



**Department of Energy**  
Washington, DC 20585

Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc.  
Center Point Energy  
Regarding F.B. Culley Generating Station

Order No. 202-26-30

Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Energy by section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act (FPA),<sup>1</sup> and section 301(b) of the Department of Energy (DOE or the Department) Organization Act,<sup>2</sup> and for the reasons set forth below, I hereby determine that an emergency exists in portions of the Midwest region of the United States (U.S.) due to a shortage of electric energy, a shortage of facilities for the generation of electric energy, and other causes. Issuance of this Order will meet the emergency and serve the public interest.

BACKGROUND

The F.B. Culley Generating Station (“Culley”) is an electric generating facility in Warrick County, Indiana. Culley is owned and operated by CenterPoint Energy and consists of two coal-fired generation units, Unit 2 (103.7 MW) and Unit 3 (265.2 MW), with a combined name plate capacity of 368.9 MW.<sup>3</sup> Unit 2 and Unit 3 began operations in 1966 and 1973, respectively. Unit 2 was slated to cease operations in December 2025.<sup>4</sup>

Order No. 202-25-13, issued pursuant to FPA section 202(c), required that Culley Unit 2 remain in operation for 90 days, through March 23, 2026. Subsequently, Order No. 202-26-20, issued pursuant to FPA section 202(c), required the Culley Unit to remain in operation for 90 days, until June 21, 2026. These orders were based on my determination that emergency conditions existed in the region served by the Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc. (MISO).

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<sup>1</sup> 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c).

<sup>2</sup> 42 U.S.C. § 7151(b).

<sup>3</sup> U.S. Energy Info. Admin., *Form EIA-860, Schedule 3: Generator Data* (2024), <https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia860/>.

<sup>4</sup> It likely would be difficult for the coal-fired units to resume operations once retired. Specifically, practical issues, such as employment, contracts, and permits, may greatly increase the timeline for resumption of operations during the period they are needed. Moreover, if CenterPoint Energy were to begin disassembling the units or other related facilities, the associated challenges would be greatly exacerbated. The costs and time of decommissioning a coal plant are extensive, and restarting such decommissioned plants would presumably cost the same as decommissioning in dollars and time, if not more. Thus, continuous operation is required in such cases so long as the Secretary determines a shortage exists and is likely to persist. See Jennifer Lessick, et al., *Bus. Models for Coal Plant Decommissioning*, at 9-12 (Aug. 2021), [https://www.pnnl.gov/main/publications/external/technical\\_reports/PNNL-31348.pdf](https://www.pnnl.gov/main/publications/external/technical_reports/PNNL-31348.pdf).

Specifically, I determined that MISO faced tight reserve margins due to well-documented year-round resource adequacy concerns, particularly during periods of high demand or low generation resource output.<sup>5</sup> I determined that the continued operation of Culley Unit 2 would provide additional generation capacity during these periods, which would help prevent the loss of power to homes and businesses that would otherwise pose a risk to public health and safety.<sup>6</sup> I determined that the continued operation of Culley Unit 2 was necessary to alleviate immediate and anticipated threats to reliability.<sup>7</sup>

My determination was based on several facts. First, in its 2024 Long-Term Reliability Assessment (LTRA), the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) notes that the MISO assessment area, which covers portions of Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Texas, and Wisconsin, is at an elevated risk, “because probabilistic assessments indicate above-normal generator outages during extreme weather can result in unserved energy or load loss. With uncertainty around new resource additions and existing generator retirements, MISO is also at risk of falling below [Reference Margin Levels] within the next five years.”<sup>8</sup> Additionally, the LTRA notes that “[t]he departure of MISO’s coal fleet has continued with a reduction in capacity of around 6 GW in the past year, and a projected reduction of a further 12 GW over the next five years.”<sup>9</sup>

Second, MISO’s year-round resource adequacy concerns are well-documented. In 2022, MISO requested Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approval of its filing to revise its resource adequacy construct (including the Planning Resource Auction or PRA) to establish capacity requirements for each of the four seasons of the year rather than on an annual basis determined by peak summer demand.<sup>10</sup> MISO justified this revision by explaining that “Reliability risks associated with [r]esource [a]dequacy have shifted from ‘Summer only’ to a year-round concern.”<sup>11</sup> MISO noted that over 60% of all “MaxGen” events (events when MISO initiates

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<sup>5</sup> See, e.g., *Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc.*, Order No. 202-25-12, at 1–4 (Dec. 23, 2025).

<sup>6</sup> See, e.g., *id.*

<sup>7</sup> See, e.g., *id.* at 5.

<sup>8</sup> N. Am. Elec Reliability Corp., *2024 Long-Term Reliability Assessment*, at 13 (Dec. 2024, corrected July 11, 2025), [https://www.nerc.com/globalassets/our-work/assessments/nerc\\_ltra\\_2025.pdf](https://www.nerc.com/globalassets/our-work/assessments/nerc_ltra_2025.pdf).

<sup>9</sup> *Id.* at 44.

<sup>10</sup> *Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc.*, Transmittal Letter, FERC Dkt. No. ER22-495-000 (filed Nov. 30, 2021). FERC accepted MISO’s proposed tariff revisions on August 31, 2022. See also *Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc.*, 180 FERC ¶ 61,141 (2022), *order on reh’g & compliance*, 182 FERC ¶ 61,096 (2023).

<sup>11</sup> *MISO*, Transmittal Letter, FERC Dkt. No. ER22-495-000, at 3.

emergency procedures because of concerns over the adequacy of available generation) occurred outside of the summer season.<sup>12</sup>

### CONTINUING EMERGENCY CONDITIONS

The emergency conditions that necessitated the issuance of Order Nos. 202-25-13 and 202-26-20 continue, both in the near and long term. The production of electricity from Culley continues to be critical to maintain reliability in MISO. MISO's resource adequacy concerns were most recently demonstrated during Winter Storm Fern, when Culley operated under a cold weather alert and declared conservative operations from January 23–February 1, 2026. On January 24, MISO declared an Energy Emergency Alert (EEA) 1, as well as an EEA 2 “MaxGen” event for MISO's North and Central Regions due to generation outages, high demand, and transfer capability limits.<sup>13</sup> From January 21–February 1, 2026, Culley operated at roughly 30 MW almost every day.<sup>14</sup>

In December of 2023, MISO released an “Attributes Roadmap,” in which it presented “an in-depth look at the challenges of operating a reliable bulk electric system in a rapidly transforming energy landscape.”<sup>15</sup> Among other things, this report described changes in the time of year during which the risk of the loss of load was greatest. For the 2023/2024 Planning Year the greatest risk of loss of load was in the summer, but it is expected that by the summer of 2027, there will be an equal loss of load risk in both the summer and fall seasons. MISO also projected risk of loss of load in the winter and spring seasons; which although not as high as in the summer or fall, will nevertheless increase over time.<sup>16</sup>

More recently, MISO affirmed the resource adequacy problems occurring outside of its summer season in its 2024 report entitled, “*MISO's Response to the Reliability Imperative*.”<sup>17</sup> In a section of that report entitled, “*Risks in Non-Summer Seasons*,” MISO again stressed that it has resource reliability concerns outside of the summer season.

Widespread retirements of dispatchable resources, lower reserve margins, more frequent and severe weather events and increased reliance on weather-dependent renewables and emergency-only resources have altered the region's historic risk profile,

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<sup>12</sup> *Id.* at 3–4.

<sup>13</sup> See MISO (@MISO\_energy), X, (Jan. 24, 2026), [https://x.com/MISO\\_energy/status/2015072060876140805?s=20](https://x.com/MISO_energy/status/2015072060876140805?s=20).

<sup>14</sup> DOE, *FACT SHEET: Energy Dep't Prevented Blackouts & Saved Am. Lives During Winter Storms*, (Feb. 2026), <https://www.energy.gov/articles/fact-sheet-energy-department-prevented-blackouts-saved-american-lives-during-winter-storms>.

<sup>15</sup> MISO, *Attributes Roadmap*, *supra* note 14, at 3.

<sup>16</sup> *Id.* at 11.

<sup>17</sup> MISO, *MISO's Response to the Reliability Imperative* (Updated Feb. 2024), <https://cdn.misoenergy.org/2024+Reliability+Imperative+report+Feb.+21+Final504018.pdf>.

creating risks in non-summer months that rarely posed challenges in the past.<sup>18</sup> These MISO studies indicate that the emergency conditions caused by the loss of generation capacity in MISO extend past the summer season.

In January 2026, NERC released its 2025 Long-Term Reliability Assessment, NERC assessed that the MISO region is at high risk of energy shortfalls over the next five years, stating that it faces significant reliability challenges as “projected resource additions do not keep pace with escalating demand forecasts and announced generator retirements.”<sup>19</sup> This determination is based on the combination of accelerating demand growth from new data centers and the retirement of existing thermal generators.<sup>20</sup> The 2025 Long-Term Reliability Assessment notes that “MISO’s accredited thermal capacity has decreased by 8.8 GW, driven primarily by reductions in accredited capacity of existing facilities and retirements.”<sup>21</sup> The report observes that winter peak periods are a particular concern, with projections showing “shortfalls in planned resources for winter peak periods.”<sup>22</sup> However, NERC also concluded that “risks could expand into spring and fall generator maintenance periods when the available dispatchable generation is not enough to counter wind and solar variability when demand is high.”<sup>23</sup>

According to NERC’s 2026 Summer Reliability Assessment, load growth in the MISO region, led by data centers, “is expected to accelerate in 2027 and beyond, which may lead to increased reliability risk in the future if resource additions cannot keep pace with rising load forecasts.”<sup>24</sup> It further notes that “[a]bove-normal summer peak load combined with low resource conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (e.g., load-modifying resources) and EEAs [Energy Emergency Alerts].”<sup>25</sup> Since the region benefits from transmission connections with neighbors to meet extreme conditions, MISO’s reliance on electricity imports will increase when extreme conditions arise.<sup>26</sup>

The evidence indicates that there is also a potential longer-term resource adequacy emergency in MISO. When MISO reported the results of its PRA for the 2025–26 Planning Year, it noted that “new capacity additions were insufficient to offset

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<sup>18</sup> *Id.* at 12.

<sup>19</sup> NERC, *2025 Long-Term Reliability Assessment*, at 7–8 (Jan. 2026), [https://www.nerc.com/globalassets/our-work/assessments/nerc\\_ltra\\_2025.pdf](https://www.nerc.com/globalassets/our-work/assessments/nerc_ltra_2025.pdf).

<sup>20</sup> *Id.* at 43.

<sup>21</sup> *Id.* at 15.

<sup>22</sup> *Id.*

<sup>23</sup> *Id.*

<sup>24</sup> NERC, *2026 Summer Reliability Assessment*, at 16 (May 2026), [https://www.nerc.com/globalassets/our-work/assessments/nerc\\_sra\\_2026.pdf](https://www.nerc.com/globalassets/our-work/assessments/nerc_sra_2026.pdf).

<sup>25</sup> *Id.* at 16.

<sup>26</sup> *Id.* at 16.

the negative impacts of decreased accreditation, suspensions/retirements and external resources” in the northern and central zones, which include Indiana.<sup>27</sup>

On June 6, 2025, the Organization of MISO States (OMS) and MISO issued the results of their annual survey (OMS-MISO Survey), which reported the degree to which expected capacity resources satisfy planning reserve margin requirements.<sup>28</sup> The OMS-MISO Survey presented projections of resource adequacy for the summer of 2026 and subsequent years. Although the OMS-MISO Survey projected a potential capacity surplus for the summer of 2026, it also projected that at least 3.1 GW of additional generation capacity beyond currently committed generation capacity must be added to meet the projected planning reserve margin. The OMS-MISO Survey also projected that there would be insufficient capacity to meet the peak demand for electricity in each of the following four summers, increasing from a deficit of 1.4 GW in 2027 to 8.2 GW in 2030.<sup>29</sup> It also projected similar results for MISO’s winter seasons, with a small surplus of generation capacity in 2026, followed by increasing deficits the following four years.<sup>30</sup>

The primary reasons for these projected deficits also are shown on the OMS-MISO Survey. Large amounts of existing generation capacity are projected to be retired each year, while, at the same time, the demand for electricity is projected to increase at an accelerating pace.<sup>31</sup> Although the OMS-MISO survey projects generation capacity to continue to increase in the coming years with the addition of new potential generation assets, the increase in capacity is largely offset by the projected retirements and does not keep up with the growth in demand.<sup>32</sup>

According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, coal-fired electricity generation in Indiana has declined from 85% of total generation in 2014 to 42% in 2024. Since 2014, approximately 5,000 MW of coal-fired capacity in Indiana have retired, with nearly another 3,900 MW of coal-fired capacity scheduled for retirement by the end of 2028, which includes Culley’s capacity.<sup>33</sup>

MISO has been taking steps to address these projected deficits, but the solution is years away. For example, on June 6, 2025, MISO submitted a proposal to FERC to

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<sup>27</sup> MISO, *Planning Res. Auction: Results for Planning Year 2025–26*, at 13 (Apr. 2025), [https://cdn.misoenergy.org/2025%20PRA%20Results%20Posting%2020250529\\_Corrections694160.pdf](https://cdn.misoenergy.org/2025%20PRA%20Results%20Posting%2020250529_Corrections694160.pdf).

<sup>28</sup> OMS and MISO, *OMS-MISO Survey Results* (updated June 6, 2025), <https://cdn.misoenergy.org/20250606%20OMS%20MISO%20Survey%20Results%20Workshop%20Presentation702311.pdf>.

<sup>29</sup> *Id.* at 7.

<sup>30</sup> *Id.* at 9.

<sup>31</sup> *Id.* at 7, 9.

<sup>32</sup> *Id.*

<sup>33</sup> *See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Indiana Analysis* (Nov. 19, 2025), <https://www.eia.gov/states/in/analysis>.

establish an Expedited Resource Addition Study (ERAS) process to provide a framework for the expedited study of interconnection requests to address urgent resource adequacy and reliability needs in the near term. This proposal was approved by FERC on July 21, 2025.<sup>34</sup> The ERAS process should help expedite the construction of needed new capacity. However, resources studied under the ERAS will have commercial operation dates that are at least three years after the process begins and are provided an additional three-year grace period to commence commercial operations.<sup>35</sup> In addition, supply chain constraints impeding the acquisition of critical grid components, including large natural gas turbines and transformers, are likely to further hinder rapid construction and exacerbate reliability concerns.<sup>36</sup> Consequently, the new ERAS process is unlikely to result in the addition of any new generation capacity in the next few years.

Order Nos. 202-25-13 and 202-26-20 were preceded by executive orders on January 20, 2025, and April 8, 2025, in which President Donald J. Trump underscored the dire energy challenges facing the Nation due to growing resource adequacy concerns. President Trump declared a national energy emergency in Executive Order No. 14156, “Declaring a National Energy Emergency,” in which he determined that the “United States’ insufficient energy production, transportation, refining, and generation constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to our Nation’s economy, national security, and foreign policy.”<sup>37</sup> The Executive Order adds, “hostile state and non-state foreign actors have targeted our domestic energy infrastructure, weaponized our reliance on foreign energy, and abused their ability to cause dramatic swings within international commodity markets.”<sup>38</sup> In the subsequent Executive Order No. 14262, “Strengthening the Reliability and Security of the United States Electric Grid,” President Trump emphasized that “the United States is experiencing an unprecedented surge in electricity demand driven by rapid technological advancements, including the expansion of artificial intelligence data centers and increase in domestic manufacturing.”<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> *Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc.*, 192 FERC ¶ 61,064 (2025).

<sup>35</sup> *See id.* P 84.

<sup>36</sup> *See generally* S&P Global, *US Gas-Fired Turbine Wait Times as Much as Seven Years; Costs Up Sharply* (May 2025) (“With demand for natural gas-fired turbines in the US rapidly accelerating amid power demand growth forecasts driven by AI, manufacturing, and electrification, wait times for turbines are anywhere between one and seven years depending on the model, and costs have increased considerably, experts told Platts.”), <https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/electric-power/052025-us-gas-fired-turbine-wait-times-as-much-as-seven-years-costs-up-sharply>.

<sup>37</sup> Exec. Order No. 14156, 90 Fed. Reg. 8433 (Jan. 20, 2025) (*Declaring a National Energy Emergency*), <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/29/2025-02003/declaring-a-national-energy-emergency>.

<sup>38</sup> *Id.*

<sup>39</sup> Exec. Order No. 14262, 90 Fed. Reg. 15521 (Apr. 8, 2025), <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/04/14/2025-06381/strengthening-the-reliability-and-security-of-the-united-states-electric-grid>.

In addition, President Trump issued a White House Memo for the Secretary of Energy that emphasized the findings of Executive Order No. 14156, stating that “ensuring reliable coal supply chains and baseload power generation capacity is essential to the United States national defense . . . . Without sufficient coal-fired baseload power, the United States will lack the stable electricity required to support defense installations, industrial expansion, and the high-energy demands of emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence.”<sup>40</sup> The President “further determine[d] that action to expand coal supply chain capacity and baseload generation availability is necessary to avert an industrial resource or critical technology item shortfall that would severely impair national defense capability.”<sup>41</sup>

Further, the Department of Energy detailed the myriad challenges affecting the Nation’s energy systems in its July 2025 “Resource Adequacy Report: Evaluating the Reliability and Security of the United States Electric Grid,” which was issued pursuant to the President’s directive in Executive Order No. 14262. The Department concluded that “[a]bsent decisive intervention, the Nation’s power grid will be unable to meet projected demand for manufacturing, re-industrialization, and data centers driving artificial intelligence (AI) innovation.”<sup>42</sup>

Grid operators—including MISO itself—have also acknowledged the Nation’s current energy crisis. For instance, during a March 25, 2025 hearing before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Jennifer Curran, Senior Vice President, Planning and Operations, MISO, testified that “the MISO region faces resource adequacy and reliability challenges due to the changing characteristics of the electric generating fleet, inadequate transmission system infrastructure, growing pressures from extreme weather, and rapid load growth.”<sup>43</sup>

Ms. Curran also described “much stronger growth [in demand for electricity] from continued electrification efforts, a resurgence in manufacturing, and an unexpected

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<sup>40</sup> Memorandum from President Donald J. Trump to the Secretary of Energy (Apr. 20, 2026) (“*Presidential Determination Pursuant to Section 303 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as Amended, on Coal Supply Chains and Baseload Power Generation Capacity*”, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/04/presidential-determination-pursuant-to-section-303-of-the-defense-production-act-of-1950-as-amended-on-coal-supply-chains-and-baseload-power-generation-capacity/>).

<sup>41</sup> *Id.*

<sup>42</sup> DOE, *Res. Adequacy Rep.: Evaluating the Reliability & Sec. of the U.S. Elec. Grid*, at 1 (July 2025), <https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2025-07/DOE%20Final%20EO%20Report%20%28FINAL%20JULY%207%29.pdf>.

<sup>43</sup> *Keeping the Lights On: Examining the State of Reg’l Grid Reliability Before the House Comm. on Energy & Commerce*, Subcomm. on Energy, 119th Cong., at 5 (Mar. 25, 2025) (statement of Ms. Jennifer Curran, Senior Vice President for Planning and Operations, Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator), <https://www.congress.gov/119/meeting/house/118040/witnesses/HHRG-119-IF03-Wstate-CurranJ-20250325.pdf>.

demand for energy-hungry data centers to support artificial intelligence.”<sup>44</sup> She added, “[a] growing reliability risk is that the rapid retirement of existing coal and gas power plants threatens to outpace the ability of new resources with the necessary operational characteristics to replace them.”<sup>45</sup>

### ORDER

FPA section 202(c)(1) provides that whenever the Secretary of Energy determines “that an emergency exists by reason of a sudden increase in the demand for electric energy, or a shortage of electric energy or of facilities for the generation or transmission of electric energy,” the Secretary has the authority “to require by order . . . such generation, delivery, interchange, or transmission of electric energy as in [his] judgment will best meet the emergency and serve the public interest.”<sup>46</sup> This statutory language constitutes a specific grant of authority to the Secretary to require the continued operation of Culley Unit 2 when the Secretary has determined that such continued operation will best meet an emergency caused by a sudden increase in the demand for electric energy or a shortage of generation capacity, or a shortage of electric energy or facilities for generation or transmission of electric energy.

As described above, the emergency conditions resulting from increasing demand and shortage from accelerated retirement of generation facilities will continue in the near term and are also likely to continue in subsequent years. This could lead to the loss of power to homes and businesses in the areas that may be affected by curtailments or power outages, presenting a risk to public health and safety.

I have determined that, to best meet the emergency arising from increased demand, determined shortage and other causes, and serve the public interest under FPA section 202(c), Culley Unit 2 shall be made available for operation through September 19, 2026.

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<sup>44</sup> *Id.* at 6.


<sup>45</sup> *Id.* at 7.

<sup>46</sup> Although the text of FPA section 202(c) grants this authority to “the Commission,” section 301(b) of the Department of Energy Organization Act transferred this authority to the Secretary of the Department of Energy. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 7151(b).

Based on my determination of an emergency set forth above, I hereby order:

- A. From June 22, 2026, MISO and CenterPoint Energy shall take all measures necessary to ensure that Culley Unit 2 is available to operate. For the duration of this Order, MISO is directed to take every step to employ economic dispatch of Culley Unit 2 to minimize cost to ratepayers. Following the conclusion of this Order, sufficient time for orderly ramp down is permitted, consistent with industry practices. CenterPoint Energy is directed to comply with all orders from MISO related to the availability and dispatch of Culley Unit 2.
- B. To minimize adverse environmental impacts, this Order limits operation of Culley Unit 2 to the times and within the parameters as determined by MISO, pursuant to paragraph A. MISO shall provide a daily notification to the Department (via [AskCR@hq.doe.gov](mailto:AskCR@hq.doe.gov)) reporting whether Culley Unit 2 has operated in compliance with the allowances contained in this Order.
- C. All operations of Culley Unit 2 must comply with applicable environmental requirements, including but not limited to monitoring, reporting, and recordkeeping requirements, to the maximum extent feasible while operating consistent with the emergency conditions. This Order does not provide relief from any obligation to pay fees or purchase offsets or allowances for emissions that occur during the emergency conditions or to use other geographic or temporal flexibilities available to generators.
- D. By July 7, 2026, MISO is directed to provide the Department (via [AskCR@hq.doe.gov](mailto:AskCR@hq.doe.gov)) with information concerning the measures it has taken and is planning to take to ensure the operational availability of Culley Unit 2 consistent with this Order. MISO shall also provide such additional information regarding the environmental impacts of this Order and its compliance with the conditions of this Order, as requested by the Department of Energy from time to time.
- E. CenterPoint Energy is directed to file with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission any tariff revisions or waivers to effectuate this Order, as needed. Rate recovery is available pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c).
- F. This Order shall not preclude the need for Culley Unit 2 to comply with applicable state, local, or Federal law or regulations following the expiration of this Order.
- G. Because this Order is predicated on the shortage of facilities for generation of electric energy and other causes, Culley Unit 2 shall not be considered a capacity resource.
- H. This Order shall be effective from June 22, 2026, through September 19, 2026, with the exception of applicable compliance obligations in paragraph D.

Issued in Washington, D.C. on this 18th Day of June, 2026.



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Chris Wright  
Secretary of Energy

cc: **FERC Commissioners**  
Chairman Laura V. Swett  
Commissioner David Rosner  
Commissioner Lindsay S. See  
Commissioner Judy W. Chang  
Commissioner David A. LaCerte

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