



**Department of Energy**  
Washington, DC 20585

**Order No. 202-26-20**

Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Energy by section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act (FPA),<sup>1</sup> and section 301(b) of the Department of Energy Organization Act,<sup>2</sup> and for the reasons set forth below, I hereby determine that an emergency exists in portions of the Midwest region of the United States (U.S.) due to a shortage of electric energy, a shortage of facilities for the generation of electricity, and other causes. Issuance of this Order will meet the emergency and serve the public interest.

*BACKGROUND*

The F.B. Culley Generating Station (Culley) is an electric generating facility in Warrick County, Indiana. Culley is owned and operated by CenterPoint Energy and consists of two coal-fired generation units, Unit 2 (103.7 MW) and Unit 3 (265.2 MW), with a combined name plate capacity of 368.9 MW.<sup>3</sup> Unit 2 and Unit 3 began operations in 1966 and 1973, respectively. Unit 2 was slated to cease operations in December 2025.<sup>4</sup>

Order No. 202-25-13, issued pursuant to FPA section 202(c), required that Culley Unit 2 remain in operation for 90 days, through March 23, 2026. This order was based on my determination that emergency conditions existed in the region served by the Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc. (MISO).

Specifically, I determined that MISO faced tight reserve margins due to well-documented year-round resource adequacy concerns, particularly during periods of high demand or low generation resource output.<sup>5</sup> I determined that the continued operation of

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<sup>1</sup> 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c).

<sup>2</sup> 42 U.S.C. § 7151(b).

<sup>3</sup> U.S. Energy Information Administration, *Form EIA-860, Schedule 3: Generator Data* (2024), <https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia860/>.

<sup>4</sup> As a coal-fired facility, it would be difficult for Culley Unit 2 to resume operations once it has been retired. Specifically, any stop and start of operation creates heating and cooling cycles that could cause an immediate failure that could take 30–60 days to repair if a unit comes offline. In addition, other practical issues, such as employment, contracts, and permits may greatly increase the timeline for resumption of operations. Further, if Culley were to begin disassembling Unit 2 or other related facilities, the associated challenges would be greatly exacerbated. Thus, continuous operation is required in such cases so long as the Secretary determines a shortage exists and is likely to persist.

<sup>5</sup> See, e.g., *Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., and Northern Indiana Public Service Company*, Order No. 202-25-12, at 1–4 (Dec. 23, 2025).

Culley Unit 2 would provide additional generation capacity during these periods, which would help prevent the loss of power to homes and businesses that would otherwise pose a risk to public health and safety.<sup>6</sup> I determined that the continued operation of Culley Unit 2 was necessary to alleviate immediate and anticipated threats to reliability.<sup>7</sup>

My determination was based on several facts.

First, in its 2024 Long-Term Reliability Assessment (LTRA), the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) notes that the MISO assessment area, which covers portions of Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Texas, and Wisconsin, is at an elevated risk “because probabilistic assessments indicate above-normal generator outages during extreme weather can result in unserved energy or load loss. With uncertainty around new resource additions and existing generator retirements, MISO is also at risk of falling below [Reference Margin Levels] within the next five years.”<sup>8</sup> Additionally, the LTRA notes that “[t]he departure of MISO’s coal fleet has continued with a reduction in capacity of around 6 GW in the past year, and a projected reduction of a further 12 GW over the next five years.”<sup>9</sup>

Second, MISO’s year-round resource adequacy concerns are well-documented. In 2022, MISO requested Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approval of its filing to revise its resource adequacy construct (including the Planning Resource Auction or PRA) to establish capacity requirements for each of the four seasons of the year rather than on an annual basis determined by peak summer demand.<sup>10</sup> MISO justified this revision by explaining that “Reliability risks associated with [r]esource [a]dequacy have shifted from ‘Summer only’ to a year-round concern.”<sup>11</sup> MISO noted that over 60% of all “MaxGen” events (events when MISO initiates emergency procedures because of concerns over the adequacy of available generation) occurred outside of the summer season.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> See, e.g., *id.* at 1–4.

<sup>7</sup> See, e.g., *id.* at 5.

<sup>8</sup> NERC, *2024 Long-Term Reliability Assessment*, at 13 (December 2024, corrected July 11, 2025), [https://www.nerc.com/globalassets/our-work/assessments/nerc\\_ltra\\_2025.pdf](https://www.nerc.com/globalassets/our-work/assessments/nerc_ltra_2025.pdf).

<sup>9</sup> *Id.* at 44.

<sup>10</sup> *Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc.*, FERC Docket No. ER22-495-000 (Nov. 30, 2021). This request was approved by FERC on August 31, 2022. See *Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc.*, 180 FERC ¶ 61,141 (2022).

<sup>11</sup> *MISO Transmittal Letter*, FERC Docket No. ER22-495-000, at 3 (Nov. 30, 2021).

<sup>12</sup> *Id.* at 3–4.

## CONTINUING EMERGENCY CONDITIONS

The emergency conditions that necessitated the issuance of Order No. 202-25-13 continue, both in the near and long term.<sup>13</sup> The production of electricity from Culley Unit 2 will continue to be critical to maintain reliability in MISO. MISO’s resource adequacy concerns were most recently demonstrated during Winter Storm Fern, when Culley operated under a cold weather alert and declared conservative operations from January 23–February 1, 2026. On January 24, MISO declared an Energy Emergency Alert (EEA) 1, as well as an EEA 2 “MaxGen” event for MISO’s North and Central Regions due to generation outages, high demand, and transfer capability limits.<sup>14</sup> From January 21–February 1, 2026, Culley operated at roughly 30 MW almost every day, providing vital generation capacity to the region.<sup>15</sup>

In December of 2023, MISO released an “Attributes Roadmap,” in which it presented “an in-depth look at the challenges of operating a reliable bulk electric system in a rapidly transforming energy landscape.”<sup>16</sup> Among other things, this report described changes in the time of year during which the risk of the loss of load was greatest. For the 2023/2024 Planning Year, the greatest risk of loss of load was in the summer, but it is expected that by the summer of 2027, there will be an equal loss of load risk in both the summer and fall seasons. MISO also projects risk of loss of load in the winter and spring seasons; although not as high as in the summer or fall, losses will nevertheless increase over time.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Further, as noted in Order No. 202-25-13, as a coal-fired facility, it would be difficult for Culley Unit 2 to resume operations once it has been retired. Specifically, any stop and start of operation creates heating and cooling cycles that could cause an immediate failure that could take 30–60 days to repair. In addition, other practical issues, such as employment, contracts, and permits may greatly increase the timeline for resumption of operations. If CenterPoint Energy were to begin disassembling the unit or other related facilities, the associated challenges would be greatly exacerbated. Thus, continuous operation is required so long as I determine a shortage exists. *See* Order No. 202-25-13 at 1.

<sup>14</sup> *See* Midcontinent ISO on X, (Jan. 24, 2026), [https://x.com/MISO\\_energy/status/2015072060876140805?s=20](https://x.com/MISO_energy/status/2015072060876140805?s=20).

<sup>15</sup> U.S. Dep’t of Energy, *FACT SHEET: Energy Department Prevented Blackouts & Saved American Lives During Winter Storms*, (February 2026), <https://www.energy.gov/articles/fact-sheet-energy-department-prevented-blackouts-saved-american-lives-during-winter-storms>.

<sup>16</sup> MISO, *Attributes Roadmap*, at 3 (Dec. 2023), <https://cdn.misoenergy.org/2023%20Attributes%20Roadmap631174.pdf>.

<sup>17</sup> *Id.* at 11.

More recently, MISO affirmed the resource adequacy problems occurring outside of its summer season in its 2024 report entitled, “*MISO’s Response to the Reliability Imperative*.”<sup>18</sup> In a section of that report entitled, “Risks in Non-Summer Seasons,” MISO again stressed that it has resource reliability concerns outside of the summer season.

Widespread retirements of dispatchable resources, lower reserve margins, more frequent and severe weather events and increased reliance on weather-dependent renewables and emergency-only resources have altered the region’s historic risk profile, creating risks in non-summer months that rarely posed challenges in the past.<sup>19</sup> These MISO studies indicate that the emergency conditions caused by the loss of generation capacity in MISO extend past the summer season.

In January 2026, NERC released its 2025 Long-Term Reliability Assessment.<sup>20</sup> NERC assessed that the MISO region is at high risk of energy shortfalls over the next five years,<sup>21</sup> stating that it faces significant reliability challenges as “projected resource additions do not keep pace with escalating demand forecasts and announced generator retirements.”<sup>22</sup> This determination is based on the combination of accelerating demand growth from new data centers and the retirement of existing thermal generators.<sup>23</sup> The 2025 NERC Long-Term Reliability Assessment notes that “MISO’s accredited thermal capacity has decreased by 8.8 GW, driven primarily by reductions in accredited capacity of existing facilities and retirements.”<sup>24</sup> The report observes that winter peak periods are a particular concern, with projections showing “shortfalls in planned resources for winter peak periods.”<sup>25</sup> However, NERC also concluded that “risks could expand into spring and fall generator maintenance periods when the available dispatchable generation is not enough to counter wind and solar variability when demand is high.”<sup>26</sup>

While the 2025–2026 NERC Winter Reliability Assessment found the MISO region to be at normal risk in 2026 and elevated risk in 2027, two earlier winter studies were more critical. The 2023–2024 NERC Winter Reliability Assessment characterized MISO as a region at elevated risk with the “[p]otential for insufficient operating reserves

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<sup>18</sup> MISO, *MISO’s Response to the Reliability Imperative* (Updated February 2024), <https://cdn.misoenergy.org/2024+Reliability+Imperative+report+Feb.+21+Final+504018.pdf>.

<sup>19</sup> *Id.* at 12.

<sup>20</sup> NERC, *2025 Long-Term Reliability Assessment* (Jan. 2026), [https://www.nerc.com/globalassets/our-work/assessments/nerc\\_ltra\\_2025.pdf](https://www.nerc.com/globalassets/our-work/assessments/nerc_ltra_2025.pdf).

<sup>21</sup> *Id.* at 7.

<sup>22</sup> *Id.* at 8.

<sup>23</sup> *Id.* at 43.

<sup>24</sup> *Id.* at 15.

<sup>25</sup> *Id.*

<sup>26</sup> *Id.*

in above-normal conditions.”<sup>27</sup> These findings were echoed in NERC’s 2024–2025 Winter Reliability Assessment, which noted that “[g]enerating capacity is 10 GW lower (-6.8%) compared to that of the prior winter as generators have retired, withdrawn from MISO’s capacity market, or received lower winter accredited capacity.”<sup>28</sup>

The evidence indicates that there is also a potential longer-term resource adequacy emergency in MISO. When MISO reported the results of its PRA for the 2025-26 Planning Year, it noted that “new capacity additions were insufficient to offset the negative impacts of decreased accreditation, suspensions/retirements and external resources” in the northern and central zones, which include Indiana.<sup>29</sup>

On June 6, 2025, the Organization of MISO States (OMS) and MISO issued the results of their annual survey, which reports the degree to which expected capacity resources satisfy planning reserve margin requirements.<sup>30</sup> The 2025 Survey presented projections of resource adequacy for the summer of 2026 and subsequent years. Although the survey projected a potential capacity surplus for the summer of 2026, it also projected that at least 3.1 GW of additional generation capacity beyond currently committed generation capacity must be added to meet the projected planning reserve margin.<sup>31</sup> The survey also projected that there would be insufficient capacity to meet the peak demand for electricity in each of the following four summers, increasing from a deficit of 1.4 GW in 2027 to 8.2 GW in 2030.<sup>32</sup> Similar results were projected for MISO’s winter seasons, with a small surplus of generation capacity in 2026, followed by increasing deficits the following four years.<sup>33</sup>

The primary reasons for these projected deficits also are shown on the OMS-MISO survey. Large amounts of existing generation capacity are projected to be retired each year, while, at the same time, the demand for electricity is projected to increase at an accelerating pace.<sup>34</sup>

Although the OMS-MISO survey projects generation capacity to continue to increase in the coming years with the addition of new potential generation assets, the

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<sup>27</sup> NERC, *2023 – 2024 Winter Reliability Assessment*, at 5 (Nov. 2023), [https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC\\_WRA\\_2023.pdf](https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_WRA_2023.pdf).

<sup>28</sup> NERC, *2024–2025 Winter Reliability Assessment*, at 15 (Nov. 2024), [https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC\\_WRA\\_2024.pdf](https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_WRA_2024.pdf).

<sup>29</sup> MISO, *Planning Resource Auction: Results for Planning Year 2025–26*, at 13 (April 2025), [https://cdn.misoenergy.org/2025%20PRA%20Results%20Posting%2020250529\\_Corrections694160.pdf](https://cdn.misoenergy.org/2025%20PRA%20Results%20Posting%2020250529_Corrections694160.pdf).

<sup>30</sup> OMS and MISO, *OMS-MISO Survey Results* (Updated June 6, 2025) <https://cdn.misoenergy.org/20250606%20OMS%20MISO%20Survey%20Results%20Workshop%20Presentation702311.pdf>.

<sup>31</sup> *Id.* at 2.

<sup>32</sup> *Id.* at 7.

<sup>33</sup> *Id.* at 9.

<sup>34</sup> *Id.* at 7, 9.

increase in capacity is largely offset by the projected retirements and does not keep up with the growth in demand.<sup>35</sup>

According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, coal-fired electricity generation in Indiana has declined from 85% of total generation in 2014 to 42% in 2024. Since 2014, approximately 5,000 MW of coal-fired capacity in Indiana have retired, with almost another 3,900 MW of coal-fired capacity scheduled for retirement by the end of 2028, including Culley.<sup>36</sup>

MISO has been taking steps to address these projected deficits, but the solution is years away. For example, on June 6, 2025, MISO submitted a proposal to FERC to establish an Expedited Resource Addition Study (ERAS) process to provide a framework for the expedited study of interconnection requests to address urgent resource adequacy and reliability needs in the near term. This proposal was approved by FERC on July 21, 2025.<sup>37</sup> The ERAS process should help expedite the construction of needed new capacity. However, resources studied under the ERAS will have commercial operation dates that are at least three years away and are provided an additional three-year grace period to commence commercial operations.<sup>38</sup> In addition, supply chain constraints impeding the acquisition of critical grid components, including large natural gas turbines and transformers, are likely to further hinder rapid construction and exacerbate reliability concerns.<sup>39</sup> Consequently, the new ERAS process is unlikely to result in the addition of any new generation capacity in the next few years.

Order No. 202-25-13 was preceded by executive orders on January 20, 2025, and April 8, 2025, in which President Donald J. Trump underscored the dire energy challenges facing the Nation due to growing resource adequacy concerns. President Trump declared a national energy emergency in Executive Order 14156, *Declaring a National Energy Emergency*, in which he determined that the “United States’ insufficient energy production, transportation, refining, and generation constitutes an unusual and

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<sup>35</sup> *Id.*

<sup>36</sup> See *Electricity*, Energy Information Administration, Indiana Analysis, <https://www.eia.gov/states/in/analysis>.

<sup>37</sup> *Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc.*, 192 FERC ¶ 61,064 (2025).

<sup>38</sup> *Id.* P 84.

<sup>39</sup> See generally, S&P Global, *US Gas-Fired Turbine Wait Times as Much as Seven Years; Costs Up Sharply* (May 2025) (“With demand for natural gas-fired turbines in the US rapidly accelerating amid power demand growth forecasts driven by AI, manufacturing, and electrification, wait times for turbines are anywhere between one and seven years depending on the model, and costs have increased considerably, experts told Platts.”), <https://www.spglobal.com/commodity-insights/en/news-research/latest-news/electric-power/052025-us-gas-fired-turbine-wait-times-as-much-as-seven-years-costs-up-sharply>.

extraordinary threat to our Nation’s economy, national security, and foreign policy.”<sup>40</sup> The Executive Order adds, “hostile state and non-state foreign actors have targeted our domestic energy infrastructure, weaponized our reliance on foreign energy, and abused their ability to cause dramatic swings within international commodity markets.”<sup>41</sup> In a subsequent Executive Order 14262, *Strengthening the Reliability and Security of the United States Electric Grid*, President Trump emphasized that “the United States is experiencing an unprecedented surge in electricity demand driven by rapid technological advancements, including the expansion of artificial intelligence data centers and increase in domestic manufacturing.”<sup>42</sup>

Further, the Department detailed the myriad challenges affecting the Nation’s energy systems in its July 2025 “Resource Adequacy Report: Evaluating the Reliability and Security of the United States Electric Grid,” issued pursuant to the President’s directive in Executive Order 14262. The Department concluded that “[a]bsent decisive intervention, the Nation’s power grid will be unable to meet projected demand for manufacturing, re-industrialization, and data centers driving artificial intelligence (AI) innovation.”<sup>43</sup> The prolific growth of data centers for the development of AI, as well as their immense energy needs, presents a new and unexpected source of load growth.

Grid operators — including MISO itself — have also acknowledged the Nation’s current energy crisis. For instance, during a March 25, 2025, hearing before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Jennifer Curran, Senior Vice President, Planning and Operations, MISO, testified that “the MISO region faces resource adequacy and reliability challenges due to the changing characteristics of the electric generating fleet, inadequate transmission system infrastructure, growing pressures from extreme weather, and rapid load growth.”<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Exec. Order No. 14156, 90 Fed. Reg. 8433 (Jan. 20, 2025) (*Declaring a National Energy Emergency*), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/declaring-a-national-energy-emergency/>.

<sup>41</sup> *Id.*

<sup>42</sup> Exec. Order No. 14262, 90 Fed. Reg. 15521 (Apr. 8, 2025) (*Strengthening the Reliability and Security of the United States Electric Grid*), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/04/strengthening-the-reliability-and-security-of-the-united-states-electric-grid/>.

<sup>43</sup> U.S. Dep’t of Energy, *Resource Adequacy Report: Evaluating the Reliability and Security of the United States Electric Grid*, at 1 (July 2025), <https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2025-11/DOE%20Final%20EO%20Report%20%28REVISED%20OCT%2027%29.pdf>.

<sup>44</sup> *Keeping the Lights On: Examining the State of Regional Grid Reliability Before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce*, Subcomm. on Energy, 119th Cong., at 5 (Mar. 25, 2025) (statement of Ms. Jennifer Curran, Senior Vice President for Planning and Operations, Midcontinent Independent System Operator), <https://democrats-energycommerce.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/democrats-energycommerce.house.gov/>

Ms. Curran also described “much stronger growth [in demand for electricity] from continued electrification efforts, a resurgence in manufacturing, and an unexpected demand for energy-hungry data centers to support artificial intelligence.”<sup>45</sup> She added, “[a] growing reliability risk is that the rapid retirement of existing coal and gas power plants threatens to outpace the ability of new resources with the necessary operational characteristics to replace them.”<sup>46</sup>

### ORDER

FPA section 202(c)(1) provides that whenever the Secretary of Energy determines “that an emergency exists by reason of a sudden increase in the demand for electric energy, or a shortage of electric energy or of facilities for the generation or transmission of electric energy,” then the Secretary has the authority “to require by order . . . such generation, delivery, interchange, or transmission of electric energy as in [his] judgment will best meet the emergency and serve the public interest.”<sup>47</sup> This statutory language constitutes a specific grant of authority to the Secretary to require the continued operation of Culley Unit 2 when the Secretary has determined that such continued operation will best meet an emergency caused by a sudden increase in the demand for electric energy or a shortage of generation capacity.

Such is the case here. As described above, the emergency conditions resulting from increasing demand and shortage from accelerated retirement of generation facilities will continue in the near term and are also likely to continue in subsequent years. This could lead to the loss of power to homes and businesses in the areas that may be affected by curtailments or power outages, presenting a risk to public health and safety.

I have also made the determination that, to best meet the emergency arising from increased demand, determined shortage, and other causes, and serve the public interest under FPA section 202(c), Culley Unit 2 shall be made available for operation through June 21, 2026.

Based on my determination of an emergency set forth above, I hereby order:

- A. From March 24, 2026, MISO and CenterPoint Energy shall take all measures necessary to ensure that Culley Unit 2 is available to operate. For the duration of this Order, MISO is directed to take every step to employ economic dispatch of Culley Unit 2 to minimize cost to ratepayers. Following the conclusion of this

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files/evo-media-document/witness-testimony\_asthana\_eng\_grid-operators\_03.25.2025.pdf.

<sup>45</sup> *Id.* at 6.


<sup>46</sup> *Id.* at 7.

<sup>47</sup> Although the text of FPA section 202(c) grants this authority to “the Commission,” section 301(b) of the Department of Energy Organization Act transferred this authority to the Secretary of the Department of Energy. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 7151(b).

Order, sufficient time for orderly ramp down is permitted, consistent with industry practices. CenterPoint Energy is directed to comply with all orders from MISO related to the availability and dispatch of Culley Unit 2.

- B. To minimize adverse environmental impacts, this Order limits operation of dispatched units to the times and within the parameters as determined by MISO, pursuant to paragraph A. MISO shall provide a daily notification to the Department (via AskCR@hq.doe.gov) reporting whether Culley Unit 2 has operated in compliance with the allowances contained in this Order.
- C. All operations of Culley Unit 2 must comply with applicable environmental requirements, including but not limited to monitoring, reporting, and recordkeeping requirements, to the maximum extent feasible while operating consistent with the emergency conditions.
- D. By April 8, 2026, MISO is directed to provide the Department of Energy (via AskCR@hq.doe.gov) with information concerning the measures it has taken and is planning to take to ensure the operational availability of Culley Unit 2 consistent with this Order. MISO shall also provide such additional information regarding the environmental impacts of this Order and its compliance with the conditions of this Order, in each case as requested by the Department of Energy from time to time.
- E. CenterPoint Energy is directed to file with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Tariff revisions or waivers to effectuate this Order, as needed. Rate recovery is available pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c).
- F. This Order shall not preclude the need for Culley Unit 2 to comply with applicable state, local, or Federal law or regulations following the expiration of this Order.
- G. Because this Order is predicated on the shortage of facilities for generation of electric energy and other causes, Culley Unit 2 shall not be considered a capacity resource.
- H. This Order shall be effective from March 24, 2026 through June 21, 2026, with the exception of applicable compliance obligations in paragraph D.

Issued in Washington, D.C. on this 23<sup>rd</sup> day of March 2026.



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Chris Wright  
Secretary of Energy

cc: **FERC Commissioners**

Chairman Laura V. Swett  
Commissioner David Rosner  
Commissioner Lindsay S. See  
Commissioner Judy W. Chang  
Commissioner David A. LaCerte

**Indiana Utility Regulatory Commissioners**

Chairman Andy Zay  
Commissioner Bob Deig  
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