U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

OFFICE OF

**ENERGY** Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response

Energy Storage Security (ESSec) Using Microservices Sandia National Laboratories Adrian R. Chavez

Cybersecurity for Energy Delivery Systems (CEDS) Peer Review



## Project Overview

#### **Objective**

 To design a secure and interoperable containerized suite of applications capable of testing, deploying, and operating an energy storage system. The team will include the ability to upgrade software in real-time, to quickly launch new applications, to detect compromised or crashed applications using fault tolerant algorithms, and to manage software applications, such as Open Field Message Bus protocols adapters, within a variety of energy storage systems.

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- Project start / end dates: (9/28/2020 - 9/29/2023)
- Research & Develop reference implementation (9/28/2020 - 3/31/2022)
- Partner sites (9/28/2020– 8/31/2023).
- Independent 3<sup>rd</sup> party red team assessment (3/31/2022-9/30/2022)
- 2 Apply orchestration and container technologies towards utility

Total Value of Award:	\$3.75M	
Funds Expended to Date:	0%	
Performer:	Sandia National Laboratories	
Partners:	Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Open Energy Solutions, Grimm, Duke Energy, DTE Energy, Entergy	



# Advancing the State of the Art (SOA)

- Energy Delivery Systems depend on software and management is manual:
  - Communicate/control resources
  - Optimize resources available
  - Maintenance and patching
  - Situational awareness intelligent monitoring
  - BlackEnergy, Shamoon, and Stuxnet are examples of malware that target software applications to propagate through a control system network
- Currently, interruptions in service are necessary to update/upgrade software
- Application containers are used widely in IT environments but not in OT environments
- Virtual machines are heavyweight and not feasible for OT environments
  - Legacy systems are widely deployed in OT environments
- Software deployments are not portable



# Advancing the State of the Art (SOA)

- Management of Energy Delivery Systems is a manual process
  - Configuration of software with existing infrastructure
  - Each deployment is unique
- Software containers reduce the attack surface by isolating processes within their own operating environments
- Orchestration allows for testing and repeatable deployments
- Software containers are portable across operating systems
- Processes compromised with malware can be identified and replaced without disruption of operation
- Interoperable solution that can be federated across multiple utilities
  - Commercial product will be included within SEL product line
- Testing, evaluation, and documentation of our approach



## Progress to Date

#### **Major Accomplishments**

- 2020 Kickoff meeting complete Monday, September 28, 2020
- 2020 Developed live-upgrades and live-migration technology proof-of-concept (CAPSec)
- 2020 DOE Practices to Accelerate the Commercialization of Technologies (PACT) (CAPSec)
- 2018 US Patent No. 10,037,203 (CAPSec)



## Challenges to Success

#### Containerization of energy storage system

- Identify software container candidates applicable for utility partner sites
- Identify ESS software applicable to each of the partner sites
- Build and deploy microservices within laboratory environment
- Measure performance of containerized energy storage system

#### Orchestration of containerization solution

- Identify software orchestration candidates to manage containers
- Develop microservices that can be upgraded and migrated without downtime
- Test and deploy within utility partner sites

#### **Deployment within utility partner sites**

- Each utility will have unique environments
- Orchestration and containerization will need to be portable and federated across partner sites

Cybersecurity, Energy Security,

• Open Field Message Bus protocol and SEL commercial product will provide interoperability

## Collaboration/Sector Adoption

#### Plans to transfer technology/knowledge to end user

- Partnering with 3<sup>rd</sup> party red team throughout lifecycle of project
  - Provide cybersecurity guidance from design to deployment
- Partnering with vendor to commercialize solution
  - Reference implementation will be Interoperable commercial product
- Partnering with 3 utilities to test and evaluate our solutions
  - Ensure we are meeting functional and operational requirements
  - Develop use cases that are broadly applicable across each utility
  - Federate solution between each of the utility partners
  - Demonstration to be performed during 2<sup>nd</sup> half of the project after the reference implementation and the red team assessment are complete




## Next Steps for this Project

#### Approach for the next year or to the end of project


- Orchestration/Containerization of Energy Storage System (9/28/2020-3/31/2022)
  - Interoperable reference implementation to be developed
- Capture and document performance metrics (1/31/2022-7/3/2023)
  - Ensure operational requirements of utility partners are met
- Independent 3rd party red team security assessment (3/31/2022-9/30/2022)
  - Document findings and mitigations to be integrated into reference implementation
- Apply towards utility environments (9/30/2022-8/31/2023)
  - Integrate reference implementation and commercial product to demonstrate interoperability
- Document and communicate results to partners and DOE (9/28/2020-9/29/2023)



# Container Application Security (CAPSec)




- Containerized architecture
- Replicates Stateful environments
- TLS Agents on parallel



### Demonstration 1: NodeRed Software BEFORE Upgrade


- NodeRed = 0.20.6
- Node.js = 8.16.0





### Demonstration 1: NodeRed Running Multiple Instances to Upgrade Software without Downtime

3 Replicas of NodeRed running





# Demonstration 1: Upgrade NodeRed Software One Instance at a Time

Rolling update performed

```
[S1006074:~ adrchav$ kubectl run mynodered —port=1880 —image=nodered/node-red-docker:0] .20.6-v8 kubectl run —generator=deployment/apps.v1 is DEPRECATED and will be removed in a futur e version. Use kubectl run —generator=run-pod/v1 or kubectl create instead. deployment.apps/mynodered created S1006074:~ adrchav$
```



```
|S1006074:~ adrchav$ kubectl set image deployment mynodered mynodered=nodered/node-red-d
| ocker:latest --record
| deployment.apps/mynodered image updated
| S1006074:~ adrchav$
```




```
[S1006074:~ adrchav$ kubectl set image deployment mynodered mynodered=nodered/node-red-d] ocker:latest --record deployment.apps/mynodered image updated [S1000074:~ adrchav$ kubectl rollout status deployment mynodered deployment "mynodered" successfully rolled out S1006074:~ adrchav$
```



# Demonstration 1: Upgrade NodeRed Software One Instance at a Time

- NodeRed = 0.20.8
- Node.js = 8.16.1





### Demonstration 2: Upgrading Stateful Programs Setup

- Two servers that will participate in upgrade
  - 1st server is the baseline and has an old unpatched version of the software running (kserver)
  - 2nd server has the updated software running that fixes the vulnerability (kserver2)
  - The software is using the libmodbus library to service Modbus queries
  - An exploit works against the baseline version on the 1<sup>st</sup> server and causes it to crash due to corrupting memory



#### Demonstration 2: Migration Process

- Migrate agent running on server1 to pull out the state information from this server
- Migrate controller running on server2 that will wait for updates from the agent and will then update state information for server2
- Server1 has initial state value <01>

```
kphan@ubuntu:~/capsec2/client$ ./kclient 192.168.155.138 1502

READ COILS

[00][01][00][00][00][06][FF][01][00][00][00][01]

Waiting for a confirmation...

<00><01><00><00><00><04><FF><01><01>
[00][02][00][00][00][06][FF][01][00][00][01]

Waiting for a confirmation...

<00><02><00><00><04><FF><01><01><01><
```



### Demonstration 2: Migration Process (cont.)

Server1 has initial state value <00>

```
kphan@ubuntu:~/capsec2/client$ ./kclient 192.168.155.207 1502

READ COILS

[00][01][00][00][00][06][FF][01][00][00][00][01]

Waiting for a confirmation...

<00><01><00><00><00><04><FF><01><00>

[00][02][00][00][00][06][FF][01][00][00][01]

Waiting for a confirmation...

<00><02><00><00><04><FF><01><01><00>

kphan@ubuntu:~/capsec2/client$
```



### Demonstration 2: Migration Software

- Top windows show the migration agent running on server1
- Bottom windows shows the migration controller it has successful updated the state information of server2

```
root@ubuntu:~/capsec2/baseline# ./migrate agent.sh
pid is: 25513
done1!!!!
done2!!!!
root@ubuntu:~/capsec2/baseline#
(base) root@ubuntu:~/capsec3/updated#
(base) root@ubuntu:~/capsec3/updated# ./migrate controller.sh
migrate controller is listening on port 4567
Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 4567)
Connection from [192.168.155.138] port 4567 [tcp/*] accepted (family 2, sport 43
890)
new value is: 0x1
pid is: 10355
gdb file created!!!
all done!!!
(base) root@ubuntu:~/capsec3/updated#
```

### Demonstration 2: Checking the State of server2 Again

 After running the migration, checking the state of server2 shows the coil has been updated from <00> to <01>

```
kphan@ubuntu:~/capsec2/client$ ./kclient 192.168.155.207 1502
READ COILS
[00][01][00][00][00][06][FF][01][00][00][00][01]
Waiting for a confirmation...
<00><01><00><000><00><04><FF><01><00>
[00][02][00][00][00][06][FF][01][00<mark>][00][</mark>00][01]
Waiting for a confirmation...
<00><02><00><00><00><04><FF><01><01><00>
kphan@ubuntu:~/capsec2/client$ ls
bad kclient modbus exploit
kphan@ubuntu:~/capsec2/client$ ./kclient 192.168.155.207 1502
READ COILS
[00][01][00][00][00][06][FF][01][00][00][00][01]
Waiting for a confirmation...
<00><01><00><000><000><04><FF><01><01><01>
[00][02][00][00][00][06][FF][01][00<mark>][00][00][</mark>00][01]
Waiting for a confirmation...
<00><02><00><00><01><01><01><01><01>
kphan@ubuntu:~/capsec2/client$
```



# Demonstration 2: Running the Modus Exploit against server1

Server1 crashes after exploit is launched (core dumped)

```
kphan@ubuntu:~/capsec2/client$ ./modbus_exploit 192.168.155.138
hey, sending bad stuff
all done
kphan@ubuntu:~/capsec2/client$
```

```
|kphan@ubuntu:~/capsec2/baseline$ kserver
waiting for connections ....
waiting for connections ....
Waiting for a indication...
<01><00><00><00><00><00><06><01><03><00><00><00><8C>
** stack smashing detected ***: ./kserver terminated
borted (core dumped)
```



# Demonstration 2: Running the Modus Exploit against server2

Server2 continues to run after exploit is launched (NO core dumped)

```
kphan@ubuntu:~/capsec2/client$ ./modbus_exploit 192.168.155.207
hey, sending bad stuff
all done
kphan@ubuntu:~/capsec2/client$
```

```
(base) kphan@updated:~/capsec3/updated$ ./kserver2
waiting for connections ....
waiting for connections ....
Waiting for an indication...
<00><01><00><00><00><00><00><01><
[00][01][00][00][00][04][FF][01][01][01]
waiting for connections ....
Waiting for an indication...
[00][02][00][00][00][04][FF][01][01][01]
waiting for connections ....
Waiting for an indication...
ERROR Connection reset by peer: read
waiting for connections ....
waiting for connections ....
Waiting for an indication
 llegal nb of values 140 in read registers (max 125)
vtes flushed (0)
waiting for connections ....
Waiting for an indication...
ERROR Connection reset by peer: read
waiting for connections ....
```

