



Department of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

CenterPoint Energy and
Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc.
Regarding F.B. Culley Generating Station

Order No. 202-26-47

Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Energy (Secretary) by section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act (FPA),¹ and section 301(b) of the Department of Energy (DOE or the Department) Organization Act,² and for the reasons set forth below, I hereby determine that an emergency exists in portions of the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO) region due to a sudden increase in demand for electric energy, or a shortage of electric energy or of facilities for the generation or transmission of electric energy, and other causes. Issuance of this Order will meet the emergency and serve the public interest.

BACKGROUND

The F.B. Culley Generating Station (Culley) is an electric generating facility in Warrick County, Indiana. Culley is owned and operated by CenterPoint Energy and consists of two coal-fired electric generating units, Unit 2 (103.7 MW) and Unit 3 (265.2 MW), with a combined nameplate capacity of 368.9 MW.³ Unit 2 and Unit 3 began operations in 1966 and 1973, respectively. Unit 2 was slated to cease operations in December 2025.⁴

Order Nos. 202-25-13, 202-26-20, and 202-26-30, issued pursuant to FPA section 202(c), required that Culley Unit 2 remain in operation for 90 days, until March 23, 2026, June 21, 2026, and September 19, 2026, respectively. Those orders

¹ 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c).

² 42 U.S.C. § 7151(b).

³ U.S. Energy Info. Admin., *Form EIA-860 detailed data with previous form data (EIA-860A/860B)*, <https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia860/> (click “2025 (early release)”).

⁴ It likely would be difficult for the coal-fired units to resume operations once retired. Specifically, practical issues, such as employment, contracts, and permits, may greatly increase the timeline for resumption of operations during the period they are needed. Moreover, if CenterPoint Energy were to begin disassembling the units or other related facilities, the associated challenges would be greatly exacerbated. The costs and time of decommissioning a coal plant are extensive, and restarting such decommissioned plants would presumably cost the same as decommissioning in dollars and time, if not more. Thus, continuous operation is required in such cases so long as the Secretary determines a shortage exists and is likely to persist. See Jennifer Lessick et al., *Bus. Models for Coal Plant Decommissioning*, at 9–12 (DOE, Pac. Nw. Nat’l Lab’y, Report, Aug. 2021), https://www.pnnl.gov/main/publications/external/technical_reports/PNNL-31348.pdf.

were based on my determination that emergency conditions existed in the region served by MISO.

Specifically, I determined that MISO faced tight reserve margins due to well-documented year-round resource adequacy concerns, particularly during periods of high demand or low generation resource output.⁵ I determined that the continued operation of Culley Unit 2 would provide additional generation capacity during these periods, which would help prevent the loss of power to homes and businesses in the areas that might have been affected by curtailments or outages that would otherwise pose a risk to public health and safety.⁶ I determined that the continued operation of Culley Unit 2 was necessary to alleviate immediate and anticipated threats to reliability.⁷

My determination was based on several facts. First, in its 2024 Long-Term Reliability Assessment (2024 LTRA), the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) notes that the MISO assessment area, which covers portions of Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Texas, and Wisconsin, is at an elevated risk, “because probabilistic assessments indicate above-normal generator outages during extreme weather can result in unserved energy or load loss. With uncertainty around new resource additions and existing generator retirements, MISO is also at risk of falling below [Reference Margin Levels] within the next five years.”⁸ Additionally, the 2024 LTRA notes that “[t]he departure of MISO’s coal fleet has continued with a reduction in capacity of around 6 GW in the past year, and a projected reduction of a further 12 GW over the next five years.”⁹

CONTINUING EMERGENCY CONDITIONS

The emergency conditions that necessitated the issuance of Order Nos. 202-25-13, 202-26-20, and 202-26-30 continue, both in the near and long term. The production of electricity from Culley Unit 2 continues to be a critical asset to maintain reliability in MISO. MISO’s resource adequacy concerns were recently demonstrated during Winter Storm Fern, when Culley operated under a cold weather alert and declared conservative operations from January 23 through February 1, 2026. On January 24, MISO declared an Energy Emergency Alert (EEA) 1, as well as an EEA 2 “MaxGen” event for MISO’s North and Central Regions due to generation outages, high demand, and transfer

⁵ See, e.g., *Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc.*, DOE Order No. 202-26-30, at 2–5 (June 18, 2026).

⁶ See, e.g., *id.*

⁷ See, e.g., *id.* at 5.

⁸ N. Am. Elec Reliability Corp., *2024 Long-Term Reliability Assessment*, at 13 (Dec. 2024, corrected July 11, 2025), https://www.nerc.com/globalassets/our-work/assessments/2024-ltra_corrected_july_2025.pdf.

⁹ *Id.* at 44.

capability limits.¹⁰ From January 21–February 1, 2026, Culley operated at roughly 30 MW almost every day.¹¹ According to the EIA-923 Power Plant Operations Report’s monthly generation data for June 2026, the total net generation for the Culley Unit 2 was 48,923 MWh from January 2026 to June 2026 for an average of 8,154 MWh per month.¹² This generation data indicates that Culley Unit 2 is providing vital generation capacity to the region.

MISO’s year-round resource adequacy concerns are well-documented. MISO requested that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approve its filing to revise its resource adequacy construct (including the Planning Resource Auction or PRA) to establish capacity requirements for each of the four seasons of the year rather than on an annual basis determined by peak summer demand.¹³ MISO justified this revision by explaining that “[r]eliability risks associated with [r]esource [a]dequacy have shifted from ‘Summer only’ to a year-round concern.”¹⁴ MISO noted that over 60% of all “MaxGen” events (events when MISO initiates emergency procedures because of concerns over the adequacy of available generation) occurred outside of the summer season.¹⁵

In December 2023, MISO released an “Attributes Roadmap,” in which it presented “an in-depth look at the challenges of operating a reliable bulk electric system in a rapidly transforming energy landscape.”¹⁶ Among other things, this report described changes in the time of year during which the risk of the loss of load was greatest. For the 2023–2024 Planning Year, the greatest risk of loss of load was in the summer, but it is expected that by the summer of 2027, there will be an equal loss of load risk in both the summer and fall seasons.¹⁷ MISO also projected that the risk of loss of load in the winter

¹⁰ MISO, *Operations Rep.*, at 10 (Mar. 24, 2026), <https://cdn.misoenergy.org/20260324%20Markets%20Committee%20of%20the%20BOD%20Item%2008%20MISO%20Operations%20Report746763.pdf>.

¹¹ DOE, *FACT SHEET: Energy Dep’t Prevented Blackouts & Saved Am. Lives During Winter Storms* (Feb. 6, 2026), <https://www.energy.gov/articles/fact-sheet-energy-department-prevented-blackouts-saved-american-lives-during-winter-storms>.

¹² See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., *Form EIA-923 detailed data with previous form data (EIA-906/920)*, <https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia923/> (choose “2026: EIA-923 June 2026”).

¹³ *Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc.*, Transmittal Letter, FERC Dkt. No. ER22-495-000 (filed Nov. 30, 2021). FERC accepted MISO’s proposed tariff revisions on August 31, 2022. See also *Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc.*, 180 FERC ¶ 61,141 (2022), *order on reh’g & compliance*, 182 FERC ¶ 61,096 (2023).

¹⁴ MISO, Transmittal Letter, FERC Dkt. No. ER22-495-000, at 3.

¹⁵ *Id.* at 3–4.

¹⁶ MISO, *Attributes Roadmap*, at 3 (Dec. 2023), <https://cdn.misoenergy.org/2023%20Attributes%20Roadmap%20Executive%20Summary631175.pdf>.

¹⁷ *Id.* at 11.

and spring seasons will nevertheless increase over time, although not as high as in the summer or fall.¹⁸

More recently, MISO affirmed the resource adequacy problems occurring outside of its summer season in its 2024 report entitled, “*MISO’s Response to the Reliability Imperative*.”¹⁹ In a section of that report entitled, “*Risks in Non-Summer Seasons*,” MISO again stressed that it has resource reliability concerns outside of the summer season:

Widespread retirements of dispatchable resources, lower reserve margins, more frequent and severe weather events and increased reliance on weather-dependent renewables and emergency-only resources have altered the region’s historic risk profile, creating risks in non-summer months that rarely posed challenges in the past.²⁰

These MISO studies indicate that the emergency conditions caused by the loss of generation capacity in MISO extend past the summer season.

In January 2026, NERC released its 2025 Long-Term Reliability Assessment (2025 LTRA).²¹ NERC assessed that the MISO region is at high risk of energy shortfalls over the next five years,²² stating that it faces significant reliability challenges as “projected resource additions do not keep pace with escalating demand forecasts and announced generator retirements.”²³ This determination is based on the combination of accelerating demand growth from new data centers and the retirement of existing thermal generators.²⁴ The 2025 LTRA notes that “MISO’s accredited thermal capacity has decreased by 8.8 GW, driven primarily by reductions in accredited capacity of existing facilities and retirements.”²⁵ NERC observes that winter peak periods are a particular concern, with projections showing “shortfalls in planned resources for winter peak periods.”²⁶ However, NERC also concluded that “risks could expand into spring and fall generator maintenance periods when the available dispatchable generation is not enough to counter wind and solar variability when demand is high.”²⁷

¹⁸ *Id.*

¹⁹ MISO, *MISO’s Response to the Reliability Imperative* (updated Feb. 2024), <https://cdn.misoenergy.org/2024+Reliability+Imperative+report+Feb.+21+Final504018.pdf>.

²⁰ *Id.* at 12.

²¹ NERC, *2025 Long-Term Reliability Assessment* (Jan. 2026), https://www.nerc.com/globalassets/our-work/assessments/nerc_ltra_2025.pdf.

²² *Id.* at 6, 8.

²³ *Id.* at 8.

²⁴ *Id.* at 43.

²⁵ *Id.* at 15.

²⁶ *Id.*

²⁷ *Id.*

The 2025–2026 NERC Winter Reliability Assessment found the MISO region to be at normal risk in 2026 and elevated risk in 2027. The two previous winter studies respectively characterized MISO as a region at elevated risk with the “[p]otential for insufficient operating reserves in above-normal conditions”²⁸ and noted that “[g]enerating capacity is 10 GW lower (-6.8%) compared to the prior winter as generators have retired, withdrawn from MISO’s capacity market, or received lower winter accredited capacity.”²⁹

NERC released its 2026 Summer Reliability Assessment (SRA) on May 19, 2026. In its assessment, NERC stated that “MISO’s peak load has increased by 2.5 GW from the 2025 SRA.”³⁰ The 2026 SRA also projects that data center load will continue to accelerate in 2027 and beyond, potentially increasing reliability risk if capacity additions do not keep pace.³¹ Furthermore, the 2026 SRA states that “[a]bove-normal summer peak load combined with low resource conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (e.g., load-modifying resources) and EEAs [Energy Emergency Alerts].”³² Since the region benefits from transmission connections with neighbors to meet extreme conditions, MISO’s reliance on electricity imports will increase when extreme conditions arise.”³³

The evidence indicates that there is also a potential longer-term resource adequacy emergency in MISO. When MISO reported the results of its PRA for the 2025–26 Planning Year, it noted that “new capacity additions were insufficient to offset the negative impacts of decreased accreditation, suspensions/retirements and external resources” in the northern and central zones, which include Indiana.³⁴

There continues to be tight capacity available during summer despite the recent “gains in offered capacity outpacing pressure of load growth” in the MISO region, as reported in its PRA for the 2026-2027 Planning Year.³⁵ MISO noted that “new generation

²⁸ NERC, *2023–2024 Winter Reliability Assessment*, at 5 (Nov. 2023), https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_WRA_2023.pdf.

²⁹ NERC, *2024–2025 Winter Reliability Assessment*, at 15 (Nov. 2024), https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_WRA_2024.pdf.

³⁰ NERC, *2026 Summer Reliability Assessment*, at 16 (May 2026), https://www.nerc.com/globalassets/our-work/assessments/nerc_sra_2026.pdf.

³¹ *Id.*

³² *Id.*

³³ *Id.*

³⁴ MISO, *Planning Res. Auction: Results for Planning Year 2025–26*, at 13 (Apr. 2025), https://cdn.misoenergy.org/2025%20PRA%20Results%20Posting%2020250529_Corrections694160.pdf.

³⁵ MISO, *Planning Res. Auction Results for Planning Year 2026/27*, at 3 (Apr. 2026, updated May 22, 2026), <https://cdn.misoenergy.org/2026%20PRA%20Results%20Posting%2020260522%20-%20Corrections754715.pdf>.

capacity is coming online, but faster resource additions are still needed to support large-load growth and ensure resource adequacy.”

On June 4, 2026, the Organization of MISO States (OMS) and MISO issued the results of their 2026 survey, which has been conducted annually for many years to determine the degree to which expected capacity resources satisfy planning reserve margin requirements.³⁶ The 2026 OMS-MISO Survey presented projections of resource adequacy for the summer of 2026 and subsequent years and states “growth as submitted by [load serving entities or LSEs] continues to accelerate, with a [compound annual growth rate or CAGR] projected between 3.1% and 5.1% over [the next] five years.”³⁷

The OMS-MISO Survey further indicates that “[v]arious projected capacity scenarios and large load additions highlight increasing uncertainty and evolving risk”³⁸ and observes various negative risks. Examples include intensification of winter reliability risks based on resource availability/performance, which exacerbates seasonal reliability vulnerabilities; delay of new resource deployment owing to persistent supply-chain disruptions, labor constraints and permitting challenges; resource adequacy pressures continuing from load growth driven by data centers, new industrial, and commercial development; and continued backlog and uncertainty related to resources with signed Generator Interconnection Agreements (GIA).³⁹ In addition, 87 GW of signed GIAs are not yet online, and 192 GW of active GIAs still under study.⁴⁰

Finally, the OMS-MISO Survey lists ongoing challenges such as more frequent extreme weather; accelerating demand for electricity and large load interconnections; loss of accredited capacity and reliability attributes as resource mixes evolve; the increasing pace of new resources additions; addressing local reliability issues (load pocket); and evolving storage participation.⁴¹

NERC released its 2026 State of Reliability (SOR) on June 24, 2026. In the SOR, NERC identifies worsening reliability concerns tied to large-load integration and localized operating stress. In its technical discussion of major system events, NERC states “shoulder seasons have become increasingly challenging for Bulk Power System operators to manage, resulting in several recent instances of pre-contingent load shedding.”⁴² The SOR also finds large load growth is increasing reliability risk and

³⁶ OMS & MISO, *OMS-MISO Survey Results* (updated June 4, 2026) (2026 OMS-MISO Survey), <https://cdn.misoenergy.org/20260604%20OMS-MISO%20Survey%20Results%20Workshop%20Presentation761711.pdf>.

³⁷ *Id.* at 2.

³⁸ *Id.* at 3.

³⁹ *Id.* at 4.

⁴⁰ *Id.*

⁴¹ *Id.* at 16.

⁴² NERC, *2026 State of Reliability: Tech. Assessment of 2025 Bulk Power Sys. Performance*, at 5 (June 24, 2026), https://www.nerc.com/globalassets/programs/rapa/pa/nerc_sor_2026_technical_assessment.pdf.

states that “data center and computational loads continued emerging as a major reliability consideration due to their scale, speed of development, and unique operational characteristics.”⁴³ Finally, data in the SOR shows that 2025 MISO summer and winter peak demands of 121.6 GW and 108.8 GW, respectively, met or exceeded extreme scenario levels showing how rapid load growth and extreme weather continue to be a real risk in MISO.⁴⁴

MISO has been taking steps to address these projected deficits. For example, on June 6, 2025, MISO submitted a proposal to FERC to establish an Expedited Resource Addition Study (ERAS) process to provide a framework for the expedited study of interconnection requests to address urgent resource adequacy and reliability needs in the near term. This proposal was approved by FERC on July 21, 2025.⁴⁵ MISO’s ERAS should help expedite the construction of needed new capacity; however, resources studied under the ERAS will have commercial operation dates that are at least three years away and are provided an additional three-year grace period to commence commercial operations.⁴⁶ In addition, supply chain constraints impeding the acquisition of critical grid components, including large natural gas turbines and transformers, are likely to further hinder rapid construction and exacerbate reliability concerns.⁴⁷ Consequently, the new ERAS process is unlikely to result in the addition of any new generation capacity in the next few years

Order Nos. 202-25-13, 202-26-20, and 202-26-30 were preceded by executive orders on January 20, 2025, and April 8, 2025, in which President Donald J. Trump underscored the dire energy challenges facing the Nation due to growing resource adequacy concerns. President Trump declared a national energy emergency in Executive Order No. 14156, “Declaring a National Energy Emergency,” in which he determined that the “United States’ insufficient energy production, transportation, refining, and generation constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to our Nation’s economy, national security, and foreign policy.”⁴⁸ The Executive Order adds that “hostile state and non-state foreign actors have targeted our domestic energy infrastructure, weaponized our reliance on foreign energy, and abused their ability to cause dramatic

⁴³ *Id.* at vii.

⁴⁴ *Id.* at 28, 30.

⁴⁵ *Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc.*, 192 FERC ¶ 61,064 (2025).

⁴⁶ NERC, *State of Reliability*, *supra* note 48, at 84.

⁴⁷ See generally Jared Anderson, *US Gas-Fired Turbine Wait Times as Much as Seven Years; Costs Up Sharply*, S&P GLOBAL (May 2025) (“With demand for natural gas-fired turbines in the US rapidly accelerating amid power demand growth forecasts driven by AI, manufacturing, and electrification, wait times for turbines are anywhere between one and seven years depending on the model, and costs have increased considerably, experts told Platts.”), <https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/electric-power/052025-us-gas-fired-turbine-wait-times-as-much-as-seven-years-costs-up-sharply>.

⁴⁸ Exec. Order No. 14156, 90 Fed. Reg. 8433 (Jan. 20, 2025), <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/29/2025-02003/declaring-a-national-energy-emergency>.

swings within international commodity markets.”⁴⁹ In the subsequent Executive Order No. 14262, “Strengthening the Reliability and Security of the United States Electric Grid,” President Trump emphasized that “the United States is experiencing an unprecedented surge in electricity demand driven by rapid technological advancements, including the expansion of artificial intelligence data centers and increase in domestic manufacturing.”⁵⁰

In addition, President Trump issued a White House Memo for the Secretary that emphasized the findings of Executive Order No. 14156, stating that “ensuring reliable coal supply chains and baseload power generation capacity is essential to the United States national defense Without sufficient coal-fired baseload power, the United States will lack the stable electricity required to support defense installations, industrial expansion, and the high-energy demands of emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence.”⁵¹ The President “further determin[e] that action to expand coal supply chain capacity and baseload generation availability is necessary to avert an industrial resource or critical technology item shortfall that would severely impair national defense capability.”⁵²

Further, the Department detailed the myriad challenges affecting the Nation’s energy systems in its July 2025 “Resource Adequacy Report: Evaluating the Reliability and Security of the United States Electric Grid,” which was issued pursuant to the President’s directive in Executive Order No. 14262. The Department concluded that “[a]bsent decisive intervention, the Nation’s power grid will be unable to meet projected demand for manufacturing, re-industrialization, and data centers driving artificial intelligence (AI) innovation.”⁵³

Grid operators—including MISO itself—have also acknowledged the Nation’s current energy crisis. For instance, during a March 25, 2025, hearing before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, MISO’s Senior Vice President for Planning and Operations, Jennifer Curran, testified that “the MISO region faces resource adequacy and reliability challenges due to the changing characteristics of the electric generating fleet,

⁴⁹ *Id.*

⁵⁰ Exec. Order No. 14262, 90 Fed. Reg. 15521 (Apr. 8, 2025), <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/04/14/2025-06381/strengthening-the-reliability-and-security-of-the-united-states-electric-grid>.

⁵¹ Memorandum from President Donald J. Trump to the Secretary of Energy (Apr. 20, 2026) (*Presidential Determination Pursuant to Sec. 303 of the Def. Prod. Act of 1950, as Amended, on Coal Supply Chains & Baseload Power Generation Capacity*), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/04/presidential-determination-pursuant-to-section-303-of-the-defense-production-act-of-1950-as-amended-on-coal-supply-chains-and-baseload-power-generation-capacity/>.

⁵² *Id.*

⁵³ DOE, *Res. Adequacy Rep.: Evaluating the Reliability & Sec. of the U.S. Elec. Grid*, at 1 (July 2025), <https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2025-07/DOE%20Final%20EO%20Report%20%28FINAL%20JULY%207%29.pdf>.

inadequate transmission system infrastructure, growing pressures from extreme weather, and rapid load growth.”⁵⁴ Ms. Curran also described “much stronger growth [in demand for electricity] from continued electrification efforts, a resurgence in manufacturing, and an unexpected demand for energy-hungry data centers to support artificial intelligence.”⁵⁵ She added that “[a] growing reliability risk is that the rapid retirement of existing coal and gas power plants threatens to outpace the ability of new resources with the necessary operational characteristics to replace them.”⁵⁶

Pursuant to section 202(c)(4)(B) of the FPA, DOE has consulted with the primary Federal agency with expertise in the environmental interest protected by the laws or regulations that may conflict with this Order. The agency did not submit additional conditions for inclusion in this Order.

ORDER

FPA section 202(c)(1) provides that whenever the Secretary determines “that an emergency exists by reason of a sudden increase in the demand for electric energy, or a shortage of electric energy or of facilities for the generation or transmission of electric energy,” the Secretary has the authority “to require by order . . . such generation, delivery, interchange, or transmission of electric energy as in [his] judgment will best meet the emergency and serve the public interest.”⁵⁷ This statutory language constitutes a specific grant of authority to the Secretary to require the continued operation of Culley Unit 2 when the Secretary has determined that such operation will best meet an emergency.

As described above, the emergency conditions resulting from increasing demand and shortage of electric energy from premature retirement of generation facilities will continue in the near term and are also likely to continue in subsequent years. This could lead to the loss of power to homes and businesses in the areas that may be affected by curtailments or power outages, presenting a risk to public health and safety.

I have determined that, to best meet the emergency arising from increased demand, determined shortage, and other causes, and serve the public interest under FPA

⁵⁴ *Keeping the Lights On: Examining the State of Reg’l Grid Reliability Before the House Comm. on Energy & Commerce*, Subcomm. on Energy, 119th Cong., at 5 (Mar. 25, 2025) (statement of Ms. Jennifer Curran, Senior Vice President for Planning and Operations, MISO), <https://www.congress.gov/119/meeting/house/118040/witnesses/HHRG-119-IF03-Wstate-CurranJ-20250325.pdf>.

⁵⁵ *Id.* at 6.

⁵⁶ *Id.* at 7.

⁵⁷ Although the text of FPA section 202(c) grants this authority to “the Commission,” section 301(b) of the Department of Energy Organization Act transferred this authority to the Secretary of the Department of Energy. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 7151(b).


section 202(c), Culley Unit 2 shall be made available for operation through December 18, 2026.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c)(4).

Based on my determination of an emergency set forth above, I hereby order:

- A. From September 20, 2026, MISO and CenterPoint Energy shall take all measures necessary to ensure that Culley Unit 2 is available to operate. For the duration of this Order, MISO is directed to take every step to employ economic dispatch of Culley Unit 2 to minimize cost to ratepayers. Following the conclusion of this Order, sufficient time for orderly ramp down is permitted, consistent with industry practices. CenterPoint Energy is directed to comply with all orders from MISO related to the availability and dispatch of Culley Unit 2.
- B. To minimize adverse environmental impacts, this Order limits operation of Culley Unit 2 to the times and within the parameters as determined by MISO, pursuant to paragraph A. MISO shall provide a daily notification to the Department (via AskCR@hq.doe.gov) reporting whether Culley Unit 2 has operated in compliance with this Order.
- C. All operations of Culley Unit 2 must comply with applicable environmental requirements, including but not limited to monitoring, reporting, and recordkeeping requirements, to the maximum extent feasible while operating consistent with the emergency conditions. This Order does not provide relief from any obligation to pay fees or purchase offsets or allowances for emissions that occur during the emergency conditions or to use other geographic or temporal flexibilities available to generators.
- D. By October 3, 2026, MISO is directed to provide the Department (via AskCR@hq.doe.gov) with information concerning the measures it has taken and is planning to take to ensure the operational availability of Culley Unit 2 consistent with this Order. CenterPoint Energy and MISO shall also provide such additional information regarding the environmental impacts of this Order and its compliance with the conditions of this Order, in each case as requested by the Department from time to time.
- E. CenterPoint Energy is directed to file with FERC tariff revisions or waivers to effectuate this Order, as needed. Rate recovery is available pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c).
- F. This Order shall not preclude the need for Culley Unit 2 to comply with applicable state, local, or Federal law or regulations following the expiration of this Order.
- G. Because this Order is predicated on the shortage of facilities for generation of electric energy and other causes, Culley Unit 2 shall not be considered a capacity resource.
- H. This Order shall be effective from September 20, 2026, through December 18, 2026, with the exception of applicable compliance obligations in paragraph D.

Issued in Washington, D.C. on this 18th Day of September 2026.



Chris Wright
Secretary of Energy

cc: **Federal Energy Regulatory Commission**

Chairman Laura V. Swett
Commissioner David Rosner
Commissioner Lindsay S. See
Commissioner Judy W. Chang
Commissioner David A. LaCerte

Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission

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