

HSS Independent Activity Report - Rev. 0**Report Number:** HIAR-ICP-2013-11-19**Site:** Idaho Site - Idaho Cleanup Project**Subject:** Office of Enforcement and Oversight's Office of Safety and Emergency Management Evaluations Activity Report on the Pre-Restart Visit to the Integrated Waste Treatment Unit by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board**Dates of Activity :** 11/19/2013 - 11/22/2013**Report Preparer:** Aleem E. Boatright**Activity Description/Purpose:**

In June 2012, the filter and solids collection system of the Integrated Waste Treatment Unit (IWTU) facility of the Idaho Cleanup Project failed during the initial plant heatup phase of operations. No hazardous release resulted. The subsequent investigation largely attributed the overall cause to carbon dust generated in the IWTU steam reforming process. The facility has been shut down since the event, and recovery has involved both operating and design changes, along with modification of the existing safety basis documents. Many of the design changes were driven by positive Unreviewed Safety Question determinations that resulted from several indications of Potential Inadequacies in the Safety Analysis (PISAs). Like much of the Department of Energy (DOE), the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) has expressed interest in this ongoing project and planned this November 2013 visit to explore the changes made to the IWTU.

Result:

The Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS) Site Lead accompanied DNFSB representatives to the Idaho Site. In an effort led by the DNFSB representatives, the Site Lead first toured the newly modified IWTU facility to observe the many process and equipment modifications that have been made since the facility was shut down. In addition, the Site Lead met independently with key operations office staff and observed DNFSB-led interviews with key operations office, project, and contractor personnel. These interviews clarified the reasons behind the many modifications to the facility and how each change was determined to be a solution to an identified problem. Both the DNFSB representatives and the HSS Site Lead also had the opportunity to review various documents that supported the IWTU modifications, as well as the planned restart process.

The HSS Site Lead plans to return to the Idaho Site to conduct a shadow assessment of both the contractor and Federal DOE readiness assessments (RAs), which will be conducted prior to the restart of IWTU. During this planned review, HSS will be able to measure the effectiveness of the processes that DOE line management and the contractor use to conduct oversight of this new nuclear facility.

HSS Participants**References**

1 (lead). Aleem E. Boatright

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Were there any items for HSS follow up? Yes No**HSS Follow Up Items**

1. Concurrently assess IWTU contractor and Federal RA reviews.