

Cross-Layer Moving Target Defense to Hide Critical Targets from Attacks



Using dummy traffic to hide critical targets from compromised internal nodes in substation networks

This project hides critical targets in electric substation networks from compromised internal nodes and protect them from further attacks. Specifically, the team studies how to add carefully controlled dummy traffic to a substation network to make critical target nodes indistinguishable from other nodes in network traffic patterns. Because adding dummy traffic increases the consumption of bandwidth, a dummy traffic generation scheme is carefully designed to achieve the desired defense performance.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

- Provides a solution for hiding critical targets from compromised internal nodes
- Prevents malicious actors from performing traffic analysis inside the network to identify critical targets for advanced attacks
- Compensates for traditional firewalls and intrusion detection systems that cannot detect passive espionage from an internal node

OUTCOME

This project delivers an algorithm for generating dummy traffic to hide critical targets in substation networks. Simulations show that this solution increases the bandwidth by 50% when providing reasonably good protection.

PARTICIPANTS

ROLE



This project is part of the Secure Evolvable Energy Delivery Systems (SEEDS) academic consortium. SEEDS researches and develops innovative cybersecurity technologies, tools, and methodologies to advance the energy sector's ability to survive cyber incidents while sustaining critical functions.



Research, development, and testing

CONTACT INFORMATION

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Cost Share: \$3,082,610

CYBERSECURITY FOR ENERGY DELIVERY SYSTEMS (CEDS)

CEDS projects are funded through DOE CESER, which aims to enhance the reliability and resilience of the nation's energy infrastructure by reducing the risk of energy disruptions due to cyberattacks.

Website: <https://www.energy.gov/ceser>

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