

U.S. Department of Energy
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NOTICE

DOE N 5632.2

6-1-81

EXPIRES: 6-1-82

SUBJECT: PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PRODUCTION REACTORS AGAINST ACTS OF SABOTAGE

1. PURPOSE. To establish minimum physical protection standards for Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear materials production reactors against acts of industrial or radiological sabotage and provide specific interim requirements pending issuance of directives for the physical protection of DOE property and the physical protection of special materials (SNM).
2. SCOPE. The provisions of this Notice apply to all elements of the Department of Energy and to contractors and subcontractors involved with the DOE's nuclear materials production reactors at the Richland and Savannah River Operations Offices.
3. DEFINITIONS.
 - a. Isolation Zone. An area surrounding the protected facility cleared of any objects which could conceal vehicles or individuals, and which affords unobstructed observations of, or other means of detection of, entry into the area.
 - b. Protected Area. An area enclosed by a physical barrier within the perimeter of the isolation zone. Vehicular or personnel access to the protected area is controlled by hardened guard stations. Access to this area is controlled through the minimum number of portals. Access to protected areas does not provide immediate access to any vital equipment.
 - c. Vital Area. An area which contains equipment vital to the continued safe operation of the reactor and which is contained within a protected area.
 - d. Counter. Any action taken to deter or prevent acts of sabotage, or to delay the successful completion of an act of sabotage, until sufficient response forces can arrive on-scene.
4. POLICY AND OBJECTIVES. It is DOE policy to physically protect all special nuclear materials (SNM) and key facilities, including materials production reactors against acts of sabotage. The objectives of this policy are to:

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- a. Protect the health and safety of the public; and
 - b. Maintain program continuity by preventing a long-term loss of major facilities.
5. GENERAL. Physical protection systems should be designed and implemented to counter a range of threats, which includes a group of several well-armed, trained, and dedicated saboteurs with or without the assistance of a single, well-placed insider. The group may operate in several modes, including frontal and diversionary assault modes, or by a combination of assault, stealth, and deceit. Additional credible threats which the physical protection system should counter include intrusion by organized demonstrators and individual vandals.
6. PROCEDURES AND REQUIREMENTS.
- a. Security Perimeters. Each reactor shall be contained within a concentric set of security perimeters, with the innermost being the vital area perimeter. Next, outboard will be the protection area perimeter(s), and, finally, the isolation zone. Specific requirements are:
 - (1) Vital Area. Vital areas contain all vital equipment within their perimeters. There may be more than one vital area within a given protected area. The perimeter of a vital area shall be established to permit detection of unauthorized attempts at entry. Access controls shall be provided; (a) for annunciation and assessment of an alarm at a central guard post, and (b) to delay an adversary from gaining access to vital equipment until the arrival, on-scene, of response forces. Alternately, vital areas shall be contained in protected areas which meet these requirements.
 - (2) Protected Area. Procedures and requirements are contained in DOE 5632.2, PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL, page 11, paragraph 8b.
 - b. Access Controls.
 - (1) All persons admitted to protected or vital areas must be properly cleared and authorized, or be under the escort of a cleared and authorized person knowledgeable of facility operations, safeguards, and security procedures.
 - (2) All persons who are afforded unescorted access to protected areas will be "L" or "S" cleared.

- (3) All persons who are afforded unescorted access to vital areas will be "Q" or "TS" cleared.
- c. Records. Records must be maintained of all nonroutine personnel entering an isolation zone, protected area, or vital area.
- d. Onsite Security Force. The onsite security force will have the capability of either defeating or delaying, until sufficient backup units arrive, the largest and best equipped credible attacking force hypothesized. In no event should there be less than five security inspectors (as defined by DOE 5632.1, PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED MATTER,) available for response within 5 minutes of an alarm. These responding security inspectors shall be other than those manning the site's central alarm assessment and control center.
7. IMPLEMENTATION. Additional implementation procedures will be published in future directives relating to physical protection of DOE property and special nuclear material.



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