



U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Inspector General
Technology Crimes Section

Live Incident Response The Law Enforcement Perspective

**Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge
Daniel Persson**

OVERVIEW



- Background
- Law Enforcement (LE) Mindset
- Collection of Evidence
- Triage
- Final Thoughts



Background



- Current Duties

- Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge OIG
Technology Crimes Section (TCS)

- Handle all LE related Tech Crimes for DOE
- Digital media analysis
- LE-centric intrusion cases
- CP cases in DOE complex
- LE POC for DOE in all joint investigations
 - FBI, AFOSI, ICE, etc



- What I Don't Do
 - I am not a Lawyer
 - I am not an Auditor
 - I don't create DOE policy
 - How can IG create and audit policy?
 - How can I define what DOE policy is?
 - I don't investigate APT – other people do



- Current Problem: “How can we take the traditional LE mindset and apply it to today’s Incident Response environment?”



Law Enforcement (LE) Mindset



- Catch the Bad Guys





- Traditional Law Enforcement Mindset
 - Seize physical evidence (drugs, body)
 - Don't alter the item
 - Remove it from the scene
 - Analyze it later
 - Reference the original at all times





- Computer Evidence is Different
 - Physical computer vs. resident data
 - Corrupting data part of collection
 - Data lost during shut down
 - Seizure re-victimizes Department
 - Hardware loses value
 - Reacquire hardware
 - Restore data from good backup
 - Easy to collect too much



Evidence Collection



- Forensic Computer Imaging





- Digital Evidence Importance
 - Holds evidence of a crime
 - Copies of fraudulent contracts
 - Emails showing Intellectual Property theft
 - Contacts in an online counterfeit ring
 - Holds evidence about a crime
 - Timestamps on files used by attacker
 - TCP network connection to IP address
 - USB serial number entry in registry (USBSTOR)



- What Can We Capture?

- RAM

- RAM resident malware
- Keys/passwords
- Data fragments
- Unpacked executables

- Processes

- Source
- Links
- Scheduled



– Networking

- Active/listening/recent connections
- Routing tables
- Services listening on specific ports

– Logons


- Users remotely logged on
- Systems connected to shares
- Recent activity



- Services
 - What's listening
 - What's running
- DLL shared libraries
- File handles
- Whatever we don't collect we lose
 - Far more challenging to recreate on dead box
 - Some data can't be recreated (e.g. RAM)



- Methodology
 - Have a plan!





- Learn tools
 - Limitations
 - Affect on system
- Test on non-production systems
 - Various OS versions
 - Different user levels
- Static binaries
 - Helix CD/website
 - Tested production binaries



- Set up proper collection process
 - RAM should be 1st
 - Use RFC 3227 Order of Volatility as guideline
- Repeatable (scripted) process
 - Recreate steps at a later date
 - Avoids missing steps
 - Train new members quickly
 - Rapid remote deployment



- RAM Collection – Winen
 - Created by Guidance Software
 - Large forensic firm
 - Numerous in-house developers
 - Included on Helix CD
 - Allows for case metadata



HELIX2009R1 (01/06/2009)

File QuickLaunch Page Help

HELIX™ INCIDENT RESPONSE • ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY • COMPUTER FORENSICS

RAM Acquisition

```
ance™
T W A R E

Winen
Version 6.12.044

ory DD

Mantech MDD
Version 1.3

Matthieu Suiche win32dd
Version 1.2.1.20090106
```

Page 3 of 3

```
HELIX Forensic Command Shell
Ctrl-D for Directory or Ctrl-F for filename completion
The Shell Path has been modified to find trusted cdrom binaries first
Do not navigate away from the CD drive letter.
=====
8:00:31.60 D:\IR\RAM\winen> type winen.txt
#Guidance Software, Inc.
#WinEn Configuration File (Max Config File size = 32768 characters)
#Syntax: "OptionName=Value"

#EvidencePath (*Required)
#Path AND Filename of the evidence file to be created
EvidencePath=

#Compress (*Required)
#Level of compression (0=none, 1=fast, 2=best)
Compress=

#Examiner (*Required)
#Examiners name
Examiner=

#EvidenceName (*Required)
#Name of the evidence within the evidence file
EvidenceName=

#CaseNumber (*Required)
#Case Number related to the evidence
CaseNumber=

#EvidenceNumber (*Required)
#Evidence Number
EvidenceNumber=

#MaxFileSize (Optional, Default=640)
#Max file size of each evidence file segment in MB (Min=1)
MaxFileSize=

#Granularity (Optional, Default=1)
#Error granularity in sectors (Min=1, Max=1024)
Granularity=
```

start HELIX Forensic Comm... 8:01 AM



- RAM Collection – MDD
 - Created by ManTech International
 - Included on Helix CD
 - Some known issues
 - 2008 Server
 - Windows Vista/7



HELIX2009R1 (01/06/2009)

File QuickLaunch Page Help

HELIX™ INCIDENT RESPONSE • ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY • COMPUTER FORENSICS

Live RAM Acquisition

Guidance
SOFTWARE

Winen
Version 6.12.0.44

Memory DD

Mantech MDD
Version 1.3

Matthieu Suiche win32dd
Version 1.2.1.20090106

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HELIX Forensic Command Shell

```
Ctrl-D for Directory or Ctrl-F for filename completion
The Shell Path has been modified to find trusted cdrom binaries first
Do not navigate away from the CD drive letter.
-----
17:52:14.46 D:\IR\RAM\MDD> type mddusage.txt
mdd ManTech Physical Memory Dump Utility
Usage:
mdd [-o OUTPUTFILE] [-qcvw]
    -o OUTPUTFILE    output file for dump
    -q               quiet; no output except on error
    -v               verbose; output offsets of failed mappings
    -c               redistribution conditions for GPL
    -w               warranty information for GPL
17:52:31.81 D:\IR\RAM\MDD> _
```

start

HELIX Forensic Comm...

5:52 PM



- RAM Collection – FTK Imager 2.9
 - Created by AccessData
 - Large forensic firm
 - Numerous in-house developers
 - *Not included on Helix CD (2.5.3)*
 - Current version on Helix doesn't support RAM



AccessData FTK Imager 2.9.0.1385

File View Mode Help

Evidence Tree

Name	Size	Type	Date Modified
------	------	------	---------------

File List

Custom Content Sources

Evidence:File System|Path|File

New Edit Remove Remove All Create Image

Properties Hex Value Inter... Custom Content...

For Help, press F1

Memory Capture

Enter the path for the dumpfile:

Enter the filename for the dumpfile:



- RAM Collection – Helix Pro
 - Created by e-fense
 - Makers of Helix forensic CDs
 - Well known in IR community
 - Flexible output
 - Attached drive
 - Networked to system running Helix Pro receiver
 - Paid subscription required



Helix3 Pro

File Edit Help

Info Acquire Hash Search

System

Windows XP (Service Pack 2)
Volatile Data

Disks

- VMware Virtual IDE Hard Drive 00000001M
4.30 GB PhysicalDrive0
- C:\
4.29 GB
- D:\
697 MB

Memory

Physical: 515 MB

Acquire Device: System Memory

Output Type: RAW

Output Name: Image Examiner:

Case Number: Item Number:

Description:

Notes:

Segmentation: 2 GB - Default Read Size:

Hash Protocol: MD5 SHA1 SHA256 SHA512

Image to Attached Device Select destination folder

[Refresh Device List](#)

start Helix3 Pro 5:42 PM



- Volatile Data Collection – Sysinternals
 - Purchase by Microsoft
 - Created by Mark Russinovich
 - Long use in IR community
 - Numerous capabilities
 - Command line tools
 - GUI tools



Process Explorer - Sysinternals: www.sysinternals.com [BC3-MACBOOK-PRO\TCS]

File Options View Process Find Users Help

Process	PID	CPU	Private Bytes	Working Set	Description	Company Name
System Idle Process	0	86.92	0 K	28 K		
Interrupts	n/a	0.77	0 K	0 K	0 K Hardware Interrupts	
DPCs	n/a	1.54	0 K	0 K	0 K Deferred Procedure Calls	
System	4	0.77	0 K	96,036 K		
smss.exe	836		172 K	428 K	Windows NT Session Mana...	Microsoft Corporation
csrss.exe	896		1,872 K	6,404 K	Client Server Runtime Process	Microsoft Corporation
winlogon.exe	928		10,496 K	4,904 K	Windows NT Logon Applicat...	Microsoft Corporation
services.exe	972	0.77	4,000 K	5,756 K	Services and Controller app...	Microsoft Corporation
lsass.exe	988		6,000 K	1,000 K	Local Security Authority	Microsoft Corporation
avghcsvx.exe	252		14,000 K	14,000 K	Avast! Home Edition	Avast Software
avgrsx.exe	464		1,000 K	1,000 K	Avast! Home Edition	Avast Software
avgcsvx.exe	620		7,000 K	7,000 K	Avast! Home Edition	Avast Software
explorer.exe	3920		35,000 K	35,000 K	Windows Explorer	Microsoft Corporation
IRW.exe	3732		2,000 K	2,000 K	Internet Radio	Microsoft Corporation
KbdMgr.exe	2196		2,000 K	2,000 K	Keyboard Manager	Microsoft Corporation
GrooveMonitor.exe	2224		2,000 K	2,000 K	Groove Monitor	Microsoft Corporation
VPTray.exe	500		26,000 K	26,000 K	Vista Process Tracker	Microsoft Corporation
acrotray.exe	2248		2,000 K	2,000 K	Acrobat Tray	Adobe Systems Inc.
MaxMenuMgr.exe	2240		1,000 K	1,000 K	MaxMenuMgr	Microsoft Corporation
rundll32.exe	2276		2,000 K	2,000 K	RunDll32	Microsoft Corporation
RTHDCPL.exe	2520		22,000 K	22,000 K	Remote Desktop Client	Microsoft Corporation
acevtsrv.exe	2212		3,000 K	3,000 K	ACEVTSRV	Microsoft Corporation
concentr.exe	2560		1,000 K	1,000 K	Concentr	Microsoft Corporation
iTunesHelper.exe	2644		10,000 K	10,000 K	iTunesHelper	Apple Inc.
jusched.exe	2864		2,000 K	2,000 K	JustSchedule	Microsoft Corporation
avgray.exe	2892		4,000 K	4,000 K	Avast! Home Edition	Avast Software
hqtray.exe	2456		4,000 K	4,000 K	HQ Tray	Microsoft Corporation
ctfmon.exe	2992		1,000 K	1,000 K	CTFMON	Microsoft Corporation
agquickp.exe	452		2,000 K	2,000 K	AgQuickP	Microsoft Corporation
CodeMeterCC.exe	3820		3,000 K	3,000 K	CodeMeterCC	Microsoft Corporation
WindowsSearch.exe	3848		6,000 K	6,000 K	Windows Search	Microsoft Corporation
Dropbox.exe	3648		41,000 K	41,000 K	Dropbox	Dropbox, Inc.
iexplore.exe	5828		20,000 K	20,000 K	Internet Explorer	Microsoft Corporation
iexplore.exe	3328		75,000 K	75,000 K	Internet Explorer	Microsoft Corporation
iexplore.exe	4544		128,000 K	128,000 K	Internet Explorer	Microsoft Corporation
Acrobat.exe	2516		43,000 K	43,000 K	Acrobat	Adobe Systems Inc.
iexplore.exe	4132		158,000 K	158,000 K	Internet Explorer	Microsoft Corporation
iexplore.exe	6056		63,000 K	63,000 K	Internet Explorer	Microsoft Corporation
iexplore.exe	3680	8.46	180,000 K	180,000 K	Internet Explorer	Microsoft Corporation
WinSnap.exe	4376		6,188 K	2,832 K	Windows Snapshot Maker	NI Wind Software
WINWORD.EXE	4948		28,688 K	3,456 K	Microsoft Office Word	Microsoft Corporation
POWERPNT.EXE	8148		36,136 K	3,444 K	Microsoft Office PowerPoint	Microsoft Corporation
procexp.exe	7080	0.77	22,208 K	26,380 K	Sysinternals Process Explorer	Sysinternals - www.sysinter...

CPU Usage: 13.08% Commit Charge: 33.72% Processes: 81 Physical Usage: 51.98%

iTunesHelper.exe:2644 Properties

TCP/IP Security Environment Strings
Image Performance Performance Graph Threads

Image File
 iTunesHelper
(Not verified) Apple Inc.
Version: 9.1.0.79
Time: 3/26/2010 1:10 AM

Path:
C:\Program Files\iTunes\iTunesHelper.exe

Command line:
"C:\Program Files\iTunes\iTunesHelper.exe"

Current directory:
C:\Documents and Settings\TCS\

Parent: explorer.exe(3920)
User: BC3-MACBOOK-PRO\TCS
Started: 3:32:56 PM 5/18/2010
Comment:
Data Execution Protection (DEP) Status: Disabled

Verify Bring to Front Kill Process

OK Cancel



- Volatile Data Collection – IRCR
 - Included on Helix CD
 - Scripted data collection
 - Output to a netcat listener
 - Large text file
 - Numerous interactive messages
 - Need to monitor while running
 - Sysinternals EULAs on screen



C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe HELIX2009R1 (01/06/2009)

enleft = 13
enleft = 418
enleft = 10
enleft = 34
enleft = 2
enleft = 2
enleft = 106
enleft = 225
enleft = 155
enleft = 10
enleft = 744
enleft = 2
enleft = 119
enleft = 349
enleft = 10
enleft = 4151
enleft = 76
enleft = 2
enleft = 106
enleft = 128
enleft = 526
enleft = 21
enleft = 10

IRCR - NetCat

The system cannot find the path specified.
The system cannot find the path specified.
The system cannot find the path specified.
The system cannot find the path specified.
This command can be used only in the current directory.
More help is available by typing help netcat

File Not Found
The system cannot find the path specified.
'D:\IR\IRCR\..\BIN\procinterrogator.exe' is not an operable program or batch file

psfile v1.02 - psfile
Copyright © 2001 Mark Russinovich
Sysinternals

PsWithInfo v1.74 - Local and remote system information viewer
Copyright (C) 2001-2005 Mark Russinovich
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com

pslist v1.28 - Sysinternals PsList
Copyright © 2000-2004 Mark Russinovich
Sysinternals

loggedon v1.33 - See who's logged on
Copyright © 2000-2006 Mark Russinovich
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com

HELIX™ INCIDENT RESPONSE • ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY • COMPUTER FORENSICS

Incident Response

Windows Forensic Toolchest (WFT)

loggedon License Agreement

You can also use the /accepteula command-line switch to accept the EULA.

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Print Agree Decline

Page 1 of 3

start | C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe | IRCR - NetCat | loggedon License Agr... | 5:56 PM



- Volatile Data Collection – Helix Pro
 - Simple GUI interface
 - Flexible output
 - Attached drive
 - Networked to system running Helix Pro receiver
 - Paid subscription required



Helix3 Pro File Edit Help

Info Acquire Hash Search

System

Windows XP (Service Pack 2)

Volatile Data

Disks

- VMware Virtual IDE Hard Drive 00000001M
4.30 GB PhysicalDrive0
- C:\
4.29 GB
- D:\
697 MB

Memory

Physical: 515 MB

[Refresh Device List](#)


Acquire Volatile Data:

Output Format:

- Network**
 - ARP table** - Show the converted Internet Protocol(IP) address for corresponding physical network address. This shows computers that are connected to a networked machine.
 - Interface tables** - List what interfaces are in use on the system and what the individual MAC address is for each of them.
 - The routing table** - List the set of rules, that is used to determine where data packets traveling over an Internet Protocol (IP) network will be directed.
 - Network statistics and connections** - Display network connections (both incoming and outgoing), with processes and executable paths associated to each connection.
- System**
 - Drivers** - List of all installed system drivers.
 - Volume Information** - List all of the drives installed on the system including their sizes, file systems.
 - Environment variables** - Get a hardware profile for the system. Includes computer name, operating system info, processor info, timezone, uptime.
 - Installed Applications** - List all of the installed applications.
 - Screen Capture** - Capture and save a screen shot of the users desktop.
- Processes**
 - Processes** - Analysis of all running processes on the system to include the full executable path information, memory usage and associated dynamic library files.
 - Services** - Analysis of all system services to include ones that are running or stopped.



- Volatile Data Collection – e-fense
 - Live Response/Aperio
 - USB drive based
 - Automated collection and storage





– Live Response/Aperio

- Automated collection = “Agent Proof”



- Centralized analysis console



Triage



- Collection was Initial Challenge





- New Challenge – Rapid Analysis
 - Quickly aggregate and compare data
 - Still labor intensive
 - Aspects of interest
 - What ports connected
 - IP addresses utilized
 - Processes (names, sources, utilization)
 - Find a commonality



- Enterprise Level Platforms
 - Have hook into systems
 - Common output/reporting
 - No need for physical access to computer
 - Pre-deployed agent
 - Require network access to system
 - Ensure agent is working and communicating



- Non-Enterprise Level
 - Much more challenging
 - Need collection/analysis tools
 - Requires physical access to systems



- Triage Tools- Live Response/Aperio
 - Centralized collection
 - Easy to run multiple cases concurrently
 - Comparison between systems cumbersome
 - Extensive reports



Live Response

File Edit Window Help

Initialize Recover Report Historical Forensics

F: - Flash LUXIO USB2.0 USB E Created: 2009-05-02 22:46:09 S/N:
Recover Key Case Number: FFR-1 Agent: Admin

PID	Process	Path
0	System Idle Process	
4	System	
1316	smss.exe	{SystemRoot}\System32\smss.exe
1372	csrss.exe	{??}\C:\WINDOWS\system32\csrss.exe
1404	winlogon.exe	{??}\C:\WINDOWS\system32\winlogon.exe
1460	services.exe	C:\WINDOWS\system32\services.exe

Base	Version	Path	Size
0x1000000		{??}\C:\WINDOWS\system32\winlogon.exe	528K
0x7C900000	5.1.2600.5755	C:\WINDOWS\system32\ntdll.dll	729K
0x7C800000	5.1.2600.5781	C:\WINDOWS\system32\kernel32.dll	100K
0x77DD0000	5.1.2600.5755	C:\WINDOWS\system32\ADVAPI32.dll	634K
0x77E70000	5.1.2600.5512	C:\WINDOWS\system32\RPCRT4.dll	598K
0x77FE0000	5.1.2600.5753	C:\WINDOWS\system32\Secur32.dll	696K
0x776C0000	5.1.2600.5512	C:\WINDOWS\system32\AUTHZ.dll	737K
0x77C10000	7.0.2600.5512	C:\WINDOWS\system32\msvcrt.dll	360K
0x77A80000	5.131.2600.5512	C:\WINDOWS\system32\CRYPT32.dll	610K
0x77B20000	5.1.2600.5512	C:\WINDOWS\system32\MSASN1.dll	737K
0x7E410000	5.1.2600.5512	C:\WINDOWS\system32\USER32.dll	593K
0x77F10000	5.1.2600.5698	C:\WINDOWS\system32\GDI32.dll	299K
0x75940000	5.1.2600.5512	C:\WINDOWS\system32\NDdeApi.dll	327K

Results Available



- Triage Tools - Mandiant First Response
 - Centralized collection
 - Pre-deployed agents
 - Individual system collection
 - Easy comparison between systems
 - Compare specific aspects
 - Processes
 - Ports
 - Ability to add analysis notes to file



First Response

File Edit Host Tools Help

Deploy Import Start Audit Export Find Clear

Hosts

Add Delete

- Hosts
- Unknownsystem

Audit Results for Unknownsystem

Script	Started (UTC)	Duration	Processes	Ports	Registry	Event Logs	Services
(imported)	06-Apr-06 16:31:46	00. 01:58:00					

Flg	Process ID	Process	Start Time (Hos...	Elapsed
<input type="radio"/>	608	svchost	1/9/2006 2:54 AM	87.14:39:
<input type="radio"/>	2756	fragent	4/6/2006 4:23 PM	00:10:56
<input checked="" type="radio"/>	1372	svrany	1/9/2006 2:54 AM	87.14:39:
<input type="radio"/>	1692	SMSAPM32	4/6/2006 2:03 PM	02:30:41
<input type="radio"/>	2012	QAMgr	3/19/2006 8:16 ...	17.21:17:
<input type="radio"/>	1476	SavRoam	1/9/2006 2:54 AM	87.14:39:
<input type="radio"/>	404	LSASS	1/9/2006 2:54 AM	87.14:39:
<input type="radio"/>	1152	explorer	4/6/2006 4:15 PM	00:17:58
<input type="radio"/>	700	Wmiprse...	2/6/2006 7:01 PM	20:22:22

Notes

Section
Looks Like Malware

Selected Item

[Show details](#) 67 items [Hide notes](#)

System **Processes** Ports Registry Event Logs Services Tasks Files Issues

Loading Processes finished.



Final Thoughts



- Identify Commonalities between Attacks
 - Tie attacks together
 - Determine Modus Operandi
 - Create profile
- Trace Attacks to Common Sources
 - IPs
 - Servers
 - Controllers



- Gather Info at Service Provider Level
 - 2703(f) Preservation Letters
 - Provides time to get Court Order
 - Notifies service provider of intent
 - 2703(d) Disclosure
 - Provides customer communications
 - Provides customer records



- Use Info Gathered

- Profile of attack and user data

- Determine attribution
- Attempt to serve warrant on individual(s)
- Present case for prosecution - Federal Court System

- Share information with LE partners

- Gather history on person or group
- Provide common threat picture



- Work with Cyber Security
 - CS knows systems, networks, processes best
 - Don't want to be stumbling block in process
 - Augment process by running parallel with copy of evidence
 - Provide attribution when possible
 - Provide deterrent
 - De-conflict with
 - FBI, USSS, DOD, ICE
 - CI and Intel elements



Questions?

