



From the Director's Office A Farewell to Classification from Joan Gates Hawthorne

After 33 years and 7 months I have finally decided to “pull the plug” and retire from Federal service. It was not an easy decision to make, but I know it is the right one. Strange as it may seem, my entire career has involved the classification program, either as an integral part of the staff or in management positions. People often ask me why I never left the field, and my answer has always been the same: “I have never been bored in classification.” As you all know, every day presents a new document review challenge, a different technical issue, some nuanced guidance interpretation, or an urgent policy decision. It is very hard to be bored when you are constantly being challenged by your world. But those same challenges create the inevitable pressures of the job. The business we are in can at times be extremely frustrating and stressful (my excuse for all those extra pounds). But, in the end, all that has been more than outweighed by the “good times.” You know - those times when we came together as a community and solved those thorny issues, practiced the art of sensible compromise, and departed the bargaining table with a product worthy of our reputation. I will forever be proud to have been a part of a community that has so

much technical talent and unique expertise. You deserve so much credit for always going that extra mile and standing your ground to make sure that we did what was right, not always what was easy. And oh boy, did we ever have a lot of experiences that would never qualify as easy – the early throes of AVLIS, the CCRP, ICF, computer codes, the birth of UCNI, the “Openness Initiative” and the Fundamental Review, DoD and stockpile numbers and yields, the creation of the NNSA, 9/11/01, Critical Infrastructure Information, CREM, OOU and so much more...

That list will continue to grow, but this time without me. The hardest part is saying “adieu” to all my friends and colleagues. You are an extraordinary and talented group of people and I wish you all the very best. Take good care of the classification program. I have every confidence that in Andy Weston-Dawkes’ very capable hands and with your expertise, the DOE/NNSA classification program will continue to be THE standard of excellence in the Executive Branch. It has been a privilege and an honor to be a part of the team. Thank you.

Joanie

Do You Know How to Fill Out a Classifier Stamp? The Surprising Results of an Informal Survey

A survey of 17 security incident reports from Headquarters and field organizations surprisingly revealed that 15 of 17 Derivative Classifier stamps were not filled out properly! DOE Manual 475.1-1A, *Identifying Classified Information*, requires the Derivative Classifier’s stamp to contain the classifier’s name and position title; the title of the guide used and the date that guidance was issued; and declassification instructions if the documents

contain only National Security Information (NSI) (declassification instructions do not apply to documents containing Restricted Data (RD) and Formerly Restricted Data (FRD), regardless of whether they also contain NSI). The two most common errors on the documents surveyed involved entries for the guidance used and declassification instructions.

Stamp (Continued on page 7)

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Special points of interest:

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- *How do you review documents for UCNI? — See Page 3.*
- *What classification/UCNI guides are being developed/revised — See Page 5.*
- *How do you fill out the Declassify on line on a classifier's stamp? — See Page 6.*

Ten Years Ago



Publication of Soviet Union Test Information

The declassification in 1997 of previously unreleased information on United States nuclear tests and the dissemination of that information in *United States Nuclear Tests July 1945 through September 1992* (DOE/NV-209), led to the release of the first official factual data on the general characteristics of nuclear tests conducted by the Former Soviet Union. The Russian Federation for Atomic Energy responded to a challenge issued by the Secretary by releasing *U.S.S.R. Nuclear Weapons Tests and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions - 1949 through 1990*. This publication detailed the number of nuclear weapons tests and peaceful nuclear explosions carried out by the Former Soviet Union, the yield or yield ranges, numbers of tests per year, dates of tests, and comments as appropriate.

10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1045 proposed

DOE published draft regulation 10 CFR Part 1045, *Information Classification*, a notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register on January 15, 1997. The regulation, which became effective on July 29, 1998, provides the framework for Government-wide management of nuclear-

related information and applies to any organization that handles Restricted Data (RD) or Formerly Restricted Data (FRD).

The regulation requires that each agency with access to RD or FRD appoint an RD Management Official. The RD Management Official is responsible for implementing the RD classification program within the agency and will serve as the primary point of contact with DOE on RD and FRD matters. The regulation requires that individuals with access to RD and FRD be trained in the procedures for classifying, declassifying, and handling documents containing the information. Another provision requires all agencies to train individuals who derivatively classify RD and FRD documents and requires each agency (except the Department of Defense) to designate individuals who derivatively classify RD and FRD documents. This requirement is included to ensure that these individuals are trained and have access to all classification guides needed. Another provision requires agencies to coordinate any classification guides that they develop which contain RD or FRD topics with DOE. Finally, a provision allowing for some DOE oversight over agency implementation of the RD classification system is included in the regulation.

Classification by Example

When Can I Use a Source Document to Classify a Document?

A source document is any classified document from which information is extracted and included in a new classified document. Classification of the new document is based on the classification markings of the source document. Although Executive Order 12958, as amended, *Classified National Security Information*, allows the use of source documents for derivative classification of newly generated documents that contain the same information, DOE only allows their use in limited circumstances. The reason for this is that there is less risk of incorrect classification using a classification guide than in using a source document, even if it is portion marked. A classified statement taken from a source document may have a higher or lower sensitivity when placed in the context of a new document. For example, two unclassified portions from different documents could be placed in a new document where their association is

classified. Another risk in using source documents is the upward ratcheting of unclassified to classified that occurs when an unclassified statement within a classified portion of a source document has to be marked as classified when used in a new document! This upward ratcheting wastes security resources and harms the credibility of the classification program by “classifying” unclassified information.

Within DOE, source documents may only be used to classify National Security Information (NSI) if (1) the information is entirely under the purview of another Government agency, foreign government, or international organization and (2) joint guides that cover the information under review are not available. This occurs most often in the areas of intelligence and foreign government information. Source

Source Documents (Continued on page 6)

Summary of the UCNI Review Process

The process for determining if a document contains Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (UCNI) is similar to that used in making classification decisions, but there are some differences. To make sure that he or she gets it right, the UCNI Reviewing Official should follow these three simple steps:

Step 1 — The Reviewing Official determines whether or not the document is newly generated or was originated previously (e.g., a published report or an environmental impact statement).

- If the document is newly generated, the Reviewing Official proceeds to step 3.
- If the document was originated previously, the Reviewing Official proceeds to step 2.

Step 2 — The Reviewing Official determines if the (previously originated) document is “widely disseminated in the public domain,” (see UCNI sidebar) which means that the document can be located in a public library or open literature source or accessed on the Internet using readily available search methods.

- If the document is determined to be widely disseminated in the public domain, it cannot be protected as UCNI. The review is finished. [Remember – this determination is made by document and *not* by information. Suppose two documents contain the exact same piece of UCNI. The document that is widely disseminated in the public domain cannot be identified and protected as UCNI, but the one that is not can be.]
- If the document is determined not to be widely disseminated in the public domain, the Reviewing Official proceeds to step 3.

Step 3 — The Reviewing Official consults the appropriate classification guide or UCNI guideline to determine if there is an applicable UCNI topic for the information contained in the document.

- If there is an applicable UCNI topic, the Reviewing Official marks or authorizes the marking of the document as UCNI.
- If there is an applicable topic that offers the choice between UCNI and OOU (see UCNI sidebar, page 7), the Reviewing Official must then determine whether or not the topic pertains to an UCNI sensitive facility.
 - ◆ If it does, the Reviewing Official chooses UCNI.
 - ◆ If it does not, the Reviewing Official chooses OOU.

The Reviewing Official then marks or authorizes the marking of the document accordingly.

Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information

Why does it matter if the document is widely disseminated in the public domain?

When the UCNI program was developed, policymakers knew that some documents that contained the types of information that warranted protection had already been released to the public. They decided that attempting to protect such documents would be difficult and would likely draw unwanted attention to the documents. Therefore, the regulation prohibits documents that are already widely disseminated in the public domain from being identified and protected as UCNI. Future documents containing the same information may be identified and protected as UCNI, but documents (e.g., reports, environmental impact statements, plant blueprints) that have previously been released cannot.

In 1985, when the UCNI regulations were published, a document was considered widely disseminated in the public domain if, for example, it appeared in a public or university library. The concept of wide dissemination has evolved with the advent of the World Wide Web and search engines such as Google. A document is now considered widely disseminated in the public domain if it can be located in a public library or open literature source or accessed on the Internet using readily available search methods. However, although a document may have been widely disseminated in the public domain at one time, it may not currently be readily available to the public. If a document that was once widely disseminated (e.g., known to have been published in the 1960s), is no longer widely available to the public, copies of the document in DOE collections could be protected as UCNI.

- If there is no applicable topic, the information is not UCNI. However, if the Reviewing Official thinks the information should be UCNI, he or she contacts the local Classification Officer.

If you have any questions concerning the UCNI review process, contact Emily Puhl at (301) 903-9048 or emily.puhl@hq.doe.gov.

Appraisal Corner

The
Office of
Security
Evaluations
(HS-61) within the

Office of Independent Oversight began conducting reviews of classification and information control (CIC) in 2006.

With the support of the Office of Classification HS-90 staff, the reviews continue to provide the comprehensive, in-depth analysis that has been the hallmark of CIC appraisals for many years. Whenever possible, the CIC appraisal is combined with the much larger safeguards and security oversight review.

However, separate CIC appraisals will still be required for smaller sites that do not have a large safeguards and security presence. The large CIC programs, such as those at Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, Pacific Northwest, Pantex, Sandia, Savannah River, and Oak Ridge, will continue to be reviewed on a two-year cycle. The remaining programs will be reviewed every three to five years, depending on the amount of classification activity.

In this first year, HS-61 conducted 15 CIC reviews, 13 of which resulted in ratings of Effective Performance (“green”), and 2 of which were Needs Improvement (“yellow.”) The main reason for the two yellow ratings was the lack of clear functional responsibility for leadership of the program. As a result of this leadership gap, no comprehensive self-assessments and oversight reviews had been conducted to self-identify problems in several program areas, including guidance, declassification instruction markings, the previously mentioned self-assessment and oversight reviews, and Official Use Only (OUO) and Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (UCNI) markings. Many programs shared the same problem areas to varying degrees; these are discussed below.

The most common problem that HS-61 has observed in CIC programs is a lack of up-to-date Headquarters guidance. Classification Officers need to ensure that each employee who has been issued classification guidance either receives all updates to that guidance, or is made aware of—and uses—the *Index of DOE Headquarters Classification Guidance* to check for updates. When employees receive updated guidance, they should incorporate it into their copies of the guide and document the update appropriately in the Record of Page Changes at the front of the guide. HS-61 has observed that even keeping a copy of the update in the same folder as the guidance is not adequate to preclude use of outdated guides. For greater assurance, some Classification Officers maintain an electronic library of guides that is available to their derivative classifiers. When a change is issued, the old guide is deleted and replaced by a complete new guide.

Another common problem is improper declassification instructions. For example, at two sites, HS-61 found several National Security Information documents that contained incorrect instructions on the “Declassify on” line of the derivative classifier marking. If declassification instructions are not correct, the documents could be released prematurely or remain classified beyond the time they need to be protected.

A third common problem in classification programs is a lack of self-assessments or comprehensive Federal oversight reviews of contractors. Even though many sites complete a classification self-assessment as part of the safeguards and security self-assessment, its effectiveness is less than adequate if the Classification Officer does not ensure that all relevant areas, such as program administration, authorities, guidance, training, document reviews, and program evaluation, are addressed in the self-assessment. Sites that have oversight responsibility must conduct comprehensive oversight reviews of contractors that address the areas required by DOE Manual 475.1-1A, *Identifying Classified Information*: management awareness and support, document reviews, guidance, education, classifiers and declassifiers, declassification, effectiveness of the program in ensuring appropriate public release of declassified documents, and the comprehensiveness of contractor self-assessments. Coordinating these two levels of assessment can support the identification of weaknesses and lead to continuous program improvement.

The HS-61 reviews of CIC also address programs for the control of sensitive unclassified information, such as UCNI and OUO. In these programs, the most common problem is with markings. For example, many UCNI documents are not properly marked to identify the guidance used to make the UCNI determination, and some sites still use the “May contain UCNI” stamp, which is obsolete and no longer authorized for use. The most common OUO marking problem is failure to use both the OUO exemption number and the category name.

Overall, DOE CIC programs are operating effectively, and HS-61 has noted program enhancements at several sites. For example, the use of an electronic library of classification guides helps reduce the use of out-of-date guidance. Some sites provide subject matter-specific training for derivative classifiers that helps strengthen their classification knowledge and decision making. In addition, some sites provide annual refresher training for derivative classifiers, ensuring that they remain current on classification issues.

Several of the unclassified inspection reports for the past year are available on the HS-61 website at <http://reports.oa.doe.gov/ssevalstoc.html>. If you have any questions regarding HS-61 CIC reviews, contact Reece Edmonds at (301) 903-5118 or reece.edmonds@hq.doe.gov.

Guidance Status

Classification Guides (CG)

CG-HRW-1. This information has been published as a classification bulletin instead of a guide. The Technical Evaluation Panel recommended declassification of most radiological warfare information. The declassification was approved on August 18, 2006. Classification Bulletin WNP-109, Classification Guidance for Historical Radiological Warfare Programs was issued on October 13, 2006, to document that declassification and re-state current policy.

CG-ICF-6. A new draft is in preparation. It will update the guidance on equation of state and opacities, add computer code topics, and resolve some of the guidance discrepancies with TCG-WS-1. A draft guide was distributed for comment in February 2007.

CG-MD-2. A revision to the CG for materials disposition is being developed and is in final coordination.

CG-NEPW-1. The final draft CG for the robust nuclear earth penetrator weapon was approved by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and was sent to Department of Defense (DoD) on September 4, 2005. Once approved by DoD and the Office of Classification, the guide will be published.

CG-NMI-1. A new CG for nuclear material inventories is being developed.

CG-PET-1. A new CG to address proliferant enrichment technology is being developed and is currently in coordination.

CG-PSP-1. A new CG for the plasma separation process was developed. All technical issues have been resolved. The guide is in final coordination.

CG-RWT-1. A new CG for the transportation of radioactive waste to Yucca Mountain has been developed. The guide has been sent to other agencies for approval.

Guidance Issued in 2006

CG-BPA-1	<i>DOE Classification Guide for Bonneville Power Administration, 10/10/06</i>
CG-ES-1	<i>Classification Guide for Environmental Sampling, 3/28/06</i>
CG-IND-1	<i>DOE Classification Guide for Improvised Nuclear Devices, 10/26/06</i>
CG-ISTV-1 Change 1	<i>Classification and UCNI Information Guide for the Intra-Site Secure Transport Vehicle, 11/29/06</i>
CG-NRI-1	<i>DHS/DOE Classification and UCNI Guide for Nuclear/Radiological Incident Emergency Response and Consequence Management, 10/12/06</i>
CG-UK-2	<i>Joint Classification Guide for the Exchange and Safeguard of Materiel Between the United States and the United Kingdom, 10/2/06</i>
TCG-UC-3 Change 2	<i>Joint DOE/DoD Topical Classification Guide for Nuclear Weapon Use Control, 11/20/06</i>
TCG-WPMU-2 Change 1	<i>Joint DOE/DoD Topical Classification Guide for Weapon Production and Military Use, 1/26/06</i>

CG-SS-4. A revision to the nuclear material control and accountability has been approved.

CG-UAV-2. Revision of the CG for the separation of uranium isotopes by the Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation method is being developed.

Topical Classification Guides (TCG)

TCG-DS-2. A revision to the TCG for detonation systems is being developed. The revised guide will incorporate new

technological developments and add use control information. The guide was sent to DoD for approval and signature on May 24, 2006.

TCG-NNT-1. Change 6 to the nonnuclear test guide to augment existing topics and incorporate topics being transferred from CG-SSP-1 is under development. A revised draft will be sent to working group members in March 2007.

TCG-UC-2A. This has been cancelled with publication of Change 2 to TCG-UC-3.

TCG-VH-2. A revision to the TCG for vulnerabilities and hardening is in final coordination. The guide was sent to DoD for approval and signature on August 4, 2005.

TCG-WI-2. A first draft of a revision to the TCG for weapon initiators is being developed.

TCG-WM-2. A revision to the TCG for weapon materials has been developed. Comments on the draft guide have been received and are being incorporated. No comments have been received from DoD.

TCG-WOYE-1. A new TCG for weapon outputs, yields and effects is being developed. The guide combines the content of the current TCG-WO-1 with a comprehensive treatment of weapon yields and effects information.

TCG-WT-2. A first draft of a revision to the TCG for weapon testing is being developed.

UCNI Topical Guidelines (TG)

TG-NNP-2. A revision of the nuclear nonproliferation TG is being developed.

Classification Bulletins Currently in Draft

TNP-25. Declassification of Unfinished Winding Mandrel Outer Diameter and Exact Rotor Tube Length for the United

Guidance (Continued on page 8)

Quick Reference for “Declassify on:”

The guide topic reads CNSI [EV], and the note in the topic reads, “Declassify on completion of security inspection.”

Stamp should read:

Declassify on: Completion of security inspection

The document is dated 1/19/2007. The guide topic reads CNSI 25X4; 40

Stamp should read:

Declassify on: 25X4; 1/19/2047

The guide topic reads CNSI 25X6; [EV], and the note in the topic reads, “Declassify when vulnerability no longer exists.”

Stamp should read:

Declassify on: 25X6; when vulnerability no longer exists

The guide topic reads CRD

The “Declassify on” line would be omitted because RD is never automatically declassified.

The document is classified using CIA Memorandum, “Foreign Reactor Programs,” dated 2/12/2006, with a section portion marked (S) and whose declassification instructions read “Declassify on 2/12/2010”

The stamp should read:

Derived from: CIA Memorandum “Foreign Reactor Programs” 2/12/2006

Declassify on: 2/12/2010

The document is classified using CIA Memorandum, “Foreign Reactor Programs,” dated 3/15/2002, with a section portion marked (S) and whose declassification instruction reads “X4”

The stamp should read:

Derived from: CIA Memorandum “Foreign Reactor Programs” 3/15/2003

Declassify on: Source marked X4
Date of source 3/15/2003

The document is classified using DoD Memorandum “Analysis of Technical Information,” dated 10/10/1994, with a section portion marked (S) and whose declassification instructions read “OADR”

The stamp should read:

Derived from: DoD Memorandum “Analysis of Technical Information” 10/10/1994

Declassify on: Source marked OADR
Date of source 10/10/1994



Upcoming Classification and Information Control Appraisals

March 5-9

Oak Ridge Office, East Tennessee Technology Park, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and United States Enrichment Corporation

June 4-15 and
June 25-29

Sandia Site Office and Sandia National Laboratories/CA and NM

July 9-13

Kansas City Site Office and Kansas City Plant

August 20-24

Idaho Operations Office, Idaho National Laboratory, and Idaho Cleanup Project

October 15-19 and
November 5-8

Nevada Site Office, National Security Technologies, LLC, and Stoller-Navarro Joint Venture

Source Documents (Continued from page 2)

documents may not be used to classify Restricted Data (RD) or Formerly Restricted Data (FRD) documents or to declassify RD, FRD, or NSI documents.

When classifying using source documents, the classification determinations on the source document are applied to the new document. When a source document is used for classification, it is important to be able to trace the source of the classification determination. Therefore, the “Derived from” line of the classification stamp on the new document should cite the source document itself, not what is cited on the “Derived from” line of the source document stamp. For example, if the source document was a CIA memorandum dated January 15, 2007, which cited a CIA classification guide dated July 15, 2006, the “Derived from” line on the new document would read: “CIA Memorandum, 1/15/2007” – not the guide.

Declassification instructions are also carried over from the source document, even if those declassification instructions are obsolete (e.g., OADR or X1 through X8). However, if the source document reflects an obsolete declassification instruction, the Derivative Classifier should note the obsolete instructions used and the date of the source document on the “Declassify on” line. For example, “Declassify on: Source marked X2, date of source 1/22/2000.”

Remember, source documents may not be used for declassification, even for NSI documents. If a document has been classified based on source documents under the purview of other agencies, the document must be referred to the other agency for possible declassification. If you have questions regarding the use of source documents, contact your local Classification Officer or Representative.

If you have questions on the use of source documents, contact Nick Prospero at (301) 903-9967 or nick.prosperso@hq.doe.gov.

Personnel Updates

Farewell

Al Camacho, Office of Classification
Lisa A. Congemi, CO, Brookhaven National Laboratory
Elliot Daniels, Office of Classification (CSC)
Michael A. Greenwell, CO, Wackenhut Services Inc.—
Savannah River Site
Joan Hawthorne, Office of Classification
Diane C. Quenell, CO, Yucca Mountain Project
Chris Reynolds, CO, Argonne National Laboratory
Dennis D. Wagner, CO, Idaho Operations Office

Welcome

Glen Bode, CO, Argonne, National Laboratory
Linda Brightwell, Office of Classification (CSC)
Kent E. Davis, CO, Kansas City Site Office
Laurel J. Hautala, CO, Kansas City Site Office
Richard Henkel, CO, Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility
Karl J. Hugo, CO, Idaho Operations Office
Joseph P. Indusi, CO, Brookhaven National Laboratory
Paul Laplante, Office of Classification (CSC)
Pamela J. Livingston-Spruill, Classification Point of Contact,
Wackenhut Services Inc.—Savannah River Site
John E. O'Brien, CO Pantex Site Office
Gregg Peed, CO, United States Enrichment Corporation—
Portsmouth
Ronald J. Sentell, CO, Y-12 Site Office
Garald L. Smith, CO, Yucca Mountain Site Operations
Office/RW-8
James Stone, Office of Classification (CSC)

Stamp (Continued from page 1)

According to the Manual, the guide title and the date the guide was issued must be written on the “Derived from:” line. On nine of the documents, the “Derived from:” line on the stamp was filled out improperly – one did not have a guide or date listed; three omitted the guide date; five indicated a change number, but omitted the date of the guide; and one had the date of the last change rather than the date the guide was issued. Although the change number is not required, there is no harm in listing it in addition to the guide title and date. However, in two instances, the change numbers annotated on the stamp indicated out-of-date guidance (i.e., change 3 and 4 for CG-SS-4 were indicated when change 5 had been issued).

Declassification instructions were also a problem. The Manual requires that if the declassification instruction is an event, a summary of the event specified in the guidance must be written on the “Declassify On” line (e.g., Declassify On: When tactical positions are relocated). Only 6 of the 15 documents that required a declassification date or event cited the date or event properly. Two documents listed “EV” as the declassification

Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information

OUO or UCNI?

Some guide topics list “OUO/UCNI” as the classification instruction. This instruction is always accompanied by a note further instructing the user to select UCNI if the topic applies to an “UCNI sensitive facility” or OUO if it does not. You may only choose UCNI if (1) you are an UCNI Reviewing Official with cognizance over the information you are reviewing and (2) the topic applies to an UCNI sensitive facility.

Contact your Classification Officer to find out if your facility is an UCNI sensitive facility.

event, three listed 25X exemption numbers without including the declassification date or event, and three listed X2 or X4 exemptions. The implementing directive for Executive Order (E.O.) 12958, as amended, dated September 22, 2003, discontinued X1 through X8 exemptions. Except for 25X1-human, even 25-year exemptions (25X) must have a declassification date or event. All Headquarters guidance has been updated to conform to the implementing directive by replacing the X1-X8 exemptions and providing a date or event for all 25X topics except for 25X1-human. If you have a Headquarters guide that uses X1 through X8, your guidance is not current. Contact your local Classification Officer or Headquarters Office of Technical Guidance at (301) 903-3688 to get the most recent version.

A less common error on the stamps was to omit the position title of the classifier. The position title of the classifier must be included on the “Classified By” line. Many documents omitted the position title completely; others included the organization, but not the position title.

If you are unsure of the information that must be included on the lines of a classifier stamp, refer to DOE Manual 475.1-1A or DOE Manual 470.4-4, *Information Security*. These are posted on the DOE directives website at <http://www.directives.doe.gov/>. In addition, the boilerplate of Headquarters guides includes a section explaining how to use topical guidance to determine declassification instructions. A quick reference guide with examples of declassification instructions is also provided on page 6 of this CommuniQué. If you have questions on filling out Derivative Classifier stamps, contact Nick Prospero at (301) 903-9967 or nick.prosperso@hq.doe.gov.

Bulletins Issued in 2006

TNP-17. Security Enhancements in the Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste, 1/13/06

TNP-18. Recent Classification Determinations Regarding the USEC American Centrifuge Program, 5/10/06

TNP-19. Updated USEC, Inc. American Centrifuge Program Guidance, 4/24/06

TNP-20. Change in Classification Guidance for Centrifuge Casings for the USEC, Inc., American Centrifuge Program, 5/9/06

TNP-21. Change in Classification Guidance for the USEC, Inc., American Centrifuge Program, 10/12/06

TNP-22. Evaluation of Commercial Technologies for Use as Security Subsystems, 5/25/06

TNP-23. Unclassified USEC, Inc., Gas Centrifuge Performance Parameters, 10/20/06

TNP-24. Declassification regarding Uranium Inventories in Building 3019 at Oak Ridge National Laboratories, 1/9/07

WNP-99. Classification Guidance for the Device Assembly Facility, 2/13/06

WNP-100. Classification Guidance for Nuclear Weapon Use Control, 3/8/06

WNP-101. Nicknames: Gabbs, Light, and Popout, 6/8/06

WNP-102. Code Words: Road, Road Stable, Road Trail, 6/8/06

WNP-103. Classification Guidance for Equation of State, 4/17/06

WNP-105. Nuclear Component Production Rates, 6/27/06

WNP-106. Nicknames: Straight Line, Fast Track, Super Kinglet, Modified Robin, Fife I, Arbor, Bushel, and Console, 7/13/06

WNP-107. Statements Related to Nuclear Weapon Reliability, 7/18/06

WNP-108. Embedded Technologies for Stockpile Surveillance, 9/20/06

WNP-109. Classification Guidance for Historical Radiological Warfare Programs, 10/13/06

WNP-111. Nickname: ALOFT, 12/29/06.



Upcoming Events

March 13-15	General Course for Classification Officers/Representatives, GTN
April 24-25	Classification Officers Technical Program Review, GTN
March 27	General Course for Derivative Classifiers, GTN
May 8	General Course for Derivative Classifiers, Albuquerque
May 9-10	General Course for Derivative Declassifiers, Albuquerque
May 22	General Course for Derivative Classifiers, GTN
June 4-8	Overview of Nuclear Weapons Classification Course, GTN
July 31	General Course for Derivative Classifiers, GTN
September 11-13	General Course for Classification Officers/Representatives, GTN
September 18-19	General Course for Derivative Declassifiers, GTN
October 2	General Course for Derivative Classifiers, GTN
October 29- November 2	Overview of Nuclear Weapons Classification Course, GTN
November 14	General Course for Derivative Classifiers, Albuquerque
December 4	General Course for Derivative Classifiers, GTN

Guidance (Continued from page 5)

States Enrichment Corporation (USEC), Inc., American Centrifuge Program.

WNP-104. Inertial Confinement Fusion Issues for Local Thermodynamic Equilibrium (LTE), Non LTE, and Near LTE conditions.

WNP-112. Use of Isotopes at National Ignition Facility.

If you have any questions, contact Edie Chalk, Director, Office of Technical Guidance, at (301) 903-1185 or edie.chalk@hq.doe.gov.

Mark your calendars

**For the 42nd Annual
Classification Officers
Technical Program Review Meeting**

**April 24-25, 2007
Germantown, MD**