transport of articles and substances with hazardous properties. They also define necessary packaging materials and requirements.

7.3.9.8 United Nations, Recommendation on the Transport of Dangerous Goods (Document No. ST/SG/AC.10/1/Rev. 9)

These recommendations provide a uniform basis for development of harmonized regulations for all modes of transport, in order to facilitate trade and the safe transport of hazardous materials. These recommendations enhance safety, improve enforcement capability, and ease training requirements while enhancing global trade and economic development.

7.3.10 Waste Generation

7.3.10.1 Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1976 (42 U.S.C. §6902)

This act regulates the management of solid waste. Solid waste is broadly defined to include any garbage, refuse, sludge, or other discarded material including solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous materials resulting from industrial, commercial, mining, or agricultural activities. Specifically excluded as solid waste is source-special nuclear or byproduct material as defined by the AEA.

7.3.10.2 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1978 (42 U.S.C. §6901)

This act amends the *Solid Waste Disposal Act* and establishes requirements and procedures for the management of hazardous wastes. As amended by the *Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984* (HSWA), RCRA defines hazardous wastes that are subject to regulation and sets standards for generation, treatment, storage, and disposal facilities. The HSWA emphasize reducing the volume and toxicity of hazardous waste. They also establish permitting and corrective action requirements for RCRA-regulated facilities. RCRA was also amended by the Federal Facilities Compliance Act (FFCA) in 1992. It requires the EPA, or a state with delegated authority, to issue an order for compliance. A federal facilities compliance order was

issued by the NMED, requiring the DOE and SNL/NM to comply with the FFCA. Compliance with the order is achieved through site treatment plans prepared by the DOE.

Original jurisdiction for implementing RCRA was with EPA; however, RCRA authorizes EPA to turn this responsibility over to individual states as they develop satisfactory implementation programs. EPA granted base RCRA authorization to New Mexico on January 25, 1985, transferring regulatory control of hazardous wastes under RCRA to NMED. State authority for hazardous waste regulation is set forth in the *New Mexico Hazardous Waste Act*, which adopted, with a few minor exceptions, all of the Federal requirements in effect on July 1, 1993, concerning the generation and management of hazardous waste. On July 25, 1995, the state of New Mexico's Hazardous Waste Program was authorized by the EPA, in lieu of the Federal program, to regulate mixed waste.

SNL/NM received a RCRA Part A permit for interim status in August 1990, which has been updated regularly since that date. A Part B permit, which established requirements for management of existing hazardous waste management units, was granted on August 6, 1992.

The HSWA modified the permitting sections of RCRA (Sections 3004 and 3005). In accordance with these provisions, SNL/NM's permit to operate includes a section (HSWA Module VUI) that prescribes a specific corrective action program for SNL/NM, the primary focus of which is the investigation and cleanup, if required, of inactive sites called solid waste management units (SWMU). The HSWA Module specifies the corrective action process, which is being implemented at SNL/NM by the Environmental Restoration (ER) Program.

The corrective action process at SNL/NM consists of

- preparing RCRA facility investigations to identify the extent of contamination in the environment and the pathways along which these contaminants could travel to human and environmental receptors;

- preparing corrective measures studies to evaluate alternative remedies for reducing risks to human and environmental health and safety in a cost-effective manner; and

- implementing corrective measures – the remedy chosen by the regulatory authority is implemented, its effectiveness is verified, and ongoing control and monitoring requirements are established.

7.3.10.3 Underground Storage Tanks (42 U.S.C. §6901, Subtitle I)

Underground storage tanks (UST) are regulated as a separate program under RCRA, which establishes regulatory requirements for underground storage tanks containing hazardous or petroleum materials. NMED has been delegated authority for regulating SNL/NM under the *New Mexico Underground Storage Tank Regulations*, derived from the *New Mexico Hazardous Waste Act*.

7.3.10.4 Federal Facility Compliance Act of 1976 (42 U.S.C. §6961)

This 1992 act waives sovereign immunity from fines and penalties for RCRA violations at Federal facilities. However, it postponed the waiver for 3 years for storage prohibition violations with regard to land disposal restrictions for the DOE's mixed wastes. It also required the DOE to prepare plans for developing the required treatment capacity for each site at which it stores or generates mixed waste. The state or EPA must approve each plan (referred to as a site treatment plan) after consultation with other affected states, consideration of public comments, and issuance of an order by the regulatory agency requiring compliance with the plan. The act further provides that the DOE will not be subject to fines and penalties for storage prohibition violations for mixed waste as long as it is in compliance with an existing agreement, order, or permit.

The FFCA requires that site treatment plans contain schedules for developing treatment capacity for mixed waste for which identified technologies exist. The DOE must provide schedules for identifying and developing technologies for mixed waste without an identified existing treatment technology.

SNL/NM has submitted site treatment plans to the NMED to address the development of new treatment capabilities in compliance with the act. A Federal Facility Compliance Order was signed on October 4, 1995, to address storage and treatment of mixed waste (NMED 1995). A negotiation of a Mixed Waste Land Disposal Restriction Federal Facilities Compliance Agreement of March 15, 1994 terminated this new agreement order.

7.3.10.5 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, as Amended (42 U.S.C. §9601, *et seq.*)

This act, commonly referred to as the *Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act*

(CERCLA), or Superfund, establishes liability standards and governmental response authorization to address the release of a hazardous substance or contaminant into the environment. The EPA is the regulating authority for the act. SNL/NM has been ranked and, having scored very low, was not placed on the National Priority List for past releases into the environment. Therefore, all legacy contamination found in the environment at SNL/NM is primarily cleaned up under RCRA corrective action authority (HSWA Permit Module VIII).

CERCLA was amended by the *Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act* (SARA) in 1986. SARA Title III establishes additional requirements for emergency planning and reporting of hazardous substance releases. These requirements are also known as the *Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act* (EPCRA), which, due to its unique requirements, is discussed separately below. SARA also created liability for damages to or loss of natural resources resulting from releases into the environment and required the designation of Federal and state officials to act as public trustees for natural resources. The *New Mexico Natural Resources Trustee Act* (NMSA 75-7) is the New Mexico statute designed to protect state natural resources. The DOE, as the Federal trustee, and the state of New Mexico have authority to act as trustees for most resources at SNL/NM. The DOI retains authority for certain designated sensitive natural resources. Other natural resource trustees act for lands surrounding SNL/NM, including the Pueblo tribes. Procedures for conduct of natural resource damage assessments are codified at 43 CFR Part 11 (*Natural Resource Damage Assessments*). A strategy and plan are being developed for integrating the natural resource damage assessment requirements into the HSWA corrective action process at SNL/NM.

SNL/NM is subject to, and required to report releases to the environment under the notification requirements in, 40 CFR Part 302 (*Designation, Reportable Quantities, and Notification*) and EPCRA, as applicable.

7.3.10.6 Emergency Planning and Community Right- to-Know Act of 1986 (42 U.S.C. §11001)

EPCRA is also known as SARA Title III. Section 313 of the act requires facilities meeting certain standard industrial classification code criteria to submit an annual toxic chemical release inventory report (*Toxic Chemical Release Reporting: Community-Right-to-Know* [40 CFR Part 372]). For covered facilities, a report describing the use of, and emissions from, Section 313 chemicals stored or used onsite and meeting threshold

planning quantities, must be submitted to the EPA and the New Mexico Emergency Management Bureau every July for the preceding calendar year. Other provisions of the act require planning notifications (Sections 302 and 303), extremely hazardous substance release notifications (Section 304), and annual chemical inventory/material safety data sheet reporting (Sections 311 and 312). Federal agencies were also defined as persons for the purposes of EPCRA, requiring all Federal facilities, regardless of standard industrial classification code, to meet the requirements of the act.

SNL/NM does not meet standard industrial classification code criteria for Section 313 reporting, but has voluntarily submitted annual toxic chemical release inventory reports since 1987. All research operations are exempt under provisions of the regulation, and only pilot plants, production, or manufacturing operations at SNL/NM are reported.

7.3.10.7 Pollution Prevention Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. §13101)

This act sets the national policy for waste management and pollution control that focuses first on source reduction, followed sequentially by environmentally safe recycling, treatment, and disposal. In response, the DOE committed to voluntary participation in EPA's 33/50 Pollution Prevention Program, as set forth in Section 313 of SARA. The goal for facilities already involved in Section 313 compliance was to achieve a 33 percent reduction in release of 17 priority chemicals by 1997 from a 1993 baseline. SNL/NM did not have reportable thresholds for any of the 17 priority chemicals listed. In August 1994, EO 12856 (*Right-to-Know Laws and Pollution Prevention Requirements*) was issued, expanding the 33/50 program and requiring the DOE to reduce its total release of all toxic chemicals by 50 percent by December 31, 1999 (58 FR 41981). In response, the DOE has developed departmental pollution prevention goals and pollution prevention program plans to meet these goals. Each DOE site, including SNL/NM, develops its own site goals contributing to the DOE-wide goals and implements actions to achieve those goals. For FY 1996, SNL/NM met or exceeded all waste pollution prevention commitments.

7.3.10.8 Toxic Substances Control Act of 1977 (15 U.S.C. §2601)

The TSCA, unlike other statutes that regulate chemicals and their risk after they have been introduced into the environment, was intended to require testing and risk

assessment before a chemical is introduced into commerce. It also establishes record-keeping and reporting requirements for new information regarding adverse health and environmental effects of chemicals. The act governs the manufacture, use, storage, handling, and disposal of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs); sets standards for cleaning up PCB spills, and establishes standards and requirements for asbestos identification and abatement in schools. It is administered by the EPA.

Because SNL/NM's research and development activities are not related to the manufacture of new chemicals, PCBs are SNL/NM's main concern under the act. Activities at SNL/NM that involve PCBs include, but are not limited to, management and use of authorized PCB-containing equipment, such as transformers and capacitors, management and disposal of substances containing PCBs (dielectric fluids, contaminated solvents, oils, waste oils, heat transfer fluids, hydraulic fluids, paints, slurries, dredge spoils, and soils), and management and disposal of materials or equipment contaminated with PCBs as a result of spills.

The TSCA regulates PCB items and materials having concentrations exceeding 50 ppm. Implementing regulations (40 CFR 761) contain an antidilution clause that requires waste to be managed based on the PCB concentration of the source (transformer, capacitor, PCB equipment, etc.), regardless of the actual concentration in the waste. If the concentration at the source is unknown, the waste must be managed as though it were a spill of mineral oil with an assumed PCB concentration of 50 to 500 ppm. At SNL/NM, PCB-contaminated wastes are transported offsite for treatment and disposal unless they also have a radioactive component. Solid wastes containing PCBs are disposed of at an offsite facility that has been approved by the EPA for such disposal (provided that strict requirements are met with respect to notification, reporting, record-keeping, operating conditions, environmental monitoring, packaging, and types of wastes disposed).

SNL/NM currently has no treatment or disposal facilities for liquid wastes that contain PCBs. Such wastes have been stored at the Hazardous Waste Management Facility (HWMF) (see Section 4.12).

The asbestos abatement implementing regulations of the act (40 CFR Part 763) relate primarily to the identification and abatement of asbestos-containing materials in schools. SNL/NM conducts asbestos abatement projects in accordance with OSHA requirements (29 CFR Part 1926), applicable

requirements of the CAA (NESHAP, 40 CFR Part 61, Subpart M, for notification and waste management/disposal), and the *New Mexico Solid Waste Management Regulations*.

7.3.10.9 Radioactive Waste Management Regulations

Low-level radioactive waste is a waste that contains radioactivity and is not classified as high-level radioactive waste, TRU waste, or spent nuclear fuel. Solid low-level radioactive waste usually consists of clothing, tools, and glassware. Low-level radioactive liquid waste consists primarily of water circulated as cooling water. Radioactive waste management at SNL/NM is regulated under the AEA, through applicable DOE orders (primarily DOE Order 5820.2A, *Radioactive Waste Management*, and DOE 5400.5, *Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment*). DOE 5400.5 also provides criteria and processes for the release of materials (through sale or disposal) to assure that released materials do not constitute a hazard to the public and the environment due to their radioactive content. This includes materials that are not waste.

Low-level mixed waste (LLMW) is waste containing both hazardous and low-level radioactive components. As a hazardous waste, LLMW is regulated under RCRA and the New Mexico Hazardous Waste Act. Because it is radioactive, the radioactive component is also regulated under the AEA through applicable DOE orders. LLMW is scheduled to be disposed of at an offsite facility.

Due to the nationwide lack of DOE treatment capacity and capability for mixed waste, SNL/NM has continued to store mixed wastes on site. On March 15, 1994, the DOE and the EPA signed a FFCA to ensure complete compliance with the storage prohibitions for mixed waste at SNL/NM. This agreement was terminated with signing of the Federal Facility Compliance Order in October 1995, implementing the site treatment plan for SNL/NM, under provisions of the consent agreement.

Transuranic (TRU) waste, regardless of form or source, is contaminated with alpha-emitting transuranium radionuclides with half-lives greater than 20 years and concentrations greater than or equal to 100 nanocuries per gram at the time of assay. TRU waste at SNL/NM will be sent to the WIPP when that facility opens. TRU waste is subject to waste acceptance criteria for the WIPP, U.S. Department of Transportation shipping requirements, and applicable DOE orders dealing with its safe handling and management.

7.3.10.10 Superfund Implementation (EO 12580)

This EO, which applies to facilities that are not on the National Priorities List, delegates responsibility to the heads of executive departments and agencies at those facilities for undertaking remedial and removal actions for releases or threatened releases (52 FR 2923). This authority applies to any cleanup actions not included as a RCRA corrective action.

7.3.10.11 Right-to-Know Laws and Pollution Prevention Requirements (EO 12856)

This EO directs all Federal agencies to reduce and report toxic chemicals entering any waste stream; improve emergency planning, response, and accident notification; and encourage clean technologies and testing of innovative prevention technologies (58 FR 41981). The DOE and SNL/NM meet applicable reporting requirements under the provisions of EPCRA and the *New Mexico Hazardous Chemicals Information Act*, in accordance with the EO.

7.3.10.12 DOE 5820.2A, Radioactive Waste Management

This order establishes the policies, guidelines, and minimum requirements by which the DOE and its contractors manage radioactive waste, mixed waste, and contaminated facilities. This order establishes DOE policy that radioactive and mixed wastes be managed in a manner that ensures protection of the health and safety of the public, the DOE, contractor employees, and the environment. In addition, the generation, treatment, storage, transportation, and disposal of radioactive wastes, and the other pollutants or hazardous substances they contain, must be accomplished in a manner that minimizes the generation of such wastes across program office functions and complies with all applicable Federal, state, and local environmental, safety, and health laws and regulations and DOE requirements.

7.3.10.13 New Mexico Solid Waste Act (NMSA 74-9-1 through 74-9-42)

This act established a comprehensive state-wide solid waste management program. It seeks to provide technical, financial, and program development assistance to counties and municipalities for solid waste management; promote source reduction, recycling, re-use, treatment, and transformation of solid waste; regulate all aspects of solid waste handling; and conserve, recover, and recycle resources. It also requires permits for the construction, operation, closure, and post-closure maintenance of solid waste facilities.

7.3.10.14 New Mexico Solid Waste Management Regulations (20 NMAC 9.1)

These regulations outline the specific requirements for New Mexico's counties and municipalities for the transportation, storage, transfer, processing, transformation, recycling, and disposal of solid waste. The objectives of the regulations are to establish the standards of practice in the following areas of solid waste management: facility permits, facility size, closure and post-closure operation, operator certification, special waste, groundwater monitoring, and financial assurance.

7.3.10.15 New Mexico Underground Storage Tank Regulations (20 NMAC 5.1)

These regulations include requirements for design, construction, and installation of new tanks; maintenance of a leak detection system and associated record-keeping; reporting of hazardous or petroleum releases; corrective action in the event of a release; and closure of UST systems. All existing tank systems must either meet new tank performance standards or undergo RCRA closure by December 22, 1998. All SNL/NM USTs will be upgraded or undergo RCRA closure by the December 22, 1998, deadline.

7.3.10.16 New Mexico Hazardous Chemicals Information Act (NMSA 74-4E-1 through 74-4E-9)

This act implements the hazardous chemical information and toxic release reporting requirements of SARA Title III for covered facilities in New Mexico.

7.3.10.17 New Mexico Hazardous Waste Act (NMSA 74-4-1 through 74-4-13)

This act establishes New Mexico's program for hazardous waste management and control. Since its initial adoption in 1997, the act has been substantially amended to bring its provisions more closely in conformance with RCRA and its amendments. The major provisions of the act have been taken directly from Subtitle C, *Hazardous Waste Management*, and Subtitle I, *Regulation of Underground Storage Tank*, of RCRA.

7.3.11 Noise and Vibration

7.3.11.1 Noise Control Act of 1972 (42 U.S.C. §4901)

By this act, Congress directed all Federal agencies to carry out the programs under their control to promote an environment free from noise that jeopardizes public health or welfare. Furthermore, it requires any Federal agency engaged in any activity resulting, or which may

result, in the emission of noise, to comply with Federal, state, interstate, and local requirements regarding control and abatement of environmental noise to the same extent that any person is subject to such requirements. Beyond the general obligation in the act and implementing regulations, there are no specific Federal or state requirements regulating environmental noise.

7.3.11.2 Occupational Noise Exposure (29 CFR §1910.95)

This regulation provides protection to workers from excessive levels of noise. It establishes sound levels that are not to be exceeded for specific periods of time without protective measures being taken. When employees are subjected to sound exceeding the specified levels, feasible administrative or engineering controls are to be instituted. If such controls fail to reduce sound levels to the prescribed levels, personal protective equipment must be provided and used to reduce sound levels.

7.3.11.3 DOE 5480.10, Contractor Industrial Hygiene Program

The purpose of this order is to establish the requirements and guidelines applicable to DOE contractor operations for maintaining an effective industrial hygiene program to preserve employee health and well-being. Section 9b sets forth noise as one of the environmental factors and stresses to be included in the program.

7.3.11.4 City of Albuquerque Noise Control Ordinance (Ord. 21-1975)

This ordinance establishes acceptable noise levels for various activities within the City of Albuquerque, including construction of buildings and projects, vehicles, and aircraft. In addition, Subsection 9-9-12, *General Noise Regulation*, states that it shall be unlawful for any person to make any noise in excess of 50 dB(A), or 10 dB(A) above the ambient noise level, whichever is higher at any residential property line, unless otherwise provided in the ordinance.

7.3.11.5 Environmental Justice Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations (EO 12898)

This EO directs each Federal agency to identify and address disproportionately high adverse human health or environmental impacts on minority and low-income populations resulting from an agency's programs, policies, or activities (59 FR 7629). The order further

directs each Federal agency to collect, maintain, analyze, and make information publicly available on the race, national origin, and income level of populations in areas surrounding facilities or sites expected to have a substantial environmental, human health, or economic effect on these populations. This requirement applies

when such facilities or sites become the subject of a substantial Federal environmental administrative or judicial action. Environmental justice impacts are being identified and addressed through the SWEIS, and the policies and data analysis requirements of this EO remain applicable to future actions at SNL/NM.

CHAPTER 8

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- 34 FR 1139 Title 43, Public Lands: Interior ;Public Land Order 4569; *Federal Register*, Volume 34, pp. 1139; Washington, D.C.; January 24, 1969.
- 35 FR 4247 Executive Order 11514, Protection and Enhancement of Environmental Quality ; *Federal Register*, Volume 35, pp. 4247; Washington, D.C.; March 7, 1970.
- 36 FR 8921 Executive Order 11593, Protection and Enhancement of the Cultural Environment ; *Federal Register*, Volume 36, pp. 8921; Washington, D.C.; May 13, 1971.
- 42 FR 26951 Executive Order 11988, Floodplain Management ;*Federal Register*, Volume 42, pp. 26951; Washington, D.C.; May 25, 1977.
- 42 FR 26961 Executive Order 11990, Protection of Wetlands ;*Federal Register*, Volume 42, pp. 26961; Washington, D.C.; May 25, 1977.
- 43 FR 47707 Executive Order 12088, Federal Compliance with Pollution Control Standards ; *Federal Register*, Volume 43, pp. 47707; Washington, D.C.; October 13, 1978.
- 45 FR 12769 Executive Order 12196, Occupational Safety and Health Programs for Federal Employees ; *Federal Register*, Volume 45, pp. 12769; Washington, D.C.; February 27, 1980.
- 52 FR 2923 Executive Order 12580, Superfund Implementation ;*Federal Register*, Volume 52, pp. 2923; Washington, D.C.; January 29, 1987.
- 58 FR 41981 Executive Order 12856, Federal Compliance With Right-to-Know Laws and Pollution Prevention Requirements ;*Federal Register*, Volume 58, pp. 4198; Washington, D.C.; August 6, 1994.
- 59 FR 7629 Executive Order 12898, Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations ;*Federal Register*, Volume 59, pp. 7629; Washington, D.C.; February 11, 1994.
- 59 FR 62545 Executive Order 12941, Seismic Safety of Existing Federally Owned or Leased Buildings ; *Federal Register*, Volume 59, Number 232, pp. 62545; Washington, D.C.; December 5, 1994.
- 61 FR 26771 Executive Order 13007, Indian Sacred Sites ;*Federal Register*, Volume 61, pp. 26771; Washington, D.C.; May 29, 1996.
- 61 FR 48921 Record of Decision for the Medical Isotopes Production Project: Molybdenum-99 and Related Isotopes ;*Federal Register*, Volume 61, Issue 181, pp. 48921-48929; U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C.; September 17, 1996.
- 62 FR 29332 Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement, Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico, Notice of Intent ;*Federal Register*, Volume 62, Issue 104, pp. 29332-29335; U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C.; May 30, 1997.
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- 15 U.S.C. §2601 *Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)*; Findings, policy, and intent ;Title 15, Commerce and Trade; Chapter 53, Toxic Substances Control; Subchapter I, Control of Toxic Substances; *United States Code*; Washington, D.C.; January 1, 1977.
- 16 U.S.C. §470 *National Historic Preservation Act*; Short title; Congressional finding and declaration of policy ; Title 16, Conservation; Chapter 1A, Historic Sites, Buildings, Objects, and Antiquities; Subchapter II, National Historic Preservation; *United States Code*, Washington, D.C.; October 15, 1966, as amended.
- 16 U.S.C. §470aa Congressional findings and declaration of purpose ;Title 16, Conservation; Chapter 1B, Archaeological Resource Protection; *United States Code*, Washington, D.C.; October 31, 1979, as amended.
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- 16 U.S.C. §661 Declaration of purpose; cooperation of agencies; surveys and investigations; donations ;Title 16, Conservation; Chapter 5A, Protection and Conservation of Wildlife; Subchapter I, Game, Fur-Bearing Animals, and Fish; *United States Code*, Washington, D.C.; March 10, 1934, as amended.
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- 16 U.S.C. §1600 Congressional findings ;Title 16, Conservation; Chapter 36, Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning; Subchapter I, Planning; *United States Code*, Washington, D.C.; October 22, 1976, as amended.
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- 16 U.S.C. §1602 Renewable Resource Program; preparation by Secretary of Agriculture and transmittal to President; purpose and development of program; time of preparation, updating and contents ; Title 16, Conservation; Chapter 36, Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning; Subchapter I, Planning; *United States Code*, Washington, D.C.; October 22, 1976, as amended.
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- 42 U.S.C. §300f *Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA)*; Definitions ;Title 42, Public Health and Welfare; Chapter 6A, Public Health Service; Subchapter XII, Safety of Public Water Systems; *United States Code*, Washington, D.C.; July 1, 1944, as amended.
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- 49 U.S.C. §5101 Purpose ;Title 49, Transportation; Chapter 51, Transportation of Hazardous Material; Subchapter III, General and Intermodal Programs; *United States Code*, Washington, D.C.; August 26, 1994, as amended.

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- 20 NMAC 2.70 Operating Permits ;Title 20, Environmental Protection; Chapter 2, Air Quality (Statewide); Subpart I, General Provisions; *New Mexico Administrative Code*; Environmental Improvement Board, Santa Fe, NM; November 30, 1995.
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- 20 NMAC 11 Albuquerque/Bernalillo County Air Quality Control Board ;Title 20, Environmental Protection; *New Mexico Administrative Code*; Water Quality Commission, Santa Fe, NM; December 1, 1995, as amended.

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- NMSA 74-2 *Air Quality Control Act* ; Chapter 74, Environmental Improvement; Article 2, Air Pollution; New Mexico Department of Environment; *New Mexico Statues Annotated*; Santa Fe, NM; 1953, as amended.
- NMSA 74-3-1 through 74-3-16 *Radiation Protection Act* ; Chapter 74, Environmental Improvement; Article 3, Radiation Control; New Mexico Department of Environment, *New Mexico Statutes Annotated*, Santa Fe, NM; 1953, as amended.
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- DOE 5480.10 Contractor Industrial Hygiene Program, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C., June 26, 1985.
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- DOE 5480.4 Environmental Protection, Safety, and Health Protection Standards, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C., July 29, 1988.
- DOE 5480.5 Safety of Nuclear Facilities, U.S. Department of Energy, Albuquerque Operations Office, Albuquerque, NM, July 17, 1987.
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- DOE 5820.2A Radioactive Waste Management, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C., September 26, 1988.
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- DOE O 440.1A Worker Protection Management for DOE Federal and Contractor Employees, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C., December 21, 1994.
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- DOE STD-3009-94 Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy nonreactor Nuclear Safety Analysis Report, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C., July 1994.

Albuquerque City Ordinances

- Ord. 21-1975 Noise Control Ordinance ; Chapter 9, Health, Safety and Sanitation; Article 9, Noise Control; *City of Albuquerque Code of Ordinances*, Albuquerque, NM, 1975.
- Ord. 21-1985 Sewer Use and Wastewater Control Ordinance ; Chapter 6, Water, Sewers, and Streets; Article 3, Sewer Use and Wastewater Control; *City of Albuquerque Code of Ordinances*, Albuquerque, NM, 1985.

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DE-AMM-97A177613

QUALIFICATION CRITERION NO. 1**NEPA DISCLOSURE STATEMENT FOR
PREPARATION OF THE SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES/NEW MEXICO
SWEIS FOR CONTINUED OPERATIONS**

CEQ Regulations at 40 CFR 1506.5(c), which have been adopted by the DOE (10 CFR 1021), require contractors who will prepare an EIS to execute a disclosure specifying that they have no financial or other interest in the outcome of the project. The term "financial interest or other interest in the outcome of the project" for purposes of this disclosure is defined in the March 23, 1981, guidance "Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ's National Environmental Policy Act Regulations", 46 FR 18026-18033 at Question 17a and b.

"Financial or other interest in the outcome of the project" includes "any financial benefit such as a promise of future construction or design work in the project, as well as indirect benefits the contractor is aware of (e.g., if the project would aid proposals sponsored by the firm's other clients)". See 46 FR 18026-18031.

In accordance with these requirements, the offeror and the proposed subcontractors hereby certify as follows: (check either (a) or (b) and list financial or other interest if (b) is checked)

- (a) Contractor has no financial or other interest in the outcome of the project.
- (b) Offeror and any proposed subcontractor have the following financial or other interest in the outcome of the project and hereby agree to divest themselves of such interest prior to award of this contract.

Financial or Other Interest:

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.

Certified by



Signature

Evaristo J. Bopano, Ph.D.
Name (Printed)

President, Beta Corporation
Title, Company

20 November 1998

Date

Beta Corporation International Disclosure Statement

DE-AM04-97AL77613

QUALIFICATION CRITERION NO. 1

**NEPA DISCLOSURE STATEMENT FOR
PREPARATION OF THE SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES/NEW MEXICO
SWEIS FOR CONTINUED OPERATIONS**

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"Financial or other interest in the outcome of the project" includes "any financial benefit such as a promise of future construction or design work on the project, as well as indirect benefits the contractor is aware of (e.g., if the project would aid proposals sponsored by the firm's other clients)". See 46 FR 18026-18031.

In accordance with these requirements, the offeror and the proposed subcontractors hereby certify as follows: (check either (a) or (b) and list financial or other interest if (b) is checked.)

- (a) Contractor has no financial or other interest in the outcome of the project.
- (b) Offeror and any proposed subcontractor have the following financial or other interest in the outcome of the project and hereby agree to divest themselves of such interest prior to award of this contract.

Financial or Other Interest

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.

Certified By:

John M. Teel
Signature

John M. Teel
Name (Printed)

MANAGER, NEW MEXICO OPERATIONS
Title, Company
FOSTER WHEELER ENVIRONMENTAL

Date 11/20/98

DE-AM04-97AL77613

QUALIFICATION CRITERION NO. 1**NEPA DISCLOSURE STATEMENT FOR
PREPARATION OF THE SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES/NEW MEXICO
SWEIS FOR CONTINUED OPERATIONS**

CEQ Regulations at 40 CFR 1506.5(c), which have been adopted by the DOE (10 CFR 1021), require contractors who will prepare an EIS to execute a disclosure specifying that they have no financial or other interest in the outcome of the project. The term "financial interest or other interest in the outcome of the project" for purposes of this disclosure is defined in the March 23, 1981 guidance "Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ's National Environmental Policy Act Regulations", 46 FR 18026-18078 at Question 17a and b.

"Financial or other interest in the outcome of the project" includes "any financial benefit such as a promise of future construction or design work on the project, as well as indirect benefits the contractor is aware of (e.g., if the project would and proposals sponsored by the firm's other clients)." See 46 FR 18026-18071.


In accordance with these requirements, the offeror and the proposed subcontractors hereby certify as follows: (check either (a) or (b) and list financial or other interest if (b) is checked)

- (a) Contractor has no financial or other interest in the outcome of the project.
- (b) Offeror and any proposed subcontractor have the following financial or other interest in the outcome of the project and hereby agree to divest themselves of such interest prior to award of this contract

Financial or Other Interest

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.

Certified By



Signature

James S. Helms

Name (Printed)

Director of Contracts

Title Company

November 18, 1998

Date

Jason & Associates Disclosure Statement

DE-AM04-97AL77613

QUALIFICATION CRITERION NO. 1

**NEPA DISCLOSURE STATEMENT FOR
PREPARATION OF THE SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES/NEW MEXICO
SWEIS FOR CONTINUED OPERATIONS**

CEQ Regulations at 40 CFR 1506.5(c), which have been adopted by the DOE (10 CFR 1021), require contractors who will prepare an EIS to execute a disclosure specifying that they have no financial or other interest in the outcome of the project. The term "financial interest or other interest in the outcome of the project" for purposes of this disclosure is defined in the March 23, 1981, guidance "Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ's National Environmental Policy Act Regulations", 46 FR 18026-18038 at Question 17a and b.

"Financial or other interest in the outcome of the project" includes "any financial benefit such as a promise of future construction or design work in the project, as well as indirect benefits the contractor is aware of (e.g., if the project would aid proposals sponsored by the firm's other clients)". See 46 FR 18026-18031.

In accordance with these requirements, the offeror and the proposed subcontractors hereby certify as follows. (check either (a) or (b) and list financial or other interest if (b) is checked)

- (a) Contractor has no financial or other interest in the outcome of the project.
- (b) Offeror and any proposed subcontractor have the following financial or other interest in the outcome of the project and hereby agree to divest themselves of such interest prior to award of this contract.

Financial or Other Interest

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.

Certified By: 
Signature

Louis F. Restrepo
Name (Printed)

President, OMICRON
Title, Company

11/21/98
Date

DE-AM04-97A1.77613

QUALIFICATION CRITERION NO. 1NEPA DISCLOSURE STATEMENT FOR
PREPARATION OF THE SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES/NEW MEXICO
SWEIS FOR CONTINUED OPERATIONS

CEQ Regulations at 40 CFR 1506.5(c), which have been adopted by the DOE (10 CFR 1021), require contractors who will prepare an EIS to execute a disclosure specifying that they have no financial or other interest in the outcome of the project. The term "financial interest or other interest in the outcome of the project" for purposes of this disclosure is defined in the March 25, 1981, guidance "Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ's National Environmental Policy Act Regulations", 46 FR 18026-18033 at Question 17a and b.

"Financial or other interest in the outcome of the project" includes "any financial benefit such as a promise of future construction or design work in the project, as well as indirect benefits the contractor is aware of (e.g., if the project would aid proposals sponsored by the firm's other clients)". See 46 FR 18026-18031.

In accordance with these requirements, the offeror and the proposed subcontractors hereby certify as follows (check either (a) or (b) and list financial or other interest if (b) is checked)

- (a) Contractor has no financial or other interest in the outcome of the project.
- (b) Offeror and any proposed subcontractor have the following financial or other interest in the outcome of the project and hereby agree to divest themselves of such interest prior to award of this contract:

Financial or Other Interest

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.

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CHAPTER 10

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CHAPTER 11

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CHAPTER 12

List of Agencies and People Contacted

ORGANIZATION	LAST NAME	FIRST NAME	TITLE	LOCATION	STATE
<i>Bureau of Indian Affairs, Albuquerque Area Office</i>	Sedik	Allen	Environmental Scientist	Albuquerque	NM
	Whitener	Don	Deputy Area Director	Albuquerque	NM
<i>Hopi Tribe</i>	Kuwanwisiwma	Leigh J.	Director, Cultural Preservation Office	Kykotsmovi	AZ
	Taylor	Wayne	Chairman	Kykotsmovi	AZ
<i>Jicarilla Apache Tribe</i>	Cassador	Arnold	President	Dulce	NM
	Sandoval	Merton	Cultural Preservation Office	Dulce	NM
	Willis	Lorene	Director, Jicarilla Apache Culture Committee	Dulce	NM
<i>Los Alamos National Laboratory</i>	Murphy	Robert		Los Alamos	NM
	Schumman	Paul		Los Alamos	NM
<i>Navajo Nation</i>	Begay	Richard	TCP Coordinator	Window Rock	AZ
	Downer	Alan	Director, Navajo Nation Historic Preservation Department	Window Rock	AZ
	Guerro	Frank	President of Alamo Chapter	Alamo	NM
	Hale	Albert	President	Window Rock	AZ
	Noyes	Peter	Navajo Nation Historic Preservation Department	Window Rock	AZ
	Secatero	Tony	President of Ca oncito Chapter	Ca oncito	NM
<i>NM Environment Department</i>	Brinkerhoff	Debbi		Albuquerque	NM
	Gallagher	Pat		Albuquerque	NM
	Kolwalski	Judy		Albuquerque	NM
	O Connel	John		Albuquerque	NM
	Turncoat	John		Albuquerque	NM
<i>NM Forestry Division</i>	Sivinski	Bob	Forester	Santa Fe	NM
<i>NM Office of Cultural Affairs, Historic Preservation Division, Archaeological Records Management Section</i>	Geister	Scott	Data Coordinator	Santa Fe	NM

List of Agencies and People Contacted (continued)

ORGANIZATION	LAST NAME	FIRST NAME	TITLE	LOCATION	STATE
<i>NM Office of Cultural Affairs, Historic Preservation Division</i>	Cushman	David	NM State Archaeologist	Santa Fe	NM
	Sebastian	Lynne	NM State Historic Preservation Officer	Santa Fe	NM
<i>Pueblo of Acoma</i>	Gilbert	Petuuuche	Realty Officer	Acoma	NM
	Pasqual	Reginald T.	Governor	Acoma	NM
	Paytiamio	Stanley	Environmental Protection Specialist	Acomita	NM
<i>Pueblo of Cochiti</i>	Pecos	Jacob	Coordinator, Cochiti Environmental Protection Office	Cochiti Pueblo	NM
	Suina	Henry	Governor	Cochiti Pueblo	NM
<i>Pueblo of Isleta</i>	Hostak	John	Director, Environmental Department	Isleta Pueblo	NM
	Lucero	Alvino	Governor	Isleta Pueblo	NM
	Lujan	Fred	Governor	Isleta Pueblo	NM
	Walt	Henry	Ethnographer, Cultural Group Coordinator	Albuquerque	NM
<i>Pueblo of Jemez</i>	Toya	Vincent	Governor	Jemez Pueblo	NM
	Whatley	William	Director, Department of Archaeology and Preservation	Albuquerque	NM
<i>Pueblo of Laguna</i>	Cywinska-Bernacik	Barbara	Director of Environmental Division	Laguna Pueblo	NM
	Johnson	Roland	Governor	Laguna Pueblo	NM
	Sarracino	Victor	Cultural Consultation Group	Laguna Pueblo	NM
<i>Pueblo of San Felipe</i>	Romero	Mike	Environmental Director	San Felipe Pueblo	NM
	Sandoval	Doris	Tribal Administrator	San Felipe Pueblo	NM
	Velasquez	Robert	Governor	San Felipe Pueblo	NM
<i>Pueblo of Sandia</i>	Holmes	Jennie	Assistant Librarian	Bernalillo	NM
	Janello	Beth	Environmental Director	Bernalillo	NM
	Lujan	Alex	Governor	Bernalillo	NM

List of Agencies and People Contacted (continued)

ORGANIZATION	LAST NAME	FIRST NAME	TITLE	LOCATION	STATE	
<i>Pueblo of Santa Ana</i>	Montoya	Ron	Governor	Bernalillo	NM	
<i>Pueblo of Santo Domingo</i>	Chavez	Everett	Environmental Coordinator	Santo Domingo Pueblo	NM	
	Tortalita	Tony	Governor	Santo Domingo Pueblo	NM	
<i>Pueblo of Zia</i>	Pino	Peter	Tribal Administrator	Zia Pueblo	NM	
	Shije	Edwin	Governor	Zia Pueblo	NM	
<i>Pueblo of Zuni</i>	Dishta	Joseph	Director, Heritage and Historic Preservation Office	Zuni	NM	
	Eriacho	Donald	Governor	Zuni	NM	
	Panteah	Loren	Cultural Preservation Coordinator	Zuni	NM	
<i>Rinchem Co., Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico, Hazardous Waste Management Facility</i>	Gorgone	Lisa		Albuquerque	NM	
	Boom	Ross		Albuquerque	NM	
	Cheng	Chui Fan		Albuquerque	NM	
	Cheng	Wu-Ching		Albuquerque	NM	
	Conway	Earl		Albuquerque	NM	
	Guerrero	Joe		Albuquerque	NM	
	King	Gabe		Albuquerque	NM	
	Kuzio	Ken		Albuquerque	NM	
	Lincoln	Maureen		Albuquerque	NM	
	<i>Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico</i>	Lojek	Carole		Albuquerque	NM
		Losi	Don		Albuquerque	NM
		Medrano	Carlos	Space and Real Estate Specialist	Albuquerque	NM
		Miller	Dennis		Albuquerque	NM
Molley		Kylene		Albuquerque	NM	
Moore		Darlene		Albuquerque	NM	
Peterson		Phyllis		Albuquerque	NM	
Roma		Chip		Albuquerque	NM	

List of Agencies and People Contacted (continued)

ORGANIZATION	LAST NAME	FIRST NAME	TITLE	LOCATION	STATE
<i>Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico (continued)</i>	Roybal	Tony		Albuquerque	NM
	Stone	Brian		Albuquerque	NM
	Tooley	Ed	Sites Planning Specialist	Albuquerque	NM
	Trujillo	Manny		Albuquerque	NM
	Vigil	Francine		Albuquerque	NM
	Wheeler	Tim		Albuquerque	NM
<i>Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico Microelectronics Development Laboratory</i>	Rohr	Don		Albuquerque	NM
<i>Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico Aerial Cable Facility, Centrifuge Complex, Drop/Impact Complex, Lurance Canyon Burn Site, Radiant Heat Facility, Sled Track Facility</i>	Bickel	David	Consultant	Albuquerque	NM
	Stibick	Frank		Albuquerque	NM
<i>Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico Advanced Manufacturing Processes Laboratory</i>	Vaughan	Johnny		Albuquerque	NM
<i>Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico Center for National Security and Arms Control</i>	Dunbar	Dan		Albuquerque	NM
	Lucero	Frank		Albuquerque	NM
	Scott-Patterson	Liz		Albuquerque	NM
<i>Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico Compound Semiconductor Research Laboratory</i>	Esherick	Peter		Albuquerque	NM
<i>Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico Explosive Components Facility</i>	Johnson	Dennis		Albuquerque	NM

List of Agencies and People Contacted (continued)

ORGANIZATION	LAST NAME	FIRST NAME	TITLE	LOCATION	STATE
<i>Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico Exterior Intrusion Sensor Facility</i>	Miller	Larry		Albuquerque	NM
<i>Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico Facilities Engineering</i>	Sandoval	Martin		Albuquerque	NM
<i>Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico Hazardous Waste Management Facility</i>	Duran	Ernie		Albuquerque	NM
<i>Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico Integrated Materials Research Laboratory</i>	Nevada	Ernie		Albuquerque	NM
<i>Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico Microelectronics Development Laboratory</i>	Roma	Charles		Albuquerque	NM
<i>Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico Molybdenum-99 Project</i>	Davis	Wayne		Albuquerque	NM
<i>Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico Neutron Generator Facility</i>	Jones	Ron		Albuquerque	NM
<i>Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico National Solar Thermal Test Facility</i>	McDonald	Marion		Albuquerque	NM
<i>Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico Photovoltaic Device Fabrication Laboratory</i>	Pope	Larry		Albuquerque	NM
	Kolb	William		Albuquerque	NM
	Bode	Mike		Albuquerque	NM

List of Agencies and People Contacted (continued)

ORGANIZATION	LAST NAME	FIRST NAME	TITLE	LOCATION	STATE
<i>Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico Radioactive and Mixed Waste Management Facility</i>	Jarry	Jeffrey		Albuquerque	NM
	Mantay	Donald	Consultant	Albuquerque	NM
	Miller	Kenny		Albuquerque	NM
<i>Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico Technical Area-V</i>	Schmidt	Ted		Albuquerque	NM
<i>Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico Terminal Ballistics Facility</i>	Bonzon	Lloyd		Albuquerque	NM
	Johnson	Dennis		Albuquerque	NM
	Johnson	Floyd		Albuquerque	NM
	Mulligan	Ed		Albuquerque	NM
	Castillo	David		Albuquerque	NM
<i>Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico Z-Machine</i>	Harris	Mark		Albuquerque	NM
<i>TRC Companies, Inc.</i>	Goar	Toni	Archaeologist	Albuquerque	NM
<i>U.S. Air Force, 377th Air Base Wing, Environmental Management Division</i>	Gooch	Sam	Chief, Programs Branch	Kirtland AFB	NM
	Leatherwood	James	Director	Kirtland AFB	NM
	Tuttle	Christine	Cultural Resource Manager	Kirtland AFB	NM
<i>U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Albuquerque District</i>	Clark	Lewis	Biologist	Albuquerque	NM
	Manger	Jean	Biologist	Albuquerque	NM
<i>U.S. Department of Energy</i>	Pietrokok	Ted		Albuquerque	NM
<i>U.S. Department of Energy/Kirtland Area Office</i>	Garcia	Deborah	Real Estate Specialist	Albuquerque	NM
<i>U.S. Forest Service</i>	Geuss	Cynthia	Cartographer	Albuquerque	NM
<i>U.S. Forest Service, Cibola National Forest</i>	Benedict	Cynthia	Assistant Forest Archaeologist	Albuquerque	NM
	Cartledge	Tom	Forest Archaeologist	Albuquerque	NM
	Kosper	Larry	Biologist	Albuquerque	NM
<i>U.S. Forest Service, Cibola National Forest, Sandia Ranger Station</i>	De Gruyter	Beverly	Biologist	Tijeras	NM

List of Agencies and People Contacted (concluded)

ORGANIZATION	LAST NAME	FIRST NAME	TITLE	LOCATION	STATE
<i>University of New Mexico, Earth Data Analysis Center</i>	Gleasner	Laura	GIS Specialist	Albuquerque	NM
<i>University of New Mexico, Maxwell Museum of Anthropology</i>	Dorr	Brenda	Curator of Archaeology/ Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act Project Director	Albuquerque	NM
<i>Ysleta del Sur Pueblo</i>	Mu oz	Vincent	Governor	El Paso	TX

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CHAPTER 13

Glossary

This glossary lists terms that may not be familiar to some readers of this document. Several sources of definitions are available including *Glossary of Terms used in DOE NEPA Documents* (DOE 1998l) and *Environment, Safety and Health Thesaurus/Dictionary* (DOE 1998k). The last citation is available through the Internet (<http://tis.eh.doe.gov/docs/dict/>).

— A —

Abatement: Reducing the degree or intensity of, or eliminating, pollution.

Absorbed dose: For ionizing radiation, the energy imparted to matter by ionizing radiation per unit mass of irradiated material. The units of absorbed dose are the rad and the gray, where 1 rad equals 0.01 gray.

Accelerator: A device that accelerates the motion of charged particles (such as electrons, protons, or atomic nuclei) to high velocities, thus giving them high kinetic energies. The accelerated particles may be used in industrial and medical applications or in research on nuclear or subnuclear phenomena.

Accident: An unplanned event or sequence of events that result in undesirable consequences.

Advanced components: A part or material that has been improved such that it is considered state-of-the-art.

Advanced manufacturing technologies: The science or study of the technology associated with the design, fabrication, theory, and application of state-of-the-art manufacturing that uses prototype research and development of new technologies.

Advanced materials: A material that has been improved such that it is considered state-of-the-art.

Air dispersion modeling: A mathematical simulation, usually computer-generated, of how gases, vapors, or particles disperse into the air.

Air pollutant: Generally, an airborne substance that could, in high enough concentrations, harm living things or cause damage to materials. From a regulatory perspective, an air pollutant is a

substance for which emissions or atmospheric concentrations are regulated or for which maximum guideline levels have been established due to potential harmful effects on human health and welfare.

Air Quality Control Region (AQCR): Geographic subdivisions of the United States established to regulate pollution on a regional or local level. Some regions span more than one state.

Air quality standards: The level of pollutants prescribed by regulations that may not be exceeded during a specified time in a defined area.

Airblast noise: Noise, typically from the detonation of explosives. The noise is of short duration (less than three seconds) and in the form of an impulse.

Alluvial fan: A fan-shaped accumulation of sediment deposited by flowing water, marking the place where a stream moves from a steep slope to a flatter slope and suddenly loses its transporting power.

Alluvial slope: The sloping surface formed by an alluvial fan.

Alluvium layer: Layer of soil deposited by running water. Typically, alluvium has a high rate of groundwater transmission.

Alpha particle: A positively charged particle ejected spontaneously from the nuclei of some radioactive elements. It has low penetrating power and a short range (a few centimeters in air).

Alpha radiation: A strongly ionizing, but weakly penetrating form of radiation consisting of positively charged alpha particles emitted spontaneously from the nuclei of certain elements during radioactive decay.

– B –

Ambient air: Any unconfined portion of the atmosphere: open air, surrounding air. That portion of the atmosphere, external to buildings, to which the general public has access.

Analytical modeling: Computer-generated mathematical calculations used to determine the potential results of an action.

Aquifer: A body of rock or sediment under the earth's surface that is capable of transmitting groundwater and yielding usable amounts of groundwater to supply wells and springs. A saturated geologic unit through which significant quantities of water can migrate under natural hydraulic gradients.

Archaeological sites (resources): Any material remains of past human life or activities that are of archaeological interest.

Artifact: An object produced or shaped by human workmanship that is of archaeological or historical interest.

As low as reasonably achievable (ALARA): An approach to radiation protection to manage and control exposures (both individual and collective) and releases of radioactive material to the environment to as far below applicable limits as social, technical, economic, practical, and public policy considerations permit. ALARA is not a limit, but a process for minimizing doses to as far below limits as is practicable.

Asphyxiant: Chemical vapors or gases that replace oxygen in air. Chemical asphyxiants prevent oxygen transfer from the blood to body cells. Physical asphyxiants prevent oxygen from reaching the blood.

Atmospheric photochemical reactions: Chemical reactions that occur in the atmosphere and are initiated by sunlight.

Attainment area: An area that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has designated as being in compliance with one or more of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, carbon monoxide, ozone, lead, and particulate matter. An area may be in attainment for some pollutants but not for others.

Background radiation: Radiation from 1) cosmic sources; 2) decay of naturally occurring radioactive materials, including radon (except as a decay product of source or special nuclear material); and 3) global fallout from nuclear weapons as it exists in the environment (such as from the testing of nuclear explosive devices).

Baseline: The existing environmental conditions against which impacts of the alternatives can be compared. For this Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement (SWEIS), the environmental baseline is the environmental condition of the site as it existed in 1997, unless otherwise stated.

Beta radiation: Ionizing radiation consisting of fast moving, positively or negatively charged elementary particles emitted from atomic nuclei during radioactive decay. Beta radiation is more penetrating but less ionizing than alpha radiation.

Bioassay: Using living organisms to measure the effect of a substance, factor, or condition by comparing before and after data. Term is often used to mean cancer bioassays.

Biohazardous waste: Any waste that is capable of transmitting an infectious agent to a living organism. This includes discarded materials such as live and weakened vaccines, blood, excretions or secretions, animal carcasses and animal waste products, hypodermic needles, syringes, and broken glass items such as blood vials.

Biological province: A continuous geographic area that possesses an animal life distinguishable, at the species and subspecies levels, from the animal life of adjacent areas.

Biological resource: Plants, animals, and other living organisms.

Biomass: All the living and once-living material in a given area; often refers to the vegetation.

Bioscience: The science or study of the technology associated with the design, fabrication, theory, and application of biological processes.

Biouptake: Absorption or incorporation of an element or chemical compound, such as lead, dioxin, polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB), or uranium, into a living organism.

Block group: A basic unit of estimated population used by the U.S. Census Bureau to define the demographics of an area. In urban areas, block groups are comprised of clusters of 1 to 4 city blocks, generally containing between 250 and 550 housing units. In rural areas, where population densities are smaller, block groups are larger areas defined by physical features such as rivers, political boundaries (such as city limits or county lines), and other reasonable criteria.

Bounding analysis: An analysis designed to determine an upper limit to potential impacts or risks.

Buffer zone: On Kirtland Air Force Base, the area surrounding a testing site. The size and configuration of a buffer zone is designed to accommodate different types and quantities of explosives and the type(s) of facilities or land use adjacent to the site.

— C —

Cancer: A group of diseases characterized by uncontrolled cellular growth with invasive characteristics, such that the disease can transfer from one organ to another.

Candidate species: Plants and animals that the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service or the National Marine Fisheries Service has sufficient information on biological vulnerability and threats to justify proposing to add them to the threatened and endangered species list, but cannot do so immediately because of the relative listing priority of candidates.

Carbon coating: Surface coating with carbon.

Carbon dioxide (CO₂): A colorless, odorless, nonpoisonous gas that is a normal component of the ambient air; it is a product of normal plant and animal respiration and of the decay of organic matter.

Carbon monoxide (CO): A colorless, odorless gas that is toxic if breathed in high concentration over a period of time. It is formed as the product of the incomplete combustion of hydrocarbons (fuels).

Carcinogen: A substance that can cause or contribute to the production of cancer.

Cathodic protection: A technique to prevent corrosion of metal surfaces.

Centrifuge: A device that spins items in a circle at high velocities (speed), which can be used to simulate high gravity conditions.

Ceramic processing: Operations and activities involving heat-resistant and corrosion-resistant nonmetallic materials.

Chemical plating: A process in which chemicals are used to coat a surface (typically metallic) with another material. The purpose is typically to improve the material properties such as rust protection.

Clean room: An area that is maintained virtually free of contaminants (such as dust or bacteria); used in laboratory work and in the production of precision parts for electronic equipment.

Climatology: The science that deals with climates and investigates their phenomena and causes.

Cobalt array: An arrangement of the metal cobalt that provides low-intensity gamma radiation.

Committed dose equivalent: The dose equivalent to organs or tissues that will be received by an individual during the 50-year period following the intake of radioactive material. It does not include contributions from radiation sources external to the body.

Committed effective dose equivalent: The dose value obtained by multiplying the committed dose equivalent for the organ or tissues that are irradiated and the weighting factors applicable to those organs or tissues, and summing all the resulting products.

Community (biotic): All plants, animals, and living organisms occupying a specific area.

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: A proposed treaty prohibiting nuclear tests of all magnitudes.

Container: Portable devices in which a material is stored, transported, treated, disposed of, or otherwise handled.

Contaminant: Physical, chemical, biological, or radiological substances or matter that may have an adverse effect on air, water, or soil.

Cooling tower: A structure that helps remove heat from water used as a coolant.

Cooperating agency: Any Federal agency, other than the lead agency, that has jurisdiction by law or special expertise over any environmental impact resulting from a proposed Federal action.

Criteria pollutants: An air pollutant that is regulated by National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS). The EPA must describe the characteristics and potential health and welfare effects that form the basis for setting or revising the standard for each regulated pollutant. Criteria pollutants include sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, carbon monoxide, ozone, lead, and particulate matter.

Cultural resources: Prehistoric or historic sites, buildings, structures, districts, or other places or objects (including biota of importance) considered to be important to a culture, subculture, or community for scientific, traditional, or religious purposes or for any other reason. This includes archaeological sites, traditional use areas, and sacred or religious locations.

Cultural resource survey: An inventory across the landscape to find and identify cultural resources and an evaluation of those resources for eligibility for listing on the National Register of Historic Places.

Cumulative impacts: The impacts on the environment that result when the impact of a proposed action is added to the impacts from other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions, regardless of what agency or person undertakes the other actions. Cumulative impacts can result from individually minor, but collectively more significant, actions taking place over a period of time.

– D –

Daughter: The immediate product of the radioactive decay of an element.

Decommission: The process of withdrawing a building, equipment, or a facility from active service.

Decontamination: The actions taken to reduce or remove substances that pose a substantial present or potential future hazard to human health or the environment. Examples are removal of

radioactive or chemical contamination from facilities, equipment, or soils by washing, heating, chemical or electrochemical action, mechanical cleaning, or other techniques.

Deflagration: Burning or causing to burn with intense heat and light.

Degradation: Process by which a chemical or compound is reduced to a less complex form.

Depleted uranium: Uranium whose content of the fissile uranium-235 isotope is less than the 0.7 percent (by weight) found in natural uranium, so that it contains more uranium-238 than natural uranium.

Deposition technologies: Technologies involving laying one material on the surface of another material.

Deuterium: An isotope of hydrogen with a nucleus containing one proton and one neutron. The hydrogen nucleus only contains one proton.

Dielectric materials: Materials that do not conduct direct electrical current.

Diffusion bonding: A process of coating one material with thin layers of another material.

Diurnal: Pertaining to, or occurring in, the day or each day (daily).

Dose (chemical): The amount of a substance administered to, taken up by, or assimilated by an organism. It is often expressed in terms of the amount of substance per unit mass of the organism, tissue, or organ of concern.

Dose (radiological): A generic term meaning absorbed dose, dose equivalent, effective dose equivalent, and committed equivalent dose.

Dosimetry: The theory and application of the principles and techniques involved in measuring and recording radiation doses.

Drainage area: An aboveground land area that supplies water to a particular stream or river.

Drawdown: The lowering of the water table (upper aquifer surface) in response to water withdrawal from the aquifer.

Drinking water standards: The prescribed level of constituents or characteristics in a drinking water supply that cannot be exceeded legally.

— E —

- Ecosystem:** A community of organisms and their physical environment interacting as an ecological unit.
- Effluent:** Treated or untreated air emissions or liquid discharges.
- Eligible cultural resource:** A cultural resource that has been evaluated and reviewed by an agency and the State Historic Preservation Officer and determined eligible for inclusion in the National Register of Historic Places, based on the criteria of significance and eligibility.
- Emergency response planning guideline level 2 (ERPG-2):** The ERPG-2 is the maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to one hour without experiencing or developing irreversible or other serious health effects or symptoms that could impair their abilities to take protective action.
- Emission standards:** Requirements established by a state, local government, or the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator that limits the quantity, rate, or concentration of emissions of air pollutants on a continuous basis.
- Emissions:** Pollution discharged into the atmosphere from smoke stacks, other vents, and surface areas of commercial or industrial facilities, residential chimneys, and vehicle exhausts.
- Encapsulate:** Enclose by a protective coating or membrane.
- Endangered species:** Plants or animals that are in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of their ranges and that have been listed as endangered by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service or the National Marine Fisheries Service following the procedures outlined in the *Endangered Species Act* and its implementing regulations.
- Environmental assessment:** A public document that a Federal agency prepares under the *National Environmental Policy Act* (NEPA) to provide sufficient evidence and analysis to determine whether a proposed agency action would require preparation of an environmental impact statement (EIS) or finding of no significant impact (FONSI).
- Environmental impact statement (EIS):** The detailed written statement that is required by section 102(2) of the *National Environmental Policy Act* (NEPA) for a proposed major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. A U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) EIS is prepared in accordance with applicable requirements of the Council on Environmental Quality NEPA regulations in 40 CFR Parts 1500-1508, and DOE NEPA regulations in 10 CFR Part 1021.
- Environmental justice:** The fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies. Fair treatment means no group of people, including racial, ethnic, or socioeconomic groups, should bear a disproportionate share of the negative environmental consequences resulting from industrial, municipal, and commercial operations or the execution of Federal, state, local, and tribal programs and policies.
- Ephemeral:** Lasting for a brief period of time, as in a temporary stream.
- Epidemiology:** The science concerned with the study of events that determine and influence the frequency, distribution, and causes of disease, injury, and other health-related events in a defined human population.
- Erosion:** The wearing away of land surfaces by the action of wind or water.
- Exotic species:** Species of plants and animals that are not native to a region. They often displace native species and may become pests.
- Explosion (conventional):** A chemical reaction or change of state that occurs in a exceedingly short time with the generation of high temperatures and large quantities of gaseous reaction products.
- Explosion (nuclear):** An explosion for which the energy is produced by a nuclear transformation, either fission or fusion. The term typically implies the release of enormous amounts (kilotons) of energy.

Exposure pathways: The course a chemical or physical agent takes from the source to the exposed organism. An exposure pathway describes a mechanism by which an individual or population is exposed to chemicals or physical agents at or originating from the site.

— F —

Fast-burst reactor: An operational mode of a reactor that releases fast energy in a short period of time.

Fault: A fracture or a zone of fractures within a rock formation along which vertical, horizontal, or transverse slippage has occurred.

Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI): A document prepared by a Federal agency, briefly presenting the reasons that a proposed action will not have a significant effect on the human environment; and, therefore, will not require an environmental impact statement.

Firing: The release of energy by an accelerator.

Fissile Material: Any material fissionable by low-energy neutrons consisting of or containing one or more of the fissile (capable of being split or divided) radionuclides: plutonium-239 and -241 and uranium-233 and -235. Neither natural nor depleted uranium is a fissile material. Fissile materials are classified according to the controls needed to provide nuclear criticality safety during storage and transportation.

Fissionable: A synonym for fissile material; the meaning of this term has been extended to include material that can be fissioned by fast neutrons such as uranium-238.

Flight dynamics: The study of aerodynamics and/or conditions of flight associated with airplanes, jets, or missiles.

Floodplain: The lowlands and relatively flat areas adjoining inland and coastal waters and the flood-prone areas of offshore islands including, at a minimum, that area inundated by a 1-percent or greater chance flood in any given year. The base floodplain is defined as the 100-year (1-percent) floodplain. The critical action floodplain is defined as the 500-year (0.2- percent) floodplain.

Fuel throughput: The amount of fuel used in a process over a period of time (for example, annual).

Fume hood: An enclosed ventilation system used to protect workers from inhaling fumes or vapors.

Fusion: A nuclear reaction during which light nuclei are fused together to form a heavier nucleus, accompanied by the release of immense amounts of energy and fast neutrons.

Fuzing: Mechanical or electrical means used to deteriorate an explosive charge.

— G —

Gamma rays: High-energy, short-wavelength, electromagnetic radiation accompanying fission and emitted from the nucleus of an atom. Gamma rays are very penetrating and can be stopped only by dense materials (such as lead) or a thick layer of shielding materials.

Geologic disposal: A system that is intended to be used for, or may be used for, the disposal of radioactive wastes.

Geology: The science of the earth: the materials, processes, environments, and history of the planet, including the rocks and their formation and structure.

Geophysics: The science of the earth with respect to its structure, composition, and development.

Geoscience: A term encompassing all the sciences dealing with the materials, processes, environments, and history of the earth and planets, including geology, geophysics, geochemistry, and paleontology.

Glove box: An enclosure that provides a barrier for remote handling of hazardous materials. The term glove box refers to the gloves that extend inward into the box such that the technicians can handle tools and materials without dermal (skin) contact.

Graphite converter: An electronic device that converts energy frequencies.

Groundwater: Subsurface water supply in the saturated zone below the level of the water table.

— H —

Habitat: The place or area where populations of plants, animals, and other organisms normally live.

Half-life: The time required for one-half of a specified substance to degrade or become inert.

Hazardous air pollutants: Air pollutants that are not covered by ambient air quality standards, but that may present a threat of adverse human health effects or adverse environmental effects.

Hazardous chemical: Under 29 CFR §1910.1200(c), a hazardous chemical is defined as “any chemical, which is a physical hazard or a health hazard.” Physical hazards include combustible liquids, compressed gases, explosives, flammables, organic peroxides, oxidizers, pyrophorics, and reactives. A health hazard is any chemical for which there is good evidence that acute or chronic health effects occur in exposed employees. Hazardous chemicals include carcinogens, toxic or highly toxic agents, reproductive toxins, irritants, corrosives, sensitizers, hepatotoxins, nephrotoxins, agents that act on the hematopoietic system, and agents that damage the lungs, skin, eyes, or mucous membranes.

Hazardous material: A material, including a hazardous substance, as defined by 49 CFR §171.8, that poses an unreasonable risk to health, safety, and property when transported or handled.

Hazardous/toxic waste: Any solid waste (can also be semisolid or liquid or contain gaseous material) having the characteristics of ignitability, corrosivity, toxicity, or reactivity, defined by the *Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)* or by the *Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)*.

Heat exchanger: A device used to transfer heat from one material or process to another material or process. Examples include a car radiator, heat pump, and solar panels used to heat water. Industrial uses are extensive.

Heat response: The science or study of material properties involving heat.

Henry’s Law: At a given temperature, the solubility of a gas in a liquid is directly proportional to the pressure of the gas above the liquid.

High bay: A specially designed room with a high ceiling. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) typically designs these rooms for industrial work that involves explosives, radioactive materials, and material processing.

High efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter: A device used to remove particles from the air with a specified minimum efficiency.

High explosives: A type of explosive that detonates under the influence of a high-pressure shock or by the explosion of a suitable primary explosive (for example, trinitrotoluene [TNT] and nitroglycerin).

High voltage technology: The science or study of the technology associated with the design, fabrication, theory, and application of high potential (voltage) electrical energy. At Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico (SNL/NM), research and development activities involve protecting materials, components, and systems from failure.

Highly enriched uranium: Uranium in which the abundance of the uranium-235 isotope is increased well above normal (naturally occurring) levels.

High neutron fluence: A high flow of neutrons.

Historic sites (resources): Cultural resources produced after the arrival of the Spanish into the middle Rio Grande valley, but earlier than 50 years ago. For the Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement (SWEIS), this would be a site dating from A.D. 1540 to 1948. Historic sites may also include resources dating after 1948 if they are considered to be exceptionally significant.

Hydraulic conductivity: The ability of soil or other material to transmit water.

Hydrogeologic region: A sequence of hydrostratigraphic units, bounded by faults, with distinctive hydrogeologic characteristics such as depth to groundwater or hydraulic conductivity.

Hydrologic surface connection: A connection between two hydrologic regimes, for example, between the groundwater and an arroyo or spring.

Hydrology: The science dealing with the properties, distribution, and circulation of natural water systems.

– I –

Inductive voltage technology: The science or study of the technology associated with the design, fabrication, theory, and application of indirectly changing (inducing) voltage from one system to another.

Inertial confinement: The science or study of the technology associated with the design, fabrication, theory, and application of confining energy associated with acceleration.

Inertial confinement fusion: A laser-initiated nuclear fusion, using the inertial properties of the reactants as a confinement mechanism.

Infrastructure: The basic facilities, services, and installations needed for the functioning of a city, plant, or other facility (such as transportation and communication systems).

Inorganic: Materials that generally do not contain carbon atoms and are not associated with living plants and animals and metals are typical examples of inorganic substances.

Ion: An atom or molecule with a positive or negative electrical charge.

Ion-exchange: The process by which atoms or molecules are exchanged based on differences in electrical potential (voltage) or charge (for example, batteries, photo processing, and water treatment).

Irradiation: The process of exposing a substance to radiation.

Isotope: Any of two or more variations of an element in which the nuclei have the same number of protons but a different number of neutrons so that their atomic masses differ.

– J –

Joining: A process that combines materials, such as bonding.

– K –

Ketones: A type of organic compound with a carbonyl group attached to two carbon atoms, typically aromatic.

– L –

Laminates: Several thin layers of material united by an adhesive or other means.

Landforms: A land feature, such as a plain, mountain, or valley.

Lapping: Polishing or smoothing a surface.

Legacy chemical: A chemical with an expired shelf life (a waste).

Light water: Ordinary water (H₂O), as distinguished from heavy water (D₂O) that contains deuterium (an isotope of hydrogen).

Low bay: A specially designed room with a normal ceiling height (approximately 10 ft). Also see definition of High bay.

Low-level waste (LLW): Radioactive waste that is not high-level waste, transuranic waste, spent nuclear fuel, or byproduct tailings from the processing of uranium or thorium.

– M –

Magnetic fusion: The science or study of the technology associated with the design, fabrication, theory, and application of combining atoms through magnetic forces.

Major source: Any stationary source or group of stationary sources in which all of the pollutant-emitting activities at such source emit, or have the potential to emit, 100 or more tons per year of any air pollutants.

Maximally exposed individual: A hypothetical person who could potentially receive the maximum dose of radiation or hazardous chemicals.

Maximum contaminant level: The maximum permissible level of a contaminant in water delivered to any user of a public water system.

Medical isotope: A radioactive element (atom) used for medical purposes.

Metalizing: A process by which a material's metallic properties are improved.

Meteorology: The science dealing with the dynamics of the atmosphere and its phenomena, especially relating to weather.

Microelectronics: Integrated circuits and electronic devices constructed of individual circuit elements with dimensions of micrometers (10^{-6} meters [m]) on a carrier with dimensions of a centimeter (10^{-2} m).

Microtechnology: The science or study of the technology associated with the design, fabrication, theory, and application involving very small structures, circuits, and materials.

Mission: An objective. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has four missions (or business lines): national security, energy resources, environmental quality, and science and technology.

Mitigation: Mitigation includes: 1) avoiding an impact altogether by not taking a certain action or parts of an action; 2) minimizing impacts by limiting the degree or magnitude of an action and its implementation; 3) rectifying an impact by repairing, rehabilitating, or restoring the affected environment; 4) reducing or eliminating the impact over time by preservation and maintenance operations during the life of an action; or 5) compensating for an impact by replacing or providing substitute resources or environmental.

Mixed waste: Waste that contains both “hazardous waste” and “radioactive waste” as defined in this glossary.

– N –

National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS): Standards defining the highest allowable levels of certain pollutants in the ambient air. Because the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) must establish the criteria for setting these standards, the regulated pollutants are called criteria pollutants.

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air

Pollutants (NESHAP): Emissions standards set by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for air pollutants that are not covered by National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) and that may, at sufficiently high levels, cause increased fatalities, irreversible health effects, or incapacitating illness.

National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System

(NPDES): A provision of the *Clean Water Act* that prohibits discharge of pollutants into waters of the United States unless a special permit is issued by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); a state; or, where delegated, a tribal government on an Indian reservation. The NPDES permit lists either permissible discharge, the level of cleanup technology required for wastewater, or both.

National Register of Historic Places: The official list of the Nation's cultural resources that are considered worthy of preservation. The National Park Service maintains the list under direction of the Secretary of the Interior. Buildings, structures, objects, sites, and districts are included in the National Register for their importance in American history, architecture, archeology, culture, or engineering. Properties included on the National Register range from large-scale, monumentally proportioned buildings to smaller scale, regionally distinctive buildings.

Near-fission: A close simulation of fission (or splitting of an atom) without actually splitting atoms.

Near-fission spectrum radiation: Radiation used during testing that simulates radiation generated through fission.

Neotropical migrants: Birds that seasonally migrate to nesting or wintering areas in the neotropical region extending from the northern edge of the tropical forest in Mexico south to Cape Horn in South America.

Neutron: An uncharged elementary particle with a mass slightly greater than that of the proton, found in the nucleus of every atom heavier than hydrogen-1.

Neutron generator: A device that initiates nuclear fission by providing a flux of neutrons at the proper time. A neutron generator consists of a neutron tube, miniature accelerator, power supply, and timer.

Neutron science: The science or study of technology associated with equipment design, equipment fabrication, theory, and application of neutrons.

Neutron tube: A component (part) of a neutron generator.

Nonattainment area: An area that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has designated as not meeting (that is, not being in attainment of) one or more of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for criteria pollutants. An area may be in attainment for some pollutants, but not others.

Nonhazardous chemical waste: Chemical waste not defined as a *Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)* hazardous waste.

Noninvolved worker: A worker who would be near the site of an action but would not participate in the action.

Nonnuclear component: Any one of thousands of parts, not containing radioactive or fissile material (plutonium-239, uranium-233, or uranium-235), that are required in a nuclear weapon.

Nonproliferation: Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon materials, and nuclear weapon technology.

Notice of Intent (NOI): A notice published in the *Federal Register* that an environmental impact statement (EIS) would be prepared and considered. An NOI describes the proposed action and alternatives and the Federal agency's scoping process, and states the name and address of the person within the agency who can answer questions about the proposed action and EIS.

Nuclear component: A part of a nuclear weapon that contains fissionable or fusionable material.

Nuclear material: A composite term applied to 1) special nuclear material; 2) source material such as uranium or thorium or ores containing uranium or thorium; and 3) byproduct material, which is

any radioactive material that is made radioactive by exposure to the radiation incident to the process of producing or using special nuclear material.

Nuclear medicine: The science of medicine specializing in nuclear materials, including medical isotopes.

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: A treaty with the aim of controlling the spread of nuclear weapons technologies, limiting the number of nuclear weapons states, and pursuing, in good faith, effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race. The treaty does not invoke stockpile reductions by nuclear states, and it does not address actions of nuclear states in maintaining their stockpiles.

Nuclear weapon: Any weapon in which the explosion results from the energy released by reactions involving atomic nuclei (fission, fusion, or both).

Nuclear weapons complex: The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) sites supporting the research, development, design, manufacture, testing, assessment, certification, and maintenance of the Nation's nuclear weapons and the subsequent dismantling of retired weapons.



Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA): The Federal agency that oversees and regulates workplace health and safety, created by *Occupational Safety and Health Act* of 1970.

Opticals: Light-sensitive devices.

Ordnance: Material, including explosives, ammunition, and related equipment.

Organic chemicals: Chemicals that are based on bonds with the carbon atom. Organics can have certain properties, such as volatility, that are not typically associated with inorganics.

Outgassing: Occurs when a solid material loses embedded gas. This can be accelerated by heating a material or reducing pressure.

Ozone: The triatomic form of oxygen. In the stratosphere, ozone protects the earth from the sun's ultraviolet rays; but in lower levels of the atmosphere, ozone is considered an air pollutant.

– P-Q –

- Packaging:** One or more receptacles and wrappers and their contents including absorbent materials, spacing structures, thermal insulation, radiation shielding, and devices for cooling or absorbing mechanical shocks. The assembly of one or more containers and any other components necessary to ensure compliance.
- Paleozoic era:** Geologic time dating from 570 million to 245 million years ago when seed-bearing plants, amphibians, and reptiles first appeared.
- Palynology:** The study of spores and pollen. Such studies are useful in archaeological contexts to reconstruct past environments or to determine plant use by past cultures.
- Particle beam:** A beam of atoms or subatomic particles that have been accelerated by a particle accelerating device.
- Particulate matter:** Any finely divided solid or liquid material, other than uncombined water.
- Person-rem:** A unit of collective radiation dose applied to populations or groups of individuals; that is, a unit for expressing the dose when summed across all persons in a specified population or group.
- Photolithography:** A printing process using plates made according to a photographic image.
- Photometrics:** The science or study of the technology associated with the design, fabrication, theory, and application involving the measurement of the properties of light.
- Photonics:** The science or study of the technology associated with the design, fabrication, theory, and application of light energy generally having no mass and no electrical charge.
- Plasma radiation:** Emissions of electrically neutral, highly ionized gas composed of ions, electrons, and neutron particles.
- Plume:** Visible or measurable discharges of a contaminant from a given point or area of origin into environmental media.
- Plutonium:** A heavy, radioactive, metallic element with the atomic number 94. It is produced artificially by neutron bombardment of uranium. Plutonium has 15 isotopes with atomic masses ranging from 232 to 246 and half-lives from 20 minutes to 76 million years. Its most important isotope is fissile plutonium-239.
- Potting compounds:** Filler material.
- Precambrian era:** The oldest division of geologic time characterized by the appearance of primitive forms of life. This era began about 3.5 billion years ago and ended about 500 million years ago.
- Prehistoric site (resources):** For the Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement (SWEIS), cultural resources produced before the arrival of the Spanish into the middle Rio Grande valley in A.D. 1540.
- Primary explosive:** A type of explosive that can explode or detonate when subjected to an energy-input stimulus such as heat, friction, spark, shock, or low-velocity impact. It does not burn. Primary explosives include mercury fulminate and lead oxide.
- Programmatic environmental impact statement:** A broad-scope environmental impact statement that identifies and assesses the environmental impacts of a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) program.
- Proliferation:** The spread of nuclear weapons and the materials and technologies used to produce them.
- Propellant:** Fuels and oxidizers physically or chemically combined that undergo combustion to provide propulsion.
- Proposed species:** Any species of fish, wildlife, or plant that is proposed in the *Federal Register* to be listed under Section 4 of the *Endangered Species Act*.
- Prototypical stack:** A model stack (or exhaust location) used in air quality modeling.
- Pulsed-power technologies:** The science or study of the technology associated with the design, fabrication, theory, and application of accelerators and reactors that generate bursts of energy.
- Pulsed-power accelerator:** A single-shot device that accelerates large numbers of particles (energy) in a very short period.
- Pulsed-power:** Electrical energy that is delivered in short, high-energy bursts.

Pyrotechnics: The art of manufacturing or setting off explosives.

– R –

Radiant Heat Facility: A Sandia National Laboratories/ New Mexico (SNL/NM) facility located in Technical Area-III where items are exposed to heat typically found in fires.

Radiation absorbed dose (rad): A unit of radiation absorbed dose. One rad is equal to an absorbed dose of 0.01 joules per kilogram.

Radiation: The particles (alpha, beta, neutrons, and other subatomic particles) or photons (such as gamma rays and X-rays) emitted from the nucleus of unstable atoms as a result of radioactive decay.

Radioactive waste: In general, waste that is managed because of its radioactive content. Waste material that contains special nuclear or byproduct material is subject to regulation as radioactive waste under the *Atomic Energy Act*.

Radioactivity: The spontaneous decay or disintegration of unstable atomic nuclei, accompanied by the emission of radiation.

Radiograph: An image produced by X-rays passing through an object.

Radioisotope or Radionuclide: An unstable isotope that undergoes spontaneous transformations, emitting radiation.

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) hazardous waste: A hazardous waste, as defined by RCRA, is a solid waste, or combination of solid wastes, which, because of its quantity, concentration, physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may 1) cause or significantly contribute to an increasing mortality or increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating irreversible, illness; or 2) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, disposed of, or otherwise managed.

Recharge: The process by which water is added to a zone of saturation, usually by percolation from the soil surface.

Record of Decision (ROD): A public document that records a Federal agency’s decision on a proposed action for which the agency has prepared an environmental impact statement. A ROD identifies the alternatives considered in reaching the decision, the environmentally preferable alternative(s), factors balanced by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in making the decision, whether all practicable means to avoid or minimize environmental harm have been adopted, and if not, why they were not.

Region of influence: A geographic area within which project activities may affect a particular resource.

Rem: See “Roentgen equivalent, man.”

Remediation: The process, or a phase in the process, of rendering areas contaminated by radioactive, hazardous, or mixed waste environmentally safe, whether through processing, entombment, or other methods.

Renewable energy: Energy that does not consume a fuel. Examples include solar, geothermal, and hydroelectric.

Resource area: Analyses in the Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement (SWEIS) are grouped into two categories: resource areas (for example, infrastructure, geology and soils, and water resources) and topic areas (for example, transportation, waste generation, and accidents).

Riparian: Areas adjacent to rivers and streams that have a high density, diversity, and productivity of plant and animal species relative to nearby uplands.

Risk: The probability of a detrimental effect from exposure to a hazard. Risk is often expressed quantitatively as the probability of an adverse event occurring multiplied by the consequence of the event. However, separate presentation of probability and consequences is often more informative.

Robotics: The science or study of the technology associated with the design, fabrication, theory, and application of robots.

Roentgen: A unit of exposure to ionizing X- or gamma radiation equal to or producing 1 electrostatic unit of charge per cubic centimeter of air. It is approximately equal to 1 rad (a standard unit of absorbed dose of radiation).

Roentgen equivalent, man: A unit of dose equivalent. The dose equivalent in rems equals the absorbed dose in rads in tissue multiplied by the appropriate quality factor and possibly other modifying factors.

Runoff: The portion of rainfall, melted snow, or irrigation water that flows across the ground surface and eventually enters streams.

– S –

Scoping: An early and open process for determining the scope of issues to be addressed in an environmental impact statement and for identifying the significant issues related to a proposed action.

Section 106 process: A *National Historic Preservation Act* (16 U.S.C. §470 *et seq.*) review process used to identify, evaluate, and protect cultural resources eligible for nomination to the National Register of Historic Places that may be affected by Federal actions or undertakings.

Sedimentary fill: Subsurface loosely arranged rock made up of gravels, sands, silts, and clays.

Seismic: Pertaining to any earth vibration, especially related to an earthquake.

Semiconductors: Any of various solid crystalline substances having electrical conductivity greater than insulators but less than good conductors.

Sensitive species: Species within New Mexico that deserve special consideration in management and planning, but are not listed as threatened or endangered. Also, a species designated by the U.S. Forest Service whose population viability is a concern based on current or predicted numbers, density, distribution, or habitat capability.

Silica: A white or colorless crystalline compound.

Silicon chip: A nonmetallic semiconductor.

Silt: A sedimentary material consisting of fine mineral particles, intermediate in size between sand and clay.

Site-wide environmental impact statement (SWEIS): A legal document prepared in accordance with the requirements of 102(2)(c) of the *National*

Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) which evaluates the environmental impacts of many actions at one large, multiple-facility U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) site. SWEISs are used to support specific decisions.

Socioeconomics: The science or study of social and economic effects.

Source parameters: Quantitative descriptions of properties of a substance that is entering the natural environment. An example of a source parameter is the mass of material available to enter the environment.

Special nuclear materials: As defined in Section 11 of the *Atomic Energy Act of 1954*, special nuclear material means 1) plutonium, uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, and any other material that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission determines to be special nuclear material; or 2) any material artificially enriched by any of the foregoing.

Specialty transmission line: Advanced technology electrical transmission lines.

Species of Concern: Species for which further biological research and field studies are needed to resolve their conservation status.

Spent nuclear fuel: Fuel that has been withdrawn from a nuclear reactor following irradiation, the constituent elements of which have not been separated.

Stack monitors: Air quality monitors placed in or near a ventilation discharge system.

START I and II: Terms that refer to negotiations between the U.S. and Russia (the former Soviet Union during START I negotiations) aimed at limiting and reducing nuclear arms. START I discussions began in 1982 and eventually led to a ratified treaty in 1988. The START II protocol, which has not been fully ratified, will attempt to further reduce the acceptable levels of nuclear weapons ratified in START I.

State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO): A position in each U.S. state that coordinates state participation in the *National Historic Preservation Act* (16 U.S.C. §470 *et seq.*). The SHPO is a key participant in the Section 106 process, assisting in identifying eligible resources, evaluating effects of undertakings, and developing mitigation measures or management plans to reduce any adverse effects to eligible cultural resources.

Steel containment box: One of several large steel cubicles that comprise the “hot cell” used to perform work involving highly radioactive material. The steel boxes are located behind thick concrete shield walls with special shielded windows to view inside. Personnel located behind the shield walls perform work inside the boxes using manipulator arm devices.

Steppe: A semi-arid, grass-covered, and generally treeless plain.

Superconductors: Materials that efficiently transmit large quantities of electricity with minimal losses.

Surface water: Water on the earth’s surface, as distinguished from water in the ground (groundwater).

– T –

Target: Item to be tested or radiated.

Telemetry: The science and technology of automatic measurement and transmission of data by wire, radio, or other means from remote sources.

Thermal batteries: Devices that provide heat without mechanical means.

Threatened species: Any plants or animals that are likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of their ranges and that have been listed as threatened by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service or the National Marine Fisheries Service.

Threshold limit values: The recommended concentrations of contaminants workers may be exposed to according to the American Council of Governmental Industrial Hygienists.

Throughput: The number of items undergoing a process, or the amount of material consumed by a process.

Total effective dose equivalent: The sum of the effective dose equivalent (for external exposures) and the committed effective dose equivalent (for internal exposures).

Traditional cultural property: A significant place or object that is associated with historic or cultural practices or beliefs of a living community, is rooted in that community’s history, and is important in maintaining the continuing cultural identity of the community.

Transient signals: A phenomenon or property of electrical current, which decays with time.

Transport pathways: The environmental media, such as groundwater, soil, or air, by which a contaminant is moved (for example, chemicals carried in the air or dissolved in groundwater and moved along by wind or groundwater).

Transuranic (TRU): An atom with an atomic number greater than uranium (92). Examples include plutonium and californium.

Transuranic (TRU) waste: Without regard to source or form, waste contaminated with alpha-emitting TRU radionuclides with half-lives greater than 20 years and concentrations greater than 100 nanocuries/gram at the time of assay.

Traveling pressure waves: Moving sound waves are actually compressed and decompressed air. The movement (or wave) is similar to water waves formed by an object dropped into water.

Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) hazardous waste: TSCA hazardous waste is waste generated from TSCA materials exceeding identified limits in the Act and supporting regulations. Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico (SNL/NM) manages two TSCA-regulated materials: polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and asbestos. The bulk of TSCA wastes generated at SNL/NM come from decontamination and decommissioning activities.

Turbidity: A cloudy condition in water due to suspended silt or organic matter.

– U –

Unmoderated cylindrical assembly: A cylinder shaped reactor that does not require water (or other material) to manage the speed of the reaction.

Unsaturated zone: A subsurface porous region of the earth in which the pore space is not filled with water.

Utility chase: A structure (may be enclosed) in which groups of utility lines make long straight horizontal or vertical runs.

– V –

Vacuum processing: Material processing under vacuum (very low-pressure) conditions.

Vapor honing: Smoothing surfaces with vapors.

Vapor phase transport: A chemical that is present as a gas and is moving (being transported) in the environment in the gaseous (or vapor) phase.

Volatile organic compounds (VOC): A broad range of organic compounds, often halogenated, that vaporize at typical background or relatively low temperatures, such as benzene, chloroform, and methyl alcohol, and other solvents.

Volumetric moisture content: The fraction of soil volume, usually in the vadose (or unsaturated) zone, that is water (or moisture). In the saturated zone, all pore spaces are filled with water so that the volumetric moisture content is equal to the fraction of soil that is pore space (that is, the porosity).

– W –

Wafer: Another word for a computer chip.

Waste characterization: The identification of waste composition and properties by reviewing process knowledge, nondestructive examination, non-destructive assay, or sampling and analysis. Characterization provides the basis for determining appropriate storage, treatment, handling, transportation, and disposal requirements.

Water makeup system: An automatic system that adds water to a process as needed to maintain the desired conditions.

Water table: The boundary between the two zones below the surface of the earth, the upper unsaturated zone and the deeper saturated zone.

Weapons component degradation: The aging, corroding, or weakening of a component or material.

Wetland: An area that is inundated by surface or groundwater with a frequency sufficient to support and, under normal circumstances, does or would support a prevalence of vegetation or aquatic life that requires saturated or seasonally saturated soil conditions for growth and reproduction.

Wildlife corridor: Passageways used by animals to move between various parts of their home range or, during migration, to move from summer (breeding) to winter ranges.

Withdrawn Area: The eastern portion of KAFB, totaling 20,486 acres and consisting of land within the Cibola National Forest, which has been withdrawn from public access for use by the U.S. Air Force (15,891 acres) and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) (4,595 acres).

– X-Y-Z

X-ray: A high-energy photon.

Z-pinch mode: A type of high-energy accelerator.

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that the Task Force meet as soon as possible to meet the priority objectives of the Secretary of Defense and to ensure that findings and recommendations are cognizant of and coordinated with the Quadrennial Review process and the proceedings of the National Defense Panel.

Dated: May 23, 1997.

L.M. Bynum,

Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.

[FR Doc. 97-14114 Filed 5-29-97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 5000-04-M

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

Notice of Proposed Information Collection Requests

AGENCY: Department of Education.

ACTION: Proposed collection; comment request.

SUMMARY: The Director, Information Resources Management Group, invites comments on the proposed information collection requests as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995.

DATES: Interested persons are invited to submit comments on or before July 29, 1997.

ADDRESSES: Written comments and requests for copies of the proposed information collection requests should be addressed to Patrick J. Sherrill, Department of Education, 600 Independence Avenue, S.W., Room 5624, Regional Office Building 3, Washington, DC 20202-4651.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Patrick J. Sherrill (202) 708-8196.

Individuals who use a telecommunications device for the deaf (TDD) may call the Federal Information Relay Service (FIRS) at 1-800-877-8339 between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m., Eastern time, Monday through Friday.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Section 3506 of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U. S. C. Chapter 35) requires that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provide interested Federal agencies and the public an early opportunity to comment on information collection requests. OMB may amend or waive the requirement for public participation in the approval process would defeat the purpose of the information collection, violate State or Federal law, or substantially interfere with any agency's ability to perform its statutory obligations. The Director, Information Resources Management Group publishes this notice containing proposed information collection

requests prior to submission of these requests to OMB. Each proposed information collection, grouped by office, contains the following: (1) Type of review requested, e.g., new, revision, extension, existing or reinstatement; (2) Title; (3) Summary of the collection; (4) Description of the need for, and proposed use of, the information; (5) Respondents and frequency of collection; and (6) Reporting and/or Recordkeeping burden. OMB invites public comment at the address specified above. Copies of the requests are available from Patrick J. Sherrill at the address specified above.

The Department of Education is especially interested in public comment addressing the following issues: (1) Is this collection necessary to the proper functions of the Department, (2) will this information be processed and used in a timely manner, (3) is the estimate of burden accurate, (4) how might the Department enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected, and (5) how might the Department minimize the burden of this collection on the respondents, including through the use of information technology.

Dated: May 23, 1997.

Gloria Parker,

Director, Information Resources Management Group.

Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services

Type of Review: Reinstatement.

Title: U.S. Department of Education Reporting Form for Projects With Industry (PWI) Compliance Indicators and Annual Evaluation Plan.

Frequency: Annually.

Affected Public: Business or other for-profit; Non-profit institutions; State, local or Tribal Gov't, SEAs or LEAs.

Annual Reporting and Recordkeeping Hour Burden:

Responses: 105.

Burden Hours: 4,200.

Abstract: This form collects data to evaluate the performance of PWI grant recipients with respect to their compliance with evaluation standards mandated by Congress, to enable the Rehabilitation Services Administration (RSA) to meet annual statutory reporting requirements, and to enable RSA to make determinations regarding continued eligibility.

[FR Doc. 97-14138 Filed 5-29-97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4000-01-P

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement; Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Notice of intent.

SUMMARY: The Department of Energy (DOE) announces its intent to prepare a Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement (SWEIS) for its Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico (SNL/NM), a DOE research and development laboratory located on Kirtland Air Force Base (KAFB) in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The SWEIS will address operations and activities that DOE foresees at SNL/NM for approximately the next 10 years. The U.S. Air Force will participate as a cooperating agency. The purpose of this Notice is to invite public participation in the process and to encourage public dialogue on alternatives that should be considered.

DATES: The DOE invites other Federal agencies, Native American tribes, State and local governments, and the general public to comment on the scope of this SWEIS. The public scoping period starts with the publication of this Notice in the *Federal Register* and will continue until July 14, 1997. DOE will consider all comments received or postmarked by that date in defining the scope of this SWEIS. Comments received or postmarked after that date will be considered to the extent practicable. Public scoping meetings are scheduled to be held as follows:

June 23, 1997, 1:00 p.m.-4:00pm and 6:00 p.m.-9:00pm, UNM Continuing Education Conference Center, 1634 University Blvd. NE; Albuquerque, NM

The purpose of these meetings is to receive oral and written comments from the public. The meetings will use a format to facilitate dialogue between DOE and the public and will provide an opportunity for individuals to provide written or oral statements. The DOE will publish additional notices on the date, times, and location of the scoping meetings in local newspapers in advance of the scheduled meetings. Any necessary changes will be announced in the local media.

In addition to providing oral comments at the public scoping meetings, all interested parties are invited to record their comments, ask questions concerning the SNL/NM SWEIS, or request to be placed on the SNL/NM SWEIS mailing or document distribution list by leaving a message on the SNL/NM SWEIS Hotline at (toll free)

1±888±635±7305. The Hotline will have instructions on how to record your comments and requests.

ADDRESSES: Written comments or suggestions concerning the scope of the SNL/NM SWEIS should be directed to: Ms. Donna A. Bergman, U.S.

Department of Energy, Albuquerque Operations Office, P.O. Box 5400, Albuquerque, New Mexico, 87185±5444, or by facsimile at (505) 845±6392. For express delivery services, the appropriate address is Pennsylvania and H Streets, Kirtland Air Force Base, Albuquerque, NM 87116.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on the SWEIS and the public scoping process, contact Donna Bergman at the address and facsimile number listed above.

For information on DOE's NEPA process, please contact: Carol Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Assistance (EH±42), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20585. Ms. Borgstrom can be reached at (202) 586±4600, by facsimile at (202) 586±7031, or by leaving a message at 1±800±472±2756.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Invitation to Comment

The public is invited to participate in the scoping process and is encouraged to comment on the preliminary alternatives and issues identified for the SNL/NM SWEIS.

Availability of Scoping Documents

Copies of all written comments and transcripts of all oral comments will be available at the following location: Albuquerque Technical-Vocational Institute (TVI), Montoya Campus Library, 4700 Morris NE, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87111.

SNL/NM's Mission

DOE is responsible for the Federal Government's nuclear weapons program, research and development of energy technologies, and basic science research. SNL/NM is one of DOE's primary research, development, and test laboratories. It was established in 1947 to support the U.S. weapons development program. Its purpose was to organize and perform engineering activities for development of nuclear and nonnuclear weapons; testing of new designs; and surveillance tests. Today, it remains one of the three national laboratories in DOE's nuclear weapons complex. Responsibilities in support of nuclear weapons activities include design, certification, and assessment of non-nuclear subsystems of nuclear

weapons; systems integration; safety, security, reliability, and use control; direction and support to production plants regarding issues associated with production and dismantlement of nuclear weapons; production and/or acquisition of weapons components; surveillance and support of weapons in the stockpile; and work in nuclear intelligence, nonproliferation, and treaty verification technologies. Nonweapons research and science services are provided in areas including waste management, environmental restoration, hazardous and radioactive material transportation, energy efficiency and renewable energy, nuclear energy, fossil energy, magnetic fusion, basic energy sciences, and biological and environmental research. Additional activities include energy and environment technologies; other engineering research; and work-for-others.

SNL/NM operations are located primarily in five technical areas (TA) and the Coyote Test Facility, all of which are surrounded by KAFB. Activities/operations in specific areas are as follows:

TA I∅Manufacturing/production activities, such as the microelectronics development laboratory and the neutron generator facility; environmental testing; facilities engineering; laboratory space; office space.

TA II∅Light laboratory activities; environmental restoration.

TA III∅Field test facilities; explosives testing operations; destructive testing operations; high energy testing operations.

TA IV∅Radiation effects experimentation; accelerator operations [high-energy radiation megavolt electron source (HERMES), x-ray source (Saturn)]; electromagnetic analysis.

TA V∅Nuclear safety and system analysis; Annular Core Research Reactor; Gamma Irradiation Facility; radioisotope production (molybdenum-99).

Coyote Test Facility∅Explosives testing; thermal testing; shock/blast testing; and large scale impact testing.

SNL/NM has an annual budget of approximately \$1 billion and employs approximately 8,700 people. SNL/NM is surrounded by KAFB, and occupies 2,842 acres owned by the DOE and an additional 15,003 acres that have been made available through a series of land use agreements or permits.

Missions of Other DOE-funded Operations on KAFB

In addition to SNL/NM, there are several other DOE-funded facilities located on KAFB. There are no planned

changes in the level or type of activities at these facilities. The environmental impacts of these operations will be included in the discussion of cumulative impacts in the EIS. DOE welcomes comments on this approach. A summary of each facility follows.

Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute, formerly the Inhalation Toxicology Research Institute, began in the 1960s as a research team for determining the long-term health impacts of inhaling radioactive particles, and has since become a recognized center for inhalation toxicology and related fields.

Central Training Academy ensures the efficient and effective training of safeguards and security personnel from throughout the DOE who are, or may become, involved in the protection of materials and facilities vital to the nation's defense.

Transportation Safeguards Division (TSD) coordinates, implements, and operates the DOE Safeguards Program for strategic quantities of government-owned special nuclear material. TSD coordinates and plans weapons distribution with the Department of Defense and coordinates special nuclear material shipments for all DOE field offices.

Allied-Signal Kirtland Operations is an applied science and engineering organization engaged in research, analysis, testing, and field operations. A major portion of this work is in the design, fabrication, and testing of electro-optic and recording systems for capturing fast transient signals.

Ross Aviation is the DOE's support contractor providing air cargo and passenger service. Ross transports cargo between production plants, national laboratories, test sites, and military facilities and provides special passenger and cargo flights on request.

The DOE/Albuquerque complex is a series of office buildings with approximately 1,200 Federal and contractor employees.

The Energy Training Center is a small office complex that includes classrooms for DOE training.

The Role of the SWEIS in the DOE NEPA Compliance Strategy

The SWEIS will be prepared pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, (42 U.S.C. 4321 *et seq.*), the Council on Environmental Quality's NEPA regulations (40 CFR Parts 1500±1508) and the DOE NEPA regulations (10 CFR Part 1021). The DOE has a policy (10 CFR 1021.330) to prepare SWEISs for certain large, multiple-facility sites, such as SNL/NM. The purpose of a SWEIS is to provide

DOE and its stakeholders with an analysis of the environmental impacts caused by ongoing and reasonably foreseeable new operations and facilities and reasonable alternatives at a DOE site, to provide a basis for site-wide decision making, and to improve and coordinate agency plans, functions, programs, and resource utilization. The SWEIS provides an overall NEPA baseline so that the environmental effects of proposed future changes in programs and activities can be compared with the baseline. A SWEIS also enables DOE to "tier" its NEPA documents at a site so as to eliminate repetitive discussion of the same issues in future project-specific NEPA studies, and to focus on the actual issues ready for decisions at each level of environmental review. The NEPA process allows for Federal, Native American, state and local government, and public participation in the environmental review process. The Environmental Impact Assessment, Sandia Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico [EIA/MA 77±1], May 1977, is the existing site-wide environmental document for SNL/NM. Since that time, several additional NEPA documents have been prepared for specific projects, including one EIS, and various environment assessments.

Related NEPA Reviews

The following is a list of recent NEPA documentation that affects the scope of this SWEIS. The summaries below are intended to familiarize the reader with the purpose of these other NEPA reviews and how SNL/NM is considered in them.

Programmatic NEPA Reviews

The Draft Waste Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) (DOE/EIS±0200) analyzes the DOE plan to formulate and implement a national integrated waste management program. SNL/NM is being considered as a possible regional site for the disposal of low-level waste and low-level mixed waste. The Final PEIS is expected to be available to the public in June.

Nonnuclear Consolidation Environmental Assessment [DOE/EA±0792]. A Finding of No Significant Impact on the Consolidation of the Nonnuclear Component within the Nuclear Weapons Complex was signed on September 8, 1993. The following decisions regarding SNL/NM were made at that time and have since been implemented:

• **Neutron Generators and Thermal Batteries:** The existing technology base for neutron generators will be

maintained at SNL/NM. Existing research, development and technology and prototyping capability at SNL/NM will be augmented to provide a limited manufacturing capability for future advanced design neutron generators. The technology base for the manufacture of thermal batteries will be transferred to existing facilities at SNL/NM.

• **Detonators:** The existing research, development, and technology base for low-power explosives components will be maintained at SNL/NM.

• **Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS** [DOE/EIS±0236]. A Record of Decision was signed by the Secretary of Energy on December 19, 1996. Inherent in the many decisions made in the ROD was to continue the operations of the three national weapons laboratories, SNL/NM being one of the three. The Record of Decision emphasized that stockpile stewardship is an essential program to maintain the safety and reliability of the stockpile in the absence of underground nuclear testing, therefore requiring enhanced experimental capabilities in the future.

Project NEPA Reviews

Medical Isotopes Production Project: Molybdenum-99 and Related Isotopes Environmental Impact Statement [DOE/EIS±0249F]. The Record of Decision for this EIS was signed on September 11, 1996. The decision made was to produce Mo±99 and related isotopes at the Annular Core Research Reactor and Hot Cell Facility at SNL/NM.

Environmental Assessment of the Environmental Restoration Project at Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico [DOE/EA±1140]. A Finding of No Significant Impact was signed on March 25, 1996. This EA analyzed the environmental restoration site characterization and waste cleanup activities for an estimated 157 solid waste management units or SWMUs at SNL/NM.

Preliminary Alternatives

The scoping process is an opportunity for the public to assist the DOE in determining the alternatives and issues for analysis. DOE welcomes specific comments or suggestions on the content of these alternatives, or on other alternatives that could be considered.

DOE is proposing to continue current operations at SNL/NM. Two preliminary alternatives were identified during internal scoping: the No Action alternative and the Expanded Operations alternative. DOE also considered a Reduced Operations alternative. However, current activities at SNL/NM are at the minimum level of

operations needed to protect the technical capability and competency to support the site's assigned missions. Therefore, the Department plans to include the Reduced Operations alternative in the EIS as an alternative considered but eliminated from further analysis.

No Action. NEPA regulations require analysis of the *No Action* alternative to provide a benchmark for comparison with environmental effects of the other alternatives. The *No Action* alternative would continue current facility operations throughout SNL/NM in support of assigned missions, and for this SWEIS, it is also the proposed action. With respect to the Defense Programs mission, the future role of SNL/NM was defined at the programmatic level by the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (SSM PEIS) Record of Decision (ROD) (61 FR 68014) (December 26, 1996). In the SSM PEIS, SNL/NM had been considered as an alternative location for the National Ignition Facility (NIF) and for relocation of non-nuclear fabrication functions from the Department's Kansas City Plant. Additionally, the SSM PEIS noted that a pre-decisional facility, the Advanced Radiation Source (X±1), might, at some time in the future, be considered for location at SNL/NM or other sites. The ROD located neither the NIF nor the Kansas City Plant functions at SNL/NM, and stated that if DOE were to propose to construct and operate such next-generation facilities as the X±1 in the future, appropriate NEPA review would be performed. Therefore, the programmatic mission defined by the SSM ROD for SNL/NM is continued operation with the current mission and functions. There are no planned programmatic mission changes in the non-Defense Programs mission areas.

Expanded Operations. This alternative would reflect an increase in facility operations to the highest levels that can be supported by current facilities. This could require construction projects to address safety, security and environmental compliance as well as to support reconfiguration of facility equipment and operations to optimize use of current facilities' capabilities. This alternative will set the bounding conditions for assessing the environmental impacts.

Preliminary Issues Identified by Internal Scoping

The issues listed below have been identified for analysis in this SWEIS as being applicable to the operation of SNL/NM. The list is tentative and is

intended to facilitate public comment on the scope of this SWEIS. It is not intended to be all-inclusive, nor does it imply any predetermination of potential impacts. The SWEIS will describe the potential environmental impacts of the alternatives, using available data where possible and obtaining additional data where necessary. In accordance with the Council on Environmental Quality Regulations (40 CFR 1500.4 and 1502.21), other documents, as appropriate, may be incorporated into the impacts analyses by reference, in whole or in part. DOE specifically welcomes suggestions and comments for the addition or deletion of items on this list.

DPotential effects on the public and workers from exposures to radiological and hazardous materials during normal operations and from reasonably postulated accidents, including aircraft crashes;

DPotential effect on air and groundwater quality from normal operations and potential accidents;

DPotential cumulative effects of past, present, and future operations at SNL/NM (this SWEIS will include effects of current and reasonably foreseeable federal actions on KAFB).

DEffects on waste management practices and activities, including pollution prevention, waste minimization, and waste stream characterization

DPotential impacts of noise levels to the ambient environment and sensitive receptors; and

DPotential impacts on land use plans, policies, and controls.

Classified Material

DOE will review classified material while preparing this SWEIS. Within the limits of classification, DOE will provide to the public as much information as possible. Any classified material DOE needs to use to explain the purpose and need for action, or the uses, materials, or impacts analyzed in this SWEIS, will be segregated into a classified appendix or supplement.

Issued in Washington, D.C., this 23 day of May 1997, for the United States Department of Energy.

Peter N. Brush,

*Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary,
Environment, Safety and Health.*

[FR Doc. 97-14168 Filed 5-29-97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6450-01-01

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. RP97-187-005]

Arkansas Western Pipeline Company; Notice of Proposed Changes in FERC Gas Tariff

May 23, 1997.

Take notice that on May 20, 1997, Arkansas Western Pipeline Company (AWP) tendered for filing as part of its FERC Gas Tariff, tariff sheets to become effective June 1, 1997.

AWP states that the filing sets forth the revisions to AWP's tariff sheets that are necessary to comply with FERC's May 5, 1997 Letter Order in Docket No. RP97-187-003.

Any person desiring to protest this filing should file a protest with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, N.E., Washington, DC 20426, in accordance with Section 385.211 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations. All such protests must be filed in accordance with Section 154.210 of the Commission's Regulations. Protests will be considered by the Commission in determining the appropriate action to be taken, but will not serve to make protestants parties to the proceeding. Copies of this filing are on file with the Commission and available for public inspection.

Linwood A. Watson, Jr.,

Acting Secretary.

[FR Doc. 97-14133 Filed 5-29-97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6717-01-01

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. CP97-533-000, CP97-534-000, CP97-535-000]

Chevron U.S.A. Inc., Venice Gathering Company, Venice Gathering System, L.L.C., Venice Energy Services Company; Notice of Application

May 23, 1997.

Take notice that on May 20, 1997, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. (Chevron), 1301 McKinney, Houston, Texas 77010; Venice Gathering Company (VGC), 1301 McKinney, Houston, Texas 77010; Venice Gathering System, L.L.C. (VGS), 1000 Louisiana, Houston, Texas 77002-5050, and Venice Energy Services Company (VESCO), 1000 Louisiana, Houston, Texas 77002-5050, jointly filed an application with the Commission in Docket Nos. CP97-533-000, CP97-534-000, and CP97-535-000

pursuant to Sections 7(b) and 7(c) of the Natural Gas Act (NGA) for permission and approval for Chevron, VGC, and VESCO to abandon by transfer certain offshore Louisiana pipeline facilities to VGS; authority for VGS to construct and operate certain new offshore Louisiana pipeline facilities; and authority for VGS to operate and provide service on both the transferred and proposed facilities under open-access rates, terms, and conditions, all as more fully set forth in the application which is open to the public for inspection.

Chevron, VGC, VGS, and VESCO state that the purpose of their joint application is, in part, to comply with the Commission's April 17, 1997, order in Docket No. CP95-202-000 where the Commission denied a petition for a declaratory order for a determination that certain offshore pipeline facilities owned and/or operated by the applicants were not subject to the Commission's jurisdiction under the NGA. Chevron, VGC, VGS, and VESCO request, therefore appropriate certificate, rate, and tariff approvals to conform the subject facilities and services to the requirements applicable under the NGA.

VGS proposes in Docket No. CP97-533-000 to construct and operate 52.4 miles of 24-inch diameter pipe (Timbalier Expansion) from Chevron's South Timbalier Block 151 platform to an existing West Delta Block 79 platform. The proposed Timbalier Expansion would increase the delivery capacity of the Venice System from the current 482,000 Mcf per day of natural gas to approximately 810,000 Mcf per day. VGS states that one or more of its parent corporate affiliates would use internally generated funds to pay the estimated \$39.1 million construction cost for the proposed Timbalier Expansion.

VGS requests in Docket No. CP97-534-000 that the Commission grant VGS Part 284, Subpart G blanket transportation authority to perform open-access, self-implementing, non-discriminatory transportation service in interstate commerce with pregranted abandonment and subject to the applicable provisions of Part 284 of the Commission's Regulations. VGS states that it would comply with the applicable conditions set forth in Part 284, Subpart A of the Regulations.

VGS also requests in Docket No. CP97-535-000 that the Commission grant VGS Part 157, Subpart F blanket authority to engage in certain construction and operational activities from time to time as may be required on a self-implementing basis. VGS states that when constructing ``eligible

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