

HSS Independent Activity Report - Rev. 0**Report Number:** HIAR-SNL-2011-02-18**Site:** Sandia National Laboratories (SNL)**Subject:** Office of Independent Oversight's Office of Environment, Safety and Health Evaluations Independent Activity Report for the Sandia Site Office Assessment of Activity-Level Work Planning and Control at Sandia National Laboratories /New Mexico (SNL)**Dates of Activity :** 02/14/2011 – 02/18/2011**Report Preparer:** Patricia Williams**Activity Description/Purpose:**

At the request of the Sandia Site Office (SSO), the Office of Environment, Safety and Health Evaluations (HS-64) personnel participated in an SSO assessment of SNL's Activity-Level Work Planning and Control processes, procedures, and implementation by line organizations, including feedback and improvement activities and efforts to sustain the program, and line implementation improvements. SSO will use the results of this review to evaluate the effectiveness of the corrective actions implemented to close out Findings C-1 and C-2 from the 2008 *Independent Oversight Inspection of ES&H Programs at the Sandia National Laboratories* report. HS-64 provided input to the assessment plan, which was finalized on January 28, 2011. The final plan was deemed appropriate for the review scope. HS-64 attended the in-briefing/planning meeting on January 31, 2011, via conference call. During the week of February 14-18, 2011, the team completed the site visit, which included field work observations at the Facility Management and Operation Center (FMOC) and Technical Area (TA) V and review of work activities at the Auxiliary Hot Cell Facility (AHCF), the Annular Core Research Reactor (ACRR), and the Gamma Irradiation Facility (GIF). Daily team meetings were held to report out to the team leads. Factual accuracy reviews were conducted the week of March 21-25, 2011, and the report was issued April 2011.

Result:

This SSO assessment was scheduled and conducted in accordance with SSO Oversight Policy as an "OAA-GOV" type assessment. The assessment served as an effectiveness review for closure of SNL 2008 HS-64 Findings C-1 and C-2 and sampled activity-level work planning and control (ALWPC) at TA-V and FMOC as a means of verifying field implementation of SNL ALWPC requirements. The SSO assessors were supported by team members external to SSO. The SSO assessors concluded the corrective actions for both findings had resulted in improvement in ALWPC at SNL and the corrective actions were rated partially effective based on SNL internal self-assessment and evidence of ongoing implementation issues. The SSO assessors recommended closure of both findings given that SNL has planned actions to address residual weaknesses in implementation and sustainability.

The SSO assessment report includes additional examples of weaknesses that should be considered by the assessed organizations and SNL policy owner. In accordance with SSO oversight policy, the results of this Operational Awareness Assessment-GOV assessment will be entered into SSO ePegasus for performance tracking and trending. SNL is not required to respond to identified issues unless they are subsequently formally transmitted in a quarterly Periodic Contractor Performance Report, with a requirement for corrective action issued by the SSO Manager.

The following issues were entered into ePegasus for SSO follow up:

- WPC/SNL 4100 - inconsistent application of job safety analysis (JSA)/skill of the worker (SOW) and rigor levels were observed. Line on Line self-assessment is not resulting in meaningful corrective actions beyond those identified in Program on Line assessment (which are targeting program improvements but not line implementation).
- WDC/SNL 06234 - Well drilling activity by the subcontractor (WDC Exploration and Wells) was not consistently analyzed and controlled and work proceeded without reassessment. The assigned low rigor rating of the work is not consistent with unmitigated consequence criteria. JSAs analyzing the project phase rather than the task level hazards are not providing clear hazard identification and control.
- TA-V/SNL 1380 - JSA, SOW, and rigor level processes are not consistently being systematically and effectively implemented. JSAs are not always being developed (per a TA-V exemption) and those that have been developed are not always consistent with ALWPC expectation for task-level specifics. The hazards and controls credited as sufficient by SOW are not clearly identified and mapped on a task by task basis through the JSA or equivalent. The assigned low and medium rigor rating of work is not consistent with unmitigated consequence criteria or the added controls that were observed to be applied; hence, appears inconsistent with TA-V-AP-008 and WPC Manual.

- FMOC/SNL 4800 - Many hazards associated with routine activity or work thought to be within the skill of the craft have not been formally analyzed to bound the extent of activities authorized by these classifications and to develop and document requisite controls to be implemented by workers. Additionally, some limitations on the information supplied to workers related to tasks, hazards, and requisite controls have negatively impacted worker performance (both efficiency and hazard control implementation).

HSS Participants	References
1(lead). Joseph Lischinsky	
2. Mario Vigliani	

Were there any items for HSS follow up? Yes No

HSS Follow Up Items