

U.S. Department of Energy Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability

Cybersecurity for Energy Delivery Systems


2010 Peer Review

Alexandria, VA ♦ July 20-22, 2010

Carl Hauser Washington State University TCIPG: GridStat

Summary Slide: GridStat

- Outcomes: Develop key and trust management solutions for secure and real-time communication substrate; transition substrate to industry partners to meet increased inter-utility communication needs
- •Roadmap Challenges: Open and flexible control leads to increased risks; complexity increases exponentially with increased number of nodes;
- Major Successes: long-lived authentication architecture; NASPInet architecture influence



- Schedule: Develop preliminary trust model and multicast signing approaches 8/10; implement multicast signing 12/10; large-scale test 6/11
- Funding: TCIPG
- Performers: Washington State Univ.
- Partners: SEL, RTI, PNNL, Avista

Technical Approach and Feasibility

• Approach

- Managed, real-time data dissemination network
- Multi-cast with redundant paths
- Performance and scale requirements
 - NASPInet service classes
 - advanced control and monitoring applications
- Metrics for Success
 - Availability is key security property
 - Multi-cast latency with end-to-end security
 - Trust management coupled to decisions about data sharing and use

Technical Approach and Feasibility

Challenges to Success

- Long-lived information infrastructure
 - Modular, stackable encryption and authentication
 - Protocols for evolutionary change of crypto algorithms
- RSA/DSA Public Key signature techniques too slow
 - Investigate HW acceleration
 - Investigate time-based signatures
 - Investigate alternative PK techniques
- Trust and key management problem scale
 - Automation essential
 - Existing trust models aren't coupled to risk analysis and decision making

Technical Approach and Feasibility

• Technical Achievements to Date

- GridStat implementation
 - Multi-site demonstration project (w/PNNL)
 - Long-lived (securely upgradeable) encryption and authentication
 - Communication component for GridSim project
- Recent Major Papers
 - Long-lived encryption (ACM DEBS 2009)
 - Long-lived authentication (IFIP WG 11.10 2010, Int'l Journal of Critical Infrastructures)
 - Smart Generation and Transmission with Coherent, Real-Time Data (invited submission, Proceedings of the IEEE)

Collaboration/Technology Transfer

• Plans to gain industry input

- What is most needed? industry to collaborate on demonstration projects with substation data
- NASPInet activities; interaction with middleware (RTI), system integrator (Harris), and research (BBN) industry to engage them in power communication infrastructure development
- Utility visits: Salt River Project, BPA, Avista, SCE, PG&E, TVA ...
- Obstacle: industry focus on short-term cyber security issues mostly not yet looking at ubiquitous wide-area communication
- Plans to transfer technology/knowledge to end user
 - Primary application: generation and transmission systems
 - Open source and royalty-free release as NASPInet reference implementation
 - Demonstrate GridStat at scale using TCIPG testbed and GENI

Next Steps

• Approach For the Next Year

- Implement low-latency digital signatures for multi-cast
- Create mathematical model linking trust factors (authentication, competence and willingness) to decision making
- Extend authentication implementation with key management component
- Continue interactions with NASPI, RTI, BBN, Harris toward deployment of GridStat-based demonstration


Potential follow-on work

- Open source release requires investment in configuration tools and documentation
- Instrumentation of GridStat networks for security monitoring

Long-lived authentication


- Authentication is *the* essential service for which module change is needed
 - Flexible confidentiality and integrity services can be built if authentication is achieved
- What if an authentication key or algorithm is compromised?
 - Pre-loaded key material, consumed over time
 - Module change protocol allows installation of new modules
- Not Public Key Cryptography
 - Structure of PK-keys depends on algorithm
 - Need to be flexible about algorithm
- Symmetric Key Cryptography
 - No particular format for keys
 - Distinct keys for every parent-child node pair

Low-latency digital signatures



- How does subscriber know that message really came from publisher?
- Existing GridStat and other RSA signing implementations add 50ms or more latency (2048-bit key)
- HW acceleration e.g. SPARC T2 crypto coprocessor adds about 1 ms but not available outside massive servers (\$\$\$\$)
- Time-based signatures (TESLA): latency must be greater than maximum network latency
- Characterize tradeoffs associated with different algorithms
- Select and implement algorithms meeting needs of representative power applications

Trust Management



- Trust vs classical security: is public key really that of the desired publisher? Is the publisher is publishing correct values?
- At envisioned scale: identity, competence and willingness always contain elements of *uncertainty*
- Existing security theories assume *certainty* of identity is achieved and say nothing about willingness and competence
- Existing trust theories address trust abstractly and do not relate trust assessment to decisions
- Thesis: a useful theory of trust can be created that
 - Relates trust judgments to risk inputs of decision making
 - Guides collection of data to support accurate judgment of risks
 - Can be fully automated as part of real-time control systems

Questions?