



U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Inspector General
Office of Audit Services

Summary of Audit Report

The National Nuclear Security Administration's Management of Classified Weapons Parts

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This is a summary of Audit Report IG-0772, entitled "The National Nuclear Security Administration's Management of Classified Weapons Parts." The complete report is not available for public disclosure.

BACKGROUND

The Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) maintains the safety, security, reliability and performance of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile. While the weapons incorporate numerous nuclear and non-nuclear components or parts, even the non-nuclear parts are designated as classified since disclosure of related information could damage national security. The Department's high risk property regulations stipulate that classified parts be accorded "lifecycle accountability," including the use of site-wide inventory systems, regularly scheduled inventories, and segregation of duties.

In light of the importance of safeguarding weapons parts in the post 9-11 environment, we initiated this audit to determine whether selected NNSA sites had adequate accountability controls over classified weapons parts. The parts included in our review did not contain special nuclear materials. Due to the sensitivity of the matters discussed, details regarding our findings are provided in a non-public report.

RESULTS OF AUDIT

Two of the three sites we reviewed had not implemented adequate lifecycle controls and did not track many classified non-nuclear weapons parts in their custody. Although some site organizations maintained informal tracking systems, they

- Lacked fundamental controls such as regularly scheduled inventories and segregation of duties to ensure full and accurate accountability; and,
- Were not integrated and could not account for classified parts transferred between organizations.

In contrast, the third site provided lifecycle accountability to support its weapons organization.

The two sites that had not provided adequate lifecycle accountability had assigned responsibility for classified weapons parts to their security organizations. Security officials at both sites acknowledged that, although they had certain physical safeguarding responsibilities, they were not responsible for lifecycle accountability over property. Property officials asserted that they were not responsible for the accountability over classified parts since their property systems were unclassified.

During our review, the two sites could not readily account for or locate some of the items included in our inventory sample. Accordingly, we made recommendations to improve lifecycle accountability for all classified weapons parts. Management did not agree with the report's conclusions and recommendations. Management's specific comments and our rebuttal are included in the non-public report.