

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

Mining Proxy Logs: Finding Needles In Haystacks

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Disclaimer


- Our security infrastructure is a work in progress
 - This presentation is for educational purposes
 - This discussion pertains to our “Unclassified” environment ONLY
 - Hopefully we can make things better by learning from each other
 - If you see problems please say something

Have Fun!



Overview

- Introduction
- Problems
- Landscape
- Solutions
- Future
- Conclusion



Introduction – About LLNL/My Team/Me

- LLNL – Livermore, CA (1 sq mile and 13 sq miles)
 - ~7000 Employees (including contractors)
 - ~20,000 computers
 - ~10,000 Access Internet
- My Team
 - Network Security Team (NST) - 8 people
 - Incident Management Team (IMT) - 4 people
 - IDS, IPS, Proxys, Firewalls, IR, Log Aggregation/Correlation, Pen Testing, Malware Analysis, Forensics, etc.
- Me
 - B.S./M.S. in Computer Science from CSU, Chico
 - Over 13 years w/ LLNL ~6 years full time
 - Currently hold a CISSP, BCCPA, GCIH, GPEN



Problems – What Are We Trying To Solve?

- How do we find “bad guys” on our networks???
 - There are a lot of users
 - There are a lot of computers
 - There is a lot of data
 - There is no consistency and centralized **g**overnance is lacking
- What do the “bad guys” look like???
 - I’ve never spoken to a “bad guy”
 - I’ve never met a “bad guy” in person
 - “Bad guys” means something different to different people
- Most of us now have a web proxy...now what???
 - It never works perfectly
 - Somebody is always blaming me for breaking their app ☹️

Landscape - LLNL Proxy Deployment

- Blue Coat Proxy SG's
 - Transparent forwarding deployment using WCCP
 - We proxy ALL egress traffic (4 ports)
 - Excluding mail, dns and things explicitly exempted
 - Protocols or enforced on their respective ports
 - Content filtering (BCWF)
 - A/V scanning (McAfee)
 - Internet authentication (Idaps)
 - By and large most data flows through our proxy!



Landscape - Log Format Details

- Blue Coat uses a format called ELFF (WC3 Extended)
 - Extend Log File Format (<http://www.w3.org/TR/WD-logfile.html>)
- date time time-taken c-ip cs-username
cs-auth-group x-exception-id sc-filter-
result cs-categories cs(Referer) sc-status
s-action cs-method rs(Content-Type) cs-
uri-scheme cs-host cs-uri-port cs-uri-path
cs-uri-query cs-uri-extension cs(User-
Agent) s-ip sc-bytes cs-bytes x-virus-id

Landscape - Log Format Details

- prefix (header) Describes a header data field. The valid prefixes are:
 - c = Client
 - s = Server
 - r = Remote
 - cs = Client to Server
 - sc = Server to Client



http://www.bluecoat.com/http:/%252Fwww.bluecoat.com/support/self-service/6/ELFF_Format_Descriptions.html

Landscape - Log Format Details continued...

- LLNL format
- date time time-taken c-ip sc-status s-action sc-bytes cs-bytes cs-method cs-uri-scheme cs-host **cs-ip** cs-uri-port cs-uri-path cs-uri-query **cs(Referer)** **cs-username** cs-auth-group s-hierarchy s-supplier-name **rs(Content-Type)** **cs(User-Agent)** sc-filter-result cs-category x-virus-id s-ip s-sitename
- Customize your log format to best suite your needs

Landscape - Log Format Example


- 2010-04-20 07:00:40 225 1XX.115.109.XX 200
TCP_NC_MISS 332 533 GET http
116vistadrive.greatluxuryestate.com 65.18.172.67 80
/mlsmax/layout05/images/menu_div.gif -
http://116vistadrive.greatluxuryestate.com/mlsmax/home.htm?mls=&vkey=&vid=linney1 - DIRECT
116vistadrive.greatluxuryestate.com image/gif
"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.3) Gecko/20100401 Firefox/3.6.3" OBSERVED
"Real Estate" – 1XX.115.27.XX SG-HTTP-Service

Solutions – How can we solve our problems?

- Most of us now have a web proxy...now what???
 - Centralize your logs
 - Modify your log format to suite your needs
- What do the “bad guys” look like???
 - Different types of bad guys, overlap, difficult to tell apart
 - Users
 - Criminals / Entrepreneurs
 - APT (Advanced Persistent Threat)
- How do we find “bad guys” on our networks???
 - Depends on which “bad guys” we’re looking for
 - Digest
 - Analyze
 - Scrutinize

Solutions – Overview

- Parse your logs with whatever makes you happy
 - My Proof of Concept codes are in Perl
 - Need a code reference I'll share
 - You can use grep, awk, sed, cut, PHP, C, etc.
- Practical tips
 - Pay attention to http redirects
 - 301, 302, 3XX
 - Pay attention to referrer
 - Could contain search terms
 - Multi staged attacks are commonplace
 - Looking at logs after 5pm can be detrimental! -Monzy



Solutions – Overview Continued

- Getting comfortable with the data
 - Machine learning algorithms are not mandatory
 - get www.010h45m.com/FreeAV2010.exe
- Our solutions will focus on the following
 - Simple statistics
 - summarization, mean, std. dev, etc.
 - User agents
 - Content Types
 - Compound Searches
 - Consult the oracle
 - a.k.a. google




Solution - Summarization

- 2010-04-20 07:00:40 225 1XX.115.109.XX 200
TCP_NC_MISS 332 533 GET http
116vistadrive.greatluxuryestate.com 65.18.172.67 80
/mlsmax/layout05/images/menu_div.gif -
http://116vistadrive.greatluxuryestate.com/mlsmax/home.htm?mls=&vkey=&vid=linney1 - DIRECT
116vistadrive.greatluxuryestate.com image/gif
"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.3) Gecko/20100401 Firefox/3.6.3" OBSERVED
"Real Estate" – 1XX.115.27.XX SG-HTTP-Service

Solution - Summarize logs

■ Daily summary

- Total HTTP users, Total FTP users, Top Sources, Top Destinations, Top Categories, Top Denied Sources, Top Spyware/Malware Sources, Top Spyware Effects, Top User Agents, Top IP getting images, Top IP performing POST's
- Top 15 Spyware/Malware Sources:
 - 1xx.115.226.xx : 48
 - 1xx.115.105.xxx : 47
 - 1xx.9.139.xx : 14
 - 1xx.9.139.xx : 12
 - 1xx.9.93.xx : 8
 - 1xx.115.105.xxx : 5
 - 1xx.115.105.xxx : 5
 - 1xx.9.135.xx : 2
 - 1xx.9.135.xx : 2
 - 1xx.115.62.xxx : 2
 - 1xx.9.135.xx : 1



■ PoC bcsummary.pl

- Daily summary of most of the above

Solution - Summarize all requests by TLD

- Top Level Domain (TLD)
 - I need to jump through hoops to travel physically
 - Virtually users are all over the map!
 - Summary of daily TLD's:
 - com : 15889009
 - net : 1883675
 - org : 679329
 - gov : 265059
 - edu : 125093
 - uk : 116674
 - us : 38544
 - de : 29788
 - it : 26079
 - tv : 24495
 - fr : 11703
 - ca : 11016
 - ru : 7621
 - PoC [tldsummary.pl](#)
 - summary by Top Level Domain
- Maybe you should block entire TLD's?



Solution – User Agents

- 2010-04-20 07:00:40 225 1XX.115.109.XX 200 TCP_NC_MISS
332 533 GET http 116vistadrive.greatluxuryestate.com
65.18.172.67 80 /mlsmax/layout05/images/menu_div.gif -
http://116vistadrive.greatluxuryestate.com/mlsmax/home.htm?mls=
&vkey=&vid= linney1 - DIRECT
116vistadrive.greatluxuryestate.com image/gif "Mozilla/5.0
(Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.3)
Gecko/20100401 Firefox/3.6.3" OBSERVED "Real Estate" –
1XX.115.27.XX SG-HTTP-Service
- Most things identify themselves
 - Or at least try to mimic common agents
 - Even malware or unwanted software

Solution - User Agents

■ Recent interesting user agents

- Possible trojan
 - “Ql.exe”
 - “TwcToolbar7”
 - “weather2004”
- Possible piracy/MPAA issues
 - “AnyDVD” (DVD cloning software)
- Possible PII issues
 - TurboTax2009.r07.005 VFNetwork/438.14 Darwin/9.8.0 (i386) (MacBook5%2C1)
- Possible Data Loss Prevention
 - dotmacsyncclient259 CFNetwork/438.14 Darwin/9.8.0 (i386) (MacBook3%2C1)
- Possible malware or IT issue
 - “Immunet Updater”
 - “MSDW” //Thank you Monzy,Danny Quist, Kevin Hall
 - Microsoft Dr. Watson (sqm.microsoft.com, sqm.msn.com, watson.microsoft.com)



Solution - User Agents Continued

- Possible Waste Fraud and Abuse (WFA)
 - “BattlefieldBadCompany2Updater”
 - “Solitaire III Build 33”
 - “AppleTV/1.1”
 - Possible attack victims
 - “honeyd/1.5b”
 - “Winamp/5.551” //Integer overflow exploit
 - Integer overflow (www.milw0rm.com/exploits/8783)
 - WordPress/2.7; <http://localhost>
 - Possibly anything
 - “ie8ish”
 - “blah”
- Handy lookup tool (user-agents.org)
 - PoC [uasummary.pl](#)
 - Summarizes user agents and list in descending order by number of occurrences

project: 007
Secret Agent



Solution – Content Types

- 2010-04-20 07:00:40 225 1XX.115.109.XX 200
TCP_NC_MISS 332 533 GET http
116vistadrive.greatluxuryestate.com 65.18.172.67 80
/mlsmax/layout05/images/menu_div.gif -
http://116vistadrive.greatluxuryestate.com/mlsmax/home.htm?mls=&vkey=&vid=linney1 - DIRECT
116vistadrive.greatluxuryestate.com image/gif
"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.3) Gecko/20100401 Firefox/3.6.3" OBSERVED
"Real Estate" – 1XX.115.27.XX SG-HTTP-Service

Solution - Content-Type (a.k.a. MIME)

- HTTP Protocol (originally designed for SMTP)
 - Used to identify the type of information that a file contains.
 - Specified by web server using “Content-type:” header
- Common examples

| | | |
|---------------|-------|--------------------|
| • text/html | .html | Web Page |
| • image/png | .png | PNG-format image |
| • image/jpeg | .jpeg | JPEG-format image |
| • audio/mpeg | .mp3 | MPEG Audio File |
| • application | .exe | Executable content |



Content-Type continued...

- Focus on executable content
 - "application/octet-stream"
 - Beware of .ico (i.e. favicon.ico)
 - "application/x-msdownload"
 - application/x-msdos-program

Or

- Ends in
 - .exe
 - .msi
 - .pif
 - .scr
 - etc.



Content-Type continued...

- PoC executables.pl
 - Look for everything that ends in .exe
 - Exempt items from trusted domains
 - Less than 100 domains for my enterprise
 - Interesting examples
 - www.hotfile.com/free-games-download/Treasure_Puzzle.exe
 - www.inovikov.net/srs/rgaSetup_Release_3.205.007.exe
 - download.uniblue.com/aff/rb/fdm/registrybooster.exe
 - koti.mbnet.fi/vaultec/files/miscellaneous/MinGWStudioSetup-2.05r2.exe
- The possibilities are endless

Solution – Compound Searches

- Mix and match all of the tools previous tools
 - This where scripting languages come in handy!
- Pay close attention to some TLDs, specifically .ca!
 - If the destination ends in .ca
 - If the mime type is "application/octet-stream"
 - Print the log line
- Check out executables coming from category of “none”
 - If content type is "application/octet-stream" or "application/x-msdownload"
 - If category is “none”
 - If the file doesn't end in .ico
 - » Print the log line


Solution – Compound Searches

- Examine requests to IP's categorized as "none"
- If the destination host is the same as the destination IP
 - If the category is "none"
 - If this isn't FTP
 - Print the log line
- PoC quickie.pl (does this + more)
 - Simple canned compound queries of interest
 - Useful for looking for things quickly
 - Great for APT indicators



Solution - Google Safe Browsing API

- “API that enables client applications to check URLs against Google's constantly updated blacklists of suspected phishing and malware pages. Isolates machine from Internet”
 - <http://code.google.com/apis/safebrowsing/>
 - ~300,227 domains (2010-04-26)
 - Built into Firefox
 - FREE
- Reactive
 - Checks nightly
 - PoC safebrows-canonical.pl
 - Monzy Merza & Adam Sealey



- Continue automation/scripting
 - Proxy Log IDS (P.L.I.D.S.)
 - Share indicators/ideas that work!
- Other Antivirus Scanners
 - Experimenting with Avira/Kaspersky
 - Add to current ICAP group
- Other Content filters
 - Procuring McAfee Smartfilter
- Do More with HTTPS
 - Deny (Category=NONE && Untrusted issuer)
 - Intercept everything
 - Archive HTTPS files



Conclusion

- Further Reading
 - Dr Anton Chuvakin (chuvakin.blogspot.com)
 - Joe Griffin
(http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/malicious/mining_for_malware_theres_gold_in_them_thar_proxy_logs_32959)

- Any Questions???

- My Contact Information
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- Thank you for your time 😊

