# **PROJECT MANGEMENT PLAN EXAMPLES**

# **Feedback Examples**

## Example 74

### 8.2.3 Quality Improvement

The focus of the quality improvement process is to reduce the variability of work processes that influence the quality of the products and services. Under the corrective action program, organizations have the authority to identify quality problems and to initiate, recommend, or provide solutions through designated channels. Management systems (e.g., root cause analysis, lessons learned) will be used to plan, implement, and evaluate improvements.

Items, services, and processes that do not meet established quality requirements are identified, controlled, and corrected according to established priorities. Processes and services that do not conform to specified requirements will be controlled so that the output of the process or service is used. Corrective actions are designed to be commensurate with the significance of the nonconforming condition. Conditions that pose significant risk are evaluated to determine the root cause of the condition and actions that would cause recurrence.

HNF-PRO-052, 653, and 298, and others determined applicable, will be evaluated and necessary facility specific procedures developed to complement them for implementation.

## Example 75

### 5. Provide Feedback and Continuous Improvement

Feedback mechanisms to be used on this deactivation project will include monitoring, weekly team meetings and multifunctional walkdown teams. Work performance will be monitored and measured against FDD and SRS ESH&QA indices. Self-assessment of the ESH&QA program will be performed periodically. This will include an evaluation of both management commitments and worker involvement. Key lessons learned will be identified and documented in the Deactivation Project Completion Report.

### **Example 76**

### **11.0 INTEGRATED SAFETY MANAGEMENT STRATEGY**

### **11.1 IMPLEMENTATION OF ISM PROGRAM**

The 9206 Complex is implementing the ISM process under the Y- 12 ISM program implementation guidelines to support deactivation project activities and other 9206 operations. The 9206 ISM process is comprised of three management levels; institution/site level; facility level; and task level. The three levels function together as an integrated system. This implementation will formalize a process already being utilized at the 9206 Complex.

Work associated with nuclear safety functions will be planned, authorized, and performed following approved technical standards, instructions, procedures, and other control documentation commensurate with the complexity, experience, and risk posed by the task. Y10-202, *Integrated Safety Management Program* provides guidance, procedures, and checklists for evaluating, planning, and conducting nuclear safety related work.

In FY-1998 an OSB charter for 9206 was approved, membership appointed, and initial working sessions held. The chartered membership includes 9206 management, technical and operations staff; a facilitator; and representatives from the ES&H disciplines. Others are added as needed. The OSB role is to ensure that the guiding principles for integrated safety management are implemented in 9206 Complex activities. The OSB provides integrated reviews, technical support, assessments, and advisement to the operations manager. The board holds regular and "upon-need" meetings, which are documented with attendance, notes, and action items. The board continues to mature and will play a key role in deactivation.

Several key elements of the Y-12 ISMS program are already in effect for 9206 operations, such as plan-of-the-day, daily crew briefs, pre-job briefs, hazard identification, work planning, review of lessons learned, worker involvement, walkdowns of areas on a daily basis by the 9206 shift managers and other Conduct of Operations program elements as appropriate. Self-assessment programs continually evaluate safety practices and provide feedback for improvement. It is expected that these functions will continue during deactivation implementation. As a part of ISM implementation, these elements will be evaluated for adherence to the Y-12ISMS program requirements.

### Feedback and Continuous Improvement (Feedback and Evaluation)

Formalizing and implementing the ISM program for 9206 activities will provide a key mechanism for continuous feedback, e.g. via OSB. The 9206 Complex routinely involves health, safety, environmental NCS, and other functional disciplines 'in the day-to-day planning and execution of activities. This established practice will continue for deactivation work planning and execution.

- Updates for the BIO, OSR, and FHA will be conducted jointly. Hazard reduction progress and changes that affect the safety basis will be incorporated.
- A multi-disciplinary team will remain in place for deactivation implementation.
- Lessons learned are incorporated into work planning and execution. Other DOE sites which have undergone deactivation while utilizing task based job performance criteria win provide valuable lessons learned for the 9206 Complex.
- End points criteria adherence and documented end points closure provide feedback to ES&H disciplines.
- Interface with the Y-12 Facility Transition Team.
- The required safety documentation will be provided for the S&M period.

### **14.0 PROJECT LESSONS LEARNED**

This project was developed and based upon past deactivation project's lessons learned within the DOE complex, especially the approach and decision-making for the Hanford PUREX Facility Project and the LMES Y-12 guidance for S&M activities. Additionally, as this project proceeds, lessons will undoubtedly be learned and they will be captured as part of the objective of providing a pilot for other Y-12 Plant deactivation projects. The following lessons learned were compiled during deactivation planning phase, which the team hopes will assist other Y-12 and DOE sites:

- Learning from the Hanford deactivation process, approach, experience, and knowledge (including their lessons learned) provided a valuable benchmark for this project. Key is that time and money is saved for Y-12, now, during, and post deactivation;
- Adopting the proven deactivation approach for phase out provided a systematic method for deactivation planning that closely follows the ISMS policy;
- Early identification of commitments and constraints allowed the team to prioritize planning efforts and ensure that long-term commitments would be incorporated into the deactivation plan;
- Establishing a deactivation goal early brought forth several difficult issues that needed to be raised early for work and
  resolution, e.g. interdependencies and intra dependencies, nuclear material holdup, etc;
- Utilization of the end points method forced the team to integrate security, NMC&A, and nuclear criticality criteria;
- There is no substitute for personnel process knowledge and experience when dealing with a complex, old, and multifaceted facility. Walkdowns with operators, especially those with specialized experience, proved invaluable in gaining process knowledge, history, and potential hazard identification;
- The deactivation walkdowns also identified immediate health and safety concerns;
- Early identification of major deactivation tasks allowed them to be analyzed and incorporated into the FHA, PHA, BIO, and OSR;
- Linking PHA nodes to deactivation end points areas/spaces/systems as deactivation planning proceeded helped tie the two documents together and group building subparts in a logical manner;
- Deactivation "walkdowns" to identify end points can be a combination of physical walkdowns, tabletop reviews, photos, and document reviews as dictated by hazards, access to the areas, and available resources;
- Performing walkdowns jointly for deactivation, PHA and FHA brought forth potential hazards from more than one perspective;
- The PBR process developed and utilized for the Y-12 Plant ORRs provides a plant infrastructure and methodology upon which deactivation readiness review can be built.
- The results and lessons learned from the recent Y-12 Plant EUO PBR Phases A1 and A2 will be valuable in preparing for the 9206 deactivation readiness review and evaluations.